The effects of selection ratio and applicant goal orientation on faking behavior

by

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Abstract

I expand on McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) and Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, and Rose’s (2006) proposed models of faking behavior in selection contexts by examining relevant situational and individual difference variables. The current study, like those studies, is a lab study that integrates Ajzen’s (1985) theory of planned behavior in an attempt to better understand process of faking in selection contexts. This study adds to the faking literature by examining the extent to which an individual difference variable – state dependent goal orientation, as well as a situational variable – selection ratio interact with perceptions of the situation to influence an individual’s intention to fake a personality inventory. It is predicted that state goal orientation will moderate the relationship between participants’ perceptions of the situation and their intention to fake. Specifically, it is expected that when participants harbor high levels of performance orientation (either approach or avoidant), the relationship between their perceptions of the situation and intention to fake will be stronger. It’s also predicted that more loose selection ratios will open the door for perceptions of the situation to have more influence over faking behavior. Finally, it’s predicted that individuals whose true personality ratings are further from the ceiling on a given trait will engage in more faking on that trait.

Results indicate that the Theory of Planned Behavior is useful in predicting faking in selection contexts. Additionally, distance from the ceiling moderated the relationship between intention to fake and faking behavior. Trends in the data showed that goal orientation may be a useful factor
in determining when applicants’ perceptions of the situation will manifest as an intention to fake. All results are discussed in detail.
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Introduction

The use of personality inventories in applicant selection has become common practice by employers over the last decade (Hough & Oswald, 2008). Some of the most likely reasons that personality inventories have experienced this upsurge are their relative ease to administer, their relatively low cost of administration, and their lack of adverse impact compared to other selection techniques (e.g. cognitive measures) (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Bobko, Roth, & Potosky, 1999; Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001). While the use of personality inventories has become more widespread, some still question the validity of these measures as actual predictors of job performance (Murphy & Dzieweczynski, 2005). While historically, this concern revolved around the lack of evidence for the link between personality scores and performance, recently the concerns have shifted to the potential ease with which responses to personality inventories can be distorted. This potential for applicants to inflate or distort ratings for their own personality traits is commonly referred to as faking or faking behavior (Peterson, Griffith & Converse, 2009).

Past research has clearly indicated that individuals are capable of faking personality inventories (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) and also that faking can negatively impact the validity of personality scores (Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999). Perhaps more troubling is the fact that applicants will also fake on their own accord (Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007). Research has shown that when applicants are engaging in response distortion, the quality of the hiring decision can be affected (Rosse et al., 1998).
However, not everyone agrees that faking is a legitimate concern. Some researchers have asserted that faking may simply be the manifestation of another personality trait (e.g. social desirability or impression management; Mersman & Shultz, 1998). Others have argued that while faking occurs, it is not substantial enough to have a substantial negative impact on the validity of personality scores (Hough et al., 1990; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). Hough et al. (1990) note that there is some question as to the generalizability of their finding that faking may not harm personality scores’ validities.

Other researchers have questioned whether the prevalence of faking in real selection contexts is enough to concern organizations (Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007). However, research continues to emerge showing that the faking of personality measures by job applicants occurs on a large scale (Landers, Sackett, & Tuzinski, 2011). Clearly, there is no conclusive evidence that faking is not a concern. Organizations continue to foster concern regarding applicants’ potential to fake personality inventories. As has been discussed, personality measures have useful qualities (e.g. low cost, low adverse impact, administrative ease, etc.), but the issue of response distortion continues to cast a dark cloud of doubt over their wide-spread implementation. It is important that research continues to examine factors that can contribute to faking.

The current study seeks to do just that. In the following sections, I briefly review the literature on faking. I then discuss a previously proposed model of faking that has shown promise in highlighting the way in which the context and individual differences may influence faking. Next, I present moderators worthy of examination and argue for their theoretical value in understanding faking behavior. Finally, I test their value as part of the previously proposed model of faking in an empirical lab study.
History of Personality Inventories in Organizational Settings

As I mentioned in the introduction, historically, organizations have been extremely wary of using personality inventories as parts of selection batteries. Much of this hesitancy is likely due to early research findings on the weak relationship between personality scores and performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991). The most likely reason for these invariable null findings was the inconsistency in the framing of individual personality traits. This inconsistency was highlighted by Barrick and Mount (1991) in their meta-analysis of the personality-performance relationship. Referring to early research, they stated, “At the time these studies were conducted, no well-accepted taxonomy existed for classifying personality traits. Consequently, it was not possible to determine whether there were consistent, meaningful relationships between particular personality constructs and performance criteria in different occupations” (p. 2). These consistently negative findings led researchers to conclude that examining personality was useless as a means of predicting performance on the job (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001).

However, the use of personality measures gained credence in the years leading up to the 21st century. The renewed interest in personality as a useful selection tool can likely be attributed to the introduction of the five factor model (FFM) in the mid-1980’s (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001). The FFM analyzes personality in the form of five traits: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (i.e. emotional stability). Meta-analyses of research using the FFM has shown that the five factors of personality to be predictive of general job performance (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001), performance in jobs with interpersonal interaction (Mount, Barrick, & Stewart, 1998), employee turnover intentions (Zimmerman, 2008), and job satisfaction (Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002) among other
things. These findings illustrate the usefulness of personality measures in predicting employee effectiveness.

As the popularity of personality measures as a selection tool has increased, questions surrounding their implementation have arisen. After concerns about their validity, the question that has received the most attention in research is that of test takers’ ability to participate in response distortion or “faking good” (Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan 2007; McFarland & Ryan 2000, 2006; Winkelspecht, Lewis & Thomas 2006; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad & Thornton, 2006). Faking, in the selection context, can be defined as applicants providing distorted (i.e. dishonest) responses in order to increase their chances of being hired.

The Issue of Response Distortion

Researchers in the past have attempted to determine if individuals that fake in a positive direction, or fake good, can be detected by examining the dispositional tendencies associated with social desirability (Levashina & Campion, 2007; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss 1996; Mersman & Shultz 1998), impression management (a subscale of social desirability) (Mersman & Shultz, 1998; Levashina & Campion, 2007), or in some cases, the trait of self-monitoring (Mersman & Shultz, 1998). Social desirability has been defined as individuals’ tendency to respond in a way that would have them perceived in a socially desirable light (Paulhus & Douglas, 1991). Impression management has been defined as a “situation-induced temporary state to present oneself in a positive (or otherwise appropriate) way” (Levashina & Campion, 2007, p.1639). Individuals who are high self-monitors are constantly aware of subtle changes in norms and attempt to adjust their behavior accordingly so as to remain on par with these norms (Levashina & Campion, 2007). These projects have been largely unsuccessful in identifying a trait that predicts faking (Snell et al., 1999). For instance, Mersman and Shultz (1998) found that
faking behavior was not correlated with individual differences in social desirability, self-monitoring, or impression management. Were these constructs highly correlated with faking behavior, employers could simply include questionnaires alerting themselves to the presence of these traits, and adjust their selection criteria accordingly. As it currently stands, this has not been shown to be an effective approach.

Without the ability to identify potential fakers prior to their completion of personality inventories, employers may choose to ignore the potential for response distortion in personality measures in order to maintain the additional benefits that their use offers. This choice is unlikely to be fruitful, as many researchers have shown that faking can be a common, as well as destructive occurrence in selection (Griffith, Chmielowski & Yoshita 2007; Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Rosse’ et al., 1998; Zickar & Drasgow, 1996). For instance, Rosse’ et al. (1998) found that applicants scored one standard deviation higher on personality inventories than did job incumbents. Rosse’ and colleagues further demonstrated that even when the number of applicants engaging in faking is small, those fakers can occupy a large percentage of the top-ranked scores on personality measures. Donovan, Dwight, and Hurtz (2003) reported that 32% of applicants studied reported exaggerating their positive attributes and 62% of applicants de-emphasized negative traits in an attempt to present themselves favorably. In another study, Petersen, Griffith, & Converse (2009) found that even when steps are taken to reduce the number of hired faking applicants (i.e. supplementing personality inventories with cognitive ability tests), the number of faked scores hired still exceeded 20%. From these results, one can see that not only does faking have the potential to be quite prevalent, but even when faking is not prevalent, the few who do fake are quite successful in staying on par with the most qualified, honest applicants.
Others have argued that although faking occurs, its effects may not be dramatic enough to negatively affect the overall validity of personality measures as a selection tool (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). In a study of military samples, Hough et al. (1990) found that while participants were able to fake when instructed to do so, faking in simulated selection settings did not damage the criterion and content related validity of the personality measures. It is important to note that the authors acknowledged that these finding may have limited generalizability to actual selection settings or to non-military contexts because methodology used was designed specifically for use in military contexts. Others have contended that faking does not occur in the applicant selection process (Hogan, Barrett & Hogan, 2007). However, the extant amount of literature supporting the notion that faking does in fact occur would lead one to believe that faking is a potential threat to effective hiring decisions.

Although it’s been documented that faking is indeed occurring, one may question how negative an impact faking can have on selection decisions. It is true that, from a utility standpoint, if examining and avoiding faking is more costly than simply ignoring it, it does not qualify as a legitimate concern to organizations. In a very telling study, Griffith, Chmielowski, and Yoshita (2007) found that applicants who faked personality measures in a selection process rose significantly in rank orders of best possible applicants and were therefore selected for the job based on their faked scores. Stated differently, they found that when scores on personality inventories were ranked from “most desirable applicant” to “least desirable applicant,” faking could increase an applicant’s desirability significantly enough to get them hired. In another examination of the effects of faking on rank ordering, using an undergraduate sample, Winkelspecht, Lewis, & Thomas (2006) found that when applicants engage in faking, they have the ability to inflate their scores enough to be considered for hire even when their honest score
would not have received consideration. If this is indeed the case and under-qualified applicants are not only capable, but inclined to fake, personality inventories are not achieving their primary goal of providing valuable information about the best applicants to select. Instead, they may be offering a rank of scores that provides very little useful information on which applicant is best. If personality inventories are a part of an organization’s selection criteria, it is likely that the most qualified applicants are not being selected.

**Methods to Combat Response Distortion.** There are two basic streams of research that focus on finding ways to prevent faking. One stream of research investigates potential avenues to actively mitigate faking. Two of these methods are warning statements (e.g. Donovan et al., 2003) and forced-choice responding (e.g. Heggestad et al. 2006). A second stream of research focuses on understanding the process through which faking occurs by job applicants. This stream of research is primarily concerned with modeling the faking process by examining relevant situational and individual difference factors (e.g. McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). The following is brief discussion of current trends in the first stream of research (i.e. faking mitigation strategies).

Researchers have suggested that the administrator of the personality inventory may be able to reduce faking by simply warning the applicants that their responses will be evaluated to determine whether or not response distortion has taken place. The effectiveness of this type of warning has been evaluated in research. A review of the research on warnings shows that the traditional approach to warnings (i.e. simply telling applicants that their faking can be detected) is mostly ineffective. At best, research evidence regarding the traditional approach to warnings has been inconsistent (for review, see Dwight & Donovan, 2003). In recent studies that demonstrate this inconsistency Robson, Jones, and Abraham (2008) found that warning not only
failed to mitigate faking but may have actually harmed their convergent validity (i.e. the degree to which applicants responses mirrored observer’s responses). In a rebuttal to that study, Robie, Taggar, and Brown (2009) found that warnings may not negatively impact convergent validity if different measurement methods are utilized. These recent publications highlight the disagreement about the effectiveness of warnings at a tool to impede faking.

Recently, another study conducted by Fan, Gao, Carroll, Lopez, Tian, & Meng (2012) has shown promising prospects for the implementation of an evidence-based warning. Fan et al. (2012) utilized an evidence-based warning that was implemented after a brief, initial block of questions. The initial block contained common personality items as well as impression management (IM) and bogus statement (BS) scales. If participants’ scores on the IM or BS scales exceeded the pre-set faking criteria, they were given a brief friendly warning message informing them that their responses on the initial block were flagged as potentially faked. After reading this warning message, they moved on and completed the entire personality inventory. Fan et al. (2012) found that this procedure was quite effective in getting fakers to reduce their personality scores and also improved the quality of individual hiring decisions. Based on these findings, it appears that if implemented correctly, evidence-based warning messages, as opposed to traditional warning messages, have significant promise for mitigating faking.

Another method that has been examined as a potential faking combatant is the forced-choice format of personality inventories. Whereas personality inventories generally ask the test-taker to indicate how much a given statement does or does not describe their personality, the forced choice format presents several seemingly desirable traits together and asks the respondent to indicate one trait that is most like them and one trait that is least like them. This method is thought to produce more honest responses due to the perceived desirability of all traits in a given
cluster (Rothstein & Goffin, 2008). Historically, this method had been shown to be ineffective (e.g., Borislow, 1958; Dicken, 1959; Dunnette, McCartney, Carlson, & Kirchner, 1962). Recently, several authors have begun to re-examine the forced choice method as a combatant to faking, and while a few have found positive results (Christiansen et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2000; Martin et al., 2002), researchers continue to find a lack of support for the forced-choice format being a viable option to mitigate faking (Heggestad et al., 2006).

If employers cannot feel confident that implementing a warning or adopting a new assessment format will extinguish the negative effects of faking, the next question becomes: Is it even possible to determine which applicants obtained their scores honestly, and which applicants obtained their scores by faking? This would be easy if all applicants faked to the same degree. Inventory designers could simply design formulas to offset the degree to which faking occurred and give employers the means to obtain a derived, “true” score. Unfortunately, as has been documented by research, this isn’t the case. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) found that while some applicants fake a considerable amount, others fake very little or not at all. It has been shown that potential employees will attempt to fake personality measures often, and furthermore, the degree to which they will fake varies (Griffith, Chmielowski, Yoshita, 2007; Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Zickar & Drasgow, 1996). So in order to maximize the validity, and in turn the utility, of personality inventories, employers need to be capable of predicting when and to what extent faking will occur. The first step in this difficult process is understanding the context (both externally and internally) in which faking is likely to occur. Furthering the development of that understanding is the purpose of the current study.

**Modeling Faking Behavior**

*The Theory of Planned Behavior.*
Recently, researchers have found some success in identifying the processes that underlie faking by applying Icek Ajzen’s (1985) Theory of Planned Behavior (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Ajzen’s model suggests that some action or final behavior (in this case actually faking a personality inventory) can be predicted by an individual’s intention to participate in that behavior; furthermore, the individual’s attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control (PBC) toward that behavior dictate whether the individual will intend to participate in the behavior. McFarland and Ryan (2006) were the first to suggest the possible value of applying the theory of planned behavior to faking. A model of Ajzen’s theory is included below. Also included in the model are two moderators tested by McFarland and Ryan (2006) (i.e. situational influences and ability to fake). This model as it applies to faking is discussed below.

Previously Examined Antecedents to Intent

**Attitudes Toward Faking.** Attitudes toward a behavior refer to the individual’s perception, whether positive or negative, of a behavior (Ajzen, 1985). It’s been found that positive attitudes toward a behavior generally yield greater intentions to engage in that behavior (Boldero, 1995). McFarland and Ryan (2006) tested this facet of Ajzen’s model in the context of applicant faking, and consistent with the theory they found that positive attitudes toward faking did in fact yield greater intentions to fake.

**Subjective Norms.** Subjective norms refer to whether the opinions of an individual’s most valued referents are positive or negative toward a behavior (Ajzen, 1985). An individual’s spouse, close personal friends, and family members may all provide valued opinions on whether they believe faking is acceptable, and hence, contribute to an individual’s perception of subjective norms. Subjective norms have been linked to intentions in previous research (e.g.
Ajzen, 1991; Beale & Manstead, 1991), and specifically, intention to fake in at least two previous studies (Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2006).

**Perceived Behavioral Control.** Perceived behavioral control (PBC) refers to an individual’s belief that they are capable of performing the behavior in the present context (Ajzen, 1985). To expand on this notion, Ajzen noted that whenever perceived behavioral control was high (i.e. an individual perceives that they are capable of performing a given behavior), the intention to perform this behavior is greater. Like attitudes towards and subjective norms, this variable can also be seen as partially a function of the situation. While the behavior may be the same (e.g. shoplifting), the degree to which an individual feels capable of completing the behavior is largely dependent on situational factors (e.g. security cameras, number of other customers, size of the establishment, etc.) In their test of this relationship, McFarland and Ryan (2006) found that there was a significant positive relationship between PBC and intention to fake.

Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) argued that together, these three antecedents can be considered the individual’s perception of the situation. They were the first to adopt this conceptualization, and they found support for collapsing across the three antecedents. They justified their position by citing that these antecedents closely mirror expectancy-instrumentality-valence (VIE) theory (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Vroom, 1964) and, “the degree of effort that one chooses to expend to attain a given outcome is a function of the valence (or importance) the person places on the outcome, perceived instrumentality (i.e., the degree to which the individual perceives the outcome is contingent on various performance levels), and perceived expectancy (i.e., the perceived probability that one can attain the performance levels necessary to achieve the desired outcome).” They found that all three antecedents loaded significantly onto a single
factor which they referred to as *perceptions of the situation* and thus warranted being collapsed. They found that after collapsing the antecedents into one broad variable, perceptions of the situation positively related to intention to fake ($b = .99$, $p < .01$).

By considering their own attitudes towards faking, the perceived endorsement of faking by those close to them, and whether or not they believe they are capable of faking, individuals are effectively setting their own perceived motivational environment. Should all three factors endorse faking (i.e. positive attitudes, positive perceptions of subjective norms, and high perceived behavioral control), the individual’s motivational environment can be viewed as being *supportive* of faking. Were all three not to endorse faking, their motivational environment can be viewed as being unsupportive of faking. In the interest of maintaining the *motivational environment* conceptualization, these three factors have been collapsed into one overarching factor as was done by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006). Based on the evidence presented by McFarland and Ryan (2006) and Meuller-Hanson et al. (2006), I propose hypothesis 1.

**Potential Moderators and Mediators**

*Situational Influence – Selection Ratio.* As seen in Figure 1, McFarland and Ryan (2006) attempted to integrate Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior with two hypothesized moderators; situational influences and individuals’ ability to fake. The situational variables that McFarland and Ryan (2006) tested were the applicants’ valence toward good performance (i.e. how highly the individual values good performance) and a warning that a faking scale was included in the inventory. Although neither of these interaction effects was found to be significant, there was a large amount of variance in intention to fake that remained unaccounted for (43%). This would lead one to believe that additional moderators may exist. As was pointed out by Snell et al. (1999), it is quite likely that the degree to which an individual does or does not
engage in faking likely varies depending on the motivational climate surrounding the administration of the inventory, and that motivational climate can be influenced by concrete factors in the selection context.

In the current study, I propose and test a new situational moderator – selection ratio. Some researchers have made the assertion that faking may have its most devastating effects in the upper ends of score distributions (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, and Thornton III, 2003). Researchers have pointed out that if the top end of the distribution of scores is most affected by faking, hiring under strict selection ratios may yield large numbers of faked scores being hired (Rosse et al., 1998). In a study conducted by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003), results showed that when selection ratios were below 60%, there were a significantly higher number of incentive group members (i.e. group rewarded monetarily for “good” performance) than would be expected. This discrepancy in numbers was not seen when selection ratios were greater than 60%. Combined, these findings point to the importance of considering selection ratio as a moderator between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake.

Selection ratio can most simply be defined in terms of a mathematical proportion. It is the percentage of applicants actually selected for the position from the entire pool of applicants seeking that position. If an applicant is able to dramatically improve his or her score on selection related criteria, and does so in a context in which other applicants are not participating in faking behavior, that applicant should quickly rise to the top of the distribution of scores regardless of how truly qualified other applicants may be (Rosse´ et al., 1998). In these cases, if selection ratios are relatively small (e.g. 5%), applicants who are dramatically distorting their responses could have an apparent advantage over honest applicants and could, in turn, prevent the honest applicants from being hired (Rosse´ et al., 1998).
For instance, envision a situation in which an organization is hiring three applicants for middle level management positions. It is not uncommon for recruiters to seek 45 qualified applicants. If the organization is utilizing personality inventories to aid them in choosing the best three applicants from that 45, it only requires that 3 of the 45 (i.e. 7%) drastically distort their responses to potentially prevent any honest respondents from being hired. This is well within reason, as some researchers have reported that drastic faking in selection contexts may occur in as many as 30 to 50 percent of applicants (Donovan, Dwight & Hurtz, 2003; Griffith et al., 2007). Therefore, examining selection ratio should provide some insight into the contextual factors of the situation that facilitate faking.

In their original test of this model, McFarland and Ryan (2006) posited that valence towards good performance would moderate the relationship between the antecedents and intentions to fake. In order to manipulate valence, they had half of their participants complete a personality inventory under instructions that the top 15% of scores would receive an incentive. While they were not explicitly testing selection ratio, it is a similar concept. They found no differences between the experimental and control groups which may seem to indicate that selection ratio may not be an important variable to examine. However, because they only examined the effects of one particular selection ratio (i.e. the difference between 15% and no incentive at all), one cannot draw firm conclusions about the degree to which selection ratio moderates the relationship between the antecedents and intent to fake. The critical difference between the current study and McFarland and Ryan’s study is that in the current study, I manipulated selection ratio in such a way that all participants completed the inventory under a preset selection ratio (i.e., either 5% or 50%). Therefore, valence will be inherent in the
manipulation, and examining the difference between reward ratios allows us to indirectly
observe valence, although it is not directly measured.

In the current study, selection ratio is theorized to moderate the relationship between the
antecedents and intention to fake the personality inventory. When selection ratios are small (i.e.
5%), the antecedents will likely be less predictive of applicant intentions to fake. This is
expected because small selection ratios encourage all applicants in that condition to distort their
responses in order to place themselves in the top five percent, and therefore those with positive
attitudes, subjective norms, and PBC will not be easily distinguishable from those with opposite
attitudes. Stated simply, the salience of the situation overwhelms differences in the antecedents,
and therefore differences in levels of the antecedents fail to predict intentions to fake. Although
stringent selection ratios may give rise to more faking behavior (i.e. impact faking directly), that
direct effect is not of primary interest in the current study.

It may seem bit redundant to have a situational factor (i.e. selection ratio) moderate a path
in which perceptions of the situation is the independent variable. However, these two factors
should not both be considered as concrete situational factors. While selection ratio is a concrete
situational factor that is predetermined by the researchers, perceptions of the situation is much
more dependent on the participant’s view of the given behavior (i.e. faking) in the given context.
It may help to conceptualize selection ratio as an objective situational factor and perceptions of
the situation as a subjective situational factor. Using this conceptualization, one can more easily
understand the way in which these two factors may interact to influence intentions to fake.

From Intent to Action: Ability to Fake as a Moderator. It is sensible to believe that the
successful fulfillment of any intention is contingent upon an individual possessing the ability to
enact that intention. When arriving at this conclusion, however, one must consider the factors
that contribute to possessing the necessary ability. Characteristics such as knowledge, applicable skill sets, and in some cases physical prowess could all contribute to one’s ability to successfully advance from intention to action. There are, however, other vital factors to consider.

In their theoretical model of faking behavior, McFarland and Ryan (2000) were careful to distinguish between an individual’s ability to fake and an individual’s opportunity to fake. They defined ability to fake as an applicant having the necessary capacity to be successful when attempting to fake. Opportunity on the other hand, referred to an individual’s “room for improvement” or distance from the ceiling on a given construct (McFarland & Ryan, 2000). In this initial introduction of their proposed faking model, they labeled factors such as item transparency, knowledge of the constructs being examined, and self-monitoring as individual abilities.

In their updated model of faking behavior (Figure 1), McFarland and Ryan (2006) listed an applicant’s opportunity to fake (i.e. distance from the ceiling on the construct being measured) as an individual ability. This differs from their original conceptualization as the two being two separate constructs (McFarland & Ryan, 2000). This would suggest, although it was never explicitly stated, that ability would be better defined as an individual’s capability. Using this conceptualization, capability can be defined as having the capacity, both internally and contextually, to achieve that which one intends to achieve. By adopting this conceptualization, opportunity can easily be classified as capability (as opposed to strictly ability) because applicants who desire to fake, but do not have the opportunity to do so, are incapable of successfully fulfilling their intention. Therefore, whenever an individual intends to fake, and has the opportunity to do so (i.e. has room for improvement on a given trait), they will be more likely
to fake successfully as opposed to an individual who has the same intention but lacks room for improvement.

It may seem as though individuals that are further from the ceiling on a given trait will naturally have an easier time turning intent into action. McFarland and Ryan (2006) controlled for distance from the ceiling apparently trying to guard against this potentially harmful factor, but they controlled only for direct effects and not moderation effects. It’s important to note that just because individuals have more “room for improvement” does not necessarily mean that they will be more likely to turn intent into action. It could be that individuals who are a considerable distance from the ceiling on a given trait actually inhibit their intention due to a lack of trait understanding, fear of detection, or having a feeling of “that’s just too much faking.” Therefore, distance from the ceiling warrants being examined as a moderator of the relationship between intent to fake and actual faking behavior.

**An Individual Difference – Goal Orientation.** As research in the field of industrial/organizational psychology has progressed, researchers have consistently pointed to a need for research to consider the way that environmental factors interact with individual differences to influence outcomes, particularly in selection contexts (e.g. Salgado & Lievens, 2008). While almost all faking research considers the role that environmental factors likely play, many researchers have noted the equally important role that individual differences may play (Snell et al., 1999; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). In their early model of the factors affecting faking in selection contexts, Snell et al. (1999) proposed that the degree to which faking occurs may be largely a function of differences among individuals. In keeping with the above recommendation that researchers consider the possible interaction between environmental and individual factors, as well as maintaining consistency with modern
conceptualizations of how faking occurs, this research will consider, environmental factors, individual factors, and their interaction in influencing faking behavior.

A substantial amount of research has been aimed at identifying exactly which aspects of the individual are responsible for observed differences in faking. McFarland and Ryan (2000) examined several factors for which they found mixed support. They found that differences in self-monitoring, (i.e. a trait that identifies individuals as being aware of subtle changes in norms that require them to adjust their attitudes and behavior) did not differentially influence faking between individuals. Other researchers have arrived at the same conclusion in individuals who have partaken in a job interview (Levashina & Campion, 2007).

Research has also considered the potential importance of differences in socially desirable responding. In regards to socially desirable responding, Levashina & Campion (2007) noted that it is entirely possible that job applicants are responding to questions in a specific way in order to maximize their attractiveness for a given position, but that does not necessarily equate to responding in ways that are typically deemed socially desirable. This discrepancy could be a critical reason for inconclusive findings regarding the relationship between socially desirable responding and faking.

Others have examined individual personality traits (i.e. conscientiousness and emotional stability) as potential predictors of faking behavior (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). These studies found that these personality traits had predictive capability in regards to faking; however, it seems somewhat counterintuitive to employ FFM traits to predict distortion of FFM traits.

An interesting avenue for research on faking may be individual differences in motivation to fake. Snell et al. posited, “In order for applicants to successfully fake a noncognitive measure,
they must be motivated to distort their responses … in such a way that will improve their predictor scores” (p. 221). This quote highlights the potential importance of not only contextual factors, but also individual differences in motivation, as potentially distinguishing fakers from non-fakers. Snell et al.’s position begs the question: Do differences in motivation actually play an integral role in faking behavior? Further, how might an employer identify the differences in motivation that distinguish a faker from a non-faker? Much of the past research on faking behavior has acknowledged the role that situational factors play in motivating the applicant to distort their responses (e.g. presence of a warning), but research has fallen short in determining how individual differences in motivation may interact with an individual’s perceptions of the situation. In an attempt to fill this gap, I propose that applicant goal orientation should moderate the relationship between their perceptions of the situation and their intention to fake.

Goal orientation describes the way an individual desires to approach a specific goal, in a given situation, while knowing that their performance will be evaluated (DeShon & Gillespie; 2005). This definition highlights the context dependent nature of goal orientation. While some view goal orientation as largely dispositional (VandeWalle, 1997; VandeWalle, Cron & Slocumb, 2001), others maintain that goal orientation is highly dependent on the goals set by an individual in a given achievement context (Elliot & Church, 1997; Grant & Dweck, 2003). Therefore, it should be noted that when the terminology “…oriented individual” is used here, it refers to the individual’s orientation towards performance in the context of the selection process, not the individual’s dispositional goal orientation.

When the concept of goal orientation was originally conceived, an individual was classified as being either mastery oriented or performance oriented. When an individual is mastery orientated, often referred to as learning oriented, they are generally concerned with
improving their abilities to perform a given task and are more responsive to meaningful, 
directive feedback (Ames & Archer 1988). In the job context, learning oriented individuals often 
seek continual growth in their job knowledge and effectiveness even if that growth occurs as a 
result of criticism or negative feedback (Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar, 1994). In contrast, when 
individuals are performance oriented, they are generally focused on achieving a positive 
evaluation from either their superiors or their peers and therefore view most forms of negative 
feedback as aversive (Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar, 1994; Ames & Archer, 1988).

Research on performance orientation has shown that it is more valid when it is bifurcated 
into two sub-dimensions: performance-approach and performance-avoidant orientation. This 
leads to a three facet representation of goal orientation in which performance orientation is 
further separated into two sub-dimensions. Those three facets are mastery orientation, 
performance-approach orientation, and performance-avoidant orientation (Elliot & 
Harackiewicz, 1996). Recently, the three facet model has received the most attention in research, 
and in their model of Motivated Action Theory, DeShon and Gillespie (2005) used this three- 
facet approach to explain goal orientation, citing that this description of goal orientation 
sufficiently captures the major differences in the construct.

The major difference between performance-approach and performance-avoidant 
orientation was noted by Elliot and Thrash (2002). They argued that individuals with an 
approach orientation are generally more focused on the opportunity to achieve positive outcomes 
as opposed to the possibility of experiencing negative outcomes (i.e. fear of failure). Conversely 
when an individual is avoidant oriented, they are generally fixated on the possibility of 
experiencing negative outcomes and view failure as a potential threat to their personal well-being 
(Elliot & Thrash, 2002). Although both approach and avoidant oriented individuals are cognizant
of the potential for failure when being evaluated, performance-avoidant individuals are more
submersed in this fear to the point that the possibility for failure is extremely salient.
Consequently, individuals who have an avoidant orientation are likely to activate defense
mechanisms aimed at reducing anxiety and avoiding negative feedback (Elliot & Harackiewicz,
1996). In the job selection context, these defense mechanisms could potentially manifest as
faking. Performance approach-oriented individuals will likely perceive any competitive context
(e.g. job selection) as an opportunity to confirm their own personal competency or desirability.
As such, they will likely exert substantial effort towards this goal.

The value of examining goal orientation in studies of faking behavior lies in its feedback
dependent nature. Every job applicant for any job receives feedback in some form (i.e. being
either hired or rejected). The intensity of an individual’s pursuit of any goal is largely
determined by how they cope with the potential to receive negative feedback. Mastery oriented
individuals should not view the potential for negative feedback as extremely aversive because it
provides them with a means to achieve their ultimate goal of self-improvement and growth.
Performance-approach oriented individuals will likely be aware of the possibility to receive
negative feedback, but their focus will be centered on performing well enough to receive positive
feedback (i.e. confirm their competency). Hence, they will be likely to engage in behaviors that
will elicit positive feedback in order to retain their positive self-perceptions. Performance-
avoidant individuals are likely to engage in similar behaviors as performance-approach
individuals; however, these behaviors are engaged in order to avoid negative feedback.

Research has shown that performance-approach and performance-avoidant oriented
individuals are likely to produce similar results in one-time tasks in which feedback is received
on only one occasion (Elliot and Harackiewicz, 1996). This single-feedback scenario is the same
type of scenario that applicants are faced with while proceeding through a job application process. While their motives may be different (i.e. confirmation of competence for performance-approach and fear of failure for performance-avoidant), in one-time tasks (e.g. a personality inventory in a job application process) the results are often the same; approach and avoidant oriented individuals try to perform at a level that prevents negative feedback.

For mastery oriented individuals, the desired outcomes in job selection contexts are somewhat less clear. The main issue for those individuals is that there is likely some disagreement within a given applicant about what the best outcome is. It is unlikely that they would be applying for a job if they did not desire to be hired for that position, so that raises the question of whether their primary motivation is to get hired for the job or to learn and grow throughout the application process. The answer to that question is unclear given the single-feedback nature of the job selection process. Were it an extended process in which individuals received feedback on multiple occasions and applicants were afforded the opportunity to improve and adjust as the process continued, it is likely that mastery oriented individuals would accept negative feedback as useful. Because both outcomes are plausible (i.e. fulfill the desire to be hired or accept any feedback as useful), it is difficult to make judgments about whether these applicants would be likely to endorse faking to be hired or endorse honesty to grow. This study should help to provide some insight into which motivation is driving the behavior in those types of individuals.

As I pointed out earlier, the nature of individual goal orientation has been debated in the literature (for review, see DeShon & Gillespie, 2005). Some have argued that goal orientation should be classified as a dispositional trait (VandeWalle, 1997; VandeWalle, Brown, Cron & Slocumb, 1999). To my knowledge, this is the first study to attempt to determine the role of goal
orientation in a model of faking behavior. For this reason, I will only seek to examine the way in which state-activated goal orientation interacts with the perceived motivational environment to influence faking behavior. Additionally, because the completion of a personality inventory in the selection process is a one-time task, the applicant’s dispositional orientation is not of primary concern, and further, that disposition is likely captured in a single measurement of state-activated goal orientation.

To this point I have discussed the nature of goal orientation and why it may be an important factor to consider in selection contexts. I will now highlight the way in which goal orientation may interact with situational factors to influence faking behavior in selection contexts. I have discussed how an individual’s perceptions of the situation (i.e. the antecedent in the current model) can be perceived to support faking by an individual with positive attitudes towards faking, who perceives that those close to them endorse faking, and believe they are capable of faking. For instance, an individual who perceives a supportive environment may have thoughts like, “There’s nothing wrong with faking in this situation because I need this job. My friends and family would fake if they were in my situation. I’m capable of faking this personality inventory to improve my chances.” These statements obviously endorse faking. However, individuals’ perceptions are only one half of the motivational picture. In addition to the perceived environment, the motivational state within an individual also warrants consideration. For instance, it is possible to imagine a scenario in which an individual’s perceptions of the situation may seem to support faking, yet that individual still does not engage in faking. I propose that goal orientation can explain this oddity.

The process by which an individual’s goal orientation and their perceived motivational environment interact can be thought of as a sort of “motivation matching” process (see Cable &
Judge, 1995 for a similar “matching” concept in regards to person-organization fit eliciting amplified future behavior). I have previously highlighted the ways in which an applicant’s perceptions of the situation may endorse faking. I’ve also discussed how an individual’s state goal orientation may endorse faking. However it is unlikely that either of these influences occurs independent of the other. Instead, it is much more likely that both factors are interacting to influence an individual’s decision to fake.

When an individual’s internal state is consistent with, or matches with, how they perceive the environment their behavior will be amplified due to a sense confirmation and comfort within the individual. For instance, if an individual perceives a situation as supportive of shoplifting, and they have an internal desire to shoplift, they will most likely attempt to shoplift. In the context of the present study, if internal and external factors seem to support faking, it is likely that faking will occur.

Conversely, when there is disagreement between an individual’s internal state and their motivational environment, the degree to which faking is manifested will be muddled due to this inconsistency. For instance, if an individual’s environment is supportive of smoking cessation, but internally they are not completely motivated to stop smoking, it is difficult to determine which factor will override the other. This lack of match between the internal and external states will likely leave the individual unsure of what the appropriate behavior is, and therefore it is likely that the response will be somewhat inconsistent. In the context of the present study, individuals who experience a mismatch between their motivational environment and their internal motivation (i.e. goal orientation) will likely have trouble deciding what the appropriate response is. This may occur in individuals who possess a mastery orientation. For those mastery-oriented individuals, the discrepancy between their desire to be hired and their desire for
personal growth could leave them unsure if faking is the best path to take, and therefore, it is unknown whether mastery orientation will have a significant impact on the relationship between their perceptions of the situation and their intentions to fake.

In individuals harboring a performance-approach orientation or performance-avoid orientation, the perception-orientation match is likely to occur in a way that supports faking. When these individuals perceive that the environment is supportive of faking (via attitudes, subjective norms, and PBC), this should create an internal match between those perceptions and their active achievement goal. Both performance-approach and performance-avoid individuals are seeking to avoid negative feedback (although, as discussed previously, the driver of this goal is different) and therefore when their perceptions support faking, they should intend to engage in more faking as this is a means to their desired end. In other words, it is expected that performance-approach and performance-avoid goal orientations will have a significant impact on the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake because both of these factors are supportive of faking behavior, thereby amplifying the expected behavior.

With the addition of goal orientation to the faking research, an element of individual motivation is being added to the literature. While the variables introduced by Icek Ajzen are motivational constructs, they are not necessarily functions of the individual’s motivational approach to a task; instead, they are functions of the motivational environment surrounding the applicant. While there are certainly other individual difference variables that may play an integral role in predicting faking behavior, because of its prevalence in past research and proven predictive capabilities in I/O psychology, goal orientation was the best choice for this research.
Intention to Fake as a Mediator. Past research has found that when an individual intends to perform a behavior, they are more likely to actually engage in the behavior (Boldero, 1995). Two previous studies have tested Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior in regards to faking, and both found significant relationships between intention to fake and actual faking behavior, as well as significant mediation effects of intention to fake (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006).

Research has indicated that faking is most likely to occur on personality traits that are perceived as job relevant (e.g. Rosse’ et al., 1998). The current study utilizes a methodology in which participants are instructed to respond to personality inventories as if they were applying for the job of sales person in a department store. As such, it is expected that faking will occur on three traits that will likely be perceived as job relevant. Those traits are conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness.

Conscientiousness is a dimension that assesses traits such as dependability, organization, responsibility, and thoroughness (Barrick & Mount, 1991). It is a trait that has shown strong links to job performance in many different types of jobs (Barrick & Mount, 1991). These traits can all be considered somewhat positive traits for someone who is applying for almost any job, and as such, it is expected that individuals will engage in faking behavior in order to increase their scores on this trait.

Extraversion is a dimension that assesses traits such as sociableness, gregariousness, talkativeness, assertiveness, and activeness (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Unlike conscientiousness, this dimension is not viewed as universally necessary for good job performance. For someone in a position that requires him or her to work in a cubicle, whose primary job function is reading through documents and make judgments based on those readings, it is unlikely that extraversion
would have a consistent positive relationship with job performance. However, in a job that is
defined by its interpersonal nature (i.e. sales positions) it can be expected to have a positive
relationship with job performance. Individuals applying for such a position are likely to
recognize the necessity for possessing extraverted traits, and are therefore likely to engage in
faking to make themselves appear extraverted.

Agreeableness is a dimension that has been labeled as likeability (McCrae & Costa,
1985) and friendliness (Guilford and Zimmerman, 1949). People who score high on this
dimension are often courteous, tolerant, good-natured, and forgiving (Barrick & Mount, 1991).
Like extraversion, agreeableness is a dimension that may be important for individuals in some
positions (e.g. customer service) and not as important for individuals in other positions (e.g.
football coach). For the job of salesperson, it is possible that individuals will perceive
agreeableness as an important, job relevant dimension because sales people are commonly
expected to be friendly and courteous. However, the connection between agreeableness and job
performance for a salesperson is less obvious than for extraversion and conscientiousness,
respectively. It could be argued that agreeableness, especially at high levels, may be perceived
to have detrimental effects on sales performance (i.e. losing focus on production in the interest of
rapport). The way that applicants perceive agreeableness in relation to sales performance has not
been well-established in research. Agreeableness appears to be at least somewhat theoretically
linked to sales performance, so it is hypothesized that individuals will engage in faking on this
dimension to make themselves appear agreeable.

It is important to note that McFarland & Ryan’s (2006) most recent model, in its finalized
form, included a warning against faking. Although there was moderate support for this addition
(i.e. significant reduction in faking on three of five trait measures), previous studies have shown
that in some cases, a warning may have little effect on reducing faking and may even reduce the concurrent validity of personality measures (e.g. Robson, Jones, & Abraham, 2008). In light of this mixed evidence, this study does not examine the effects of implementing a warning.

**Hypotheses**

Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of the situation will be positively related to the intention to fake.

Hypothesis 2: Selection ratio will moderate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake, such that when applicants are aware that selection ratios are smaller, the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake will be weaker, and for the high selection ratio the relationship will be stronger.

Hypothesis 3: An individual’s opportunity to fake (i.e. distance from the ceiling) will moderate the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior such that when an individual is further from the ceiling on a given trait, the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior will be stronger.

Hypothesis 4: Performance-approach and performance-avoid orientation will moderate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake. As individuals’ performance-approach or performance-avoid orientations rise, the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intentions to fake will be stronger.

Research Question: How does learning goal orientation influence the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake?

Hypothesis 5: Intention to fake will mediate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and actual faking behavior.
METHOD

Participants

The sample consisted of 136 undergraduate students enrolled in a psychology course at Auburn University. Students received extra credit and were entered into a random drawing for a cash prize in exchange for their participation.

Procedure

The study was completed in two waves. In one wave, all participants completed a personality inventory under instructions to respond honestly. Their score under the honest instructions is referred to as their *baseline score*. In another wave, all participants completed the same personality inventory under motivated instructions (i.e. faking-good instructions), with the selection ratios manipulated (5% vs. 50% selection ratio). Participants’ personality scores under this condition are referred to as their *experimental score*. In this wave, participants also completed several surveys at various time points (i.e. a state goal orientation questionnaire and measures concerning attitudes toward faking, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and intention to fake). Participants completed the two waves at two separate times with at least one week’s separation.

The order of the personality inventories was counterbalanced in order to minimize potential order effects. In other words, half of the participants completed the baseline inventory first, and the other half of the participants completed the baseline inventory last. In this type study, order effects can be extremely detrimental as participants may attempt to complete the experimental inventory while taking their responses from the baseline inventory into consideration. Counterbalancing is a common approach taken to limit the potential for harmful order effects.
All inventories and questionnaires were completed online. Participants were provided with a web link and were required to complete all questionnaires in a given wave in one sitting, within a few days of receiving the web link. The procedure is outlined in detail in this section. Figure 3 contains a concise, visual representation of the order the procedure followed. The procedure is outlined for a participant who completed the baseline inventory first. The instructions for the baseline inventory read as follows:

Please complete the following personality inventory. Respond to all items as honestly as you can.

One week after completing the baseline personality inventory, participants were sent another web link to the same personality inventory (with different instructions) along with several additional questionnaires. Upon following that web link, participants were taken to a page with the below instructions. These instructions are designed to introduce the selection context and activate the internal state that would be present were the participants actually engaged in the selection process. The selection context introduction read as follows:

Imagine that you are applying for a job as a sales associate (day-to-day salesperson) at a popular American department store named Jenkins’ Luxury Department Store. Imagine that this is your dream job. Imagine that you are going through the process of being evaluated to determine if you will be hired for that job. As part of the simulated selection process, you will be asked to complete personality inventory.

In order to make this imagined situation more realistic, we will compare your responses to this personality inventory against responses given by other participants. After all participants have completed the study, those participants that would be selected for the job based on their responses to the personality inventory (if this were an actual job selection procedure) will be eligible for a monetary reward. You will complete several questionnaires in addition to the personality inventory; however, only your responses to the personality inventory will have bearing on whether you receive the monetary reward. You will be informed when it is time to complete the personality inventory. As a reminder, imagine that you are applying for a job as a sales associate (day-to-day salesperson) at a popular American department store named Jenkins’ Luxury Department Store.
During this wave individuals first completed the measure of perceptions of the situation (i.e. the proposed antecedent in the current model). Instructions for this questionnaire read as follows:

*Complete the following questionnaire. Please respond honestly. *Your responses to these items will not compared to other applicants’ responses, and you responses will have absolutely no bearing on whether you receive the monetary reward.*

Following their completion of the antecedent measure, individuals completed a measure of state goal orientation. Because the selection context had already been introduced, goal orientation could be measured with the expectation of getting an accurate picture of the goal orientation that an individual would possess if they were taking part in an actual job selection process. Had goal orientation been measured prior to some sort of introduction, it would be impossible to claim the participant’s goal orientation was an accurate reflection of their state goal orientation in selection contexts. Instructions for the goal orientation questionnaire are included:

*Please complete the following questionnaire as honestly as possible. Your responses to this questionnaire will not compared to other applicants’ responses, and your responses to this questionnaire have absolutely no bearing on whether or not you are eligible to receive the monetary reward. Please respond honestly.*

After completing the goal orientation questionnaire, the participants were given instructions for the selection ratio manipulation. Instructions for the experimental inventory read as follows:

*The following questionnaire asks questions about your personality. Your personality is an extremely important factor in determining whether you will be a successful sales associate here at Jenkins’ Luxury Department Store. Our data shows that personality is a very important part of performing who will perform this job well. Because your personality is so important, you will only be considered for the job if you score in the top (5% or 50%) of scores. Continue on and complete the personality inventory.*
However, after reading these instructions and prior to actually beginning the personality inventory, participants completed the measure of intention to fake the personality inventory. It is important that intention to fake was assessed at this point in the procedure because this is the point when those intentions should have been the most salient. Instructions for the intent to fake measure are included below:

*Before you complete the personality inventory, the researchers in this study want to ask a few questions about how you will approach the personality inventory. Your responses to this questionnaire will not be compared to other applicants’ responses, and your responses to these questions will have absolutely no bearing on whether you receive the monetary reward, so please respond honestly.* You will complete the personality inventory immediately after answering these questions.

After completing the measure of intention to fake, participants completed the experimental personality inventory. A one-item manipulation check that assessed participants’ awareness of the selection ratio manipulation was included as the first item on the personality inventory.

The order of procedures outlined here was vital to the validity of the measures and the overall study. They were arranged such that responses to one questionnaire should not have negatively impacted the responses to a subsequent questionnaire, and further, the order of the delivery of the questionnaires should have provided the most accurate test the proposed model.

I’ve included a figure (Figure 3) depicting the procedure for the current study. It is important to note that participants were not actually eligible for a monetary reward based on their responses. Instead, in the interest of fairness, all participants were entered into a random drawing for three cash prizes. Upon completion of the study, all participants were debriefed and informed why this element of deception was necessary.

**Measures**
Demographics were assessed by asking participants to indicate their race and gender. These data were used to examine potential group differences and ensure that no unexpected bias existed.

Because Ajzen doesn’t offer recommendations on appropriate measures, authors that have previously applied his theory to faking have developed appropriate measures. Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, and Thronton (2006) developed such measures, and their measures were used in the current study.

Attitudes toward faking a personality assessment was measured using 3 items rated five 5-point Likert-type scale (responses range from $0 = \text{strongly disagree}$ to $4 = \text{strongly agree}$). An example item is, “It was important for me to perform well on the personality test, in order to be more competitive for the job I wanted.” This measure displayed good reliability in their study ($\alpha = .79$).

Subjective norms toward faking were measured using a 5 point Likert-type scale with responses to items ranging from $0 = \text{strongly disagree}$ to $4 = \text{strongly agree}$. An example item is, “Other people would think less of me if they knew I faked on this test to try and get a better score.” In their study, this measure displayed decent reliability ($\alpha = .53$).

Perceived behavioral control (PBC) was measured using 4 items on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Response options range from $0 = \text{strongly disagree}$ to $4 = \text{strongly agree}$. An example item is, “I felt confident that I could increase my score on the personality assessment.” This measure also displayed good reliability in their study ($\alpha = .75$).

State goal orientation was measured using an adaptation of Elliot and Church’s (1997) achievement goal questionnaire to evaluate each applicant’s state goal orientation in the selection context. This measure is an 18-item questionnaire that evaluates learning goal orientation,
performance-approach orientation, and performance-avoidance orientation. For the purposes of the current study, one item was removed as it was deemed to be overly redundant. Example items are: for learning orientation – “Even if I’m not hired, I will use this inventory to learn something about myself;” for performance-approach orientation – “It is important to me to do better on the personality inventory than the other applicants;” for performance-avoidant orientation – “I will do whatever it takes to avoid being rejected for this job.” Responses are given on a 7-point Likert-type scale with possible responses ranging from not at all true of me – very true of me. When they created the scale, Elliot and Church (1997) found that factor loadings supported the three factor representation of goal orientation, and they used items assessing each factor as independent scales. Responses for a given factor were averaged to gain a score for each dimension, so that individuals had a score for mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoidance orientations. In the current study, each set of items was used an independent scale.

**Intention to fake** was measured using a 3 item, 5 point Likert-type measure that was developed following recommendations offered by Icek Azjen via his personal website (2011). A sample item is, “I plan to fake when completing the personality inventory.” Reliability was very good for this scale (α=.92).

**Actual Faking Behavior** was measured using difference scores on the three relevant Big Five dimensions (i.e. experimental scores minus baseline scores). All traits were analyzed separately where necessary such that positive difference scores indicate inflated responses. A 120-item unpublished personality instrument designed by Johnson (2001) served as the personality inventory for this study. The scales that measure neuroticism and openness to experience were not included as they had limited relevance to the current study, so the entire inventory was 72 items long. This measure was developed using items from the International
Personality Item Pool (IPIP), and it uses 24 items to assess each of the five personality traits. This measure contains items designed to assess sub-dimensions of each Big 5 trait (e.g. anxiety for neuroticism, friendliness for extraversion, and imagination for openness), but because sub-dimension scores are not relevant to the hypotheses in the current study, they will be collapsed to yield an overall trait score. Because this study used difference scores, the larger the difference score between baseline and experimental scores, the more distorted the response.

A manipulation check was used to ensure that participants are completely aware of the condition in which they completed the manipulated personality inventory (i.e. large vs. small selection ratio). This check was done by asking participants to select which of the following statements they consider to be true: 1) Very few applicants will score well enough on this inventory to be considered for the job, and 2) About half of the participants will score well enough on this personality inventory to be considered for the job. This manipulation check was included as the first item of the experimental personality inventory.

Analytic Strategies

All proposed hypotheses and research questions were tested using a form linear regression. The presence of mediation was tested using a regression-based SPSS macro designed to provide significance tests for indirect effects via a Sobel test as well as bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. Testing mediation requires one to test the indirect path from the predictor variable to the outcome variable through a predetermined mediator. This is accomplished by employing the above-mentioned tests to determine whether the product of the predictor-mediator effect and the mediator-outcome effect is significantly different from zero. Separate mediation analyses were performed for each of the three relevant personality traits (i.e. agreeableness,
extraversion, and conscientiousness). The macro that performs these analyses was designed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) and is offered for public use on Andrew Hayes’ personal website.

The presence of moderation was tested using two steps of linear regression. In the first step, the dependent variable was regressed onto the predictor variable and the moderator with no interaction term. In step two, the interaction term was added and significance tests were examined. In the case of a significant interaction term, a regression-based SPSS macro designed specifically to examine trends and direction of the moderation effect was employed. Stated differently, this procedure allows the researcher to examine the impact, if any, the moderator variable is having on the predictor-outcome relationship. Separate moderation analyses were conducted for each of the three relevant personality traits (i.e., Hypothesis 4). The SPSS macro that performs these analyses was designed by Hayes and Matthes (2009) and is available for public use via Andrew Hayes’ personal website.
RESULTS

The participant pool for the current study was 85% Caucasian and 8% African American with all other racial groups representing less than 5% of the participants. Eighty-three percent of the sample was female. This type of distribution is representative of the population from which the participant pool was recruited. In addition, other than one exception there were no differences on any variables of interest in the current study due to race or gender. The exception is that females rated themselves as significantly more agreeable than males (Female mean = 4.03, Male = 3.70; t=-3.35, p<.01). This difference did not impact the degree to which males or females engaged in faking on the agreeableness dimension and is therefore inconsequential.

Hypothesis 1 stated that perceptions of the situation would be positively related to the intention to fake the personality inventory. This hypothesis was tested by regressing intention to fake onto perceptions of the situation. Regression analysis yielded a significant coefficient (b=.778, t(134) = 4.588, p<.01). Thus hypothesis 1 was supported.

Hypothesis 2 stated that, selection ratio would moderate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake in such a way that when applicants were aware that selection ratios were smaller, the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake would be weaker than when selection ratios were larger. Because this hypothesis was tested as a between-subjects test, a manipulation check was used to ensure that individuals in a respective condition (i.e. either small or large selection ratio) read and understood the instructions that served as the manipulation. Exactly 83 participants (61%) responded correctly to the manipulation check item, and therefore only those participants’ scores were used to test hypothesis 2. This may be viewed as an overly conservative approach, but because of the large percentage of participants that responded incorrectly to the manipulation
check it likely provides the most accurate test of the hypothesis. As can be seen in table 3, selection ratio did not moderate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake \((b=.44; t=1.09, p=.28)\). Trends in the current data were not in the direction of the proposed hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Hypothesis 3 stated that, an individual’s opportunity to fake (i.e. distance from the ceiling) would moderate the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior such that when an individual is further from the ceiling on a given trait, the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior would be stronger. In order to accurately test hypothesis 3, three separate moderation analyses had to be performed; one with faking scores for agreeableness, conscientiousness, and extraversion, respectively. In the moderation analysis with agreeableness as the dependent variable, distance from the ceiling did not moderate the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior on the agreeableness dimension, \((b=.12; t=1.891; p=.06)\). In the moderation analysis with extraversion as the dependent variable, distance from the ceiling did moderate the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior on extraversion items, \((b=.14; t=3.14; p<.01)\). The trend in the extraversion dimension shows that as distance from the ceiling increases, the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior strengthened. This was evident by examining the strength of the intention-behavior relationship at low \((b=.0135, p=.72)\), mean \((b=.06, p<.05)\), and high \((b=.13, p<.01)\) distances. Similar to extraversion, the distance from the ceiling in the moderation analysis with conscientiousness as the dependent variable did moderate the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior on the conscientiousness dimension, \((b=.23; t=3.80, p<.01)\). The trend for the conscientiousness dimension shows that as distance from the ceiling increases, the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking
behavior strengthened. Once again, this trend was made clear by examining the intention-behavior relationship at low ($b = -0.918, p = .11$), mean ($b = 0.04, p = 0.26$), and high ($b = 0.18, p < 0.01$) distances. Hypothesis 3 was partially supported.

Hypothesis 4 stated that performance-approach and performance-avoid orientation would moderate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake. This hypothesis was tested using two separate moderation analyses as all participants had scores for both performance-approach and performance-avoid orientations. As can be seen in Table 4, neither performance-approach orientation ($b = 0.27; t = 1.13, p = 0.26$) nor performance-avoidance ($b = 0.24; t = 1.15, p = 0.25$) orientation significantly moderated the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake. It is worth noting that although the interaction was not significant for either approach or avoidance orientation there is a noticeable upward trend in the relationship between perceptions of the situation and intention to fake as an individual’s performance-approach orientation increases ($b = 0.57$ one standard deviation below the mean approach orientation, $b = 0.74$ at mean level, and $b = 0.91$ at one standard deviation above the mean approach orientation). The same trend is seen when performance-approach orientation is examined as a moderator ($b = 0.61$ at a lower level, $b = 0.75$ at mean level, and $b = 0.89$ at a higher level). This trend gives some indication that the proposed relationship may exist, but the moderated relationship was not significant in the current data. Hypothesis 4 was not supported.

The moderation effect of individuals’ mastery orientation was examined, but no significant effects or identifiable trends were observed.

Hypothesis 5 stated that intention to fake would mediate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and actual faking behavior. Again, three separate analyses were run
with faking scores on each of the three personality dimensions included as the dependent variable. These results can be seen in table 5. Intention to fake did not mediate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and actual faking behavior for the agreeableness dimension. This is made evident by examining the results of the Sobel test ($Z=1.07$, $p=.285$), as well as by examining the 95% confidence interval for 2000 resamples using bootstrapping (unstandardized indirect effect estimate = .02, 95% CI [-.04, .13]). Intention to fake did mediate the relationship between perceptions of the situation and actual faking behavior on the extraversion dimension. The significance of this effect is evidenced by both the Sobel test ($Z=2.7$, $p<.01$) and the fact that the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval around the effect did not contain zero (unstandardized indirect effect estimate = .09, 95% CI [.02, .23]). The results regarding the mediation effect for the conscientiousness dimension are somewhat equivocal. The Sobel test provides evidence that the mediation effect is significant ($Z=2.00$, $p<.05$), but the 95% confidence interval produced a conflicting result (unstandardized indirect effect estimate = .07, 95% CI [-.03, .24]). The reason for disagreement likely lies in the fact that the Sobel test assumes that the indirect effect is normally distributed and that the sample size is sufficiently large. Both of which may be questionable considering the relatively modest sample size in the current study (n=136). The bootstrapping procedure makes no such assumptions, and therefore should be given more weight (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Briggs, 2006). Due to the lack of agreement between the two procedures regarding the significance of the indirect effect, one should be cautious when attempting to draw substantive conclusions about this result. Hypothesis 5 was partially supported.
DISCUSSION

Several of the results from the current study warrant further discussion. First, the degree to which the Theory of Planned Behavior was applicable to personality inventory faking in selection contexts was tested using a mediation analysis. This mediation analysis examined whether intention to fake mediated the relationship between attitudes toward faking, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control (collectively, perceptions of the situation) and actual faking behavior. Next, several potential moderation effects were examined. These included state goal orientation, selection ratio (5% v. 50%), and distance from the ceiling. In summary, the Theory of Planned Behavior showed utility for faking in selection contexts which is consistent with previous research (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al. 2006). Additionally, trends in the current data provided evidence to the potential presence of a moderating effect with respect to goal orientation, although the moderation effects of performance-approach and performance-avoid orientation were not statistically significant. Finally, distance from the ceiling moderated the relationship between intent to fake and actual faking behavior. These results are discussed further in the following section.

First, Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior was once again shown to be a useful tool for predicting intention to fake and actual faking behavior. This is consistent with the findings of McFarland and Ryan (2006), as well as Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, and Rose (2006). The Theory of Planned Behavior continues to be a promising avenue for faking research with three studies having shown its utility in selection contexts. Future researchers should consider examining interventions aimed at altering subjective norms, attitudes toward faking, and perceived behavioral control with the goal of lowering intentions and faking behavior. This approach has proven successful in altering behavior in other realms (see Beale & Manstead,
1991 for example), and with the clear influence of these three antecedents on subsequent intentions and faking it could be a promising direction for reducing faking behavior. With the popularity of web-based personality inventories in the selection process, significant attention should be given to designing interventions that can be delivered early in the recruitment process with minimal face-to-face contact. Potential mediums may be pamphlets, videos, or messages delivered via electronic mail.

A second noteworthy finding concerns the noticeable trend (albeit not statistically significant) that as individuals’ performance goal orientations (either approach or avoid) increase, the relationship between their perceptions of the situation and their intent to fake strengthened. The lack of statistical significance in the current data may attributable to the relatively modest sample size (n=136), and a larger sample would likely provide a more accurate test. This presence of this trend gives some credence to the notion that applicants who experience an internal match between their perceptions of the situation and their goal orientation may be more likely to intend to fake a personality inventory in selection contexts. The internal state-perceptions match is an avenue that warrants further examination primarily because selection contexts have the potential to greatly influence an applicant’s internal state with respect to motivation, behavioral intention, and comfort, among other relevant variables. If researchers are able to obtain a clear picture of what that internal state looks like while applicants are engaged in the job search/application process, it could provide a substantial amount of evidence as to why some individuals’ perceptions end up manifesting as faking and others simply do not. Obviously, this is a challenging task as one of the difficulties with internal state examination is sound measurement, and selection processes are often already measurement intensive. However, the first step may be looking for general trends in how job applicants’ states are altered as they
prepare to begin the job application/interview process. Although it is unlikely that general trends will emerge with regards to perceptions (because they are based on individual history among other things), as discussed earlier in this paper, states can be greatly influenced by present, objective environmental factors (e.g. selection ratio). Armed with that information, researchers and practitioners could begin to develop a better understanding of how this internal state-external perception interaction occurs and what types of behavior are likely to emerge as a result.

The current study is one of the first to identify a variable (distance from the ceiling) that significantly moderates the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking behavior. McFarland and Ryan (2006) posited that knowledge of the constructs being measured may play a role, and Muller-Hanson, Heggestad, and Rose (2006) did not examine any moderators in the path from intention to fake to actual faking behavior. This study provides some evidence that the relationship between intention to fake and actual faking may have less to do with an individual’s ability to fake and much more to do with their opportunity to fake (i.e. distance from the ceiling). The findings of this study show that for the most job relevant traits (i.e. conscientiousness and extraversion in the current study) an individual’s room to fake plays a large role in the relationship between intention and action. Although this study does not remove the possibility that ability variables may have utility, it does provide evidence that distance from the ceiling (i.e. opportunity to fake) does play a significant role in moderating that path. It cannot be conclusively stated that when any individual has room to fake, they necessarily do fake, but the results do indicate that their room to fake is an important variable to consider.

The final noteworthy point is the relatively clear indication that applicants tend to fake more on the dimensions they perceive as most job relevant. This is not a new assertion, and it is one that has become relatively accepted in research on faking. In the current study, participants
were asked to imagine that they were applying for a sales position and complete the personality inventory under those instructions. The results show that the dimensions of conscientiousness and extraversion were more likely to be faked than agreeableness. This is likely due to applicants’ perception that appearing more conscientious and extraverted would make them appear to be a more desirable applicant than appearing more agreeable. This finding gives credence to the notion that applicants do not fake blindly or universally, but instead, they fake intelligently and with a purpose (Fan et al., 2012).

**Limitations and Implications**

The biggest limitation of the current study is the use of a student sample. A great deal of effort went into mimicking real-life selection contexts by providing motivation to perform well via the presence of a cash reward as well as a selection ratio manipulation that provided individuals with some knowledge about the competitiveness with which they should approach the application process. This approach is one that has been utilized in previous research (McFarland & Ryan, 2006), and while it was not explicitly tested, there is no reason to believe that students are incapable of behaving like job applicants. Still, the participants were not true job applicants and that is a recognized shortcoming of the current study.

A second limitation may be that all data were collected via self-report questionnaires. This could lead to issues with common method bias. All data were collected via self-report with the exception of actual faking behavior, and that was calculated by subtracting responses to the honest inventory from responses to the faked inventory. While it is never ideal to collect exclusively self-report data, this is commonly the approach used to collect information about job applicants’ personalities, and therefore, it is consistent with the way personality assessment is typically conducted in real selection contexts.
One implication is that these findings illustrate the importance of considering an individual’s perceptions of faking when trying to determine the degree to which they will fake a personality inventory. If a causal link could be established between perceptions and intentions, it is possible that researchers and practitioners may be able to mitigate the degree to which faking occurs by designing interventions that can be given early in the recruitment process that specifically target attitudes towards faking, subjective norms, and perceived control of faking. In theory, should one succeed at lowering these three perceptions, they should be able to limit the degree to which applicants intend to fake and subsequently fake the personality inventory, which would go a long way to getting more accurate responses on personality inventories.

A second implication concerns considering where an individual stands on a given personality trait when examining their faking behavior. This can be a tall order because it requires an initial measurement of personality prior to examining faking behavior. In other words, practitioners cannot claim to know the severity to which an applicant has faked without having collected honest responses to that inventory at some point. If we look at it from a backend perspective, this could explain why some individuals appear to fake substantially more (i.e. extremely high scores) than others in some selection contexts. This finding begs the question, “Which is more problematic, an individual who increases their score from 2 to 4 or an individual who increases their score from 4 to 5?” Some may view the final score and believe that the individual who scored a five must have engaged in more faking, but without having an honest assessment, free from any motivation to fake, that conclusion cannot be reliably drawn. Finally, this study once again confirms that applicants can and do fake personality inventories in selection contexts. If practitioners are using or seeking to use personality inventories as a part of
their selection battery, it is vital they understand that self-report measures of personality can be faked and that often, they are.
References


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Hon. = Honest Instructions; Exp. = Experimental Condition; Diff. = Difference Score; Dist. = Distance from Ceiling
**p<.01
* p<.05
Table 2
Moderated Regression Analysis With Intention to Fake Regressed onto Perceptions of the Situation and Selection Ratio

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Note. Perception of the situation is a continuous variable. Selection ratio is a dichotomous variable where 0 = Lenient Selection Ratio (50%) and 1 = Stringent Selection Ratio (5%). *p<.05
Table 3
Moderated Regression Analysis With Faking Score Regressed onto Intention to Fake and Distance from Ceiling for Respective Personality Dimension

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*Note.* All variables above are continuous variables. *p<.05
Table 4
Moderated Regression Analysis With Intention to Fake Regressed onto Perceptions of the Situation, Performance-Approach, and Performance-Avoid Goal Orientations

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Note. All variables above are continuous variables. *p<.05
Table 5
Indirect Mediation Effect of Perceptions of the Situation on Actual Faking Behavior through Intention to Fake for Each of Three Respective Personality Dimensions

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</tbody>
</table>

Note. All 95% confidence intervals are calculated from 2000 bootstrapped samples. *p<.05
FIGURE 1 - McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) adaptation of Ajzen’s Model of Planned Behavior

- Attitudes Toward Faking
- Subjective Norms Toward Faking
- Perceived Behavioral
- Situational Influences
- Ability to Fake
- Intention to Fake
- Actual Faking
FIGURE 2 – Proposed Model of Faking Behavior

Individual Difference: Goal Orientation

Perceptions of the Situation

H1

H2

H4

H5

Intentions to Fake

Situational Influence: Selection Ratio

Ability to Fake: Distance from Ceiling

Actual

*Adapted from previous work done by McFarland & Ryan & Muellen-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thronton (2006)*
Figure 3

ORDER OF PROCEDURE FOR
HALF OF THE PARTICIPANTS

Wave 1 – In order of administration
Selection Context Introduction
Antecedent Measures
Goal Orientation Questionnaire
Selection Ratio Instructions
Intent to Fake Questionnaire
Personality Inventory

One Week Delay Between Wave One And Wave Two

Wave 2 – In order of administration
Selection Context Introduction
Antecedent Measures
Goal Orientation Questionnaire
Selection Ratio Instructions
Intent to Fake Questionnaire
Personality Inventory

ORDER OF PROCEDURE FOR
OTHER HALF OF PARTICIPANTS

Wave 1
Personality Inventory
(Honest)

Wave 2
Personality Inventory
(Honest)
Appendix 1

MEASURES
Perceptions of the Situation

Instructions: The following questionnaire asks you to indicate your feelings about the personality inventory you will be completing shortly. Please read each statement below and indicate how much you agree with it by marking your answer sheet in accordance with the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. It was important for me to perform well on the personality test in order to be more competitive for the job I wanted.
2. I didn’t really care about how well I did on the personality test.
3. The thought of getting a desirable job was enough of an incentive for me to try and do well on the personality test.
4. I think that exaggerating my good qualities on the test would lead to a better score.
5. I felt confident that I could increase my score on the personality assessment.
6. I felt I could increase my score on the personality assessment without being detected by the lie scale.
7. Other people probably faked their answers on this personality test to get a better score.
8. In a real employment setting, most people would not hesitate to fake on an employment test if it increased their chances of getting hired.
9. Faking on a personality test in order to get a job is not a big deal.
10. Other people would think less of me if they knew that I faked on this test to try and get a better score.

Note: items 2 and 10 are reverse-scored.
GOAL ORIENTATION INVENTORY

This scale was completed on a 5 point scale with response option ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items presented without italics are original items developed by Elliot and Church (1997). The italicized items presented below the original are the items adapted to the current study.

PERFORMANCE APPROACH
1. It is important to me to do better than the other students.
-It is important to me to do better on the personality inventory than the other applicants

2. My goal in this class is to get a better grade than most of the students.
-My goal is to get a better score than most of the other applicants

3. I am striving to demonstrate my ability relative to others in this class.
-I am striving to demonstrate my personality is more ideal for this job than the other applicants

4. I am motivated by the thought of outperforming my peers in this class.
-I am motivated by the thought of performing better than the other applicants

5. It is important to me to do well compared to others in this class.
-It is important to me to do well compared to other applicants so that I am hired.

6. I want to do well in this class to show my ability to my family, friends, advisors, or others.
-I want to perform well to show my family, friends, and others that I’m desired for this position.

MASTERY (Learning)
7. I want to learn as much as possible from this class.
-Even if I’m not hired, I will use this inventory to learn something about myself.

8. It is important for me to understand the content of this course as thoroughly as possible.
-It is important for me to understand the content of this personality inventory as thoroughly as possible

9. I hope to have gained a broader and deeper knowledge of psychology when I am done with this class.
-Whether I’m hired or not, I hope to have gained a deeper appreciation for my own personality when I’m done with this process.

10. In a class like this, I prefer course material that arouses my curiosity, even if it is difficult to learn.
-In a process like this, I prefer to do things that arouse my interest, even if they are somewhat difficult.

11. In a class like this, I prefer course material that really challenges me so I can learn new things.
-In a situation like this, I don’t mind difficult tests, as long as I can learn from them.
PERFORMANCE AVOID
12. I often think to myself, "What if I do badly in this class?"
-It would be normal for me to have the thought, “What if I do poorly on this personality inventory”?

13. I worry about the possibility of getting a bad grade in this class.
-I am worried worry about the possibility of getting rejected for this job based on my responses to the personality inventory.

14. My fear of performing poorly in this class is often what motivates me.
-I am motivated by the fear of getting rejected for this job.

15. I just want to avoid doing poorly in this class.
-I will do whatever it takes to avoid being rejected for this job.

16. I'm afraid that if I ask my TA or instructor a "dumb" question, they might not think I'm very smart.
-I’m afraid that if I don’t perform well, they will not want to give me the job.

17. I wish this class was not graded.
-I wish the personality inventory did not affect my ability to get the job.

INTENTION TO FAKE QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire was completed on a likert-type scale with response options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

1. I plan to fake when completing the personality inventory.
2. I intend to alter my responses to the personality inventory so that I appear to be a desirable applicant.
3. I will make an effort to be a desirable applicant by faking on the personality inventory.
Johnson (2001) Personality Inventory

Please respond to the following items by indicating how accurate the statement is. 1 = Very Inaccurate, 2 = Somewhat Inaccurate, 3 = Neither Accurate nor Inaccurate, 4 = Somewhat Accurate, and 5 = Very Accurate.

**AGREEABLENESS**

1. I trust what people say
2. I use others for my own ends**
3. I love to help others
4. I insult people**
5. I boast about my virtues**
6. I feel sympathy for those who are worse off than myself
7. I believe that others have good intentions
8. I take advantage of others**
9. I am indifferent to the feelings of others**
10. I yell at people**
11. I think highly of myself**
12. I try not to think about the needy**
13. I trust others
14. I obstruct others' plans**
15. I am concerned about others
16. I get back at others**
17. I have a high opinion of myself**
18. I am not interested in other people's problems**
19. I distrust people**
20. I cheat to get ahead**
21. I take no time for others**
22. I love a good fight**
23. I believe that I am better than others**
24. I sympathize with the homeless

**CONSCIENTIOUSNESS**

25. I excel in what I do
26. I like to tidy up
27. I put little time and effort into my work**
28. I carry out my plans
29. I handle tasks smoothly
30. I leave my belongings around**
31. I do just enough work to get by**
32. I waste my time**
33. I complete tasks successfully
34. I break rules**
35 I do more than what's expected of me
36 I make rash decisions**
37 I know how to get things done
38 I keep my promises
39 I work hard
40 I act without thinking**
41 I leave a mess in my room**
42 I tell the truth
43 I am always prepared
44 I jump into things without thinking**
45 I often forget to put things back in their proper place**
46 I break my promises**
47 I have difficulty starting tasks**
48 I rush into things**

EXTRAVERSION
49 I feel comfortable around people
50 I love large parties
51 I wait for others to lead the way**
52 I do a lot in my spare time
53 I seek adventure
54 I have a lot of fun
55 I avoid contact with others**
56 I talk to a lot of different people at parties
57 I try to lead others
58 I am always busy
59 I enjoy being reckless
60 I look at the bright side of life
61 I make friends easily
62 I prefer to be alone**
63 I take charge
64 I like to take it easy**
65 I love excitement
66 I radiate joy
67 I keep others at a distance**
68 I avoid crowds**
69 I take control of things
70 I am always on the go
71 I act wild and crazy
72 I love life

** Indicates Reverse Coded Items