THE RVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM Except wher refrence is made to the work of thers, the work in this disertaion is my on or was do in clabratin it my advisry cmite. This isertaion does ot contain prorietar or clsifd infrmtio. _______ Marshal L. Michel I Certifcate of Aproval: _______ _______ Wiliam Trimble Lary Gerber, Chair Profesor Profesor Histry Histry _______ _______ Daniel Szechi Owen Cot? Profsor Profsr Histry litcal Science MIT, Cmbridg, MA _______ Stephen L. McFarlnd Actig Dean Graduat Schol id2965934 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com THE RVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM Marshal L. Michel I A Disertaion Submited to the Graduate Faculty of Aubrn University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requiremnts for the Degre of Doctr of Philosphy Aubrn, Alabma Decmer 15, 206 id3053330 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com i THE RVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM Marshal Louis Michel I Permision is granted to Aubrn University to make copies of this disertaion at its discreti, upo rqest of idiiduals r instiutins and at eir xpese. Th authr esrves l publicatio rights. _________ Marshal L. Michel I 15 Decber 206____ at of Graduation id3199049 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com iv DISERTAION ABSTRACT THE RVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM Marshal L. Michel I Doctr of Philosphy, Decmber 15, 206 (M.S. American Tecnolgial Univrsity, 197) (B.. Georgtw University, 1965) 479 Typed Pages Directd by Lary Gerber During the Vietnam War, the United Staes Air Force had performed inconsitently and after the war as faced with anumber of chalenges. Many of the Air Force snior leadership felt hat he chalenges could be rsolved by the use of hig technolgy weapons ystems, especialy the advanced McDonel-Douglas F-15 ?Eagle.? At he same tie, many oung fihter pilots who er vetrans of the most dificult air combat over the Hanoi are of North Vietnam felt hat he Air Force ned acomplet cultre change and a new emphasi on realistic trainig. The frustration f thes young oficers, the ?iron majors,? with te Air Force cultre is described, and wel at heir push for new trainig methods. After the 1973 Midle East War Genral Robert Dixon, comander of the Air Force?s Tactial Air Comand (TAC), encouraged acomplet revalution f TAC?s trainig. The ?iron id3228562 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com v majors? on devloped a very realistic exrcise caled Red Flag that was quickly expande to the rst of the American miltary. At he same tie, under budgetary presures the Air Force dcide to buy asmal, hig performance fighter-bomber, the F-16, to suplemnt its F-15s . In 1978, the nw comander of TAC, Genral Wilbur Crech, began to push for very expensive, hig technolgy weapons a wel as contiuing the mphasi on realistic trainig. Thes weapons wer intede to give the Air Force along range, al weather strike capbilty. But he nw eapons wer expensive and, since the Air Force hose to buy stems instead of spare parts because of limited budgets, the nw sytems wer often grounde. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Air Force was presured agroup of Critcs who claimed the Air Force was porly led and presd to eliminate hig-technolgy weapons. Thes arguments, as wel as how the Air Force sucesfuly resited them, are dscribed, as wel as the Gulf War suces of the igh-tech weapons maned by crews trained at Red Flag. Today the arguments aginst hig-tech weapons til rage, but as long as American miltary operations are sucesful, it sems the comitent o hig tech weapons and, more important, realistic trainig wil contiue. vi Style manual or jurnal used: A Manual For Writers of Term Papers, Thes and Diserttins, Sixth Eiton Computer software used: Microsft Word id3310480 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com vi TABLE OF CONTETS INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER ONE: ALIGNMENT THE INDEPNDENT UNITED STAES AIR FORCE A AMRICA GLOBAL RGY 15 SC ND THE IR FRCE ULTRE 20 THE ROLE OF TE TATIA I FOCE 4 SAC TAKS VR 25 CHAPTER TWO: REALIGNMENT KENEDY, MCNARA ND A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY 30 MCARA, THE WHIZ KIS, D THE PBS 2 NEW DOCTINS AND TE N OF SAC?S DOMINATION 37 NVETIOL SYMS 8 COMOALIY 40 THE ?SCEMCIZING? OF THE TACTIAL IR FORCES 2 CHAPTER THRE: VIETNAM ND THE DVELOPMENT OF A NEW AIR FORC UL THE AIR WAR 53 RULS OF ENGEMNT PENL DECISOS 58 CULTRE SHIFT 9 THE WA? EC ON PROMTIONS 62 COMBT OPRATIS 5 CHAPTER FOUR: STAESIDE TCH WARS THE FIGHT FOR AN IR SUPERIOITY FIGHTER 70 ?BLU BIRD? 6 RED I 79 PLAYING WITH NUMBERS 82 INTERSEVICE OPATION ? SORT OF 4 F-X O ?AGL? 8 id3350277 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com vi CHAPTER FIVE: ONE WAR ENDS, ANOTHER BEGINS THE 1968-1972 BREAK IN THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM 95 ARTHQU BEFOR TSUNMI: THE AUL REPO ND TOP GUN 97 TH CRITICAL IMRTACE OF DACT 10 E AI FORE RSPONS ? UMB I DOWN 3 WHY THE DIFT APROACHES? 104 COUNR CURENS IN THE IR FORCE 8 THE IITIAL MOV 10 CHAPTER SIX: BUDGET BATLES LAIRD TAKES OVER 17 DVI PCARD AND THE ACQUISTION PROCES 20 REINFORING THE CRIICS 13 TH IX DOCINE 25 E F-15 AN THE A-X 16 PACKRD?S FIRS BLUE RIBON PANEL ? THE FITZHUGH COMISION 129 E DPARTURE F THE CRITICS 30 AN I WHOS TI AD OME ? THE LIGHTWEIGHT FIGHTER 1 THE AIR FRCE HIFS ITS PSITION 35 CHAPTER SEVN: THE WAR ZONE TRAUMA I: LINEBACKER, 1972 142 WOKING TH PROLM 6 STPI E BLEDING 152 LINEBACKR?S IMPACT O THE AIR FORCE 3 SRIOUS ULTRE LSES 157 PT WAR CHALNGE AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACETIME INOVTION 162 THE SHIF I AIR FORCE LADERSHIP 3 BACKLIDING 167 CHAPTER IGHT: POST VIETNAM BATLES NIXON?S EW DEFNSE TA 172 CTIUING ITH LIGHT WEIGHT FIGHTER 6 THE MORPHI OF E F-16 180 DVELOPING A NW AIR FORCE ULTRE: DIXON TAKES R TC 182 RUMA I ? HE 1973 MIDLE AST WAR 3 DIXON?S OBSSION WITH RIIC INIG 186 THE IR MAJR? BEGIN TO INOVATE 9 ix THE FLYING SAFETY ISUE 193 CANGI TH WAPONS CHOL CULTRE 4 THE ISRAELI AIR FRCE VIT 196 CHAPTER NIE: THE BUBLE UP INOVATION TSUNAMI RED FLAG 20 IS UNFRLED 7 WHAT RED FLAG WOUGHT 2 DUPLICTIN COMBAT 4 THE NW FIGHTER PILO CULTRE: ?REALISTIC FLYIG SAY? 230 THE IMPCT OF RED FLAG ON THE AIR FORCE 1 IA MEIAN MILITARY 234 DIXON?S OTHER CHANGES 6 I? LGAY 238 CHAPTER TEN: WASHINGTON WARS F10 ENGIE PROBLEMS 24 BUDT BATLES 5 THE F-15 ND H REVOLUTION I AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT 248 TMPORAY ND F HE DFENSE BUDGET US 51 THE CARTE-BOW YEARS 2 F10 NGI PRLMS ? TL/STAGNATIONS 56 THE AIMVAL/CEVA CONROVERY 28 PRT & WHITNY S. THE AI FCE 6 THE FY197 DEFE BUDGT 23 CHAPTER LEVN: CHANGI OF THE GUARD CRECH TAKES OVER TAC 270 TH BGINIG F HE RECH ERA 3 ?ROL ACK? 278 TECHNOLGY OR TAINIG? 0 AGI THE F?S DOCTRINE 28 ?DER BOS,? AIR ORE HICS, AND VOTING WITH YOUR FET 5 RAINE ND FLYING TIME IUES 28 CTR?S FY1980 EFS BUDGT 9 JAMES FALOWS JOIN THE CRIICS 23 TH CRTER DCTRIE AND ATER?S ELCTION YEA EPIHANY 304 STLT D CARTER?S CREDIBILITY 6 CRECH AN THE TE OCTRINE 307 x MORE HIG-TECH SYTEMS 310 FALWS MAY 1980 ARICLE CHAPTER TELVE: THE RGAN YEARS INITIAL BUDGETS 32 HE RSRNC OF THE CRITICS 6 T LIBEALS? UNAK 3 HE CRITIC? BRIEFIGS 4 FALOWS? NATIONAL DEFNSE 39 THE DBE BWEN TH AIR FORCE AND THE CRITICS I: VR ANA 341 THE DBTE BTEN THE AIR FORCE AND THE CRITICS I: LONG RANG, AL WA ITEDICTIO 345 H ONGRESIONAL MILITARY EFORM CAUCS 7 CHAPTER THIRTEN: COUNTERATCK THE AIR FORCE?S FRUSTRATION 356 CRCH AND TH CIICS 0 THE FY1983 BUGET 36 COUNTERING TH MILITARY EFORM CAUCS I: THE ARMED SERVICS COMITES 365 COUNTERING TH ILITARY EFOR CAUCS I: THE ISALI AIR FORCE 367 WINIG THE NGI WAR 1 THE FY1984 BUDET 37 ND OF TH RAGN DEFNSE BUDGET INCREASE THE CRITIC?S LAST 378 CRH? EGCY 0 CHAPTER FOURTEN: THE GULF WAR 38 POST WAR SESMENTS 398 CHAPTER FITEN: CONCLUSIONS WHY THE ?IRON MAJORS? REALISTIC TRAINIG INOVATION SUCD 405 HY THE CRITICS? ATEMPT A INOVATION FAILED 1 WA DI HE RIICS ACOMPLISH? 42 THE CRITICS? MODEN RESURECTION 6 ONE AN FUT? 430 xi BILIOGRAPHY 435 1 INTRODUCTION The United Staes Air Force ame out of the Vietnam War in a undiagnosed schizophrenic stae. Superficaly, it had not ben oticeably unsucesful. While politcaly the bombing of North Vietnam had ben controversial, the Air Force had not suferd heavy loses, nor had it ben sen as impotent ? in fact, just he oposite. American miltary leaders, frustrated by the rules that had limited them throughout most of the war, gave the Christmas 1972 B-52 bombing of Hanoi credit for endig the war.1 The Air Force had not ben sucesful in air-to-air combat, but anew Air Force fighter, the McDonel-Douglas F-15 ?Eagle," was beginig flight est and would solve this problem. Other new Air Force tchnolgies, notably laser guide bombs, howed tremndous potential for use in futre conflicts. Because historicaly Air Force inovation meant echnolgical inovation, the srvice?s futre prospects emed bright o most of the Air Force ladership. Howevr, the large, xpensive F-15, designed as pure air-to-air fighter, had ben controversial since its inception. It had to vercome inital opositon from those who wanted amulti-role fighter-bomber instead of asingle mision, air superiority fighter, and once dvelopment started, ther was ongoing opositon from asal group of Pentagon disidents inside and outside the Air Force who thought e F-15 was to expensive and complex. Thes disidents ? whom Ical the ?Critcs? - wanted avery smal, light, id3475587 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 2 simple, inexpensive fighter instead of the F-15. Nevrthels, the Air Force fl in solidly behind the F-15, and the Critcs wer left carping on the sidelines. While Air Force tchnolgical inovation was proceding apce, ther wer many in the srvice who di not fel the srvice had performed wel during the Vietnam War nd that he fault was not with its ystems. Thes wer mainly oung fihter pilots who ad flown the dificult combat misions to the avily defnde Hanoi are, especialy during the 1972 Linebacker operations, when asmal number of North Vietnames MiGs savged American strike flights. This group ? whom Ical the ?iron majors? - felt he solution to the Air Force problems that materialized over North Vietnam was not nly atechnolgical one but also anew, inovative program of realistic, ombat-orientd trainig far emoved from the safety-orientd trainig programs the Air Force had used before and uring the war. 2 Howevr, inovative rforms in Air Force trainig ? signifcant alternations in the philosphy acompanied by the asociated practial changes - semed omed from the start. The Air Force, ven though it was the nwest of the American rmed forces and had forward-loking image, was higly doctrinaire and had the most embeded cultre, acultre that semed to be imune to change. The Air Force ultre was spin-of of the strategic bombing doctrine taken from the Royal Air Force after World War Iby the laders of the American Army Air Corps. 3Because trategic bombing was unique mision best performed by its own experts, thes post-World War IAir Corps leaders aw it as way for the airmen to become indepndent from the United Staes Army, on the model of the indepndent Royal Air Force. From the arly 1930s, the Army Air Corps began to implent its own strategic bombing doctrine of daylight precison bombing with unescorted heavily armed bombers 3 and used it o devlop the four-engie B-17 and other strategic bombers. The Army Air Corps was renamed Army Air Force (AF) and, son after America entred World War I, the AF tok its trategic bombing doctrine into war over Europe, and one of the enduring images of World War I is huge formations of American four-engie bombers streaming contrails on their way to targets in Germany. In fact, the doctrine proved adisater in combat. It ok the dvelopment of lng-range fighter scorts and al-weather bombing sytems - whic hanged the doctrine from precison bombing to are bombing - to make strategic bombing sucesful. 4 The advent of the atomic bomb, whic had to be dliverd by an irplane, ld in 1946 to the formation f aseparte ?atomic? force, the Strategic Air Comand (SAC). While SAC was technicaly aseparte comand, it consited ntirely of Air Force oficers and made the formation f an idepndent Air Force inevitable. Once the indepndent Air Force was established in 1947, most of the laders came from strategic bombers, and they set about o make that mision the dominat one in the nw service. As the Cold War devloped uring the Truman d Eisenhower administrations, SAC became the miltary force of choice for American politcal eaders because astrategic bomber force was inexpensive when compared to the number of conventional forces nede to maintain the American doctrine of containment. Under the ladership of ne if its early comanders, the charismatic Genral Curtis LeMay, SAC?s trategic nuclear tack doctrine bcame the main mision f the Air Force. SAC?s cultre - a hig degre of discipline, tight op-down guidance and control, the supremacy of the SAC staf over the line crews, new ideas coming only from SAC headquarters, and strict flying safety regulations ? gradualy became the Air Force?s 4 cultre. This cultral devlopment was ignifcant because, as Wiliamson Muray, ahistorian of miltary inovation, otes identifying ew strategic requiremnts and translating them into new task?is ol half th btl? snior ficers, who d estblisd themslves by stisfying traditonl criteria for perfrman, ad te ncsary powr [for]creting prmotin pths along whic young ofiers ecializng in the new task could be proted.5 SAC genrals on ruled the Air Force, and while ther wer smal subcultres in the service ? notably the tactial fighter pilots ? that resited SAC cultre, the only result was the fighter pilots had low promtion rates and litle influence on the srvice. SAC?s doctrine and values wer firmly embeded in the Air Force when the Kenedy administration tok ofice in 1961, but Kenedy and his new Secrtary of Defnse, Robert McNamra, wer apaled by the cost of the strategic sytems the SAC comanders wanted and by SAC?s lack of lexibilty. Ironicaly, son SAC ? whic had begun as the inexpensive dfense option - priced itself out of the lading role in American defnse strategy. McNamra imediately began seris of inovative changes in the Department of Defnse (Do), notably a focus on flexible doctrine and conventional weapons, as wel as the use of sytems anlysi as the basi for procuring ew eapons ystems. McNamra?s changes folwed aclasic patern of inovation described by Bary Posen, who psit that civilans are bst at bringi major peacetime changes to miltary doctrine devloped by the normal hierachial, conservative miltary cultre.6 While McNamra changed American miltary doctrine and forced the Air Force to buy tactial sytems, ainly fighters, instead of strategic bombers, he di not change the Air Force ultre. LeMay simply put SAC oficers in charge of the rapidly expandig 5 fighter forces with orders to make the fighter force ? notably the Tactial Air Comand (TAC) ? just like SAC, only fling smaler aircaft. Ther is nothing to indicate LeMay would not have sucede in making TAC an organization with top down guidance, strict control, and an emphasi on flying safety under peacetime conditons, but he Vietnam War intervend. For the Air Force, fighting the Vietnam War ? known i the srvice as ?SEA? (Southeast Asia) ? caused the srvice to make anumber of internal decisons that had major, unitende consequences. Probaly the most important was critcal personel decison the Air Force made arly in the war ? no aircew meber would be snt back for a no-voluntary second tour ntil evryone had flown his first our. The rsult was that over the course of the ight years of the war, virtualy evry aircew meber in the Air Force flew a combat our. 7 The nxt consequence was that while thes oficers wer in combat, they became part of an etirely new cultre that emrged, a?combat cultre? that emphasized flexibilty, individual responsibilty, litle top-down control, and a?get the job done? atitude that was entirely difernt from the strict supervison ad emphasi on flying safety in the staeside Air Force. The young aircews, not surpisngly, prefred the combat cultre. After four years of war, beginig in 1968, ther was four-year break in the bombing of the avily defnde ares of North Vietnam. The United Staes Navy, dismayed by heavy loses to MiGs, devloped the ralistic ?Top Gun? trainig course to improve air-to-air performance. The Air Force, on the other hand, left its trainig programs intact, mainly because the Air Force ladership blamed its loses to MiGs ? 6 about he same kil:los ratio as the Navy?s - on the politcal imitaions of the war nd saw no reason to alter its flying safety cultre for percived hig-risk realistic trainig. After the four-year hiatus, the US began bombing the Hanoi are agin i 1972. The Navy di extremly wel in air-to-air combat, shoting down eight MiGs for evry aircaft it lost, while the Air Force suferd heavy loses among the aircews hose staeside trainig had sacrifced realism for flying safety. It was the loses during this period that made some of the Air Force?s young, combat hardend vetrans, the son to be ?iron majors,? detrmined to change the Air Force?s fly safe? cultre to ne of realistic trainig. It semed aSisyphean task. Historicaly the Air Force was comited to inovation by technolgy, not rainig. By the nd of the Vietnam War the srvice had evloped anew, hig-technolgy air-to-air fighter, the F-15, whic was expectd to dminate Soviet fighters, basicaly ignoring asmal group that complained the F-15 was overly complex and expensive. Ading to the iron majors? problems was that miltary historians and pundits considerd realistic trainig imposible. Howevr, this di not diminish te iron majors? vigorus eforts to change the way the Air Force trained. They won afew victories, notably the formation f an ?Agresor Squadron? to fly aginst American units, but despite the failures of Vietnam, but it ok the 1973 Midle East War to give the iron majors? ideas traction. During the first few days of the war, aThird orld maned air defnse ystem, using the latest Soviet quipment, humbled the vaunted Israeli Air Force, and this aded urgency to the iron majors? quest for betr tainig. It was t his time that Genral Robert Dixon tok over the Tactial Air Comand, the ?fighter comand,? and Dixon was detrmined to improve TAC?s trainig. After the 7 1973 Midle East War, Genral Dixon ad Israeli Air Force omander Major Genral Benjamin ?Benie? Peld became friends and felow travelrs. After talking to Peld and reading reports of the war, Dixon?s interst in improving Tactial Air Comand trainig became an obsesion. At he same tie, some of the iron majors taioned in the Pentagon, otably Major Richard M. ?ody? Suter, devloped an idea for a lrge, remarkably realistic exrcise program, caled Red Flag, in the Nevad esrt. After going through athorugh and at times dificult Pentagon veting proces, Suter presnted the idea for Red Flag to Genral Dixon at TAC, who enthusiasticaly embraced the concept. Dixon tok advantge of the fact hat he was the sole lader of absicaly self-contained organization - a situation that is very conducive to quick inovation - to abolish te ?fly safe? cultre in TAC, replacing it with acultre that emphasized realism, flexibilty, and local control. The first Red Flag exrcise tok place in late 1976 and the program was n istant suces. A new ?realistic trainig? cultre quickly tok hold, helpd by the fact hat Vietnam-era fighter pilots wer beginig to dminate the Air Force. Dixon was ble to kep the Red Flag exrcise program on track despite anumber of early acidents, and son ?realism? became the ky to Air Force trainig, and Red Flag became amodel for the other services. This was remarkable inovation for aservice that, until that ime, had completly eschewd improvemnt by ?trainig the man? for improvemnt by technolgy. Dixon?s replacemnt at TAC in 1978, Genral Wilbur Crech, brought back the emphasi on technolgy but wisely kept Dixon?s trainig programs in place. Crech acelrated the push for new technolgies to give the Air Force the capbilty to d long- 8 range, al-weather bombing, as wel as new, improved air-to-air misiles. The sytems proved costly and ificult o devlop, but both Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimy Carter suported the sytems in principle bcause they provide unique capbilties that wer aligned with te American ational strategy of having conventional forces that could fight aconventional war in Europe, Korea, nd later the Persian Gulf. During this period, the Air Force ? under some dures ? agred to buy the smal, relatively inexpensive Genral Dynamics F-16 as fighter-bomber to augment its F-15 force. The Ford and Carter administrations? relatively smal defnse budgets and a seris of Air Force dcisons resulted in alck of spare parts for the F-15s and F-16s, This lack of spares and ificulties with te F10 engie that powerd both fighters led to more and more problems through te late 1970s, especialy with te F-15. The problems with te F-15 led to heavier and heavier critcism from asal but vocal group of defnse Critcs who maintained America nede larger numbers of les costly stems, but heir cals genraly went unhede until the liberal journalist and eoliberal James Falows joined the Critcs? ranks in 197.8 Falows as nti-miltary and a perfct example of Samuel Huntigton?s thesi of signifcant ension betwen American liberal belifs and the naturaly conservative miltary establishment.9 At he time, Falows as resarching an article for The Atlantic Monthly considering ew ideas bout how to cut he miltary budget, and to find those who agred with tis view he went out on the ?fringes? of the defnse stablishment. He bcame intersted in the Critcs, whom he found ?kokie but convicing.? In the rsulting October 197 article, ?Muscle Bound Superower,? and later works Falows decred the Critcs wer miltary combat ?experts? and unquestionigly tok up their basic arguments: the American ational defnse trategy 9 was flawed because the miltary leadership was incompetnt, the weapons acquistion proces corupt, and hig defnse budgets wer linked to hig inflation; what America nede was new strategy that embraced amuch greatr number of simple, reliable, and les expensive sytems. Unspoken was the idea that he money saved would go into social programs.10 Falows tried to bring about hes changes in ational security policy in anew ay. Rather than trying for a bureaucratic victory from inside the government, he launched a politcal-style campaign, presntig the compeling argument of ?simpler, more rliable, more combat capble, and cheaper weapons? to what he trmed the ?ditorial elites? of the pres who, he blievd, could influence American policy. Beginig with is 197 article, Falows began to genrate an udience for the Critcs. The Critcs? cals to change American defnse policy and cut he dfense budget semed to be overwhelmed by the 1980 elction f the awkish conservative Republican Ronald Reagn, but Falows and the Critcs actualy became ore poular during the Regan dministration as defnse budgets oared. In 1981 Falows? bok, National Defnse, higlighted the Critcs? main arguments and became abestelr and bok awrd winer.1 Falows? and the Critcs? cals for more dfense for les money struck achord, and ot just with liberal Democrats. Led by Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), Congres formed aMiltary Reform Comite that son umberd more than fity mebers from al sides of the politcal spectrum in the House and Senate. The Comite gave the Critcs ? now caled the Defnse Reform Movemnt (DRM) - a very smpathetic hearing, and by the arly 1980s conventional wisdom in the poular pres and parts of 10 Congres was that American hig-tech weapons wer to expensive and unreliable, and actualy provide les combat capbilty. While the Critcs wer risng, TAC comander Genral Wilbur Crech ad ben relntlesly pushing his hig-tech weapons programs, exactly the kind of sytems the Critcs oposed. The Critcs? poularity surpised Crech and the Air Force, who considerd the Critcs? arguments implistic and often disngenuos, if not dishonest. During the arly 1980s, the Air Force and the Critcs engaed in along, runig batle over the futre of America?s hig-tech weapons procuremnt. It was batle fought on two difernt fronts. The Critcs, with Falows? help, ran their politcal-type campaign i the nws media, basing it on the premise that he ?voters? had litle in-depth knowledge of the isues and voting mainly on their intuiton. The Critcs argued their case in the poular media nd with simple briefings to mebers of Congres and other suporters, combined with sarp critcisms of miltary leadership. At he same tie, Crech, Air Force Chief of Staf Genral Lew Alen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, Air Force Genral David Jones, realized the service?s arguments wer to complex and uanced for the gneral public. They worked closely with te administration, especialy Secrtary of Defnse Caspar Weinberger, to devlop ways to apeal to adifernt audience, the Congres. Their aproach was to treat the case as trial nd preare al of their arguments in detail. The Air Force published numerous very specifc arguments for its hig-tech weapons in its own profesional journals, and contiued thes arguments in the congresional rmed services and apropriations comites wher expertise in miltary stems was the norm and Air Force gnerals and Do oficals wer treatd with respect. At he same tie, Congres 1 was made awre that he Air Force and the nw administration wer taking agresive and efctive steps to slve its identifed problems. In the nd, Crech and the Air Force got he igh-tech tactial sytems they wanted, and by 1985, the Critcs? push for large numbers of inexpensive, low-technolgy stems had ben efctively stymied. Stil, the Critcs? arguments refused to die, and when America moved to the Persian Gulf in 190 to cunter the Iraqi nvasion f Kuwait he two pints of view er put o what he Critcs aled ?the acid test of combat.? Acording to the Critcs, American forces would be porly led and their hig-tech equipment would be unreliable and inefctive, specialy in the arsh desrt environment. This di not hapen. The Coaliton forces, led by America?s hig-tech air power, er wildly sucesful. Most of the Air Force oficers who er asociated with te campaign, from top to btom, give some credit o the igh-tech weapons, but greatr credit o the ralistic trainig they recived in Red Flag nd other xercise. They also belived that he cultral change that had swept he Air Force and the other services as result of the ralistic trainig revolution brought on by Dixon ad the iron majors, and maintained by Crech, was major cause of American suces. The Critcs, on the other hand, wer unrepntat and claimed it was their unspecifed changes that brought about he victory. This author concludes most of the credit for the suces of the US Air Force in the 191 Gulf War must be given to the sucesful inovations in trainig and ?combat cultre? that ok over the Air Force after Vietnam, led by Mody Suter, the iron majors, and Genral Robert Dixon, and to the xpansion f thes programs under Genral Wilbur Crech. While video tapes of the igh-tech weapons may have meserized TV viewrs, in fact most of the Air Force strikes in the Gulf War caried Vietnam-era weapons but 12 used tactis devloped at he various Flag exrcise and epnde on the sucesful supresion f the air defnse. While the Critcs proved to be completly wrong about American leadership and weapons, they had ben roughly treatd by scholars and miltary anlyst evn before the 191 Gulf War. The Critcs? failure to influence policy was genraly atributed to their inabilty to frm acohernt mesage, their unwilinges to work within the sytem to bring about change, their inacurate valutions of weapons ystems, and their inabilty to influence Congres. 12 Comentaors found the Critcs? arguments halow, simplistic, and to focused on their personalites instead of their arguments. The Critcs? also lacked an uderstandig of the interconectdnes of miltary weapons ystems and the procuremnt proces and had to many personal gendas not fcused on the national interst. Thes personal gendas meant he Critcs wer unwiling to entr into calitons with like-minde miltary people ? and ther wer many ? to work to bring about change. Another eason Falows and the Critcs failed was that Falows? fundamental theory ? that n elction style campaign that won ver the lite pres could change American defnse policy ? was flawed. The Critcs wer outmaneuverd by the Air Force, whic presnted nough serious, carefuly crafted etailed arguments to Congres that hey caried the day. Howevr, despite the Critcs? failure to influence the weapons acquistions proces and the sucess of the igh-tech weapons they deplored in the Gulf War, the Critcs di not disapear. By the mid-190s, Falows and other suporters insited that he Critcs? unamed reforms ade America?s victory posible, and one of the Critcs, Air Force Colnel John Boyd, was practialy deifed for his ?contributions? to American defnse. 13 Today it sems fair to say that some of the Critcs? arguments - the weapons procuremnt proces is corupt, that hig-tech weapons are to expensive and o nt fit America?s neds - stil recive a hearing in the lite poular pres and are stil regularly advanced by those who ant o reduce American defnse budgets (the Critcs? argument that he miltary is porly led came a croper in the dsert in the first Gulf War nd has ben droped). Nevrthels, despite the Critcs? contiued resonace in the poular pres, the selction f weapons ystems i stil done by what hey would cal the usal cabl ? miltary profesionals, the Department of Defnse, and the congresional rmed services comites. Plus ?a change, plus c?est la m?e chose. Howevr, the weapons ystems are only part of the story. Today it is the ralistic trainig of American miltary forces more than their hig-tech sytems that sets them aprt from other countries - realistic trainig that, until Genral Dixon, the iron majors, and the dvelopment of Red Flag, had ben considerd imposible. 1. Marshal Michel, The Elevn Days of Christmas (San Franciso: Encounter Boks, 202), 34-235. . The group consited of very experinced fighter pilots with extnsive combat records, many (bt t al) ithr fom th Fightr Wans Scol or pilots wh ould atn the Weapons Schol at soe pint i teir carers. At imes they er caled the ?Figtr Mfi? beause f their closes and agrmnt on ost isus that invol the fihter forc, t hy sould nt b mistken for the Critcs? Fighter Mfia,? whic was compsed of ver few pilts, oe with xprienc in Vietnam. T ?iron mjors? inlude Moy Sutr, Roger Wels, Jn Vickery, Joh Cordr, Charles Chuck? Horr, Wiliam Kirk, Wil ud, and James ?Snake? lark. 3. Doctrine dals with te miltry ns of implentig national strategy; it defines the mas tht il b ploed ad the ethod thy wil be mplod, and is th basi ow the miltary is tructr n for wat weapons the iltary wil procure. Bary Psen, T Sources of Miltary Doctrine: Frnc, Britai, and Germany Betwn the World Wars (Itha, NY: Cornel Univrsity Pres, 1984), 13, psi. 14 4. Alfred Price, Batle Over the Reich (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1973), 89-6. For afulr acount nd th rsults, Stepn L. McFarld Wesly P. Newton, To Cmnd the Sky: The Batle for Air uriority Over Germany, 1942-194 (Washigton, DC: Smitsonia History of Aviation ad Spceflight, 0). 5. iliamson Muray d Alan R. Milet, eds., Miltary Inovation i the Interwar Period (Cbridge, UK: Cmbrige Uivrsity Prs, 198), 12. 6. Posen, 25-26. 7. Jacb van Stavern, Gradual Failure: The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965-196 (Wshigto, DC: Air Force History and Musms Program, 202), 3, 75, 4-4. 8. The Critcs include, among others, Air Force Colnels John Boyd and Everst Ricioni, Do alyst Pire Sprey and Franklin ?huck? Spiney, as wel s Snator Gary Hart (-CO) and his tafr Wilim Lid. 9. Smuel Hutigton, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politcs of Civl-Miltary Rlations (Cambridg, MA: Blkap Prs of Harvard Uiversity Pres, 1957), 193. 10. Robert Rothenberg, The Neoliberals: Creating the New American Politcs (New York: Simn ad Scustr, 1984), 12-13. 1. Jaes Flows. National Defnse (New York: Random House, 1981). htp:/w.natinalbok.rg/bwirs1980.html, (Augst 205). 12. The scholrs include Samuel Huntigton, Eaton Profesor f the Science of Governmnt and Diretor f the John M. Oli Istiute fr Stratgic Studis at Harvard Unirsity; Wiliam Pry, formr Secrtary of Defns and curently Michel nd Barbar Berberin rofesr, Stanford University, ad coiretor f the Prvtive Defnse Projct Istiut for Intertial Studis, resarh claboration f Stanford and Harvard Universites; Dr. Wiliamson Mray, Profsor Emeritus, Ohi te Uiversity, formr Charls Lindbergh Prfesor, Air and Spac Msem, Hornr Profsor f Miltary Teory, Marin Corps University, Centnial Visting Prfesor, Lndn Schol of Econmics d uthr f umrous boks i both air power and miltary invatin; Dr. Serge Herzog, aSwis iltary afirs cnsultnt, utrl observer ad uthor f probaly th definitve ork on the Crits ad TACIR, Defnse Rfrm n Tecnlgy: Tctial Aircaft (Wstprt, N: Praegr, 194). 15 CHAPTER ONE: ALIGNMENT THE INDEPNDENT UNITED STAES AIR FORCE AND AMERICAN GLOBAL STRATEGY The United Staes Army Air Force nterd World War I with two basic theories: daylight precison bombing could win a war, and bombers could fight eir way into and out of the target without fighter scort.1 Both of thes theories proved invalid. The cloudy weather over Europe and the igh altiude jt streams over Japn destroyed the idea of daylight precison bombing, and in October 1943 the Luftwafe shot piecs the idea that bomber formations could fight eir way into and out of the target unescorted. 2 While the bomber nthusiast of the Army Air Force had proved singularly inept at producing combat doctrines, they wer much more sucesful in the post-war bureaucratic batles that made the Army Air Force an idepndent service. A post-war Strategic Bombing Survey atempted to validate the ned for an idepndent Air Force based on the unique capbilties of strategic bombing, but he atomic bomb provide the final rgument for what became the United Staes Air Force. It semed that he combination f long-range bombers with atomic weapons would give the United Staes a major advantge in ay war in the nar futre.3 The atomic bomb and the bomber force also led to the dvelopment of anew strategic doctrine, ?detrence,? wher detring anuclear war became the main purose of the id3507523 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 16 miltary. The nw eapons and the ned for devlopment of the practial spects of this doctrine clearly caled for aspecialized group of experts, the Army Air Force ?bomber genrals,? who became the backbone of the Strategic Air Comand (SAC) when it was creatd on 21 March 1946. SAC tok the bulk of the AF?s bomber forces to rganize and equip them for nuclear warfre, whic became the postwar extnsion f the Air Force doctrine of strategic bombardment.4 To emphasize that heir mision was detring war rather than combat, SAC adopted the slogan ?Peace is Our Profesion.?5 The United Staes Army Air Forces became the United Staes Air Force on 18 Septmber 1947, when President Hary Truman signed the National Security Act, symbolicaly on the presidential Army Air Forces airplane, the Sacred Cow. That same day, Stuart Symington became the first Secrtary of the Air Force and Genral Carl A. Spatz the first Chief of Staf. 6 The nw Air Force onsited of thre comands ? SAC, the Tactial Air Comand (TAC) composed mainly of ighters for tactial, no-nuclear operations, and the Air Defnse Comand (ADC) to defnd the United Staes aginst trategic nuclear tack. The nw Air Force?s taed primary mision was ?gainig and maintainig enral ir superiority and establishing air superiority wher and as required,? but almost imediately the srvice placed its higest priorites on SAC?s mision f long-range, indepndent ofensive nuclear operations aginst he Soviet Unio and Comunist China.7 The Truman doctrine of ?containment? depnde on SAC, and in 1948 the comand began metoric rise when the charismatic, igar-chomping Genral Curtis LeMay tok over SAC. 8 Son SAC became the backbone of American defnse and iconic 17 LeMay would tower not nly above SAC and the Air Force but over American ational defnse policy until the arly 1960s.9 For the first few years of SAC?s existence, Truman tried to balnce the smal defnse budget qualy betwen the srvices, but son the isue bcame the amount of security thes limited efnse budgets would buy. 10It became clear that, in a era of limited defnse budgets, the unique capbilties of SAC?s nuclear-rmed, maned bombers, despite their shortcomings, maried the most important considerations in American defnse policy, containment and etrence, at low cost. To win the ?batle of the budget,? the Air Force mbraced SAC?s trategic nuclear bombing doctrine ven more strongly and the Air Force?s Tactial Air Forces (TAF), whose mision was to suport the Army, wer pushed out of the Air Force mainstream. 1 On 14 April 1950, Truman recived NSC 68, ?A Report o the National Security Council by the Executive Secrtary on United Staes Objectives and Programs for National Security.? The rport was based on the premise that nuclear weapons and comand of the air wer critcal nd would remain so as the Soviets increased their nuclear capbilty. Truman gred with te findigs but strugled with te budgetary isues the rport aised until the Korean War broke out, alowing him to ake large increase in the dfense budget. Nevrthels, despite the conventional nature of the Korean War nd aconventional forces buildup in Europe, most of the budget increase for the Air Force went o SAC. In 1951 alone SAC almost doubled its personel and had a 20 percnt icrease in ew heavy bombers, mainly the uge, xpensive and controversial B-36.12 18 By the sumer of 1952, the Air Force projectd the United Staes could not aford both anuclear detrent and alrge army to fight conventional wars, o the srvice became ore and more strident about its demands that it be the ?keystone of American miltary power? with te budget o suport it. 13 When Dwight Eisenhower became president i November 1952, this theory fit into his clear set of defnse priorites. Using the threat of SAC?s nuclear capbilty, he nde the Korean War, and SAC also helpd with is next priority, to presrve the doctrine of containment with as low amiltary budget at posible ? security and solvency.?14 Truman?s last budget projectd adefict of almost $10 bilion ut of utlays of les than $80 bilion, and the 1953 defnse budget was 62 percnt of edral spendig. Eisenhower felt hat he Truman strategy, particularly NSC-68, would bankrupt he country and wanted to find away to sutain containment for the indefinite futre, but in away that would not destroy the American econmy in the proces, so Eisenhower comited his administration to reducing the budget defict and decide defnse would have to take major, evn draconia, cuts, aplan caled the ?New Lok.? 15 In April 1953, the administration comited to the ?New Lok? defnse policy and nuclear detrence bcame the main, almost ole, national defnse strategy of the United Staes. In a tempt o make the point o the Soviets that ny war ould become total war, and to make that prospect so frightenig it would etr al wars, the Air Force - actualy SAC, now almost he synoym for the Air Force ? was expande and modernized while the Navy and Army wer cut. Eisenhower?s new nuclear strike doctrine made SAC?s targets virtualy al the Soviet cites, euphemisticaly caled ?urban 19 industrial complexs,? as wel as most Soviet miltary base, especialy bomber and misile base.? 16As SC became the focus of American defnse, SAC comander Curtis LeMay trained and preared SAC for asingle, fuly mobilzed nuclear tack on the Soviet Unio, whic LeMay caled the ?Sunday punch.? The ?Sunday punch? was not just intede to incapcitae the Soviet miltary, but o destroy the Soviets? wil? and abilty to wage war. By March 1954 SAC had esignated 18 of the 134 major cites in Rusia for atck with casualties in thes cites projectd to be twen 75 and 84 percnt of the poulation.17 The doctrine linked the number of bombers and thermonuclear bombs to the number of miltary, industrial nd econmic targets in the Soviet Unio, and thus gave SAC planers an icentive to find an evr increasing umber of targets. As Soviet capbilties increased, SAC aded more aircaft and bombs to its inventory, and the ?New Lok? became the ?sorcer's aprentice.?18 In Decmber 1960 SAC finalized awar plan, the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), to use al of thes weapons at once in a integrated fashion. One scientist briefd on the SIOP said ?it semed that he purose was simply to strip mine the USR.?19 The budgetary aspects of the ?New Lok? had far eaching and cripling efcts on the rst of the American rmed forces. During the Eisenhower administration SAC recived 48 percnt of the total defnse budget, while the Army?s 195 budget was cut from $13 bilion to $10.2 bilion ad the srvice rduced in size by almost one-third. 195 was ctualy the Army?s hig water mark under Eisenhower, ho belived that he 20 Army?s main job would be to maintain order in the US after a nuclear exchange.20 In the 1956 defnse budget he Army was further cut o $7.4 bilion ad the Navy to $9.4 bilion, while the Air Force rceivd $12.7 bilion. I 1957 the Air Force budget increased to $15.7 bilion, while the Army?s hare droped to $7.3 bilion ad the Navy?s to $9.1 bilion.21 The cuts caused consternation i the Army and Navy, not nly because of the reduction i force structre but also because of the overal strategy. 2The cuts epecialy dismayed Genral Mathew Ridgeway, the Army Chief of Staf, who said the New Lok ?wil lead us to disater.? 23 In 195 Genral Maxwel Taylor eplaced Ridgeway nd contiued to argue for an rmy capble of ighting alimited war. When the Eisenhower administration contiued to emphasize American uclear capbilty, in 195 Taylor resigned and wrote abok, The Uncertain Trumpet, critcizng Eisenhower?s defnse doctrine. At his time, as MIT?s Harvey Sapolsky has noted, ?the Army became Democrats.?24 But despite thes objections, at he nd of the 1950s SAC reflcted almost perfctly American ational strategy and, importantly, it di it at reasonable cost. SAC ND THE AIR FORCE ULTRE Miltary historian Wiliamson Muray describes miltary cultre as ?the most important factor not nly in miltary efctivens, but also in the process involed in miltary inovation, whic is esntial in prearing miltary organizations for the nxt war.? 25 LeMay nd SAC had evloped a unique cultre and, not surpisngly, because of LeMay?s power, personality, and the importance of SAC in the Air Force, SAC?s cultre became the Air Force?s cultre. The cultre mphasized inovation by technolgy, and 21 LeMay constantly presd for any stem that oferd promise of alowing more of his bombers to get hrough to their targets - new bombers that could fly ?higer, faster, and farther,? as wel as new thermonuclear bombs and uclear delivery stems on fighters. 26 Ther was, howevr, one otable xception. LeMay nd the rst of SAC wer oposed to any sort f nuclear weapons delivery stem that hreatned to replace maned nuclear bombers. LeMay became astrong, if at imes ubtle, oponet of lng-range, intercontiental balistic misiles (ICBM).27 Since SAC?s doctrine caled for amasive, cordinated, single-strike nuclear tack, LeMay?s al out ?Sunday punch,? SAC designed its planig, organization, and trainig for this mision. The SAC headquarters taf had to plan the masive strike bforehand down to the minutest detail, and because of the importance of this planig, LeMay had SAC?s best and brightest? oficers brought o SAC headquarters in Omah, Nebraska. Thus LeMay?s SAC cultre put apremiu on being ameber of the staf, not n being ameber of an ircew.28 For the aircews, ?control? was the watchword. To insure adhernce to its plans, SAC?s tactis wer simple so they could be standarized and used by al crews. SAC?s crews and crew mebers wer expectd to be interchangeable, so SAC devloped trainig that emphasized rote rpetion f task without deviation, relying heavily on rigd ahernce to checklist, reharsls and rils. To insure uniform trainig acros the comand, SAC established amasive control rganization, caled Standarization ad Evalution (STANEVAL), to ensure al SAC crews er folwing al checklist, rules 2 and irectives. A positon i aflying unit?s STANEVAL section was the first tep to the covetd SAC staf.29 Because SAC depnde on top-down control and on al of its crews precisely excuting each single mision i the cordinated ?Sunday punch,? in SAC cultre the SAC solution was the only corect solution for evry problem. The comand studiously avoide any atempt at inovation at he lower levls because it might detract from the centralized comand and control and the grand esign of the SIOP. The cultre that evoled, not surpisngly, featured alck of lw-levl initative and an uwilinges to act without orders from above. But it was the sytem LeMay wanted ? and ede ? so SAC and the Air Force as whole aceptd it.30 In the late 1950s, beginig with te acquistion f the large and expensive B-52, SAC?s bombers became ore xpensive and thus fewr in umber. Because ach bomber had its part in the ?Sunday punch,? to kep from losing any of them in acidents ?flying safety? and ?risk avoidance? became dominat hems in SAC trainig.31 In early 1960, one Air Force publication oted, ?Throughout he Strategic Air Comand it is wel understod that flying safety takes precdence over al other operational requiremnts. No program recives more mphasi than flying safety.?32 The cultre of lying safety so dominated SAC and the Air Force that he srvice oficaly advocated that n aircew meber should not fly if he di not fel ?up to it,? and said his upervisor had to respect, suport, and evn ecourage him in his decison ot fly. 3 Aditonaly, because it dealt with nuclear weapons, SAC adopted aprogram of ?Zero Defcts.? Zero Defcts? meant, in esnce, that evrything had to be done 23 perfctly. The philosphy worked wel ith nuclear sytems ? the Navy had basicaly the same program on its nuclear submarines ? but SAC aplied the principle to evry aspect of the comand?s functions, and then xpande it o the ntire Air Force.34 A young oficer who later became a senior mangemnt anlyst remberd that s a lieutnat in the Air Force in the late 1950s: I was introduced to the concept of ?Zero Defcts,? or ?ZD.? On the flight lie, airmn ckd, uble-chckd, triple-checked the tigtnes of vry rivet, very screw, vry bolt f vry airaft. Thos writng intelignc rports aoide like the plague mispelis or improerly laced cmas. From t nrals to the snior ncisined ofirs, nothing but ?Zero Defcts? was xpectd. And, that?s what hey gt? It wasn?t because te trops wr perfct. We achievd zero defcts becaus th bras put s in charg of th rporting. What outfit wold hve te tmerity to atuly reprt fite defcts? We just lie. 35 hile SAC was only a prt of the Air Force, LeMay wanted to ensure SAC and its cultre to dminate the srvice. One oficer noted that ?SAC?s methods, their procedures, became the only ones alowable, and they [SAC} refused to tlerate any deviations. They di their best o standarize verything for whic they had responsibilty and manuals and irections became the order of the day.?36 LeMay began by promting or ensuring the promtion f his ?boys,? those h knew and wer SAC - and LeMay ? loyalist, and then set up asytem wherby al low-rankig SAC oficers would have an dvantge in promtion sytem. 37Congres had limited by law the number of ficers that service could have at he igher anks, o in Decmber 194 LeMay devloped asytem to promte SAC oficers in a way that would avoid the congresionaly imposed ceilngs. Thes wer temporay promtions, caled ?spot promtions,? whic gave the slectes 24 the pay s wel as the insignia of the igher grades. They wer ?legal? because they wer only temporay, and the mebers went back to their previous grades when they left heir aircews or wer rated eficent i operational evalutions. The rsult was that SAC oficers who er ?spot promted? recived the xtra py comiserate with teir new rank, and on their oficer fectivens reports (OER) the ?spot promtion? showed they wer ready for the nxt grade. As a result, SAC oficers wer promted at rates far higer than those in ay other part of the Air Force.38 Given SAC?s unique mision, it is dificult o critcize the internal ogic of its philosphy and method. The problems arose when LeMay forced SAC?s cultre on the entire Air Force, including the parts that had entirely difernt misions. THE ROLE OF THE TACTIAL IR FORCE Under Eisenhower?s New Lok,? by the late 1950s the mphasi on SAC meant he TAF was only 12 percnt of the Air Force, and the fighters? role had changed. Air Force doctrine ow caled for fighters either to defnd aginst enmy bombers or t fly ofensive tactial nuclear strike misions at low levl, poping up to lb anuclear weapon atrget. Tactial fighters at actial nuclear lert and their criteria for bombing acuracy was hiting within 750 fet of a trget, considerd ?close nough? with a nuclear weapon.39 Conventional dive bombing and air-to-air combat rainig recived litle mphasi, because the aim was to destroy the nemy air force on the ground with nuclear weapons. One Air Force gneral noted about his period, ?Genral LeMay had deliberately loade the Air Staf with ?bomber guys,? who er not wel acquainted with things like ?air superiority? or air-to-air combat, nd who anted to destroy enmy 25 aircaft on their airfields.? In 1957, LeMay ctualy tried to eliminate the TAF, but he posibilty of the Army devloping its tactial ir suport arm overode this idea, nd later that year LeMay reluctantly gave the TAF more funds to kep its mision from being turned over to the Army. 40SAC TAKES OVER SAC?s domination f the Air Force had major efct on aseparte but raditonaly important Air Force subcultre, the tactial fighter cultre. Because trategic bombers and tactial fighters flew entirely separte types of misions, they had vastly difernt cultres. Bomber misions are, to agreat extnt, relatively inflexible, since bombers have a specifc target and a set ime to strike it, with suces measured by their abilty to work their way through te dfense and bomb the target. The gneraly aceptd virtues of bomber pilots are prsevrance, discipline, and organization f their multi-person crew. Fighters, on the other hand, are alowed much more fredom in searching out heir targets ? exmplifed by the famous diktat of World War One German ce Manfred Von Richtofen: ?a fighter pilot must roam his aloted are, find the nemy, and shot him down. Anything els is rubish.? Fighter pilots put apremiu on agresivens and indepndent inovation whic, as might be xpectd, led to afrewheling tactial fighter pilot cultre that colide head on with te SAC top-down control and ?fly-safe? cultre. 41 One author noted: When afighter pilot was in trainig, his uperiors wer constantly spelig out strict rules bout he use of te aircaft and condut i the sky?bt smehow th mesag t ut o th youg fihter pilots tat if aman truly had it e could inore thes rles?and that in some strange uofical wy, pking thrug is fingrs, his istructr expcted him to chalenge l the limits.42 26 Aditonaly, fighter pilots wer alone in the cokpit, and this bred acultre of individualism. As the noted writer Richard Bach remberd from his time flying fighters, ?ther is no space aloted for another pilot tune the radios in the weather or make the cals to air tafic ontrol centrs or t help with te mergency procedures?.Ther is no ne lse to make dcisons. In a war?If die, Iwil die alone.? 43 Air Force aircew and leaders, both fighter and bomber, would not have disputed thes descriptions of the two cultres. Both sides agred on the charcteristics of SAC cultre and the fighter pilot cultre; ther wer simply diametricaly oposed views about whetr each was god or bad. The TAF?s fighter pilots ridiculed SAC?s fly safe? and ?Zero Defcts? cultre while LeMay famously said, ?Flying fihters i fun, flying bombers i serious.?4 Because SAC had the most important mision, SAC dominated the post-World War I Air Force, and few fighter pilots wer promted to hig rank. By the late 1950s, as the Eisenhower administration came to an ed, SAC had for al practial purose taken over the United Staes Air Force and was the dominat arm of the American miltary. The leading Air Force gnerals wer virtualy al ?bomber genrals? teped in SAC doctrine. Air Force ultre was SAC cultre, and the Air Force bcame known for its emphasi on inovation by technolgy, top-down guidance with no inputs from below, and rigorus adhernce to standarization ad flying safety.45 27 1. Ther are sveral iterations of name changes that he rader should be awre of. The Unitd Sts Army Air Crps (USAC) ws stblis on 2 Jly 1926. It bcame t ite taes r ir Forces ( F) on 20 June 1941, ad the United Staes Air Force on 18 Sptmber 1947. Brnard Nalty, Wiged Sword, Wing Sil: A History of th Uited tates Air Force, Volume One, 1970-1950 (Washito, DC: ir Force History an Musms Prgra, 197). 2. For short explantion f how this doctrine was devloped, se Pery Smith, ?The Role f Dctrin,? in America Defnse Pliy, Fifth Eitn, . John F. Reicart and Stvn Sturm (Baltior, M: Johs Hopkins Pres, 1982), 651-657. 3. Le Kenet, A History f Strategic Bombing (New York: Scribner, 1982), 384. 4. Ibid., 38. 5. Davi A. nderton, Strategic Air Comand: Two-Thirds of the Triad (New York: Scribner, 1971), 2. 6. Hrman S. Wolk, ?The Quest for Indepndence,? in Nalty, Winged Sword, 374. 7. For ful acunt from th Navy poit of viw s Jefr Barlo, The Revolt f the Admirals: The Fight fr Navl Aitin 1945-1950 (Washington, DC: Navl Historicl Centr, 194). For shorter sumary, se Stepe L. Rearden, ?U.S. trategic Bmbardmt Doctrine Since 1945,? in Cse Studis in tratgic Bombardment, ed. Stephen Reardn (Washigto, DC: Air Forc Mseums nd Studies Progras, 198), 21. 8. Executive Order 987 (change to 950 Executive Order 950) Revoking Executiv Ordr No. of 26 July 147, presribing th Functions of th Armed Fors; Signe: 21 April 1948; Fedral Registr: 13 FR 219, 23 April 1948. (Washinto, DC: GPO, ). 9. Authr?s interview ith Wayne Thompson, former Air Force historian, and biograper of Geral Curtis LeM, Spteber 205, Fbruary 206. 10. Knt, A History of Strategic Boming ,39; Wolk, ?The Quest for Indepndece,? in Nalt, Winged Sword, 380, pasim. 1. War A. Trest ad Gorge Watson, ?Fring Air Force Misions,? in Nalty, Winged Sword, 402-40, psim; Richrd H. Kohn ad Joseph P. Harha, ed., Strtegic Air arfre: An Iterview ith Genrals Curtis LeMy, Ln W. Jonson, David A. Burhinl, and Jack J. Caton (Washigton, D: Oficer of Air Frce Histry, 198), 51, 60, pasim. 12. Rearden, ?U.S. trategic Bombardment Doctrine Since 1945,? in Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment, 21. For an i epth lok at h cotrovrsy from th U Navy?s point of view, se Jfry Barlw, The Rvolt f the Admirals: The Fight fr Navl Aviatin 1945-1950 (Washington: Navl Histrical Cnter, 194). 13. Rearden, ?U.S. trateic Bombrdment Doctri Since 195,? in Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment, 214. 14. Andrew Bacvich, "Genrals versu the President: Eisenhower and the Army 1953-95," Civl-Miltary ad Miltry-Media Rlatios (Fal 1985): 219, 23. 1. Ibid., 21. 28 16. Robert Futrel, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinkig in the United States Air Force (Maxwl Air Force Bas, AL: ir Uivrsity Pres, 198), 276. 17. Rrden, 409; ls s Kohn, 109, for SAC genral oficer coments. 8. Paul Dukas, L'aprenti srcier, 87. 19. Rerden, Cse Studis i Stratgic Bombardment, 423; Waren A. Trest and George Watso, ?Framing Air Force Misins,? in Nalty, Winged Sword, 410-41. 20. Bcevich, 24. 1. Futrl, 78-0. 2. Waren A. Trest, Air Force Roles and Misions: A History (Washington, D.C: Air Force History and Musems Prgram), 16-167. 23. Bacevich, 94. axwl D. Tylor, Gen. USA, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Hrpr & Brothers, 195); for asumary se Maxwl D. Tylor, Gn. ,USA. ?The Uncertain Trumpt,? spech befre the US Army Wr Coleg, Carlisle Barcks, PA, 5 Fbrury 1950, Air For Historical Rsearch gency, Maxwel AF, AL (herafter AFHRA). 24. uthor?s lecture notes from 16 October 205 lecture in ?The Politcs of Defnse,? crs taght by Prfesr Harvy Sapolsky, MIT. 25. Wiliamson Mura, ?Dos Miltr Cultre ater?? Orbis, Winter 19, 27-8. 6. Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome (Nw Brunswick, NJ: Trasaction, 194), 5-6, pasim. 27. Rearden, 413-41. 8. Koh ad Harhan, 90-1. 29. Trest n Wtso, 47; Mike Worden, The Rise of the Fighter Genrals: The Problem of Air Leadership 195-1982 (Maxwl AFB, AL: ir Univrsity Pres, 197), 1-2, pasim. 30. Worden, 14; LeMay in Kohn ad Harhan, 90. 1. Th acident rats SAC ad to el wit wer quite hig. Se Keneth P. Werl, ?os Wr the Days: Flying Safty During th Transiton to Jts, 194-1953,? Air Power Histry (intr 205): 40-53, especialy te crt o 48. 32. Pry M. Hoisgton, Brig. Gen, USAF, ?Suprvisn Dwn the Line,? Flying Safety 16 (January 1960): 16. 3. Frcis D Hesy, ?Editor?s View,? Flying Safety, 16 (January 1960): 3. 4. John F. Lhman, Comand of th Seas (New York: Scriber, 8) 2-4. 35. Eric Zoeckler, ?Manger?s Memo,? nohmish (WY) County Busines Journal, June 203, 12. 36. Tom Clancy and Genral Chuck Horner, USAF, Every Man Tiger (New York: Putna, 19), 17. 37. Genral Curtis LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, Mision With LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NJ: Dobld, 1965), 231. 38. Worden, 17, pasim. 9. r, 24. The standar measuremnt for bombing eror is Circular Eror Probale (CEP). The standr t his ti was CEP f sev hundre fity fet, whic 29 meant 50 percnt of the bombs had to fal within acirle with asevn hundre fity fot rdius around the targt. Bernr Apel, Lt Col. USAF, ?Bombing Acracy in aCmbat Envirnmet,? Air Univrsity Reviw, July-Augst 1975. htp:/w.airpower.maxwel.af.mil/airchronicles/aureviw/1975/jul-aug/apel.html (acesd My 204). This article in ls a exlnt, if slightly technicl, xlantion f th problems of droping unguid bombs from fighters wit convtioal sights ? ?dum bs frm dub airplanes.? 40. Futrel, 279, 28, 468. 1. This i wel documentd in World War I dat compiled by sevral countries, both alied and Axis. A god sumary is Fesibilty Study to Prict Combt Efectivns i Selcted Rles: Fighter Pilot Efectivens, ARDA ntract Study MDA 903, 76 C0169, MDC E1643, (St. Louis Misuri: McDonel ouglas, 29 April 197), 4-14-13. 2. Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuf (New York: Bantm Boks, 1980), 24. 43. Richard Bac, Straner to th Grund (New York: Harper and Row 1963), 96. . oren, 27. 45. Wrd, 6; LeMay in Kohn ad Harhan, 41. Hoisngton?s ful article gives awonderful ?fel? for th tmosper i the lte 1950s. 30 CHAPTER TWO: REALIGNMENT KENEDY, MCNAMRA, ND A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY As asenator and presidential candiate, John F. Kenedy had ben higly critcal of the Eisenhower strategy and efnse program, viewing its complet reliance on masive retalition with few options a unrealistic. Kenedy wanted to move the US from alost total depndence on uclear detrence to a comitent o intervention by conventional forces, uplemnted by a limited policy of nuclear detrence. After Kenedy was elcted, to implent his new national security strategy and build American miltary conventional forces to match American comitents around the world, Kenedy named businesman Robert Strange McNamra, formerly president of Ford Motr Company and an Army Air Force staistical control ficer in World War I, as Secrtary of Defnse. It was fateful decison. McNamra quickly began to use the moribund aditonal powers granted to the Secrtary of Defnse in the Defnse Reorganization Act of 1958, and in his long tenure h became both ighly controversial nd perhaps the most powerful and influential Secrtary of Defnse in American history.1 The nw national strategy, ?Flexible Response,? would use trategic nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in asytem of ?graduated response,? rather than LeMay?s al- out nuclear warfre scenario.2 Later, in Vietnam, McNamra cried the concept of graduated response over to cnventional warfre, with ighly controversial results.3 id3563964 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 31 To bring miltary credibilty to the nw strategy, Kenedy caled one his miltary advisors, retired former Army Chief of Staf Maxwel Taylor, back to active duty in 1962 and amed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf to help structre the miltary for ?flexible rsponse.? The Air Force di not embrace Taylor, and one Air Force gneral ? not aSAC ?bomber genral? - said later ?[Taylor?s] Uncertain Trumpet was lot f crapand Taylor played aleading role in devloping the ruinous trategy ? gradualism - that led to eight plus years of agony in Vietnam.?4 McNamra nd Kenedy not nly rejcted SAC?s Sunday punch? doctrine bcause of its lack of lexibilty, but also because the cost was enormous. SAC had contiued to devlop more targets and to demand more weapons and sytems to strike them, and SAC?s 1963 SIOP caled for atcking 8,40 Sino/Sviet argets with nuclear weapons, and the comand had calulated that by the nd of iscal year 1970 it would ned 3,0 Minuteman, 10 Atlas, and 70 Titan ICBMs, as wel as 840 new RS-70 bombers with apropriate ?heavy bombers of amore advanced nuclear-powerd esign? to cntiue asuring SAC?s et goal of a90 percnt destruction f selcted Sino-Soviet bloc targets. 5 But Kenedy and McNamra felt he US could not aford such a lrge, inflexible force and build up its conventional forces at he same tie, so they droped the ?New Lok? for anew American uclear doctrine, ?Flexible Response,? whic required asmal and les expensive strategic force. Ironicaly SAC, whic had become the mainstay of America?s defnse in the 1950s because of its percived cost efctivens, had priced itself out of the game. 6 32 Initaly Kenedy told McNamra that he should not be constrained by the ?arbitray budget ceilngs? that had forced a reliance on uclear weapons in the 1950s but rather to proced with acquirng enral purose forces based on ?what ype of conflicts we anticpate, what countries we chose to asit, and to what degre thes countries can asit hemselvs; in short, what contigencies we preare for.?7 Howevr, the number of conventional forces required to met his ambitous goal was tagering, so in 1962 McNamra nd his Do staf devloped an itelctual basi for force structre devlopment. 8It was ?two and ahlf war? scenario, wher the United Staes would have nough forces to fight awar gainst he Soviets in Europe, China in Asia, nd asmaler insurgency anywher in the world. 9 MCNAMRA, THE WHIZ KIDS, AND THE PBS Before McNamra, Secrtary of Defnse would impose limits on veral defnse spendig but provide litle other guidance, and if the miltary said aweapon filed a "miltary requiremnt," that was enough.10 McNamra?s view as difernt. He came to Do to lead nd belived that Do nede central planig, some ethod to prioritze neds other than the individual services? desires, and away to find options other than those presnted by the uniformed iltary. As on as he tok over, McNamra surounde himself with a staf mainly drawn from RAND and the acdemic omunity, and then began to work on the nw conventional forces and eciding how to pay for them.1 In the proces of sytematicaly anlyzing defnse rquiremnts, McNamra?s staf produced probaly the most important and lasting result of the cNamra years, the five-year Programing, Planig, and Budget System (PBS), whic become the art 3 of the McNamra mangemnt program. McNamra lso introduced the roling Five Year Defnse Program (FYDP) for lng-range planig, but he FYDP only provide genral fiscal guidance.12 The inital ims of PBS wer to set up a long-range, rather than year-to-year, budget proces using anlytical tols to devlop explict measures for whic weapons ystems the country nede, considering the miltary neds and cost togethr. Decisons in the PBS, FYDP and other Do initatives wer to be made by ?Systems Analysi? (SA), whic used conmics and aplied mathematics, especialy staistics and algorithms, to anlyze complex weapons programs, and quantiative ?comon sense? factors uch as cost efctivens to provide ascientifc basi for decison making. One of the ?Whiz Kids,? Alain Ethoven, defined sytem anlysi as way to use ?the simplest, most fundamental concepts of econmic theory, combined with te simplest quantiative methods.?13 Enthoven said that hrough sytems anlysi ?evry decison should be considerd in as broad context as necsary?to reduce a complex problem to its componet parts for betr understandig. Systems anlysi takes acomplex problem and sorts out he tangle of signifcant factors o that each an be studie by the method most apropriate to it." 14 To provide the anlytical staf nede to devlop thes anlyse of alternatives for the top olicymakers, McNamra established an ofice that quickly became one of the most powerful in the Pentagon, the Ofice of Secrtary of Defnse for Systems Analysi, OSD/SA, and amed Enthoven to anewly creatd positon, Asitant Secrtary for Systems Analysi. PBS alowed OSD/SA to become advocates for positons, and they 34 often produced Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPM) for McNamra bsed on their anlysi. McNamra used DPs to send to his ugestions for actions, notably on weapons ystems, without miltary aproval (and at imes without evn discusion) to the White House for adoption, and often the DPM was used to cancel programs the miltary wanted, such as LeMay?s pet Mach 3 RS-70 bomber, without miltary input.15 McNamra relid on civilans like Enthoven for advice rather than miltary oficers because h wanted ?indepndent? points of view of orce planig, and the stablishment of OSD/SA marked acentralization f authority in the ands of the civilans on the Do staf. It son became clear that McNamra would be ls atentive to miltary advice than had previous ecrtaries, and this was to cause amajor ift with miltary oficers, who placed ahig value on experince and whose natural want is to cver as many risk as posible. Enthoven ad his OSD/SA staf, on the other hand, focused on the rsource constraints that limited risk coverage, and aproached problems with methods that semed abstract and unrealistic to the miltary ? and, as it would become clear, to Congres. 16When McNamra nd his taf tok over many of the functions that had ben part of the uniformed iltary?s portfoli it made them unpoular with te srvice laders, but they wer merly folwing along established charcteristic of the American politcal traditon whic Samuel Huntigton identifes in his eminal The Soldier and the State as the ?poular strand.? This poular strand is part of the ?citzen soldier? legnd, the blief that ny American can excel in the miltary art. It is, as Huntigton otes, the logical result of the constant ension betwen aprofesional miltary and a liberal stae, and this 35 poular strand in American politcal traditon meant hat few outside the uniformed miltary objectd when McNamra tok on aditonal powers a Secrtary of Defnse. 17 Nedles to say, the miltary di not welcome McNamra?s initatives based on the poular strand aproach. Popular strand isregarde the fact hat he srvice laders belived that hey wer profesionals, like lawyers or doctrs, and many scholars uch as Huntigton agred that he miltary wer profesionals. Acording to the ?miltary as profesional? schol of thought, miltary oficers poses the thre charcteristics of aprofesional - expertise, responsibilty, and corpratens - and acentral, unique skil, the mangemnt of violence. As profesionals, their function is not nly to cnduct sucesful armed combat operations but also t organize, quip, and train their forces a wel as planig the direction f the operations both in ad out of combat. 18 LeMay nd his Air Force ohrts disliked sytems anlysi not nly because their advice was ystematicaly disregarde and because the dcisons went aginst cherished Air Force programs, but also because it required a new ay of thinkig, anlysi and evn speaking that was unfamilar to the gneraly porly educated Air Force leadership.19 LeMay nd the other genrals wer used to what hey saw as due dfernce, and the sytems anlysi jargon was epecialy dificult for them to aster (though ter is litle vidence they tried), and they fel back on their only strength, experince. McNamra nd his taf chose to interpet his lack of sophistication i the Air Force?s arguments a simple ?apeal to authority? by agroup that had no rationale for its programs. Enthoven specialy atributed ulterior motives to the uniformed iltary, saying "much of the controversy over PBS, particularly the use of sytems anlysi, is 36 realy an tack on the increased use of the lgal uthority of the Secrtary of Defnse and an expresion f aview about his proer ole."20 Thus, by using reasonig methods and jargon ufamilar to the miltary, and by impugnig motives to the uniformed iltary critcs of sytems anlysi, McNamra nd his taf wer able to disregard the miltary?s arguments rather than deal with tem. The rsult was that he first year of the Kenedy administration, the Air Force lost evry batle with McNamra nd his taf.21 In retrospect, McNamra?s handig of the miltary was unfortunate. The Do under McNamra nd the miltary had two difernt views, Do puting the major emphasi on the conmic ipact of weapons elction while the miltary belived that he conmics of weapons elction was only aprt of the problem; the main problem was findig the right echnolgy to met he national defnse strategy.2 Had McNamra nd his taf reflcted more on the uman spects of sytems anlysi and the choices that humans had to make in the anlysi, they might ave ben more modest in their expectaions and more intersted in the miltary?s judgments. Nevrthels, LeMay nd the other genrals must bear some of the rsponsibilty for having such atin ear to the nw devlopments; had they ben more flexible, they might ave smothed some of the tnsions. One long-term result of the Whiz Kids? era was that, when the miltary services found themselvs being regularly outmaneuverd by McNamra?s ystems anlyst, they began to send some of their brightest young oficers to various civilan mangemnt schols to become xperts in modern mangemnt echniques. Son, many uniformed iltary men had become xpert in sytems anlysi, budget isues, and the mangemnt of various programs. While ther was great deal of internal discusion about how miltary men 37 wer now becoming ?mangers? instead of ?leaders,? the ducation programs contiued because the miltary simply saw no choice if they wer to be able to kep control f their programs. By the mid-1960s, the Air Force had formed its own Studies and Analysi agency ful of ficers who ad learned the sytems anlyst? tricks? to find the right numbers to defnd their positons. The Air Force bgan to take on OSD/SA at its own game ? and, with suport from Congres, increasingly won.23 NEW DOCTRINES AND THE ND OF SAC?S DOMINATION To kep contiuity and credibilty and, to alesr extnt, to kep the miltary molifed, Kenedy apointed LeMay s Chief of Staf of the Air Force in 1961, but he mod in SAC and the Air Force rmained one of aprehnsion. The aprehnsion was son justifed as McNamra began cuting or educing some of the Air Force?s meanig LeMay?s - most cherished programs. 24 McNamra celrated the phase-out of the B-47 nuclear bomber flet, supende the dvelopment of anuclear-powerd bomber, and curtailed work on LeMay?s top riority, the igh-altiude, MACH 3 RS-70 bomber, begun during the Eisenhower years a replacemnt for the B-52. 25 McNamra lso canceld aplaned wing of B-52s and the air-launched Skybolt, ablistic misile with a1,0-nautical mile range dsigned for launching from B-52 bombers. 26 Further, to the Air Force?s dismay, McNamra showed aclear prefrence for misiles, the Air Force?s ICBMs and the Navy?s olid fuel, submarine-launched Polaris intermediate range balistic misile, and expresd publicly his belif that he maned bomber as strategic weapon had no lng-run futre; the intercontiental balistic misile was faster and les 38 vulnerable.27 In 1962, the Air Force rceivd its last B-52 bombers, and more than twenty-five yars pased before the Air Force acquired anew strategic bomber. NEW CONVENTIONAL SYTEMS As McNamra hd the miltary acquire more conventional weapons ystems, he became concerned about he rapidly risng devlopment cost of thes ystems. A 1962 study of twelv major weapons ystems howed that he average program ende up costing 20 percnt of the orignal estimated cost.28 Betwen 1962 and 1965, to cunter this trend of ver-budget programs, McNamra nd his taf devloped a program known as Total Package Procuremnt (TP), whic ontiued the trend towards centralized decison-making authority in the ofices of the Secrtary of Defnse.29 The cntral idea of the TP was that OSD/SA anlyst would undertake studies to define mision ares, specify performance measures, anlyze fasibilties, and estimate cost for weapons. A company?s bid on the sytem had to incorprate al thes cost in the bid, including inital design, final design, manufacture, tsting, trainig, and spare parts, and the contractor was to be hld to its bid cost, thus in theory eliminating cost overuns. Once the contact was igned, the contractor pursed the ntire program ? engiering, devlopment and production - with litle involemnt or versight from the government.30 Because the doctrine of lexible rsponse would cal for alrge increase in the number of Air Force tactial fighters, McNamra was epecialy intersted in risng unit cost of tactial ircaft, whic meant procuremnt of evr smaler numbers of evr more complex and expensive fighters. The soaring cost led McNamra nd his ystems 39 anlyst to rethink fighter oles and misions with te aim of lwering thes cost. Ther wer many options, and McNamra setled on thre for the TP. First, for fiscal reasons cNamra droped ful-scale dvelopment and prottyping, wher sevral contractors each built asingle prottype aircaft hey thought would met a miltary requiremnt, and then service pilots flew the prottypes to selct he winer.31 Under TP, ther would be no prottypes, only ?paer airplanes? described in the contractors? bids. The arguments for and aginst his aproach wer obvious. By having flying prottypes, at least he most basic problems would show up, whic was extremly important since an ircaft was elcted and the awrd made to the contractors, it was dificult o cancel no mater how por the aircaft?s performance. On the other hand, because ?paer prosals? without aircaft wer relatively low cost, if the contractors di not have to build aprottype more would be wiling to submit prosals, and thus provide more options.32 This was startlingly inovative aproach, but whetr or not it would be sucesful depnde on how acurately the ?paer? airplane and its ystems would reflct he ral one. The dcison to use TP was testimony to hw comited McNamra was to his philosphy of sytems anlysi, whic he blievd could predict how aper airplane would perform. It also showed how litle atention McNamra nd his taf paid to the uniformed services, whic wer strongly aginst he idea.3 The scond and third ares McNamra focused on wer ares that made no sense to him, the use of specialized fighter aircaft or difernt misions and the use of difernt aircaft by the Air Force and the Navy for what semed to be the same ision. Both thes questions had long history. At he bginig of World War I, the air arms of the 40 waring countries had numerous mision-specialized aircaft, notably dive-bombers, but gradualy the single mision aircaft disapeard, phased out in favor f pure fighters that became fighter-bombers when they became obsolet or when they wer not required for air-to-air combat. Nevrthels, after World War I both te U.S. Air Force and Navy returned to specialized aircaft. Both ad intercptors and both bought specialized ground-atck aircaft, the Air Force under SAC?s nuclear philosphy of using jet fighter-bombers to deliver nuclear weapons and the Navy for specialized conventional tack. 34 On McNamra?s econd point, the Air Force and the Navy usaly used ifernt aircaft for the same isions because of the Navy?s requiremnt for aircaft o be stresd to land on acrier, with concomitant weight increase and performance omproise. Since the late 1930s ther had nevr ben alnd-based aircaft hat was ucesfuly adpted for carier operations, and only afew carier aircaft had ben sucesful as land-based aircaft because of this extra weight. 35 ?COMONALITY? To McNamra, thes ideas emed ineficent and out of date. He wanted fighters be designed from the bginig for ?dual use? in both te air superiority and ground atck roles, and he made acomitent o the concept hat henceforth both te Air Force and Navy should use the same tactial ircaft - ?comonality? - because they wer flying what he saw as esntialy the same isions. Comonality gave McNamra quick victory. The Navy had bought a remarkable new fighter, the two-seat, twin-egine McDonel F-4 Phantom I, as specialized air-to-air intercptor for defnse of their carier task forces. The F-4 also culd cary alrge 41 bomb load, and McNamra began his drive for comonality b presuring the Air Force to buy the Phantom. The Air Force was reluctant at first, but it nede anew fighter, had no serious design prosals for afighter of its own i the wings, and the prformance of the F-4 was exceptional. It quickly became clear that it would not nly be a cpable air- to-air fighter but also aground atck and reconaisance aircaft. With te F-4, the idea of comonality was of to arousing start, though McNamra sid ?we started to late [on the F-4].? 36 After the F-4, the srvices wer loking forward to two new aircaft programs, a Navy intercptor t replace the F-4, an Air Force long-range interdiction/strike aircaft, and an Air Force lose air suport aircaft. At his point, based on ?comonality? and ?multi-role? considerations provide by OSD/SA, McNamra told the srvices to devlop a single basic aircaft into difernt versions for each service. The base dsign was the Air Force?s long-range interdiction/strike aircaft, designated the Tactial Fighter Experimental (TFX), and intede to pentrate Soviet air defnse at low altiude and hig sped to deliver tactial nuclear weapons. McNamra told the Navy to devlop amodifed TFX using anew misile sytem as replacemnt for its prosed new intercptor, though te Navy argued strenuosly that single aircaft could not adequately perform both misions. While the F-4 had ben sucesful, the Navy said the TFX was trying to merge incompatible rquiremnts from the outset.37 Nevrthels, McNamra nd his OSD/SA anlyst stuck with te dcison, and the TFX was to become ailestone in the postwar history of ighter devlopment and the poster child for comonality and the TP. 42 Two cmpanies, Boeing and Genral Dynamics, wer the finalist for the paer TFX design, and both entries featured a vriable gometry ?swing? wing, whic would alow the aircaft o land slowly hen the wings wer placed forward while having very hig sped at low levl when the wings wer swept back. The Air Force and Navy prefred the Boeing design, but McNamra overode their choice and awrde the contract o Genral Dynamics on 24 November 1962, in part because his OSD/SA sytems anlyst said that he Boeing prosal was not realistic and that he Genral Dynamics design promised to be more afordable and alow greatr comonality. 38 Ther was great deal of controversy about he choice bcause it showed how vulnerable sytems anlysi was to personal interpetaion, and it was lso widely noted that Genral Dynamics was located in Fort Worth, Texas, the ome of Vice-President Lyndon Johnson. 39 The TFX, renamed the F-1, was large and heavy, with afuly loade takeof weight of 96,0 pounds, because the tianium orignaly intede for much of the airfame to save weight proved prohibitvely expensive. The F-1 varible gometry "wing box" was heavy, and the trade of betwen the xtra weight and complexity of the mechanism made the prformance bnefits debatble. Overal, the F-1 pushed the nvelope of aircaft, engie, and avionics design i anumber of ares. 40 THE ?SACEMCIZING? OF THE TACTIAL IR FORCES The Cuban misile cris of October 1962 solidifed McNamra?s and Kenedy?s belif in improved conventional forces. While SAC?s capbilties and Kenedy?s threat o use them helpd stabilze the situation, McNamra credited the paceful outcome to mutal recogniton by the U.S. and the Soviets that nuclear exchange would be 43 mutaly suicdal nd to U.S. conventional forces nforcing the quarntie. LeMay, not surpisngly, disagred.41 The nw emphasi on conventional warfre meant he Air Force?s tactial ir force (TAF), in disary at he nd of the 1950s, began to grow. In 1961, SAC had lmost 6,0 bombers, while the TAF had les than 2,0 fighters, but nder McNamra, fighters moved to the top f the Do budget, folwing only ICBMs. TAF wings increased from 16 at he nd of FY1961 to 21 in FY1965, with plans caling for evn greatr increase. 42 Howevr, the rise of the TAF di not mean the Air Force ultre changed. LeMay, now Chief of Staf of the Air Force, simply moved the SAC cultre to the TAF, atempting to make it a?mini-SAC,? the only difernce bing that it had fighters and tactial misions. He moved SAC ?bomber genrals? to take over the two primary TAF comands, United Staes Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and the critcal staeside Tactial Air Comand (TAC), and by October 1961 al major comanders and the vast majority of the Air Staf leaders wer ?bomber genrals.? 43 LeMay?s most important apointment was naming Genral Walter Sweney, apure bomber genral, to take over TAC with Lt. Genral Charles B. estover, another pure bomber genral, s his deputy. As on as Sweney tok comand in October 1961, he set about ?SACemcizng? TAC, and imediately focused on geting tihter control f what he saw as en as n organization f undisciplined fighter pilots. 4 Up until this time, TAC had ben uder asytem of benig neglct. While the TAF had les money and older quipment han SAC, the pilots wer able to fly the fighters they loved with relatively litle supervison from the Air Force. In contrast o SAC, the 4 measure of merit in the Tactial Air Force was flying skil, and the TAF pilots fought like wolves to stay out of staf positons and in the cokpit. Because they avoide staf positons and wer not in the Air Force nuclear bomber mainstream, not surpisngly promtion rates for fighter pilots wer lower than their SAC counterparts, but hat materd litle to them. The fighter squadrons had regular inflow of excelnt ew pilots who er wiling to give up romtion portunites to d the kind of lying they enjoyed, and the fighter pilot cultre flourished without growing. 45 SAC mebers considerd TAC to be the ?ragedy as miltia? with a?flying club? mentality, and inded flying fihters during this period was lark.46 From the priod comes ome of the most lyrical flying writng evr produced ? Richard Bach, James Salter, Thomas Wolfe ? but TAF ?trainig? bore litle rlation to preartion for combat.47 Daily fighter tainig misions consited of going to alocal ground atck range for anumber of standarized bomb, rocket, and strafe dliveris, then skylarking at low levl folwed by unauthorized air-to-air combat ? dog fihting? or ?hasling? with any other fighters in the are or, failng that, with each other. Ther was genral but nsubstantiated belif that ny kind of dogfiht aginst any kind of aircaft was useful, but he main aim of the fighter pilots was just o cmpet, and the prevailng atitude was that ?winig was evrything.? 48 Ther wer few rules for such ?trainig.? Strict Air Force rstrictions for lw-altiude flying wer honred in the breach, and young pilots wer simply thrown ito air-to-air dogfihts and beatn badly, but raely taught what hey had one wrong. They learned by doing and, along the way, they picked up many bad habits. Few Air Force fighter pilots could explain what hey wer doing, and in 45 many ways air combat skil was genraly considerd agift, not subject of study. The belif in the ?gift,? plus the gneral feling that he nxt war ould be anuclear exchange that would not invole fighters except as delivery vehicles, promted acsual titude that oferd no incetives to work on formations, escort actis, or ther aspects of air combat hat wer to prove ncesary in wartime.49 This aproach resulted in many acidents, whic in Sweney?s new ?Peace is Our Profesion? TAC was unaceptable. One of Sweney?s first teps was increased mphasi on flying safety, and one of his ubordinates wrote in a Air Force flying safety magzine as Sweny was taking over TAC that ?I can sure you that?Genral Walter C. Sweny, down through is taf and on down ito the field, [wil] concetrate on eliminating pilot and supervisory erors.? 50 Sweny acurately saw the TAC fighter pilot cultre and trainig as ego-driven ad undisciplined, with litle interst in improvemnt, the oposite of the way SAC trained its crews. 51 SAC had fixed set of techniques to improve the individual?s performance, because an idividual?s performance rflectd on the crew specifcaly and SAC in genral. Sweny set about o make TAC trainig the same as SAC?s. Each TAC fighter pilot had to cmplet aseris of quarterly trainig evnts - X number of 30-degre dive- bombing runs, Y number of instrument aproaches, and other vents - and carefuly log them. To check on the fectivens of the trainig, Sweny brought in the SAC sytem of Standarization/Evalution, though e di rename it Tactial Evalution (TACEVAL), and periodic Operational Readines Inspections (ORIs) for TAC?s flying wings. ORIs wer test, not learnig exrcise, and pasing ORIs was critcal for awing comander?s 46 carer. Under Sweny?s regime the measure of merit for TAC trainig became (1) no acidents (2) pasing the ORI and (3) having al crews complet their standar evnts.52 The trainig was, by Air Force measures, ucesful, especialy in the safety are. In 195, just before Sweny tok over, TAC had 472 Clas A acidents, but nder Sweny the acident rate steadily declined ven measured in absolute numbers. 53By 1965, the number of Clas A acidents droped to 26 because of adhernce to rigorus new TAC safety guidelines, and otably TAC achievd this low acident rate as the comand was expandig and increasing its trainig programs to suply crews to fly in the Vietnam War.54 Sweny aceptd Air Force doctrine of the day, that in the vent of awar in Europe ?to achiev air superiority, the most lucrative method is to destroy enmy air capbilty when it is on the ground by atcking his airfields and parked aircaft.?5 Since air superiority meant knocking out he Soviet air force on the ground, ther was litle ned for unsafe air-to-air tainig for the pilots. One Air Force gneral noted later, ?betwen 1954 and 1964, the USAF trainig curiculm for fighter pilots include litle, if any, air- to-air combat. The omision was partly as part of doctrine, whic regarde fighters primarily as means for delivering uclear ordinace, but mainly out of a concern for flying safety.? 56 The strictly enforced virtual prohibiton air-to-air tainig met with much grumbling in TAC, and TAC pilots wer also dismayed that hey wer critcized ? harsed, they felt ? for such ?nocompliance with directives? as not using the aircaft checklist proerly and ?incomplet? briefings, not having TACEVAL team embers on 47 special orders, and in genral not being what he nw comand structre demd ?profesional.?57 Sweny sems to have ben a extraordinarily dificult comander to work for, and he and his programs genrated ?tremndous resntment? in the fighter comunity as he made changes that struck at he art of TAC.58 One of his most devasting changes was forcing aSAC sytem known as ?centralized mainteance? on the tactial fighter wings. Prior t Sweny, each TAC squadron had its own distinctively marked aircaft, each aircaft with its own mainteance rew chief and its own pilot with teir names on ?their? aircaft. Under the Sweny stem, al mainteance was taken awy from the squadron and moved to the nxt higest levl, the wing, wher al squadron ad personal markings wer removed. This led to alos of identiy and the ndig of the sprit hat he flying mebers of the squadrons had established with teir mainteance prsonel. 59 Sweny also began to push SAC?s Zero Defcts? program intede to cmpletly eliminate mistakes. While ?Zero Defcts? was necsary working with nuclear weapons, it was imply imposible to fly the number of misions atctial wing flew evry day ? about 60 ? without mistakes. One TAC oficer who became a four-star genral ater in his carer emberd the rsults of Sweny?s Zero Defcts era. ?Few comanders can aford integrity in a?zero defcts? environment. Teling the truth ende carers quicker than making mistakes or doing something wrong. ?60 Sweny?s changes began to change TAC, making it more organized, betr documentd trainig, and many fewr acidents, the comand apeard to be prospering. While the nw sytem caused obvious morale problems, the faling morale di not apear 48 on Air Force measures of merit, and malcontets wer dealt with in the standar way ? they wer moved out of TAC to difernt, on-flying asignments (radr staions in Thule, Grenlad wer afvorite) or given minor jbs and ot promted. Sweny became il with pancreatic ancer in January 1965, but he rfused to turn comand over to his deputy and for the six months Sweny?s aide, Captin Wilbur Crech, di much of the day-to-day work until Genral Gabriel P. Disoway, the comander of United Staes Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), replaced Sweny in July 1965. 61 Though Disoway had ben the dputy comander of TAC and afighter pilot before to World War I, he flew almost no cmbat during World War I and one in Korea. His carer had ben asucesion f staf jobs in various ares, including personel and weapons evalution. 62 In 1965 ther was nothing to sugest hat in afew years, left o its own devices, TAC would be anything other than ?mini-SAC,? with te emphasi on flying safety, filing trainig squares, and centralized top-down guidance. The atempt would almost certainly have sucede xcept for ne thing ? the Vietnam War. It was to change completly the Air Force ultre, probaly forevr. Sudenly flying fihters became iportant. 1. Lawrence Lyn and Richard Smith, ?Can the Secrtary of Defnse Make a Difernc?? 7, 1 Itertiol Security (Sumer 1982): 61. 2. For Kenedy?s defnse polies, e Pblic Papers: Kenedy, 24, 230-23, quoted in Robert utrl, Ieas, Cocts, and Doctrine: Bsic Thikig in the United States Air Frc 1961-984, Volume I (Mxwel Air Forc ase, AL: ir Uivrsity Prs, 198), 24-5. 49 3. Richard H. Kohn ad Joseph P. Harhan, ed., Strategic Air Warfre: An Iterview with Genrls Curtis LeMy, Ln W. Jonso, Davi A. Burhinal, nd Jack J. Caton. (Wasigton, D: Ofic of Air Force Histry, 198), 12-123. 4. ilbur Crech, Gen. US, Oral istor Interview by Hugh Ahman, 19 June 92, K239.0512, AFHRA, 53. 5. Stephen L. earden, ?U.S. trategic Bombardment Doctrine Since 1945,? in Case Studies in tratgic Bombardment, ed. Stphen Rero (Washigto DC: Air Force Msums d Studies Prgrs, 198), 428. 6. Waren A. Trst and George Watson, ?Framing Air Force Misions,? in Bernard Nalty, ingd Sword, Wig Shild: A History of the United Stats Air Force. Volume Two 1950-197 (ashinton, DC: ir Force istry ad Musms Program, 197), 19. 7. Donald M. Snow, ?Levls of Stratgy and American Strategic Nucler Policy,? Air University Revi 35 (Nomber-Decmber 1983): 64. 8. A god sumary is fund in Wilia W. Kaufman, Planig Convetional Forces, 1950-1980 (Wshingto, DC: The Brokings Istiutio, 1982), 5-7, icluding Tabls -2. 9. Alan Ethoven ad K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (Sant Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 205), -6, psim. 10. Alain Ethoven, ?Econic Analysi and the Department of Defnse,? The American comic Rview 53 (May 1963): 41-416. 1. Keith Clark and Larence Legre, d., The President and the Mangemnt of National Scurity: A Report by th Instiut of Dfns Aalysi (Nw York: Prager, 196), 12-5. . Enthoven, ?Econmic Analysi,? 416-418. 13. Ibid., 42; Rihard Saders, The Politcs of Defnse Analysi (New York: Duneln, 1973), 13. 14. Ethoven, How Much is Enough?, 6. 5. Futrl, 29-30. 16. Ralph Sanders, The Politcs of Defnse Analysi (New York, NY: Duneln, 1973), 4, 1, sim. 1. Samuel Huntigton, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politcs of Civl-Miltary Reltios (Cambridg, MA: Blkp Prs of Harvard Uiversity res, 1957), 193. 18. Acording to Huntigton, profesionals are dfined by the posesion f the folwing aquire skils. Expertise: knwledge n skil i asignifcant frm f uman endeavor, cird by prolngd ucation a xperince. Resposibilty: being aprctil expert working i asocial ontext d rformig a srvice to scity. Corpratns: the clective snse f rganic unity and consciousns f themselvs a art from laymn. Huntigto, 8-1. 19. Mike Worde, The Rise of the Fighter Genrals: The Problem of Air Leadership, 1945-82 (axwl AFB, AL: ir Univrsity Prs, 197), 35, pasi; C.R. ?Dick? 50 Anderg, Col. USAF, Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vitam (Washington, DC: Air Frc Histor and Musms Program, 201), 39-43. 20. Entove, Hw Much is Enough?, 13. 1. Kh and arhan, 89-0. 2. Tis i best e i the ful text of Enthoven?s Econmic Analysi.? 3. Futrel, 170-17; Tomas Clayt, ?Air Frce Operations lsi, in Encylopedia of Operations Resrch nd Mangemnt Scice, d., Carl Haris and Saul Gas (Nrwl, MA: Kluwr Aaemic Publishrs ,201). htp:/w.mors.org/history/af_oa.pdf. (aesd Feb 6). 24. Trest, 18-189. 5. Rarden, 427. 26.Trest, 163,18. 7. Robrt S. McNamra, The Esence of Security: Reflctions in Ofice (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1968), 20, 34, pasim. 28. McNmar, 78-0. 9. Ibid., 86-, pasim; Enthoven, How Much is Enough?, 24-, pasim. 30. Enthoven, ?Econic Aalysi?, 41-415. 1. Mark A. Lorel ad Hugh P. Levaux, The Cuting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircft R&D (Snta Monica: Rnd, 198), 90-1. 32. Enthoven, How uch is Eough, 30. . Artur C. Agan, Lt. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 10 February l973, K.239.0152-857, FHR, 8-9; Jhn P. Flyn, Maj. Gen. Oral History Intrview, 1 Augst 8, K239.0512-17, AFHRA, 23-4, psim. 34. The US Navy ground atck aircaft wer designated ?A for Atack (A-1, A-3, A-) wil air-to-ir fihters wer designted ?F for Fihtr (F-8, F-4). The ir Force used ?F for l fighters and fightr-bombrs. Lorel and Levaux, 12. In t authr?s min, the mst incongruos use of the prefix was the latr Air Force F-17 ?Stealth? aircaft, wich aried air-t-air waons t l, only two laser guid bombs. 35. For te convrsion f ir superirity fighters t grund-tack aircaft, one god source is Philp Jaret?s Aircaft of th Second World War The Devlopment f th Warplane 193-1945 (London: Putnam Arautical Boks, 197), 9-82, pasim. The diferc betwen land-base ad crier-bsed irft is awel documentd spect of miltary avitio. Se, for xmple, David Brown, Carier Fightrs 193-1945 (Londn: McDonld nd Jan?s, 1978), 7-9. 36. Cogres, House Comite on Apropriations, Hearings on Miltary Posture and H.R. 9714, Staemnt by Secrtary f Defnse Rbert McNamra, 87th Cngres, 2nd ses., 14 Februry 1962, (Washington, C: GPO, 1962), 343-45. 37. Rort F. Coulam, Ilusis f hoice: The F-1 and the Problem of Weapons Acquistin eform (Princeton, NJ: Princetn Univrsity Pres, 197), 56-8, psim. 38. Ibid., 64-7. 9. Futrel, 9-482. 51 40. Jeruald Gentry, Maj. USAF, ?Evolution f the F-16 Multinational Fighter? (Student Rserch Paper, #163, Industrial Cleg of t Armed Forces, 1976), 4. 41. Futrl, 84-5. 2. Ibid., 6. 43. Michael R. Worden, Rise of the Fighter Genrals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership (xwel Air Forc Bas, AL: ir Uivrsity Prs, 198), 9. 4. Tom Clancy and Chuk Horner, Gen. SAF, Ever Man Tiger (New York: Putna, 19), 76-9, for Horner?s bitr viw of weny?s impct on TAC. Wrden gives slightly more balnced aproach, 25-8. 45. After gradutig from undergduate pilot rainig (UPT), the nw pilots wer given asignmnts from alist giv out by th Air Force based on tir ak in clas -#1 rcid first choice, #2 second, and s on. Ter wer only fw fighter sigments on eah list, but ey wnt quikly to the bst pilots in th clas, since f planed o stying in th air force. It was imply aleasnt altertive to th other otios presnted b the draft. Authr?s intervie with Jms Sltr (Horwitz), Septmbr 205, South Hampton, New York. 46. Crch, Oral History, 97-8. 7. Se James Slter?s The Hunters (New York: Harper, 1956) as wel as the previously notd Bach?s Strangr to th Ground (New York: Harper nd Row, 1963) and Wlf?s The Right Stuf (New Yrk: Bantm Boks, 1980). 48. Frdrick C. ?Bots? Bles, rig. Gen. USAF, Check Six: A Fighter Pilot Loks Back (New Yor: Ivy, 191), 54-5. 49. Bruce K. Holway, Gen. USAF, ?Air Superiority in Tactial Air Warfre,? Air University Rviw 19, 3 (Mrch-pril1968): ; gan, 12. 50. Edward Hoisngton, Brig. Gen. USAF, ?Supervison Down the Line,? Flying Safety 16 (Jnury 1960): 18. 5. Crech, Oral History, 71. Crech was Sweny?s aide uring this period. 2. lany and orner, . 53. At ht ime th Air Force dfined a?Clas A? acident as one that resulted in adeath, permanet disabilty, ls f a ircft, or dmge of more tha $1 milion. Jmes A. Coly, Mjor, USAF, ?Red Flg ? Is Realis Worth t Cst?? (Student Thesi, US rmy War Cleg, 196), 23. 54. Stistics from Air Force Safety Centr, quoted in Coley, 4-5. . Gabriel P. Disway, Lt. Gn. USAF, ?Tactial Air Pwr: Past, Presnt, and Futre,? Suplment o the Policy Letr for Comnders from the Ofic of the Secrtary of th Air Frc, 19 Jun 1963, 9. 56. Ricard P. Halion, ?A Troubling Past: Air Force Fighter Acquistion Since 194,? Air Power Jourl (Winter 190), 54-6. 57. TC val,? Tac Atack, Dcember 191, 4. 8. rech, Orl History, 72. 59. Robrt Dixon, Gen. USAF. Oral History Interview, 21 Septmber 198, K23.012-591, AFHRA, 230, pasim. Crech sard Dixon?s viws. Slife, 76-8. 52 60. Horner and Clancy, 17. 1. Crch, Oral Histor, 94-6. 62. htp:/w.f.mil/bis/bio.asp?bioID=5235. (acesd April 205). 53 CHAPTER THRE: THE VIETNAM WAR ND THE DVELOPMENT OF A NEW AIR FORCE ULTRE THE AIR WAR Combat ir operations during the Vietnam ar ? known i the Air Force as ?SEA? (Southeast Asia) - tok place in thre distinct ares - South Vietnam and later Cambodia, Laos and southern North Vietnam, and ep into North Vietnam. Each are had its own charcteristics, detrmined mainly b the dfense. Defnse wer relatively light over South Vietnam and Cambodia. Though tey caused some problems for lw flying (under 2,0 fet) aircaft, especialy helicopters and other proelr driven ?slow movers,? in genral South Vietnam was considerd low threat for jets. From cobat misions in South Vietnam and Cambodia the Air Force larned that it nede anew ground atck aircaft o suport he Army, an ircaft hat could cary alrge bomb load, take damge, and loiter for lng periods waitng for targets. 1 Many ares of Laos, known as ?Stel Tiger? in the south and ?Barel Rol? in the north, and in southern North Vietnam, known as Route Pack One or ?Talyho,? had signifcant amounts of light and medium unguide automatic anti-aircaft (A), and ocasionaly surface-to-air misiles (SAMs), though te SAMs uferd from apor comand and control sytem and wer genraly inefctive.2 The dfense wer heavy enough tat her wer altiude rstrictions ? no flying below 4,50 fet ? and it was higly dangerous (almost always fatl in some ares) for helicopters. In Laos, the North id3611112 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 54 Vietnames wer protecting their suply route south, te Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the suplies moved on the Trail mainly at night, like the Chines in the Korean War, because the United Staes air forces lacked a serious night arget location/atck apbilty. While the srvices devloped many stopgap measures, notably the Lockhed AC-130 ?Spectre? gunship, they wer vulnerable to defnse. From trying to interdict he Ho Chi Minh trail, the Air Force larned it nede aircaft with te capbilty to lcate and atck targets at night and in bad weather in defnde ares.3 The bombing campaigns over the avily defnde Hanoi/Haiphong are, caled ?Route Package Six? or simply ?Pac Six,? had the greatst impact on the Air Force.4 The campaigns into Route Package Six wer divide into two periods, ?Roling Thunder? (February 1965 until April 1968) and, after a break of our years, Operations ?Linebacker I? (April-October 1972) and ?Linebacker I? (Decmber 1972). Thes air campaigns over North Vietnam, flown aginst advanced Soviet sytems and most closely aproximating the kind of defnse the Air Force would met in Europe, recived the most atention from the Air Force.5 When the air war over North Vietnam first began early in 1965, it was n adventure for fighter crews. At he bginig of the war, aircews er sent o base in Thailnd on temporay duty (TDY) to atck initaly lightly defnde ares in Laos and North Vietnam. 6Howevr, as the atcks increased the North Vietnames defnse became stronger, especialy in the Hanoi are, and American fighter squadrons, mainly F-105 fighter-bombers, moved ful time into Thailnd in mid-1965. By late 1965 the North Vietnames, with te hlp of Soviet advisors and equipment, had established the 5 beginigs of a Soviet-style integrated air defnse sytem (IADS) with large amounts of unguide A and an icreasing umber of early warnig radrs, as wel as ground control radrs to vector a smal number of Korean War vintage MiG-17 fighters to atck American fighter-bombers. By mid-196, the North Vietnames recived radr-guide A, then surface-to-air misiles (SAMs), and finaly the latest Soviet MiG-21 fighters.7 American loses teadily increased, and the loses brought a cultral change to the fighter comunity. Flying fihters was no lnger alrk separte from the important busines of SAC but aserious, dangerous afir, and the fighter crews quickly became profesional in their atitudes toward the misions. They also began to take apervers pride in flying the toughest misions ? the ?heavies ? to the Hanoi are.?8 RULES OF ENGAEMNT The bombing of North Vietnam was higly controversial t many levls. President Lyndon Johnson, Secrtary of Defnse Robert McNamra, nd asmal group of advisors directly supervised al atcks. Johnson famously (and acurately) said, ?They [the pilots] can?t bomb an outhouse without my permision.?9 Very strict and restrictive ?rules of engaemnt? (ROE) formalized the control, and the rsult was that he Roling Thunder bombing campaign from 1965 through 1968 was one of the most ightly controled bombing campaigns in history. American ircews er forced to fly routes designated by the White House to and from their targets to avoid overflying ?sensitve? ares, and for most of Roling Thunder the White House rfused to alow the bombing of targets such as MiG airfields and suply depots in the cites of Hanoi and Haiphong, as wel as strikes anywher ther might be the posibilty of causing casualties among the Soviet 56 and Chines miltary advisors. The most egreious example of the rstrictive ROE hapend in mid-196 when surface-to-air misiles arived in North Vietnam from the Soviet Unio. The American politcal eadership refused to alow atcks on the laborate sites while they wer being built and wer relatively defnsels, and it was not until the sites hot down to American ircaft hat President Johnson alowed atcks on the positons. By then the dfense around the ares wer so strong the Americans lost evn aircaft in the atck and failed to hit he sites.10 The claimed rationale for the ROE was to insure that he Chines wer not provked into entring the war, but it was lso aprt of the same Kenedy/McNamra/Johnson ?gradual escaltion? philosphy that drove American uclear strategy. Under ?gradual escaltion,? US aircaft bombed major North Vietnames targets one at time, to try to presure the North Vietnames into stoping their suport for the war in South Vietnam. Not nly di the White House limit he air strikes, but from tie to time it would initate bombing halts to ?send amesage? to the North Vietnames that America was iling to stop the bombing and egotiate. In the vent, the North Vietnames ignored the ?mesages? and used the pause in the bombing campaign to dispers many potential targets and to build up defnse on the ones that could not be moved.1 Air Force Chief of Staf LeMay nd the rst of the Air Force ladership had violently disagred with ?gradual escaltion? as nuclear strategy, and they disagred equaly vehmently with it as conventional strategy. From the bginig of the war, LeMay wanted to launch a conventional version f his nuclear ?Sunday punch? aginst North Vietnam, using B-52s and tactial ircaft o hit niety-four critcal major targets, the 57 Roling Thunder Target List (RTL, pronunced ?ratle?) the staf had ientifed as vital to the North Vietnames war efort. To LeMay?s disgust, Johnson ad McNamra repatedly refused to alow such an tack.12 The aircews flying into Route Package Six thought e ?gradual escaltion? policy and the ROE wer not nly responsible for the avy American loses but also wer keping the US from winig the war. They felt he policy oferd no incentive to the North Vietnames to move the pace proces forward and simply resulted in more American loses and more aircew kiled or taken as prisoners of war (POWs). One senior former F-105 pilot, Colnel Jack Broughton, wrote two scathing boks, Thud Ridge (1970) and Going Downtown: My Batles with Hanoi and Washington (1973), about hes restrictions, and the boks wer widely read by Air Force and Navy fighter pilots. 13 Broughton?s boks reflcted the crews? biternes directd at not nly McNamra and Johnson but also at he uniformed iltary, especialy Air Force, ladership for not resignig to protest he crews lost because of the ROE. Most of the Air Force ladership Broughton was refring to wer former SAC oficers, and the close control ver North Vietnam sacked of SAC rules and regulations. The fighter crews flying over Hanoi ? incorectly, in this author?s mind - lumped Johnso and McNamra, the Air Force leadership, and SAC into ne group they blamed for the rstrictions that handicaped the air strikes and caused the avy loses. 14 The pilots who flew the ?heavies? over Hanoi returned higly decorated and with te credibilty that he miltary bestows on combat vetrans. The normal tour for pilots flying over North Vietnam was 10 misions, whic tok about five months. From 196 to 58 1968, more than 20 pilots urvied their tours over North Vietnam, so the number of pilots directly afectd by the limitaions of the Roling Thunder campaign was signifcant.15 When they returned from the combat zone they told the story of the ROE and the loses it caused, and the tales quickly spread throughout he ntire srvice, not just he fighter comunity. One of the rasons thes tories pread quickly and became part of Air Force lore was that comon asignment for younger fighter pilots after acombat our was an istructor in oe of the flying schols, wher they had n audience of students eager to hear bout he ?big war? and the problems with te ROE, McNamra, nd the SAC genrals comandig the Air Force. PERSONEL DECISONS As the war intesifed, the Air Force made apersonel decison that would have masive long-term consequences for the srvice. Because the lngth of the war as uncertain, the Air Force prsonel oficers reasonably decide it would be st o spread the danger (and the glory) evnly throughout he rated force, and made the dcison that no aircew meber would be forced to fly asecond, no-voluntary combat our ntil evryone had flown their first. 16 The rsult was that during the ight years of the active war (1965-1973) most young (below the rank of lieutnat colnel [O-5]) Air Force aircews flew a combat our. 17 The Air Force was ble to implent his policy because, unlike the Navy and most other air arms in the world, it di not separte pilots in flying schol. In the rst of the world, the bst pilots in flying schol automaticaly went o fighter/atck aircaft while the others moved to atrack to initaly become copilots of large, multi-engie aircaft 59 such as transports, bombers, and tankers. This idea of spliting pilots by fling skil in pilot rainig was nathema to the bomber-dominated Air Force, because from the time it became an idepndent service, the Air Force rfused to acept he idea that fighter pilots wer more skilful than bomber pilots. The rsult was n Air Force prsonel policy that said that ny pilot who graduated from pilot rainig was ?universal pilot? who culd be trained to fly any tpe of aircaft, though in practie prior t the Vietnam War virtualy no pilots from ulti-engie aircaft wer moved to fighters. The ?universal pilot? force gave great flexibilty to Air Force prsonel oficers when it came to asignig crews to new aircaft or combat ours, but it was to have sver unforesen consequences.18 CULTRE SHIFT The aircews arived in the SEA combat zone trained in the ?fly safe? nvironment of the staeside Air Force, but once in combat hey devloped an etirely difernt cultre. The staeside Air Force mphasized flying safety and ensured control with large numbers of inspectors and checks to make sure the crews er ?folwing the bok,? but in SEA the Air Force ould not aford such ontrol measures. With combat units pread cros Vietnam and Thailnd, it was imposible to devote the rsources to inspect each one to make sure they wer folwing the rules - evryone was imply to busy fighting the war. In SEA combat units, Air Force laders had no choice but o decntralize and give individual comanders and aircews control ver the operations. This meant great fredom of action ad few of the staeside rules - as one comander put it o his newly arived pilots, ?your mision her is to fly, fight, and go t the bar.?19 The rsult was that the twenty-something-year-old aircews had both responsibilty and fredom to exrcise 60 their own iitative with no ne loking over their shoulders. Not surpisngly, most of them liked this arngemnt. In this combat cultre, anew model of behavior, the ?macho man,? emrged. It honred pilots who er wiling to ?hang it out,? to take chances, and who showed colnes under fire. In the rank order of ?macho men,? the fighter pilots who flew the misions dep into the avily defnde ares in Route Package Six in North Vietnam and suferd the most loses had the most taus. One comander noted that, fter his first mision to Route Package Six, apilot ?would fel ike areal man. And he is.? 20 At the same tie, while agresivens was valued, the ralites of combat made the fighter pilots? flying club? atmospher disapear, especialy in the units that went o Route Package Six. Combat was erious busines, and ther was push to miniize ?stupid? loses. Informal rules quickly sprang up ? nevr fly alone, don?t go below 450 fet, don?t urn with MiGs ? but he rules wer enforced by the crews themselvs, not by higer headquarters. The nw model was the rsponsible, col-heade but stil agresive pilots and flight leaders who ?knew hen to hld ?em and when to fld ?em.? 21 Over the long course of the war, virtualy al of the Air Force?s aircew flew combat tours, and they provide a critcal mas that would lead to amajor cultre change. The ?Peace is Our Profesion? mot disapeard, replaced informaly with anew slogan ? ?The Mision f the Air Force is to Fly and Fight, and Don?t You Forget It!? The slogan was quickly adopted by TAF fighter units around the world. The nw Air Force ultre and behavior paterns that devloped in this atmospher of fredom and lack of controls em to be st explained by the theory of ?emrgent 61 behavior.? Emergent behavior is an upredictable change that can pear when single agents (individual ircew mebers) interacting in the same nvironment form difernt group behaviors. Previous tandars have litle or no efct on the mergin behavior, so the group behaviors that emrge canot be predicted by the previous behavior r indoctrination f the individuals (the Air Force?s fly safe? cultre). Because the number of interactions increased with te number of new aircew, ther wer an eormous number of interactions and concomitant changes. 2 The crews found combat conditon f hig uncertainty, stres, and complexity, and also fund that fast-moving combat situations tende to reward agresivens, flexibilty, and inovation. A much more agresive atitude rplaced the staeside, no-combat Air Force philosphy that ?flying safety is parmount o the completion f the mision.? In combat, ther was n emphasi on ?geting the job done.? If it could be done by the bok, fine, but if not?. Air Force aircews always went i to help American ? or Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) ? trops in trouble, whatevr the cirumstances. Contributing to the agresive atitude was the fact hat cidents wer not an isue. For bureaucratic reasons, in SEA an irplane lost or damged for any reason, safety violation r not, was imply writen of as ?combat los.? It saved paer work, encouraged agresive flying, and gave Air Force units in Southeast Asia spectaularly god flying safety record, whic in turn helpd the unit comanders? chances for promtion. 23 62 The mphasi on geting the job done also had n efct on what was the normal hierachal patern of the Air Force. Comand was necsary for promtion i the Air Force, and rank almost always detrmined who recived staeside comands. Howevr, in most SEA combat units, hig-rankig oficers who er lacking in skil or agresivens wer sent o staf positons, and unit comands given to thers of lwer rank who ad the skils nede in combat. At he lower levls, leadership roles wer evn more amater of merit. If ayoung lieutnat was betr pilot and flight leader than more snior ficer, the lieutnat became aflight leader and the snior ficer stayed a wingman. The combat cultre was lso wary, if not downright ostile, to those in staf positons and the snior leadership.24 If the ipies of the time wer saying ?don?t rust anyone over thirty,? the SEA combat cultre mot might ave ben ?don?t rust anyone who desn?t wear flight suit.? THE WAR?S EFECT ON PROMTIONS The nwly emrgin combat cultre had nother major impact on the Air Force as whole. The overal comand of the Air Force was til in the ands of LeMay?s SAC prot?gs, but almost unoticed in the long, drawn-out war as change in Air Force promtion paterns that would make the Air Force omand structre in the late 1970s completly difernt from its tructre in the late 1960s. On 28 Decmber 1965, the Air Force Chief of Staf, Gen. John P. McConel, terminated the Strategic Air Comand Spot Promtion Program, whic had given SAC oficers a signifcant advantge in promtions. Now SAC oficers had to cmpet for promtion an equal foting with te rst of the Air Force, just as the Vietnam War was 63 becoming serious. As the war progresd, while snior thre-star nd four-star SAC genrals til controled the Air Force, ther was change in the overal promtion paterns, achange suported by the Secrtary of Defnse.25 SAC was America?s front line of detrence, so the comand had lways ben able to rationalize alrger share of Air Force promtions because SAC oficers had more ?responsibilty.? But he Vietnam War had changed the dfiniton f responsibilty, and SAC was low to realize this. The comand hurt itself in the promtion competion by tring to kep its more snior oficers out of combat nd on the SAC staf while the Air Force stablished alrge number of ighter wings and fighter squadrons in both Vietnam and in Thailnd, each of whic was comand oportunity for lieutnat colnels and colnels. Aditonaly, the unit comands turned over quickly, usaly evry six months, unlike comands outside the combat zone, whic usaly lasted two years. This meant more tactial oficers became comanders, and because a sucesful comand in acombat zone was virtual guarnte of promtion, more tactial comands meant more promtions for tactial comanders at he xpense of SAC oficers.26 At he same tie, SAC?s opresive cultre had made it higly unpoular with young oficers, and the Vietnam War oferd them the oportunity to leave SAC by voluntering to fly acombat our. This led to the exodus of many of SAC?s best young oficers, the ones who nrmaly wer promted quickly.27 As the war draged on, the ?no second tour ntil evryone has flown first our? policy began to bite, and more and more of SAC?s older, higer-ankig oficers had to fly combat ours. But once in combat, former SAC oficers faced chalenges in the SEA 64 combat cultre. They had spent heir carers in SAC?s Peace is Our Profesion? and ?by the bok? atmospher, and many wer unable to adjust o the flexibilty nede in combat operations. Others, especialy those lectd to fly fighters, had ificulty fling the smal, agile, fast moving tactial ircaft. Some washed out of trainig, while others di porly in combat. Stil others moved to staf positons, unawre in that in the SEA combat cultre the staf was considerd the ?penalty box? for ficers that could not perform cobat flying duties. For thes reasons, relatively few former SAC oficers recived combat comands, whic ut into their promtion posibilties. 28 For the lower ankig oficers, the dynamic was omewhat he same. A captin with acombat our had ben given agreat deal of responsibilty, often leading large flights on complex and angerous misions and genraly doing things that wer easily explained in an Oficer Efectivens Report (OER). Aditonaly, an oficer competing for promtion after a combat our displayed a chest ful of ribons on his ofical photgraph, and the photgraph was the first hing apromtion board saw in apromtion folder. This gave him asignifcant advantge over an oficer who ad nevr ben i combat nd had few ribons. As the war progresd, more oficers with combat ours wer promted, and this began to have a synergistic efct. As an evr-increasing umber combat vetrans at on promtion boards, combat ours became an important aspect for promtion. Fighter pilots with outsandig records wer particularly likely to be promted, often arly, giving them a signifcant head start o becoming Air Force laders and genral oficers. 29 SAC di send its KC-135 tankers and B-52 bombers to the combat zone, but he tankers, while prforming avital mision, stayed wel awy from enmy defnse. The 65 B-52s flew regular bombing misions but at very hig altiudes over ares of South Vietnam and Laos wher no defnse could reach tem. This was violation f the combat cultre, and the tactial combat crews ho faced real enmy defnse very day devloped anew slogan ? Peace is Our Profesion, War is Our Hoby? to mock SAC crews.30 COMBAT OPERATIONS Over North Vietnam, the rules of engaemnt genraly prohibited atcks on MiG airfields, o the only way to eliminate the MiG threat was to destroy the MiGs in the air. But air-to-air combat with te North Vietnames MiGs proved more dificult han the Air Force or Navy expectd. The F-4 was higly capble aircaft but it was large and easy to se, had relatively por visbilty for the crew, and was adled with flight envelope and radr limitaions. More important, armaent limitaions undercut its efctivens in the air-to-air ole. F-4s caried AIM-9 ?Sidewinder? heat-seking misiles and AIM-7 ?Sparow? radr-guide misiles designed to be fired at bombers, but for most of the war F-4s di not cary canon for close-range, maneuvering engaemnts. The Rules of Engaemnt usaly required visual identifcation f enmy aircaft, so US pilots could not fire the long-range AIM-7 until they saw the nemy, whic ut into the misile's eficency. In hard turnig combat ? a?dogfiht? the AIM-7s and AIM-9s, whic had minium range of half amile, wer often usels, and the canon-armed iGs had n edge over the misile-only F-4. Nevrthels, for most of Roling Thunder the F-4:MiG kil ratio fr both services was bout 2.5:1 in favor f the Americans, whic the Air Force leadership considerd aequate. While the xchange ratio btained in the Korean War 6 betwen USAF -86s and Soviet-flown MiG-15s had ben 10:, the Air Force ladership explained the difernces awy as imply areflction f the politcal ROE and inadequate US misiles.31 Then, towards the nd of 1967, ther was disturbing shift in air combat over North Vietnam. The North Vietnames MiGs became ore agresive, and in aseris of shocking revrse from October 1967 to April 1968, the Air Force and Navy kil ratio aginst he North Vietnames MiGs droped to under 1:. During 1967, MiGs acounted for 7 percnt of the US loses over North Vietnam, but in 1968 North Vietnames MiGs acounted for 2 percnt of US loses.32 Before the Air Force fuly apreciated the importance of this devlopment, in April 1968, President Johnson anounced abombing halt over the Hanoi are that son expande to abombing halt over al of North Vietnam. 3 With te nd of the raids into North Vietnam, encounters with MiGs ende, for al practial purose, for the nxt four years. 1. Arden B. Dahl, Maj. USAF, ?The Warthog: The Best Deal the Air Force Nevr Wante? (Student Tesi: National Dfns University, 203), 2-3. 2. The Air Forc dfined ?light? as mal arms and automatic weapons up to 14.5m, and ?medium? as 23m, 37, nd 57 cnn. Chaptr 2, ?Defnse,? 32nd Tctial Rconisnce Wing Tactis Manual (Udor, Tilnd, 1970), 7-8. Author?s olecti. 3. Rbrt Futrel, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinkig in the United States Air Force (Maxwel Air Forc Base, AL: ir Uivrsity Pres, 198), 307; for th results of this problem on ir re wpons ystems elction, s James C. Slife, Lt. Col. USAF, Crech Blu: Geral Bil Crech ad th Rformati of th Tactial Air Frces, 1978-1984 (Maxwl Air Force as, AL: ir University Pres 205), 34, psim. . Like North Kra in the Korean War, North Vitnam was divide into ?Route Packages? t decnflict Air Forc d Nvy Strikes. The Air Force ha Rute Packags I, V, nd VI, th Navy I, I, IV, an what was nown as VI, th Hipong ar. Wyne 67 Thompson, To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 196-1973 (Washigt, DC: Smithsoni Instiution Pres, 20, a Wasigto, DC: Air Force History and Muses Prgram, 20), 297 (map). 5. Ibi., 280-284. 6. The air base in South Vietnam wer ful of aircaft being used to suport he ground forcs. Th government of Thiland alwed the USAF to s Ryal Thai Air Frce Base (RAFB) as log as te misios r flown it Las and Nort Vietnam, not South Vitnam. Jcb van Stvrn, Gradual Failure: The Air Wr Over North Vietnam 1965-196 (Washigto, DC: Air Force History and Musems Program, 202), 23, 75, 4-4; Thompson, 5-6. . Istvan operczer ad Mark Styling, MiG-21 Units of the Vietnam War (London: Osprey, 201), 4-5, psim. 8. Jack Broughton, Col. USAF, Thud Ridge (Philadelphia: Lipincot, 196), 4. 9. Futrel, 28-289; Van tavern, 84, pasim; for asumary, 312-34. 10. Van Stavern, 16-165. . Ibid, 108, pasim. 12. Tilfor, 6; lso Richard H. Kohn ad Joseph P. Harhan, ed., Strategic Air Warfre: An Iterview it Genrls Curtis LeMay, Lon W. Joson, Dvid . Burhinal, d Jack J. Cato. (Washington, DC: Ofice f Air Frce History, 198), 13, pasim. 13. Broughton?s boks wer also very poular in the Israeli Air Force; Thud Ridge was translated by e f thir lding acs, Brigdier Gnrl sher Snir. Ator?s jourl whil Air tac? to Israel, 197-1980. 14. Se, in aditon t Brughton?s boks, Tilford and most notably H. R. Mcaster, Derliction f Duty: Lydon Jons, Rert McNamr, the Jit Chiefs of Staf nd th Lies That Led to Vietam (New York, N.Y.: Hrper Colins, 197). T U Nvy aircws d th sam flings. This as the them of the pular 0 film Flight of the Intruder an ws bsed o the novel by t sa tile by Sthen Conts (Anaplis MD: Nvl Istiut Prs, 1986). 15. At difernt imes in this nartive, the author wil use the trm ?pilots? and at other times ?aircw,? and tis i delibrat. T F-4 ad to crw ebers, erly i the war two pilots nd lter pilot an anvigtor, genrly caled a Wapons Systms Operatr (WSO, or ?wiz?). Though te WSOs hared th sm risk s the pilots, in trms of influence, promtions, leadersip ositons, n virtualy al otr masures of erit, pilts domiate the Air Forc nd avigatrs are rlegted to distinct ?scond clas citzen? rle, nd tir prmtio rtes nd othr masurs are the same as -flying oficrs. May F-4 ilots deplred this, but it was fct. Thompson, 7-8, psim. 16. Van Stvern, 15-146. ?Rat? is te Air Force trm fr ficer aircew ? pilots and vigators. Worden, . 17 While mny SAC crws flew short ?combat? tours (ix months or les) in B-52s or KC-35 tankrs, thes di not count as turs, inly because f te lw risk ivoled 68 in the misions. Marshal Michel, The Elevn Days of Christmas (San Franciso, CA: Ecounter Bks, 201), 8-20. 18. This policy was identifed as the main reason for avriety of problems over North Vietnam, inluding hig loses latr i th wr. Red Bron I, Vl. 1, Sumary (elis AFB, NV: Tactial Fihtr Wpons Centr, 1975), 3-4, pasim. The Red Bron Rports orignated with request from the Dpartment of Defnse Resarc an Engieri (DR&E) to th apns Syste Evalutin Group (WSEG) to begin a study of air-to-air engaemnts in SEA to idntify resarch ad evlopment prjcts for the rs 1970-1975. Th rsults wer fur volums dted Octobr 1967, Aril 1968, Sptmber 68, and Febrary 196, that cerd 765 ncounters. Red Baron I was conductd y the miltary services and evluat 2 etrs through 30 Jue 1972in a five-olume rport dtd Janury 1973. Red Baron I was five-lme stdy that cord 394 ncunters urig the rst of th wr. Red Bron I, Vol. 1, Sumar (Nelis AFB, NV: Tactial Fitr Weapns Centr, 1975), 1. 19. il Grifin, Lt. Col. USAF, 14th Tactial Fighter Squadron Operations Oficer, Udorn, Thailnd, to authr during author?s oriention brifing, ctbr 1970. 20. Broughtn, 6. 1. Ibid., 23; C.R. ?Dick? Anderg, Col. USAF, Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietam (Washington, D.C: Air Frc istor ad Musms Proram, 201) 1-4. 2. Eergent behavior is comon ad can be sen i the World Wide eb (W), urba trafic pterns, and the stok mrkt. For a ful explantion, s Stevn Johnson, Emergene: Th Coect Livs f Ants, Brains, Cits, d Sftware (Nw Yrk: Scribnr 202). 23. Joh Schlight, ?The War in Southeast Asia,? in Winged Sword, Winged Shield: A History f te United Stats Air Force. Vlume Two, 1950-197, e. Berar Nalty, (Washington, DC: Air Force Histry and Msus Prgram, 9), 278-9; Mike orde, The Rise of the ightr Gerls: The roble of Air Leadership, 145-1982 (Maxwl AFB, AL: ir University Pres, 197), 27-8. 24. nderg, 26. 5. McNamra, for example, sent back a promtion list o LeMay because it had to many SAC oficers n it. Dru L. DBery, ?Flexible Respns: Evolution r Revolutin,? in Nalty, 175. 26. Worde, 12. 7. Michl, Elevn Days, 15-6. 28. alton S. Mod nd Jacob Neufield, ?Modernizng After Vietnam,? in Nalty, 350-35; Wrde, 18-19. 29. orn, 2. 30. Brughto, Thud Ridge, 6-7, pasim. 1. Wiliam W. Momyer, Gnerl USAF, Air Power in Thre Wars: World War I, Vietnam, and Korea (ashingto, DC: epartment f th Air Force, 1978), 172, psim. 69 32 Red Baron Reports, Volume Thre (Nelis AFB, NV: Tactial Fighter Weapons Centr, 1975), . 3. Thompson, 139, pasim. 70 CHAPTER FOUR: STAESIDE TCH WARS THE FIGHT FOR AN IR SUPERIOITY FIGHTER In 1963, the Tactial Air Comand began the formal proces of replacing the F-4 by sendig the Secrtary of Defnse aRequiremnt of Operational Capbilty (ROC) for an air-to-air fighter to replace the Phantom. Nevrthels, it was not until early 1965 that Major Genral Arthur Agan, the Air Force Director f Plans and Operations (XO), formed an Air Force panel to devlop a?Tactial Air Superiority Study? to cnsider the requiremnts for the F-4 replacemnt. 1 Agan was n advocate of pure, single-role air-to-air fighters, and as vice omander of the United Staes Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) had said, ?I wanted to rename our so-caled fighters, the F-105 and the misile-armed F-4, ?atck aircaft? because that?s what hey wer. If had ben comander of our wings of Rusian fighters Icould have wiped us [the US F-4/F-105 force] out in asingle mornig of air-to-air combat?we [ould have ben] totaly destroyed.?2 To give his panel authority, Agan iclude former fighter pilots who ad ten or more air-to-air kils in World War I and Korea. The Agan panel focused on improved technolgy for the nw fighter, the standar form of Air Force inovation. It was taken as given that Air Force pilots wer wel trained. Much of the impetus for a pure air-to-air fighter came bcause the F-1 was long-range atck aircaft with no air-to-air capbilty, and also because it was haping up as id3655736 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 71 disater that Air Force gnerals privately caled the ?switchblade Edsel.?3 Expensive from the start, many of the F-1?s ystems wer unsucesful, resulting in masive cost overuns and performance shortfals. By 1965, its flyawy cost had soared to $103M acopy, and it proved to be an operational failure as wel. Its first combat operations over North Vietnam wer so unsucesful after a few months the force had lost half its aircaft and the surviing F-1s returned to the United Staes.4 The rquiremnt for a pure air-to-air fighter would, the panel knew, be controversial. Secrtary of Defnse McNamra nd his Do staf had insited on multi-role fighter- bombers, and Asitant Secrtary of Defnse for Systems Analysi Alain Ethoven semed focused almost entirely on aircaft or the Vietnam War. He was far more intersted in asmal, simple, ground-atck aircaft or imediate use in combat han o anew fighter for afutre conflict with te Soviet Unio. Genral Agan viewd this a very shortsighted and thought many of the problems with te OSD staf came from its fixation on Vietnam. Agan felt his tunel vison ot nly drove the kind of weapons OSD wanted, but also led the OSD to frget he situation i Europe, wher the U.S. Air Force could expect ahuge batle for air superiority in the vent of a war ith te Soviets. Agan noted ?[the OSD] staf wer al thinkig about Vietnam?wher we had ir superiority given to us. This wouldn?t hapen aginst Rusians [in Europe] who ad more air-to-air combat capbilty and wher we il have to win air superiority.? 5 McNamra reinforced this percption when he snt ameo t Secrtary of the Air Force Eugen Zuckert directing that when considering a new ground-atck fighter, the Air Force ?should asume air superiority.? 6 72 As for the multi-role isue, the Agan panel knew that in World War I, Korea, nd Vietnam virtualy al the fective fighter-bombers on evry side bgan their service lives as ir-to-air fighters, and then became fighter-bombers when they became obsolescent or when ther was no lnger an ir-to-air threat. But he proces di not work in revrse - no aircaft designed from the start as multi-role fighter-bomber by any ation had ben sucesful as n air-to-air fighter.7 The Agan panel validated the rquiremnt for apure air-to-air fighter, and in February 196 Agan ranged an uprecdentd meting among the thre Air Force four- star genrals who cntroled the TAF, the comanders of TAC, USAFE, and the Pacifc Air Forces (PACF). After this meting, the thre four-star genrals ent Air Force Chief of Staf Genral John McConel a?twelv-star? letr suporting the idea of afighter primarily deicated to air-to-air combat. This was the first ?twelv-star? letr in the history of the Air Force and marked an uprecdentd unity of pinio. 8For the first time, al thre comanders of the TAF agred to a requiremnt and signifcantly, Genral Gabriel P. Disoway, the nw comander of TAC and atraditonal suporter of multi-role fighters, emed to agre to apure air-to-air fighter. 9 More important, this was seminal doctrine change.10 ?Air superiority? now meant destroying enmy aircaft in the air, not just destroying them on the ground. From doctrine flows ystems, and so when McConel agred to the nw doctrine h also agred to the specialized air-to-air fighter it would require. When the Agan panel report eached Enthoven?s Ofice of Systems Analysi, the OSD/SA staf began considering the rquiremnt, ow caled the ?F-X.? 1 Despite 73 Agan?s report, ther was great divison f opinio in OASD/SA about whetr the nw fighter should be amulti-role aircaft designed from the bginig for air-to-ground and air-to-air misions, or strictly an ir-to-air fighter. This air-to-air/multi-role dbate was to persitently haunt he dvelopment of the F-X, but he presure for amulti-role fighter was omewhat relived when the Air Force, under presure from McNamra nd the Army, agred to buy an ircaft soley for close air suport (CAS).12 CAS was hen aircaft atcked so close to friendly trops they had to be actively controled, and because it involed close contact with te Army, and, as one Air Force historian otes, ?of al the forms and use of air power, [CAS was] the most contetious.?13 The Army wanted the mision for itself and was devloping an dvanced atck helicopter to would take the mision from the Air Force, but for a vriety of reasons, mainly chauvinistic, the Air Force was unwiling to turn the CAS mision ver to the Army. To cmply with McNamra?s request, many in the Air Force wanted adual role aircaft, the Northrop F-5, capble of both close air suport and air-to-air combat. But after much discusion i the Air Force and in OSD, in the nd the Air Force yield to McNamra?s contiuos proding for comonality and, in November 1965, agred to buy the Navy?s A-7 atck aircaft virtualy ?of the shelf? for the CAS mision.14 The dcison was not a hpy one for the Air Force snior leadership because it meant for the nxt en years the Air Force tactial fighter force would consit mainly of Air Force vrsions of the Navy F-4, the Navy A-7, and McNamra?s multi-role F-1. Stil, the A-7 proved in many ways a blesing. It was fine aircaft with long range, acurate bombing sytems, was capble of carying a very heavy bomb load, and was higly regarde by its pilots, who dubed it 74 the ?SLUF.?15 In the nd, the most important contribution the A-7 made to the Air Force was that it gave the srvice amodern ground-atck aircaft, so the Air Force was fre to devlop asingle-role fighter for air superiority. 16 As one Air Force gneral ater noted, ?It broke the back of OSD?s insitence on multipurose fighters acros the board, [and] set he stage for the F-15.?17 Ther also arose a separte dbate over the charcteristics of a?pure? air-to-air F-X. Ther wer two schols of thought. One, the ?higer, faster? schol, belived that improvemnts in afighter meant having it fly higer and faster and fire advanced misiles at long range to shot down emy aircaft lying below it. The other schol, the ?turn and burn? schol, belived the main criteria of an ir-to-air fighter should be outsandig maneuverabilty and acelration at low and medium altiude and the abilty to make ils with conventional misiles and guns. 18The lading advocate for the ?higer, faster? F-X was the rnowned Lockhed designer, Clarence ?Kely? Johnson, devloper of the U-2, the SR-71, and later the F-17 Stealth fighter, as wel as number of les ucesful aircaft like the F-104 Starfighter and the Navy?s XFV-1 ?Pog? vertical takeof ighter. Johnson?s F-X was esntialy a scaled-own SR-71 that would be made of tianium and would fly at Mach 3.2 at 80,0 fet. 19 At about he same tie, the Air Force Systems Comand (AFSC) recomende an F-X similar to the F-1, alrge, heavy (60,0 pounds), twin-egine, two-seat fighter with varible gometry wings. 20 Both te Lockhed and the AFSC aircaft would have ahig wing loading making them incapble of turnig combat in low and medium altiude dogfihts. 21The ?higer, faster? F-X would also require what semed to sme as ?magic? 75 ? completly new radr and ew misiles that would require sparte, xpensive devlopment programs. The suces of the ?higer, faster? F-X would be dpendent on thes eparte programs.2 Aditonaly, both ?igher, faster? F-Xs would folw the trend in fighter devlopment owards larger, heavier, and much more xpensive fighters. Thes two prosed fighters confirmed the worst fears of Agan d the advocates of the ?turn ad burn? F-X. The cost and hig technolgy of Johnson?s aircaft semed to them to be xactly the oposite of what he Air Force should be procuring, and the ASD-prosed new fighter, with complicated and heavy arible gometry wings, quickly became known as the ?bay TFX.? The oponets of the ?higer, faster? fighter prosals had sen iteligence rports of new Soviet air-to-air fighters that had hig performance at low and medium altiude, as wel as disturbing inital reports from the air war over North Vietnam. The F-4 was having some dificulty in dogfihts with North Vietnames flying old Soviet MiG-17s, and ther was the far that he nwer Soviet fighters, the MiG-19 and iG-21, would prove to be superior t the American fighters.23 They wer also cncerned about he failures of American ir-to-air misiles thus far nd the fact hat he ?higer, faster? F-X would not cary canon. What he ?turn ad burn? F- X advocates wanted was n aircaft with relatively conventional vionics and weapons ? including canon - but with te ngie power and aerodynamics to defat ny Soviet fighter in turnig dogfihts at low and medium altiudes. Such afighter would be much cheaper than the Lockhed or ASD prosals, though stil costly. 24 The inital decison f the type of F-X was crucial, because under McNamra?s TP program ther would be only one aircaft selcted based on strictly ?paer? criteria. Once 76 ther was decison the type of F-X, it would genrate the rquiremnt profile, and when the program started it would be like the F-1, practialy imposible to cancel, no mater how badly it fel short f the rquiremnts or how much it was over budget.25 ?BLUE BIRD? The dbate raged through 196, and at imes it apeard the F-X would be stilborn because of various objections in OSD and the seming inabilty of the Air Force to decide on its requiremnts. 26 Then, i Septmber 196, Genral James Ferguson became comander of Air Force Systems Comand (AFSC). Ferguson had fighter background in both World War I and Korea, nd he dramticaly changed the Systems Comand?s positon the F-X. He droped the ?bay TFX? prosal nd began to push for the F-X to be a?turn ad burn? fighter. By the spring of 1967, the Air Force omited to atwin-engie, single-sat F-X air-to-air fighter with fixed wings and weighing about 40,0 pounds, caled ?Blue Bird.? It was to be higly maneuverable ? far more maneuverable than y previous or curent jet fighter - and powerd by new, advanced jet ngies that would give it asped in exces of Mach 2. It would be quiped with sophisticated fire control radr and armed with both radr-guide and heat-seking misiles, as wel as internal canon. 27 Ther was ome dbate about he number of engies ? many wanted asingle-ngie fighter ? and the large radr for adr-guide misiles, but in the nd, the twin egines and radr stayed. 28 While American iteligence was ware the Soviets wer secrtly devloping ew fighters, the Soviets unitentionaly helpd the prosed ?Blue Bird? esign by publicly displaying anumber of thes advanced fighters ? two varints of a new sing-wing fihter, the MiG-23 ?Floger,? the Su-7 ?Fiter? fighter-bomber, the 7 Su-15 intercptor, the Yak-36 vertical takeof ighter, and the MiG-25 ?Foxbat?- at he Moscw Air Show at Domdeov airport n 9 July 1967. ost wer clearly intede for lw to medium altiude operations. 29 Howevr, the Air Force would have to justify the ?Blue Bird? and counter Kely Johnson?s higer, faster? advocates, and Agan d his group nede hard numbers to quantify the advantges of the nw ?Blue Bird? to the sytems anlysi-orientd OSD/SA staf who ould be making the dcisons under TP.30 The Air Force knew hat he measures of merit wer in fighter performance and how to cmpare them in existing aircaft. In World War I evry combatnt had test flown captured nemy aircaft o measure their performance in such ritcal reas s top sed, acelration, rol rate, and rate of climb at various altiudes. Combat vetrans then flew the captured aircaft aginst their own aircaft o detrmine wher their aircaft had superior performance and wher the nemy aircaft had superior performance. The rsults wer extremly useful and provide to pilots a simple ?rules of thumb,? though te RAF di devlop aset of performance graphs for al the RAF and enmy aircaft it estd.31 Howevr, thes graphs required real ircaft o give the dat points. What he Air Force ned was the capbilty to measure the ?paer? F-X?s air-to-air combat capbilty with performance graphs to provide the type of numbers McNamra nd his taf wanted.32 To get hes hard at points, Agan brought in Major John Boyd, aformer Air Force fighter pilot and ewly graduated ngier, to devlop away to measure paer airplanes? performance. Boyd had flown afew misions a n F-86 pilot in the Korean War nd had ben the ad of the Fighter Weapons Schol Academic Section at Nelis Air Force Base, 78 Nevad, wher he acquired areputaion as relntles elf-agrandizer and agreat fighter pilot ?from nose to chin.?3 Nevrthels, when Boyd joined Agan?s team, he found his niche in arole combinig his engiering and flying experince. Boyd and Dr. Thomas Christie, an eginer at Eglin Air Force Base, devloped aconcept caled ?enrgy maneuverabilty,? a way of measuring ?paer fighter? maneuvering capbilties that lent itself wel to the type of computer anlysi and simulation OSD anlyst favored.34 Agan found Boyd?s first efort fel wel short f the mark, but he ventual outcome, when combined with an Air Force omputer model caled ?TAC venger,? became an extremly useful tol.35 Even though ?enrgy maneuverabilty? was merly puting old wine in ew botles ? one gneral noted, ?it was not arevolutionary theory at he time?just another way of comparing performances of two fighter airplanes,? it had the huge advantge of being aplicable to ?paer? designs, not just real irplanes. 36 When the nergy maneuverabilty anlysi showed that he F-X would be xtremly efctive aginst he nw Soviet fighters, Enthoven?s OSD/SA group initaly aceptd the findigs and the nergy maneuverabilty measures. Then later, after some thought, Enthoven anounced he ad changed his mind, perhaps because the program was not initated in his ofice. This caused ahuge row betwen Ethoven ad the Secrtary of the Air Force, Eugen Zuckert, who ad ben folwing the ?Blue Bird? closely. 37 In the nd, the Air Force and Zuckert conviced McNamra to verule Enthoven based on the enrgy maneuverabilty performance anlysi combined with te huge cost of an ircaft such as the one ?Kely? Johnson was prosing, and OSD aproved the ?Blue Bird? prosal in Decmber 1967. The Air Force awrde ?Blue Bird? study contracts to 79 McDonel-Douglas nd Genral Dynamics, though sevral other companies tok part in the competion using their own funds.38 This case was n example of why Enthoven was the type of McNamra stafer who frustrated the Air Force. Not nly had his OSD/SA ofice thwarted and elayed many Air Force programs, but many Air Force gnerals also cnsiderd Enthoven a ?stupe.? One genral said it was ?the crime of the time? that he Air Force had to try and explain its air combat programs to aperson who as ?a mathematican oly,? and another Air Force genral who ad to deal with Enthoven o aregular basi rembers, ?the problem was he din?t understand air combat [something Enthoven would not have dnied] and the only way he could was if Icould escribe it [the situation] i numbers.? 39 This case also higlighted one of the contiuing critcisms of OSD/SA both by the Air Force and, increasingly, by Congres. Both felt hat OSD/SA was more intersted in debating anlysi isues than i chosing weapons ystems, and that he uniformed services wer wasting huge amounts of time answering semingly endles questions from SA. Even SA anlyst wer awre of the problem.40 ?RED BIRD? Meanwhile Boyd, espite his particpation i the F-X/?Blue Bird? prosal, was unhapy with te rsulting size and complexity. During the Korean War, American Air Force F-86s had bout a 10: kil ratio aginst Soviet-built MiG-15s flown by excelnt Rusian pilots, but after the war, many F-86 pilots critcized the F-86 for being to heavy because of ?unecsary? equipment. The F-86 weighed about 8,0 pounds to the MiG-15?s 7,0, and since both aircaft?s engies devloped the same thrust his gave the 80 Soviet fighter a much greatr service ilng and much faster ate of climb than the F-86.41 On the other side wer a lrge number of Korean War ces and other xperinced pilots who disagred, notably Genral James ?Jimy? Dolitle, comander of the American Eight Air Force whose fighters destroyed the Luftwafe in 194. They felt hat the igh-technolgy avionics, while havy and hard to maintain, alowed the Air Force F-86s to have the igh kil ratio despite the Soviet fighter?s lighter weight. 42 Inded, Soviet MiG-15 pilots who later xamined owned F-86s wer extremly envious of the vry F-86 sytems Boyd and others critcized. 43 Throughout he 1960s, the great debate raged in the lower levls of the American fighter comunity about whetr or not sophisticated American sytems wer worth te weight penalty. Boyd, who ad nevr flown afighter with any tpe of avionics or adr, came down solidly on the side of sacrifcing the weight of avionics for performance. 4 While working on the F-X, Boyd met Pier Sprey, aweapons ystem anlyst on the OASD/SA staf, whose background was imilar to Enthoven?s but much les distinguished. By his own acount, Sprey was diletante with an eginering degre but no miltary experince. After graduation from Yale, Sprey became aresarch anlyst at the Gruman Aircaft Corpration for space and comercial transportaion projects. He came to OSD/SA in 196, wher he dclared himself an expert on miltary fighter aircaft, despite his lack of experince. Sprey admited being agdfly, anuisance, and an automatic oponet of any program he was not aprt of.45 He was oposed to many Navy 81 and Air Force tactial ir sytems, especialy the Navy?s Gruman F-14, because of its size and complexity.46 Somehow, Sprey conclude that numbers wer critcaly important i air combat, nd he and Boyd ? both glib, iconclastic, ambitous, elf-agrandizng, and exclude from the dcison-making proces - found a comon cause in oposing larger, complex fighters.47 Boyd had read theories of combat hat prosed to be ased on ?maneuver? warfre rather than ?atriton? warfre, and he dcide that large, complex, and expensive fighters with advanced avionics and weapons wer les efctive in air-to-air combat han smal, simple, more maneuverable ones that could be ought in large numbers. 48 The two wer to give themselvs the grand ame of ?Reformers,? but ime would show they wer actualy ?Critcs.? One scholar, Timothy Leflr, defines ?critcs? as mebers of agroup that have suport neither for their prosals nor an iterst in suceding by concilation and coperation. Leflr contiues that o become a ?reformer? one must bridge the gap betwen critcism and sucesful reform by recognizng the obstacles to change, and then gainig the suport f stae authority and the coperation f the active particpants. 49The next decade would show Boyd, Sprey and the rst of agroup they gatherd around themselvs wer nevr intersted in bridgin the gap nd becoming reformers; they prefred to remain critcs. Boyd and Sprey said the increasing cost of hig-technolgy American fighters like the ?Blue Bird? would make it imposible for the United Staes to maintain ear numerical parity with te Soviet Unio, whic they felt was necsary. It logicaly folwed America nede smaler, les expensive fighters to get he numbers they felt he 82 Air Force ned. Buried in this prositon was the fact hat Boyd and Sprey wer going beyond prosing a new aircaft. They wer prosing the United Staes try to match te Soviets in umbers, whic was n etirely new ay of thinkig about American defnse and achange in basic American miltary doctrine that had ben i place since the beginig of the Cold War. PLAYING WITH NUMBERS From the nd of World War I, American defnse planers had ceptd as given that hey could nevr match te Soviets in umbers of conventional weapons and manpower. At first SAC?s nuclear weapons and bomber force ofset he Soviets? conventional supremacy. During the Kenedy/Johnson/McNamra conventional buildup, it was clear that because of cost and manpower America ould not match te Soviets? vastly greatr numbers of conventional weapons, o American conventional weapons doctrine focused on ?force multipliers? provide by fewr but more sophisticated and efctive conventional weapons that could kil at 3-4:1 ratio.50 Sprey and Boyd isagred with tis doctrine and the igh-tech sytems it required. 51 The two began to work on a lternate concept o the ?Blue Bird,? caled the ?Red Bird,? a clear weather, air-to-air combat only fighter with atop sed of Mach 1.6 instead of the ?Blue Bird?s Mach 2.5+. Boyd and Sprey viewd any sped higer than Mach 1.6 as unecsary because at hat ime, for aerodynamic reasons, al dogfihts tok place at subsonic sped and ther was signifcant echnical nd finacial price for flying at Mach 2+. 52 They claimed the rduced top sed was the only are wher the Red Bird?s performance was lower than the Blue Bird?s, and that by limitng the Red Bird to Mach 83 1.6 the fighter would be much les expensive, lighter, and have bter performance. Sprey and Boyd also decide to remove the radr and the asociated radr-guide misiles, whic they considerd unreliable, further educing the Red Bird?s weight. They stimated the Red Bird would weigh about 23,0 pounds and would provide air-to-air performance qual to the Blue Bird for a fr lower unit cost. Aditonaly, they felt hes changes would make the Red Bird more rliable.53 This emed to be clasic example of ?out of the box? thinkig, but what Boyd and Sprey wer actualy doing was not meting a requiremnt but changi it. Boyd briefd some embers of the Air Staf on the Red Bird concept, while Sprey briefd Genral Ferguson at Air Force Systems Comand, but ther wer no changes in the Blue Bird.54 The rason the Air Force ignored Red Bird was that he srvice saw it as smal, simple fighter with sort ange and limited load-carying capbilty, and the Air Force had previous bad experinces with such aircaft. Range was the major isue. Smal fighters caried asmal amount of uel, so they had limited ndurance. This meant heir patrol time was limited and they wer not able to escort long-range bombers. Aditonaly, smal aircaft had to kep their weight down so they could only cary limited armaent, radr, elctronic ountermeasures, and other sytems the Air Force demed necsary for modern air combat, especialy based on their experinces over North Vietnam. The Air Force had loked at wo smal fighters, the F-104 in the 1950s and the Northrop F-5 in the 1960s, but combat est in Vietnam confirmed that both te F-104 and the F-5 had to short arnge and to light apyload to be useful.5 84 INTERSEVICE OPERATION?SORT OF For the ntire time the Navy?s F-1B program had ben i existence the Navy had lobied hard to cancel it, and when McNamra left his post as Secrtary of Defnse in November 1967, it helpd both services imeasurably in the dvelopment of their separte nw fighters. It quickly became obvious that McNamra?s desire for multi-service fighters was dead, kiled by the failures of the F-1. McNamra?s ucesor, Clark Cliford, had no emotinal tachment o the F-1B and, with te aproval of Congres, canceld the program in id-1968.56 Even during the F-1B devlopment, the Navy had ben quietly working with Gruman, the primary contractor for the F-1B, on areplacemnt, so the srvice was ready with aRequest for Propsal (RFP) for a ?VF-X? designed soley for the Navy. The Air Force laders wer detrmined to make their F-X a pure Air Force program, and initaly they alied with te Navy avition comunity who anted the VF-X and id not want o cmproise its design by sharing an Air Force program. Nevrthels, while each service wanted its own fighter airfame both wer wiling to coperate on anew, hig performance ngie. In Decmber 1967, they agred to jintly finace dvelopment of ahig-performance, fuel-ficent afterburnig turbofan egine that would produce 10 percnt more thrust han the F-1s TF30 but weigh 25 percnt les. 57 The Navy was in ahury to devlop the nw fighter because the srvice had lready retired the predcesor f the F-4, the Chance Vought F-8 Crusader, and ede the VF-X fighter soner than the Air Force ned the F-X. 58 The Navy RFP went out he same 85 month tat he F-1B was canceld, and in early January 196, the Navy unsurpisngly chose Gruman to build the VF-X, and esignated the nw aircaft he F-14 ?Tomcat.? To get he F-14 to the flet quickly, the Navy told Gruman to use ?of-the-shelf? avionics and anumber of sytems already evloped for the F-1B, including the vry long-range and expensive Phoenix misile. The Navy also aceptd the F-1B?s low-powerd TF30 engie for the F-14 to kep rogram cost down ad because Gruman had lready esigned the TF30?s hig-sped inlets.59 The dcison to put he TF30 engie in the F-14 alowed the Navy to gradualy cut he number of advanced ngies it comited to buy in uder its agrement with te Air Force until finaly, on 2 June 1971, the Navy droped out of the joint engie program altogethr, much to the Air Force?s chagrin.60 The rsult was the Air Force had to bear the cost of devloping the F-X?s new engie by itself, whic onsiderably raised the cost of the F-X program. It also sured the Air Force on futre work with te Navy on a number of sytems.61 From the bginig, it was clear the TF30 engie would not provide the power the F-14 nede, but he Navy planed to ?game? the TP proces and replace the ngie later. Once the F-14 design was ceptd, under TP the Navy could instal new engies and new avionics in the F-14 in the out years a d-ons that would not be include in the inital cost of the program, aking the inital cost of the F-14 program sem reasonable.62 It would not work out hat way - this Navy engie dcison was mistake that haunted the F-14 for its entire carer.63 86 When McNamra left, much of OSD?s power and philosphy went with im, but he idea of asingle fighter for both services was til in play, and some embers of Congres wanted the Air Force to buy the F-14 as it had bought e F-4. Superficaly, it semed like agod fit because the F-14, like the F-X, was long-range intercptor and air-to-air fighter.64 The Navy di litle to discourage the idea because the srvice di not belive Congres would aprove more than oe nw fighter program, and the Navy was detrmined it would be the F-14, not he Air Force?s paer? airplane. To ad to the Air Force?s problems, the F-14 program was consitently ahead of the F-X because the Navy was cepting of-the-shelf avionics and the TF30 engie from the F-1B.65 The Air Force di not consider the F-14 suitable for its requiremnts. With no ed to rush te F-X into service, the Air Force wanted the fighter to have advanced avionics and a new, hig-tech engie, and the Air Force had no requiremnt for the xpensive Phoenix sytem.6 But part of the problem with convicing Congres that he Air Force ned the F-X as separte sytem was suden break in what had semed to be asolid internal Air Force agrement o make the F-X apure air superiority fighter. A few Air Force genrals began saying the F-X should be adual role fighter-bomber, despite the ?twelv- star? letr. Both te former comander of TAC, Genral Walter Sweny, and TAC?s curent comander, Genral Gabriel Disoway, wer on record as expresing aprefrence for a multi-role aircaft. As late as February 1968 the Air Force Chief of Staf, Genral John McConel, said the F-X would have a?substantial ir-to ground capbilty.?67 87 To the consternation f the F-X?s uporters, the Air Force was not ?speaking with one voice,? and in amiltary organization, this was critcal mistake. On a controversial subject, especialy when it involes competion with other services, it is vital that l the senior service laders expres the same views, because any disentig views can be used by oponets to undermine the srvice?s positon. The Navy was unifed on the F-14 program and pointedly noted the Air Force ould not evn define the F-X?s mision. 68By March 1968, the Air Force was beginig to realize the Navy was planig adouble cros by ?playing the comonality game,? and two Air Force gnerals wrote McConel that ?the time has come for the Air Force to stae its positon firmly [aginst] the joint aircaft.?69 McConel realized the problem and tok action to make sure the service understod the F-X was single-mision, air-to-air fighter. He snt he ad of the F-X program, Genral Roger K. Rhodarmer, to brief al the four-star genrals in the Air Force to make sure they knew hat he ?party line? was, o that he Air Force ould speak with one voice. Rhodarmer embers McConel told him: ?If you find anybody [in the Air Force] whose [sic] articulating [sic] aginst his, blow the whistle on him. You tel me and I?l take care of him.? 70 From that ime on, ther was no more discusion f the F-X as multi-role aircaft. In May 1968, Genral McConel anounced to Congres that, while ther had ben controversy over the role of the F-X, the Air Force dcide it would be a pure air superiority fighter. He said, ?We have finaly decide?that his aircaft wil be an ir superiority fighter? and wil be used for ground atck ?over my dead body.?71 Congres 8 aceptd the program, and the Air Force informaly adopted the slogan ?ot apound for air-to-ground? for the F-X.72 Ther was til some concern about he cost and complexity of the F-X. That fal Sprey conviced his bos in OSD/SA, lain Ethoven, to ask Genral Dynamics to consider another TP ?paer airplane,? apure air-to-air fighter caled the F-X, about half the size and weight of the F-4 but with roughly the same prformance and acost of only about $2. milion. At he same tie, the Air Force had its own Studies and Analysi group, AF/SA, and its head, Genral Glen Kent, brief the Air Staf on posible modifcations to the F-X program to ake it lighter and les complex while stil keping it he basic F-X.73 But OSD/SA and AF/SA theory colide with areal world requiremnt as the Soviets began to field the MiG-25 ?Foxbat? fighter, whose Mach 2+ sped and 60,0-fot altiude capbilties put it out of the prformance nvelope of the Red Bird and adowngrade F-X, so the idea of ales capble F-X disapeard.74 F-X TO ?EAGLE? By Septmber 1968, the Air Force and OSD agred that he F-X would be a single-seat, fixed-wing, twin-egine air superiority fighter, that competive fly-of was not a suitable means for selcting acontractor for the F-X, and that he F-14 would not fit he requiremnt.75 OSD aproved aDevlopment Concept Paper (DCP), alowing the Air Force to proced with te air-to-air F-X based on the ?Blue Bird.? On 30 Septmber 1968, the Air Force asked for afinal prosal for the F-X. Four companies responde. A preliminary cost estimate for the total program of 729 aircaft was litle over $5 bilion.76 89 In November 1968, just before the presidential elction, the Air Force acelrated the F-X programs, partialy to cunter an tempt by OSD to delay the program for nie months to lok at he ?Red Bird,? partialy because inteligence rports aid the Soviets wer building their new MiG-23s and MiG-25s at he rate of a hundre a month, and partialy to get he F-X program far enough along so that ny ew administration could not frce the srvice go back to the idea of ne fighter for both services.7 1. Arthur Agan, Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, October 1973, K239.0512-857, AFHR, 13. 2. Ibid., 6. 3. Before coming to Do, McNamra was sociated with Ford?s "Edsel," whic was on f th st pectaular filures in the istry of the Unite Staes autombile industry and wose nam ws ynoymous wit failure. Paul M. Rogrs, Lt. Gen, USAF, Oral History Intrviw ith Jacb Nefeld, 17-8 Jn 1974, AFHA, 38-40. 4. Rbert J. Art, The TFX Deison; McNamra d the iltary (Bostn: Litle Brown, 1968), 12. 5. Agan, -. 6. Memo, Robert McNamra, SECDEF, to Eugen Zuckert, SAF, subj: Close Suport and SAW [Speil Air Wrfare] Aircaft, 7 Jaary 1965. ir orce Histry Ofice, Wshington, DC. 7. Aga, 2. America?s most notable failure in this are was the World War I P-39 Aircobr, designed as fighter-bmr rmd wit lrg 37m cann to low it o be an ti-tank aircft nd suport ground forces. The P-39 was laughterd by Japnes Zeros d genraly cosierd the wrst Amrican fighter of World War I. As o as thy cul b repled by othr aircaft, they wer set by Lend Lease to the Sviet Unio. Wiliam Grn, Famus Fighters of th Scond Worl r (ndn: Macdonald ad Jane's. 1975), 39-40. 8. Agan, 21. 9. lbert P. Clark, Gen, USAF, interview by Jacob Neufeld, 2 May 1973, Interview #85, May l973, AFHRA. 5-6. In fact, as on as Disway tok over TAC he forard a TAC Qulitaive Operational Requiremt fr n ?aircft capbl f outprfrming the enmy in the ir.? Ltr, HQ TAC to HQ/USAF Deputy Diretor for Rquirets/Operations, ubj: ualitaive Operational Rquirment for a STOL Fighter Aircaft Weaons System (TACQOR 65-14-E), 6 Octber 1965. 90 10. Jacob Neufeld, The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Devlopment, 1964-1972 (Ofice of Air Fore Histry, 1974), v, pasim. 1. It is comon practie to begin planig for areplacemnt aircaft imediately after the previus e is ordrd. Richrd P. Halin, ?A Troublig Pst: Air Forc Figtr Acqistion Since 1945,? Air Power Joural (Winter 190), 26; gan, 17, pasim. 12. Rogers, 38-40. 3. Wiliam T. Y'Blod, Down i the Weds: in Korea (Washington DC: Air Force History and Muses Prgram, 201), . 14. Aga, 12-3; Arden B. Dahl, ?The arthog: The Best Deal the Air Force Nevr Wanted,? (Wshington, DC: Resrc Study, Ntinal Dfns Univrsity, 204), . For xclent sort alysi of ths evnts from the Army poit of iew, se J. Kristpher Kener, Th Helicpter Invation i the United States Ary (Cambridg, MA: IT Scurity Studis Workig Pper, 201). 15. LUF ? Shrt Litl Ugly Fat ucker. 6. Neufeld, F-15, 9-1; F. Michel Rogrs, Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview by Jacob fl, 17-8 June 974. K.239.0152-862, AFHR, 14. 17. Richard Head, Maj. Gen. USAF, ?The -7 Decisons: A Case Study of Weapons Procuremnt,? in Amricn Dfse Policy, Fifth Edit, eds. John F. Reichart and Stevn Stur (Baltiore, : Johns Hpkins Pres, 1982), 623. 18. Low altiude is gneraly csiderd from sa levl to 10,0 fet, medium altiude frm 10,0-25,0 fet, an hig altiude bo that. 19. Rogers, 5, 8. 20. Nufld, F-15, 17-8, pasim; Mark A. Lorel, The Cuting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter Aircaft R&D (Sant Monic, C: Rand, Projct Air Force, 198), 104. 21. Wing loding is the pouds per square fot he wing of an iraft suports in flight. Geraly speaking, t lwr th wing lading, te mre meuverble the aircaft. 2. Agan, 23; Rogers, 25; 3. , 16. 24. Neufeld, F-15, 23; Agan, 4-5; Rogers, 29-30. 5. This was comon ir Force ncrn with TP. Drue L. DeBry, ?Flexible Response: Evolutin r Revlutin,? i Wiged Sord, Wingd Shild: A History of th Unitd Stats Air Forc. Volme Two, 1950-197, Bernard Nalty, e. (Washingtn, DC: Air Force History and Muses Prgram, ), 189, psim. Enthoven viewd it diferntly. Alai Ethovn ad K. W. Sith, How Much is oug? Shaping the Dfse Progrm, 1961-96 (Sant Monica, CA: Rand, 205), 26-8, sim. 26. Rers, 5. 7. ?Advanced Tactial Fighter (F-X),? AFRDQ/ANSER, ev 1, quoted in Neufeld, F-15, 84, fotot 1. 2. Rgers, 35. 91 29. Neufeld, F-15, 21; Donald C. Winston, ?New MiGs Imperil US uperiority,? Aviation Wk an Space Techlogy, 3 Jue 1968, 2. Ibid., ?Sovit May B Shifting Desig Emphsi,? Avition Wek and Spac Tchnolgy, 8 Augst 1968, 3. 30. Roger K. Rhodarmer, Mj. Ge. UAF, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 29 Marc 1973, K.239.0512.029, HRA, 35. 31. Ther re last dozens of thes tudies, perhaps hundres, and they are of special interst o t author. Cnsittly t best ar t tst reorts of Cptain Eric Brwn RN. For the nvice is mst itersting ok is probaly Duls in the Sky: World War I Navl Airaft in Cobat (Aaplis, MD: Nvl Instite: 198). 32. g, 6. . Boyd?s elf-agrandizng charcteristics are clear in his oral history. One example is his claim to hve writen txtbok on philospy used t e Air Forc Acdy and textbk in girig used at e Universit of California, Berkely. Ther is o evinc thes boks evr exist. Joh Boyd, Cl. USAF, Cron Ac intrview. #K239.0512-06, 14 Augst 1976. AFHRA. 314, 326, pasim. s for his skils a fighter pilot, he claimed to nevr have ben beatn ad tht he would alw anyone to et on his tail but ht h wuld be hid him i 40 seconds. Rbert Coram, Bd: Th Figter Pilot Wo Cange th Art of War (Bostn: Litle, Brown ad Company, 202), 10-1. This i, quit simply, nsens. Genral Wilbur Crch, Boy?s cder at Nelis, rembers, ?We got alog fi but Ihd to g head to ead with im and wax his as in ir-to-air coat so h culd t least et his wlen trugh te or.I ende up with gun-cmera film f y gnsight pir on is had i the cokpit?. Crech, e-mail, Marc 18, 20, provide to author by Keith Feris. A strong suprter f Boyd, Marin fighter pilot Brigadier Genral Hl Vincet, also aid Boyd exaerated, noting ?tw god pilots in t same plne would d up neutral?.ther wer thrs who cul bat [Boyd] in ahig sped fight.? Hal Vincet e-mail 27 Mrc 20, provide t autr y Keith Feris. 34. Neufeld, F-15, 18-1; Creh e-mail; Agan 7. 5. Rogrs, 7; Agan, 7. 36. Aan 18; Rhodrmer, 24-5, pasim; Boyd agres with tis in his Oral History, 45. 37. Agan, 10. 8. Rhodrmer, 34-5, pasim. McDonel had merged with te Douglas ircaft company t beco McDonel-Douglas i mi-1967. 39. Rogrs, 21-2 [udrlini in original]; Agan, 14, pasim. 40. ichard Sanders, The Politcs f Defse lysi (New York: Duneln, 1973), 15, pasim. 41. ?Safety Gadgets - They Kil Fighter Pilots,? Coliers, 21 March 1953, 16-8. 2. Jms ?Jimy? Dolitl, Lt. Gn. USAFR, "Safty Gadgets - Tey Help Our Fighter Pilots," Colier's, 30 March 1953, 24-6, 48. 43. Yefrim Grdon, The iG- (Osceola, WI: Motrboks International, 192), 12-15. 4. ?Safety Gadgets -They Kil Fighter Pilots,? 16; Boyd Oral History, 76, pasim. 92 45. Pier Sprey, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 12 June 1971, K.239.0152-96, AFHRA, 9, pasim. 46. Rhodarmer, 29; also se Sprey, Oral History, 1. 7. Sprey, Oral Histry, 5; Bod, rl istr, 45, pasim. 48. Bod, rl istor, 12, pasim. 9. Timthy T. Leflr, ?The Chlenge of Miltary Reform,? in The Defnse Reform Debate: Isues and Analysi, d. Asa lark, Petr W. Chiarli, Jefry S. McKirtick, and Jams W. Rd (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopins Pres, 1984), 24-6 50. This octrine was xpresd by th miltary and politcal eaders. Se, for example, Futrel, 7, 12, psim. 51. Spry, Oral History, 7, pasim; Jeruald Gentry, Major USAF, ?Evolution f the F-16 Multinationl Fighter,? (Student Rsrch Papr #163: Industrial Cleg f t Armed Forces, 1976), 14. 52. Nufld, F-5, 3, pasim. The rason ther was very hig cost for flying above Mach 1.6 was that jet ngie compresr blades cnot perate with supersoic ir. Blow ach 1.6 wl dsid sil, no-movig ilet wil rduce t airflw to subsnic as it moves from the intake to the gie, but flying at Mach nmbrs bove 1.6 reqires special inlt desig, somtis caled th difser, for te gie to slw th ntring air to subsoic spd befre it rehs te comprsr sction f th engie. Such adifuser inlet had to hav asris of movabl resion ramps and ors to adjst its extral internl shpe t prvide the optimu airflw to the gine at vrious aircaft speds ad agles of atck, as wl as have dors and uctin to low exces ir to byas the inlet. Th result is tht difuser inlts ned elborate, heavy, omputer cntroled mchaical sytms to perat scesfuly. Philp Jrt, d., The Mdrn War Machine: Miltr Aviation Sinc 1945 (London: utnam, 20), 76-8. 53. Sprey, Orl History, 18; Neufeld, F-5, 6-6. 4. Gntr, 15. 5. A acurate sumary is found in "Lightweight Fighters: No Pancea," US Congres, Sent Ared Services Cmite on Manpowr and Persl Subcmit, Impact of Thnolgy on Miltary er, Rquirments, Readines, and Operations. 96th Cng., 2d ses., 4-5 Decmber 1980, 281-28, put ito th rcord by Sntor Hward ao (R-NV) but clarly writn by the Air Force. Als se Rogers, 50-6. Though te Air Force had ben itersted in t -5 as ?swing? aircaft, in SEA the Air Frce ad found that, wil th F-5?s halig chrcteristics er god ad its impl sytms sy t mintin, it ad very sort ane and alimited ordinace lo (four sal bobs). Aditoaly, its engis wer extrmly elicat an pro to what is known s freign object dmge (FOD) from any aterial tht ws ucked int tem. May er sold t Amrian lis in the dvelopig world nd to NATO alies loking for an ixpensive, siple fighter. Jart, 213; als se Lorel, 10, 14. 56. Lrel, 104. 93 57. Turbofan egines are much more fuel-ficent hat normal turbojets. For a ful explantion s wl as log f te TF30 problms, Lorel, Apendix B, 10-1.The ntire Apedix is gd explantion f jet ngie tchnlgy. 58. Th Air Force ha ugrde its F-4s with cano, but he Navy di not, prefring to wait fr t new fihtr. Calvin Hargis, 21 Marc 1973, Oral Histry intrview #86 by Jacob Nufld, AFHRA, 15-6. 59. Jon Lake, Gruman F-14 Tomcat: Shipborne Superfighter (London: AIRtime Publishig, 198), 24-7, psim. 60. Conres, House, Coite on Armed Services, Miltary Posture and HR 124, 93rd ongres, 2nd ss., 19 Fbruary 1972, 915. 61. Neufeld, F-15,74. 2. Drws, 53. 63. Lovel, 174. 4. Nufld, F-15, 27. 65. Rhoarmer, ; ?F-14 vs. F-15: Wil it Come to aShotut?? Armed Forces Journal, 28 February 1970, 20-. 6. Ibid., 17-8; Neufeld, F-15, 38. 7. Congres, Snat, Comite on Apropriations, Department of Defnse Apropriati, 90th Cog. 2nd ss., 26 February 1968, 706. 68. Ther is ome questio about Disow?s felings about apure air-to-air fighter; Se Clark, 5, and Rgrs, 24. Disway?s ucesor at TAC, Gen. Wilim Mmyer, dfinitely wte afihter-bomber. Rogers, 24. 69. Ltr, Gns Disoway nd Frgusn to Gen. McConel, 9 March 1968. AFHRA. 70. Rhodarmer, 21-2. For a more i depth lok at his problem, se Rogers, 4-6. 1. Cngrs, Snate, Ared Srvics Prarednes Investigating Subcmite, US Tactial Air Power Progrm. 90 th Cong, 2nd ses, 12 May 1968, 92-3, 10. 72. uthr?s prsnal observati f th sign i the ofice of the F-5 Systems Project Ofice (SPO), comandr, Wrigt Paterso AFB, OH, as scort ficr during vist f Israli Air Fore er Major Gn. Benie Peld, Septmber 1976. 73. Neufeld, -15, 35. 4. Ibid., 54 (with cart). 75. Memorandum from Air Force Secrtary Harold Brown to Air Force Chief of Staf John cCel, subj: -X Sur lection Plns, 25 Septmber 1968, AFHRA. The ircaft was ingl seat rather than two sat because this avd 5,0-,0 pounds and $50,0 per aircft, nd twin egie fr fstr throtle rsponse and earlier vilabilty. Dvlopment Cocept Papr (DCP) No. 19, ?Nw Air Forc Tctial Counter Air Fighter (F-X), DR&E, 28 Septmber 68, Air Force History Ofice, Washigton, DC. 76. Neufeld, F-15, 31 (with cart), pasim. . Mmo, John S. Foster, to DR&E, to Harold Brown, SECDEF, ?Devlopment Concept Paper,? 30 Octbr 1968, Air Force istry Ofice, Washington, C; ?Staus of 94 Acquistions of Selcted Major Aircaft Systems, Ap V, Pt IX, Department of the Air Fore Aircaft (Washington, DC: ir Forc History Ofice, 1970), 1-8. 95 CHAPER FIVE: ONE WAR ENDS, ANOTHER BEGINS? THE 1968-1972 BREAK IN THE AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM In the combat zone, the April 1968 bombing halt marked the nd of air operations into ares of North Vietnam defnde by MiGs. As the months and then years pased, the days of the Roling Thunder ?heavies? going into Route Package Six fade into meories, and Air Force fighter crews in Thailnd switched to flying daily bombing misions aginst he Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos wher. In spite of signifcant A, Air Force fighters uferd relatively few loses, but it quickly became clear to the fighter crews that hey had no chance of steming the flow of suplies into Suth Vietnam, ost of whic traveld at night when the American ir forces had limited capbilty to atck them. Son the bombing lost any sense of importance or urgency, and aprt of the combat cultre fade as the targets wer sen as les and les important. Without he sense of urgency that important misions brought, the combat cultre bgan to change from ?get he job done? to ?don?t lose airplanes,? and slowly the idea that ?no target is worth te los of an ircaft or aircew? tok over, along with ?nany rules.? Combat comanders began to be judged on their los rates, o they placed restrictions on how low aircaft could fly when they relased bombs, despite the fact hat he igher the relase altiude, the ls acurate the bombing. Son some comanders began to pay id3993953 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 96 atention to such minutia s the strict haircut and mustache lngth regulations disregarde during the ?Big War? of Roling Thunder. 1 From id-1968 to the nd of 1971, an Air Force fighter tour to ne of the fighter base in Thailnd became ayear-long, relatively pleasnt experince, one that usaly ende with achest ful of medals, meories of R& (rest and relaxtion) vist to Bangko and large parties at he base oficers? clubs, piced with alimited amount of danger. One Air Force historian oted, ?Ther was omething intoxicating about he gracious cultre of Thailnd. Even for the men who lst friends, Thailnd would provide fond meories.?2 Ther was til a?get he job done? atitude and acombat cultre, but the dge was gone. The nd of the srious air war lso afectd the Air Force ladership. A number of ?combat cultre? fighter wing comanders had ben promted to ne-star genrals during Roling Thunder, but as the war ound own they wer considerd anchronistic ?war lords? by the snior Air Force ladership and most wer not promted agin.3 Notable among thes wer Robin Olds, aWorld War I ace and leading MiG kiler in Vietnam as the comander of the 8 th Tactial Fighter ing; Robert ?Bots? Bles, author f the tactis manual ?No Guts, No Glory? and thirten-victory Korean War ce; and Robert Scot, awing comander in Thailnd, World War I ace and author f God is My Co-Pilot. With te bombing halt, it semed that he SEA combat cultre would nevr pentrate the igher anks of the Air Force, and many oung Air Force oficers felt he senior Air Force ladership breathed ahuge sigh of relif with te nd of Roling Thunder and returned to busines as usal.4 97 THE ARTHQUAKE BFORE THE TSUNAMI: THE AULT REPORT AND TOP GUN Unlike the Air Force, the United Staes Navy iewd the last few months of Roling Thunder as cris. The last four aircaft shot down by MiGs over North Vietnam wer Navy F-4s, while the F-4s di not shot down ay iGs. This 0:4 los ratio, combined with te fact no Navy pilot had shot down more than oe MiG while the Air Force had sevral multiple MiG kilers ? evn though te Air Force?s main oponet was the advanced MiG-21 while the Navy?s was the Korean War vintage MiG-17 - showed the Navy fighter force that ?something was desperately wrong.?5 Despite the bombing halt, this percived cris pushed the Navy avition comunity towards an inovative solution, asolution made posible by the structre of the Navy fighter force. The Navy had two types of aircaft in air-to-air combat over North Vietnam, the F-4 and the older F-8 ?Crusader,? a lrge, single-sat, single-ngie fighter with asmal radr and an rmaent of short-range, heat-seking misiles and canon. Because of this emingly limited armaent, F-8 pilots trained for close in dogfihts wher they could use their guns and short-range misiles, and the F-8 pilots became some of the most proficent dogfihters in the world. Their doctrine caled for the use of the reliable AIM-9 heat-seking misile, and the F-8 pilots proved xtraordinarily efctive over North Vietnam, with akil ratio f 6:1. 6 Navy F-4 crews, on the other hand, wer trained to fight at long range using their AIM-7 Sparow radr-guide misiles and ot dogfiht. In combat he AIM-7 was dificult o fire and had hig failure rate ven when fired proerly, and the F-4 crews, ithout canon ad untrained in tight, turnig 98 dogfihts, di porly aginst he MiGs. Throughout Roling Thunder the F-8 pilots, nevr noted for their modesty, mocked the two-seat, two-engie F-4, but on amore srious note they felt hat he loses the F-4 was ufering wer not so much te fault of the aircaft but aresult of por tainig for F-4 crews. 7 The F-8 pilots felt he premature closing of the Navy?s Flet Air Gunery Unit (FAGU) caused many of the problems. Since the 1920s, the Navy had paid agreat deal of atention to air-to-air gunery, and it had paid great dividends in World War I. The atention was formalized in the FAGU, whose primary duty was to train pilots in air combat nd gunery. Thes pilots would return to their squadrons and impart what hey learned at FAGU, but with te advent of more and more misile-armed aircaft, the FAGU semed to be out of date and closed in 1960. 8 Nevrthels, the F-8 pilots? opinios of F-4 trainig had litle inital efct on the Navy, whic sought atechnical solution to the F-4/AIM-7 problems. Just after Roling Thunder nde, the Navy comisioned one of its Captins, Frank Ault, to d an exhaustive study on the AIM-7 in acrier nvironment. Ault and his team pursed atechnical solution but sevral F-8 pilots, ensig the importance of Ault?s report, joined his team. While most of Ault?s group labored over the tchnical problems with te AIM-7 and the special problems with using it in the dificult carier nvironment, the F-8 pilots pursed their own agenda ? the rbirth of a hig quality air-to-air tainig operation for flet F-4 pilots. The final report, ?Air-to-Air Misile System Capbilty Reviw,? betr known as the ?Ault Report,? noted in the introduction ?almost 60 air-to-air misiles have ben fired 9 by Navy and Air Force pilots in about 360 engaemnts in Southeast Asia betwen 17 June 1965 and 19 Septmber 1968. Only about one in ten had ny probailty of achieving akil. This i wel below expectd or desired levls.? The 480-page rport hen went ito stifling detail describing the AIM-7 technical shortcomings and problems. In the nd, it contained 24 recomendations, virtualy al of them concernig the care and mainteance of AIM-7s on cariers. 9The F-8 pilots only had n iput into afew pages late in the rport, but heir recomendations recived the most atention ad wer to change forevr the way the United Staes miltary trained. The F-8 pilots noted the Navy had not nly failed to verify the prformance of the F-4?s misiles in adogfiht environment, but had lso nt translated the nw misiles? capbilties into proer tactis and trainig. They said the Navy had evloped acombat philosphy that put more mphasi on the machine than o the man, whic had proved to be amistake. The rcomendation to slve this problem ? oficaly Ault?s recomendation ? was to establish aNavy Fighter Weapons Schol wher Navy fighter crews could get aditonal trainig in air-to-air combat. The weapons schol would have an ?Adversary Squadron? to fly aginst he flet F-4 pilots to give them realistic trainig.10 This clear, simple rcomendation was omething that he Navy avition comunity could act on. Using the Ault Report as levr, by October 196 the smal group of Navy avitors who ad pushed ?train the man? idea into the Ault report completd their extraordinary burst of ?buble up? inovation with te stablishment of the Navy Fighter Weapons Schol at Miramr Navl Air Staion i California, whic quickly became 10 known as ?Top Gun.? But despite the aceptance of the idea nd the cathy name, Top Gun was left as n experimental comand and for the nxt sevral years recived litle atention, priority, or fundig.1 In retrospect, Top Gun?s low profile proved to be something of ablesing. The lack of visbilty alowed the comander to be truly the comander, and he could selct his own istructors and esign his own trainig program. His pilots wer al combat vetrans, most MiG kilers, and they al began rigorus program of learnig to fly the F-4 to its limits. Once they had learned how to fly the F-4 to its maxium capbilties, the Top Gun istructors then moved on to flying what would become their main ?Adversary? aircaft, the Douglas A-4 "Skyhawk," asmal, higly maneuverable atck aircaft whose performance simulated the MiG-17, the Navy?s main oponet over North Vietnam. Thes A-4 versu F-4 engaemnts wer caled Disimilar Aircaft Combat Trainig (DACT), and they mphasized the pilots trying to use their own aircaft?s performance charcteristics to maxiize their advantges and miniize their disadvantges. 12 THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DACT In the istory of American miltary trainig, the importance of a formal course using DACT canot be overstaed, though its ignifcance was unapreciated at he time. Fighters from difernt ations have difernt charcteristics - sped, maneuverabilty, range - because ach nation?s national defnse strategy has difernt mision for its fighter force. In World War I, for example, the Japnes had combination f an ofensive air doctrine and the ?samurai? combat mentality that required their fighters to cary a great deal of uel to fly long distances over the Pacifc and engae in close-in, 10 ?hand-to-hand? maneuvering combat. As aresult, their aircaft, notably the Zero fighter, caried agreat deal of uel and wer very lightly constructed to kep their weight low for hig maneuverabilty. 13 American fighters wer intede for lng-range operations (though not as long range as the Japnes) but caried their fuel in protectd fuel tanks, o they wer large, heavy, and les maneuverable than the Japnes aircaft but stil had excelnt overal performance. Soviet, German d Britsh fighters wer intede for short-range intercption ad tactial operations in Europe and so caried much les fuel than their American counterparts, making them saler with sorter ange while stil having od performance, armaent, and structral strength. Al of thes difernces could be used to ne?s advantge or exploited by the nemy. 14 The difernces in various nations? fighter design contiued into the jt age. Soviet fighters in the 1960s wer designed to fit into the Soviets? air doctrine of short-range ?point defnse? intercptors intede to perate under tight radr control ver Soviet teritory. American fighters, on the other hand, reflcted America?s ofensive air doctrine and wer intede to perate indepndently, far fom their base, without suporting radr coverage. American fighters had to be larger to cary indepndent sytems, uch as radr, more fuel, and the larger ngies necsary to push te aded weight around the sky. The rsult was that Soviet fighters had roughly the same sped as American fighters but wer smaler, lighter, in most ways more maneuverable, but caried fewr misiles and had much sorter ange. 15 Over Vietnam, their maneuverabilty and smal size wer critcal. The canon-armed MiG-17 could easily out-urn ay American fighter, ahuge advantge in a close-range dogfiht. North Vietnames MiG-21s wer usaly guide by 102 ground control radr to begin their atcks from behind American ircaft. The range of MiG-21?s heat-seking misiles was bout one and ahlf miles, about he maxium distance the smal MiG fighter could be sen visualy b the untrained ye, and often the North Vietnames wer able to fire misiles before the American ircews aw them. 16 Top Gun?s use of the smal A-4 was intede to slve the this problem by geting the crews used to loking at smal aircaft. Top Gun inovation went beyond the ?bok nowledge? of the strengths and weakness of the F-4 and Soviet fighters and forced its tudents to put he principles into practie in daily combat with smal and very maneuverable A-4s. This apears to have ben the first ime in history a miltary force trained regularly aginst equipment hat simulated the quipment hey would be facing in combat. It was the birth of ?realistic trainig,? whic was to become the great American miltary inovation f the post-Vietnam era. The Top Gun trainig program had noe of the rstrictions the Air Force had on air-to-air combat nd, in devloping the trainig sylabus, the Top Gun istructor cadre sought information from al quarters. At one point, they invited John Boyd, now an Air Force Lieutnat Colnel, to brief the Top Gun istructors about his ?enrgy maneuverabilty? charts. While nergy maneuverabilty was by now acomon buzword in the air-to-air comunity, Boyd?s briefing di not go wel. Boyd, who ad not flown for ver five yars, insited it was imposible for an F-4 to win a dogfiht with te higly maneuverable MiG-17. The Top Gun istructors disagred (at least wo had shot down MiG-17s in dogfihts), but Boyd was damnt i saying it was imposible. The Top Gun 103 instructors left he briefing unimpresd by Boyd and his plethora of charts and graphs, and the unit?s comander, Comander Ron ?Mugs? McKeown, said later: ?nevr tust anyone who ould rather kic your as with aslide rule than with ajet.? 17 As Top Gun devloped, the instructors realized that thorugh anlysi of each practie ngaemnt was the ky to learnig. Because many engaemnts, especialy large ones, wer confusing evn to Tp Gun?s experinced instructors, the Top Gun comander persuade the Navy to ask Cubic Defnse Systems to devlop asytem for recording air combat rainig. Completd in May 1971 and known as the Air Combat Maneuvering Range (ACMR), this ystem alowed for eal time tracking and recording of air combat engaemnts by means of smal pods, each te size of a heat-seking misile, atched to the aircaft. The pod relayed the aircaft?s ped, altiude, heading, and other parmetrs to acentral computer for display on alrge scren, and when a simulated misile was fired, it calulated the parmetrs and recorde ither a hit or amis. It also alowed for views from various angles, including from each ockpit. When the crews returned after a mision, they could replay n etire dogfiht and acurately anlyze and learn from each one, much as profesional thletic teams use videotape to reviw games.18 The ACMR proved aquantum leap in the larnig and teaching of air combat skils. THE AIR FORCE RSPONSE ? DUMB IT DOWN Unlike the Navy, with te nd of Roling Thunder Air Force trainig revrted to its ?fly safe? cultre, and the mphasi on trainig remained on avoiding acidents. Trainig for air-to-air combat was considerd to dangerous for peacetime operations, and the Air 104 Force ut he number of air-to-air tainig misions throughout he ntire TAF. When it di conduct air-to-air combat rainig, almost al of it was matching F-4 aginst F-4, usaly from the same unit. The rsult was Air Force F-4 pilots had no experince loking for smaler aircaft or dogfihting ainst aircaft more maneuverable than the F- 4.19 Ther wer a few atempts to d DACT beginig in 1968, notably with delta-winged F-106s whose prformance simulated the MiG-21, but he program was limited, esntialy confied to instructors in the Air Force?s elite Fighter Weapons Schol, and involed acomplicated set of rules. 20 Ther was no atempt o expand the program to regular USAF units, though Air Force F-106s di train with Top Gun ad other Navy units. 21 WHY THE DIFERNT APROACHES? Sevral factors apear explain why the Navy started aprogram of realistic air combat trainig and the Air Force di not: ATIUDES TOWARDS FLYING SAFETY. The Air Force and Navy had ifernt views of lying safety. Flying safety in trainig was not he isue for the Navy it was in the Air Force, because flying from aircaft cariers was inherntly dangerous, far more dangerous than ything the Air Force di on aroutine basi. For the Navy, the idea of restricting combat rainig for ?safety reasons? for pilots who rutinely had to land on acarier at night in bad weather was misplaced priority.2 FLYING PERSONEL. The Navy had F-8 pilots who knew the value of aproer air combat rainig program, and they knew both ow to fly air-to-air combat nd how to teach it. The F-8 comunity was ble to lead the Navy down apth tat he Air Force 105 could not ake bcause it had no cmunity that knew ho to fly or, more important, to teach air?to-air combat. SERVICE PRSONEL POLICIES. While the Air Force only sent pilots to Vietnam for ne tour, the Navy di not have asimilar policy, and many Navy crews flew four or five combat ours while others flew noe. While this led to morale problems, the policy alowed the Navy to kep its trainig program, whic di not have ?universal pilots? but chose the bst tudents to be fighter/atck pilots, basicaly the same as it was before Vietnam. 23 On the other hand, the Air Force policy of ?no n-voluntary second tours? meant that he srvice?s personel sytem had to replace almost 10 fighter pilots ayear s they finished their SEA combat ours. The srvice quickly ran through its fighter pilots, and as the war contiued, this ned for eplacemnt fighter pilots meant icreasing numbers of pilots without fighter xperince had to be trained in the F-4. The Replacemnt Trainig Units (RTU) that rained fighter pilots to g to SEA wer gradualy filed with ?universal pilots? with litle or no fighter background. Despite the Air Force theory that ?universal pilots? could fly any aircaft, it proved ificult o take pilots, especialy older pilots, without fighter xperince and make them efctive F-4 pilots in the six months the RTUs had to train them.24 Nevrthels, evn though it was son clear that he F-4 RTUs could not reliably turn the pilots of large, multi-engie aircaft into F-4 pilots in the six months aloted, TAC steadfastly refused to extnd the length of the RTU. The ned for eplacemnt pilots meant hat evryone in each RTU clas had to finish on time so they could replace a pilot who as completing acombat 106 tour, so the RTUs etled on avery basic ourse that concetrated on trainig for ground atck in alow to medium-threat environment ? Laos and South Vietnam - and virtualy ignored trainig for air-to-air combat. 25 Along with te limitaions on trainig in the name of ?flying safety,? the pushing of unqualifed ?universal pilots? into fighter cokpits was another symbol f the Air Force?s lack of comitent o prearing for combat, nd became ore and more of an isue with experinced F-4 pilots and F-4 combat unit comanders who ad to utilze thes pilots in SEA.26 LEADERSHIP. robaly the most important reason for the Air Force?s limited fighter trainig program was the unwilinges of the man responsible for Air Force fighter trainig, Tactial Air Comand comander Genral Wiliam ?Spike? Momyer, to try to change the program. This was urpisng since Momyer was considerd to be vry outspoken ? he ad cquired his nickname ?Spike? because ?he could pick a fight with anybody? - and had sen the Air Force?s por performance over North Vietnam first hand while h was Sevnth Air Force omander during the aviest combat of Roling Thunder.27 When he tok over TAC in Augst 1968, one would have xpectd Momyer would have pushed for adical improvemnts in the trainig program. He di not. The question f why Momyer efused to improve tactial fighter tainig is one of the great questions of the Air Force?s Vietnam War. 28 Momyer does not sem to have ben higly knowledgeable about what was required for sucesful air-to-air combat, nd he fought ard to take canon ut of al Air Force fighters.29 As Comander of Sevnth Air Force, ther is no record of Momyer asking TAC for improvemnts in trainig, and later he proclaimed the Air Force fighter force was ucesful during the war, using the 107 disngenuos argument hat ?our Army and Navy wer imune to atcks from the North Vietnames Air Force? (whic had no bmb carying aircaft) and concluding ?through pilot skil, improvison [sic], and trainig the air batle in the skies over Vietnam was fought and won.? Momyer also said he thought at he Air Force kil ratio in Vietnam from 1963-1968 was ?very aceptable? 2:1, and that he rason for the lower kil ratio was that ?politcal nd technolgical factors tende to depres [the] kil ratio in Vietnam, with politcal constraints perhaps being the most ignifcant factor.? 30 Thus, acording to Momyer?s thinkig, realistic trainig such as DACT for TAC crews ould not have helpd the kil ratio but would have increased acidents, o Momyer made no changes. In fact, he actualy cut back on air-to-air tainig. 31 It is also psible that Momyer asociated realistic trainig with te frewheling ?combat cultre? he ad sen ? and send to disaprove of ? in the SEA combat zone as comander of Sevnth Air Force. As one Air Force historian otes, while in Saigon Momyer baned smoking in staf metings and ?expectd clean uiforms?and flower beds [around the adquarters].? 32 Momyer?s trongly held positon ad unwilinges to admit his ideas wer wrong efctively put he quietus on atempts to improve tactial fighter tainig, and uring most of Momyer?s time as TAC comander the Air Force had the worst rainig it has evr had for fighter pilots. Even after the avy loses his porly trained TAC crews suferd in 1972 during Operation Linebacker, Momyer nevr acknowledged lack of trainig as cause of Air Force loses and the changes that wer made uring his tenure wer forced on him. 108 Ther are at sevral posible rasons why Momyer was unwiling to pres for more and betr tainig. One is that he truly belived that politcal restrictions wer responsible for the low kil ratio. Another is that he rquiremnts and time constraints for TAC to turn alrge number of universal pilots into fighter pilots imply made it imposible to provide an dequate air-to-air tainig program, and Momyer?s taemnts wer rationalizations of this reality. Howevr, this argument stil begs the question f why di he not fight for betr tainig. A les charitable interpetaion is that Momyer was the ultimate victim of ?carerism,? aderogatory term in the miltary that means the dsire to have hig rank or a powerful positon simply to have it rather than to use it with aclear sense of purose.3 This theory sugest that Momyer wanted to be the comander of TAC after his tour as Sevnth Air Force Comander, and thus di not critcize TAC?s trainig. Once at TAC, given his tenuos relationship with Ryan, Momyer was not wiling to take the risk of being fired for lsing aircaft in trainig acidents, o he stoped al hig-risk trainig. This would also explain why Momyer di not push for an icrease in the time for RTU trainig from six months to alonger time that would have alowed the universal pilots to become qualifed. COUNTER CURENTS IN THE AIR FORCE Nevrthels, evn during Momyer?s tenure, under the surface ther wer curents puling the Air Force towards changes in its trainig program. Many in the Air Force wer very impresd in June 1967 when the smal Israeli Air Force (IAF) smashed the air forces of Arab staes, destroying more than 40 aircaft on the ground and in the air with 109 a 12: air-to-air kil ratio. With tis air superiority, the ground forces of the Israel Defnse Forces (IDF) routed the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordani armies in the Sinai, Golan Heights, and West Bank. In the international politcal realignment after the 1967 War, the United Staes replaced France as Irael?s main suplier of aircaft and other weapons, and a new relationship srang up betwen the American miltary and the Israel Defnse Forces (IDF). The Israeli Air Force had cquired an Iraqi MiG-21 through a seris of clandestine maneuvers in 196, and to strengthen the nw U.S.-Israel relationship the IAF sent he MiG to the United Staes. Ther agroup of American Air Force and Navy pilots flew the iG in aseris of compartive tst aginst US Air Force and Navy fighters under a program caled ?Have Donut.? Later in 1968, the IAF sent wo Syrian MiG-17s that had efcted to Israel to the United Staes wher they wer exploited under asimilar program, ?Have Dril.? The Air Force and Navy test pilots produced a seris of writen reports and movies describing the MiGs? performance and charcteristics and iscused how difernt he two iG types ? whic formed the backbone of the North Vietnames Air Force ? wer from Aerican ircaft, especialy the F-4. 34 In return for the MiGs and other captured Soviet quipment, in 1968 the US government agred to sel Israel F-4 Phantoms, and the IAF sent aclas of pilots (evral of them MiG kilers) to check out in the F-4 at George Air Force Base in California during late 1968 and early 196.35 At George, the Israelis howed air-to-air flying skils that wer wel beyond their American istructors, evn though al of the Americans had at least one combat our in the F-4. 36 10 THE INITIAL MOVES In 1970, the Air Force bgan its first entaive ?buble up? moves towards improving trainig. An istructor at he Fighter Weapons Schol, Major Roger Wels, began to devlop an cademic ourse on Soviet fighter tactis and was ble to get aces to previously clasifed information that described the Soviet fighter force, its trainig, and its employment i some dtail. In early 1971, Wels gave his first ?Threat? presntaions to the students at he Fighter Weapons Schol, and then tok his ?Threat Briefing? to TAF fighter base al over the world, wher it recived rave rviews. 37 Encouraged by the rsponse, awre of the Navy?s Top Gun program and the avilabilty of the Have Donut and Have Dril MiGs, Wels and other weapons chol instructors began to cnsider the posibilty of btainig aful squadron f Soviet fighters to fly aginst he Weapons Schol pilots and instructors. Ther wer many problems, mainly the lack of avilable MiGs, but he idea genrated considerable internal discusion, much of it at he bar in the Nelis Oficers? Club among agroup of FWS instructors who epitomized the Vietnam cobat cultre. 38 The Fighter Weapons Schol was part of a lrger organization kown as the Air Force Fighter eapons Centr (FWC), and Wels and the others conviced the FWC?s comandig enral, Major Genral iliam Chairsel, to try and sel the idea of aMiG squadron to TAC comander Momyer while the two er on agolfing outing. Chairsel raised the idea, but briefing the Soviet hreat was one thing, and flying ? wher ther was safety involed ? was nother. One of Momyer?s deputies toped the idea t TAC headquarters because it was ?to radical nd angerous.? 39 The Air Force?s first atempt 1 at serious ?buble up? inovation i tactial flying trainig had failed, but a sed had ben planted and the precdent of taking ideas bout radical changes in trainig to TAC headquarters had ben established.40 The idea of realistic trainig and a more rigorus elction f ighter pilots recived another bost at he bginig of 1972 when, as part of the arngemnt hat had brought the MiGs from Israel to the US, two Israeli F-4 pilots, Asher Snir and Eytan Ben-Eliyahu, came to Nelis a students in the Fighter Weapons Schol Instructor?s Course. Both wer experinced F-4 pilots but hardly the normal students. Snir already had twelv air-to-air victories and was considerd one of the IAF?s best and bravest pilots. Ben-Eliyahu was younger but also was MiG kiler and an IAF ?up and comer? (he would later become comander of the Israeli Air Force). They wer outsandig pilots, o proficent hat only a few Fighter Weapons Schol instructors wer considerd god enough to fly with tem, but what most impresd the FWS instructors was the Israelis? atitude. One of their instructors remberd, ?they wer very profesional in their aproach and flying, evn though early on sevral instructors tried to provke them into unauthorized ogfihts. [The Israelis] flew evry mision like the survial of the stae was t risk and flew their aircaft into parts of the [performance] nvelope our Air Force ladership of the time would not have liked, but proved they could o it safely.?41 The Israelis wer more than hapy to share their combat experinces, as wel as their low opinios of U.S Air Force flying trainig. 42 They had long discusions with teir instructors about how to preare for combat nd harped on thre thems: "know your 12 enmy"; fly in trainig the way ou wil fly in combat"; and "wash out of ighters those pilots who d not have the proer mentality or skils."43 Asher Snir?s instructor at Nelis was Richard M. ?ody? Suter, the comander of the Weapons Schol?s Air-to-Air Flight, awarm, likeable bon viant and raconteur, large, fair complexioned, and pear shaped.4 While h was no pster child for Air Force fitnes programs, Suter was unique combination f lying skils, personality and extraordinary creativity, an ?idea minute? man. He also had solid combat reputaion with 23 combat misions, and was known as n outsandig pilot. Suter, Snir and Ben- Eliyahu and many of the Nelis instructors became friends before the Israelis finished their course in April 1972, and the skil of the Israelis, not nly in their flying but also in their philosphy, left alsting impresion their Air Force ounterparts. 45It was clear to Wels, Suter and the rst hat he Israeli Air Force and Navy?s Top Gun, with its dazling ew ACMR, had far betr tainig programs than the Air Force. They also saw that he IAF and Navy trainig programs had two things in comon ? alow priority for flying safety and arigorus elction program for fighter pilots.46 The discusion with te Israelis also suported another theory held by Suter and others in the Weapons Schol, that god air-to-air combat skils vastly improved air-to-ground bombing skils. The theory was that ir-to-air combat involed maneuvering the aircaft at he ?dge of the nvelope? and thus made the pilots much more skilful in al aspects of lying. A god air-to-air pilot would be able to maneuver his aircaft wel hen it was heavily loade with bombs and would be able to put he aircaft in the proer positon to deliver bombs acurately. But air-to-air tok agreat deal of trainig and, some 13 thought, natural skil. Suter said on more than oe ocasion, ?Bombing is for technicans, air-to-air is for artist. Artist are born, but hey don?t become artist overnight.?47 Nevrthels, theories wer one thing, changi TAC?s trainig another. The experince with te atempt o frm aMiG squadron ad the gneral service hauvinism made it clear to Suter, Wels, and the others they could not sugest hat he Navy might be doing something betr than the Air Force. Morever, as long as Genral Momyer, the ?50 pound gorila? of the TAF, decred that he problems encounterd over Vietnam wer the rsult of politcal imitaions, TAC?s emphasi on safety in trainig would contiue.48 To change the Air Force?s atitude towards flying safety and the ?universal pilot? would take some type of acris and, as 1972 began d the Vietnam War contiued to wind own, that semed unlikely. 1. Thes conclusions are based on author?s journal while staioned at Udorn Royal Thai Air Fore Base Octbr 1970-Dec 1971 (whe thigs cnge) with ther F-4 crewmebrs tiond in Thailnd uring this priod. Bob Hips, Lt. Col. USA, -mail to author, 17 June 205; Wilim ?Wil? Rud, Cl. USAF e-mail to authr, 13 May 205; Jn Vickry, Col. USAF, e-ails to athor 5, 21, 2 June 205. 2. Waye Thompsn, To Hanoi nd Bck: Te USAF ad North Vietnam, 196-1973 (ashington, DC: Air Force istry a Musems Progrm), 12. 3. Mike orden, Th Ris of the Fightr Gnerals: The Problem of Air Leadership, 1945-1982 (axwl AFB, AL: ir University Prs, 197), 49. . arshl Michel, Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam 1965-1973 (Navl Instiute Pres, 196), 45-8. 5. Richard K. Wilcox, Scream of Eagles: The Creation f Top Gun ad the U.S. Air Victory in Vietnam (New York: J. Wiley, 190), 8, 16, psim; Jefry P. Simpson, Lt. Cmdr. USN, ?Origins of Tp Gun,? Th Hok, (Winter 1983), 21. 6. Eighten kils, thre loses. Baret Tilma, MiG aster: The Story of the F-8 Crusader (Aapolis, MD: Navl Instiut Pres 190), 34, psim. 7. Wilcox, 16-8, pasim. 8. Ibid., 0; for ahistory of Navy air gunery, se J. B. Lundstrom, The First Team: Pacifc Navl Air Cmbat frm Perl Hrbor to Midway (Aaplis, MD: Navl Instiute Pres, 205), Apendix Two, 358. 14 9. ?Air-to-Air Misile System Capbilty Reviw,? NAVIRSYCOM: Navl Historical Centr, Washington, D, 17 Feruar 197, 324-326. 10. Wilcox, 42-4. . Ibid., 8. 12. Ii., 52-; Simpson, 2-3. 3. This trade of had ufrtunate consequences for the Japnes. While Japnes fighters wer vstly superior in rg d mavrabilty to thir American d Britsh countrparts, their light structre, whic include unprotectd fuel tanks, e them higly vulnerabl to any tpe of damge. Wiliam Gren, Famos Fighters of t Scond World War (Grde Cit, N.Y.: Doublday, 1975), 46-9. 14. For an xclent acount f hw thes difernces play out in combat, se Eric Brown, Cpt. RN, Duls in the Sky: World War I Navl Aircft i Ct. (Anapolis, MD: Navl Instite, 198). T work als includes no-navl aircaft. 15. Yefrim Gordn, MiG-15 (Osceol, I: Mtrbks Interntional, 192), 7, 134. 6. Rd Barn Reports Volume Thr (Nelis AFB, NV: Tactial Fighter Weapons Centr, 1975), 3, pasim. 7. Wilcox, 145-146. 18. C.R ?Dick? Anderg, Col. USAF, Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietam (Washingtn, D.C: Air Frc istor ad Musems Proram, 201), 08-109. 9. Red Baron, Volume Thre, 2-3. 20. Maurice . Jhnson, Capt., USAF, ?Disimilar Aircaft Engaemnts,? Fighter Weapons Newsltr, March 1968, 26-9; onald D. Crson, Cpt. USAF, ?Disimilar Aril Cmbat Tactis ? New Techniques i Btle Traiig,? Air Force Magzine, March 1973, 57-61. 2. Edie Cobleigh, Capt. USAF, "Top Gun, Navy Style," USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Wintr 1972, 5-8. 2. ilcox, -17. 3. Mihel, 52. 24. Wilbur Crech, Gen. USAF. Oral History Interview by Hugh Ahman, 19 June 9, K39.0512, AFHRA, 16-162. 25. Anderg, 23, pasim. 6. E of Tour Reort, Col. Charles Gabriel, Comander, 432nr TRW, 14 Septmber 1972, 8-9, AFHRA. 27. Crech, Oral istory, 74. Sevnth Air Force in Saigon was responsible for al Air Force oprations during the war ith te xceptin of B-52 raids. htp:/w.glbalsecrity.org/miltary/agny/usaf/7af.htm. (cesd February 206). 28. Momyer hs rfused sevrl interview reqest fro this author vr the last en years. 29. Crech, Oral History, 41. Momyer was lso nt a fn of pure air-fighters. Thompson, 15. 15 30. Wiliam Momyer, Gen. USAF, Air Power in Thre Wars: WI, Korea, Vietnam (Washington, DC: Air Forc History and Musms Program, 1978), 176-178. Fctuly, Momyer?s arguments wer disngenuos. Air Force pilts in the Korean ar faed man f th sae politcal rstrictios Air Frce pilts had over Nort Vitm nd flw aircft ht wer no betr than equal to th MiGs tey wre facing, yet he Air Force pilots wer stil abl t sot down but six Sovit pilots for ver Amrican pilt lst, and thir kil rtio gainst Chines ad Korean pilts was 25-30:1. Ther re may refrences for this; e god sort ne is Wilim T. Y'Blod, MiG Aly: Th Fight for Air Supririty (Washintn, DC: Air Force History and usems Program, 20). 31. Bruce K. Holway, Gen. US. ?Air Superiority in Tactial Air Warfre,? Air University Rviw 19, 3 (Mrch-April1968): -9. 32. Thompson, 4. . Frank Waler, F., aj. USAF, ?Are Oficers Incompetnt? The Miltary Reform's Case Agist he Oficer's Corps,? ir Univrsity Rview, Stmbr-October 1985, htp:/w.airpower.maxwel.af.mil/airchronicles/auri/1985/sep-t/walr.html (acesd Augst 205). 34. Wilcox, 17. 5. Shlm Aloni, Israeli F-4 Phantom I Aces (Oxford, UK: Osprey Aircaft of the Aces Nuber 60, 204), 7-8. 36. Athor Interview ith Robert Wagner, Col. USAF, 15 May 205. Wagner was one of the IF?s istructors at Grg. 37. Anderg, 72-3. Author ecived the briefing and can confirm the rsponse. 8. Vickry e-mail, 6 Jne 205; Anrg, 74. 39. John Cordr, Maj. G. USF, phone interview ith author, 23 March 205. 40. Ibid.; Vickery e-mil 6 June 205. 1. E-mail with Wil Rud, Col. USAF and former FWS instructor, 13 ay 205; Vickery e-il, 19 June 205. 42. Snir, when latr asked what he ad learned in the Fighter Weapons Schol Instructor Cours, pused for sverl scons, th said, ?I learnd hw t take an Amerian crse. It is qite difrnt frm urs ? not emandig.? Author?s coversation with Asher Snir, Sptembr 197. 43. Vickery e-ail, 19 June 205. . Th Wapons Schol at his time had comander, an operations oficer (in efct e dputy cmander) nd two ision-rient flights, th Air-t-Grund flight and th Air-to-Air flight. 45. This was not be Suter?s last contact with foreigners. In 1976-197, he was the Air Force dbriefr ad vntal friend f Soviet MiG-25 Foxbat pilot Lieutnat Viktor Ivanvih Belnko, the fector who flew a iG-25 to Japn i 1976. Athor?s otes f rious convrsatins with Mdy Sutr hile authr ws traiing to be air atch? t Israel, 1976. 16 46. Vickery e-mail 5 June 205; Richard M. (?ody?) Suter, ?Corna Ace? interview by Lt. Cols. Gord Nelson a John Dick, 26 Janary 197, FHR; Everts -mail 5 Feruary 205. 47.Sutr Orl History, 13, pasim. 8. e, for example, George A. Devorshak, Major, USAF, ?An nalysi of Fighter Weapons Trainig nd Dirctivs,? Rsarc Study, Air niversity, 1971. 17 CHAPTER SIX: BUDGET BATLES LAIRD TAKES OVER In November 1968, Richard Nixon was elcted president, and on 15 January 196, just afew days before Nixon?s inaugration, outgoing Secrtary Defnse Clark Cliford presnted the FY1970 Defnse Budget o Congres. Cliford?s budget was imilar to the FY196 budget but with an icrease of almost $3 bilion to $7. bilion. The F-14 program was loted $41 milion ad, as the Navy had requestd, the budget caled for sevral varietis of F-14; the F-14A with te orignal, smal TF30 engie, an F-14B with the Air Force?s F-X engie under devlopment, and finaly an F-14C with te F-X engie and avanced avionics. The first funds wer aloted for the F-X, $45 milion i FY1970 and $175 milion i FY1971 for the aircaft and its hig technolgy radr and engie.1 In January 196, Nixon amed Represntaive Melvin Laird as Secrtary of Defnse. Laird had served on the Defnse Subcomite of the House Apropriations Comite and had often ben at ods with Secrtary of Defnse McNamra, both on Vietnam policy and on the mangemnt of the Do. In his first report o Congres in early 196, Laird painted ableak picture, noting that not nly had modernization f the miltary ben defred because of the Vietnam War but also that he thirty-four main Do weapons sytems programs wer plagued by defcts and cost overuns totaling more than $16.2 bilion. Laird atcked McNamra?s TP, saying it had one litle to slow the trend id4040650 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 18 towards increased cost, reocuring risk, and elays in aircaft procuremnt programs. To Laird, TP semed to exacerbate thes problems, causing large cost overuns for sytems that wer deliverd late and wer actualy les efctive than the ones they replaced. The lading example of TP failure was the F-1, with its huge upward cost spirals and por performance in combat. 2In aditon to TP, Laird said that he over centralization f decison-making in the Ofice of the Secrtary of Defnse ld to ?a kind of parlysi? and that much of the problem was in Ethoven?s Ofice of Systems Analysi, 3and OSD/SA was poular whiping boy. It was, as noted, especialy unpoular with miltary oficers, who felt hat he OSD anlyst had no busines in miltary decisons and wer usrping the miltary?s authority over the weapons ystem acquistion proces. It had become qualy unpoular with Congres, whic thought OSD/SA was trying to bstruct ongresional preogatives on miltary maters and concetrate power in the Secrtary of Defnse?s ofice. Finaly, ?sytems anlysi? in genral had become apejorative trm because in the poular mind it was identifed with ?body counts? and other numerical sytems that ried to explain how the United Staes was ?winig? in Vietnam.4 Enthoven vigorusly defnde the ofice and viewd its actions a simply restoring the Secrtary of Defnse to his rightful positon granted by stautory authority, but in fact OSD/SA?s power had lready roped signifcantly after McNamra left in 1967. 5 Nevrthels, it was til sen as to powerful, so Laird quickly moved to emasculate the ofice. 6 He liminated the most important part of OSD/SA?s charter, its abilty to initate planig, and from this point on OSD/SA could only evalute and reviw service 19 prosals.7 It would not be involed in the dcison proces as it had ben uder McNamra. In fact, the System Analysi ofice was fortunate to survie in ay form. In both 1968 and 196 the Chairman of the House Armed Services Comite, Mendel Rivers (D-SC), tried to abolish te ofice bcause ?the Secrtary should not have a civilan-led staf of anlyst advisng him on maters of strategy and force rquiremnts.?8 Laird had ben a efctive and poular congresman, and he moved quickly to improve Do?s relations with te lgislative branch, whic had ben soured by McNamra. By and large, he sucede. During his tenure, Laird coperated closely with the mebers and was lways avilable to testify before Senate and House comites. Once the budget was before Congres, Laird was flexible, aceding to aditonal cuts when they could be absorbed without serious harm to national security.9 At he same tie, he moved to improve the fractious relationship betwen the Secrtary of Defnse?s ofice and the uniformed services. McNamra hd ben heavy hande with te srvices, and his requiremnt hat he srvices make budget request for ?mision ares? that cut acros ervice lines instead of leting each service dtermine its own budget was particularly unpoular. Laird ecntralized policymaking and operations and revised the PBS to alow areturn of service budget ceilngs and service programing of orces within thes ceilngs. This gave the srvices amore influential role in the dvelopment of budgets and force lvels, and quickly won Laird the god wil of the uniformed iltary. At he same tie, Laird recognized congresional detrmination, with wide public suport, to cut defnse cost. Laird?s overal aproach was to have the srvices agre to a 120 substantial cut in personel and realocate thes funds to new eapon sytems like the Trident uclear balistic misile submarine, cruise misiles, and the F-14 and F-X. The services aceptd the plan, and total miltary personel declined from about 3.5 milion i FY 196 to 2.3 milion by the time Laird left ofice in January 1973. 10 His credibilty with te srvices also alowed him to prune the srvice budgetary request before they went o Congres. In genral, while some critcs ay that hes relationships wer unimportant, it apears that Laird?s respect for and raport with te uniformed iltary services and Congres provide the administration with aresrvoir f suport it could later draw on for some of its more controversial ctions. 1 DAVID PACKARD AND THE ACQUISTION PROCES Laird was detrmined to get a betr handle on cost growth by revisng many of McNamra?s programs. Laird noted that during the McNamra years ther was ?a widespread belifthat ?betr mangemnt? would solve the problem. ?Betr mangemnt? had tendency to be translated into ?more mangemnt? with an acompanyig increase in rigdity, delay, and the supresion f initative.? 12 Laird began by chosing David Packard as the Deputy Secrtary of Defnse with instructions to decntralize the acquistion proces. Packard proved to be awise choice, and many today consider Laird and Packard the bst eam evr to cupy the top ositons at he Pentagon. One historian of Do noted, ?Laird was gifted leader, comandig the respect, evn afection, of al hands a he articulated amaster vison? Packard, awel known ad respectd leader of hig-technolgy American idustry, provide the igh 12 quality mangemnt and aministrative skils that sured [Do] functions wer caried out efctively.?13 Laird and Packard belived that TP technical studies, reliance on prime contractors, and ?planig? failed to avoid costly and time-consuming problems with weapons sytems, and that TP?s technical oversight failed because the programs wer to complex to mange from contracts and plans alone. Laird gave Packard the charter to - once agin - overhaul the weapons procuremnt proces to avoid huge cost overuns. 14 Packard loked closely at he miltary?s thirty-four largest programs that Laird had cited to Congres for ways to cut cost. He ralized that he Navy had misued the TP sytem by uying the TF30 engie for the F-14A while planig to upengie the aircaft later, and ecide to use the F-14 program to send amesage to the srvices that he days of ?gaming? TP wer over. When the F-14 program began to experince ost overuns, Packard cut he procuremnt umber of F-14s in half, and he later efused to give the Navy any aditonal funds to put amore powerful engie in the F-14. The fighter was to remain uderpowerd for the nxt wenty ears.15 Packard was epecialy intersted in the Air Force?s hig visbilty F-X program and concerned about he aircaft?s performance and cost. He was n advocate of prottyping, feling that, while prottyping was more xpensive to cntractors, its long-term advantges outweighed its inital hig cost. Having real sytems instead of paer sytems to work with brought miltary users back into the slection proces, and in genral, prottyping would alow more flexibilty and certainty in the proces. Having contractors 12 build and test areal piec of hardware not nly gave asurance the dsign would demonstrably perform, but also meant betr estimation f olw-on cost. The Air Force xplained to Packard it had considerd some form of aprottype flyof of competing versions of the F-X, but found that he proces was more complicated than it semed ? ther had, for example, ben twenty-two difernt ypes of prottyping programs in the past ? and ultimately detrmined that prottyping was impractial for the F-X because the planig for the program was o far dvanced. Packard agred, but insited on prottyping for the F-X?s engie and radr, and also insited on prottyping for al futre major programs.16 Packard and Laird belived the F-X cost overuns wer caused by the TP?s genral lack of program supervison after the signig of the contract, and to try to avoid more overuns with te F-X Packard insited on anew ?milestone? proces to carefuly monitor the dvelopment and production cost.17 A seris of markers ? milestones? wer set up at critcal devlopment points in the program, and at each milestone aspecifc, formal decison to cntiue, delay, or cancel the program would be made by an elaborate st of reviw boards at both te OSD levl (the Defnse Systems Acquistion Reviw Council) and service lvel (the Air Force Systems Acquistion Reviw Council). Under this reviw sytem, adelay in oe part of the program would hold up the whole program, and if the dlays became xcesive, they would invite adecison to cancel the program rather than draging it on, as hapend under TP. Laird also streamlined mangemnt - now amiltary Sstems Project Ofice (SPO) would have ful devlopment responsibilty. The miltary SPO Director was responsible for controling 123 cost and had specifc, regular eporting requiremnts to the Comander of the Air Force Systems Comand, Do, and Congres, reports that wer to higlight signifcant changes to the program?s cost, schedule, or equiremnts. 18 The Air Force wanted to get he F-X selction proces completd and the aircaft into production as quickly as posible, and many in the srvice initaly critcized OSD for forcing delays in the fielding of the F-15. 19But as the program devloped, it was found that he slower pace and milestone sytem worked quite wel because the sytem alowed both te Air Force and OSD to lok carefuly at he project as it moved along and alowed the tchnolgy for the F-15 to devlop more fuly. 20 REINFORCING THE CRITICS In May 196, Lieutnat Colnel John Boyd and Pier Sprey wer joined in the Pentagon by another advocate of a lightweight fighter, Colnel Everst Ricioni, asigned to the Tactial Fighter Requiremnts Divison f Air Force Headquarters. Ricioni, like Boyd, had not flown i Vietnam and he was, like Boyd, an eginer. He had flown fighters for abrief period (he taught at he Air Force Academy for lnger than he flew) and claimed to have writen amanual on jet aircaft actis while flying F-10s in Germany.21 When Boyd and Sprey learned that Ricioni was not nly concerned about the size and expense of the F-15 but also about sevral of its new sytems, they welcomed him to the group. Ricioni grandly designated the group ?the Fighter Mafi? and himself as the ?the Godfather.? 2 The thre began to brainstorm ways to make the Air Force and the Department of Defnse acept heir theories. They gave the ?Red Bird? a new name, the ?VF-X /F-X,? but it remained a smal, single-ngie fighter that would 124 have aloade weight of 25,0 pounds, no radr or sophisticated avionics, and armed with only canon ad heat-seking misiles.23 In mid-196, Sprey mounted aformal chalenge to the F-14/F-X. In the name of the OSD/SA staf, he drafted a?Draft Presidential Memorandum [DPM] on Tactial Air,? sugesting both te Air Force and the Navy adopt he VF-X/F-X concept, claiming it would alow the srvices to duble the size of their futre fighter force.24 The DPM cirulated around the Pentagon for cordination ad, coming after Laird had semingly guted OSD/SA, dismayed both te Air Force and the Navy because it hreatned both te F-14 and F-X programs. The Navy was epecialy unhapy because Laird?s reduction i the number of F-14s left he Navy short f the number of new fighters required for its cariers, but it wanted more F-14s, not ales capble lightweight fighter. The Navy tok the lad in the counteratck, and in a informal but devasting response cirulated around the Pentagon, George Spangenberg, the Director f the Navl Air Systems Comand?s (NAVIRSYCOM) Evalution Divison, and Fred Gloeckler of the Systems Evalution Divison, wrote ascathing anlysi of Sprey?s work. The Navy engiers aid the lightweight claimed for the VF-X was ?unachievable? and the prosed thrust-o-weight ratio and wing loading could only be achievd by a lrger airplane. They aded it was ?obvious? that Sprey was not an eronautical engier and that: [Sprey?s] basic oncepts have ben considerd in detail by the Services during th formtive stags of t F-14 a F-15, hav bn reviwd by DR&E [Deputy Dirctr f Resarch nd Evalution], ad rjcte in al decisons to date.the ronsidrtion f the concept [VF-X/F-X] s viable alterntiv sould have be turd w bfore submision to the serics. 125 In comon with past paers by the same author, this tudy contains may falcius asumtions, half-truts, distortins, and eroneus extrpoltions. Unsbstatiated opinios are preste s facts. Any rbutals give the apernc f arguments gainst h rudimentar virtues of simplicty, ig rformae, nd low cost. 25 This response, while dliverd with feling, was factual nd anlytical nd efctively blunted Sprey?s atempt o frward the DPM. It also showed that Sprey was out of his clas when confronted with knowledgeable aronautical engiers, but it was valuble leson for Sprey, Boyd, Ricioni, and other Critcs ? do nt make arguments in front of experts. Their arguments would only achiev traction when they could presnt hem to no-engiers unawre of the complexity and trade-ofs of aircaft design. This meant they would have to move out of the Pentagon ad fight on adifernt field. THE NIXON DOCTRINE Nixon presnted his administration?s grand strategy, the "Nixon Doctrine,? in July 196 on Guam and formaly oferd it o Congres on 3 November 196. The "Nixon Doctrine" stresd pursit of peace by aprtnership with American lies uported by miltary aid and credit-asited sales of miltary equipment abroad. The aim was to preare America?s alies to take up agreatr share of the dfense burden, especialy manpower neds, in case of war. American miltary forces, Nixon said, would be "smaler, more mobile, and more ficent genral purose forces." Aditonaly, instead of the previous administration's "two-and-ahalf war" concept (readines to fight simultaneous wars on two major fonts and one minor font) the Nixon Doctrine cut back to a"one-and-ahalf war" strategy. 26 126 The Nixon administration also atempted to show ho the nw strategy would lower the dfense budget. On 25 February 1970, aproud Laird tok his FY1971 Defnse Budget o Congres. The nw Nixon Doctrine, he said, alowed record cuts in the dfense budget in ashort period. Laird noted that, s apercntage of GNP, the FY1968 defnse budget was 9.5 percnt, but he Nixon/Laird budget planed to drop the dfense budget?s percntage of GNP to 7 percnt i FY1971. Laird also pinted out hat, s a percntage of the fderal budget, in FY1970 defnse was 37. percnt, but would be cut o 34.6 percnt in FY1971. In constant dolars, defnse would go from $72.3 bilion i FY1970 to $65.9 bilion i FY1971.27 Laird noted in pasing that he Department of Defnse was loking for anew ?International Fighter? for NATO and its other alies, who ould be taking more rsponsibilty for their own defnse under the Nixon Doctrine. 28 This last was to have aprofund efct on America?s tactial ir forces. Implict in the Nixon Doctrine was the asumption that America?s alies would recive modern weapons, whic in early 1970, evn i NATO, was not he rality. America?s NATO alies had hodge podge of lder aircaft, most of them with limited range and weapons capbilty. For the Nixon Doctrine to be credible, NATO nede amodern fighter force. THE F-15 AND THE A-X In Decmber 196, the Air Force slectd McDonel-Douglas to build the F-X. It was designated the F-15 ?Eagle,? and on 19 Decmber 196, OSD authorized the Air Force to purchase twenty aircaft or test and evalution.29 The total program cost wer projectd to be $6 bilion i Septmber 1968, but had climbed to $7.3 bilion by February 1970, whic Laird blamed ntirely on bad estimates at he inital planig stage. It was, 127 he said, an example of the overoptimistic orignal cost estimates ndemic under TP wher the mphasi was on winig acontract with paers for anlysi rather than real sytems. Notwithstandig this, Laird said F-15 devlopment was proceding on schedule and the program would recive $370 milion i FY 1971. Its first flight was cheduled for October 1972, and the aircaft would be in operational service by November 1974.30 The contract awrd was not without some dispute. While the competiors agred the awrd was fair, McDonel-Douglas had come under agreat deal of scrutiny for its minority hirng and employment practies, whic some saw as discriminatory. Under strong presure from the Air Force, the company revised its hirng and promtion practies.31 As Laird had promised, the two ther key hig-technolgy componets of the F-15, the radr and the ngie, wer selcted by prottype competion. The Hughes AN/PG- 63, apulse-Dopler adr with a?lok down, shot down capbilty,? won the radr competion ad, in aclose contest, the Air Force slectd the Prat &Whitney F10 engie to pwer the F-15 over the lighter and structraly superior Genral Electric F401, because the F401 was considerd higer isk. 32 Because the nw engie would be so technolgicaly advanced and so critcal to the F-15?s performance, the contract for the F10 imposed aseris of tight guarntes on Prat & Whitney to make sure the ngie prformed up to specifcations. One of the milestones the ngie would have to met was satisfactory Miltary Qualifcation Test (MQT), whic include a 150-hour endurance tst. Aditonaly, the Air Force had negotiated a?corection f deficencies? clause under whic Prat had to crect, at its 128 own expense, ?any subsequently discoverd eficency steming from its design, workmanship, or material.?3 The prottype competion ad the tough, performance-driven gine contract semed to be an ironclad guarnte that he bad old ays of TP wer over. The F-15 program was cleard to take of ? or so it semed. While the F-15 program was on its way, the Critcs also won avictory for simple, cheap tactial ircaft. Laird anounced the Air Force would go ahead with devlopment of the ?A-X,? asimple, subsonic, heavily armored, long-range atck aircaft hat could cary a lrge ordinace for close air suport. High sped was not arequiremnt but low cost was, o the aircaft was to use two proven, econmical jet ngies and have an extremly limited avionics uite. The A-X would be the first aircaft built under Packard?s prottyping program, and two cntractors would build aircaft or acompetive flyof. 34 Though one Air Force gneral was to say ?ther was bsolutely no requiremnt for the A-X? and another said it was ?dumb idea,? the Air Force aceptd the A-X because it fulfiled anumber of parochial Air Force goals. 35 The A-X acquistion had the same rationale as the acquistion f the A-7, the dsire to kep the close air suport mision for the Air Force and awy from the Army. The Army was devloping asophisticated atck helicopter, the AH-65A Cheyne, for close air suport when the Air Force isued the A- X requiremnt.36 The A-X was much eaper than the Cheyne and the prosal scutled the AH-65A program, presrving the close air suport mision for the Air Force. The A-X program guidelines caled for two cntractors to cnduct acompetive flyof with teir prottypes, whic showed that he Air Force was ?on board? with 129 Packard?s guidelines, and also showed that he Air Force was iling to take sriously the cals for simpler and cheaper aircaft.37 Aditonaly, the A-X provide the tactial ir forces with amodern ground-atck fighter, contiuing the TAF?s expansion ad modernization, and also reduced presure to cnvert he F-15 to abomb carier. It helpd the Air Force xpunge the last of the Navy aircaft, the A-7, from its inventory and alowed the Critcs to claim avictory validating their acquistion schems and the ?simple/cheap? criteria. Stil, many of the Critcs wer skeptical that he Air Force was serious about CAS as mision ad predicted the Air Force would quickly cancel the A- X program once the Army droped the Cheyne. It was not.38 PACKARD?S FIRST BLUE RIBON PANEL ? THE FITZHUGH COMISION39 In late 196, Laird had sked Packard to establish a?Blue Ribon? panel to examine the Do?s weapons ystem acquistion proces, to recomend changes in mangemnt, and to improve the PBS.40 The mebers of the board wer ecltic and semingly a bit od to be loking at he Department of Defnse. The Chairman, Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, was the Chairman of the Board of the Metroplitan Life Insurance Company, so the group became the Fitzhugh Comision. The Comision iclude sevral torneys, as wel as Dr. Martha E. Petrson, President of Barnard Coleg, and Hobart D. Lewis, President of Readers Digest Asociation, Ic. 41 In July 1970, the Fitzhugh Comision isued its Report o the President and the Secretary of Defnse on the Department of Defnse. The board made more than oe hundre recomendations, but few er surpisng. It recomende xploring 130 devlopment of subsytems indepndent of ul weapons ystems, ore use of competive prottypes, and les reliance on paer studies. The panel also recomende agenral rule aginst concurent devlopment and production, and aprohibiton total package procuremnt ? TP. 42 Packard had nticpated the rport and imediately sent he srvices a meorandum on how to improve their programs. Wiling ? inde eager - to cmply, the Air Force began cost-cuting exrcise for the F-15 program. The thre-month reviw left he program intact but eliminated anumber of items planed for the aircaft, including along-range identifcation sytem caled TISEO (Target Identifcation System Electro-Optical). 43 THE DPARTURE OF THE CRITICS Even with te slection f the A-X, the Critcs? Holy Grail remained the F-X/VF-X. Unable to win the internal batle in the Pentagon, Sprey went public with is ideas. In March 1970, an ofical from the Do made apresntaion both te F-14 and F-15 programs at meting of the American Istiute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in St. Louis. Sprey counterd with apresntaion f his weapons acquistion theories and his idea of the F-X fighter, whic he now claimed weighed les than 25,0 pounds. 4 While provcative, the presntaion had no aparent impact on the Department of Defnse or the Air Force. In Septmber 1970, in ablatnt apeal to parochial service prejudices, Ricioni wrote ameorandum to the Air Force ladership saying that some in the Navy wer working on alightweight fighter of their own, the VF-X, to augment he F-14 after Laird had cut he buy. The lter was clearly tring to raise the spectr of the 13 Air Force having to buy another Navy fighter. Ricioni also devloped abriefing that prosed posible dsigns for thre new lightweight fighters and presnted the briefing to anyone on the Air Staf who ould listen. Again, thes eforts yield no results. 45 One of the main reasons for both Sprey?s and Ricioni?s failures was their lack of credibilty. Sprey, as has ben oted, had no credntials other than his time at OSD/SA ? hardly a plus in the post-McNamra era. Ricioni was considerd ajoke, specialy in the critcal rea of the Air Force Directorate of Operations, XO, wher the ral ?fighter mafi? young Air Force fighter pilots with years of lying experince and combat ours in Vietnam ? wer asigned. Ricioni?s atempts to sel himself as ?fighter pilot,? though e had nevr ben i combat nd had come to the Pentagon rather than go t Vietnam, brought ots of derison from Air Force ombat vetrans, especialy when Ricioni walked own the als of the Pentagon with an row under his arm because h was ?warior.?46 He gnerated his own problems in other ways. After sevral drinks at Pentagon Christmas party in Decmber 1970, Ricioni cornerd the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staf, Genral John C. Meyr, a26-victory fighter ace in World War I, and lectured him about what was rong with te F-15 and why the Air Force ned the F-X. Meyr was not amused. He aparently di not ake indly to being lectured to by a?fighter pilot? who ad nevr flown a combat mision ad who as unwiling to volunter to fly in Vietnam, though te war had ben going on for five yars and the Air Force was hort f ighter pilots. Shortly afterwards Ricioni?s tour in the Pentagon was completd and, given the choice btwen flying combat in Vietnam and adesk job in Korea, Ricioni chose Korea. 47At about he same tie Sprey left OSD, but instead of 132 contiuing to work on tactial ir sytems, he founde acompany caled Enviro Control, whic devloped mechanisms for water polution istrumentaion, as wel as providing water polution demonstrations and studies. 48 But Sprey stayed in the Washington are and he and Boyd contiued to use al their bureaucratic infighting skils to push te lightweight fighter and kil the F-15. They formed an liance with anti-miltary mebers of Congres who anted to cut he defnse budget and, in May 1971, the anti-Vietnam War, anti-miltary congresional ?Congres Through Peace and Law? organization isued areport hat recomende droping both te F-14 and F-15 in favor f avery low-cost fighter that loked supicously like the F-X. 49 A few months earlier, in March 1971, Laird presnted the administration?s FY1972 Defnse Budget o Congres. In his openig staemnt, he noted that he ?period f defnse domination i [fedral] resource alocation is over? and that defnse spendig ?no lnger consumes the large prcentage of the fderal budget it di in the 1950s.? Laird said the administration belived America nede to drop its defnse budget and manpower to pre-Vietnam levls and that restructred miltary required 7 percnt GNP or les. The administration?s FY1972 budget declined in real terms by about 5 percnt from FY1971 and was proximately 24 percnt below the FY1968 budget. In constant dolars, it was bout equal to the pre-Vietnam FY1964 budget.50 Nevrthels, the budget kept Laird?s basic omitent o the srvices, alowing them to buy new equipment at the xpense of the force structre in the imediate futre. For the Air Force, the nw budget alowed it o purse its modernization programs in exchange for educing the 13 number of tactial fighter wings from twenty-four to twenty-one from 1973 to 197. The F-15 program would recive $348 milion i FY1971 and $415 milion i FY1972; procuremnt would begin i 1973, and in FY 1976 the F-15 would be in service. 51 AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAD COME ? THE LIGHT WEIGHT FIGHTER Ironicaly, as the Critcs left he Pentagon, acombination f Do acquistion philosphy and finacial considerations aligned in favor f a low-cost, hig-performance fighter, caled the Light Weight Fighter. It was radical change, but he atractions of the LWF wer becoming clear. A low-cost fighter would help cut he dfense budget, and anew fighter oferd Laird and Packard an oportunity to try out some of their theories about weapons acquistion. I February 1971, Laird agred to a study, known as the ?Simon Study? from its leader, OSD stafer Alan Simon, to examine the potential of alightweight fighter with te aim of using it as model for Packard?s prottyping program. Just before h departed for Korea, Ricioni recived $149,0 for astudy project on the LWF and gave the money to cntractors from Genral Dynamics and Northrop, the two companies that had lost he F-14 and F-15 competions, to design a25,0-pound fighter whose prformance would be superior t the F-4.52 The word of the finacial incetive quickly spread. Lured by the promise of alrge contract, sevral companies ? Lockhed, Northrop, and Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) - oferd the Air Force ?unsolicted? prosals for alightweight fighter. Boyd and Ricioni visted Boeing when the contractor di not submit aprosal nd urged ? or presured - to submit aprosal, whic Boeing di. 53 134 With te formation f Simon?s group, the Air Force saw the LWF was serious project and realized it had to become an ctive particpant. Ther wer, in fact, many in the Air Force who liked the idea of a smal, simple fighter and in Augst 1971, the Air Force st up aProttype Program Ofice for the LWF. hen Packard anounced to Congres in Septmber 1971 that, because of the Simon Study, the Department of Defnse would go ahead with an experimental program to devlop aLWF, the Air Force was ready. 54 The LWF program was not nly intede to build anew fighter but also t do it on a?design to cst? basi of no more than $3 milion acopy, based on abuy of 30 aircaft. 5Using the Simon Study as n outline, Do preared request for prosals and other information for the companies intersted in competing for the LWF contract. Based on the contractors? preliminary studies, the Do would selct wo cmpanies and give them $10 milion dolars to build aprottype of their aircaft. The aircaft was to be dsigned for both te Air Force and Navy, and then ther would be afly-of betwen the prottypes to decide the winer in a?winer take al? competion. The actual ?requiremnts prosal? Packard and Laird aproved for the aircaft companies was very broad to alow the companies? wide latiude in devloping the nw fighter. This fredom, Packard and Laird belived, would produce inovative prosals for the nw aircaft.56 Packard and Laird also said the purose of the LWF project was only to alow contractors to demonstrate tchnolgy, but he ultimate aim of the program was clear. Packard acknowledged this when he wrote an itersted senator ?[the LWF] could, if objectives 135 wer met, provide the Air Force with te option f complentig the F-15 force with inexpensive fighters.?57 Despite the movemnt of the program, neither the Air Force nor the Navy comited to buying the winer. The Air Force ladership remained aprehnsive that he LWF would cut into the number of F-15s it wanted to buy, and the srvice rfused to write the mandatory ?Required Operational Comitent? (ROC) for the fighter.58 AIR FORCE SHIFTS ITS POSITION As the LWF program oved inexorably forward, it semed the Critcs had won a major batle, but hey had ctualy won ithout afight. Despite its public fot draging, it sems that internaly the Air Force had slowly begun to change its mind about he requiremnt for aLWF for force structre rasons ? ales expensive fighter meant he service ould buy a lrger number - and as means of presrving the air-to-air ole of the F-15. The Air Force?s primary long-range strike aircaft, the F-4, was gin and the F-15 was coming under increasing presure to be asigned a bomb-carying interdiction role. The srvice bgan to se the LWF as n F-4 replacemnt and quietly decide internaly that, if the prottype tst showed the winer had equate prformance, it could be nlarged and otherwise modifed to become a?swing role? fighter for both ground atck and air-to-air combat. Aditonaly, and importantly, the Air Force was intersted in having an iexpensive, hig-performance multi-role fighter for the National Guard and Air Force Resrve forces that wer equiped with obsolet, low-capbilty aircaft. Equiping them with modern fighters would provide aquantum iprovemnt i American TACIR capbilties. 59 136 Force structre was realy the ky, especialy in this time of limited budgets. At acertain point, the size of the fighter force materd, because the Air Force had to have the proer number of aircaft in the proer places to met he Soviet hreat. The srvice nede to expand to met its comitents, and the Air Force alculated it nede about twenty-six active fighter wings to provide flexible forces for deployment o world trouble spots.60 Because the LWF would be considerably les expensive than the F-15, the Air Force would be able to grow amuch larger modern fighter force. While at his time twenty-six active fighter wings emed wildly optimistic, the nw idea was combination f hig cost F-15s and low cost LWFs and A-10s that became known as the ?hig-lo mix? and became abuzword in the TAF.61 While McDonel-Douglas made strenuos eforts to lwer the F-15?s price and give it aground-atck apbilty, evn at a lower cost he multi-role ?striped? F-15 was ?hig end? compared to the projectd cost of aLWF.62 The main Air Force oncerns wer about he LWF?s performance, but hes wer somewhat suaged when Laird made one of the rquiremnts for the LWF roughly the same ?fuel fraction,? that is the same prortional fuel oad, as the F-15, and this gave the LWF roughly the same range.63 While the Critcs, notably Sprey, considerd long range ausels requiremnt, range was key isue for the Air Force, and the igh fuel fraction f the LWF changed the srvice?s view of the aircaft in spite of the considerable drawbacks of its mal size. 64 Ther was lso apolitcal dimension to the LWF program, because it would suport the Nixon Doctrine. In the mid-1960s, unhapy with te cheap but inefctive F-104s and 137 F-5s, evral NATO countries had comited to anew ?European fighter? caled the Multi-Role Combat Aircaft (MRCA), evntualy named the ?Tornado.? The MRCA became an F-1 clone - expensive, multi-role, and swing-wing ? and, like the F-1, had many problems. By the arly 1970s, half the countries had roped out of the program because of hig cost and marginal performance.65 The air-to-air F-15 was to expensive and to limited for the NATO alies who nede a fighter-bomber, not apure air-to-air fighter, so ales expensive, dual-mision LWF would be aperfct solution for thes alies. Having NATO fly the same fighters as the U.S. Air Force would also have huge bnefits for both sides. Foreign sales would reduce the unit cost of the aircaft, and it would also mean the USAF and its NATO air forces would be using the same aircaft with comon spare parts, weapons and other items, thus olving many existing logistical problems. 6 The Air Force gradualy saw that he LWF could be awin-in situation. If the LWF proved sucesful, buying it would not nly be politcaly poular, but he srvice would also be gting a very capble aircaft. The ky was that he Air Force had quietly changed the mision f the LWF. It would not be the low-tech, cheap, air-to-air aircaft the Critcs envisoned, but ahig-tech, if smal, multi-role fighter-bomber.67 On 13 April 1972, Do selcted Genral Dynamics and Northrop to devlop prottypes of their LWF for aprottype fly of. The Genral Dynamics entry, the YF-16, was single-ngie fighter with te same Prat and Whitney F10 engie as the F-15, while the Northrop entry, the twin-egine YF-17, had two Genral Electric F10 engies, 138 a modifcation f the F401 engie that had lost out o the F10 in the F-15 engie competion.68 1. Clark Cliford, ?Staemnt of Secrtary of Defnse Clark M. Cliford. The Fiscal Year 970-1974 Defnse Progra and 1970 efns Budgt,? January 15, 196, 8-9. 2. Andrew A. Jorda nd W. J. Tylor, Amrica Nationl Secrit: Policy and Proces (Baltimore: Jhs Hopkins University Pres, 1984), 79. 3. Ibid., 7. 4. Richard Sanders, The Politcs of Defnse Analysi (New York: Duneln, 1973), 12, 319-324, psim; Lawrnce J. Krb, ?Th Budget Procs in the partmet of Defnse 7-197: The Stregths and Weakness of Thre Systms,? Public Admiistration Reviw 37, 4 (July-Augst 7): 340; Lawrnc Ln and Rihard Smith, ?Can the Secrtary of Defnse make aDifernce?? Interatioal Security (Suer 1982): 49. 5. Alain Ethoven ad K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (Sant Monica, CA: Rand Corpratin, 205), 23, psi. 6. Rbert Sders, The Politcs of Defnse Analysi (New York: Duneln, 1973), 4. 7. Enthovn, 21. 8. Ibid., 21. 9. Kor, 34. 10. Cngresional Quarterly Almanc, 93rd Congres, 1st Sesion, 1973, Volume XI, 23-214. 1. Some thought is brought no benfits and was genraly abd iea. Enthoven, 2. 12. Congres, Senate, Subcomite on Department of Defnse Apropriations, Statemt f Scrtry of Defnse Mlvi R. Lird o th 1971 fse Prgrm ad Budgt, 25 Februar 1970, 5; Calvin Hargis, Oral History interview #86 by Jacob Nefeld, 1 Mrch 3, AFHRA, 18 13. Stephen JCimbal, The eagn Defnse Program: An Iterim Asesment (Wilmingto, Dl: Scholrly Rsources, 1986), 4. 14. Ibid., 49. 5. Roert W. Drews, The Air Force and the Great Engie War (ashington, DC: National Dfnse Univrsity Prs, 1987), 23, 4-35; Jo Lak, Grumn F-14 Tmcat: Shipbre Suprfighter (London: AIRtime Publishing, 198), 53-4. 16. Pal M. Rors, t. Ge. USF, Oral History Interview ith Jacob Neufeld, 17-19 June 74, AFHA, 8-10, pasim. Hargis, 15-6. 1. Hargis, 1. Some Air Force oficers felt hat, in fact, it was the Air Force that was responsible for this thd f prgram dvlopmet. Neufeld, 35-6. 139 18. An excelnt and concise dscription f this i found in Philp Lacombe, ?Acquirg Systms, Step by Stp,? Air Frce Magzine, Agust 1983, 53-5. Also se U.S. Conres, enat, ucomite on Dprtmet of Dfense Apropriations, tatemt of Scrtry of Defns Mlvi R. Laird n the 1971 Dfense Prgrm and Budgt, 25 Februar 1970, 24, 135-136. 19. Rogr K. Rhodarmer, aj. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 29 Marc 1973, K.239.0512.029, HRA, 12-3; 20. Rogers, 40-2; 4-8. 1. Thr is no evidence that such amanual existed. 2. Grant Ham, T Mind of Wr: John Boy and American Security (Washingto, D.C: Sithsonia Pres, 201), 85. 23. Jacb Neufeld, Te F-15 Eagle: Origins and Devlopment 1964-1972 (ashington, DC: Ofic of Air Forc History, 1974), 32; Jeruald Gentry, Maj. USAF, ?Evoluti f the F-16 Multinatinal Fighter? (Student Rsrch Papr #163: Industrial Cleg of te Armed Forces, 1976), 25. 24. Pir Spry, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 12 June 1971, K.39.0152-96, AFHRA, 40. 25. Congres, Senate, rmed Services Comite on Manpower and Personel Subcomit, Impct of Tchnolgy on Miltary Mapwer, Requirmets, Readins, and Operations. 96th Cng., 2d ses., 4-5 Decmber 1980, 5 Dcbr, 275; Gtry, 21. This me was cirulate in th Pentagon ad copies presnted informaly to the services in lat 196. 26. Cogres, Senate, Subcomite on Department of Defnse Apropriations, Statemnt f Scrtry of Defnse Mlvi R. Lird o th FY 1972-1976 Defnse Progra ad the 1972 fs Budget, 92 nd Congres, 2nd ses., 4 Feb, 1971, 0-1. For a cmplet explantion, se Presint Richard Nixon, Report o Congrs, US Foreign Poliy for th 1970s: A Nw Strategy for Pece, 1 Fbruary 1970 (Washingtn, DC: GO, 1970). 2. Laird, Chart 26. 8. Ibi., 24, 60, 137; Gentry, 6-8. 29. Neufeld, F-5, . 30. Lair, 24 ebruary 1971, 79-80. 1. Memo, Undrsecrtary of the Air Force John McLucas to Roger Kely, Asitant Scretary of Dfnse, Manpower and Rserve Afirs, ?Equal Oportunity Complie: F-15 Cntract,? 24J 1970; ?The F-15 and Fair mployment,? Sait Louis Pst Dispatch, 6 ebrury 1970, 0; ?McDonl Hirg Pln Arvd, The Washington Post, 1 February 197, 10. 32. Pulse Dplr adr is able to detct argets below the orizon by using the ?Dopler fct,? rather thn simpl puls used by rgular adrs that canot lok blow the rizon beause t pulse bounces of th ground. Petr Jret, Te Mdern War 140 Machine: Miltary Aviation Since 1945 (London: Putnam Aeronautical Boks, 20), 134. For the ngie, se Drews, . 3. Drws, 31-2. 4. Arden B Dahl, ?The Warthog: The Best Deal the Air Force Nevr Wanted.? (Resarch Stuy: Ntional Dfense Univrsity, 204), 26. 35. Rogers, 58-9; ilbur Crch, Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview by Hugh Ahman, 19 June 2, K239.0512, AFHRA, 248-250. 36. Rogers, 58-9. For an i-depth lok at he isue, se Benjamin Franklin Coling, ed., Case Studis in the Devlopmnt f Clse Air Sport (Washigto, D.C: Ofice of Air Forc History, 20). 37. The prttping proces is acomplex one. While it sems logical, it should be noted tat re of the bst fightrs f Wrld ar I ? t Britsh Supermrine Spitfir, th North Amrican P-51 Mustang, and the Jpnes A6M Zero, wr not h rsult of te prttyping proes, evn thouh it was the orm at h tim. Als, America?s best post-war fihter, th F-86, was t e product f a prottype flyof. Wilia Gren, Famus Figtrs of te Scond World War (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1975). For the -86, se Jaret, 49. 3. Th Firchild-Republic A-10 was chosen the winer of the competion i January 1973. One in th field in 975, te A-10 as critcizd by its ilots fr its lack of vionics, whic wre vntualy updatd at considerbly more cost han had the aiis ben ilud at he time of its evlpmt. Crech, Oral History, 248-250; Robert C. Samns, Secrtary of th Air Force, ?Tac Air: Lok t he Late 70s.? Air Frc Magzie, Jauary 1973, 5. 39. The Comision is caled in some documents the Packard Blue Ribon Comision, but his ame is mor cnly ad acurtly given to aCmision Packard actualy caired undr President Rol Regn i 1986. 40. Congres, Snt, Sbcomit n Departmt of Defnse Apropriations. Statemt f Scrtary of Defnse Melvi R. Lird on the 1971 fse Prgrm ad Budgt, 25 Februr 1970, 17-8. 41. itzhgh Comision (Blue Ribon Defnse Panel), ?Report o the President and the Secrtary of Defnse the Dpartmet f fs, 1 July 1970? (Wasingto, DC: GPO, 1970), i. 42. Ibid., 78-0. 3. Rogers, 21. 4. Spry, Oral History, 39. 5. Everst Ricini, Cl. USAF, interview by Jeruald Gentry, Maj. USAF, quoted in ?Evolution f the F-16 Multinatioal Fightr,? 31, 37. 46. Rbert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Bostn: Litle, Brown ad pan, 202), 9. 47. Ibid., 31. 14 48. Congres, Senate, Armed Services Comite on Manpower and Personel Subcomit, Impct of Tchnolgy on Miltary Mapwer, Requirmets, Readins, and Operations, 96th Cng., 2d ses., 4-5 Decmber 1980, 273. 49. Mmbers of ores for Pace Through Law iltary Spendig Comite, The Econics f Defns: A Biprtisn Reviw of Miltary pendig (New Yrk, NY: Pragr, 1971). 50. Laird, 24 Feb, 1971, 50-15. 1. Ibi., 81. 52. Corum, 94. Ricioni was later to work for Northrop. 3. Ibid., ; Hilikar, ?Fther of the F-16,? Cde One, Genral Dynamics Magzine, April 191, 4. 54. Gentry, 7, 51. Richard M. ?ody Suter,? Col. USAF, ?Corna Ace? interview by Lt. Cols. ordn Nelson John Dick, 26 January 197, HRA, 24. 5. The $3 milio was ot made ontractul. Gentr, 56. 6. Carls R. Jansn d Kenth C. Rogers, Origin of the F-16 Multinational Program (1970-197), Volum 1 (irtland Air Force Base NM: Air orce Systems Cnd Headquarters, 17 October 1983), 13. 57. Letr, Dvid Packard, Dputy Secrtary of Defnse, to Stuart Symington, US Senate, 10 Sptember 1971, AFHRA; Gntry, 59. 58. Gentry, 4. 9. Samns, 37. 60. Ibid., 34; 1. Gen. Alton Slay Testimony, Congres, Senate Armed Services Comite, FY97 Miltary Prcurnt, 95th rs, 2d ss., January 17 976, 486. 62. Lorel, 213; athor?s coversations with McDonel-Douglas represntaives, Tel Avi, Isral, 197-978. Te rprsntives er tryig to kep the IAF from buying F- 16s. 3. While they had the same fuel fraction, extrnal stores ? extra fuel tanks and misiles ? cut into te F-16?s rng more tha th F-15?s. Simply put, th F-15 ws bigr and ths extrnal stores wer prortionaly smaler, thus ading les overal drag, while i smalr fighter th sam xternal stres wer larger prortion f th r and tus cut into te rang ore. Hilikr, 9. 64. Edgar Ulsamr, ?YF-16: On Time, On Track, On Budget,? Air Force Magzine, January 1974, 51-4; The Lightweight Fighter Hlts the Cost Spiral,? ir orce Mgzine, October 1973, 64-8. T Air orc Magzin is the unofical ?party organ? of the corprat Air Force. 65. Gentry, 42. . Joh Vogt, Gen. USAF, ?Alied Air Power in Europe: The View From the Top,? Internatinal Defns Rview, January 1974, 3-4. 67. Geral Slay Testimoy, 4896-. 8. ntry, 46. 142 CHAPTER SEVN: THE WAR ZONE TRAUMA I? LINEBACKER, 1972 By late 1971, the Vietnam War semed to be steadily windig down ad the Navy?s Top Gun schol was beginig to fel some presure. Ther had ben virtualy no MiG encounters ince mid-1968, so the program?s graduates had no MiG kils. Without combat sucess, ther was real question about whetr Top Gun would survie post-Vietnam. Then, i the combat zone, slowly, almost impercptibly, the situation began to change. Early in 1972, North Vietnames MiGs began to engae Air Force aircaft at night over Laos. Though ter wer only afew engaemnts with MiGs, once agin the Air Force kil ratio was low, about 2:1. The MiGs also began gresively pursing Navy reconaisance aircaft during the day, and in the first months of 1972 Navy F-4s, mainly flown by Top Gun graduates, hot down four MiGs for no lses of their own. The Top Gun schol breathed asigh of relif ? its program semed to be working, and its futre loked secure. 2Then, i April 1972, the North Vietnames launched amasive invasion f South Vietnam. As the North Vietnames threatned to verwhelm the South Vietnames army, the USAF poured F-4 squadrons into American base in Thailnd to stem the tide. 3Once the atck was contained, in the bginig of May 1972, Nixon rderd masive atcks id4084132 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 143 aginst argets in the Hanoi are and the minig of Haiphong harbor in a operation caled ?Linebacker.?4 The Air Force xpectd god results. The squadrons ent o the conflict wer fuly operational nd considerd wel trained by Air Force standars, and the crews er al experinced, most with at least one combat our. Almost of al of the squadrons flew the latest model F-4, the F-4E, with an iternal canon that made it avst improvemnt over the arlier F-4s. Aditonaly, some of the F-4s had clasifed evice known as ?Combat Tre,? whic alowed the F-4s to tel whic radr blips on their screns wer friendly and whic wer MiGs. ?Tre,? as it was quickly dubed, would alow the F-4s to use their long-range AI-7 radr misiles to fire at MiGs beyond visual range (BVR), before the MiGs could se the F-4s. 5 The Air Force raids on Hanoi that began i May consited of large, complex ?strike packages? built around afew F-4s carying laser guide bombs (LGBs) and their critcal guidance pods, caled Pave Knife. The Air Force had only a few of thes Pave Knife pods ? four, for most of the operation ? and protecting them was given the ighest priority. 6A strike package consited of F-4 flights droping chaf to jam North Vietnames radrs in front of the LGB cariers, with ?Wild easel? anti-SAM hunter-kiler teams and sevral difernt varints of ighter scorts to protect he LGB aircaft and chafers from MiGs. 7Each of the Thai base was given a componet of the complex misions ? anti-SA Wild Weasels and hunter-kiler misions came from Korat RTAFB, laser bomb and chaf misions from Ubon RTAFB, and fighter scorts from the two ther base, the main air- to-air base at Udorn RTAFB and another unit at Takhali RTAFB.8 14 But he rsults the first hre months of Linebacker fel far short f Air Force expectaions, and the rsults of the first day of the strikes on Hanoi n 10 May showed the stark contrast betwen Navy and Air Force trainig. That day Navy F-4s hot down eight MiGs without los and produced the first ace of the Vietnam War, Navy Lieutnat Randy Cunigham, who shot down thre MiG-17s in the space of a few minutes. The Air Force shot down thre MiGs but lost wo F-4s, including one flown by a crew that had recntly scored thre victories.9 As Linebacker contiued, Air Force loses remained hig, especialy to MiGs, and the Air Force operations reflcted por tainig, tactis, discipline, and organization. While the nw laser-guide bombs wer extremly efctive, ther wer inordinate dificulties and loses while protecting the LGB delivery aircaft, and many of the raids destroyed their targets by simply overwhelming the North Vietnames defnders. The heavy loses in the inital stages of Linebacker made adep impresion the Air Force crews. It came as shock to them how porly preared they wer, and one pilot, Ron Keys, remberd ?I had ben having the time of my life [up to this point]?it had nevr ocured to me Ihad ben porly trained.? 10 Cordination f the complex strikes was nightmare bcause noe of the Air Force units had evr tained with other units with difernt misions, and the crews er not preared for perations aginst an itegrated air defnse ystem of MiGs, SAMs, and radr-guide A. The Air Force was lso using formations that made it easy for the MiGs to atck unsen, and the crews er also porly trained for air-to-air combat - for many, their first air combat engaemnt was ith a MiG. Despite bing heavily 145 outnmberd, afew North Vietnames MiGs wer able to disrupt many Air Force strikes, and the MiGs ran up a kil ratio f almost 2:1 in their favor through July 1972. One F-4 pilot, avetran of two previous combat ours, remberd, ?For the first hre months of Linebacker the MiGs gave us an old fashioned but kicing, pure and simple.? 1 The Air Force?s por performance aused ismay in the White House. Since the beginig of the Vietnam War the Air Force had ben agitaing to be ?cut lose? to atck al the signifcant argets in North Vietnam, but now that President Nixon gave the Air Force the oportunity, it stumbled badly. Nixon singled out he Air Force laders for sevre critcism and at one point he told Kisinger: I want you to cnvey directly to the Air Force that Iam disgusted with their perfrmane?.I o nt blame t fine ir Force pilots who afantstic job i so many ther rs. Ido blame th manders?.If ther is oe mre instance of winig about arget rstrictions w il simply blw th whistle o this hole sry performane f ur Air Force in failng for day ftr day ftr da in Nrth Vietam this past wk [12-9 My] t hit enormousl importt argets wn they ad n oportunity to do s and wr rderd to d s nd thn ould?t cry ut he rder?.I want you to cnvy my uter isgust o [Admiral] More [Cairman of the Jint Chiefs of Staf] whic he can i turn ps n t the [Air Frce snior comanders]. It is time for tes peole ither to sap up or gt out?.12 Nixon?s unhapines with te Air Force?s performance was mirored by the snior Air Force ladership, especialy concernig the loses to MiGs. Had the kil:los ratios ben kept within the Air Force, the ladership might ave aceptd Genral Momyer?s rationale that he loses wer caused by a vriety of actors over whic the Air Force had no cntrol. Howevr, while Momyer's taf at TAC headquarters could shield him from hearing things he di not want o hear, things wer difernt i Washington. Each wek ther wer separte, al-service metings for the thre groups of genral oficers who 146 wer in charge of the uniformed iltary - the Chiefs of Staf, the Chiefs of Staf or Operations (OPSDEPS), and the Deputy Chiefs of Staf or Operations, (DEPOSDEPS). The metings tok place in asmal, seald, and unimpresive rom known as the ?Tank,? wher the gnerals at round alrge, rectangular, dinig rom-size table. Each of the wekly briefings tarted with an iteligence rport, and beginig in May 1972 the top Air Force ladership had to sit and listen while abriefr fom the Joint Chiefs of Staf described how many MiGs the Navy shot down ad Navy loses compared to Air Force MiGs hot down ad Air Force loses. 13 Both services wer flying the same F-4s - in fact, the Air Force F-4s with acnon ad Tre wer superior ? and one can imagine how embarsing it was for the Air Force gnerals to have to sit hrough tes briefings wek after wek, and how often the Navy admirals mentioned the Top Gun. It was clear the Navy was doing something riht, as loath as the Air Force laders wer to admit it. Parochial service onsiderations would have to be put aside to slve this problem. WORKING THE PROBLEM The Air Force Chief of Staf, Genral John D. ?Jack? Ryan, sat hrough many of thes briefings and was especialy dismayed by the Air Force?s por air-to-air performance. Major John Corder, ahigly decorated Roling Thunder vetran d ameber of the Fighter Tactis Branch of the Air Staf?s Tactial Divison, was the oficer who ad to brief Ryan daily on the loses, and Corder embers that his was ?always a tense time.?14 The problems finaly came to head when Corder briefd Ryan i June 1972 about an Air Force F-4 pilot who ad lost aMiG kil because h ad his misile arming switches in the incorect positons - not an ucomon problem in the at of combat in 147 the F-4. Ryan ?threw a fit and asked how this was posible, what was rong with our air-to-air combat capbilty??15 One of the oficers in the rom was Corder?s bos, the Chief of the Tactial Divison, Lieutnat Colnel Wiliam Kirk, adouble MiG kiler and the former comander of the F-4 squadron at he Fighter Weapons Schol. Kirk told Ryan that, in his opinio, Air Force fighter pilots wer so porly trained that only 10 percnt could pas a writen test on the basics of air combat nd the F-4?s air-to-air sytems. Ryan was taken abck and clearly iritaed that TAC?s por tainig meant his fighter pilots wer coming up short in combat. Ryan had clashed with Momyer before and ther sems to have ben o lve lost betwen the two, so Ryan turned to Kirk and Corder and said, ?OK, you gys make up that est, take it o the field and give it, then tel me what he rsults are. And on?t el Momyer what you?re doing.? 16 Kirk and Corder, both of whom wanted to return to fighters after their Pentagon tours, quietly disregarde Ryan?s last directive. They quickly pased the word to Momyer?s staf and asked for someone from the TAC staf to jin them on their vist o the base to give the tst. Corder wrote atwenty-five question test and on the front of the tst put acaveat: ?If ther is any question this test hat you don?t ed to fight aMiG this afternon, don?t answer it.? Out of more than two hundre pilots who tok the tst, only one pilot droped one question. 17 Just as Kirk had predicted, results wer absolutely miserable. The average score was 40 percnt, and only 10 percnt of the pilots pased the tst. It was clear Air Force F-4 pilots, evn those who ad flown to cmbat ours, knew litle about he F-4?s radr or 148 misiles, wer unable to judge their distance from the smal Soviet MiGs when presnted with pictures, and sevral drew gunsight profiles of MiG-21s that loked like F-4s. 18 Morever, the acdemics wer the asy part. Ther was no flying to check on the crews? air-to-air flying skils - or lack therof. Before the tam returned to the Pentagon to brief Genral Ryan they stoped at Tactial Comand Headquarters to brief Genral Momyer. It was tricky time, because they wer going to have to tel the man responsible for TAC?s trainig that his program was inadequate. After some discusion the tam decide to brief Momyer that he rsults wer ?understandably por? because of the short rainig time TAC had to make Air Force ?universal pilots? combat capble in the F-4 before they went o SEA.19 Momyer was not pleased with te briefing or the tst results because h ad ben saying how el his TAC-trained pilots wer doing in SEA, but faced with te facts and knowing the tam was to report o Genral Ryan, he ad no choice but o listen ad then ask for the tam?s recomendations. Kirk, who ad ben Suter?s and Wels? comander at Nelis and knew about he Navy?s Top Gun program, had ready answer for the question. He rcomende that TAC form an ?Agresor squadron? of aircaft hat duplicated the MiGs? mal size and performance to regularly vist al the fighter wings in TAC and teach air-to-air combat. It was flying varition f Wels? threat briefing and an Air Force vrsion f Top Gun, though te later went discretly unmentioned. 20 It semed to the tam that Momyer di not like the idea, nd Kirk, Corder, and the rest of the tam returned to Washington to brief Genral Ryan. It ok the tam thre days to preare their findigs, devlop abriefing and a?package? for Ryan proving an 149 Agresor squadron, and to get on his chedule.21 Meanwhile, back at TAC Genral Momyer, knowing that he tam would report hat TAC?s trainig was inadequate and then give Ryan their ecomendations, tried to take the initative. He caled Ryan, described what he rport found and recomende that TAC form an Agresor Squadron. When Corder, Kirk and the rst of the tam went i to brief Ryan, he listend to their eport and then said, ?Momyer caled me a few days ago and said he wanted to form an Agresor squadron. Does this package do that??2 Kirk asured him it di. Corder embers, ?Ryan tok the package, opend it o the aproval page and, without reading it, scrawled abig R acros it. Irealized this SAC genral was going to change the way e trained for air-to-air combat in our air force. Iliked his tyle.? Even though Ryan was former SAC bomber pilot and ot particularly wel liked or espectd by some in the fighter comunity, he started the Agresors on their way - ?the most ignifcant item in the dvelopment of modern [Air Force] air-to-air capbilty,? one gneral said later. 23The prosal Ryan proved was the forming of an Agresor squadron using smal, supersonic Northrop T-38 Talon trainers turned over to TAC by Air Trainig Comand (ATC) wher they wer used in the last ix months of pilot rainig. Except for tp sed, the T-38 simulated aMiG-21?s performance quite adequately, and because the T-38 was a two-seatr, it alowed xtra trainig oportunites. Air Trainig Comand was loath to give up the T-38s, evn with sarp cuts in pilot rainig as the Vietnam War wound down, but he large ?R scrawled on the aproval package worked wonders in the Pentagon.24 By late 1972 the Agresors, based at Nelis and oficaly designated the 150 64th Fighter Weapons Squadron, began to get heir T-38s, though as one of the orignal Agresors noted, ?Air Trainig Comand sent us the oldest, most beat up jets I?d evr sen.?25 The Agresor pilots wer young former F-4 pilots, ome of them MiG kilers, and one of the rquiremnts was that hey had combat our, prefrably during Linebacker. One of the first Agresors was Major Roger Wels, and he provide much of the intelctual backbone of the unit.26 The Agresors had studie Top Gun ad knew they di not want o be amiror image of the Navy program. Top Gun?s mision was imply to give Navy F-4 crews experince flying ainst mal, maneuverable fighters flown by skiled pilots, but he Top Gun istructors flew their A-4s using standar Navy tactis, not Soviet actis. Because Top Gun tok only the top crews from each unit in the flet, this alowed the instructors agod eal of leway in how they taught eir students because al of the students wer higly qualifed. Aditonaly, the prevailng atitude of the instructors at Top Gun sems to have ben to win at l cost, while taching along the way. 27 While Top Gun oly brought in afew selcted pilots from acros the flet, the Agresors would fly with al the pilots in a Air Force fighter unit, not just he bst, so the nw Agresors knew their mision had to be considerably broader and would have to be more inovative. The Agresors decide that when they visted aunit hey would bring an iteligence oficer to presnt Wels? Soviet capbilty and tactis briefings, and then to cmbine the ?bok nowledge? with flying misions aginst T-38s that had many of the same charcteristics of the MiG-21. Unlike Top Gun, the Agresors would fly like 15 the Soviets, using Soviet actis and radr control. A typical Agresor ACM (air combat maneuvering) flying trainig mision would se the Agresors, completly under the control f their own ground radr controler, fly Soviet formations into the fight o give the American crews the chance to se the Soviet formations on radr before the actual dogfiht began. Once the dogfiht began, the maneuvering was fre play.28 The Agresors also introduced acultral change in how Air Force pilots aproached ACM trainig misions. Because the Agresors flew aginst les experinced crews whose air-to-air skil levl was considerably lower than the Agresor pilots, the Agresors won most of the fights, especialy in the bginig. The vast disparity in skil levls meant he Agresors had to be cautious about how they debriefd the misions and much les competive in their aproach. The Agresors knew the prception the misions wer amasculinity test would change the focus to winig rather than learnig, so they could not let he trainig become a ?me vs. you? evnt wher pride was on the line. The ky to sucesful air combat rainig was to remove go from the trainig dogfiht, so the Agresor pilots worked hard on being profesional, on making the misions learnig experinces, and on devloping the art of debriefing each engaemnt.29 As one Agresor wag noted, ?our mision was to gun somebody and make them like it.? To this end, the first hing the Agresors di with te T-38s was to put gun cameras in them to record their misions, and the idea was to let he film do the talking, so ther would be no arguments. 30 This was nother major cultral shift ? now air combat was not fr building up the go, but for tainig, and if astudent won afight with an Agresor, the Agresors had one their job as instructors. 152 Ther wer other signifcant difernces with Top Gun. Because Top Gun was elf-contained, the Top Gun comander wrote his instructors' efctivens reports internaly, with litle input from former students or the students? unit comanders. The Agresors, on the other hand, wer in TAC?s chain of comand and their comander was fairly low rankig oficer ? alieutnat colnel (O-5). Since the Agresors went o TAC wings, if awing comander felt he Agresors wer arogant or to hard on his wing?s pilot when they visted, a phone cal from the wing comander to TAC headquarters could have had serious impact on a Agresor?s carer. 31 STOPING THE BLEDING Back in the combat zone, after thre months of genral disary and a kil ratio f les than 1: aginst he MiGs, in Augst 1972 the Air Force rews finaly began to get agrip on the situation. Crews became familar with teir misions, new comand and control measures wer implented by Sevnth Air Force hadquarters (with modest uces), but he most important change was that he crews began to have mas debriefings at he end of each day?s misions. 32 When Sevnth Air Force orderd the mas debriefings, the idea semed to be complicated, time-consuming and apor use of resources. After very large daily strike to the Hanoi are, each of the Thai base sent one lad crew that had flown that day?s mision to Udorn RTAFB after the mision lande. Represntaives from the other componets involed in the day?s trike ? comand and control, inteligence, tankers and others ? also came to Udorn. Once veryone arived in the late afternon, ther was mas debriefing wher each group discused what went wrong and right on the mision, 153 then devloped ways to crect he mistakes for the nxt day. The particpants then returned to their base to put he agred changes into the nxt day?s trike plan. It quickly became obvious that he mas debriefing was n extraordinarily useful way to exchange information ad improve operations, and loses droped ramticaly almost imediately.3 LINEBACKER?S IMPACT ON THE AIR FORCE The units that flew in Linebacker genraly returned home after spendig only two r thre months in the combat zone and fresh units ent i. As more and more units rotaed in ad out, son alrge prcentage of the Air Force?s tactial fighter aircews had ben involed in the Linebacker operations. They shared the xperinces when they returned, and son the ntire TAF realized it was not wel trained. The Fighter Weapons Schol at Nelis ent sevral instructors over to fly with te crews during Linebacker and observe the situation. They came to the same conclusion, that he yars of neglct of air-to-air trainig and the large number of unqualifed ?universal pilots? being sent ito cmbat in the F-4 wer finaly bearing biter fuit. But while the rsults of Linebacker wer a sharp rebuke of TAC?s trainig methods, identifying what went wrong and fixing it was tricky busines, because Genral Momyer was til comander of TAC and responsible for the trainig. In October 1972, the anual Tactial Fighter Weapons Symposium tok place at Nelis. TAC?s genral oficers wer the target audience for the gathering, but it also include many oung combat vetrans, including the Air Force?s first aces, Captins Stev Ritchie and Charles ?Chuck? DeBlevue. The focus of the metings was on tactis 154 and trainig, and the combat vetrans told the gneral oficers that hes wer two ares wher the Air Force was orely lacking. After the symposium, Ritchie wrote aletr to TAC omander Momyer about TAC?s air-to-air tainig. The lter said, among other things: I fel our F-4 aircews asigned to Sutheast Asia wer not prorly trained to nga MiGs i Rte Pckge Six d cmbat is certainl ot he plce to train. We must prear our airews for worldwide air cmbat bfre the war bgins?I m cnvicd that prer aircw prertion rquirs complet renovatio f [TAC] trinig rograms? 34 But he lter and the rsults of Linebacker had litle impact on Momyer and the TAF in genral. The bombing of North Vietnam ende in January 1973 and in Augst he war ende for the Air Force, and TAC staeside trainig contiued with its emphasi on ?caned? misions and filing trainig squares.35 The solution to the problems that apeard in the war, the TAC leadership felt, was not rainig but atechnolgical solution with te nw F-15 and betr misiles.36 Except for the Agresor squadron Ryan had foisted on the comand, ther was litle change. Howevr, while Momyer di not introduce any ew trainig programs, the far that many had that he would terminate the Agresors once the war as over di not materialize. Ryan remained as Chief of Staf, and the Agresors emed to prosper.37 But despite the avilabilty of the Agresors, TAC under Momyer was til part of the staeside Air Force ?fly safe? cultre. It sems any TAC wing comanders wer hesitant o bring the Agresors to their base for intese air-to-air tainig, fearing (probaly corectly) that n acident would negatively impact on their performance reports. They wer also afrid the Agresors would show their pilots wer porly 15 trained. Some ay lso have ben awre that he Agresors had ben foisted on Momyer and he may not have ben asuporter of the program. In the vent, it was not until mid-1973 that he Agresors flew their first deployment o the F-4 wing at Homestad Air Force Base, Florida. Even though al the Homestad squadrons had flown during Linebacker and had sevral MiG kilers, the wel-trained Agresors won most engaemnts. They found that he F-4s? tactis wer ?por? in 51 percnt of the engaemnts, that he F-4 crews er able to se the Agresors before they atcked only 15 percnt of the time, and the F-4 crews? radio cmunication was por in 82 percnt of the ngaemnts.38 While the Agresors? flying skils wer superior t the Homestad crews, it was their briefing and ebriefing skils and their unwilinges to ?crow? that made a dep impresion the F-4 crews. After ach practie ngaemnt, ther wer long, intese debriefings the Agresors disectd evry aspect of the ngaemnt from the first meting to the final disengaemnt, with te hlp of gun camera film and tape rcorders the Agresors caried in each ockpit. Word spread mong the wing comanders and the Agresors became ore and more poular, and son they wer traveling evry wek to fly at nother TAC base.39 To make their tainig authentic, the Agresors carefuly studie what had gone wrong in air combat over North Vietnam, using a thre-seris et of multi-volume combat reports known as the Red Baron Reports. Thes reports described, in great detail, evry air-to-air engaemnt hat ok place during the Vietnam War, and include coments of the American ircews involed on both teir specifc engaemnts a wel as genral 156 coments about he aircaft and weapons they wer using. The rports also include staistics that documentd the por performance of American ir-to-air misiles. The Red Baron Reports pointed out he smal MiGs usaly caught e Air Force aircaft by surpise - 80 percnt of the loses came from an emy fighter in the 30 degre cone to the rar of the aircaft, the ?blind spot? - because pilots wer so overwhelmed by the nw, heavy combat environment hat hey wer not loking behind them when the MiGs atcked. 40 Another eason the Air Force aircaft wer caught by surpise was that he Air Force was using por formations, put ?in stone? by the Air Force?s 1964 tactis manual, writen by John Boyd while h was t he Weapons Schol. The formations wer both ard to fly and creatd ?blind spots? for MiGs to exploit, and the problem exacerbated by por ear visbilty from the F-4 cokpit. 41 The Red Baron I report also cnfirmed what Kirk had told Air Force Chief of Staf Ryan - Air Force rews knew very litle about he MiGs? limitaions, trengths, and the formations they flew, and also knew litle about heir own F-4s. The rport pointed out that, in genral, Air Force misiles performed porly not nly because they had limited firng envelopes and wer unreliable, but also because they wer usaly fired from positons wher they had no chance to function proerly, a situation caled ?firng out of the nvelope.? This was the same thing the Ault Report had found for the Navy F-4 crews. The Red Baron I report also nted that he Navy F-4 pilots had much igher suces rate than the Air Force with AIM-9 heat seking misiles because the Navy pilots fired the AIM-9 ?in the nvelope,? the smal are directly behind aMiG wher the misile had the bst chance of unctionig proerly and hiting the target. The Navy F-4 157 ?in the nvelope? firngs rose dramticaly in 1972 compared to their firngs in Roling Thunder, and this was tributed by the pilots to their Top Gun trainig.42 The Agresors used the Red Baron reports on their vist to emphasize how the points they wer teaching wer the rsults of hard lesons learned in combat, further increasing their credibilty.43 SERIOUS CULTRE CLASHES Even before the Vietnam War ende, the clash betwen the SEA combat cultre and the staeside Air Force ultre was manifesting itself in the ighest ranks. In combat many Air Force oficers, including hig-rankig ones, had breached iscipline bfore in the at of batle, but he most erious violation began i late 1971.4 In mid-1971, Genral John D. Lavel had replaced Genral Momyer as Comander of the Sevnth Air Force in Saigon, whic was in charge of the day-to-day Air Force combat operations in SEA. The apointment was omething of asurpise bcause Lavel and Air Force Chief of Staf John Ryan wer not n god terms, but it was en by some as n idication that he war in SEA was indig down. Genraly, Lavel was wel-respectd and wel-liked World War I vetran d was intimately familar with SEA combat operations. He had ben Deputy Comander of the Pacifc Air Forces (PACF), whic was in overal charge of al service air operations in SEA, before moving to Saigon.45 Since the nd of Roling Thunder, the Air Force and Navy had flown authorized daily, unarmed reconaisance flights with protective fighter-bomber scort ver southern North Vietnam to onitor the North Vietnames miltary activites near the 158 Demiltarized Zone (DMZ), and the North Vietnames genraly aceptd thes flights and let hem go unchalenged. Shortly after Genral Lavel arived in Saigon, he noted from the rconaisance flights that her was n icreasing buildup of North Vietnames suplies in southern North Vietnam as wel as n icrease in the dfense, including surface-to-air misiles. Lavel orderd aircaft rom the base that flew the reconaisance flights, the 432nd Tactial Reconaisance Wing at Udorn RTAFB in Thailnd, to increase the number of surveilance misions. hen it became clear that he North Vietnames wer involed in amajor build up that semed to be the prelude to an invasion f South Vietnam, Lavel pased the nws to Washington. Beginig in Septmber 1971, President Nixon rderd PACF to tel Lavel to cary out a seris of strikes on the suply ares and on airfields in the are. The problem arose when Lavel contiued the strikes without specifc authorization, and the word was pased ? how is the question f some dbate ? to the rconaisance rews and their escorts to say they wer fired on, whetr or not his was true. The Air Force ould then say the strikes wer response to North Vietnames atcks on the lgitmate reconaisance flights. The bombing misions became ?protective raction strikes" to make it apear they wer folwing the Rules of Engaemnt. Howevr, when a Air Force anti-war phot interpetr learned of the dceptions and wrote his congresman, Lavel was caught. Air Force Chief of Staf Ryan profesd to be ?shocked, shocked? by the rvelation, and relived Lavel of his comand just afew days before the North Vietnames invade South Vietnam, using the suplies Lavel had orderd atcked. 159 Whetr Ryan uthorized, or hinted at uthorizng, the atcks or not became aater of heatd ebate, but in the nd it was detrmined that Lavel operated without he required authorization. Sevral other hig-rankig oficers in the combat heatr, including Major Genral Alton Slay, Lavel?s Deputy Comander for Operations at Sevnth Air Force, Colnel Charles Gabriel, the 432nd Comander, and Colnel Jerome O?Maley, the 432nd Wing?s Vice Comander, wer implicated but nevr charged.46 Ryan son relived Slay nd it semed his carer was over. It was not. The Lavel case was very controversial in ad out of the Air Force. Many Air Force oficers felt hat Genral Ryan, the former SAC bomber pilot and Sevnth Air Force Comander unpoular with some of the combat cultre fighter pilots, had implied to Lavel that President Nixon had proved such strikes. This would have semd plausible to Lavel, because Nixon ad Kisinger had earlier aproved the scret bombing of Cambodia nd wer known to be loking for ther agresive miltary options in the war. After Lavel's cashiering, many felt hat Ryan blamed Lavel alone for the actions evn though Ryan himself had ben complict. Not nly di many Air Force ombat cultre oficers fel Lavel was railroade, but many ears of rustration and feling that he Air Force had its ?hands tied behind its back? also led many to fel that he bombing raids wer justifed. It showed a huge disconect betwen the SEA combat cultre and the staeside Air Force ultre. 47 On the operational evl, after Linebacker the combat cultre vs. afety cultre gap widend as Air Force fighter crews realized they had gone into cmbat unpreared because of their leaders? emphasi on flying safety over ealistic trainig. Once pacetime 160 setled in, i the crews er dismayed to find a return to flying safety rules and restrictions and the same lack of realistic trainig that had caused the loses over North Vietnam. Even with te Agresor program, by the mid-1970s it semed to many oung oficers that he ?fly safe? and ?zero defcts? cultre, with its concomitant lack of integrity, was til an igrained part of Air Force ultre. 48 This belif in the failure of Air Force ladership began to apear in thes and other paers writen at he Air Force snior service schols, wher outsandig oficers matriculate for acdemic and leadership studies before moving to more rsponsible positons. While students had writen paers on Air Force thics from the foundig of the schols, more wer writen o the subject from 1972-1976 than had ben writen i al the previous years combined. 49 In oe 1974 survey taken of captins at Squadron Oficers Schol (SO), 52 percnt said ethics was serious problem in the Air Force, and 61 percnt idicated they had lready had to sacrifce their integrity at imes to satisfy their job requiremnts. Interstingly, they blamed this lack of ethics not n their imediate superiors but rather on the most enior Air Force ladership.50 A 1976 study at he nxt higest Air Force srvice schol, Air Comand and Staf Coleg, noted that majority of ficers ? 58 percnt - belived that her was n ethical problem in the Air Force caused by ?presure from above,? but hat ?the more snior the oficer, the ls likely he was to percive an ethical problem.?51 The young oficers also nted that he problem went o the Air Force?s combat capbilty. The Air Force was not rainig for combat, but no ne was iling to admit it, and Air Force omanders wer faking their tainig weapons cores rather than dmiting they wer not rainig their crews up to standar. 16 Worse, nothing apeard to be changi, as hown i 197 when the famous Air Force aerobatic team, the Thunderbirds, had minor but damgin mid-air colison. Istead of reporting the acident as required, the comander atempted to cver it up. The incident and the cover up wer ?handle internaly,? and the comander was not relived. 52 The rsult was, as one oficer noted, ?[Air Force fighter crews] left he Vietnam conflict not nly distrustful of the national eadership but of the Air Force ladership as wel. The suprem leson f combat was that he only people one could trust wer pers?.Ther was comon disregard, evn disrespect, for authority above the squadron levl.?53 Part of the xplantion for this was lmost certainly the zitgeist. The young aircews had ben i coleg in the 1960s and certainly internalized some of the countercultre questionig of authority. Aditonaly, most wer not volunters for the war. They came into the srvice at he time of the draft, and the bulk of the junior Air Force aircews had joined the Air Force to avoid the Army. After being involed in the war nd seing the price paid for the ROE and other estrictions, it is not surpisng they wer cynical bout heir leadership. Other authors have sugestd an ditonal reason for the young aircews? discontet. Older World War I genrals wer often porly educated ? the SAC comander after LeMay, Genral Thomas ?Tomy? Powers, had only ahig schol degre and o further education. 54 At he bginig of the 1960s, about 45 percnt of Air Force oficers had coleg degres, but by 1974, about 85 percnt of the oficers had coleg degres, and in the lower oficer anks, it was 10 percnt. 5 This meant hat during the Vietnam War many of the midle and uper-levl eaders di not have coleg degres, while virtualy 162 al the young aircews they wer comandig wer coleg raduates. Many felt his further contributed to the cultral divide.56 Not surpisngly, many of the young Vietnam aircew voted with teir fet and left the Air Force after their comitent expired, genraly about sevn or eight years after comisionig.57 Most left because they had nother life they wanted to purse, or because they wanted to fly for the airlines, but many left because they wer repled by the staeside Air Force ultre. Initaly, the Air Force paid litle atention to the xodus, because it had n exces of aircews after the war nd avoluntary reduction i their numbers was ctualy helpful to the Air Force prsonel sytem. 58POSTWAR CHALENGES AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACETIME INOVATION The young aircew that stayed son had their ecords go before the majors? promtion board that usaly comes after about nie yars in the srvice.59 Major is perhaps the most important comisioned rank in the miltary. Promtion to major guarnted an oficer a carer of twenty ears in the miltary, evn if they wer nevr promted agin, thus ensuring retiremnt benfits, but few pilots tayed only for the rtiremnt benfits. Ther wer far to many lucrative oportunites in airlines for those who er intersted in money and stabilty. The pilots who stayed in di so fr avriety of reasons - they loved the flying, they njoyed the pople they flew ith - but once they wer promted to major, they had ?bought into? the Air Force. For many, the comitent o the Air Force was comitent o change things, to bring some form of realistic trainig so the Air Force ould ?train the way it planed to fight.? One Air Force historian, a vetran of this 163 period, wrote later, ?Thes fighter crews came out of their combat experince with positve goals. One of the goals was to find abetr way to teach te nxt genration the fighter busines.? 60 The laders of this group wer combat vetran fighter pilots, most of whom had ben captins during the war nd became ajors in the arly 1970s. They became known as the ?iron majors,? a group that was iling to put heir carers on the line as they pushed hard for changes in the tactial ir forces. 61 In many ways, thes iron majors had some of what was caled in 1905 the ?Cardinal Vices of the American Soldier: ?personal indepndence, areblious pirt, awilinges to critcize higer authority, and excesive wants? in this case, realistic trainig. Howevr, it was on to become clear that hes vices wer the vices of their virtues. 62 THE SHIFT IN AIR FORCE LADERSHIP In retrospect, it was ironic that so many fighter pilots left he Air Force in the mid-1970s. By then the combination f the Kenedy/McNamra changes from the mphasi on SAC to TAC in the arly 1960s and the dynamics of the Vietnam War, with its preonderance of tactial forces, wer beginig to signifcantly change the Air Force leadership. In 1960, the list of Air Force snior leaders ? chiefs of the Air Staf directorates and major comanders - showed levn Air Staf leaders wer ?bomber genrals? with only two ?fighter genrals, ? and of the major comanders, fiten wer ?bomber genrals? and two ?fighter genrals.? While the first group of ighter leaders from Roling Thunder had not ben promted very far, the post-Roling Thunder fighter leaders, especialy the Linebacker vetrans, had vanced much farther. By 1975, the Air 164 Staf directorates had eight bomber genrals and four fighter genrals at heir head, while ten fighter genrals but only five bomber genrals wer major comanders.63 Howevr, the shift in the numbers di not automaticaly bring cultral change. Most of the snior genrals, no mater what heir background, had vanced as part of the ?flying safety is parmount? and ?zero defcts? cultre. While most of the young genrals wer products of the SEA combat cultre, it normaly tok about six years for a genral to reach arnk that lowed him to influence policy, and uring that ime thes combat cultre gnerals would be distracted by the administrative routines of peacetime and the presing post-Vietnam chalenges - the al-volunter force, budget cuts, oaring fuel cost, inflation that was eating into the Air Force?s planed modernization programs - as wel as genral national mbivalence about he miltary. Thes distractions would chalenge their abilty to rember that wartime dmands ifernt skils than peacetime, and the iron majors wer afrid that he laders who ad ben their comrades-in-arms a combat comanders would gradualy be co-pted by the ?fly safe, zero defcts? cultre and forget about he Air Force?s hortcomings in Vietnam. The iron majors knew that unles the TAF quickly established concret, realistic trainig programs, the winds of change that began with te Agresors would rop f to zephyrs, and then disapear. 64 One of their main reasons for the iron majors? concern was that hey knew conventional means of postwar peacetime inovation would not work for the Air Force. The most ucesful example of peacetime inovation had ben the German iltary betwen World War Iand World War I when they devloped blitzkrieg tactis, the Luftwafe, and submarine warfre.65 The Germans had used their Genral Staf Coleg to 165 devlop new ideas bout war fighting, but al Air Force oficers, regardles of specialty, atende the Air Force srvice schols ? Air War Coleg, Comand and Staf Coleg and Squadron Oficers Schol. The faculty include al types of Air Force oficers as wel as civilans, and since the schols wer so genral, they oferd litle to the fighter pilot who as intersted in changi the way the Air Force trained its aircews for combat operations. The comon joke was that her was very litle ?war? in the Air War Coleg curiculm, so Air Force profesional education would not help bring about change. 6 It was true that before the Air Force bcame indepndent, while the Air Force was the Army Air Corps and later the Army Air Force, the schols at Maxwel had ben the birthplace of a great deal of doctrine, but some of the doctrines wer the blief in unescorted aylight bombing and the rfusal to devlop the long-range fighter, so this was not encouragin.67 But he bigest problem was that he Air Force ultre had nevr ben itersted in inovative ways to devlop human skils ? trainig the man,? as the Navy?s Ault Report caled it. In the Air Force, inovation was lways technolgical inovation, ew and betr sytems, atrait known as ?the Icarus Syndrome,? defined as ?when identifying with te air weapon ad a comitent o technolgical superioritybecomes an ed itself and aircaft or sytems, rather than mision, become the primary focus.? 68 The most prominet ?intelctual? represntaive for this aproach was the Air Force historian I.B. (Irving Brinto) Holey, author f such works a Ideas nd Weapons: Exploitation f the Aerial Weapon by the United States during World War I(ashington, D.C: Air Force History and Musems Program, 1953) and A Study in the Relationship of Technolgical 16 Advance, Miltary Doctrine, and the Devlopment of Weapons (Washington, D.C: Ofice of Air Force History, 1983). The influential Holey relntlesly pushed the importance of Air Force doctrine tied to technolgy and the ned for the Air Force to adpt its doctrine to the improving technolgy of air and space warfre, while virtualy ignoring trainig. 69 An outside observer noted, ?The Air Force?s aproach [to inovation] was esntialy linear. If it was faster, traveld farther, was more complex (and more xpensive), it was?bound to be ter?.the Air Force rsembled aswift greyhound pursing the rabit of technolgy with blinders on to kep it from distractions.?70 The iron majors? fear was that ?politcs? and the ROE would take the blame the Air Force failures in SEA, and the Air Force would contiue to inovate the same way it always had, with its emphasi on mangemnt, control, and technolgy. Left o its own devices, almost certainly the Air Force ladership would not pt for ealistic trainig programs that might decrase flying safety, but rather for the dvil it knew - technolgy. Using its corprate ?fly safe? and ?zero defcts? philosphy, the Air Force would try to solve the problems that rose in Vietnam with new sytems, uch as the F-15, then use flying using safety as tol to kep from losing the valuble nw asets in acidents, much as SAC had one when the B-52 came into the inventory. Viewd in this context, and considering the masive modernization programs that wer already under way, it is remarkable that in the later 1970s the Air Force bcame the lader in realistic ombat trainig and led the way to trainig programs that would change the American miltary for the foreseable futre. 167 BACKSLIDING One of the rsults of the frustrations with te lack of realistic trainig was that he young aircews tok things into their own hands. They droped the rules they devloped and imposed on themselvs in combat nd began to return to the ?flying club? atitude of pre-SEA TF. lying discipline waned, and while in the United Staes the posibilty of being caught kept alid on many extracuricular ctivites, for TAF units in Europe and the Pacifc flying safety rules went out he window. In Europe, many of the flying activites tok place over the North Sea or ver NATO trainig ares in Germany wher ther wer virtualy no rules. Air Force aircews ?blew of? Air Force rgulations and engaed in large, low-levl dogfihts over the North Sea wher fighters from any NATO countries met and fought for the fun of it, and on low-levl ground-atck trainig misions the Air Force aircews ent o the German trainig ares wer they flew as low as they could, completly disregarding the Air Force?s 50 fot above ground levl minium altiude. The aircews knew this was the kind of lying they would ned in combat, but her was limited learnig because ther was no structre to teach tem how to dgfiht or fly at very low levl. Stil, it was the bst he crews could o, evn if such flying violated the safety rules. One pilot who later became a four-star genral remberd, ?[The rstrictive rules] led crews to lie and then do the ral job the bst way they could. Thus, integrity meant lying? 71 The los of discipline in the air was repated by antics on the ground. Oficers? clubs, especialy in uits wher ther wer no genral oficers on the base, became rowdier and 168 rowdier. The Air Force was teadily revrting to the competing flying safety vs. fighter pilot cultre conflict of the pre-Vietnam days.72 1. Red Baron Reports Volume Two, Part One, (Nelis AFB, NV: Tactial Fighter Weapons Cnter, 1974), 12, 34-6, 40-8, psim. 2. Richard K. Wilcox, Scream of Eagles: The Creation f Top Gun ad the U.S. Air Victory in Vietnam (New York: J. Wiley, 190), 206. 3. Marshl Michl, Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Anapolis, D: Navl Instiut Pres, 197), 9-83; Wayn Thopson, To Hanoi and Back: The USAF nd orth Vietnam, 6-13 (ashigto, DC: Air Frce istry nd Musms Program) 23-24, psi. 4. The operatin would later be caled Linebacker I. 5. icl, Clshes, 143-14. 6. Thompson, 23. 7. Caf is mal, specialy cut lengths of aluminu foil, very much resmbling Christms tinsel tht crats lod tat radr beas cant pntrate. Topso, 243. 8. Red Baron Volume Tw, Part One, 16. 9. For ful acnt of this dy, s Alfred Price and Jefry Ethel, One Day in a Very Lng War (New Yrk: Ranom Hous, 198). 10. Ro Keys, Capt. USAF, quted in C.R ?Dick? Anderg, Col. USAF, Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in th Decade After Vietam (Washington, D.C: Air Frc Histor and Musms Program, 201), 26. 1. Rus Everts, Col. USAF, e-ail to author, 5 February 205. 2. Mesag, Nixn/Haig to Kisinger, 19 May 1972, Ntional Archives, Nixon National Scurity Coucil Ppers, 1972; author?s interviews ith lexandr Haig, Wshigton, D, 13, 20, 24 Aril . 13. Jh Corder, Maj. Gen. USAF, phone interview ith author, March 23, 28, 205. Description f th ?Tnk? from author?s rsal obsrvations wile giving umerous brifings ther wile srving n te Jint Chiefs f Staf, 1983-1986. 14. Cordr intrviw, 23 March. 5. Ibi. The acount of the foundig of the Agresors was devloped by the author from interviews ith ad e-mails frm sevral of th particpnts; intriws it Jon Crder ad Wiliam Kirk, Gn. USAF, 6, 7, 9 Nvember 205; Colel John Vickery, e-mails 5 June, 2 June 205. Also James A. Knight, Lt. Gn., USAF. Oral History Interview, 30 Nov-1 Dc 1983, K239.0152-1561, AFHRA, 45, 208, s wel as the acounts in Anderg?s Siera Hotel, 7-8. 16. Ibid. Ryan was comndr f PACF and Momyer?s bos when Momyer ws comander of Sevnth ir orce in Saigon. Thmpso, 213-215. 17. Ibid. 169 18. Ibid. 9. Ii. 20. Ibid. 1. A staf ?package? is afolder of background materials pertainig to aprticular desired action, with ovr shet prred y the stf or th ricipal?s igntre tht signifs he aproves the rcomende action. Normaly te staf briefs the pricipal on the isu nd their comendatio. Th pricipal istens to th rifing, rads the package, the signs (r ds t sign) te cover shet. Autr?s persoal observations whil srving o the Joint Staf, 1983-1986, and Air Staf, 198-198. 2. Corder intrview. 3. Th ngati i of Genral Ryan comes from Broughton, Going Downtown, i, 76, pasim. Jes A. Knight, Lt. Ge., USAF. Oral Histry Iterview, 30 Nv-1 Dec 1983, K239.0152-1561, FHRA, 45, 208, as wel s the acounts in Andreg?s Siera Hotel, 75-8. 24. The Air Force wanted a MiG-21 simulator ather than MiG-17 simulator because t ir r?s mi oponet was the MiG-21 due to North Vietnaes basing ptrns. Of the Air Force?s 137 kils, 105 r i-s; f the avy?s 57 kils, 41 wer MiG-17s. Rd Barn Thr, Volume One, 4-6, pasim. 25. Jack Mclark, Col. USAF, itrview ith author, the Pentagon, Washington, DC, 14 April 205. 26. Ibid. 7. Richard K. Wilcox, Scream of Eagles: The Creation f Top Gun ad the U.S. Air Victory in Vietnm (New Yrk: J. Wiley, 190), 7, 14-5, pasim. 28. Maclark intrvi; Anderg, 7; author?s personl experince flying F-15s on numerous misios with te grsors, 1980-1983. 29. This it nt atrivial task ? in fact, many consider it more dificult han the actual flying. Ed Clemts, Cpt. USAF, Agresivel Spaking,? USAF igter Wpons Reviw, Sur 1974, -5. 30. Mike Pres, Capt. USAF, ?Met he Agresors,? USAF ighter eapons Reviw, Fal 1973, 3; Pres, ?grsivly Spaking, itr Ws Reviw, Fal 1974, 2-3. 3. Manclark interview. Wing comanders wer senior ful colnels (O-6) personaly hose by th TAC coander. Th insights it the tightrop the Agresors had t wlk cm from Manlark's itrviw it te author. 32. Mihel, 165-167. . Ibid., 8. 34. Capt Stev Ritchie lter to Genral Wiliam W. Momyer, ?Air Superiority,? TAC omndr, 30 Otobr 1972, AFHRA. 35. Anderg, 47-9; Tm Clancy and Genral Chuck Horner, USAF, Every Man Tiger (New York: Putna, 19), 13-136. 36. Robert C Sems, Secrtary of the Air Force, ?Tac Air: Lok at he Late 70s,? Air Frc Magzine, Janur 1973, 3-4. 170 37. Donald Carson, Capt. USAF, "Teaching Tactis in TAC?s MiGs,? Air Force Magzine, Mrch 1974, 4-7. 38. ike Pres, Capt. USAF, ?Agresively Speaking,? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Fal 1974, 2. 39. Anderg, 8-3. 40. R Baron I, Vol. 1, Sumary, 1-2, pasim. 1. John yd, Capt. UAF, Aeril Atck (Nelis AFB, NV: Tactial Fighter Weapns Cetr), 13-14, pasim. Copy avilabl at ir University Libry, Maxwel AFB, AL. 42. Red Baron I, Vol. 1, Sumary, 4, pasim. 3. Prs, ?Agresively peaking,? 1-2. 4. Broughton, Going Downtow, 3, pasim. 5. Thmps, 198-19. 46.Congres, House of Represntaives, Comite on the Armed Services Investigati Subcmit, ort o th Unauthorizd Bmbing of Miltary Targets in North Vietnam, 92nd Congres, 2nd ses., Dec 15 972, 813-814. Al f thes oficrs wil apr gi later i th nartiv in difrnt contexts. 47. For an exclnt, balced acout of the Lavl afir se Thompson, 19-210. The ?of the rord? coments wre made t t uthor by the 1972 cader of the 432nd, Gnral Charles Gabril, 19 Jun 76, TAC Headquartrs, Langley AFB and t nd eputy wing comnder, Geral Gerald O?Mley, the Peton, Washigton, DC, in Agst 1976. Bth Gabril and O?Mley are now dcasd. The felin was lso widespread in the 432nd Wing wher the bombing misins orignte and whre the author ws erving in 1972 n Lavl was relived. 48. ?IG Ucovers False Reports,? Air Forc Tims, 2 Decmber 1971, 5; Clancy and Horner, 14-142. 49. Thomas C. Padget, Maj. USAF, ?A Study of Atitudes Concernig Unethical Behavior in te Air Forc,? (Resrch tudy, ir Cman an Staf Cole: Mxwel Air Frce Bas, L May 1976), 24. 50. Ptr Henderson, aj. USAF, ?What he Captin Realy Means? Air University Reviw, Jauary-February 1976, 1-2. 51. Padgt, 24. 2. Ibi., 5. 53. Anderg, 47-9. 4. htp:/w.af.mil/ibray/biographies/bio.asp?bioID=6801 (acesd Augst 205). . In 196, the Air Force bgan to require acoleg degre prior t comisionig. Anderg, 4-2. 56. Ibid., . 7. Air Force oficers after comisionig acrue further comitents for aditonal speializd trinig. Fr exaple, during th Vitna War pilt had five-yer cmitnt fter he fiished pilot rainig ad trainig o his first aircft. This 17 genraly meant hat it was minium of six and ahlf years before h could leave the srvice. Fro utor?s journal s aserving Air Force oficr 196-1972. 58. This was majr ccern for the ir r in the late 70s. Robert Dixon, Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview, K239.0512-591, 21 Sptmbr 198, 245; Ed Gates, ?: Instiutin r Ocupation,? Air Force Magzine, Augst 7, 60-3; nral David Joes, ?The Air Fore Is Way f Lif,? Air Forc Mazine, May 197, 12-5. 59.Th xact number f yars in service that n fier neds to b considerd for major as vried, bt ni ers i sri is god avrag for 1960s-70s, whn this uthr ws acptai ad promted to major. 60. Anderg, 48-9. 1. Th trm ?iron majors? has ben given a number of meanigs. Richard G. Davis, in The 3 Initatives: a Study in Air Force-Army Copratin, Air Staf Historical Study (Wasingto, D.C.: Ofice of ir r Histor, United Stes ir Force, 1987), 41, describes the ?Iron Major" syndrome as ?the staf oficr who becam suh an rdent avoat of is w service prgra tht would neither cmproise on te tails of prject nr considr altrnatives to it." This athor?s dfiniton wuld b ?an oficer who il ot mproise o th aims f is prgram but is flexible in how they ar acievd,? and wuld fit wit te dscription i Roert Kapln, ?Supremac b Stelth,? Th Atlantic Monthly, July-Augst 203, 46. 62. Quoted i Samel Hntiton, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Prs of Hrvrd Uiversity Prs, 1957), 269. 63. Mike Wrden, The Ris of the Fighter Genrals: The Problem of Air Leadership, 1945-1982 (axwl AFB, AL: ir Univrsity Prs, 197), 24-25. 6. Vickery e-mail to author 18 July 205; Everts e-mail to author 29 July 205. 5. For an xclent cnt, se Wiliamson Muray nd Aln R. Milet, Miltary Inovatin i the Intrwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge Uiversity Prs, 196). 6.Vickery -mail; Evrts -il. 7. Mura nd Milet, 124-127. 68. Carl Builer, Th Icarus Syndrome (London: Transaction Publishers, 194), 6-7, pasim. 69. Dr Alan L. Gropman, ?An irman?s Quinte,? Aerospace Power Journal, Sumer 1987, 23. 70. Fredric A. Bergerson, The Army Gets An ir Force: Tactis of Insurgent Bureaucrati Politcs (altimr: Johns Hopkis University Pres, 1980), 64. 71. Horner and Clncy, 17. 2. Adrg, 47-50; author?s interview ith Genral John ?Johny? Jumper, Chief of Staf USF, MIT, rc 17, 205; author?s persol observatis, 1973-1975. 172 CHAPTER IGHT: POST VIETNEM BATLES NIXON?S EW DEFNSE TA At he nd of January 1973, just after Nixon?s econd inaugration, Secrtary of Defnse Laird resigned. He had reluctantly left Congres to serve as Secrtary of Defnse, and from the bginig had made it clear he intede to serve no more than four years. Laird left an impresive lgacy. During his tenure, he nver lost avote in Congres and maintained al the sential weapons ystems devlopment programs the miltary wanted, while at he same tie alowing Congres to make substantial reductions in the defnse budget. Laird was god as his word, but left with aflury of activity. On 27 January 1973, two days before Laird left ofice, American d Vietnames negotiators igned aVietnam setlemnt i Paris, and that same day Laird supende the draft. The FY 1973 defnse bil Laird prosed before h left was record, over $74 bilion, and perhaps because lgislators wer simply hapy to be out of Vietnam and trying to fuly understand the implications for futre budgets, it suferd relatively smal reductions. Howevr, ther was ome critcism of the nw, hig-tech weapons ystems. A GAO study said that he Navy?s underpowerd F-14A would be inferior t the aircaft it was replacing, the F-4J, whic led Senator Wiliam Proxmire (D-WI) to say the program id4127024 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 173 had ben manged by ?a group of kamikaze pilots detrmined to cmit procuremnt suicde.?1 While ther apeard to be asharp contrast betwen Laird?s coperative aproach and McNamra?s active mangemnt, some anlyst fel that heir acomplishments wer quite similar ? selctive but important ifluences on weapons ystems they felt wer overpiced, but litle influence on budgetary alocations, budget otals, or force lvels and capbilties. It was beginig to sem, as one oted, ?the sytem was not he solution.? 2 Secrtary of Health, Education ad Welfare, Eliot Richardson briefly replaced Laird. Richardson was concerned about aposible drop in the dfense budget with te nd of the war nd cautioned aginst precipitae cuts when he presnted the FY1974 defnse budget in early 1973, evn though it was, at $82.6 bilion, the largest in history. The debate over the budget was dominated by the provison f $70 milion to Suth Vietnam, but in the nd, spured by concerns raised by the October 1973 Midle East War, Congres only cut it by $4. bilion. 3 Stil, ther would not be the ?peace dividend? Nixon had hoped for because of inflation, the xpense of the nw al-volunter force, and cost overuns on sevral major new eapons ystems programs, despite Laird?s and Packard?s eforts. 4 The ad of the GAO, Comptroler Genral Elmer Stats, found that in forty-five sytems cost overuns wer up by 20 percnt, caused by greatr complexity to give greatr capbilty, inflation, as wel as mangemnt problems, notably the presure to cntiue to push weapons into production without proer cost/efctivens asesments. In the Air Force programs, the F-1 and F-15 acounted for much of the cost overun, and the F-15 program baloned from $34 milion to $47 milion.5 On a 174 separte front, Richardson tok astep to further educe the power of OSD/SA by redsignating it he Ofice of Program Analysi and Evalution (PA&E), no lnger heade by an sitant secrtary.6 Richardson spent only thre and a hlf months a Secrtary of Defnse bfore becoming Atorney Genral s part of the turmoil caused by Watergate. In early May 1973 Nixon ominated the young - forty-four - James Schlesinger to replace him. Schlesinger was formidable intelct and personality who knew the miltary wel because h ad worked at Rand and as sitant director f the Bureau of the Budget. Schlesinger also had strong views on defnse fundig, and evn before bcoming Secrtary of Defnse Schlesinger made it clear he was in favor f increasing the dfense budget. In aspech in San Franciso in Septmber 1972, he warned that it was ?time to cal ahlt o the slf-defating ame of cuting defnse outlays, this proces that sems to have bcome adicting, of choping awy ear fter year."7 Son after he tok ofice, Schlesinger complained about "the post-war folies" of defnse budget cuting, pointig out hat he Do budget, in real terms, had ben reduced by one-third since FY 1968. Purchase of equipment, consumables, and resarch and devlopment wer down 45 percnt from the Vietnam War peak nd about $10 bilion i constant dolars below the prewar levl. The dfense budget was bout 6 percnt of the gros national product, about 17 percnt of ttal fedral government expenditures, both the lowest percntages ince bfore the Korean War, and miltary manpower as t he lowest point since bfore the Korean War.8 175 Six months after Schlesinger was pointed, the October 1973 Midle East War explode, reinforcing Schlesinger?s and other ?hawks? notin that he Soviets wer as agresive as evr, with expansionist aims backed up by very god, modern weapons. The Soviets and Americans had reached aproximate nuclear parity, and Schlesinger belived this reduced the chance of anuclear confrontaion, but now conventional forces had become a lrge part of detrence. At he same tie, he also belived that American conventional force strength was declinig vis-?vis the Soviets. In oe xample, in 1965 the United Staes had 3,80 fighter/atck aircaft o the Soviets 2,80, but by 1975 the United Staes had 2,30 fighter/atck aircaft and the Soviets 3,60, ashift of 2,30 in favor f the Soviets.9 Armed with tes taistics and alrmed by the improvemnts in Soviet weapon technolgy shown i the 1973 Midle East War, Schlesinger pushed hard for larger Do budgets. Howevr, he ad dificult road, made more dificult by astructral problem - step oil price increase that pushed the cost of trainig, exrcise, and other fuel consuming miltary actions teadily upward. During 1974, the miltary services cut trainig fuel use by 15 percnt, but fel cost stil increased from $1.3 bilion i 1973 to $3.5 bilion. Double-digt inflation at his time also had major impact on the dfense budgets.10 Schlesinger, like Laird, got along wel ith te miltary leadership. He consulted with them regularly, shared many of their views, and wanted to give them ore rsources. Air Force Genral Robert Dixon, who tok ver TAC in Septmber 1973, considerd Schlesinger a?great? Secrtary of Defnse and tried to help him by publicly citng the 176 Soviets? tactial ir force build up, saying ?the Soviets are producing a fighter squadron a wek, afighter wing amonth.?1 But Schlesinger?s views came into direct onflict with moderate and liberal senators and represntaives who saw the Pentagon budget and miltary spendig as hazrd to dmestic programs, as wel as those in the administration, otably Henry Kisinger, who anted to cut miltary spendig. CONTIUING WITH E LIGHT WEIGHT FIGHTER One of the isues that Schlesinger had to deal with was the Light Weight Fighter. In early 1973, Secrtary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamns ought o calm Air Force fars about he LWF being areplacemnt for the F-15 by saying he agred with te Air Force doctrine that gave first priority to air?to-air superiority and that he F-15 was the solution, marking ful politcal ceptance of the air-to-air ole for the F-15. 12 Seamns balnced this judgment by noting the LWF program was intede to investigate the fasibilty of afighter with advanced technolgy and esign concepts to ?provide information that would be invaluble to the Air Force in helping to detrmine futre Air Force tactial requiremnts.?13 Despite internal interst in the LWF, publicly the Air Force was til hesitant. Air Force Genral Oto Glaser told Congres, ?We have no intetion f the Air Force going into production f this airplane, of asking for force structre for this airplane,? and the previous Air Force Chief of Staf, Genral Jack Ryan had said ?The lightweight fighter is not aweapons ystem?it is more of atechnolgy efort so yu can try thes things out so se if they do give you increased performance.?14 The curent Air Force Chief of Staf, Genral George S. Brown, strongly defnde the F-15 as multi-role fighter-bomber, 17 noting, ?we?ve always had in mind its [the F-15?s] atck apbilty?.it?s going to be the best aircaft we?ve had in the atck role.? He contiued, ?many people are jumping to the conclusion either the YF-16 orYF-17 wil go into production.? While h agred with the ?principle? of alow cost LWF, Brown said that t his point i its carer the F-15 was low cost because its devlopment and suport cost wer paid. Buying more F-15s meant paying only the procuremnt and operations and mainteance (O&M) cost. Unles alarge number of the LWF wer bought, Brown said, the dvelopment and suport cost of the LWF might not make it cost efctive. In the nd, he noted, ?the [LWF] program is a prottype rogram with te question f production to be answerd after flight esting? hardly a ringi endorsemnt.15 Actualy, the LWF and F-15 wer not Brown?s or Seamns? main concerns. Both wer extremly woried that Congres had not aproved the production f the Airborne Warnig and Control System (AWCS), amodifed Boeing 70 with alrge, sophisticated pulse Dopler adr mounted in asucer on the top f the aircaft. The AWCS would solve one of the main problems that peard in the Vietnam War, the abilty to lcate nemy aircaft at low altiude, and was considerd vital to NATO?s defnse plans. Howevr, the AWCS was expensive and was low in devloping because of sytems and software integration problems, problems that wer more naging than serious but stil put astrain o the critcal program. 16 In March 1974, to decide an Air Force positon the LWF and futre fighter acquistion, Genral Brown established the Tactial Fighter Modernization Group to devlop atctial fighter ?road map? for the 1980s, and afew months later the group 178 recomende acquirng the winer of the LWF competion.17 At about he same tie, in what was to be a pivotal devlopment, four NATO nations ? Belgium, Denmark, the Nethrlands, and Norway ? formed aMultinational Stering Group (MSG) to lok at aircaft o replace their F-104s and F-5s, and began to met with American represntaives in June 1974 for briefings on the LWF program.18 The MSG mebers wer enthusiastic about he program but had to make adecison their own program by January 1975, two months before the Air Force had planed to chose the winer of the fly-of. The US was ware that he LWF was in competion with European fighters, notably the French Mirage F.1, and that he MSG was under great presure to ?buy European.? Because the contract would be huge - over 2,0 aircaft - the Air Force agred to advance the dcison date for chosing the winer betwen the YF-16 and YF-17 to January 1975. 19 In the last half of 1974, the YF-16/YF-17 fly-of began. Schlesinger had irectd that the winer be a multi-service aircaft and told the Navy specifcaly that it could not have its own ew LWF, much to the srvice?s chagrin. 20 The fly-of showed the twin-egine YF-17 had 25 percnt greatr load carying capbilty than the YF-16, but he YF-16 had greatr ange, was uperior in air-to-air combat, nd was projectd to have lower devlopment, production, and operational suport and life-cyle cost. Its ingle ngie used les fuel and, though it was not noted in the final report, almost certainly one of the considerations was that he YF-16 used the same F10 engie as the F-15.21 On 13 January 1975, Secrtary of the Air Force John McLucas declared the Genral Dynamics YF-16 the winer of the competion. While the YF-16 was smal fighter 179 - about 15,0 pounds empty, as oposed to the F-15?s 26,0 pounds - it hardly met he Critcs? definiton f ?simple? and ?low tech.? To kep the weight down ad met he prformance goals, the F-16 used avery advanced igtal ?fly b wire? sytem, composed of elctronic ircuits to send inputs from the pilot the motrs that move the various flight controls on the aircaft. This elctronic flight control sytem was coupled with adigtal computer and replaced heavy conventional mechanical flight controls - ther wer no direct hydraulic or mechanical inkages betwen the pilot and the flight controls. This flight control sytem alowed the F-16 to perate in aconditon caled ?relaxed staic stabilty? wher longitudinal stabilty is reduced, alowing the aircaft?s centr of gravity to move to apoint close to the arodynamic entr of the aircaft. This reduced the tail oad nd asociated trim drag, and thus the aircaft had much greatr performance than similar ircaft with mechanical controls. It also means that if the computer failed, the F-16 was esntialy uncontrolable.2 As mentioned, the F-16 used the same F10 engie as the F-15 to achiev the rquired range and other performance goals, whic would cause problems to be dscribed later. Schlesinger cherd the slection f the F-16 as ?a hpy cirumstance that he airplane with te bst performance is also the lowest cost."23 Nevrthels, the Air Force stil had levrage with Do because it had not comited to buying the F-16, evn after the competion. Schlesinger knew that, despite the suport f the Critcs and Congres, to get ful-scale production f the F-16 he ad to have the suport f the uniformed Air Force hierachy. The Air Force stil semed to favor more F-15s, o Schlesinger met with Genral David Jones, the nw Air Force Chief of Staf, to discus the isue. Schlesinger 180 pitched the merits of complentig the F-15 with te F-16, an ircaft hat was considerably cheaper and therfore avilable in larger quantiy. In amajor concesion, Schlesinger also tld Jones that if the Air Force would buy the F-16 instead of the F-15, Do would not ake the money that was aved awy from the Air Force, but alow the Air Force to use the money to buy more aircaft. He also cmited to keping the F-16 program cost within it budget. If the F-16 program excede its budget, Schlesinger said, the program would be canceld and the Air Force ould buy more F-15s. Jones had the guarnte he wanted ? an icrease in force structre, and he rmeberd ?the Secrtary.asked me what it would take to get he Air Force to suport he F-16.I told him four more [tactial fighter] wings [about 290 aircaft]?He laned over and shok my hand.? 24 THE MORPHING OF THE F-16 After it was elcted as the winer of the competion, the F-16 was turned over to the Air Force Configuration Control Comite (C) for modifcations to bring it up to Air Force ombat standars before it went ito ful-scale production. The lader of the Comite was long-time fighter pilot Genral Alton Slay, who as now a four-star genral, having recoverd from his disagrements with Ryan d his asociation with te Lavel afir. Slay quickly moved to make the F-16 into the multi-role combat ircaft the Air Force wanted. Because the Air Force was paying the bils, Slay nd his comite had the nthusiastic help of Genral Dynamics, who ilingly droped the Critcs? concept of a simple, auster lightweight air-to-air fighter. The Configuration Control Comite aded roughly two tns of new elctronic equipment and other modifcations 18 to the F-16, including more pylons for bombs and elctronic ountermeasures pods, and then icreased the F-16?s length so it could cary more fuel and enlarged the wing so it could cary bombs and kep the same prformance. 25 The F-16?s bombing sytem was about five times ore acurate than the F-4?s in droping conventional bombs, whic, as one wag noted, was ?a god thing since it caried one-third the number of bombs.?26 More important for the F-16?s combat capbilty, the Configuration Control Comite orderd it equiped with asmal but higly capble pulse Dopler adr, something the Critcs had amntly oposed. Critc James Falows later noted corectly that hes changes ?represnted nothing les than the rjection f the ntire philosphy under whic the plane had ben designed.?27 The Critcs had ben outflanked by the Air Force?s abilty to make the F-16 adual-role aircaft, while the F-15 remained the Air Force?s primary air-to-air fighter. Genral Jones was very pleased, saying, ?the F-16 turned out o be amuch betr aircaft than the air-to-air advocates wanted.? 28 Ther was, as the Critcs had claimed, aprice to be paid for the changes. The cost of the F-16 improvemnts required to make it adual-role fighter wer initaly understimated and thes aditonal cost, plus aproduction ?stretch out? in the first en years, caused the actual cost of the F-16 to rise 29 percnt over inital estimates for the tn-year period.29 In June 1975, the F-16 program recived a huge bost when the four mebers of the European Multinational Stering Group (EMSG) also agred to buy the aircaft. 30 This decison provide NATO amodern fighter-bomber vastly superior t any Soviet aircaft and one that had comonality with USAF aircaft, and at he same tie alowed for a 182 certain amount of econmies of scale in production, though much of this was ofset by coprduction agrements with te EMSG. The F-16 son became the fighter of choice for other American lies, notably Israel. 31 Howevr, evn though it lost he competion, the YF-17 di not die. The Navy di not want either aircaft and pushed to devlop its own ew fighter, but he House Armed Services and Apropriations Comite had enid the srvice?s request for $34 milion for the project. Nevrthels, the Navy was detrmined not buy the F-16 because it was single ngie and because it was n Air Force aircaft (the rank order of importance is aquestion f debate), and selcted the YF-17. In aconvoluted arngemnt, McDonel-Douglas, the maker of the F-4 and F-15, bought e YF-17 design from Northrop and convertd it o alrger, multi-role fighter, much as the Air Force had one with te F-16, and esignated it he F/A-18.32 This infuriated Schlesinger and Congres, but he GAO said the Navy decison was legal, so in the nd o funds wer cut. 3 DEVLOPING A NEW AIR FORCE ULTRE: DIXON TAKES OVER TAC The most ignifcant date in the dvelopment of the Air Force ultre change was 30 Septmber 1973, when Genral Robert Dixon replaced the rtirng Genral Momyer as comander of the Tactial Air Comand. Dixon was unsual. He was very wel educated (Dartmouth ?41), had rushed of to jin the Royal Candian Air Force bfore the US entred World War I, and uring World War I he flew reconaisance misions rather than fighter misions over Europe bfore bing shot down ad captured. 34He later served in SAC?s Directorate of Personel, then as comander of a fighter wing in the Korean War wher he shot down aMiG-15. During the Vietnam War, he ad served as 183 Momyer?s deputy comander of the Sevnth Air Force wher he ad sen the Air Force?s hortcomings at close range, then became Director f Air Force Personel. ?Acerbic? is acharitable way to describe Dixon, and he quickly made it clear that things wer going to change at TAC headquarters. While Genral Momyer was quiet and had ben satisfied with sort briefing shets and brief mornig staf metings, Dixon was entirely difernt. Many of his daily staf metings went on for four or more hours a he relntlesly pushed his taf or details. Dixon later admited, ?I put he TAC staf in avery, very blody confrontaional mode with me and with each other day fter day fter day.?35 When asenior ficer could not answer a question to Dixon's atisfaction, he would berate the oficer in front of the staf with a brage of profanity. Ther are verifed acounts of Dixon removing a brigadier genral?s rank at one staf meting and of ul colnels being reduced to tears by his insults. One Air Force oficer who later became a four-star genral noted, ?[Dixon] was famous for his indiscriminate hatred.?36 His actions caried over to his vist to the field, and one dputy wing comander ? aformer Vietnam POW who knew the meanig of abuse ? remberd after one of Dixon?s vist to his wing ?I got so damn ad Iwent home and typed out my resignation from the Air Force. Isimply wasn?t going to take that kind of crap nymore.?37 TRAUMA I ? THE 1973 MIDLE AST WAR One wek after Dixon tok over, asecond evnt ok place that would have almost as great n ifluence on the Air Force as Linebacker. On 6 October 1973, sevral Arab staes launched an tack on Israel, beginig the 1973 Midle East War. The Israeli Air Force had ominated miltary operations in the Midle East for years, but for first ime it 184 faced a modern Soviet integrated air-defnse ystem (IADS) and the rsults wer devasting. 38 For the first few days of the war, the vaunted IAF ? considerd by many the bst air force in the world ? suferd huge loses to the IADS maned by the Egyptians and Syrians. In the first hre days, the IAF lost fity aircaft in about 1,20 sorties.39 This was n usutainble los rate, rivaling the los rate of the arly USAF bomber ofensive over Germany in World War I. Loses wer so heavy that, for afew critcal days early in the war, the IAF actualy stoped making atcks aginst he lading Arab tank columns, evn though te tanks wer overunig Israeli positons and wer threatnig to pentrate the Jwish stae?s borders. By the nd of the war, Israel ost 53 of its 170 A-4 Skyhawks and 3 of its 17 F-4 Phantoms. Even o the last day of the war, it was til groping for solutions to the SAM problem, losing five Phantoms in asingle raid. 40 The IAF problems had ctualy begun during the War of Atriton (March 196 through mid-1970), an Egyptian campaign to use havy artilery fire to increase casualties among the Israeli forces along the Suez Canl. The Israelis counterd with a bombing campaign, led by new American F-4s. The Soviets then suplied the Egyptians with alrge number of Soviet air defnse weapons, including modern radrs and SA-3 misiles, much more modern equipment han the United Staes had faced in North Vietnam just afew months before. Unlike in North Vietnam, Soviet specialist also operated the quipment and, while IAF raids estroyed some SAM bateris, the IAF suferd heavy loses to the Soviet misiles. The Arab staes began to cncentrate on 185 SAMs rather than fighters for air defnse. The IAF failed to adjust o the change, and the result was heavy loses in the 1973 War.41 For the USAF, the war as n almost unaloyed blesing because it marked the beginig of close ties betwen the USAF and the IAF. fter some fits and starts driven by Secrtary of Stae Henry Kisinger?s politcal machinations, the U.S. began to send aid to the Israelis. Dixon, as comander of TAC, had the rsources the Israeli Air Force nede, and he quickly and enthusiasticaly began to send equipment o the theatr. When he was told to send ew F-4Es flown by Air Force rews nostop acros the Atlantic to replace Israeli loses, Dixon ?leaned forward in the sadle? and preositoned TAC F-4Es in the Azores, in the midle of the Atlantic Ocean, so they could get o Israel faster. 42 The Israelis wer apreciative. In the first few days of the war n IAF inteligence oficer, Ode Erez, brought aseker head for the nw SA-6 misile to Washington for US experts to examine, and once the war as over the American miltary was lowed to send alrge number of Army, Air Force, and Navy personel in aWeapons Systems Evalution (WSEG) group to stay in Israel for sevral months. The Air Force quickly asembled ateam of perational experts led by Korean War ce Brigadier Genral ?Bots? Bles to talk to the IAF. The tam was lowed to interview evryone from the top comanders to regular ircew, and was given aces to captured Soviet quipment and much of the raw dat in the rports the IAF was prearing.43 Besides relating their experinces aginst he latest Soviet sytems, the IAF told the Air Force they wer practialy eliminating the limits that flying safety imposed on their tainig to make it more ralistic. They specialy emphasized the ned to fly very low ? under fity fet ? to 186 stay below the misile nvelope. This information ad the aces to Sviet quipment, especialy their latest misile and air defnse radr sytems, was huge windfal for the Air Force and TAC.4 Dixon?s rapid eployment of the TAC F-4s and the wilinges of the IAF to share the captured quipment and their experinces was the bginig of a beautiful friendship betwen Dixon ad Israeli Air Force Comander Major Genral Binyamin ?Benie? Peld. Peld, who like Dixon had cerbic tendencies, had become comander of the Israeli Air Force in January 1973, replacing the poular Mordechai ?Modi? Hod. Hod had ben given credit for the IAF?s tunig and complet victory in the 1967 Six Day War, but it was lso Hod who ad understimated the impact of the Soviet misile sytems at he nd of the War of Atriton. The 1973 War was the first ime the Israeli Air Force had ben les than completly dominat over the batlefild; it was trauma for the Israeli public and brought Peld agreat deal of critcism.45 Thus, Dixon ad Peld found themselvs in much te same positon, having to devlop inovative nw programs after their service?s por performance in wartime. Both nede to relok at heir equipment, their tainig, and their doctrine. Both air forces wer facing the same Soviet sytems and the same Soviet actis, and the Dixon-Peld relationship was to be afruitful one for both air forces. DIXON?S OBSESION WITH REALISTIC TRAINIG The rsults of the 1973 war preyd on Dixon?s mind, and he said in a interview in early 1975 that he October 1973 war as key influence on reshaping TAC?s trainig. The war made it clear to him that he TAF was facing aformidable Soviet chalenge and 187 would have to make dramtic improvemnts in their combat capbilty to met it. The lesons Dixon tok from the war er that actial forces would have to devote signifcant resources now to defnse upresion, that inovative tactis wer the ky to suces and survial in ahig-threat environment, and that he ?overiding requiremnt? was for higly trained aircews, because without rained crews inovative tactis could not be implented. Aditonaly, because of the improved aircaft sheltrs and efnse around airfields, it would be dificult o destroy large numbers of enmy aircaft on the ground, and this meant TAC had to put evr-increasing emphasi on the air-to-air combat trainig. Dixon said the ?key to air superiority trainig is DACT, or disimilar ir combat trainig,? so that n elarged DACT program and the Agresors wer necsary for improving the crews? air-to-air skils.46 At he same tie, Dixon saw that TAC?s air-to-ground trainig was til modeld on SAC trainig and id not remotely resmble combat.47 Air Force fighters flew in two-ship or four-ship formations at medium altiude along standarized routes to smal bombing ranges close to their base. Once on the range, they performed aset seris of reptious bombing runs in ?box paterns,? flying on the same dsignated heading to the targets. Ther wer no threat simulators, no cordination r combined misions with other units, and the routes to and from the bombing range wer ?caned,? the same very day, so ther wer no avigation r timing chalenges. On thes trainig misions, the only thing the crews had to d was to drop their bombs acurately. This was entirely difernt from acombat mision, wher amajor part of the mision is navigating to the target aginst enmy defnse, then identifying the target, and then bombing, often uder 18 heavy enmy fire. The crews flew their tainig misions oley to ?fil the squares? on their tainig shet, and to preare for the anual Operational Readines Inspection (ORI), aSAC-type inspection wher the crews flew esntialy the same ision, only for agrade. Not nly wer the routes and targets ?caned,? but her wer also ther unrealistic aspects. It was practialy imposible for separte units with difernt but complentary misions to practie misions they would have to fly in combat. In aditon, the Air Force restricted low-levl flying to aminium of 50 fet above the ground, whic was neither demandig on the pilots? flying abilties nor lw enough to be useful in combat. Aditonaly, the weapons the aircaft caried and roped wer very smal ?blue bombs? that weighed about 25 pounds and gave of apuf of white smoke (someties) when they hit he ground. The lightweight blue bomb?s trajectory was nothing like standar bombs, whic weighed from 50 and 1,0 lbs, and the blue bombs wer very suceptible to the wind. An istructor in atower on the range scored the bomb ipacts, o crews had no responsibilty for seing wher their bombs hit, as they would have to d in combat. 48 For virtualy al crews, the first ime they caried or droped alive bomb would be in combat. The use of practie bombs aded to the lack of realism in the trainig because it made the weight and rag of the fighters on trainig misions al wrong. The weight and extra drag of aful load of real bombs are vry important because with aful combat load fighters are much les responsive and harder to fly. Despite this, in trainig crews flew with light loads and evr had to make ?heavyweight? takeofs or ?heavyweight? air 189 refueling with te weight and rag of a ful combat load, both of whic wer much more dificult fuly loade.49 THE ?IRON MAJORS? BEGIN TO INOVATE Dixon?s desire to improve trainig was based on the same ipulse that was pushing the iron majors, but at his point he young oficers had, as one later put it, ?lots of velocity, but no vector.?50 Unitentionaly, the iron majors began to frm groups that in modern mangemnt are caled ?industry per networks (IPN).? The charcteristics of an IPN are multiple groups of nocompeting pers, elctive admision to the group (low- rankig fihter pilot combat vetrans), face-to-face metings, and etailed iscusions of isues. IPNs alow ?mebers to learn vicariously from the xperinces of pers and adres dep roted comon problems,? genraly myopia (the focus on imediate problems at he xpense of the larger isues) and inertia (the tndency to cling to ld asumptions and time tsted ways of perating).51 Mangemnt experts also realize that for efctive inovation the inovators ned ?fre space for conversation? wher ideas can be ?bounced of? a lrge number of people with no stigma. Ther must hen be open lies of comunication throughout he organization so the ideas can flow frely. Howevr, such ?fre spaces for conversation? have to fit into the work paterns of the organization, and afighter pilot in a operational unit had his workday filed with flying, as wel as briefings and ebriefings, whic genraly tok longer than the flight itself. Line pilots also had variety of what wer euphemisticaly caled ?aditonal duties,? from runig the snack bar to writng efctivens reports. The workday left no time for discusing larger isues. 52 190 Unitentionaly, the Air Force had facilty and customs that lowed young oficers to cmunicate with each other and exchange ideas in a informal way. In the afternons after flying ende many, if not most, of the aircews adjourned to the bar t he Oficers? Club for lw priced rinks and snacks at ?Hapy Hour.? Her they xchanged stories, compared xperinces, and engaed in discusions about what was rong with te Air Force and how to fix it. Many of the pilots had flown i Linebacker, so the Vietnam War was one of the main topics, as was the 1973 Midle East War nd the posibilty of a war in Europe. One of the charcteristics of this ?bar talk? was that rank had no place. Anyone could have an idea, nd anyone could say, ?That?s BS, and her?s why.? Senior ficers who anted to push, as oposed to discus, their ideas or the Air Force party line simply wer not include in the conversations. The Oficers? Club at Nelis, as the ome of the Fighter Weapons Schol, was special hotbed of new ideas, ince it had not nly the instructors but also students who er considerd the bst fighter crews in the TAF. One varint of thes fre spaces for comunication hapend on wekends when fighter crews er encouraged to take airplanes and fly ?cros countries? for navigation trainig and to practie instrument aproach and landig procedures at difernt base. Every wekend, beginig about non o Friday, fighter pilots would take of and fly around the country to difernt base, usaly landig Friday fternon at few selct fighter base known for the quality and quantiy of emales they atracted at fter work ?Hapy Hours? Luke AFB in Phoenix, Arizona, Langley AFB in Hampton, Virginia, wher TAC headquarters i located, and Nelis wer afew of the favorites, but her wer 19 also Navy base, such as Miramr Navl Air Staion i San Diego, the ome of Top Gun, and the Navl Air Staion at Ocean, Virginia. Thes cros-countries alowed the fighter pilots to mingle and exchange ideas with pilots from difernt wings, of difernt aircaft, and often from difernt services. For Air Force pilots, it was chance to ask Navy pilots about heir tainig.53 Aditonaly, ther was n organization f Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter pilots who ad flown the dificult misions to Hanoi n both Roling Thunder and Linebacker, the Red River Valey Fighter Pilots Asociation. Known simply as ?River Rats? or ?Rats,? the mebers wore adistinctive, oficaly sanctioned patch on the shoulder of their flight suit, and the patch was n automatic invitaion for ther Rats to cme over and start aconversation, whic quickly led to war stories. Some of the mebers wer returned POWs (virtualy al of the POWs during the Vietnam War wer aircew, mostly pilots), whic gave them extra staus and moral uthority. The Rats also had regular metings and ?reunios? at Air Force and Navy base around the world, and their discusions invaribly drifted to what went wrong in the war nd how to fix it.54 The formation f thes IPNs and the avilabilty of thes fre spaces for conversation stimulated the type of dialogue that led to inovation ad creativity, but he most important IPN and fre spaces for conversation wer in the Air Force Headquarters, know as the Air Staf, in the Pentagon, especialy in the ofices of the Tactial Fighter Divison (XOT) of the Air Force Operations Directorate in the Pentagon (XO), in the basemnt of the Pentagon ext o the purle water fountain. The XO director was thre-star genral who as the Deputy Chief of Staf or Operations, the XO, and was extremly powerful, 192 genraly considerd the scond most powerful man o the Air Staf behind the Air Force Chief of Staf. The Tactial Divison f XO was intede to be the ome of the Air Force?s young fihter pilots with te most fertile tactial minds, known as ?action oficers? (AOs). 5 The XOT action ficers wer many of the Air Forces? top fighter pilots chosen for both teir inteligence and inovative skils and, of course, include many of the iron majors. 56 While the young aircew often groused at Pentagon asignments, prefring to stay in the cokpit, most realized that working in XO was higly desirable. The asignment ot nly alowed them to ake ral changes in the Air Force, but also the folw-on asignment for the majors from XO was often the much sought-after comand of afighter squadron. Above the AOs in XO wer the divison chiefs, enior lieutnat colnels who ad finished asucesful tour as squadron comander and wer being romed for wing comander positons.57 The iron majors of XO had considerable leway to exrcise their imaginations, helpd because the XO ofice spaces wher they sat wer smal and open (o cubicles), whic made fre discusions easy. While nw and creative ideas came from al over the TAF, in the Pentagon the AOs had charter to inovate and take nw ideas out of the ?bar talk? category. Any action ficer with agod iea could work up abriefing and presnt it o his imediate superior and up the chain of comand wher the idea was vetd at l levls. Eventualy, if the idea was god enough, it could go al the way up to the Chief of Staf. This was n option that was not avilable to field oficers, and many god ieas for improvemnt from the field certainly die the dath of athousand cuts a they worked 193 their way up the chain of comand. With its proximity to pwer and its talentd oficers, XO was to become the otbed of inovation i the Air Force in the mid-1970s.58 THE FLYING SAFETY ISUE The iron majors wer not taly enamored with te Air Force impulse to inovate by technolgy. While they wer enthusiastic about he nw F-15 and F-16, they had sen hig technolgy up close in combat nd knew that while someties it worked, often it di not. The main problem they had sen i the war in genral, nd in Linebacker in particular, was por tainig, caused by ringi in ?universal pilots? to fighters a wel as the incompatibilty betwen the Air Force idea of lying safety and a realistic trainig program. The combat vetrans knew that many aircaft lost over Vietnam and atributed to ?combat? wer, in fact, acidents, and they belived that most acidents reflcted an inabilty to fly an ircaft proerly. The iron majors aw apeacetime patern ? an acident, folwed by restrictions on flying the aircaft, then aother acident folwed by more rstrictions. Their conclusion was that, ironicaly, the mphasi on flying safety actualy caused acidents.59 Flying safety might prevnt acidents in peacetime but would increase loses in wartime, when porly trained pilots would have to fly their aircaft o the limits. It was betr to train to the limits under supervison i peacetime, when loses could be anlyzed and solutions found, rather than lose aircaft in combat wher the cause of the los would be unkown ad perhaps the crew lost. The iron majors belived if crews er trained to fly their airplanes to the limits, they would be preared for unexpectd and emandig situations and could fly their way out ? or, betr, ecognize when they wer geting into dificulty early and avoid the problem.60 194 This was not anew isue. In a 194 letr to the Secrtary of Defnse concernig hig acident rates, Army Air Force Chief Genral ?Hap? Arnold said: If our only interst was flying safety in the United Staes, we ould have very ma fly a primr trair o suy days, an could ct he cidnt rcord to lost zero. If we stpe fling d put he airplans in hagars we uld hav n acidnts at l. But war is not fught t wy. From th otset, te Army Air Forces have tght e men at ome the aneuvers that hy would excute in ombt abroad. In thse manuvrs a fw re boun t b injrd r kiled, ut he overwlming prortion f the mn are bter preare to dfat he nmy. 61 The bright spot in the push for ealistic trainig was the maturing and expandig Agresor program. The Air Force formed asecond staeside squadron at Nelis and aded two more oversas, one squadron i the Philpines and one squadron i England, for tainig fihter units based in the Pacifc and in Europe. The xpansion f the Agresors was important because the iron majors belived that ir-to-air flying skils wer the sine qua no f the tactial fighter force, but having sen Linebacker and read the rports of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the iron majors knew air-to-air tainig and its asociated skils wer necsary but not suficent. Winig the air-to-air batle was only one of the means to an ed ? puting bombs on the target. The Air Force also nede large-scale, realistic onventional ground-atck trainig. CHANGI THE FIGHTER WEAPONS CHOL CULTRE Genral Dixon contiued making changes in the other ways TAC di busines, starting with te Fighter Weapons Schol. The schol?s mision was twofld ? to provide a ?graduate schol? for selcted fighter pilots to take nw techniques back to their units and to cntiualy examine USAF tactis and combat procedures with an ey towards improving them. The schol had sign i front of the building that said, ?Home of the 195 World?s Greatst Fighter Pilots,? and many of the instructors agred with te sntiment, but he schol had many critcs. Thes critcs noted almost noe of the instructors had any MiG kils, that some had nevr flown acombat our in SEA, and that others had only flown acombat our in the back seat of the F-4. The tactial manuals writen at he schol wer considerd ?holy writ? to be folwed at l cost, and changi them was long, involed proces. The rsult of this inflexibilty was that during the SEA war, when the FWS should have ben the primary source of Air Force tactial inovation, the schol di litle to help the Air Force rews over North Vietnam, unlike the Navy?s Top Gun. The inabilty of the FWS to devlop tactial inovations was epecialy noticeable in its resitance to sugestions to change the clumsy Air Force four-ship fighter formations.62 Thes inflexible four-ship formations wer identifed as being responsible for many of the loses over North Vietnam and wer unfavorably compared to the smaler, more flexible, two-ship formations the Navy and IAF flew.63 During Linebacker, the Weapons Schol sent agroup of instructors to Thailnd to fly combat misions with te crews and they returned with te ralization that he four-ship formation was obsolet. Stil, it ok sevral years before any changes wer oficaly made, in part because two-ship was ?Navy formation.?64 Aditonaly, the critcs noted that some - but not al ? of the Weapons Schol instructors put more mphasi on demonstrating their superiority over their students rather than teaching their techniques. Thes instructors had the atitude that hey should teach students enough to be god, but not be ter than their instructor. In short, the 196 Weapons Schol was considerd by many to be focused on ?avel gazing? while disregarding any tactial ideas or sugestions that came from outside.65 This changed in July 1974, shortly after Dixon tok over TAC. He snt Major Lary Keith, aMiG kiler but not aFighter Weapons Schol graduate, to take over the Weapons Schol. Keith saw that many of the instructors wer more intersted in ?harsing and hazing? the students than teaching them, so he fired sevral instructors and brought in anew group to change the way the Weapons Schol taught. The sign ?Home of the World?s Greatst Fighter Pilots? came down, and the FWS refocused on teaching and inovating rather than humilating and hazing.6 THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE VIST As part of his atempts to improve TAC?s trainig, Dixon used his friendship with IAF comander Benie Peld to get an impartial but expert lok at TAC?s trainig programs. Dixon asked Peld to send agroup of his F-4 pilots to the United Staes to fly with crews in sevral American F-4 wings and the Agresors, and then pas on their impresions to Dixon. I May 1975, a team of ive Israeli Air Force pilots and abck seat F-4 navigator, led by Colnel Amos Lapidot, later comander of the Israeli Air Force, visted sevral Air Force base to fly with American pilots. The Israelis wer not impresd. Their eport o Gen. Dixon was, by American standars, cathing, evn though one tam ember said later that ?because of considerations of US-Israel relationship, it was omewhat softend ? teling the truth does not mean teling al the truth.? The bigest problem the Israelis found was TAC?s emphasi on flying safety in trainig. One of the tam embers rembers, ?My main impresion was that he USAF 197 flight safety limitaions of the time wer sterilzing the pilot's fighting abilties. As aresult of the 1973 war, e in the IAF wer losenig the safety restrictions on flying trainig extnsively.? 67 The Israelis also wer unimpresd with te Air Force pilots? integrity and the ?zero defcts? cultre that sutained it. In oe incident hat went unmentioned in the rport, aTAC pilot flew an ir-to-air combat mision with one of the IAF oficers in the back seat of his F-4. The TAC pilot verstresd the aircaft during hard maneuvering,68 but he pilot di not el the mainteance rew about he overstres and asked the Israeli not tel anyone bcause ?If they found out I?d overstresd an ircaft lying with you, it would be the nd of my carer.? The story cirulated around the group, and while the Israelis understod the oficer?s actions, they seriously questioned the mentality of aleadership that would fire an oficer for teling the truth.69 The Israelis? letr to Dixon and the gneral cultre in TAC reflcted Dixon?s belif that he ned to change not nly the way TAC operated but also the way TAC thought. TAC had other problems, notably cuts in flying time bcause of reductions in the defnse budget and the soaring cost of uel. As the number of lying trainig hours declined, Dixon felt TAC nede to make the trainig misions more productive. He belived to much emphasi was being placed on the quantiy of ?fil the square? sorties flown ? whic ould be measured ? rather than o the quality of the trainig. Dixon later said that TAC trainig was ?what mounted to calisthenics?the same thing evry day in a very unreal tmospher ? and betraying the purose of trainig and betraying the crews.? 70 But sing quantiative measures, along with an emphasi on flying safety, was 198 part of Air Force ultre, and what Dixon ede was people to cme up with inovative changes to provide the igh quality trainig he wanted and the TAF nede. 71He was trying to build TAC into an organization that ?discourages orthodxy for its own sake and encourages creative, useful inovators and mavericks? [But] my kind of maverick has to understand the sytem and bring about change without either wrecking it or himself.?72 At his point, Dixon?s earch for inovative mavericks was bout o intersct with te ideas of Mody Suter and the iron majors. 1. Congresional Quarterly Almanc, 92nd Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1972, Vol. XVI, (Washigt, DC: GPO, 1972), 75-75, 801. 2. Lwrence Lyn, ?an the Secrtary of Defnse make aDifernce?? International Security 7, 1 (Sumer 1982): 69. 3. Congresional Quarterly Almanc, 93rd Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1974, Volume X, (Washit, DC: GPO, 1974), 814. 4, Congresional Quarterly Almanc, 93rd Congres, 1st Sesion, 1973, Volume XI (ashit, DC: GPO, 1973), 876, 86. 5. Ibid., 87. 6. Richard Sanders, The Politcs of Defnse Analysi (New York: Duneln, 1973), 3. 7. Paul M. Rogers, Lt. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview ith Jacob Neufeld, 17-8 19 Jun 74, AFHR, 38-40.3-4. 8. Congresioal Quarterly, US Defnse Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Comitets (Wshington, DC: GPO, April 1978), 2-3. 9. Libray of Cores, United States/Soviet Miltary Balnce: A Framework of Refrence for ngres (Washigton, DC: GPO, 1975) Tbles 3-6. 10. Edgar Ulsamr, ?USAF?s R& Priorites for 1974,? Air Force Magzine, January 1975, 37. 1. Robert Dixon, Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview, 21 Septmber 198, K239.0512-591, AFHRA, 265. 12. Robert C. Seamns, Secrtary of the Air Force, ?Tac Air: Lok at he Late 70s,? Air Frc Mgzie, Janur 1973, 2, 36. 13. Ibid., 38. 4. Congres, Senate, Armed Services Comite, FY1974 Miltary Procuremnt, 93 rd ongres, 2nd ss., 17 January 1973, 490. 19 15. John L. Frisbe, ?The Chief Discuses USAF?s Prospects? [Interview ith Air Force Cief f Staf Gorg Brown], Air Forc Magzine, Fbruary 1974, 32. 16. Ibid., 3. 7. Charles R. Janson ad Keneth C. Rogers, Origin of the F-16 Multinational Program (1970-197), Vl. 1, Nartiv (Kirtland Air Frce Bas N: Air Frce Systes Comand), 17 October 1983, 4. 18. Jeruald Getry, Majr USAF, ?Evolution f the F-16 Multinational Fighter? (Student Rserch Paper, #163, Industrial Cleg of t Armed Forces, 1976), 78. 19. Ibid., 79-80. 20. US Defnse Policy, 8-9A. 1. Janso ad Rgers, 3-40. 2. Jh Hilikar, ?Father of the F-16,? Genral Dynamics Code One Magzine, April 191, 1. 23. Schlesinger quoted in Robert Carol, ?F-16: Swing Force Fighter for the 80s,? Air Fore Mazi, April 1976, 32. 24. Dvid Jones, Gen. USAF, quoted in James C. Slife, Lt. Col. USAF, ?Crech Blue?: Genral Bil Crch and the Rfrmtion f the Tactial Air Frces, 1978-1984.? (Thsi, Schol of Advane Air Power Studies: Maxwl ir Force Bas, AL, 202), 16; Wiliam D. White, U.S. Tactial Air Powr (Wshington, DC: rokings Instiution, 974), 31. 25. Janson, 5-6; Eric Hehs, ?F-16 Evolution,? Genral Dynamics Code One Magzie, July 197, 12-3. James alows iewd th chges i the F-16 critcaly; Jmes Falows, ?America's High Tch Weaponry," Te Atlantic Montly, May 1981, 26. 26. Everts e-ail, 29 July 205. 7. Jams Flows, National Defnse (New York: Random House, 1981), 05. 28. Jones quted in Slife, ?Crch Blu,? 16. 9. Srg Hrzog, Dfns Reform and Technolgy: Tactial Aircaft (Westport, CN: Praer, 194), 3. 30. Clarence C. Geigr, History of the F-16: Prottype to Air Combat Fighter, 1971-1975. Vol. 1, Nartiv (Wright-Patersn Air orce Bas, OH: ir Frce Systms Comand, June 197), 35. 31. As of November 205, 19 countries ither fly or have orderd the F-16 and 430 have ben built. htp:/w.aerospaewb.org/aircaft/igtr/f16/ (acsd November 205). 32. US Defnse Policy, 1-A. . Ibid., 21-A. ls Wiliam Bryan, ?Congresional Influence on Weapons Procuremnt: The Case of Lightweight Fighter omlity,? Pblic Policy 28 (Fal 1980): 43-43. 3. Interstingly, another Air Force four-star genral during this period, John C. Meyr, was Dartmouth ?39. 35. ixon Oral History, 267. 20 36. Tom Clancy and Genral Chuck Horner, USAF, Every Man Tiger (New York: Putna, 19), 109. 37. Jack Van Loan, Col. USAF, e-mail to author, 19 June 205. 8. The sytem the United tas fced in Vietnam, whil it was n IADS, used old early 1960s Sovit isils a rdrs. Th IAF fcd n Egyptin defse sytm that hd 20 of the ry efctive nd bran ew mobile SA-6 SAM sytms, backd up by sixty-fiv SA-3 batris (to moder to b suplid to the North Vietnes) and sevnt -2 teris (the NV ha ut wenty). Ln rden, Air Warfre i the Misile Age (Washington, DC: Smitsonia Prs, 1985), 85-7, 172-175. 39. Mrav Hlperi ad Aharon Lpidot, G-Suit: Combat Reports From Israel?s Air Wars (London: Tim Wrner Bks UK, 190), 97-8. 40. Ibi., 98. 1. Iid., 76-7, pasim. 42. James Knight, Lt. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview, 17 Augst 198, K239.0512-54, AFHRA, 20. One story is that i th rush to get he F-4s to Israel at least one stil had its nuclear weapo fusing equipment on bard. 43. Frdrick C. ?Bots? Blse, Bri. Gn. USAF, Check Six: A Fighter Pilot Loks Back (New Yor: Ivy, 191), 67. 4. Ibid., 207-208; Dixon Oral History, 276. 5. Author?s conversatis with varius IAF oficers 197-1980; Yiftach Spector, Brig. Gen. IF, iteriw ith autor, 14 Septmber 204, Ramt Ha Shron, Isral. 46. eral Robrt Dixon qted in Edward Ulsamr, ?TAC's Focus i ?Len d Lethal,?" Air Force Magzie, March 1975, 30-1. 47. Dixn Oral History, 213, psim. 8. James A Coley, aj. USAF, ?Red Flag ? Is Realism Worth te Cost?? Student Thesi, US ry War Coleg, 1987, 21-2 49. Ibid., 25-6; .R ?Dick? Anderg, Col. USAF, Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietam (Washingtn, D.C: ir Forc istor ad Musems Proram, 201), 90-1. 50. Vickery, e-mail to author, 6 June 205. 1. Stoan Sgourev nd Ezra Zckrman, ?Levragin the Power of Per Networks? [also tiled ?Imprving Capbilties Through Idustry Per Ntrks?], MITSloan Mnagnt Reiw, 42, (Wintr 205), 3-8. 52. Richard K. Lestr and Michael J. Piore, Inovation: The Mising Dimension (Cambridge, Ms.: Harvr Uiversity res, 204), 154. 53. Evrts e-mil 5 February 205; Vickry e-mail 6 June 205; author?s own experinces flying F-4s 1974-1975. 54. Ibid., al thre of the above; River Rats web site, htp:/w.river-ats.org/. (aces Mrc 206). 5. ?Action ficer? is the name given to any oung oficer in the Pentagon, ot just those in XO. derg, 72; autor?s Ptag experice 1983-1986. 56. Aderg, 89. Also se Clancy nd Hornr, 130-3. 201 57. Vickery e-mail 6 June 205; Corder interview. 8. Andrg, 89-2. 59 ?Der Baron? (Richard M. ?ody? Suter, Col. USAF). ?anything els is rubish, Fighter Weapons Reviw, Sumer 1972, 3. 60. Ricard M. ?dy? Suter, Col. USAF, ?Corna Ace? interview by Lt. Cols. Gordn Nelson John Dick, 26 January 197, 17; ?Der Baro, (Sutr) ?anything els is rubish,? Figter Weapons Reviw, Sumer 972, 3; Everts e-mail. 61. Qoted by rdrick C. ?Bots? Bles, Brig. Gen. USAF, in ?An ce Loks at Flying Safty,? Unite States Air Frce Flying Safety Magzine, Jauary 1981, 6. 62. e, for example, Major Gary Skaret, ?Doubl Atck,? Fighter Weapons Reviw, Spring 1971, nd the sme uthor?s le ta Revistd On Mre Time,? Fighter Weaos Reviw, Sur 1971, 4-16. 63. Andreg, 34-5; for afuler discusion ad iagrams, e Michel, Clashes, 46-58. 64. For the Air Force ?party line? se ?Der Baron,? (Suter) ?anything els is Rubish,? igtr Weapns Reviw, Fal 1971, 31-3. 65. Anderg, 50-3. . Ibi., 51-2. 67. The other mebers of the tam wer Lt. Colnels Yoram Agmon ad David Gal, and Majors Elazr Lior, Yiftac Spctor. Spctor e-mail t authr, 15 pril 205. 68. Aircft re dsigned with strutral iits tht low tem to ul acertain maxium nubr of Gs, o G eqaling the weigt of the aircaft and for Gs beig four ties the weight f the aircaft. The F-4 as tresd for 7.3G, like mst fightrs of the tim. In t cokpit is sml ?G mtr? tht rgistrs the maxiu nuber of Gs puld i aflight. If an ircaft is over-d in afliht en it is uposed to writen up so maintence chek to se if thr is ay structral damge. Th ckpit G mtr has lrg buton it at wil ?zero ut? the metr when it is pused, eliminaig the evidence that he aircaft s ovrstrsed. T dangers of ?nching of? the G mtr wh a ircft s ben overstresd ar obvious, but it was ot ucmon ocurene in peacetim r tainig situtins dring this time. Athr?s experices flying F-4s, 1970-1975. 69. Spector e-mail. 70. Dixn Orl History, 246. 1. Kight, 204-205. 72. Dixon quoted in Edward Ulsamr, ?TAC's Focus i ?Lean d Lethal,?" Air Force Magzie, March 1975, 28. 20 CHAPTER NIE: THE BUBLE UP INOVATION TSUNAMI RED FLAG Just after the nd of the October 1973 war, Mody Suter was transferd from comand of the air-to-air flight at he Fighter Weapons Schol at Nelis to the Pentagon. Suter went o the Directorate of Operations, Tactis Branch, XOT, and arived ful of ideas he and his compatriots had evloped at Nelis for ealistic trainig ainst arealistic threat. The rsults of the 1973 war, her a Soviet IADS maned by Third World crews rought avoc n the IAF and prevnted it from intervenig in critcal and batles, aded urgency to their discusions. The Air Force would have to face the same sytems in the vent of awar in Europe, but it was afe to asume the sytems would have much betr crews from the Warsw Pact. Suter and others wer concerned that, t this point, the Air Force would not be able to win that batle, aconcern suported by the IAF Vist Report o Dixon, whic Dixon pased on to XO. Ther was consesu that he TAF nede a new program to devlop combat skils and to test actis devloped uring Vietnam, and, if necsary junk them and start over. XOT provide plenty of re spaces for conversation ad the Air Staf was one big IPN, so was the prfect place to devlop the ideas. Lieutnat Colnel Jim Brown as the XOT Branch Chief and the AOs include Majors John Corder, who ad ben ivoled with te formation f the Agresors, and Chuck Horner, both of whom went on to fame in Gulf War I, as wel as Suter, and later id4175554 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 203 Majors Wil Rud, John Davis, and John Vickery. Each day t non, they ate lunch at he confernce table in Brown?s ofice to talk about he work they wer doing and brainstorm. During thes lunchtime etings, Suter and the other AOs discused folw-ups to the Agresor program and began devloping the concepts of what would become Red Flag.1 Al the AOs wer familar with Nelis, and the talk turned to devloping the large but esntialy empty Nelis range complex - an rea 40X80 miles, about six milion acres, wher the land and airspace above wer restricted to miltary use - for large-scale ground-atck trainig. While the Air Force had used the Nelis ranges for years, in 1973 most of the range complex was huge amount of empty space for flying with afew targets, ometies nothing more than stacked fity galon drums.2 Ther had ben some atempts to upgrade the ranges, led by the chief of the range complex, Colnel Joseph D. Salvuci, later acknowledged as the ?father? of the sophisticated range complex that was devloped. Salvuci also wanted to upgrade the targets to make them more ralistic, and then move anumber of ?threat simulators? elctronic equipment hat would send out emisions imilar to Sviet misile and early warnig radrs ? ont the range so crews ould have to maneuver aginst hem. The iron majors tok this idea nd began to think about, in efct, onverting the Nelis ranges into acombat rainig ?Disneyland,? and built on their experince with te Have Donut and Have Dril MiGs, to se it hey could use actual Soviet radrs given to the American miltary b the Israeli Air Force on the range. They also discused upgrading the targets using various tank, truck and aircaft hulks trewn acros miltary base around the United Staes.3 The nxt question was how to presnt he idea to the Air Force ladership. To show arequiremnt for such large-scale trainig, ther nede to be asimple intelctual ?hok,? 204 and Suter found this hok in the Army?s Pentagon libray in aset of studies that showed that if afighter pilot survied his first en misions, his chances for surviing the rst went up from 40 percnt o wel over 90 percnt. 4 During Korea nd Vietnam, the Air Force had the luxry of alowing the nw tactial fighter pilots to fly their first en combat misions aginst easy targets, but Suter and the rst knew if the nxt war er fought in Europe aginst he Soviets, it would be a?come as you are trained? war. The crews ould have no time for easy misions before they went aginst he bst Soviet air defnse.5 The xercise that Suter and the others began to envison would provide an itense combat-ype larnig environment wher aircews could fly their first 10 "combat" misions a part of alrger Blue Force and learn how to adpt o misions in areal war in Europe, flying ainst aSoviet-style integrated surface-to-air defnse ystem and the Agresors using Soviet actis. Ther, in acontroled trainig environment, pilots could devlop the skils they would ned to survie their most vulnerable priod in real combat. The xercise would, in esnce, make the aircews combat vetrans before the war started.6 As the idea ripend, Suter devloped other anlytical ?hoks.? If, as intede, the exrcise could increase urviabilty like the istorical studies indicated, it would be the equivalent of augmentig the Air Force in Europe by 30 percnt and would shift he whole balnce of power to NATO?s air forces in central Europe.7 Other dat also showed that if trainig provide a way to help ilots urvie the first en misions, ther was the potential for huge aditonal benfits. Studies acros national boundaries from World War I, World War I, the Midle East, and Korea showed that 20 percnt of ighter pilots 205 scored 80 percnt of the kils, acharcteristic found in other forms of human edeavor and known as the ?Lotka curve.?8 But his kil di not begin to show up ntil after apilot had survied ten misions, o t become one of thes higly eficent pilots ? caled ?hawks? in the xperimental dat ? apilot had to survie the first en misions when he was vulnerable ?dove.? 9 A program that would alow pilots to survie the first en misions thus not nly vastly enhanced apilot?s chances for survial, but also pend the posibilty he might become a?hawk,? an extraordinarily efctive kiling machine. Finaly, combat dat from the Midle East wars howed that he synergism betwen god equipment and wel-trained pilots could result in air-to-air kil ratios f over 50:1, artio the Israelis aproached in the War of Atriton ad achievd in 1973.10 Suter and the others harpend the focus of the idea of alrge scale, higly realistic trainig exrcise through 1974 and early 1975. As the idea became ore srious, the lunchtime table talk in Brown?s ofice bgan to explore the ntire gamut of isues the exrcise would raise. The mebers used their IPNs to ask questions of ther action oficers in difernt departments throughout he Air Staf ? operations, mainteance, budget, plans, inteligence, resarch and evlopment, as wel as experts on ranges, test programs, and ew eapons and tactis ? to se what hey thought of the idea. Fundig was certain to be an isue, so they went o the action ficers responsible for major exrcise fundig to se wher to purloin deployment and exrcise flying money. As the group made the rounds, they constantly asked "what do yu think -what re we mising?" The aim was to genrate hard questions, then devlop answers to thes question based upon iput from thes experts, who liked the idea but wer not sure it was going anywher in the Air Force?s fly safe? cultre.1 206 As the plan coalesced, Suter and the others began to put ogethr a briefing for alarge-scale trainig exrcise at Nelis. In the Pentagon, while a picture was orth athousand words abriefing was the quivalent of the picture, with te aded benfit of someone to explain the picture and answer questions. Suter, who ad ?had not nly the visonary's ey but also the salesman's gift,? devloped the briefing while the mebers of the branch onsulted and kibitzed.12 Once they drafted abriefing, the XOT AOs tok it around the Air Staf to ther ion majors in difernt branches and contiued to slict hard questions. They also cnducted internal ?murder boards? on the briefing, and it was contiualy polished and refined. As the concept for the xercise idea voled, ther was considerable discusion about how to use it. The Air Force had Operational Readines Inspections (ORI), devloped by SAC and ow used throughout TAC to test he flying and bombing skils of the crews. Many thought e xercise would have a betr chance of being adopted if the particpants wer grade, like an ORI. Others disagred. The problem with an ORI, they argued, was that it was test, and the mphasi was on pasing, on folwing established procedures, on being as conservative as posible. No ne ver wanted to learn aything from an ORI except hat hey pased, because bing inovative and failng would result in people being fired, especialy wing comanders. This ?no grade? group argued the aims of the new exrcise hould be xactly the oposite of an ORI. The xercise was to be aplace for crews and comanders to experiment, to learn, and the measure of suces would be how much tey learned. The xercise hould be an oportunity to test potential combat actis aginst adynamic enmy, and the crews and comanders had to be alowed to fail in peacetime when the lsons wer cheap. Grading the xercise would iscourage 207 inovation ad experimentaion. I the nd, ther was consesu not grade the xercise like an ORI.13 RED FLAG IS UNFRLED Once the briefing was completd to evryone's atisfaction, Brown ad Suter presnted it o the Deputy XO, Brig. Gen. Charles Gabriel. Gabriel, aproduct of the SEA combat cultre, was predisposed to like any idea that would improve trainig. He had flown to turs in Korea nd shot down a MiG, and then had ben the wing comander of the 432 nd Wing at Udorn during the Lavel bombing campaign ad the early days of Linebacker when his wing?s porly trained pilots had suferd heavy loses to MiGs. He had lso writen a ?End of Tour? report hat was higly critcal of the trainig of the crews that rived in his wing. 14 Red Flag was the name given to the xercise, and the first lide of the briefing was large rd Soviet flag that Roger Wels had used for his Soviet hreat briefings. The briefing for Red Flag described how aTAC fighter wing would eploy to Nelis along with other TAC units, al caried by the transports of the Miltary Airlift Comand (MAC). The Nelis auxilary field at Indian Springs would be used as the dployment location, because it had recntly upgrade runway nd facilties that closely resmbled a ?bare base? similar to wher Air Force fighter units would be dployed in wartime. The deploying wing would bring its own ?Bare Base? units to provide suport, and once at Nelis, the aircews ould fly operational misions in large, Linebacker-type strike packages using live ordinace on the Nelis ranges, whic would be with equiped with Soviet IADS simulators as wel as instrumentd asesment and fedback sytems. Each day ther would be amas briefing and ebriefing of the misions, much te same as 208 after the Linebacker misions. Once the xercise proved feasible, other groups from Army Air Defnse,. Navy avition, SAC, and avriety of ther units would be invited to particpate. The posibilties wer endles. Gabriel, who as intimately familar with what hapend uring Linebacker, liked the idea nd the briefing. He asked Brown to g with im on atour of TAC base in the westrn United Staes to ?trial balon? the idea. Gabriel and Brown gave the Red Flag briefing to the Tactial Fighter Weapons Centr comander, the 12th Air Force Comander, and Colnel Bil Kirk, 479th Wing Comander at Nelis who ad lso ben responsible for the Agresors, and also presnted it at he 1975 Fighter Symposium hosted by TAC at Nelis.15 Everyone liked the concept, and when Gabriel returned to the Pentagon, he told Brown to have the briefing cordinated with te Air Staf leadership. Suter tok the briefing through al of the subordinate groups and finaly to the Chief of Air Force Operations Directorate, the XO, Lieutnat Genral Robert Huyser. Huyser aproved the concept and told Suter to brief Red Flag to the other thre-star directorate heads of the Air Staf or cordination ad inputs before taking the briefing to the Air Force Chief of Staf, Genral David Jones. 16 The cordination proces in the Pentagon can be a tricky one. One of Suter?s iron major coleagues remberd, ?The Air Staf was power-brokers heaven wher egos are big and self-promtion was, to many, the ky to advancemnt. A few genral oficers tok pleasure in ?just aying o? t any package they din?t orignate in their directorate.?17 As Suter and the iron majors explored the isue in their IPNs, it semed the most likely person to pose Red Flag was the Director f Programs and Requiremnts (PR), Lieutnat Genral Abot Grenleaf. Grenleaf was power on the Air Staf 209 because h controled the fundig for virtualy al Air Force programs, and the rst of the genrals wer loath to chalenge him on ay isue for fear of retalition i the form of 3cuts in their programs. After Suter briefd Grenleaf on Red Flag, as feard Grenleaf refused to aprove the package bcause of undig isues. When Genral Huyser was told Grenleaf had not aproved the briefing, Huyser ? a bomber genral who ad not flown combat in Vietnam - told Suter not take the briefing to Air Force Chief of Staf Jones. 18 Suter and his coleagues discused the problem with te action ficers they knew in lower levls of Grenleaf?s PR directorate and learned that her was no way to make the genral come around once h ad made up his mind on a isue. Suter and the iron majors had great idea with te aproval of virtualy al the gneral oficers on the Air Staf, but also had major oadblock that stoped it cold. Help came from outside the Air Force. America?s most famous avition artist, Keith Feris, whose father had ben a Army Air Corps avitor and had had strong ties to the Air Force, was creating the B-17 mural "Fortess Under Fire" at he National Air and Space Musem and was living an partment i the Washington are with Pet Hayes, a Pentagon iron major and former instructor at Nelis with Suter. The aprtment, quickly named the "Bunk House" because it housed fighter pilots visting the Pentagon, son was the ome of almost nightly ?white whiskey? gatherings.19 Feris would paint al day on the B-17 mural t NASM and come home to the "Bunk House" for the nightly ?bul sesions? with whoevr was ther, and one afternon Suter and his group stoped by the Bunk House for drinks. They talked about he rcent decison by Genral Grenleaf to not sign the Red Flag package and the aparent derailng of the project. Feris aked what 210 Red Flag was, and Suter xplained the concept and how it could benfit he Air Force and other services like the Army air defnse units and Navy tactial viation. Feris was long-time friend of Suter and rembers, ?I suported Mody in evry way Icould, whic meant bringi togethr al kindre spirts Icould gather.? Feris thought it was great idea nd asked Suter if he could brief other services on the Red Flag concept, because Feris knew the Army genral who as the ad of the Army?s air defnse branch and thought e might be intersted. 20 The nxt day Suter discused the Army briefing idea with Brown ad the "lunch bunch," and Brown pased the idea up to Genral Huyser. Huyser said it was l right o give an ?information ly? briefing if requestd by the Army, so Feris arnged the invitaion ad Suter gave the briefing. The Army genral, ware that he Army would be paying othing to ?pigy back? on Red Flag nd that he xercise would provide afine place to train his air defnse units, was enthusiastic, and he told the Chief of Staf of the Army, Genral Fred Weyand, about he idea. A few days later at social gathering, Weyand remarked to Genral Jones that he ard that he Air Force had this inovative realistic trainig concept caled Red Flag nd that he Army would be intersted in particpating. Jones knew nothing about Red Flag, and when he rturned to his ofice, he caled Genral Huyser demandig to know hat Red Flag was nd why the Army Chief of Staf knew about it and he di not. Suter imediately apeard on Genral Jones' schedule to brief Red Flag. 21 One of Suter?s talents was the abilty to ?shape-shift? his briefings to fit his audience, and the long hours of information gathering, cordination, and veting the briefing around the Air Staf paid ividends. Suter knew Jones was intersted in realistic trainig because 21 he ad established a Tactial Employment Schol while h was comander of the United Staes Air Forces in Europe and Suter also knew that he main objections would come from Genral Grenleaf based on cost. In his Red Flag briefing to Jnes, Suter pointed out her would be litle cost because the lectronic threat simulators and target hulks wer on Air Force gunery ranges al over the United Staes and could be consolidated at Nelis. The Agresors wer already based at Nelis o they would cost nothing. The ranges wer avilable and ther was parking space and housing at he Indian Springs auxilary airfield. By now, Suter knew agreat deal bout deployment fundig and pointed out it would be posible to reprogram oney from les efctive xercise, so Red Flag would not increase the budget or the days deployed by operational units. Finaly, Suter pointed out hat he concept of ?jointes? the srvices working togethr - was curently amajor isue with te Joint Chiefs of Staf and Congres, and the Air Force could ofer Red Flag to the other services a program for jint coperation ad trainig wher al the other services had to d was bring their personel and equipment. The Army had lready aceptd the Red Flag concept, so the xercise was win-in for Genral Jones and the Air Force. 2 Jones liked the idea nd the briefing, but knew that his would have to be aTAC, not an Air Force, program. He caled Genral Dixon, and Dixon agred to listen to Suter?s briefing. In early July 1975, Suter and Keith Feris drove five hours outh from the Pentagon to Langley Air Force Base, home of TAC Headquarters, in Hampton, Virginia. Suter knew Dixon?s reputaion for brutalizng senior staf oficers, but he word among the iron majors at TAC headquarters was that he ?Tidewater Aligator? the name Dixon had given himself - was much more tolerant of lwer ankig oficers. One 21 meber of the TAC staf who regularly briefd Dixon told Suter it was not unsual for Dixon to pick up his telphone and cal ajunior staf oficer when he ned aditonal information. What Dixon wanted, the word was, was expertise and in-depth knowledge. Suter also had ?hole card,? an dvocate on the TAC staf, the ighly respectd and recntly promted Major Genral Charles Gabriel. Gabriel had taken Suter?s briefing on its first ?road show? to the westrn TAC base and to the 1975 Fighter Symposium, and was now TAC?s Deputy Chief of Staf or Operations. Folwing established protcols, Suter first gave the briefing to Major Genral Howard Leaf, TAC?s Deputy Chief of Staf for Requiremnts, who thought, ?It was great briefing? and set up Suter to brief Dixon and the ful staf on 15 July.23 As it urned out, Dixon?s persona fit Suter perfctly. By now, the presntaion had ben honed by hundres of hours of disection by the iron majors, al experts, from al parts of the Air Force, and most of the gnerals on the Air Staf had made their inputs. Howevr, Suter?s most important asets in his briefing wer his expertise, his honest, unabshed nthusiasm for the idea nd the firm belif, based on his own combat experince and the combat experinces of thers, that he Air Force ned this program. Suter?s first lide was the bright red Soviet flag, the ?Red Flag,? intede to d double duty as warnig. Red Flag, Suter told Dixon, focused on arenwed mphasi on trainig the aircews the Red Baron study showed had ben porly preared for combat. Red Flag would preare TAF crews for their first en misions in aconventional war aginst he Soviets in Europe. The xercise would employ entire ?strike packages? - tankers, elctronic warfre aircaft, bombers, fighters, reconaisance aircaft, search and rescue hlicopters - aginst arealistic enmy that operated avanced radr sytems, 213 integrated misile and A, and the Agresors flying disimilar intercptors using Soviet actis. It would test Vietnam-era tctis and the tactis that TAF crews er planig to use in awar in Europe, and would force the crews to plan d excute large, combined misions while daling with te inhernt fog f war nd aprofesional enmy force. For each Red Flag, asingle tactial fighter wing would be the ?core? unit, and its aircaft and personel would eploy to Nelis a part of the "Blue Forces.? Upon arival, they would be plunged into asytematic proces to preare them for ?combat.? First, the Blue Forces crews ould go t Nelis? inteligence nter wher they would examine captured Soviet quipment and recive briefings on the quipment?s capbilties, limitaions and the Soviet actis for using it. Next, the Blue Forces would fly over an elctronic warfre range wher the crews ould practie using their elctronic countermeasures quipment (ECM) aginst actual Soviet racking and misile radrs. Then the crews ould fly one and two-ship ?warm up? air-to-air misions aginst he Agresors. After thes orientaion flights, the Blue Force would move to integrated, large-force ground-atck misions, using avriety of tactis to atck targets uch as irfields, misile sites, vehicle convoys, and tanks defnde by the "Red Force," whic would elctronicaly simulate anti-aircaft artilery, surface-to-air misiles, elctronic jaming equipment and the Agresors. Thes misions would increase in size and complexity as the xercise moved on. After ach mision, ther would be what Suter and the others considerd the most important aspect of Red Flag, the mas debriefing of al the crews involed in the large misions, modeld on the ones in the later part of Linebacker. The 214 misions would use rports and videos from the Red Forces to anlyze the rsults, o the Blue Forces could learn exactly what hey had one corectly and what nede work.24 In aditon to utlinig of the xercise, Suter had gain moved within the Red Flag idea nd shape shifted the briefing to make it especialy apealing to Dixon. Suter sugestd if Red Flag was suces TAC would get more fundig for ealistic trainig at Nelis and such TAC programs a the Agresors, range instrumentaion, and exrcise flying hours.25 Suter also knew that Dixon would want TAC to be in charge, and he ad anticpated Dixon?s next question - "Suter, who gets the credit for Red Flag?" Suter had Genral Jones? agrement o his response - "You do, sir!"26 ?Gen. Dixon loved it,? one atende recaled.27 Dixon told Genral Gabriel, Maj. Gen. James A. Knight, the comander of the Tactial Fighter Weapons Centr, and the staf to implent Red Flag nd that he wanted the first Red Flag t Nelis within six months. Ther was no money avilable, but Dixon was o enthusiastic about he xercise h told his comptroler, Col. Richard Muray, to get he rsources ?out of hide.?28 Ther stil remained the critcal isue of how to deal with te Air Force flying safety cultre. To provide ralistic ombat rainig, Red Flag would require that he crews fly at low levl to avoid etction by enmy radr coverage, whic is line of sight. Because of the curvature of the arth, low flying aircaft could avoid surface-to-air misile radrs, but ?low? meant very low ? les than 20 fet, wel below the authorized altiude for Air Force pilots at he time. This low flying would certainly cause acidents, especialy early in the program when the crews er unacustomed to such flying. 215 But, after discusing the Israeli Air Force loses in the 1973 Midle East War with IAF comander Benie Peld, Dixon had had difernt view about acidents than most of the snior genrals in the Air Force. He was to later say: We had the bst acident rate in TAC?s history in 1974, and alitle later ? Itink it ws probaly 1976 ? we ad te worst?I c?t el you tht anybody that has lw cident rat is hr r, conversly, abm, but Ic tel ou from the ratio f the crews. Did they think they wer geting ralistic trainig[in 1974]? Ty rtainly in?t29 Dixon was preared to try to change the Air Force flying safety cultre, and after Dixon aproved the briefing he caled Genral Jones and told him TAC was ready to take the lad on Red Flag. He also tld Jones that his type of realistic trainig involed risk, and would probaly result in icreased acidents for atime. Jones gave Dixon permision to waive the low levl altiude rules for the xercise, and Dixon sent out amesage that during Red Flag ircews could fly at low altiude with esntialy no restrictions when atcking targets, engae in air-to-air combat below 10,0 fet, and ignore airsped restrictions. 30In retrospect, Dixon?s imediate and unconditonal comitent o Red Flag was remarkable. Almost out of the blue, he was oferd an exrcise program that would, in esnce, tar up the ntire TAC trainig program and rebuild it, with unpredictable rsults and certainly unitende consequences. It would also take money - ther was litle to spare at his time - and ther would certainly be acidents, perhaps lots of acidents, whichic ould result in his uncermonius firng. Dixon?s decison to relax safety rules for Red Flag flew in the face of the last wenty ears of Air Force doctrine and policy. It would have ben uderstandable if Dixon had simply said, ?this i arealy intersting idea; let?s tudy it for a few months.? He di nothing of the sort. 216 Because h knew ther would be acidents, Dixon isited Red Flag had to quantify the rsults o he could prove the trainig was orthwile. He orderd that he Red Flag staf include aStudies and Analysi unit o dcument he rsults of the xercise.31 One of the first hings instaled at Nelis was the Red Flag Measuremnt and Debriefing System (MDS), whic include a Telvison Optical Scoring System (TOS) consiting of two video cameras et on hig round a sfe distance from sevral targets. 32When abomb impacted around the target, it was easy to score the bomb hit, and TOS not nly provide acurate scoring, but it also showed crews that hey wer ?presing? geting to close to the target o try to get a hit. When acrew droped real bombs in combat, relasing abomb to low put he aircaft into the ?frag patern? of the bomb, posibly leading to the los of the aircaft and its crew. The Red Flag measuring sytem also had video cameras on various imulated misile and A sites that showed how efctively crews maneuverd aginst hes threats.3 But Dixon?s enthusiasm di not automaticaly translate to his taf or t the flying wings. One of the staf mebers in charge of planig the first Red Flag remberd that when he briefd the xercise to Twelfth Air Force, the sub-nit in charge of Nelis, ?ther wer alot more nay sayers than ?go-fr-it? guys.?34 At he same tie, Suter went to Nelis to brief the oficers that would organize the first Red Flag, and found them very enthusiastic and ready to g.35 The problems raised by various isues ? fear of acidents, heavy operational comitents, lack of undig - resulted in litle inital movemnt. In early Septmber, Dixon asked for abriefing on Red Flag, and from the briefing it was clear ther had ben litle progres because the staf and the units wer stil working out various isues. Dixon 217 was incesed and lived up to his nickname of the ?Tidewater Aligator.? He said to fly the first Red Flag exrcise in November or heads would rol, and aflury of mesages went out o make sure this hapend. 36 One of the rsults of Dixon?s outbrst was the rapid evlopment of the first Red Flag ?Operations Plan.? The plan was very short, only about sevn pages with atchments, and the Red Flag planer at Nelis who rote it remberd, ?It was lmost a?back of the nvelope? document, and Iwas mazed it went hrough te TAC staf. Igues the planers wer just hapy that hey din?t have to spend time on it and had something to give to Dixon.?37 The first exrcise involed units close to Nelis to reduce ost and help with te logistics, o twenty-four F-4s from the 49 th Tactial Fighter Wing from Holman AFB, New Mexico, frmed the core of the ?Blue Force? for the first Red Flag on 29 November 1975. They wer joined by reconaisance aircaft, anti-SAM ?Wild easels,? forward air controler (FAC) aircaft, search-and-rescue hlicopters, and 561 people. The 49 th aircews doubted ther would be more than oe Red Flag, but hey had just ucesfuly completd an ORI and they viewd this a ?god eal? temporay duty (TDY) of two weks in Las Vegas, evn it was one-time xercise dreamed up by the TAC staf. When the 49th arived, to their amzent hey wer told that he low-flying altiude rstrictions wer basicaly removed and that he Nelis range now had realistic Soviet argets and threats, laid out acording to Sviet actial principles, as wel as ?moky SAMs,? pyrotechnic devices that wer fired balisticaly from the ground (not at he aircaft, just along the route) and left a smoke trail ike areal SAM. Ther was lso an elctronic warfre aircaft hat jamed Blue Force radio transmisions and the Agresors. The wing went hrough te ntire program, flew 52 sorties, and each of the wing?s forty 218 aircews flew at least ix air-to-ground misions and two air-to-air misions.38 Just like in combat, fter the misions the crews either went o the bar to discus the day?s misions, often with teir Agresor ponets (not quite like combat?) or stayed in the squadron to plan the nxt day?s mision. Sevral times during the xercise acrew that had maneuverd porly as hown by videotapes from the Red Flag Measuremnt and Debriefing System was designated as ?hot down,? and the nxt day helicopter tok the ?downed? crew to the midle of the xercise are and roped them of with just he survial gear they would have after they bailed out. Once droped of, the crew had to use their survial radios to cal for aful-fledged search-and-rescue operation. 39 Importantly, ther wer no acidents in the first Red Flag, but he xercise howed some of realites of TAC trainig. In air-to-ground operations, many tactis that had worked in Vietnam resulted in heavy simulated loses. The Blue Force ?lost? twenty aircaft, including twelv in air-to-air combat with te Agresors, while shoting down five Agresors, akil ratio f over 2:1 in favor f the Agresors.40 At he nd of the two-ek exrcise, the ral question was how el Red Flag was meting its main goal of providing realistic ombat rainig. While SEA combat experince quickly disapeard from the active units a young pilots left he Air Force or wer promted out of the cokpit, almost half the Holman crews - 49.2 percnt ? who went o Red Flag wer combat vetrans, and many had particpated in the Linebacker operations. As part of the documentaion sytem, Dixon had the crews rate the xercise' realism on ascale of 1 to 10, with 10 represntig real combat. Overal, the Holman crews rated Red Flag s 8.7 out of 10.41 Coments include ?Best rainig environment 219 [I?ve] ver ncounterd?; not nly let?s me think about actis but requires it!? ?Outsandig trainigmost realistic since actual combat.?42 The xercise umary noted Red Flag ?demonstrated the principles for composite strike operations? [and] emonstrated the dificulties of detrminig the ighest priority threat nd taking the apropriate actions in acombined air-to-air and ground-to-air threat environment.? It also showed the ?importance of diversity of tactis and the ned to shift tactis frequently.? It was: cost efctive and provide contiuos trainig in itegrated strike prations priously ailable ly intermitetly?most imrtt, the Red Flg exrcis, b phasizng the cncept of integrated oprations, provide avehicle for taii uits i the csry cmd, cntrl, comuniatins, inteligence, and interoperabilty techniques and ctrie of combid oprtios ad frd man advatgs for inrasing peratins readines through joint riing. 43 The suces of the first Red Flag enrated huge xcitemnt i TAC, but evn with the inital suces, Dixon was cautious. He constantly pointed out hat hig Red Flag acident rate would make ralistic trainig to expensive, and he then would have to put limits on the xercise.4 He told the flying wing comanders that, while the low levl flying restrictions wer of, he would ?hang, draw and quarter the man that akes ayoung second lieutnat down ther who as nevr tained ther and gets him kiled?don?t ake people down ther that don?t know ho to perate down ther[at low levl]! That?s your job?you had betr know evrything about him ther is to know. If you kil him, you are responsible for kiling him.?45 He also asured Genral Knight, the comander at Nelis, that he would be protectd from reprcusions from acidents, but hat ?we have to d this right or we?l set realistic trainig back to filing squares around the flag pole.? 46 20 Dixon also left anote in the mandatory ?Crew Read File? at Red Flag teling the crews: ?For God?s ake, be alitle careful about his thing, because a litle misdirectd enthusiasm wil set us back 20 years.? 47 At he same tie, Dixon emphasized that if ther was n acident he comander was responsible for findig out what hapend and teling Dixon the truth so the staf could fix the problem. 48 Red Flag I tok place at he nd of January 1976 and Red Flag I was longer, almost a month long, from 28 February -26 March. Beginig with Red Flag I, the Air Force F-15 Operational Test and Evalution uit permanetly staioned four F-15s at Nelis to fly with te Blue Force in evry exrcise. Crews came from Europe to fly and A-10s came to Red Flag for the first ime in Red Flag V in July 1976. 49By the nd of its first ful year of peration, both Marine and Army aircaft and helicopters wer particpating, and Red Flag ircews had flown more than 10,0 realistic ombat rainig sorties. By the nd of 1976, the ?value of [Red Flag?s] realistic simulation was universaly aceptd?as the ultimate tst?resmbling actual war s much as posible, with crews often operating under considerable strain.? 50Later Red Flags howed Dixon was right o be concerned about acidents. In 1976, the first ful year of Red Flag, ther wer 32 Clas A mishaps. This was 4.6 times the rate of TAC mishaps er 10,0 flying hours (TAC?s overal rate was 7 per 10,0 hours) and 1.4 times the Air Force rate (2.4 per 10,0 hours).51 Dixon came under increasing presure from Air Force Chief of Staf Jones to lwer the acident rate, and at one point Dixon ad Jones reportedly got into ashouting match about he acident rate in the E ring of the Pentagon. Nevrthels, despite the igh acident rate and Jones? increasing doubts, Dixon remained comited to the xercise. One of his coleagues rembers 21 ?[Dixon] was iling to take the at for acidents at Red Flag because h belived deply that his very realistic trainig would save Air Force lives in the futre and contribute to victory in war. He nver waverd in his uport.? 52 After ach exrcise, ther was extnsive folw up. The Red Flag staf tok the critques of the particpating units and cirulated them to the nxt units cheduled to particpate, and tried to ad more simulators and realistic targets a quickly as posible. When ther was n acident, the fighter pilots on the Red Flag nd TAC stafs carefuly anlyzed it o lok for any trends. They son found the major cause of acidents was hiting the ground uring the first wek. This emed to be cause the nw environment overwhelmed the aircews the first few days when they wer "presing" to try to d wel, and this lead to distraction, iatention, or chanelized atention.53 To help lower the acident rate, acident reports went out from each Red Flag to al units o they could begin to preare and train for the nvironment. Gradualy, as Dixon ad the iron majors expectd, the acident rate droped in 197 and 1978 as the Red Flags contiued and pre- Red Flag trainig improved.54 Despite the acidents, the cathy tile of ?Red Flag? and the ralism of the trainig wer wel recived both within the Air Force and by the public, and it became asymbol of anew ay of trainig. Dixon brought anyone who ould come ? senators and represntaives, tafers, news people ? to vist he xercise, and the comander of the Fighter Weapons Centr, Lieutnat Genral James A. Knight, remberd, ?we invited the world and they came?it was in Las Vegas [and] the downton people wer very responsive to ur neds, particularly in etrtainig vistors.? 5 2 In May 197, TAC and Red Flag won the Colier Trophy, honring those who ad made signifcant achievments in the advancemnt of avition, beating out he man-powerd ?Gosamer Condor.? The citaion said, ?The awrd goes to the Tactial Air Comand for devloping and implentig Red Flag, an uprecdentd combat simulated flight rainig program for aircews of the U.S. Armed Forces and asignifcant contribution to national defnse.?56 As Suter had promised, Dixon ad TAC got al the credit and, espite their contributions, noe of the XO iron majors recived an ivitaion to the awrd iner, evn though it was in Washington. Genral Huyser, the XO, was given a eight-person table, and he gave his tickets to Suter and the other oficers who had evloped the idea. When Genral Dixon aceptd the awrd, he thanked the asemblage on behalf of TAC and al the outsandig personel in TAC and at Nelis who brought e xercise to fruiton, but made no mention f the gnesi of the idea of Red Flag. After the diner, Dixon pased by wher Suter and the XO group wer standig and said, "Don't Iknow you from soe wher?" Suter smiled faintly and said, "Yes ir, Mody Suter sir!" Dixon loked at Suter and his coleagues and said, "Ther?s an open bar in ther, have yourself agod time,? and walked of without another word. It was, as one oficer noted, ?typical Dixon.?57 WHAT RED FLAG WROUGHT The isues that came up in the Red Flag exrcise precipitaed adebate about he Air Force's Tactis Manual, Air Force Manual (AFM) 3-1. Ther wer two schols of thought about he manual. The ?safety Air Force? schol held that tacti could not be tried if it was not in the Tactis Manual. The ?combat cultre? schol said that he Tactis Manual was guide and that actis or maneuvers that wer not expresly 23 forbiden could be tried. Dixon steped in ad said to rewrite the Tactis Manual to clearly stae that it was constantly evoling uide. He made it clear that he wanted the aircews to be creative and to try any tacti they thought would work, and only those evnts that wer expresly forbiden wer prohibited. 58 The change in the Tactis Manual was, in oe snse, a bureaucratic proces, but it was formal cknowledgemnt of the sa change from ?fly safe? to ?train the way ou plan to fight? that had ocured and was gainig moentum. Red Flag initaly focused on bringi existing equipment o Nelis to kep cost down, but Genral Grenleaf?s ofice of Programs and Budget xpectd abil was coming, and they wer right. 59 In the spring of 1976, once Red Flag was firmly established, Suter wrote Air Force Required Operational Capbilty (ROC) 76-1 formaly to request funds to improve Nelis? ranges in order to creat arealistic ombat rainig environment with areal-time scoring sytem for fedback. The ky elments in ROC 76- 1 wer those discused - or fantsized about - since the conception f Red Flag ? more realistic targets, more instrumentd ranges and instrumentd aircaft on the ranges, and real-time fedback to Nelis to faciltae control, safety, and the pasing of information to the aircews. The Air Force aceptd the ROC and Congres aproved the funds in FY1978. Thes funds wer akey building block in making Red Flag into a truly efctive and flexible trainig operation. More video recorders wer instaled around the ranges o virtualy al the vents could be taped, ebriefd, and used as teaching tols, but he most important ew piec of equipment was the ?Air Combat Maneuvering, Instrumentd? (ACMI) range, an improved version f the Air Combat aneuvering Range (ACMR) devloped for Top Gun i May 1971.60 The ACMI was not nly useful for Red Flags but 24 also fr the normal day-to-day trainig conducted at Nelis by the Fighter Weapons Schol. The xercise teadily grew in size and sophistication, and the video fotage tok the gueswork out of the xercise and provide asolid link betwen day-to-day trainig and fedback. Genral James Knight, the Nelis comander, later said I went many times to the range to bserve nw ideas that our young crs i th squadrn wr trying to dlop n invate. It was obvious, wen lokig at it from the vies take from th defnsie side on th grund, wh ad canc of surviing and who din?t by te tactis they mploye. 61 As Red Flag became ore sucesful, its importance alowed Suter to acquire more Soviet aircaft and weapons ystems, including SAMs from the Foreign Technolgy Divison at Wright-Paterson AFB, Ohio, riginaly provide by the Israelis. 62 DUPLICATING COMBAT The combat vetrans who flew Red Flag exrcise thought e xperince losely duplicated combat, but heir impresions beg the question f ?how?? Before Red Flag, miltary theorist had, for sevral reasons, considerd the idea of realistic trainig imposible. First, the nemy and location f the ?next war? wer unkown.63 Vietnam had ben aclasic example of this problem as the United Staes Army, trained for afst moving armored war in Europe, strugled ther. Second, ther semed to be no way to duplicate the contiuing physical nd psycholgical stres and efcts of combat, both of casualties and/or ther sytems damged or destroyed. For ground forces, this meant men wounde and ying, equipment disabled and/or destroyed, fire, xplosins, noise, and isrupted comunications. For 25 navl vesls, it meant al of this plus the los or intermitent operation f ship?s ystems. How to resolve combat betwen smal units was lso aproblem. Often during round exrcise tanks wound up gun barel to gun barel with teir comanders creaming ?you?re dad? at each other. 64 Third was the sher logistics of having a lrge-scale ralistic trainig exrcise.65 Large xercise meant moving forces from their ares of responsibilty into the xercise location, often far way. Such deployments for the xercise and then redployments tok a great deal of time and resources. Thes considerations drove planers of large-scale exrcise to make them (1) short, to miniize out-of-are time and (2) scripted, to achiev the maxium ?trainig," as measured by the number of evnts that ocured during the xercise and how el they met he xercise objectives. The rsult was that ther was litle, if any, spontaeity or action/reaction, exactly the oposite of combat. Al of thes factors combined ? lack of knowledge of who the nemy would be and the location f the nxt war, inabilty to simulate casualties, and the ned to kep the exrcise short and scripted for lgistical nd time constraint reasons ? made any large exrcise vry structred and thus nrealistic, because one of the charcteristics of war is its chaos and unpredictabilty. This al contributed to the idea that realistic trainig ? that is, trainig that simulated real combat - was, for practial purose, imposible.6 Red Flag was ble to vercome virtualy al of thes problems. The first part of the first problem ?location f the war - was unimportant. Al the places the United Staes was planig to fight? Korea, Europe, and later the Persian Gulf ? had irfields, uplies, hangars, comand and control facilties and other basic necsites already in place. 26 Ther was litle difernce in the ares wher the Air Force planed to fight and Nelis, except at Nelis the weather was reliably god so trainig was posible yar-ound. The scond part of the first problem, the charcteristics of the nemy, was easy because during the Cold War the Air Force knew the nemy would be the Soviets or their proxies. Air combat is heavily depndent on technolgy, and the Air Force knew it ould be facing Soviet echnolgy, whetr maned by the Soviets in person r by their alies, and that heir enmy would be using Soviet actis because Soviet echnolgy and tactis wer inseparble. 67 The scond problem, personel causalites and batle damge, was much les relvant in air combat han i ground or navl ship combat. In air combat each aircaft is alone, aself-contained unit, linked to thers only b radio. A damged or shot down aircaft simply drops out of ormation, perhaps with ardio cal. It does not disrupt he flow of the air batle ? it is imply gone. This ituation is easily duplicated in trainig, when a aircaft designated as ?hot down? is caled on the radio and told to leave the fight, a proces known as ?kil removal.? When a ircaft is ?kil removed,? the rst of the formation adjust to fil the gap to acomodate the nw numbers, just as they would o in combat. A combination f actors neutralized the third problem, logistics. The Air Force planed to fight in ares that l had the same basic facilties that wer in place at Nelis. Because most of the tactial Air Force was based in the United Staes, deploying quickly to Europe or Asia was part of each unit?s war plans, o adeployment o Nelis was realistic and alowed ach unit o practie its deployment plans. Once dployed, the units become part of an i-place omand and control and suply network, just as they would 27 in combat. The rfers and ocumentig procedures wer also in place, and isputes wer resolved after the day?s misions. Finaly, once at Red Flag, units faced asituation that closely replicated combat. They wer awy from their homes and familes and al they had to d was ?plan the misions, fly, fight, and go t the bar.? The movemnt and relocation f orces that was uch adificult ask for land forces and surface ships was plus for Red Flag because it aded aditonal realism. Red Flag lso duplicated combat by placing the crews in a unfamilar environment. They wer flying over a vst range that was new to most of them and had no familar landmarks. They had new targets evry day, so n evry mision the crews had the chalenge of navigating and maneuvering to avoid efnse to and from the target are, then actualy findig the proer target and roping real bombs. Not nly that, but he crews er responsible for scoring their own bomb ipacts, as they would have to d in combat. When the crews returned and ebriefd, they reported wher the bombs hit, then in the mas debriefing at he nd of the day their eports wer compared to the actual results a shown by video and films. The ralism genrated by Red Flag was ynergistic. In the air, combat vetrans with hundres of misions aginst heavy defnse recognized that Red Flag came vry close to duplicating the basic nature of combat. Miltarily anlyst and combat vetrans alike have long recognized that combat is auniquely dnamic situation, men aginst men, and for each move, ther is acountermove. In this ense, it is much like agme, but with magnifed consequences because of the finality of the outcome. Aircaft sped increase the dynamis. Modern jet fighters travel at eight o ten miles aminute and can rive or depart acombat zone in afew seconds, o air combat is an rea of what his author cals 28 ?acelrated ynamis.? A combat pilot has not nly to be concerned with what is going on at he imediate moent, but what wil be going on i the nxt minute or two because the sped of the actions can etirely change the nature of the batle in amoent. Red Flag was ble to duplicate the dynamis and uncertainty of combat because the crews nevr knew hat kind of defnse they would encounter, wher, or how many. This was to help the aircews devlop what is known i the fighter comunity as ?ituational awrens,? the abilty to kep track of multiple, hig-sped evnts at he same tie while stil keping focused on the mision. Red Flag lso brought new levls of realism to air-to-air combat rainig. When the Agresors visted TAC wings, their misions wer ?caned? to get maxium trainig for al the crews. An gresor vist began with one vrsu one combats, then moved on to two versu two, then four versu four as the vist progresd, al in pre-scheduled air- to-air combat rainig ares. While thes caned misions wer useful and the bst way to maxiize trainig benfits during ashort vist, realism was acrifced because both sides began with acrucial elment of situational warens - each knew exactly how many enmy aircaft her wer, as wel as when ad wher the ngaemnts would take place. 68 This was the not he case at Red Flag, wher ther wer unkown umbers of ?enmy? aircaft and a lrge are wher engaemnts could take place. The Blue Force nevr knew ho many Agresors it would find, or when ad wher it would be atcked. Someties flights would get in ad out and evr se an Agresor, while other flights might be atcked both inbound and outbound.69 29 Maximu realism was lso built into the ground-atck misions. Every crew had the oportunity to cary aful combat load of real bombs on at least one Red Flag mision, forcing both te aircews and the ground crews to flow the procedures for arming and safeing weapons on the ground and arming the weapons before dlivery. It demonstrated to the aircews how dificult it was to fly heavy aircaft and how important proer switch positons wer.70 More than oe crew hauled two tns of live bombs to the range and deliverd them acurately only to get alrge cloud of dirt instead of an explosin because they had forgten to arm the weapons. The video f such mistakes was source of great amusent of the rst of the crews at he mas debriefing, and served to reinforce the point.71 Finaly, Red Flag was ble to simulate the ubiquitous ?the fog f war,? wher Clausewitz famously noted, ?evn the simplest ask become dificult.? 72 At Red Flag, the problems that devloped from flying large, cordinated strike packages ? flights being early or late, being in the wrong place, aircaft aborting, radio and other comunications problems ? wer no difernt from the problems that rose in combat, because they are ndemic to trying to get large numbers of aircaft airborne and in positon to excute aplan. The ?fog f war? apeard naturaly, simply b using large numbers of aircaft. It is important o nte that Red Flag di not fer the crews ?by the bok? answers for evry problem that would arise in combat. In fact, it deliberately tried not provide specifc solutions to specifc problems. Red Flag intede to show the aircews that during alrge xercise, as in combat, things would go wrong and the crews nede to have aflexible mindset so they would be mentaly preared for problems. 73 230 THE NW FIGHTER PILOT CULTRE ? REALISTIC FLYING SAFETY? Red Flag nd the Agresors proved to be xtremly poular with te aircews, and provide ahuge psycholgical benfit. Flying fihters had lways ben ?fun,? but now realistic trainig provide the Type A fighter crews not nly with new chalenges but also with te feling that hey wer doing something worthwile. Crews loked forward to going to Red Flag to fly low levl over a strange range, work in large strike packages with new people in difernt aircaft aginst realistic air and ground threats, drop live bombs, and have god, meanigful debriefings. They loked forward to the Agresor vist as chance to have their skils testd aginst he bst. This feling of doing something worthwile was one of the rasons the crews had come to fly in the Air Force, and al they had to d to kep this type of trainig was to flow the rules.74 With te comitent o realistic trainig, another cultral change bgan to take place in the fighter force. The older crews and low-levl comanders wer combat vetrans and knew the trainig they wer geting was exponetialy betr than y trainig they had goten before and was going to help them survie and be fective in the nxt war. They also knew the quickest way to end this type of trainig was to have acidents. The Rules of Engaemnt wer as lose as posible, but hey had to be nforced, and in the squadrons, the older aircew became the ?guardians of the ROE.? They had ben through both real combat nd ?around the flagpole? trainig, and they wer not going to have the realistic trainig they had prayed for jeopardized by a young oficer who ould not folw the rules. Another ?guardian of the ROE? was the Agresors. They had credibilty not nly because of their expertise but also because of their atitude. They 231 wer not flying to win, but o teach, and thus wer wiling to cal any violation f the ROE, evn o themselvs.75 THE IMPACT OF RED FLAG ON THE AIR FORCE Red Flag was ucesful beyond anyone?s expectaions, and was milestone in the iron majors? push for ealistic trainig. Prior t mid-1973, the average Air Force fighter pilot recived virtualy no air-to-air combat rainig, and o air-to-ground combat trainig except for tips to the local range. Thre and ahlf years later ? at he bginig of 197 ? virtualy evry fighter pilot in the Air Force had flown aginst he Agresors in demandig air-to-air combat rainig, and over 70 aircews, about half the TAF fighter force, had flown i Red Flag exrcise.76 Dixon ethusiasticaly pushed the Air Force to expand Red Flag to provide bnefits of realistic trainig to ther comands, including Strategic Air Comand and the Miltary Airlift Comand (MAC). Both agred to particpate in Red Flag IV, and for both of thes comands the introduction to realistic ombat rainig was rude one. When SAC?s B-52s came to their first Red Flag, SAC headquarters was o cncerned that its crews perform wel that SAC headquarters planed the ntire mision. The B-52s came in at hig altiude in the contrail evl, so they draged long lines of thin white clouds behind them. The Agresors, ?laughing so hard they could hardly kep them in the gunsight,? shot down? evry one. That fternon at he mas debrief, to jers and raucous coments, the B-52 mision comander xplained how the crews had to fly the mision i the contrails ?because that was the altiude SAC headquarters planed, and we couldn?t deviate.? The rsults of the misions went back to SAC headquarters, and from that point on the SAC crews tok over their own mision planig.7 23 During that same Red Flag, MAC sent sevral arge C-14 transports to particpate, but MAC failed to apreciate that he C-14s wer painted ?MAC White? on the top f the aircaft or heat disipation. Even though te C-14s flew at low levl they wer easily spoted by the Agresors who, nce agin, shot down evry one. 78 This led MAC to reconsider is colr schems, and later Red Flags found B-52s and C-14s ? now painted grey and gren ? dogin in ad out of the mountains at low levl to avoid the Agresors and the other defnse. 79 Ther wer many lesons learned for the TAF as wel. Many Vietnam-era TAF tactis ? airborne forward air controlers, reconaisance misions, and Wild easel atcks on SAM sites ? wer extnsively modifed as result of lying Red Flag misions. Each Red Flag sent out ?Lesons Learned? briefings throughout he TAF, wher the aircews devoured them.80 Performance at Red Flag became a unit?s measure of merit, and the units cheduled for Red Flag began to fcus on it long before their arival. Dixon made it clear unit comanders bore the rsponsibilty for prearing their units for the dmands of Red Flag, especialy fling at very low levl. 81 Flying at low levl was n acquired skil, like flying air-to-air combat, but TAC lacked ateaching template to instruct he young pilots how to d it. At his point, another ?iron major,? Major John Jumper, steped in to provide an inovative way to teach low- levl flying and the other combat skils nede for Red Flag. had served in Vietnam during the aviest fighting of the war nd afterwards went o fly F-4s in Europe, wher he saw the steady etrioration i flying skils because of ?around the flagpole? trainig. He also actively particpated in the informal, undisciplined ways the aircews tried to kep their flying skils, uch as disregarding low-levl altiude rstrictions and engaing 23 in large, unbriefd, multinational disimilar ircaft dogfihts over the North Sea.82 In 1975, Jumper went o the Air Comand and Staf Coleg at Maxwel Air Force Base, Alabma, wher he wrote his thesi on away to improve aircew skils caled ?Building Block Trainig.? In the paer Jumper outlined in great detail aprogram wher young aircews began low-levl trainig by fling in formation ad oing hard maneuvers and turns at 50 fet, then oce they wer proficent her droping down to 30 fet wher they would repat he trainig, and once proficent her drop down to the Red Flag altiude, 10 fet. Before moving to the lower altiudes, the crews ould fly with instructors and their progres documentd in their grade bok.83 Jumper, like Suter and the iron majors in the Pentagon, consulted closely with other fighter crews to make sure his ideas wer solid. But Jumper?s thesi, another xample of ?buble up? inovation, might ave languished in the libray at Maxwel had Jumper not ben sent o Nelis a n istructor in the Weapons Schol just after he finished Air Comand and Staf. When he arived at Nelis, Jumper found that, because of areshufling of base, the F-4 Fighter Weapons Schol was canceling its advanced weapons chol clases to teach absic F-4 flying course for crews new to the aircaft. This was simple task compared to the flying the Weapons Schol instructors had ben doing, and it left he instructors with time on their hands. Their squadron comander, Lary Keith, ?encouraged? them to work on ew ideas for tainig as part of Red Flag and Dixon?s push for ealistic trainig. 84 With tis encouragemnt, Jumper?s fuly formed ?building block trainig? ideas found fertile ground. Jumper tok his building block thesi to the quarterly Fighter Weapons Schol magzine, USAF ighter Weapons Reviw. It was ceptd, and the 234 entire Winter 1976 and Spring 197 isues of the Reviw er devoted to new trainig methods, led by Jumper?s building block? aproach. The aircews genraly read the Fighter Weapons Reviw carefuly, and the units quickly adopted the nw trainig sugestions. Trainig standars oared, and son crews had to fly more misions to qualify for aRed Flag deployment han they had to fly for combat operations over Hanoi.85 While Jumper?s ideas on building block trainig wer not apedagoical revolution, they wer a signifcant part of the Air Force?s inovation i the mid-1970s, in some snse as important as Red Flag. The iron majors knew it as not enough to say, ?We?r porly trained.? They had to have nues in whic to train ? like Red Flag ? and they had to learn how to train. Red Flag nd the building block aproach to trainig wer codepndent. THE IMPACT OF RED FLAG ON THE AMERICAN MILITARY The Army was atching Red Flag closely, and once the xercise bgan, it made ahuge impresion the srvice. Dixon ivited Army genrals to vist, and les than year after the first Red Flag, Major Genral Paul Gorman of the Army?s Trainig and Doctrine Comand (TRADOC) wrote aglowing evalution f the xercise and recomende ? almost demande - that he Army adopt asimilar exrcise program. Gorman said that he Army has ?evry reason to hasten to emulate TAC? because Army trainig was evoling in the same direction as TAC?s but was ?five yars or more bhind.? 86 On Augst 9, 197, the Department of the Army anounced the foundig of the National Trainig Centr at Fort Irwin, California. The National Trainig Centr was oficaly activated 16 October 1980, with an Oposing Force (OPFR) simulating Soviet forces much like the 235 Agresors di for the Air Force during Red Flag. The first exrcise was held in January 1982.87 Ironicaly, the Navy was the slowest o flow. The srvice was quite pleased with Top Gun, but because carier air wings had evry tpe of aircaft and usaly launched ful strike packages autonmously, the srvice was lower to move on to large air-to-ground atck exrcise. But after adisatrous performance by Navy atck aircaft around Beirut, Lebano, in May 1984 Navy Secrtary John Leman orderd the Navy to establish te Navl Strike Warfre Centr at he Navl Air Staion at Falon, Nevad, for studying and trainig for strike misions. It was quickly christend ?Strike University? and worked closely with Top Gun.8 The flags contiued to unfrl. With encouragemnt from Dixon ad help from the TAC staf, the Candian miltary creatd Maple Flag t Cold Lake, Alberta, Canda, whic more closely simulated the German weather than the dserts of Nelis, and TAC established Blue Flag t Hurlburt Field, Florida, to train personel for the comand and control sytem in the European theatr. 89 Ther have ben few changes in American miltary history that have ben as profund as the ones brought on by Red Flag, and certainly noe that ok place as quickly in peacetime. In late 1968, realistic ombat rainig was considerd imposible and ot evn atempted. Top Gun ad the Agresors brought some sal changes in oe specifc are, but in 1975, realistic trainig for most of the American miltary was til apie dream, blocked by semingly impentrable structral nd cultral impediments. Yet by the late 1970s, the cultre of ?realistic trainig? was n established part of American 236 miltary philosphy, and evry trainig program or exrcise had to met asimple criterion ? combat realism. DIXON?S OTHER CHANGES Dixon ext focused on improving TAC?s combat capbilty b increasing the combat sortie rate. He was extremly intersted in the igh sortie rates the Israeli Air Force regularly genrated and how they wer able to ?surge? in the 1973 Midle East War. After consulting with Benie Peld, Dixon aded anew ?flag,? Black Flag, whic exrcised the abilty of mainteance rews to suport wo days of lying at he maxium wartime sortie rate. Black Flag was ucesful, but his conversations with Peld confirmed to Dixon that he TAF nede amore basic hange.90 As discused arlier, in its beginigs TAC used the concept of squadron mainteance, wher personel asigned to the squadron di most mainteance. 91When Genral Sweney tok comand of TAC, he introduced the SAC concept of centralized mainteance, wher the wing, not he squadrons, di al mainteance. On the surface, this emed to make snse, because it alowed asingle st of specialist and equipment maintain al the aircaft in awing, rather than each squadron having its own specialist and equipment. For avriety of subtle but important reasons that Dixon uderstod, the sytem was unpoular nd unsatisfactory for fighters,. One of the main efcts of wing mainteance was psycholgical. With squadron mainteance, the mainteance rews and the aircews wer in the same sal unit and came to know each other, but with wing mainteance, crew chiefs wer asigned at random and often changed aircaft, and this bond was broken. Dixon ad many others in the TAF felt his ?lack of wnership? made the mainteance prsonel es investd and thus les intersted in their job, and it also cut an 237 informal bond betwen the nlisted mainteance prsonel and the oficer pilots. When IAF comander Peld told Dixon that much of the rason for the igh sortie rate genrated by the Israeli Air Force during the Yom Kipur war as the intagible bond betwen aircews and the mainteance prsonel, it simply confirmed something Dixon already belived.92 It was, like ralistic trainig, focused on the men rather than the machines. This intagible ?touchy-fely? relationship was not he only reason Dixon wanted to bring back squadron mainteance. He knew that, compared to bmbers, fighters required relatively litle cntralized, specialized mainteance and more ?quick fix? and turn-around mainteance, so ther was relatively litle bnefit from centralized mainteance. More important, squadron mainteance was of a piec with Red Flag nd the other programs Dixon itroduced to increase the TAF?s readines to fight awar. Red Flag showed that, under combat conditons, ome form of squadron mainteance was necsary to kep the aircaft at he xercise flying, and is was clear that TAC squadrons nede nough specialist and equipment o deploy with te units. In 1976, Dixon began to pres the Air Force to alow him to introduce asytem caled Production Orientd Mainteance Organization (POM), whic was esntialy the old sytem of squadron mainteance.93 But POM was ?combat cultre? thinkig that was til not fuly absorbed by the Air Force. Unlike Red Flag, whic TAC esntialy controled, changi TAC?s mainteance oncept was dificult because it would mean changes in the ntire Air Force mainteance sytem. Ther wer semingly god arguments for keping the wing mainteance sytem. Concetrating specialist in oe place rquired fewr people than spreading them around 238 in the squadrons. Even Dixon admited that wing would ned almost wice as many specialist to kep them in the squadrons rather than keping them in centralized mainteance. While Dixon was powerful voice, he ad to cnvice the other Air Force four-stars to agre to change Air Force manig requiremnts to give more mainteance people to TAC ? not an easy task, because the Air Force was having recruitng problems in the post-draft and post-Vietnam War era. Then, evn if the Air Force agred to the manig, the schols at Air Trainig Comand had to increase the number of mainteance men they wer trainig, a time consuming proces. Dixon kew hic butons to push to make this hapen because h ad ben the Air Force Chief of Personel, but he was fighting other four-star genrals who ad their own personel neds and ther was only so much Dixon could o. The change was low and evolutionary, and it was not until after Dixon left TAC that he comand fuly adopted squadron mainteance.94 The rorganization i mainteance and mainteance manig in TAC might sem to be rlatively unimportant, but proer mainteance manig was key to TAC?s readines and combat capbilty. The changes wer gradualy implented, but he tmporay shortage of mainteance prsonel and equipment wer to become ajor isues a the F-15 began to cme into service with its ophisticated sytems.95 DIXON?S LEGACY In the nd, Dixon ? along with Mody Suter - must go dwn as what scholar Charles Muray cals ?System Builders.? System Builders prose ideas that have a profund impact hat ranscends the imediate and marks a fundamental change in a worldview.96 239 Before Dixon ad Suter initated Red Flag, realistic trainig was considerd imposible. When Dixon left TAC, it was el on its way to being a way of life in the miltary. To make sure his TAC programs would contiue, Dixon used his knowledge of the personel sytem to have more gneral oficer slots aloted to TAC, including two thre- star genral positons in his ubordinate comands, Ninth Air Force and Twelfth Air Force. This was part of an ogoing and ultimately sucesful atempt by the TAF senior oficers to take over the Air Force from the SAC genrals. Dixon said later ?I could run TAC without either of thes numberd Air Forces?.but Iwanted to train more gnerals.? He contiued that in the mid-80s the ?Pentagon was run by former colnels that come out of TAC,? and one former ember of his taf was chief of staf, one vice hief of staf, one asitant vice hief of staf, one the dputy chief of staf or plan d operations (XO), and one the dputy chief of staf or esarch and evlopment. 97 1. John Vickery, Col. USAF, e-mails to author 5 June, 21 June 205; Wil Rud, Col. USAF, e-mail t authr 7 ptber 205. 2. C.R ?Dick? Anderg, Col. USAF, Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietam (Washingtn, D.C: ir Force istr ad Musems Proram, 201), 91. 3. James A. Knight, Lt. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview, 17 Augst 198, K29.0512-54, FHRA, 27; author?s interview ith Col. Joseph D. Salvuci, February 06. 4. Wher precisely Suter got hes numbers i not clear. Vickery?s e-mail of 21 June 205 says ty am from aLitn study i th Petagn libray, but during this period the uthor bserved in the XOT ofices a copy of the Fesiilt Sty to Predict Combat Efctins i Slcted Rls: Fighter Pilt Efctivens, ARDA Contrat Study MDA 903, 76 C0169, MDC E1643, (St. Louis Misouri: McDonel ugls, 29 April 197). This extraordinary document is acmpilatin f avriety f stdies, and the information t cnectio betwe icresed survibilty nd th numbr of isins i discused i p. 3-6, pasim, spcialy in Section 3, p. 9-10. The information is also cntained in Herbert K. Weis, ?ystms Aalysi Problms of Liited War,? Anals of Rliabilty and Maintainbilt, July 196, 5. In fact, the actual 240 studies howed the 10 percnt rule was for ?decisve? misions, misions wher combat was o ints omon was hot don. 5. Vickery and Rud e-mails. 6. Ibid.; R Flag Brifing slides in author?s colection, provide by John Vickery. 7. Suter briefin to US Army Traiig nd Dtrin Cman (TRADOC), described in An W. Chapan, ?he Oriis and evlopet of the National Trainig Cntr 1976-1984,? TRADOC Historical Mogrph Sries, (Frt Monre, Virgini: US Army Trainig and Doctrine omand [TRADOC], 197), . 8. Alfred Lotka, ?Th Frquecy Distribution f Scientifc Productivity,? Journal of the Washingtn Acdemy of Scins, 16 (1926): 317-32; Feasibilty Stud, 3-9. 9 ?Fiter Pilot Efctives,? 3-, 3-. 10. Mrav Halperin ad Aharon Lapidot, G-Suit: Combat Reports From Israel?s Air Wars (London: Tim Wrer Bks UK, 190), 2. 1. Vickery and Rud -mails. 2. ir e-mail; Knight, 210. 13. Anderg, 90-1. 4. Joh Corder, Lt. Gen. USAF, phone interview by author, 13 April 205; End of Tour Reprt, l. Charles abriel, Comadr, 432nd TRW, 4 Setmber 1972, 8-9, AFHA. 15. History of the Tactial Air Comand, Volume One, July?Decmber 1975, Volume One (Langly Air Force Base, Virgiia: Hadquartrs, Tatial Air Comand, March 1976), 105. 6. Vickery e-mail 6 June 205; Rud e-mail 13 May 205. 17. ir -il, 19 J . 8. Anderg, 92; Vickery e-mail, 19 June 205. For Huyser?s biography, se htp:/w.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=50 (acsed Nvembr 205) 19. Feris interview ith uthr March 16-7, 206, Moris Hils, NJ. ?White whiskey" includs odka, rum, and gin, wi is considerd t be ls hangovr inducing tan ?brow hiskey? sch as bleed hiskey, burbon, an scot. 20. Iid. 1. Feris interview; Vickery e-mail; Anderg, 93. 2. Vickery -mail; Feris intrview. 3. Feris Interview; Tactial Air Comand History, Jul-Dec 1975, 76. 24. Rd Flag brifing slides. 5. Ibi. 26. Vickery e-mail, 16 June 205. 7. Robrt Dixon, Gen. USAF, ?Adendum to USAF Oral History Interview,? K239.0512-591, 9 Octobr 19; Leaf to Dixn (underling in rigal), Apndix A in ?Adendum?; also Robert Dixon, Gn. USAF, Oral History Iterview, 21 Setmber 198, K239.0512-591, AFHRA, 246. 2. Leaf to Dixon. 9. Dixn Oral History, 246-247. 241 30. Wiliam Edwards? letr, Apendix D to ixon ?Adendum?; Leaf letr; TAC History 1975, 105; Jmes A. Knight, Lt. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interviw, 17 ugst 198, K23.2-14, FHR, 236. 31. TAC History 975, 78. 2. Genral Lar Welch letr to Dixon, Apendix C, Dixon, ?Adendum.? 3. Adreg, 94. 4. Vickry, -mail. 35. Author?s Interview ith Col. Joseph D. Salvuci, February 206. 6. Dixn Addum Apendix . Fr aful list of th msges, e TAC History, Volume 1, 975, 105, fotnot 157; p. 106, fotnote 159. 37. Corder interview ith author. A nrmal xrcise plan runs evnty to eighty pages. Fr th pla itslf, se ?Red Flag Iplentaion Order.? TAC Prgramin Plan Numbr 20-75, Hedquartrs Tactil Air Comd, Lagly ir Force Bse, Virgii, 1 ovember 1975. 38. TAC History 1975, 10-13. 9. Ibid., 13; ?Bold Eagle-Red Flag,? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Spring 1976, 17. 40. ?Final Report, Red Flag One,? in Twelfth Air Force History, 1 Jul 1975-31 Decmber 1975, Vlum One (Bergstrom Air Force Bas, TX, 1976), 7 41. Iid., 8-9. 2. Ronal L. Rusing, Major USAF, ?Preparing the Fighter Force ? Red Flag/Cmpsite Force? (ster?s Thesi: US Army Comand and Gnral Staf Cole, 1980), 25. 43. TAC History, 1975, 19. For afuler acount, se ?Final Report, Red Flag ,29-November-20 Dec ,? USA Tctil Fighter Wapons Cetr, Nlis AB, NV, 1 January 1976, in Twelfth Air Force History 1975, Aedix . 4. Dixo Oral History, 247. 5. Ibid., 28 46. Ii., 47-248. James Knight, Lt. Gen. USAF, letr, Apendix E in Dixon, ?Adendum.? 47. Dixon Oral History, 248. 8. Ibid., 28-285. 49. History of the Tactial Air Comand, Volume One, January-Decmber 1976, (Langley Air Frc Bs, V: T Hedqurters, March 197), 95, 9. 50. Ibid., 108. 1. Air Force Safety Centr staistics quoted by James A. Coley, Maj. USAF, ?Red Flag ? Is Realism Worth t ost?? (Student Thsi: US ry War Coleg, 1987), 57. 52. Dixon, Adendum, Apendix F; Kigt 237, pasim. 3. Cley, 61. 54. Ibid., 59. . Knight, 241, 245. 56. Aderg, 9. 7. Vickry, e-mail 19 June 205. 24 58. Dixon, Oral History, 256. 9. Ibid., 249; Vicker e-mail 19 June. 60. John Corder, Lt. Gn., USAF, pho interview by author, 13 April 205. 1. Kigt, 241. 62. TAC History, 975, 108; also Anderg, 14-15. 3. Bary Psen, The Sources f Miltary Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Betwen the World Wars (Itha: Cornel University Prs, 1984), 12-3. 64. Autr?s notes n observr for Exrcis Galnt Eagle, Fort Hod, Texas, March 1975. In subsquet crsatins with Army oficers, th authr learnd this was normal but evrthels frustrating problem. 65. Vickry -mail; the problem was lso alude to in Chapman, 4-5, pasim. . Posen, 16; Wiliamsn Mury nd Aln R. Milet, eds. Miltry Inovtion i the Interwar Priod (Cbridge, UK: Cambridge Univrsity Prs, 198), 9-1; Rbert Cowly nd Gefrey Parker, Th Reder?s Compaio to Miltary History (New York: Hughto Miflin, 201), 35-356. This id nt en gd, useful trainig could nt take place. It simply di not duplicate combat. 67. Th Soviet stem fr air obat ws tightly linked togethr and thus forced certain tactis. It might ave ben psile to cane th tactis, but Soviet prxis in the Wrsw Pt wer forced to us Soviet actis whil te other contries th Soviets suplied their sytms t ? e.g. the Nrth Vietnames and Arab stas ? di nt hav the exrtis to dvelop new tactis. Wiliamso Muray, ir Wr in the Persia Gulf (Baltimre, MD: Nauticl & Aviation Pub. C. of America, 195), 79-80. 68. Coly, 25. 9. This was lso god trainig for the Agresors, who ad much te same problem ? they nevr kne when they would be ?bouncd? r by ny airaft. John Vs, Rd Flag: Ralism o t Range,? Air Fre Magzine, Augst 1978, 42. 70. Anderg, 10. 1.Vickry e-mail, 16 June 205. 72 A ful transltion f O War: htp:/w.clusewitz.cm/CZHOME/On_War/ONWARTOC.html (acesd February 206); th quote is from Bok e, Chpter Sevn, ?Friction i War.? 73. Anderg, 94; Vickery e-ail, 16 Jun 205; Erts e-mail 29 July 205. 4. r, 10. 75. Joe Le Burns, Maj. USAF, ?Points on the Star,? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Wintr 1974, 23. 76. It should be noted that, t his point, o crews from the Pacifc Air Forces (PACF) an Unitd Stas Air Force Eurpe (USAFE) had ployed to Red lag; thes crews represte about 1/3 of the tatical fightr crews in te Air Frce. Howevr, by 1976 th Air Forc nt nly had two squdrons of Agresors in the U.S. but n ful Agresor squadr i Europe t train USAFE crews and ne Agrsor sqadro in PCF t trin PACF crws. Coley, 32. 7. Vickery e-mail, 21 June 205. 8. TAC History 1976, 97, 1. 243 79. Coley, 89; Vickery e-mail 21 June 205. 80. Jack LForge, Col. USAF, e-mail 7 June 205. 1. Dixon, Oral Histry, 28; Rusing, 2-8. 82. Aderg, 32. 3. John J. umper, Capt. USAF, "Trainig Towards Combat Capbilty," USAF Fighter Weapos Rviw, Winter 1976, 2. 84. Andreg, 53-4. 5. Kight, 29-20. 86. Paul Gorman, Gen. USA, ?Phase IDivison Restructring Study, Volume I, The Heavy Divisn. Apedix C, Towards Combied Arms Traii Centr,? (Frt Monre, VA: TRDOC Headqurters, 9 Nver 1976), Anex (ful document publishd 1 March 197), -67. 87. Chapmn, 3-4. . Dn ore, Capt., USN, ?A TOPGUN For Air-Ground Ops,? Navl Instiute Procedigs, Octbr 202, 42. 89. James C. Slife, ?Crech Blue: Genral Bil Crech and the Reformation f the Tactil Air Forces, 1978-1984? (Thsi: Schol of Adve Air Pwr Studies, Mxwel ir r Base, AL June 202), 46, pasim. 90. Dixon Oral History, 23. 1. Edgar Ulsmer, ?Streamlinig Airpower for Theatr Warfre,? Air Force Magzine, February 1978, 17. 92. Dixon, Orl History, 24. 3. avid Andertn, ?POM and POST: Keystones of TAC Readines,? Air Force Magzine, Jnuary 197, 46; Dixo ral Histor, 29-231. 94. Dixo Orl History, 253, 268; Knight, 18. 5. Andertn, 49-50. 96 Charls Muray, Human Acomplishment: The Pursit of Excelnce in the Arts and Sciences, 80 B.C. to 1950 (New York: Harper Colins, 203) 150-153. 97. Dixon Oral Histry, 28-259. 24 CHAPTER TEN: WASHINGTON WARS F10 ENGIE PROBLEMS Through 1973, while the lightweight fighter competion was in progres, F-15 devlopment was contiuing. The airfame and sytems wer performing wel, but he F10 engie had ben having dificulties with te 150-hour endurance tst hat was part of its Miltary Qualifcation Test (MQT). Under the milestone program, this would elay the F-15s entry into service, so in April 1973 the director f the System Program Ofice, Genral Benjamin Belis, made the fateful decison to waive the 150-hour endurance part of the MQT testing requiremnts. Belis made the dcison without eling his Air Force superiors, Secrtary of Defnse Schlesinger, or Congres, because h felt he F-15 was critcal to national defnse and ede to g into active srvice, and thus the urgency to begin production f the F10 engie. 1 This was the bginig of the problems with te F10, caused by oth Prat & Whitney and the Air Force.2 The fundamental problem cae when, after President Gerald Ford reduced the defnse budgets, the Air Force tok aclulated gamble and spent its limited funds buying weapons ystems rather than spare parts, adecison that was to have far-eaching reprcusions.3 For the F10 engie, this led to adecison ot buy the rcomende numbers of spare ngies or spare parts, despite warnigs from Prat to the Air Force that the srvice was ordering to few spare parts. 4 Ther wer also cnflicts betwen Prat and the Air Force on ther isues. The Air Force wanted to improve the F10?s performance id378023 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 245 and reliabilty b instaling aDigtal Electronic Engie Control (DEC). Acording to the Air Force, Prat agred and also agred to split he $80 milion bil. But after the Air Force obtained the $40 milion from areluctant Congres, when the time came to sign the contract Prat demured, and then said that ding the Digtal Electronic Engie Control actualy would cost $20 milion, two and half times what it had prosed orignaly. The F10 nevr ecived the DEC, and the Air Force flt betrayed.5 To make maters worse, in mid-1975 Prat began to claim that finacial problems might force the company to slow production f the F10. The Air Force ned the engies a quickly as posible to put hem into the F-15s that wer roling of the production lies at McDonel-Douglas, and the posibilty that Prat might delay engie deliveris pushed the Air Force in Septmber 1975 to agre to drop the critcal ?corection f deficencies? clause in the F10 engie contract. Now Prat was not nly the sole producer of the F10 engies that he Air Force ned for its F-15s and F-16s, but it also had contract hat would make the Air Force, rather than Prat, pay for the corection f deficencies in the Prat-produced ngies. 6 BUDGET BATLES In early 1975, the Ford aministration prosed aFY1976 budget of $107 bilion, despite internal complaints from Defnse Secrtary James Schlesinger that it was to low (he ad prosed abudget of $17B). Schlesinger warned about he rosin of real purchasing power by inflation ad said that he low budget would place the United Staes behind the Soviet Unio in defnse pendig by the late 1970s. Despite the warnigs, Congres cut he FY1976 budget by $7.4 bilion, though tes cuts di include $1.3 bilion itende for South Vietnam. Sen. John Culver (D-Iowa) of the Senate Armed 246 Services Comite spoke for many senators when he said, ?we may have goten to the crosroads wher the United Staes does not have to be first in evry are of defnse.?7 This was the igh-water mark in congresional tempts to rein i the Pentagon, and after the cuts wer anounced Schlesinger said publicly that hey wer ?dep, savge, [and] arbitray,? and many in asharply divide Congres agred.8 Democratic Senator Henry M. ?Scop? Jackson ad agrowing roup of bi-partisan hawks aw a more agresive Soviet atitude marked by increasing miltary asitance to the Arab confrontaion staes, brinksmanship, threats of an itervention during and after the 1973 War Arab-Israeli war, and Soviet suport for guerilas in Angola, southern Africa nd other ares. A special sticking point for Jackson was the Soviet limitaion f Jewish imigration.9 Ther was lso aconfluence of evidence the Soviets wer embarking on alrge-scale conventional forces buildup. U.S. Air Force Chief of Staf Genral David Jones noted that not since the xpansion f Nazi Germany in the 1930s had ther ben such a?single minde mphasi on miltary expansion by amajor power.? 10 The dovish Senator Culver comisioned the Libray of Congres to d an idepndent anlysi of Soviet miltary capbilties, and the anlysi indicated that he Soviets had markedly increased efnse spendig, and that in 1975 1 percnt of Soviet GNP went o their defnse budget, 40 percnt of that o new eapons. The study conclude, ?the quantiative balnce of miltary power had begun to shift o the Soviet Unio in 1965 and US qualitaive superiority nevr compensated completly [for the nw Soviet weapons] and, in certain respects was lowly sliping awy.? 1 This and other inteligence information was ind benath te wings of the awks, and alter anlysi by the Congresional Quarterly 247 conclude that Soviet actions during this period ?guarnted the suces of later prosals to increase dfense budgets.?12 For the Air Force, the bigest problem with reduced budgets was their efct on the Airborne Warnig and Control (AWCS) program. In the House, Represntaive Pat Schroedr (D-CO) and other liberal Democrats tried to cut he program copletly, citng a GAO report about he sytem?s vulnerabilty to jaming and enmy fighters. Some in the Senate made a similar prosal to drop the sytem. 13Though te atempts wer defated when the GAO backed of its asertions in the face of amore dtailed Do study, Congres only aproved funds for four of the six AWCS the administration requestd. Aditonaly, $30 milion for AWCS spare parts wer cut, as wer over $20 milion i spares for the TAF, $2 milion from the F-15 program, and 10 percnt of the O&M funds.14 Schlesinger?s blunt opositon to cuts in the dfense budget was personaly costly. His relations with Congres wer often strained and he di not enjoy the prsonal raport with legislators that Laird had. The strain caried over to President Ford, aformer congresman, who viewd Schlesinger as pedant and id not care for either Schlesinger's tyle or his constant carping for higer defnse budgets when Ford, with te encouragemnt of Secrtary of Stae Henry Kisinger, wanted to cut he dfense budget. Schlesinger?s emipublic disagrements within the administration ad with Congres over the dfense budget, as wel as his difernces with Kisinger over d?tent, al contributed to Frd?s decison to fire him in November 1975. 15 Ford replaced him with the forty-one yar old Donald Rumsfeld, viewd by many as tough, talentd organizer and by others a overly ambitous and unprincipled. 16 248 The firng of Schlesinger was en as piec with Kisinger?s push for d?tent and, combined with te administration?s low defnse budgets, et of apolitcal firestorm. Jackson, conservative Republican Ronald Reagn, and other Cold War hawks made stingi, public atcks after the firng on the Nixon/Ford/Kisinger d?tent and efnse polices, and the Schlesinger firng arguably laid the groundwork for Reagn?s politcal rise and the ventual defnse buildup in the 1980s when he bcame president.17 THE F-15 AND THE RVOLUTION I AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT The stablishment of aful-time dtachment of F-15s at Red Flag in 197 quickly showed that he nw fighter was more than improvemnt, evn a great improvemnt, over previous fighters - it was quantum leap. It proved able to dminate any other fighter in the inventory with te power of its two F10 engies, its aerodynamics, and its advanced avionics. The mainstay of the avionics uite was the pulse Dopler ?lok-down radr, shot down? radr that could, unlike any previous radr, detct aircaft lying below the F-15 and relay the information clearly to the pilot. In mock ombats, the power of the two F10 engies meant hat he F-15 could out-climb, out-urn, and out-acelrate any of its adversaries. Aditonaly, its aerodynamics ade it completly controlable at al airspeds and al flight positons. It was o efctive that later in its carer an Israeli F-15 was involed in amid-air colison ad had one wing completly torn of, but was til able fly for fiten minutes and land safely.18 Interstingly Critc John Boyd, whose enrgy maneuverabilty charts had helpd sel the F-15 to OSD, tried to hamstring the F- 15?s performance by limitng it o 51/2 Gs because that was the sped at whic his enrgy maneuverabilty charts aid the F-15 was most eficent. Fortunately, Mody Suter found 249 out about he idea nd pased it o Dixon ad the F-15 comunity, who quickly squashed the prosal.19 By 1975, the Israeli Air Force had heard the rports from the USAF and McDonel-Douglas bout he F-15?s performance and began to pres for the sale of a few F-15s to Israel. Genral Benie Peld pushed on Dixon, the IAF pushed on McDonel-Douglas, and Israeli suporters in Washington pushed on Congres, using the argument hat he Syrians had recived the rconaisance vrsion f the igh-flying, Mach 2+ MiG-25 ?Foxbat,? whic ould fly over Israel unthreatned by IAF -4s. The IAF was fortunate bcause the Air Force had bought wenty pre-production F-15s for testing, but he tst program procede so smothly that it became obvious that he number was excesive for the Air Force?s neds. With extra ircaft avilable, the temptaion for both Dixon ad McDonel-Douglas to provide the xtra F-15s to the Israelis was iresitible. Such asle would confund the Critcs by showing the most combat-ready air force in the world wanted the fighter, it would ?score points? with pro-Israeli suporters and mebers of Congres, and ther was lso an excelnt chance the F-15s would be tsted in combat. 20 Four F-15s from the Air Force/McDonel-Douglas joint est unit wer brought up to production standar and sold to the IAF, and the four planes flew acros the Atlantic and arived in Israel on Friday, 10 Decmber 1976, at Hatzor Air Force base. A huge welcoming comite was on hand, including Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, the ntire cabinet, and mebers of the ultra-Orthodx religous parties. The F-15s wer delayed on route, and by the time they arived it was o late in the afternon the mebers of the religous parties had left o begin the our-long drive to Jerusalem before the bginig 250 of Shabat. The rst of the cabinet and Prime Minister Rabin stayed for the arival nd post arival cermonies. When the rligous parties learned that he mebers of the government had violated the Shabat, they withdrew suport from the Rabin government and it fel, and imediately the F-15s wer credited by the pres with teir first ?kil.? 21 The IAF recived twenty-one more F-15s in 197 and 1978, but most of the pilots chosen to fly it wer young pilots with litle xperince, to the chagrin of many of the IAF?s older aces. Most of thes aces flew the Mirage I, avery smal, simple, French fighter with virtualy no avionics and armed with only canon ad simple hat-seking misiles. Israeli Air Force pilots universaly aceptd the idea it was the pilot and his skils, not he aircaft, whic made the difernce in adogfiht, and thes old aces initaly loked forward to trainig dogfihts in their Mirages aginst he F-15s flown by the young ?rokies.?2 But heir first engaemnts with F-15s left he Mirage pilots haking their heads. One Mirage ace with fourten kils described his first fight with an F-15 whose pilot was just out of F-15 trainig schol to the author. ?The rules wer that he could not use his AIM- 7s, o the fight began with ahead-on pas. Istarted to turn ad he puled up and came around on me. Isaw him ake thre or four mistakes on the way that Icould have asily taken advantge of i he ad ben i aregular fighter, but her was nothing Icould o t counter the F-15. He shot me down ithin forty seconds. Iflew home in my Mirage, both of us feling very old and out of date.?23 The IAF -15s went ito action for the first ime on 27 July 197, when four F-15s engaed ight Syrian MiG-21s over Lebano. The F-15s hot down four of the MiGs, 251 thre with te radr-guide AIM-7Fs fired from beyond visual range, and over the nxt thre years IAF -15s hot down sevn more MiGs without los, most with AIM-7Fs.24 THE TMPORAY END OF DEFNSE BUDGET CUTS From FY1973 to FY1976 Congres had ben agresive in cuting miltary budgets, with te hig water mark the $7.4 bilion i cuts in FY1976.25 But evn such astaunch liberal s David Broder of the Washington Post noted in 1976 that domestic expenditures had risen to 78 percnt of government expenditures while dfense dcreased to 2 percnt, and said that ?unles new international grements are rached?domestic program growth il have to slow. The armed services canot contiue to subsidize its expandig cost.?26 The rcogniton that he dfense budget was legitmate ned meant the FY1976 budget marked the nd of the slide in defnse fundig. Ford was in adificult positon after firng the awkish Schlesinger, and this made it easier for new Secrtary of Defnse Donald Rumsfeld when he wanted to increase the FY197 defnse budget. Ford agred to building real growth into the nw defnse budget, and the budget asked for $12.7 bilion, $14. bilion more than Congres aproved in FY1976 and a real growth of $7.2B. In his FY197 anual report o Congres, Rumsfeld justifed the increase by saying that rends in compartive American-Soviet miltary strength ad not favored the United Staes for fiten to twenty ears, and that if thes trends contiued they "would have the fect of injecting afundamental instabilty in the world." Rumsfeld suported his claims with two CIA reports using difernt methods (the ?ruble? method and the ?dolar? method) to show the Soviets wer spendig much more on defnse than the US. Thes tudies, as wel as the previously cited Libray of Congres tudy, showed the Soviets wer on the way to gainig 25 qualitaive superiority to g with teir existing superiority in umbers.27 Ading to the presure on Ford was the presidential candiacy of Ronald Reagn, and on 4 May 1976, after a stunig defat by Reagn i the Texas Republican presidential primary, Ford asked for a $974 milion suplemntal to the dfense budget for more warships. 28 Congres aproved real growth after inflation f $7 bilion i the FY 197 defnse budget, giving prefrence to ?genral purose? nonuclear forces by aloting them $40.2B. The budget made no cuts in the funds requestd for procuring the four major TAF sytems - 108 F-15s, 6 AWCS, 10 A-10s, and 16 F-16s.29 The bil also aproved the ntire rquestd O&M budget and irectd the president o include in the FY1978 budget, for the first ime, an icrease in O&M funds to cver ?reasonably foreseable? inflation i the coming years. 30 Stil, some noted that in constant dolars the FY 197 defnse budget was $5 bilion les than it had ben i FY 1956.31 THE CARTER/BOWN YEARS Numerous pols in 1976 showed hig public suport for increased efnse spendig, but this had litle impact on the 1976 presidential race bcause both parties? defnse ?hawks,? the Republicans? Ronald Reagn ad the Democrats? Scop? Jackson, lost in their party?s primaries. 32 Reagn ran very sucesful campaign atcking d?tent, the Strategic Arms Limitaion Talks (SALT) with te Soviets, and the fderal government i genral, but while his campaign was el recived Reagn could not vercome the power of incumbency and lost o President Ford, 1,07 votes to 1,87. Jackson was the arly Democratic front-runer but skiped the first presidential primary in New Hampshire, won by evntual Democratic nomine Jimy Carter. Jackson?s campaign enrated hostilty from the party's left and was handicaped by alegations of ilegal contributions 253 by Boeing and other defnse contractors, and espite winig sevral ater primaries, Jackson droped out of the race after losing the crucial Pensylvani primary to Carter. Carter, in contrast o Jackson, pledged to make anual $5-7 bilion cuts in the dfense budget, though tis cal was caveatd by claims it would be from ?fat.? 3 After Carter became president, he chose the ighly qualifed Harold Brown as his Secrtary of Defnse. From 1961 to 1965 Brown had worked under Robert McNamra s Director f Defnse Resarch and Engiering (DR&E), had served as Secrtary of the Air Force from October 1965 to February 196, and from 196 and 197 he ad ben president of the California Instiute of Technolgy. He was the first cientist o become Secrtary of Defnse, and this was to influence not nly Air Force programs but also national defnse policy. It would have come as no surpise if Carter, as Navl Academy graduate and former Navy oficer, had some sympathy for the miltary as it strugled with te post-Vietnam era nd the al-volunter force, but he di not. The nw president set hre genral goals for defnse policy - slow don the nuclear rms race, strengthen American conventional forces in Europe while keping the balnce in South Korea nd withdrawing American trops from the country at he same tie, and restrainig the dfense budget by cuting manpower and closing base. 34 Thes goals, and the specifc programs to implent hem, quickly made Carter and Brown upoular with te miltary. One of the first problems arose when Carter expande President Ford?s 1974 clemncy program for Vietnam War esiters. Ford?s program coverd convicted raft violators, convicted miltary desrters and those who wer ?Absent Without Leave? (AWOL), draft violators who ad nevr ben tried, and 254 vetrans with les than honrable discharges for absence ofense. Nevrthels, the program had strict onditons ? signig an oath of alegiance and twenty-four months of alternative srvice, while miltary desrters automaticaly recived bad conduct discharges. Carter?s program was much more lniet. In January 197, he dclared an unconditonal mnesty for draft resiters, both acused and those who culd face posible prosecution. Later that year, he st up the two-stage pardon proces for miltary ?absentes.? 35 After the trauma of Vietnam, this di not sit wel ith te armed forces. One former Air Force gneral spoke for most of the uniformed iltary when he said Carter?s action semed ?eliberately intede to leave a bd taste in the mouth of those who di go t that war nd performed honrably?.President Carter welcomed home desrters with what semed to be more warmth tan had evr ben shown vetrans, welcomed [anti-war protestor] Tom Hayden to the White House, and rewarde [anti-war former Atorney Genral] Ramsey Clark by making him aspecial envoy. It was [the beginig of] asory era.? 36 The Brown/Carter FY1978 budget further increased the animosity of the miltary. Ford presnted his $123.1 bilion FY1978 defnse budget o Congres just before laving ofice in January 197, but after Carter's inaugration he and Brown prosed aseris of amendments to the prosed budget hat had the fect of reducing it by almost $3 bilion, mainly b cuting traditonal miltary benfits uch as the miltary comisaries.37 Though Congres overwhelmingly rejcted the Carter/Brown prosals, for the uniformed iltary, strugling to make the nw al-volunter armed forces ucesful, the atempt o cut benfits, combined with te vry genrous amnesty program for those who had refused to serve in Vietnam, wer the bginigs of a dep distrust of the Carter 25 administration.38 The final defnse bil pased by Congres was lightly over $10 bilion, and Carter scored a major victory when he was ble to eliminate the B-1 bomber program. 39 This was huge blow to SAC and higlighted how far the comand had falen i the last fiten years, and was to have srious implications for the TAF as wel. Carter egarde the strengthenig of NATO as key national security objective, and the Air Force?s tactial fighter procuremnt programs, any of whic wer scheduled to suport NATO comitents, wer genraly untouched. Nevrthels, Congres had to rebuf one administration atempt o slow production f the F-15, because many of the fighters wer destined for American forces asigned to NATO. 40 Brown di make asignifcant formalization f American defnse doctrine by oficaly mandating an ?ofset strategy? wherby American hig-technolgy weapons would be used to fset Soviet numbers. The ?ofset strategy? suported TAC?s new fighters and include improved comand and control, including AWCS, an emphasi on the supresion f enmy air defnse, especialy the SAMs that had taken such a heavy tol n the Israeli Air Force in 1973, and more and betr precison-guide munitons. One of Brown?s most important initatives was devlopment of ?stealth? technolgy, whic oferd the promise of producing planes with very low radr profiles betr able to elude nemy defnse. The overal ?ofset strategy? doctrine, while in many ways just he formalization f apolicy the United Staes had ben pursing since World War I, became the doctrinal mainstay of American weapons ystem acquistion policy for the nxt five administrations. 41 In other ares, the TAF was prospering. The nw realistic trainig programs wer going wel. Thre new, modern fighters- the F-15, F-16, and A-10 - wer coming into the inventory, and at he same tie the Air Force apeard to have won sevral important 256 bureaucratic batles with te Critcs. The srvice had met Packard?s and the Critcs? demand for prottyping, not nly with te F-16 and A-10, but also with te radr and engie of the F-15. The F-16 and A-10 broadly met he Critcs? and their congresional alies? prosals for inexpensive, simple fighters. The bad old ays of McNamra, TP, and the F-1 with teir cost overuns and por performance semd to be over. Finaly, Pier Sprey had left he Pentagon, and John Boyd and Everst Ricioni had both retired from the Air Force.42 But below the surface things wer changi, and the Carter administration was to prove atrying time for the Air Force. F10 ENGIE PROBLEMS ? STAL/STAGNATIONS The problems began with te Air Force?s most glamorus program, the F-15. By 197, serious problems had surfaced with te F-15?s F10 engies when they began to exhibit aphenomeno caled a?stal-stagnation? in simulated air combat. The cause of the ?stal/stag,? as it was dubed, was disturbance in the airflow to the ngie, marked by aloud bang, or seris of bangs, ashet of lame shoting out of the ngie, and arpid rise in egine tmperature that damged the turbine blades if it excede their temperature limits. The only cure was huting the ngie down ad restarting it if it had not verheatd, an wkard maneuver in the midle of adogfiht.43 This was bad enough in the twin-egine F-15, but was clearly unaceptable in the single-ngie F-16, whic used the same ngie. 4 The comonality in egines that had semed such an advantge had now become aproblem. Aditonaly, the F10 engies wer using up sare parts at n astonishing rate compared to projections. As noted arlier Genral Benjamin Belis, the F-15 SPO Director, had waived the 150-hour endurance tst, but evn when the ngie had ben 257 endurance tsted for shorter periods the ngie had ben run to maxium RPM sped and left her. Ther was no throtle movemnt because, in adogfiht, experince had shown the ngie would be lft at ful power the ntire time. By leaving the ngie at steady power seting, the ngie only went hrough two ?cyles? the move up to ful power, then the move back. But once in service, the F10 engies proved so pwerful that he F-15 pilots often had to reduce power for a maneuver, and in afst moving dogfiht, the F-15 pilots wer moving the throtles rapidly and often. Test showed the F-15 pilots wer moving their throtles to cntrol their airsped six times ore often than expectd, thus creating many more ?cyles.? Each time the ngie cyled, it changed its internal temperature, and the rapid change in temperature weakend parts of the ngie, specialy the turbine blades. To prevnt hem from coing aprt and estroying the ngie, the turbine blades had to be rplaced at certain umber of cyles or when the ngie overheatd. This meant he F10 engies wer using spare parts at six times the planed rate. Ther was no budget for aditonal spare parts, and as increasing umbers of F-15s and F-16s came into the inventory and thus more ngies, the problems with spare parts increased. 45 By mid-197, the F10?s problems had rasticaly curtailed F-15 flying, and it droped from the normal rate of thirten-fiten flights amonth for a pilot two-thre flights amonth. When they di fly, F-15 pilots had to kep loking at heir engie gauges instead of paying atention to their mision, so traing and proficency droped ven further. To reduce the stal/stag rate until afix was found, the ngies wer ?de-tuned? so they would not run at he igh eat genrated at maxium RPM. While this cut down o the over temperatures that came with stal/stags, it noticeably reduced the prformance of 258 the ngies. The los of performance of their once dominat jet, the rduction i flying time, combined with engie problems when they di fly, sent morale plumeting in the F-15 units. 46 In the single-ngie F-16, the problem was obviously more critcal, but he smaler numbers of F-16s alowed the Air Force to give their F10s amechanical fix. The F-16's F10 was fited with a"proximate spliter," aforward extnsion f the internal engie casing that split he incoming air fom the compresor fan d pased some of this air into the core, while diverting the rst down the fan duct and into the afterburner. By closing the gap betwen the front end of the casing and the rar of the fan to just under half an inch, te spliter sentialy solved the problem. Engies fited to the F-16 flet incorprating the proximate spliter had only 0.15 stagnation stals per 10 hours of flying time, uch betr than the F-15 flet. The proximate spliter worked qualy wel in the F-15, but evn such asmal fix was costly and this feature was not introduced on the F-15 production lie bcause the los of asingle ngie was en as les hazrdous in the twin-egine F-15.47 THE AIMVAL/CEVAL CONTROVERSY While the F-15 was plagued with engie problems, in 197 ther wer more srious questions raised about its operational efctivens, ironicaly because of ajoint Air Force-Navy exrcise that would evntualy vastly improve both services? air combat capbilty. While their performance was outsandig, the F-15 and the F-14 had major problems with armaent. Their designers had learned aleson from the arly F-4s, whic had ben handicaped because they only had misile armaent, and both te F-15 and F- 14 caried a20m canon. Howevr, the misiles the nw fighters caried wer only 259 slightly modifed varints of Vietnam-era AIM-7s and AIM-9s, and it was clear that o fuly utilze their adr and avionics? capbilties thes fighters they would ned betr misiles. With only enough devlopment funds for ne type of misile, both services agred the first priority was new, short-range, heat-seking misile, the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Misile (ASRAM), to replace their AIM-9s. To define xactly what charcteristics the misile would ned the Air Force and Navy comisioned alrge-scale xercise tudy, caled Air Intercpt Misile Evalution/Air Combat Evalution, AIMVAL/CEVAL. 48 AIVAL/CEVAL tok place at Nelis and the tst aircaft consited of a higly instrumentd ?Blue Force? of F-14s and F-15s aginst a?Red Force? of Northrop F-5Es flown by the Agresors. Because the AIMVAL/CEVAL test wer to lok for the bst charcteristics for short-range misiles, the Rules of Engaemnt (ROE) forced close-in dogfihts. The ROE varied epndig on the specifc test, but genraly they wer Vietnam War ROE, whic required a visual identifcation (VID) of the target as hostile before firng. In the ral world, the American fighters had ways to identify Comunist aircaft beyond visual range, notably the previously mentioned Vietnam-era ?Combat Tre,? but because Tre was til clasifed the sytem was not part of the xercise. 49The rsult of the ROE was that he Blue Force ould not use its long-range AIM-7 misiles, thus negating one of the F-15/4s? main advantges. Aditonaly, Red Force always outnmberd the Blue Force fighters and the Blue Force had no ground radr control, while ground based radr guide the Red Force F-5s (whic had no radr) to an atcking positon. Thus the Rules of Engaemnt produced the worst posible case for the Blue Forces ? ROE for aThird World conflict, but alrge number of enmy aircaft 260 with excelnt radr control, numbers and control that would only be found in amajor war in Europe. With te ROE the batles invaribly started when the two sides caught sight of each other, and this gave an dvantge to the smal, hard to se, wel flown ad more numerous F-5s. The problems with fighting large numbers of smal aircaft in close- in, turnig dogfihts was el known i the Air Force fighter force, and was one of the reasons the srvice insited the F-15 have a beyond visual range misile. At he nd of the exrcise, although fighting outnmberd and with te F-5s having al the advantges, the F-15/F-14 Blue Force had kil ratio f 2:1. This was atisfactory, and besides it was irelvant ? the purose of the tst was to try to devlop charcteristics for a new short-range misile. 50 In terms of devloping a new misile, from Air Force?s and Navy?s point of view the test wer higly sucesful and crucial to futre air-to-air misile programs. The tst showed that modifed AIM-9, the AIM-9L, had performance lose to the prosed (and very expensive) new ASRA, and anewr AIM-9, the AIM-9, would actualy be superior t the ASRAM. This meant he srvices could acept improved, inexpensive AIM-9s and shift heir limited misile dvelopment funds from the ASRAM to anew, radr-guide, medium-range misile to replace the AIM-7. This new misile was designated the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Misile, or ARAM.51 After the xercise, the AIMVAL/CEVAL test results and kil ratios wer contained in alrge body of complex documents that wer clasifed because they showed the capbilties of the various misiles testd, as wel as the capbilties the Air Force and Navy considerd most important. Ther was ome sal concern that he complex dat might be misnterpetd, but hat was minor consideration. 52 261 This was to prove amistake. AIMVAL/CEVAL was higly sucesful program for what it was intede to achiev, but proved to have some srious nitende consequences a the ?open spaces for comunication? and IPN chanels that had served the iron majors o wel for Red Flag nd other programs proved a two-edged sword. In the ard fought air batles, at imes the wel-trained F-5 Agresor pilots gave as god as they got. When the Agresors made their egularly scheduled trainig vist to TAC fighter base around the country, the Agresor pilots recounted their own higly colred versions of AIMVAL/CEVAL around the bar. The urban legnd son spread that he F- 5s had beatn the F-15s in head-to-head ir combat. This tory son arived in Washington wher Colnel Everst Ricioni, retired and working for Northrop, the builder of the F-5, pounced on it. 53At he same tie John Boyd, espite his retiremnt, had maintained his contempt for the F-15 and multi-role F- 16 and contiued to cultivate agroup of ficers he ad hired in the Pentagon. Boyd learned of the cheap, simple F-5?s suces? in AIMVAL/CEVAL and saw this a n oportunity to strike back at hose who ad changed the F-16 into amulti-role fighter. At the same tie, Ricioni and Sprey (whom Northrop also had hired as consultant) saw this a n oportunity to push an dvanced version f the F-5, the F-20, on the Air Force.54 For technical reasons, the F-20 had only a pure air-to-air capbilty, so it fit perfctly with what he Critcs til wanted, asimple, hig performance air-to-air fighter. 5 For the nxt sevral years Ricioni, aide by Sprey and Boyd, tried to sel the F-20 ? whic TAC comander Wilbur Crech said had ?no utilty in big league combat? - to the Air Force, then to versas customers, then to the Air Force National Guard and Resrves, without suces. 56 The multi-role F-16 oferd more capbilty, and Northrop?s 26 busines practies with oversas customers gave the American government pause; when two ut of the thre of the F-20 prottypes crashed, the program ende.57 Howevr, the Critcs ontiued to use the ?results? of AIMVAL/CEVAL to hector the F-15 program and Air Force weapons elction i genral. PRAT & WHITNEY VS. THE AIR FORCE Once Prat & Whitney stablished itself as the sole producer of Air Force fighter engies and had contract hat droped the ?corection f deficencies? for the F10, the company semed to the Air Force to lse al interst in god-faith eforts to slve the engie?s problems. Air Force oficers who tried to discus the F10?s problems aid they had to met with Prat?s lawyers before they met with te ngiers, and the uge profits Prat was now making from the ngies, while the Air Force was adled with te F10?s problems and cost, soured the atmospher of the metings that di take place. 58 The Air Force was furious, but it semed to have fw options. Howevr, Prat and Whitney?s inital competior for the F-15 engie, Genral Electric, was atching thes evnts with interst. GE had modifed the F10 engie used in the inital F-15 competion to fit in the Navy?s F-14, and Congres had located $41 milion for the program in FY197 and FY1978. Howevr, the Navy, for complex F-14 program budget reasons, had ecide it would not spend the funds, to GE?s chagrin.59 In late 197 Gerhard Neuman, the ad of GE?s engie group, visted Genral Dixon at TAC headquarters. Dixon was by now higly frustrated with te F10 and especialy Prat?s atitude, so he was more than wiling to listen while Neuman explained how amodifed F10 would fit in the F-15 and F-16. Dixon, itrigued by the idea, pased the information to Genral Alton Slay, comander of Systems 263 Comand, and Dixon also emphasized how much TAC nede an lternative source of F-15/6 engies.60 Slay, who ad n upleasnt experince when a F-15 he was flying had stal/stag nd lost an egine in bad weather, strongly agred. He rmeberd the $41 milion that Congres had loted for the Navy F-14 engie and set about rying to get he funds transferd to the Air Force to pay GE for test of the nw F10 in the F-15/F-16. Congres, anoyed that he Navy had not spent he money, concerned about he F10 engie, and unhapy with Prat & Whitney?s atitude, agred to transfer the funds to the Air Force, whic in turn realocated them to Genral Electric. 61 While ther was considerable interst in loking to Genral Electric?s F10 as n alternative to the F10, ther also wer major problems. President Carter had canceld the F10-powerd B-1 bomber program, thus endig the fundig for the ngies. With no firm orders for the F10 and therfore no production lie, investing scare dolars in a engie that would esntialy duplicate the F10, except for the promise of betr reliabilty (the orignal F10 had ben judged betr than the F10 in that category) and betr service semd to be apor investment i a time of limited efnse budgets. Prat & Whitney heard about he GE ofer and pushed this valid point o Congres, and the idea semed like it would be stilborn.62 THE FY197 DEFNSE BUDGET As Carter?s first erm contiued, he found that he and Brown had to walk atightrope on defnse pendig. Congres had shown its traditonal wilinges to defr to the president on weapons isues o Carter had won victories in canceling the B-1 and afith nuclear ircaft carier, but by 1978 world evnts erode and son washed awy Carter?s detrmination to cntiue cuting the dfense budget. The mergence of mid-levl threats 264 in the world in the late 1970s posed areal problem for ?bargain basemnt? American miltary forces - McDonald's cashiers had higer wages than plane handlers on the carier US Nimitz ? and Carter found he could not ignore the rpeatd reports of aSoviet arms buildup and public suport for increasing the dfense budget. 63Politcal realites forced him to provide ral nual increase in the dfense budget despite risng inflation. The FY197 defnse budget Brown presnted to Congres in early 1978 was record $126 bilion, a3.5 percnt ?real? increase, and it also, fr the first ime in the Carter ra, asked for modest increase in pay for lwer ankig enlisted personel. Brown oted to the House Armed Services Comite on 2 February 1978 that her was n ?increasingly precarious? balnce btwen NATO and the Warsw Pact, and that NATO must be preared to stop afst moving Soviet atck acros Europe. The FY197 budget, he said, would o that. At he same tie, Brown disngenuosly insited the budget would save $5-7 bilion as Carter had pledged, because ?it was $8.4 bilion les than the Ford aministration had projectd in its budget for 197.? Brown also said futre dfense budgets would show 3 percnt anual increase in real growth because the Soviets had increased their defnse budgets by 3-4 percnt per year over the previous fiten to twenty ears. 64 Most of the increase in the FY197 budget went o American forces deicated to NATO. The FY197 budget gave the Air Force the 78 F-15s and 145 F-16s it requestd, as wel as 3 more AWCS, along with ahuge nw air efueling tanker, the McDonel- Douglas KC-10, and money to re-ngie xisting air efueling tankers. Notably, the bil aded $1.4 bilion to the $37. bilion requestd for O&M to alow for inflation because 265 Congres aw prior budgets di not have this protection built in, and the srvices had to ?eat? any O&M inflation icrease.65 Despite the increase, defnse hawks noted FY197 defnse pendig was 5.1 percnt of the GNP, as oposed to 8.1 percnt i 1964 just before the Vietnam War. 6 Carter also prosed increasing the dfense budget by about 5 percnt a year fom FY1981-985 in real terms, endig his 1976 elction pledge to cut he dfense budget by $5-7 bilion ayear. This dismayed many of his uporters, and liberals in the House, ld by Pat Schroedr, tried to verturn the House Armed Services Comite?s aproval of the budget, but wer easily repulsed.67 In the Senate, Critc and liberal Senator Gary Hart tok another tack. He argued for, and recived, more money for the Navy?s McDonel-Douglas AV-8 Harier vertical take-of ?jump jets? because h saw the Harier as the backbone what Hart ealy wanted, aflet of smal, low-cost cariers to replace the Navy?s large atck ariers. Howevr, the aproval of the Harier money was imply away for hawks to ad more money to the dfense budget, not an ceptance of Hart?s ideas bout cariers. When Hart ried to cut money for the F-18 intede for the larger cariers, the Senate soundly rejcted his prosal.68 Carter vetod the first defnse bil sent o him, ainly because it stil contained anuclear carier as wel as other increase above what he ad requestd. Congres sutained the vto, but in the nd, the bil pased substantialy unchanged xcept for the removal of the carier.69 A new era in defnse pendig was in the ofing. 26 1. David M. Kenedy, The Great Engie War (Cambridge, MA: Kenedy Schol of Government, Harvar Univrsity, 1985), 21; Robert W. Drws, The ir Force and te rat Egi Wr (ashigton. DC: National Dfnse University Prs, 1987), 39-42. 2. Drews, 6-7. 3. Hans Driesnack, Gen. USAF, ?The Key to Readines: O&M,? Air Force Magzie, Octobr 1980, 5. 4. Knedy, 96. 5. Ibid., 10; also, author?s discusion with te F-15 engie SPO oficer at US-Israeli F-1 Program Reviw, April 1978, Tel Avi, Isral. 6. Drews, 4-5. 7. Congresional Quarterly, US Defnse Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Comitets, Third Eiton (Washingto, DC: GPO, Aril 1984) 9, 13, with an excelnt chart. 8. Cogresional Quarterly Almanc, 93rd Congres, 2d Sesion, 1974, Volume X, 379. 9. Ibid., 365-36. 10. Quoted in Air Force Asociation Policy Paper, ?Force Modernization ad Readines,? Air Force Magzine, Mrch 1976, 10. 1. US Defns Policy: Wapons, Strategy and Comitents, Third Eiton, 13-4. 2. Congrsioal Quarterly, U Defns Policy: Weapos, Strategy and Comitets [First editon, but not numbred as uh] (shington, DC:GPO April 1978), 3-A. 1. Congresional Quarterly, Volume X, 368. 4. Ibid., 379. 15. Amos A. Jordan d Wiliam J. Taylor, American National Security: Policy And Proces (Baltimre: Johns Hopkins University Prs, 1984), 204; Congresinal Quarterly Dfense Policy, April 1978, 18-A. 16. Congrsinal Quarterly Almanc, X, 362. 7. resiol rtrl, Defse Policy, April 1984, 1. 18. Merav Halperin ad Aharon Lapidt, G-Suit: Combat Reports From Israel?s Air Wars (London: Tim Wrer Bks UK, 190), 136-142. 19. Richard M. ?ody? Suter, Col. SAF, ?Corna Ace? interview by Lt. Cols. Gordn Nelson Jhn Dick, 26 January 197, FHR, 30-1. 20. Ibid., 29. 1. After the government fel, Prime Minister Rabin caled for new elctions. He semed to b on is way to a asy victory, but in the cours f th campaig, it bcam known that Rabi?s ife Leh d a dlar ak acnt i the United Stes, tritly agist Isreli lw. Th scandal this cused, nd Leh Rabin?s arogant rsponse, is enraly considerd te rso Rabin lost he lction d rouht power, fr the first tim, Meahm Bgin?s Likud prty, wic until that ime had ben cnsidred afringe party. Dn Kurza, Yitza Rabin: Soldier for Pece (Nw York: Harper Colins, 198), 198-20. 267 2. Most American fighter pilots also aceptd the idea. Mody Suter noted in 1972, before the F-15 arivd, ?an xclent fighter ilot wil bt he pants of amiocre jock [pilt] in t best ir mchie you ca build him.? Der Baron? (Richard M. ?dy? Suter, Col. USAF), ?anyting els is rbis, Fightr Weps eviw, Sumer 1972, 3. . Author interview ith Avrahm Salmon, Colnel IAF (ret.), Ramt Ha Sharon, Israel, 17 Septmbr 204. 24. G-uit; also author?s notes made while srving as Air tach? to Israel, January 197-June 1980. 25. Cogresional Quarterly, Defnse Policy, April 1978, 3-A. 6. David Brder, ?How Much is To Muh,? Washington Post, 19 June 1976, A10, quoted in Air Forc Magzine, Otober 1976, 10. 27. Cogresinl Quartrly Almanc, 5th Congres, 1st Sesion, 197, Volume XI, 29-231. 28. Ibid., 2. 9.Congresional Quarterly, Defnse Policy, April 1978, 26-A; 273. 30. rsil rtrl Almac, Vlume XI, 79. 1. David Jones, Gen. USF, ?Y 1976 Postr Staemnt,? Suplemnt o Air Force Policy fr Cmaders #4-1975 (5), 21-42. 32. US Defnse Policy, 15. . Ibid., 5. 34. Charles Witze, "The Budget is Not Stable." Air Force Magzine, January 197, 8-9. 35. Harold Brown, Thinkig About National Security: Defnse and Foreign Policy in a Dangerus Wrld (Ne Yor: Westview Pres, 1983), 12. 36. T. R. Milton, Gn. USAF, ?Lsons of Vietnam,? Air Force Magzine, March 198, 10. 37. Congresional Quarterly Almanc, 95th Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1978, Volume XIV, 320. 38. Congresional Quarterly, Defnse Policy, April 1978, 5-6. 9. "Trascript f the Prsidnt's Nws Cnfernce," New York Times, 1 July 197, 10. 40. US Defnse Policy, 4-5. 1. Harold Brown, Thinkig about National Security, 8, pasim; Wiliam Pery, ?Desrt Strm an Detrece,? Freign Afirs 70 (Fal 191): 6. 42. Robert Coram, Boyd: The ihter Pilot Who Chnged the Art of ar (Bostn: Litle, Brwn ad pan, 202), 76-8. 43 Art Bergman, Col. USAF, ?Stal/Stagnation - The Pilot Factor,? USAF ighter Weapons Rviw, Mrch 197, 4-7. 4. Kenedy, 80-; James Falows, ?Trouble With Air Force's Eagle,? The Atlantic Monthly, Jauar 192, 64-5. 45. Dwes, 60-; Falows, ?Problems,? 65; 6. Falos, ?Problems,? 52-3. 268 47. Dawes, 68. 8. Excpt for the Phoenix, the F-14?s armaent was imilar to the F-15?s. 49. Marshal Micl, Class: Air Cobt Ovr North Vietnm 196-972 (Anapolis, D: Navl Instiute Pres, 198), Apendix A, 214. 50. Author?s interiew ith Tad Olmstron, Lt. G. USF, Cambridge, MA, October 205, March 206. 51. Edward Grifit, Maj. USAF, ?Aimval-ceval? [lower case in tile], Fighter Wepons Reviw Winter 1976, 7-9. The rtil is agod, if tchical, unclasifd escription f th xrcise. 52. Knight, 231-23. 3. Coram, 04, pasim. 54. Grnt T. Hamond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washingto, DC: Sithsian Istiutin Pres, 201), 05. 5. The F-20, like te F-5, had low-mounted wing that sat very close to the ground. This meant at larg xtrnal stores uch as bbs ad lrge ful tanks wr dificlt r iposibl to cry. htp:/w.wpafb.f.mil/usem/resarch/fighter/f20-3.jpg (acesd Marh 205) as picture of the F-20 on th ground and sows its low round lrance. 56. Crech felt politcal presure made Secrtary of Defnse Brown itersted in the idea. re Oral Histry, 231. 57. ?n A Wing And a Payof: Northrop faces an F-20 Probe,? Time, 20 June 198, 54-. 58 Drews, 5, 6-7, pasim. Prat later admited this; e Victoria M. Hayes, ?Analysi of the Air Force nd the Gret Engie War? (Studnt Thesi: Air Forc Istiute f Tcnolgy. Dfs Tchnical Iformtion Cetr, Alxandria, VA, 198), 20. 59. Drews, 95. 60. ixon, Oral History, 23-24. 1. Keedy, 102. 62. U.S. Congres, Senate, Comite on Armed Services. Department of Defnse Authorization fr Fiscal Yr 1980, 96th Cgres, 1st s., 2 Aril 197, 127; rws, 79. 63. ?A plane handler on the nuclear-powerd carier Nimitz normaly works 16 hours a dy or about 10 ours per wk? h maks les pr hour tha cshier at McDnld's, lives belw th poverty levl nd is ligble fr fod stamps, nd probaly has ot sen his wif and cild fr six moths.? Quot from Melvin R. Lair, "Wht Price Gd Voluter Miltry?" Acros the Bard, 19 Jne 1980, 7. 64. Cngrsional Quarterly, US Dfnse Policy, Washington, April 1978, 5-6 5. oresil rtrl Almac, 95th Cngres, 2d Sesion, , Volume XIV, 178. 6. Congresional Quarterly, US Defnse Policy, Washington, DC. April 1978, 9, 1. 7. Ibid.,13-A; Cgrsional Quartrly Alman, XIV, 325 68. Congresional Quarterly Almnc, XIV, 329. 269 69. Ibid., 34-345. 270 CHAPTER LEVN: CHANGI OF THE GUARD CRECH TAKES OVER TAC In 197, Genral Benie Peld steped own as comander of the Israeli Air Force, replaced by Genral David Ivry, a quiet, serious oficer very difernt from the motinal and critcal Peld. The folwing year, on 30 April 1978, Peld?s friend and felow travelr Genral Robert Dixon steped own as comander of TAC. Genral Wilbur Crech, a long-time prot?g of Air Force Chief of Staf Genral David Jones, replaced Dixon. Jones was o fnd of Crech e alowed him to stay on active duty evn after Crech ad serious heart atck, something that normaly would have forced ven a genral to retire.1 Dixon sems to have ben uhapy with Crech?s elction because Dixon ad Jones wer locked in a ongoing batle about he Red Flag cident rate, and Dixon semed to fel that Crech's categorical imperative was to lwer TAC's acident rate, ven at he expense of realistic trainig. Dixon was fraid Crech would gut Dixon?s realistic trainig initatives when he got he chance, and one of the rsults of Dixon?s unhapines was that he rfused to particpate in the change of comand and his own retiremnt cermony, whic made the turnover, at best, awkard. 2 Dixon left abipolar legacy. Profesionaly Dixon, along with Mody Suter and the iron majors, wer the ?Systems Builders? responsible for the dvelopment of realistic trainig, certainly one of the most important revolution i miltary afirs in American id450838 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 271 history and on a pr with istory?s most ignifcant peacetime iltary inovations, uch as the dvelopment of the concepts of the blitzkrieg and carier warfre btwen World War Iand World War I. Aditonaly, Dixon protectd those who devloped the specifc ideas that made ralistic trainig a way of life and ?train the way ou plan to fight? the cultre of the Air Force. Dixon fosterd the atmospher that made it posible to bring new ideas bout realistic trainig forward, and he was iling and able to push tes ideas through te top leadership and obtain fundig. As a result, Red Flag nd other realistic trainig exrcise steadily improved because the oficers working on the exrcise knew that he more ralistic they wer, the bter Dixon would like them. Most important, Dixon tok the at when acident rates began to rise. When Dixon turned over TAC, the ralistic trainig cultre rvolution was complet, and from that point on any sugestion that realism was les important han flying safety would met with stif resitance.3 Dixon also suported the standar Air Force way of inovation, ew hig technolgy sytems. During his tenure, the nw eapons ystems he suported - the F-15, F-16, A-10, and AWCS ? began to flw into the inventory, as wel as the Lockhed F-17 Stealth fighter, the Northrop B-2 bomber, and the ntire range of ther stealth sytems that oday play key role in America?s air arsenal. Dixon icreased the number of precison-guide munitons (PGMs) and sponsored evlopment of anew genration f such weapons, and when he rtired TAC had 30,0 laser bomb guidance kits and was procuring more at he rate of about 10,0 packages ayear. 4In aditon, Dixon was no desk bound comander. In 1974, when aquestion arose about restrictions on head-on gun atcks during Agresor tainig because they wer ?unsafe,? Dixon went o Nelis 27 and flew in the back of an Agresor T-38 to watch te atcks, then aproved them for trainig.5 On the other side, ther is no question that Dixon?s treatment of his enior subordinates was major problem. Dixon?s method f dealing with people and his rule by fear clearly made him les efctive as leader than his inovative ideas, his wilinges to stand up for them, and his other acomplishments warnted. His suporters might argue this was part of his constant presing for creative solutions and in-depth answers. This ems disngenuos, but it is true difernt people interpetd Dixon?s rants diferntly. One of Dixon?s favorite threats was ?if you screw this up I?m going to burn your house down, kil your wife and family, and rape your dog.? Mody Suter and other lower ankig oficers whom Dixon favored id not ake this eriously, saying it was just ?Dixon being Dixon.? 6 But for higer-ankig oficers on the TAC staf and for ficers in the field who ad litle contact with Dixon, the coments had difernt impact. The words of ther oficers who ad ealings with Dixon speak volumes. One strong suporter of Dixon oted he was ?hort emperd and impatient.? 7 Another ? no suporter ? said Dixon was ?a rude arogant human being who left he Tactial Air Comand literaly on its as.I am conviced he got al that crap from serving on LeMay?s taf at SAC headquarters [from 1958-1962].? 8 Dixon?s two capos - Lieutnat Genral James D. Hughes, the comander of 12th Air Force at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, and Lieutnat Genral James Hartinger, comonly known as the ?Grr,? comander of 9th Air Force at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, reflcted Dixon?s tyle and wer genraly viewd by TAC oficers with te same aprobation. Both Hughes and Hartinger left heir comands les than month after Dixon left TAC.9 273 THE BGINIG OF THE CRECH ERA Personaly, the difernce btwen Wilbur Crech and Dixon could not have ben starker. One oficer, a suporter of Dixon because of what he di for TAC, noted, ?Crech was totaly difernt? [He] was gentleman, and Inevr heard him raise his voice or embars anyone in public.? Another ? a Crech suporter - said, ?Gen. Crech was t al times apolite gntleman.? As befiting someone who ad led an Air Force acrobatic team, Crech paid agreat deal of atention to his personal pearnce. He was impecably gromed, had his hair dyed once a wek, and reportedly changed his uniform twice ady.10 Crech also had very strong, higly devloped view of how oficers hould behave. He quit apositon i the ighly regarde Fighter Weapons Schol because h could not stomach is imediate comander?s emotinal imaturity, his inabilty to hld his temper, and his wilinges to break rules to insure the Fighter Weapons Schol would win the anual Air Force gunery met. The rsult was Crech was transferd and his bos gave an Oficer Efectivens Report (OER) that Crech later said ?made me lok like Irobed abnk,? but he base comander, who knew Crech wel, countermande the OER and Crech?s futre prospects wer unscathed.1 Crech viewd the SAC genrals who ad ben controling the Air Force with ajaundiced ye. He blievd that, because of World War I, they had moved rapidly from captins to genral oficers without having spent much time in the intermediate ranks, and thus had no idea bout how to d staf work or t how ork with astaf in apeacetime nvironment. Crech knew one gneral whose aide kpt en spare sts of eyglases to replace the ones he broke throwing them acros the rom when he was 274 displeased, and Crech felt hat most genral oficers of that era imitaed Genral Curtis LeMay, the ?master intimidator.? Crech later said that ?the ladership technique of the time was to be an SOB [who] related control f people with teir personal os of control? and, evn worse, ?the railng and rantig and bombastics include tightenig the screws of control; evry time ther was n acident her wer six more rgulations.? Crech felt hat Dixon, while h was one of the most creative, bright, and imaginative four stars the Air Force ver had, was, like LeMay, amaster intimidator.12 At he same tie, Crech ad sen what he considerd some god examples of leadership. He spoke of ne gneral who, when it was necsary to fire acomander, flew thre and ahlf hours acros the country to tel him in person. The gneral met he comander, told him that he was very sory but he ad to relive him, and said that if ther wer anything he could o fr the comander or his family he would o it. The genral then got n the plane and flew thre and a hlf hours back to his headquarters. Ther was no dubt in Crech?s mind what kind of comander he wanted to be.13 Dixon was t least partialy corect about he rasons Crech ame to TAC. Jones was not hapy with TAC?s hig acident rate or the F-15 mainteance and spare parts problems that wer leading to asharp decrase in the amount of lying time for TAC pilots and aircaft. TAC was lso having dificulty in retainig pilots, though les dificulty than the rst of the Air Force, and the dcline in flying time was en as not only lesnig the TAF?s kils but also as direct ause of the igh number of ighter pilots leaving the Air Force. Crech wanted to make changes, but not dismantle most of what Dixon had one. 14 275 Crech was very much an Air Force ?company man.? He had ben a ctive particpant i the Air Force?s atempt o limit Army avition i 1962, and he ad worked for Secrtary of Defnse McNamra nd had ben Genral Sweney?s aide to when Sweney, as comander of TAC, tried to ?SACemcize? the comand. 15 Sweny had chosen Crech to be his aide bcause Sweny, as ?bomber genral? with no experince in fighters, wanted someone with fighter xperince on his taf. Crech later remberd that Sweny was ?heavy hande,? but also felt hat Sweny ?profesionalized TAC.?16 When Genral David Jones was comander of United Staes Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), Crech ad ben Jones? Director f Operations, and his primary focus was flying safety. Crech's guidance to the USAFE flying units was to teach te Soviet/Warsw Pact hreat, but only acdemicaly. One oficer who orked for Crech in USAFE remberd, ?We wanted to preare the aircews but Crech was emphatic that the idea was train but not have acidents. Many of the junior ficers felt he acident rate was hig because of inferior tainig but USAFE?s focus was ?fly safe,? not rain realisticaly, while Crech was ther.?17 Crech ad n exceptionaly strong fihter background and was, by al acounts, an outsandig ?stick and ruder man.? He had ben the comander of the Skyblazers aerobatic team and had flown fighter combat ours in Korea nd Vietnam, and Crech?s time in combat strongly influenced his aproach to tactial ir power. His flew his Korean combat our in F-80s, America?s first jet fighter and one that was proaching obsolescence by the time of the war. The F-80s' main mision was ground atck, but Crech ad viid meories about being completly outclased when modern Soviet 276 MiG-15s atcked his F-80. He also saw ho the Chines and North Koreans moved most of their equipment and suplies at night with litle interfrence bcause the American ir forces had no weapons ystems that wer efctive at night. Fiften years later, as n F-4 pilot in Vietnam, he saw the same situation when the North Vietnames wer able to move trops and suplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail at night, agin with relatively litle American iterfrence.18 While the operational comander of USAFE, Crech became vry familar with te Soviet war plans that include fighting twenty-four hours ady, prefrably in bad weather, to cunter NATO?s tactial ir power. Thes experinces had n obvious impact on Crech?s view of tactial ir warfre, and he was detrmined to devlop new night-fighting sytems and other hig-tech weapons to fset the Warsw Pact?s numerical superiority. 19 Crech was ?ground atck guy? and viewd the pure air-to-air arena with some supicon. A former Air Force Chief of Staf noted, ?Crech was beliver in destroying enmy aircaft on the ground and thus always pushed for multi-role fighters,? and it semed Crech might bring another doctrinal change by droping the mphasi on air-to-air combat hat had brought in the F-15.20 The problem any ? including Dixon ? saw with tis aproach was that it was dificult o kil aircaft on the ground. Air base wer wel protectd, and the aircaft sheltred in hardend hangers. Many thought it was easier and much eaper to kil aircaft in the air, and this had ben Israeli experince in the 1973 War.21 Crech was certainly intersted in flying safety ? one of his proudest boast was that while h ad comande the Skyblazers they lost no pilots in acidents while the staeside Air Force arobatic team, the Thunderbirds, had elven major acidents and had 27 five pilots kiled uring that period.2 Stil, when he tok over TAC in mid-1978, Crech sems to have ben very conscious that Red Flag nd the nw cultre of realistic trainig had taken over the Air Force, wer poular with te aircews, and that her wer fears he would cut into realistic trainig in the name of lying safety. Crech knew he ad to be careful not make changes en as returnig to the ?bad old ays? of ?around the flagpole? trainig. Stil, it sems that Crech?s persona may have influenced and limited the pople to whom he chose to listen. While the daper Crech was wing comander in Europe in the arly 1970s, the ls-than-daper Mody Suter came over to brief a Weapons Schol program. Crech di not like the briefing and told Suter so, and it sems Suter di not take the critcism wel.23 One former genral oficer who knew Crech wel said, ?I'm not sure Crech would have taken the Red Flag initative mesage from Mody [Suter], who was bushy-tailed activist. Ithink Crech would have ben skeptical of the mesage because of the mesnger?[but Crech] was hande Red Flag long with TAC and he made it go.? 24 As afurther impetus to kep realistic trainig, the Air Force had sudenly begun to have apilot shortage. In FY 1978, the srvice had surplus of ver 3,80 pilots, while in FY 197, it showed ashortfal of ver 1,30 pilots, and by the nd of calendar year 1978, the Air Force was retainig les that 40 percnt of its pilots. 25 This was erious, and since rewarding and meanigful flying time was one of the bigest pilot ?satisfiers,? Red Flag and other ealistic trainig clearly had to stay.26 While Crech wanted to cut TAC?s acident rate, he also understod he ad to aproach te rintroduction f lying safety into the caluls of realistic trainig carefuly. 278 ?ROL BACK? To alter ealistic trainig in away that would produce fwer acidents, Crech nede a philosphical ?hok,? whic he provide when he caled al his wing comanders to a?Warfighter Confernce? at TAC headquarters almost imediately after he tok over. 27 At he confernce, Crech laid own anew doctrine for the way the TAF would fight aconventional war. Genral Dixon?s doctrine, while understandig the ned for defnse supresion, emphasized atcking important argets and only atcking SAM sites and their adrs a required, but Crech introduced acomplet change to this doctrine. At he Warfighter Confernce, he told his comanders ?from now on we?r going to make defnse ?rol back? our first order of busines.? 28Acording to the nw doctrine, the TAF would focus on the nemy air defnse ystem as its primary target and wreck it, piec by piec. Only then would the TAF begin active atcks aginst other ground targets. ?Rol back? caled for atcking the air defnse ystems closet o the front line at medium altiudes with precison guide munitons, and then moving towards the rar. This emed to mean drastic ut in low-levl pentration to avoid SAMs, atcti that Crech aled the ?low levl disease." Crech told his comanders to take this new information back to their wings and ?launch a major efort o educate tactial people throughout he Air Force on this major shift and the rasonig that lies behind it.?29 Ther was no disent. While Crech was not a?screamer? or a comander who humilated his ubordinates, he ad his own ay of dealing with tose who di not flow his directives. He simply fired them, and his reputaion had precde him. 30 The mesage was clear. ?Rol back? was the nw TAC party line, and the trops had to get on board or get out. Ther wer certainly doubts among the atendes, though wisely they went 279 unstaed and the comanders dutifuly tok the nw party line back to their wings. 31Crech also sent out he ful TAC briefing team to brief the nw doctrine to al the fighter pilots in the TAF, including those in Europe and the Pacifc, as wel as fighter pilots in the Air National Guard and Air Force Resrve. 32 But no disent i public di not mean l the comanders in TAC agred with ?rol back.? Many disagred with Crech?s new aproach, including his predcesor, Genral Robert Dixon, and many of the iron majors. As the nw doctrine cirulated through TAC and the TAF, those who disagred with Crech?s doctrine flt it was n open question if Crech was incer about he miltary utilty of ?rol back? or whetr he was imply loking for a way to rationalize demphasizng low-levl flying trainig and thus acidents, ince low-levl flying was the bigest ource of acidents in TAC. 3 Others disagred with te basic idea of ?rol back.? The doctrine semd to mean that the nemy air defnse, particularly the SAM sites and radrs, would be the primary target of the fighter force and that he TAF would only particpate in the land batle after supresing the air defnse. Al agred rol back was the bst plan if time prmited, but in case of a surpise atck, rol back semed to invole atcking the air defnse first instead of atck Soviet ground units, leaving NATO ground forces on their own for a long period until the TAF had reduced the air defnse. 34 By spendig time supresing defnse, some thought Crech?s doctrine might alow the Soviets to swep through and capture the NATO base while their aircaft wer stil atcking the air defnse. This semed to be aserious flaw, and otably the other NATO air forces di not acept rol back as primary doctrine.35 Rol back spawned a crton by a wag in USAFE 280 headquarters howing two Rusian tankers in acf? in Paris post-WI with one asking the other, ?By the way, who on the air batle??36 TECHNOLGY OR TAINIG? Before taking over TAC, rech ad ben the Comander of the Air Force Systems Comand?s Electronic Systems Divisons (ESD) and became namored with technolgy. At he first Warfighter Confernce, in aditon to rl back, Crech anounced his comitent o inovation by technolgy, teling his comanders TAC was going to begin a ? ful court pres to devlop and field sytems and munitons that fit our new tactis.?37 While the Critcs would say he prsonifed the previously described ?Icarus Syndrome? of technolgy for technolgy?s ake, in fact Crech focused on the mision, though primarily on technolgical ways to acomplish it. Crech?s main technolgical focus was on ight and al-weather combat. He had sen the Chines in Korea nd the North Vietnames in SEA move mainly at night, and he knew that in the winter por weather dominated Germany. Staistics howed that in central Europe ther was only an verage of about 4.5 hours of god flying weather during the short daylight ours in the winter, while at night and flying under the weather ther wer 14 hours a24-hour period.38 Crech was thus completly comited to al-weather atck sytems, but he was not an eginer and id not have adep understandig of engiering problems. When he ad n idea, he would push it by fiat, no mater what he practial dificulties, and this was to cause a number of problems. Many of the nw sytems Crech ampioned wer plagued with long devlopment times, cost overuns, and reliabilty problems. This caused Crech and the Air Force anumber of problems, not nly operationaly, but also with te Critcs and their 281 congresional lies, but Crech nevr waverd in his belif that such sytems wer absolutely critcal to the TAF.39 Rol back and the comitent o hig technolgy di not sem to any to be fuly consitent with te comitent o lw-levl flying at Red Flag. The incesant push for more hig-tech sytems eant TAC had to speak out of both sides of its mouth, saying on the one hand that hig technolgy weapons wer necsary, while contiuing to emphasize the signifcance of the trainig at Red Flag wher the TAF crews trained to g in low, prearing for an imediate ?come as you are? war. The seming dichotmy di not sem to bther Crech. He was nothing if not a creful and thoughtful comander, and he ralized that o most people ?realistic trainig? meant low-levl flying. Even as he pushed for higer technolgy in TAC?s weapons ystems, he rcognized this percption that realistic trainig meant low-levl flying was part of TAC's "combat cultre," and he tok pains to pint out it was not changi under his regime. In 1980, for example, TAC?s deputy comander, Lt. Genral Robert Mathis, boasted ?the number of lw-levl misions [TAC has] flown below 20 fet has more than tripled in fiscal year 197 [Crech?s first year in comand] compared with fiscal year 1978.? 40 Crech would explain this by saying such trainig was necsary for the presnt but hat he Soviets wer devloping sytems to deny the TAF low-levl pentration ad that low levl had its own set of problems, and he contiued his push for new, expensive, hig-technolgy sytems o the TAF could rol back the dfense from edium altiude. Crech?s atempts to reduce acidents at Red Flag had litle fect initaly, but Red Flag?s acident rate gradualy came down to the point wher in two ut of the last hre years of the Crech regime (1982 and 1984) it was evn with te overal TAC acident 28 rate.41 Crech as claimed credit for this, but credit probaly more proerly should go t Genral Dixon?s insitence on teaching pilots how to fly low levl and the ful implentaion f such trainig concepts as Johny Jumper?s building block aproach,? whic began prior t the Crech reign. 42 The ?Flag? exrcise concept was extraordinarily flexible, and Crech introduced improvemnts in the xercise, including a new emphasi on ight atck. Red Flag 78- and 79-2 introduced night scenarios; as expectd, they di not go wel, mainly because most of the fighters lacked terain folwing and ight delivery stems.43 This confirmed Crech?s belif that he TAF nede new night weapons delivery and avigation sytems and that echnolgy was the bst ype of inovation.4 Aditonaly, Crech tought e TAF was adly lacking in elctronic warfre trainig, so he orderd the dvelopment of an elctronic warfre xercise, ?Gren Flag,? to integrate lectronic warfre into TAC?s atck plans. TAC held the first Gren Flag exrcise in the spring of 1981, and as Crech supectd 72 percnt of the sorties wer ?inefctive? aginst asophisticated jaming threat. Crech ?got n his oapbox? and orderd betr tainig as wel as new elctronic warfre sytems, both ofensive and efnsive.45 CHANGI THE TAF?S DOCTRINE Crech ad sevral critcal sets in his push to change the TAF?s focus from low-levl atck to rl back of the air defnse and to devlop ahig technolgy, al-weather strike force focused on iterdiction. First, Crech was ble to take his own ideas nd make them the TAF?s doctrine? unilateraly because the Air Force di not have a?doctrine comand? like the Army?s Trainig and Doctrine Comand (TRADOC), 283 whic devloped Army doctrine. Doctrine was important because, as n Air Force historian Irving B. Holey noted ?doctrine dfines the scope and potential capbilties of [Air Fre] wapos ystms. Dctrie lis behind the dcisns of what ns wil be dvelopd and givs guian to the rlative importance of sevral comting roles. When the time cms to arti th inribly inadequat suply of dolars, dotrine provides te ratioale for fvoring one weapn sytem ver anthr.46 Crech ad nother aset hat came into play once h ad established his ?al-weather, rol back? doctrine. The Air Force had given TAC, and TAC alone, the authority to define the weapons ystems requiremnts for al of the TAF. Represntaives of TAC, USAFE, and PACF had semianual metings to certify requiremnts, but in the nd, the decisons about sytems wer made by TAC ? whic meant Crech. 47 Thus, as Crech?s biographer notes, ?Crech ad the organizational imperative - as the TAF spokesman for requiremnts - and the prsonal influence through is relationships with te chiefs of staf and key oficers on the Air Staf ? to play signifcant role in?aircaft, sytems, and munitons devlopments.?48 Crech?s final set was the Air Force Chiefs of Staf while h comande TAC. He and Genral David Jones wer close, and when Genral Jones left o become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf on 21 June 1978, afew months after Crech tok over TAC, Genral Lew Alen replaced him. Alen was personable but, evn though e was pilot, he ad no cmbat experince, despite having ben i the Air Force during World War I, Korea, nd Vietnam. 49He was hapy to give Crech fre rein ad so Crech, during much of his time as comander of TAC, had both an Air Force Chief of Staf and a 284 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf who ad complet confidence in him and aceptd virtualy al of his ystems acquistions recomendations. While Crech unilateraly formed the TAF?s doctrine and selcted its ystems, his ideas wer as welcome throughout he TAF as Dixon?s realistic trainig initatives. This was epecialy true of the dvelopment of anight and al-weather capbilty. Every aircew knew ho sucesful the North Vietnames had ben i moving trops and suplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail at night during the Vietnam War, and they also knew the winter weather in Europe was por, so the idea of devloping sytems to fight at night and in bad weather made god sense. Ther was lso suport for the AMRAM radr-guide misile, because most fighter pilots knew about he shortcomings and failures of the AIM-7 family, and for ?stand of? sytems like the Maverick air-to-ground misile. The nw hig-tech push proved to be atwo-edged sword, because Crech?s instincts wer not always on the mark and his wants wer someties xcesive. One of the most costly technical overaches was the Precison Locator Strike System (PLS), acomplex sytem intede to detct al types of enmy radrs with igh-flying U-2type aircaft. The U-2 would pas the information to acentral comand staion, whic forwarde the locations on to the strike base for ol back operations aginst air defnse. Though Crech aled PLS ?absolutely critcal,? it was higly complex, extremly expensive and in the nd unworkable, though parts of it proved sucesful in other sucesful programs.50 Ther was lso the problem of pasing over the ?god? in favor f ?the bst,? notably in the are of laser bomb designation sytems, and this would afect TAF capbilties in the Gulf War. 285 ?DEAR BOS,? AIR FORCE THICS, AND VOTING WITH YOUR FET In 1978, the prcentage of pilots who culd leave and id leave the Air Force was varying from 35-40 percnt, twice the istorical rate.51 More disturbing was that, for the first ime, fighter pilots wer geting out in large numbers, evn after Crech tok over. 52 Crech knew he ned to kep thes oficers, but he ad relatively litle control ver many of the Air Force polices that wer driving them out. Privately Crech also felt hat the main reason pilots left he Air Force was the igh pay nd semingly light workload of the airlines, and that pilots used Air Force polices a way to rationalize their decison.53 One of the major iritants that led to the increasing departure of Air Force pilots was the ?Controled Oficer Efectivens Report? (OER), whic began i Augst 1973. Because of percived ?inflation? of OERs, the Air Force bgan ?quota sytem? by mandating only acertain percntage of ficers in a unit could recive the ighest numerical blocks ? 2 percnt could recive the ighest ?1, the nxt 28 percnt a?2, and the rmainig oficers had to recive a?3. The changes aimed to make the proces of promtion boards easier, and the ad of Air Force Personel decred, ?A betr sytem has ben established. It has ben thre years in the making. It is the aproved sytem; it is afir sytem; and it wil be an efctive sytem, with te anticpated suport.? 54 Unfortunately, the nw OER sytem was not hought rough. Despite the fiat, the sytem had obvious problems and was disater fom the bginig, especialy for pilots. A glaring example of the problem arose in the nw F-15 squadrons. The pilots wer hand picked by TAC headquarters a the bst in the TAF, but despite this elction proces 286 once the pilots arived in the squadron they found their comanders had to give half of them ?3s,? anumerical rating that put hem in the ?lower half? of the Air Force. At he same tie, 2 percnt of the pilots in les elctive squadrons - pilots not selcted for the F-15 - recived a ?1, puting them at he top f the Air Force?s oficer anks. Many Air Force gneral oficers disagred with controled OER ? Crech aled it ?dumb as dirt? - but it remained for sevral years and had pernicous efct on aircews.5 After ashort period comanders learned how to ?game? the controled OER, but he sight of comanders pendig hours trying to detrmine how to adjust he OER numbers in their squadron istead of simply writng straightforward reports contributed to the pilots? feling that he Air Force?s priorites wer misplaced and hastend their departure from the srvice. 56 Shortly after Crech tok over in 1978 the Air Force abndoned the controled OER sytem, but he srving oficers? records wer not expunged and the bad felings remained. 57The problems the TAF had with retntion wer higlighted by aremarkable lter writen i early fal 1978 by one of the iron majors, Ron Keys, a misive that became quickly and universaly known as the ?Dear Bos? letr. Keys, an istructor at he Fighter Weapons Schol at Nelis, was told to cntribute his views to areport n ?why young pilots wer leaving the Air Force.? Keys had to provide his thoughts the night before h left or ashort TDY in Alaska nd, presd for time, he wrote his contribution in the form of aletr that expresd the concerns of his friends who ad left and wer leaving the srvice (Keys himself was not planig on leaving). He then turned in the letr and eparted on his TDY. The lter contained alitany of isues, including the controled OER, sumed up in the final pargraph: 287 I?m resignig because of lng hours with litle suport, entilemnts erode, intrity amokry, zero visble carer progresi, ad sior cmaders totl ising th pint (and vryn afrid or forbiden to infor th cmander)?.te Comer of TAC rives and is impresd with so shines and scarves and clean shtrays, ot what we can do in combat. 58 After Keys droped of the lter what hapend becomes fuzy, but it was eparted from the rst of the contributions, widely copied, and cirulated around the Air Force. The lter apeard in sevral versions and one apeard in the October 1978 in the influential Armed Forces Journal, widely read by defnse cognoscenti. The Air Force Times, awekly newspaer ead lmost universaly b Air Force prsonel, also published aversion, and son reached Crech?s desk.59 Some Air Force gnerals tried to silence the critcism, but Crech was much wiser. 60 His genral philosphy was that he wanted to make TAC betr for the pople that wer going to stay nd ot wory about the ones that re going to leave, so he rsited the impulse to have Keys ?decapitaed? and instead caled him to TAC headquarters. 61 Crech and Keys pent sevral hours alone discusing the complaints, and at he nd of the meting Crech promised to talk to ther young oficers and take action their concerns. Crech was god as his word, and brought in anumber of young oficers to TAC headquarters to discus thes isues and others.62 Keys returned to Nelis unstigmatized, and Crech?s reputaion with te iron majors oared. In Septmber 205, Ron Keys ? now Genral Ron Keys ? was pointed the comander of Air Combat Comand (AC), whic had ben formed by mergin SAC and TAC in 192 - Crech?s old positon. Stil, Air Force pilot retntion umbers contiued to fal, droping to 26 percnt i 197.63 Crech ontiued to belive that he Air Force ould not realisticaly compet for 28 pilots when the airlines wer in ahirng cyle and ofering hig paying jobs, but he also contiued working on isues uch as increased flying time that would kep TAC pilots in the srvice.64 READINES AND FLYING TIME ISUES One of Crech?s most imediate problems was increasing the amount of time TAC flew, because low flying time was not nly amajor eason so many oung fihter pilots wer leaving the Air Force but also, more important, it was cuting into cmbat readines. 65 Shortly before Crech tok over TAC, the comand?s fighter Utilzation Rate (UTE), the number of sorties and hours tactial fighters flew amonth, ad steadily declined and reached ahistoric low in February 1978 of 1.5 sorties/17 hours amonth. 6 Only 34 percnt of TAC?s F-15s wer flyable at he nd of any given day, and an inspection found the F-15 wing at Langley incapble of deploying to its forward base in Europe, ven with tre weks notice. 67 The problems originated in the Air Force dcison i the mid-to-late 1970s to spend its limited procuremnt budget on ew aircaft and buy only the minium nuber of spare parts, because pares also came out of the procuremnt budget. Genral Jack Chain, the director f Air Force Operations and Readines, said in 1980, ?Our aircaft at he nd of the Vietnam War wer tired and wer facing anew genration f Soviet quipment. We had choice: we could have ither a new airplane or we could have bought spares for our old ones. We couldn?t buy both.? 68 Aditonaly, as one gneral noted, spare parts wer simply not ?sexy? and lacked aconstiuency in the acquistion proces when the question was ?two more F-15s? or ?50 more xtra tires and 10,0 more widgets for the radr.? 69 While this decison was later lambasted by the Critcs and some in Congres, 289 more objective asesments ugest he Air Force hoice to buy stems instead of spares at his time was not an ureasonable one. A 194 anlysi writen by the Congresional Budget Ofice noted that during this period ?the underlying problem?was n imbalnce betwen defnse rsources and ational security comitents that made it imposible for Do to buy both readines and modernization.?70 Aditonaly, the nw Air Force sytems iply required more spare parts than the older ones. Older sytems could be rpaired at he base by aspecialist, but aircaft like the F-15 had many ?line rplaceable units? (LRUs) that wer removed and replaced when ther was malfunction ad the malfunctionig part sent back to a central repair facilty. LRUs made mainteance quicker and required fewr specialist, but required many more spare parts. The fal of in flying time was lso due to the lack of Operations and Mainteance (O&M) funds. O&M funds fal under agenral category caled ?Readines,? whic is intede to kep the operational miltary machine runig smothly. Readines funds pay for fuel, for exrcise such as Red Flag, mainteance of equipment, and amyriad of ther items that contribute to the day-to-day capbilty of American miltary forces. O&M funds are a pernial problem with te miltary, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, Genral David Jones, aid repatedly in the late 1970s that on vist he ard ?the wings? most critcal neds for improving readines are more trainig and exrcise.O&M di not produce jobs like nw eapons ystems, o it was n orphan except for the miltary [leaders].?71 For the Air Force, O&M was bout 30 percnt of budget, and while it grew faster in dolar terms than the dfense budget from FY1964 to FY1981, fuel cost and the dvalution f the dolar bsorbed much of that increase. 290 While the Air Force rgularly asked for signifcant icrease of O&M funds, Congres equaly regularly cut hes request because they often saw O& funds as ?wasteful.?72 This combination f the Air Force?s decison to purchase ystems at he xpense of spare parts, the problems with te F10 engie, and the dcreasing budgets of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations wer beginig to bite when Crech tok over TAC. While both te fundig for spare parts and O&M wer out of his are in Washington, Crech ad wide latiude to make changes in TAC and he tok advantge of Jones? confidence in him to begin aseris of measures he could take on his own to improve the situation. Crech finalized Dixon?s push for decntralized mainteance, whic Crech hoped would not nly improve morale and thus retntion, but also increase the number of aircaft avilable to fly. Because h controled TAC?s budget, Crech was ble to move some oney into the spare parts acounts, and he also made two cntroversial decisons that he thought would help solve the problems. First, he opend up some of TAC?s War Resrve Munitons (WRM) stocks, pare parts held in resrve in case of combat, nd used them to provide spare parts for tainig. Second, he authorized ?canibalizng? of spare parts, that is, taking operable parts from aircaft in scheduled mainteance and using them to replace inoperable parts on aircaft scheduled to fly. 73In 1978, Crech?s first year in comand, TAC ?canibalized? F-15 parts over 15,0 times because of lack of spares. The rsult was n icrease of lying time, but canibalization showed up in adifernt staistic, known as the ?fuly mision capble? (FMC) rate. Thes wer the number of aircaft hat wer ready to fly the nxt day t end of each flying day, and evn though canibalization alowed more aircaft o fly during the day, at he nd of the day the FMC numbers only showed aircaft hat had l their parts; canibalization had no efct on that 291 number. In 1978, the TAC FMC average for its F-15s was t an l time low of 35 percnt, and by 1980, despite some budget increase and Crech?s manipulation f the suply situation, the average F-15 FMC rate was til only 56 percnt. 74While this might sem aconsiderable improvemnt, it stil meant hat, t he bginig of anormal day, only alitle more than half of TAC?s F-15s wer flyable. During Crech?s tenure, xcept for his last year, on average h ad more aircaft grounde for lack of spare parts than i the last ful year of Dixon?s tenure, 197. Hindering Crech?s abilty to fix the problems wer further dificulties with Prat & Whitney and the F10 engie. In April 197, ther was strike in two f Prat?s F10 subcontractors that slowed spare parts production, and by early 1980 the Air Force was almost 10 engies hort for its F-15s and F-16s. The situation was o desperate that older F-15s under modifcation at he McDonel Douglas plant i St. Louis had their engies removed and instaled in ew F-15s coming of the production lies o they could fly to their base. 75 To try to slve the F10 problems, Congres had ben more than wiling to give Genral Slay the Navy?s $41 milion authorized for the Genral Electric F10 engie. Congres also aproved Slay?s plan to launch alow-cost project o test he GE engie in the F-16, as wel as permision ad funds to preare aprogram for an lternative ngie competion for al the futre F-15s and F-16s. Throughout 197 Prat & Whitney and its congresional lies fought o kep fundig for thes programs at minium, but he tst program on the GE engie contiued. 76 29 CARTER?S FY 1980 DEFNSE BUDGET By late 1978, liberal Democrats wer pilorying Carter because h anounced that he would alow the dfense budget o grow at 3 percnt ayear, at he xpense of domestic welfare programs.7 Nevrthels, despite liberal opositon, at hat point her was no longer talk of cuting defnse budgets, just discusion f how large the increase hould be. In early 197 Carter and Brown requestd a defnse budget of $132 bilion for FY1980, and in the nd Congres only cut he rquest by about $1.3 bilion. As afurther sign of the times, Congres easily pased an uthorization for anew nuclear carier, despite having upheld Carter?s veto f such aship les than year before. Carter bowed to the inevitable, aceptd the carier, and signed the bil. 78 Congres also aded $2.4 bilion more for weapons ystems to the Do request, increasing the number of F-15s to 60, F-16s to 175 and A-10s to 14, as wel as 4 KC-10 super tankers. Congres aded the aircaft because it hought Brown?s plan would ?stretch out? the aircaft buy resulting in higer unit cost and perhaps an evntual cut in the number of F-15s. Congres also thought e administration?s inflation estimates - 7.6 percnt for FY1980, droping to about 6 percnt over five yars - wer unrealistic. 79 Despite the increase, a lter eport by the Congresional Quarterly noted that he defnse pendig levls required the Air Force to decrase the number of sytems it bought, and the proces fed on itself because maler purchase increased the unit cost of weapons, thus further decrasing the number of weapons bought on agiven budget.80 Thes procuremnt gains wer somewhat ofset when Congres cut $1 bilion i O&M funds because many on the House apropriations comite stil considerd O&M 293 ?pork? to be cut.81 The cut in O&M funds resulted in reductions in exrcise, including the cancelation f some Red Flags, and this low fundig, combined with te F10 engie problems, eant most F-15 and F-16 pilots wer only geting eight ours of lying a month, athird of the time they nede to stay proficent. 82 Presure to increase the dfense budget contiued to build and ade to Senator Jackson?s fierc anti-Soviet opositon to the Strategic Arms Limitaions Treaty (SALT) I treaty in the Senate. In June 197, Carter signed a suplemntal budget hat ded $1 bilion to the dfense budget, including $42 milion for aditonal F10 engie purchase, to placte his pro-defnse critcs. Nevrthels, the SALT hearings that began i July 197 wer a disater for the administration as hawkish critcs of Carter?s defnse policy gave xample after xample of an icreasing Soviet weapons buildup. 83 JAMES FALOWS JOINS THE CRITICS While Crech was ecuring his grip on TAC and pushing for new eapons programs, in ashington John Boyd had retired and was orking as n upaid ?advisor? to Do, stil pushing for large numbers of lw-tech weapons. He joined Ricioni, ow orking for Northrop, and Sprey in trying to presure the Air Force to buy Northrop?s imple, relatively inexpensive F-20, and also cultivated agroup of jurnalist to try to sel the Critcs? ideas. Boyd made amajor breakthrough when, i early 197, James Falows, Washington editor f The Atlantic Monthly, caled on him to discus increasing defnse budgets.84 Falows had impecable liberal credntials. He had graduated from Harvard in 1970 wher he was the president of the Harvrd Crimson, avoide service in Vietnam and had ben a nti-war protestor, then went on to study econmics at Oxford University as 294 Rhodes Scholar. Falows became a meber of Ralph Nader?s group ?Nader's Raiders," then began his journalism carer as editor f The Washington Monthly and the Texas Monthly. Falows as not aNew Left or McGovernite liberal but a?neoliberal," a politcal ideolgy that was in fashion i the mid-1970s. Neoliberals had distinctive way of loking at public policy and belived that raditonal iberalism had to find ew methods to achiev its goals. Neoliberals, in contrast o traditonal iberal Democrats, wanted to lwer xpectaions about what government would o and claimed to be ?tough-minde? about he ned for astrong ational defnse, while at he same tie lowering the dfense budget and iverting the funds to scial programs. Neoliberals belived that large dfense budgets resulted from antional security policy devised by miltary men ad efnse anlyst whose thinkig was out-of-date and inflexible, and the neoliberals wanted to adopt amore sophisticated aproach and change, or at least signifcantly modify, long-aceptd tactial nd strategic oncepts to produce abetr strategy. Not surpisngly, thes new concepts would result in cheaper weapons and alow cuts in miltary budgets. The noliberals cast awide nt, and at various times include Jimy Carter, Al Gore, Bil radley, Richard Gephardt, Les Aspin, former California governor Jery Brown, and Gary Hart.85 Jimy Carter became the first neoliberal president, and from 197-197 Falows served as Carter?s chief spechwriter. Falows found the positon frustrating because Carter was man who culd se both sides of an rgument and, as Falows later lamentd, he was ?capble of holding two ideas bout he same thing in his head t he same tie.?86 Falows as more intersted in seling asingle, simple idea nd les intersted in the nuances or ther options, but Carter was not wiling to d what Falows 295 wanted him to d, to articulate his ideas in simplistic, black-and-white trms. This drove Falows to leave in 197.87 Falows belived that editorial writers in certain parts of the media, genraly those in the orbit of the New York Times, wer ?opinio elites? and played a signifcant part in the devlopment of public policy b leading and shaping the opinios of their eaders, the ?politcal elites.? He thus belived that he ky to making public policy was troking the egos f the opinio elite ditorial writers and columnist who ad the greatst influence on the politcal elites? percptions, then presntig thes editors and columnist with a simple but semingly impresive piec of reasonig with an easy-to-grasp them that provide quotable comentary and god news tories. Falows anted ?ideas that resonated with te ditors of the New York Times? and would bring ?editorialist to an enthusiastic frenzy.? Once one of thes simple ideas was ceptd, Falows belived, it would have ariple fect with other opinio elites, and the ditorials would echo and resonate for at least ix months.8 As aneoliberal Falows as frustrated by the semingly mindles increase in Carter?s defnse budget, and when he lft he administration i 197 he bgan to resarch an rticle on ew miltary weapons for The Atlantic Monthly. Falows anted to talk to people who ould confirm the noliberal philosphy and say, in simple trms, the defnse ?xperts? wer wrong, that America was buying the wrong weapons, and that they wer to expensive. Because Falows belived that he large dfense budgets wer caused by ?experts,? he schewd anyone who as eriously asociated with te dfense establishment because they would understand, if not agre with, te philosphy behind the weapons the miltary was procuring. He also knew - or sensed as reporter - that s 296 Samuel Huntigton oted, Americans love ?defnse iconclast and miltary mavericks.?89 To find them, Falows later said he ?deliberately left he mainstream of defnse anlysi and moved towards the fringe.? 90 For Falows to make his argument, he ned individuals who ad t least a modicum of credibilty, and when he met John Boyd in 197, Falows had found his man. Boyd was biter about not being promted to genral nd more than hapy to tel Falows hat was rong with te armed forces.91 Falows as entranced by Boyd?s glib and charismatic maner, and Boyd introduced Falows to Pier Sprey and a new meber of the Critcs, Franklin ?Chuck? Spiney, ano-flying former Air Force oficer who as now acivilan alyst in the Ofice of the Secrtary of Defnse. 92 When Falows apeard on the scen, the Critcs wer no lnger involed with te policy making proces in the Pentagon, and had become prmanet outside oponets of Do weapons ystems. They wer stil trying to sel their ?cheap nd simple? ideas to anyone who ould listen, genraly using Ricioni?s Northrop F-20 to cnstantly bring up the AIMVAL/CEVAL exrcise and the F-15 problems. Falows had hit he mother lode ? articulate malcontets and ?colrful charcters? who shared his worldview of the miltary, and who also had ?certain kokines? and the edge Falows found lacking in the profesional miltary.93 They wer not experts by any conventional measuremnt, but Falows decide to anoit hem as ?experts? and make them into apersonaly apealing roup of iconclast to align aginst he facels, genric ?Air Force,? Pentagon,? defnse planers,? and ?contractors,? groups Falows implied ? quite incorectly ? wer an eormous monlith with identical points of view. 297 By this time, John Boyd had his pater about what genius he was down to perfction. He said he ad writen abok on philosphy used at he Air Force Academy, as wel as bok on physics that was reviwed by unamed ?theoretical physicst, mathematicans, and sytems cientist? and was being used at he University of California (ther is no evidence that hes boks evr existed).94 He also claimed to have particpated in designig the F-16, whic he crtainly di not.95 While h was head of the Academic Section at he Fighter Weapons Schol in 1960, Boyd had ben asigned to write the tactis manual for the Fighter Weapons Schol that was dopted by the Air Force, though te tactial formations Boyd put in the manual wer porly designed and cost many lives over North Vietnam before they wer finaly corectd in the mid-1970s.96 Boyd had voide flying in Vietnam, so t give him cobat credibilty Falows aid, ?Boyd was one of the most ucesful pilots in the Korean War,? despite the fact hat Boyd only flew tenty-two misions (a normal tour was 10), nevr led a flight, nevr fired his guns despite bing in sevral engaemnts, and certainly nevr shot down a enmy aircaft. 97 Falows tok Boyd?s asertions of his genius at face value, and to explain why the briliant Boyd was not promted to genral Falows echoed Boyd?s biternes - Boyd ?wouldn?t play the game? and was to smart and inovative for the miltary?s anchronistic promtion sytem. Boyd?s complaints meshed nicely into what was to become one of Falows? central thems, that American miltary leaders wer incompetnt and refused to promte inovators. It folwed that if the American miltary leadership was incompetnt, then the 298 expensive programs they suported could be discredited, making way for les expensive programs that would fre up money for social programs. Falows rote later: Most of tday?s genrals and amirals are men who gt her because the wr procuremt wizrds, or adpt at puncing their tikts, or carful nt ake aves. Simply on hma levl, I was truk by how litle ?dg? most of the gerals ed to hve to their carctrs, how bland st of thm smd, nt nly in cmparison with te captis clnels benath te, but also red to sucsful men ad wom i oter filds?plitcians, ctrs, bsines, techers, and writrs. 98 Falows nevr semed to cnsider that genral oficers, especialy after the Vietnam War experince, might show ajournalist a bland face, nor di Falows check to se most oficers became gnerals wer truly ?procuremnt wizards? or ?ticket punchers.? Had Falows done some rsearch, e would have larned that evry fighter pilot f this post-Vietnam genration promted to genral flew at least one combat our in SEA, and since Boyd avoide flying a SEA combat our he simply di not met absic requiremnt for promtion. Aditonaly, Boyd also spent most of his carer in the Pentagon while his contemporaies, besides flying combat ours in Vietnam, wer comandig operational flying units.9 Falows? taemnt was lso revaling because it showed that he blievd one of the main criterion for an uthentic miltary oficer was the ned to be ?dgy.? Why this should be important is unclear ? certainly history is ful of great miltary leaders who wer not ?edgy? (Le and Grant spring imediately to mind )- but by seting ?edgy? as an important criteria Falows uported his idea that miltary leaders wer incompetnt, and thus their conventional defnse thinkig had to be wrong. Simply put, Falows di not view the miltary leaders a profesionals. Had he viewd them as profesionals, like 29 doctrs or lawyers, it is inconceivable h would have gone sarching for the truth ?on the fringes.? As a comparison, one might consider the raction to awriter who rote aseris of articles and a bok on how cancer esarch ould be improved by folwing the advice of no-MD ?experts? from fringe roups who suported the use of Laetrile bcause thes ?experts? wer ?edgy,? then saying that real oncolgist and cancer esarchers wer not credible bcause they wer not ?edgy.? Howevr, Falows nede other xperts besides Boyd. ?Chuck? Spiney?s anlytical background made him easy to designate as n expert, and Spiney brought an extra edge because h was crusader who as conviced of the ?inhernt coruption? in the dfense procuremnt proces. Spiney gave the Critcs? arguments amoral tone, saying that he difering views of new eapons wer not honest difernces of pinio but a Manichean contest of god vs. evil, of honest men like himself ighting ainst acbal of corupt miltary oficers and contractors who er only intersted in profits, not combat capbilty. Spiney described to Falows aptern of ?organizational cancer? that led to unrealistic miltary planig. This aproach apeald to Falows? trong streak of self-righteousnes, acharcteristic he was to cntiue to devlop to the anoyance of many, including the Washington Post newspaer critc who nted that ?many in Washington's media establishment regard [Falows] as anctimonius.? 10 Spiney used his anlytical skils to devlop the Critcs? arguments into along briefing he caled ?Defnse Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch,? also known as the ?Spiney Briefing.?10 Falows praised Spiney?s briefing as ?extraordinary? and ?the most useful document for understandig Tac Air,? evn though Falows had mited he was no judge of the arguments. 102 30 Falows also chose Wiliam Lind, one of elow neoliberal Senator Gary Hart?s taf, as n expert. Lind had no miltary experince but had worked for Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), writng aDefnse White Paper in 1976 that sugestd a drastic restructring of national defnse with large budget cuts, mainly from reducing the size of the army while building up the navy. When Taft lost his relction bid in 1976, Lind went o work for Hart and son joined Boyd, Canby, and Sprey in trying to cut defnse budgets by eliminating ?old plated? weapons. Lind had the ?certain kokines? Falows treasured and could be counted on to say things like, ?Clausewitz ould not have lasted two eks at West Point.?103 Pier Sprey was dificult o prtay s an expert in ay miltary are because h ad nevr served in the miltary, had no visble xpertise in miltary history, and was now working on evironmental water cleanig sytems. On the plus ide, Sprey was higly colrful, aperfct ?charcter.? He had knack for promting himself as n ?insider?s outsider? and was relntlesly self-agrandizng, claiming to have writen the tst program for the A-X [by this time the A-10] at he Air Force tst centr at Edwards Air Force Base, and to have worked on the F-15 with NAS, both untrue. 104 Best of al, he could be counted on to say outrageous things and to make wild acusations, uch as, ?TAC headquarters [personel] are noe to technicaly competnt and can?t define what hig performance means?in almost evry program they have ven ben ivoled in they have some disatrous requiremnts that wer gong to ruin the airplane?; the Air Force has no clear concept of what fighter is?; and ?the Air Force Systems Comand at Wright Paterson is extraordinarily technicaly incompetnt.? 105 Sprey had lso devloped what he claimed wer the four ?measures for suces in air-to-air combat,? based on 301 ?historical dat.? The four measures of suces ? numbers, maneuverabilty, firepower, and simplicty - showed that large numbers of smal, simple aircaft would be more efctive than few larger, more sophisticated aircaft.106 But evn Boyd thought Sprey was ?weird,? so t make Sprey an ?expert? Falows had to fal back on journalistic word games, definig Sprey as n expert because h was ?renowned in defnse cirles for suport f simple weapons,? implying that ?simple was god? was given, when i fact that was the argument. 107 Designating thes Critcs a ?experts? alowed Falows to make semingly legitmate ?apeal to authority? arguments, asuming o ne would point out hat he xperts wer not experts and that heir arguments wer actualy argumentum ad vercundiam, the falcy of apealing to the tstimony of an uthority outside his pecial field. It also alowed him to use the journalistic technique of ?reinforcing experts.? Spiney choed the Sprey line that AIMVAL/CEVAL showed that ?increasing umbers of particpants changes the nature of [air] combat nd tactis required,? while Sprey suported Spiney?s claims of the inhernt coruption by saying the Air Force bought expensive sytems because ?the more xpensive aprogram is?the bter it is for the Air Force? and that ?ther is zero incentive anywher in the Air Force or any other service to evr not produce agold plated sytem.?108 Finaly, the ?xperts? alowed Falows to absolve himself of the normal journalist? responsibilty to check their facts. He later said, ?I di not have the xpertise to judge whetr their arguments wer corect, but Iwas impresd by the freshnes and cohernce of their arguments and their vison f aonce-in-agenration portunity to use new resources for the miltary.?109 Falows thus admited he was not searching for tuth, at 302 least not American philospher Wiliam Jaes? conception f the truth: ?True ideas re those we can similate, validate, corborate, and verify. False ideas re those we canot.?10 Having established his ?experts? credntials, Falows ent on to proclaim, ?they realy knew, first hand, about he ralites of weapons design ad weapons contracting and weapons efctivens in combat. They wer not afrid to think inovative thoughts and chalenge powers-that-be to get heir points acros.? Thus, Falows et he measure of merit for the Critcs? arguments ? freshnes and cohernceinovative thoughts? that ?chalenge the powers-that-be.? Such omon journalistic standars a ?acurate? and ?true? went unmentioned. Falows ent on to say, ?I came to respect hem and value them ore than yone Ihave ver met.? 1 Falows introduced his ?experts? in his Atlantic Monthly article ?Muscle Bound Super Power,? published in October 197, whic became one of the sminal rguments for what would become known as the ?Defnse Reform Movemnt? (DRM). The article began by aserting that ?the United Staes has become shackled to hig technolgy that may fail when it mets the ultimate tst [of combat].? Falows then considerd the arguments of anumber of critcs of American defnse policy who ad lternative strategis, including one group that wanted to remove al American forces from Germany and give ach German family an tiank weapon to stop aSoviet invasion.12 On the more srious ide, he introduced the xperts he creatd to back up his basic arguments: Boyd, the inovative, unapreciated miltary genius who as not promted because h would not ?play the game?; Spiney, the ?courageous Do anlyst? who showed how corupt he whole weapons procuremnt sytem was; and Sprey, the maverick who 30 pointed out specifcaly what was rong with te weapons America was buying. To make their arguments more compeling, Falows presnted the Critcs a courageous lone voices crying in the wildernes, as ?public servants? wiling to take on the formidable genric enties of ?the Pentagon,? the contractors,? the planers,? and ?the Air Force? in arigorus, public debate.13 Falows? reinforcing experts? al agred America?s defnse policy was flawed and they agred on what specifcaly was rong and how to fix it. What he US miltary, specifcaly the Air Force, nede to d was top buying expensive, hig-tech weapons and instead buy large quanties of inexpensive, asy to maintain, reliable weapons sytems to met he uge number of Soviet weapons aryed acros Europe in the Warsw Pact. This would be more combat efctive and save money at he same tie.14 Selcted parts of the AIMVAL/CEVAL test wer perfct for the Critcs? argument. Since the kil:los ratio in AIVAL/CEVAL was only 2:1 in favor f the F-15s over the F-5 and four F-5s could be ought for ne F-15, then the F-15 should be droped in favor f more F-5s. To explain why the Air Force ould not se this obvious truth, Falows quoted Spiney, who said that he Air Force bought F-15s instead of F-5s because dfense planers chose weapons for contractor profits and their own promtions.15 In fact, most Air Force oficers promted to genral wer pilots with combat experince, not procuremnt oficers, but such details wer ignored in favor f Falows? imple, asy-to-understand main point - America was asting money on defnse bcause the Air Force?s new hig-tech weapons wer to expensive to be ought in adequate numbers and to complex to work in combat. 16 304 Interstingly, the Air Force itself gave the Critcs evral oportunites to expres their views. Boyd and Sprey wrote an rticle about he ?simple vs. complex? fighter question i the Fighter Weapons Reviw, though te Air Force folwed ith an rticle critcizng the aproach in alter isue. 17 Stev Canby, anew Critc who fcused on the flaws in US strategy, oferd acritcism of Crech?s rol back? strategy in a197 article in Air University Reviw her he noted the Europeans, like the Israelis, chose to g low and trained for it, and that he thought at Crech and the TAF wer going in the wrong direction: The U.S. aproach as evoled toward ahig technolgy stem, based on ral-time cmnd nd cntrl, sphisticted fse uprsion, n precison-guide muitos. The Euroeans, on th othr hand, argue that this ystem is nly cstly, to scptible t cuntermesures (i., norbust), ad that it is based n a incort percption f th nature of the grond wr. Tey mk th telig pint hat h medium-altid windw i hic th USAF is atmti to fly is in fact losed, an can oly be kpt open by perxpensive and uncertai defns upresio means. Eura programs, o th othr had, re orited to th stil-op low-altiude windw. Tey ave drive ifrent viws n cmand n control, perationl mthos, ordnac hoice, ad aircaft desig, relyig mre n orgizational technique thn igh-cost tchnolg.18 Canby disregarde Air Force trainig for lw-levl operations at Red Flag, though this might ave ben a honest misunderstandig brought on by Crech?s two-track aproach of lying alrger number of Red Flags while pushing publicly for new eapons for his rol back doctrine. THE CARTER DOCTRINE AND CARTER?S ELCTION YEAR EPIHANY Folwing hard on the els of Falows? article was the Irani hostage cris in November 197, whic focused the public and the Congres on American miltary capbilties, or the lack therof. The Soviet invasion f Afghanistan i Decmber 197 305 not nly increased the scrutiny of alegd low levls of defnse spendig but also insured that he Senate would not acept he SALT treaty, forcing Carter to withdraw it from consideration. The invasion also led Carter, in his 1980 Stae of the Unio adres, to proclaim the ?Carter Doctrine?: Let our positon be absolutely clear: any atempt by any outside force to gain control f the Persian Gulf region wil be rgarde as n asult on the vital interst of the United Staes of America. And such an sault wil be rpeld by any means ecsary, including miltary force."19 Simply put, the Carter Doctrine meant America would fight o presrve the flow of Midle East oil, and was the first presidential public anouncemnt since Vietnam that threatned the comitent of American trops to protect esntial United Staes national interst. In so ding, the Carter Doctrine xtende America?s miltary shield to the Persian Gulf region ad modifed the Nixon Doctrine, whic primarily relid on alies in a region to defnd themselvs and protect American regional interst with United Staes material id. To implent he Carter Doctrine, the United Staes miltary formed the ?Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force? (RDJTF), whic in 1983 under Ronald Reagn became the United Staes Central Comand (CENTCOM). 120 The Congresional Quarterly noted that in 1980, ?Congresional larm over the U.S.-Soviet miltary balnce had reached a new levl of intesity,? and Carter?s FY1981 defnse budget, presnted in the 1980 elction year, einforced this. The budget was $16.8 bilion, $34 bilion ver the amount Congres had proved the previous year, and include pay raise, funds for 30 more F-15s and 180 F-16s, and provison for about $75 milion for new avionics to alow the ?simple? A-10s to find targets at night. 12 Carter also cmited to an nual real growth rate of 5 percnt i the dfense budget.12 306 Nevrthels, O&M funds contiued to be contetious. The Air Force asked for a5 percnt icrease in O&, but he House Apropriations Comite made ?ficency-orientd? O&M cuts, despite strenuos protest by Do and Air Force oficals that such cuts wer eroding the radines of the forces. The comite was not sympathetic and complained that ?the Department of Defnse often goes to great lengths to leave the implication that ny reduction [i O&M funds], no mater how made or aplied, wil have a direct and revrse impact on readines.? 123 But while cuting some O&M, the comite increased the number of F-15s from the thirty Carter wanted to frty-two, aded $680 milion for spare parts and misiles and $10 milion to the Air Force?s flying budget for F-15s and F-16s. Congres made the aditons to the flying budget when it found out hat Do had only planed to have F-15/F-16 pilots fly ten hours amonth because of projectd engie problems. The comite belived the ngie problems would be fixed and increased the budget for flying time to fiten hours apilot, considerd the minium nede to maintain flying proficency. 124 STEALTH AND CARTER?S CREDIBILITY During his 1980 presidential campaign aginst Ronald Reagn, President Carter claimed that he ad ?revrsed the Republican decline? in defnse pendig, but sevral evnts undercut his credibilty. In late April 1980, an American hostage rscue operation colapsed at field inside Iran kown as Desrt One, and the miserable failure was blamed, corectly or not, n Carter?s cuts in the dfense budget. 125 Then, i aWashington ews confernce on 2 Augst 1980, Defnse Secrtary Harold Brown anounced the xistence of the formerly higly clasifed Stealth aircaft 307 program ?because ther have ben sevral eaks about he stealth program?[so] Ibelive it is not apropriate or credible for us to deny the xistence of such aprogram.?126 Since Stealth technolgy was in the ighly clasifed ?Black World,? Carter?s critcs pounced on the anouncemnt as n example of how litle Carter cared about national security. Thes critcs laimed he anounced the program soley to bost his relction chances by countering asertions he was eak on defnse, much as President Lyndon B. Johnson had revaled the xistence of the Mach 3 SR-71 reconaisance spy lane during his presidential campaign aginst Bary Goldwater. 127 This aded to Carter?s credibilty problem on defnse, whic increased ven further when Carter threatned to veto the defnse budget with te increase he ad initaly suported because the budget had to much defnse spendig and ot enough domestic spendig. 128 CRECH AND THE CARTER DOCTRINE During his time at TAC, one of Crech?s main asets was that he was uperb at alignig TAC with te national miltary strategy and was consitently able to fer the kind of miltary capbilties the xecutive branch wanted. He was epecialy prescient ? perhaps lucky ? when it came to evnts in the Persian Gulf. In 1978, long before the Gulf became an rea of public oncern, Crech asked the TAC staf or astudy of lng-range, al-weather strike aircaft, caled the "Enhanced Tactial Fighter? (ETF). 129 Oficaly, the ETF was uposed to be a suplemnt or eplacemnt for the F-1, but he ETF requiremnt overlaped the capbilties of the Lockhed F-17 Stealth fighter-bomber, whic, in 1978, was til in the ?Black World.? It was o secrt hat few politcians or Washington bureaucrats knew about its planed role, and the screy that surounde the F-17 program worked to Crech?s advantge. Congres is normaly quite skeptical when 308 the armed services ask for anew eapon when they already have aprogram that wil met he rquiremnt, and had they known about he F-17 the ETF study might ave ben quickly kiled. Instead, the screy suroundig the F-17 alowed Crech to proced with te study. 130 The inital ETF study recomende the purchase of more F-1Fs. While the arly history of the F-1 had ben disater after disater, the Air Force had contiued to pur money into fixes, and the latest version, the F-1F, was n excelnt aircaft. But he F- 1F was not he answer that Crech wanted. He wanted amulti-role fighter-bomber that could conduct astrike mision alone by fighting its way in ad out of the target are if necsary, without he ned for fighter scort, elctronic jaming aircaft, or AWCS suport ? in other words, aground atck version f the F-15. 13 The pure air-to-air ?not apound for air-to-ground? F-15 was lready in the inventory when Crech tok over TAC, but Crech knew the F-15 had great deal of rom for growth (15 cubic fet of empty space vs. F-16?s two cubic fet) and early in the F-15 devlopment program the aircaft had isplayed considerable air-to-ground capbilty.132 The F-1F, while a cpable air-to-ground aircaft, was helples in air-to-air combat, so the name of the TAC study was changed from the Enhanced Tactial Fighter (ETF) to the ?Dual Role Fighter? (DRF), aword change that eliminated the F-1F from the competion. 13 TAC had no money for aful devlopment program to lok at he F-15 as a ground atck aircaft, so Crech aproached George Graf, the president of McDonel Douglas ,and ?solicted an usolicted prosal? for an improved F-15. Graf was more than wiling to help because McDonel Douglas was concerned about he F-15 production lie ndig and about competion from the F-16. For some tie Graf had 309 ben pushing atwo-seat F-15 with extremly long range provide by large confrmal fuel tanks cal Fuel and Sensor Tactial Packages, or ?FAST Packs,? fited under the wing at he fuselage join. The aircaft would cary an extnsive ary of sensors to give it al-weather capbilty and the abilty to guide ?smart? bombs. At he same tie, it would have most of the rgular F-15?s air-to air capbilty.134 With encouragin words from Crech, McDonel Douglas and Hughes Aircaft colaborated in aprivately funde study of the fasibilty of adpting the basic F-15 to the air-to-ground role. McDonel Douglas tok atwo-seat F-15B, aded a Hughes ynthetic aperture radr for hig-resolution ground maping, and configured the back seat for aWeapons System Oficer (WSO) to perate the radr and asuite of sophisticated navigation ad weapons delivery stems. The aircaft was equiped with extra weapons pylons on the botm of each of the FAST packs, giving it atotal of 15 air-to-ground weapons? pylons. Named the ?Strike Eagle,? the aircaft also caried a lrge, xternal laser bomb designator pod caled ?Pave Tack,? the first laser designation sytem that provide the capbilty for autonmous delivery of laser-guide bombs at night.135 The Strike Eagle functioned wel in test and, best of al, to this point he program cost TAC nothing.136 After seing the rsults, Crech, in his role as the Air Force?s tactial weapons requiremnts oficer, had the DRF include in the Air Force?s FY 1980 defnse budget. To show the Air Force was trying to cntain cost, Crech told Congres TAC would also consider aconversion f the F-16 to met he DRF requiremnt, but nder no cirumstances would the Air Force try to devlop an etirely new aircaft.137 Thus, when Carter anounced the formation f the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, Crech 310 already had very long-range strike aircaft under devlopment hat would be prfect for the long distances in the Gulf region. MORE HIG-TECH SYTEMS Crech also cntiued to push for evn more advanced sytems to give the TAF an al-weather capbilty. While the large Pave Tack pod was perfctly serviceable sytem for al-weather weapons targeting for F-4s, F-1s and F-15Es, Crech ad visons of alarge force of al-weather atck F-16s, and this meant amuch smaler sytem that could fit on the F-16. Crech enthusiasticaly suported the dvelopment of asytem caled Low Altiude Navigation ad Targeting, Infraed, Night (LANTIRN), whic onsits of two integrated pods, anvigation pod and a trgeting pod, mounted xternaly but smal enough to fit on the F-16. 138 The navigation pod contained aterain-folwing radr that made automatic inputs to the aircaft's autopilot alow the aircaft o maintain apreslectd altiude above the train ad avoid obstacles while flying low levl in darknes and bad weather, as wel as wide-field infraed sytem for the pilot fr visual navigation. The scond, separte targeting pod contained an ifraed sensor and alser designator/angefinder for delivery of laser-guide munitons, with automatic target tracking to alow afighter to atck targets with precison-guide weapons on asingle pas. 139 By way of explantion, laser guide bombs (LGBs) are simply conventional bombs with alser guidance had nd smal, moveable guidance fins aded. LGBs can be caried and roped from any aircaft with abomb rack, but hey have to be guide by a laser designator sytem that is often ot caried on aircaft droping the LGB. When Crech tok over TAC, the TAF already had two laser designator pods in service, the 31 Vietnam-era Pave Spike and the large, al-weather Pave Tack. The Pave Spike (AVN/AQ-23) was smal sytem, weighing alitle over 450 pounds and about 6 fet long, and could fit into the F-4?s forward misile wel, but was only usable in day nd god weather. The Pave Tack (AVQ-26) was folw on sytem, uch larger ? about 15 fet long and weighing over 130 pounds - that used imagin infraed (IR) sensors for target acquistion ad weapons delivery. It had night and limited bad weather capbilty. The size of the Pave Tack meant only large fighters like the F-4, the F-15E, and F-1 could use it, the F-4 and F-15E carying it on below the bly on the cnterline staion, while the F-1 caried it in the bomb ay. The Pave Tack, while fective, was unpoular with F-4 crews because of its drag, and was nicknamed ?Pave Drag.? Underapreciated at he time was nother important capbilty of Pave Tack, the abilty to videotape the rsults of the bomb ipacts with avideo camera slaved to the sight. While intede for use as bomb damge asesment ol, it was to asume great importance in Air Force public relations. But Crech wanted a sytem that would work for both te F-15E and the F-16; while Pave Tack fit wel on the F-15E, the drag it genrated would ramticaly reduce the Strike Eagle?s range and it was much to large for the F-16. While al involed with te program conced LANTIRN?s capbilties, they also agred it was complex and would take along period to devlop. Nevrthels, as TAC comander Crech was ble to make LANTIRN a priority. 140 Production f the Pave Tac pods was ende after about 150 wer made, much fewr that originaly intede, and the DRF, instead of having the Pave Tack sytem instaled, would have to wait for LANTIRN. 312 Crech also cntiued to designate the ?fire and forget? radr-guide AMRAM aTAC top riority. The AMRAM would replace the arlier beam-riding AI-7, whose firng aircaft could only guide the misile to ne target at time, and also required the firng aircaft kep its radr beam on the target and folw the misile, ahuge tactial disadvantge,. The AMRAM was fre of thes limitaions and it was posible to fire six AMRAMS from one aircaft at six difernt argets at ranges thre times greatr than the AI-7, and then break way from the targets after firng because the misile?s guidance sytem was internal, sytem known as ?fire and forget.? Crech di not belive that ny aircaft was capble of modern air combat without ardar misile, so he insited that he AMRAM be smal enough and light enough for the F-16.14 The chalenge of making ARA and LANTIRN smal enough to fit on a F-16 was dauntig one whic, combined with te sytems? genral hig technolgy, meant both sytems hared many of the same cost overuns and elayed evlopment problems. From 1981 to 1985, the projectd cost of the LANTIRN program doubled, and the AMRAM was evn worse. 142 The misile was 1 fet long, 7 inches in diametr and weighed about 35 pounds, but it caried what wer esntialy miniaturized versions of the AIM-54 Phoenix misile lectronics, amisile that was 13 fet long, 15 inches in diametr and weighed over 10 pounds.143 The rsult was the AMRAM tok longer to devlop ? ten years ? than the F-15 or F-16, and its unit cost oared from $10,0 in 1978 to $90,0 in 198 before an Air Force ost-cuting program lowerd the cost o $40,0 in 193.14 Another sytem Crech promted because it oferd great l-weather capbilty was the Imagin Infra-Red (IR) Maverick misile, intede mainly for the A-10. The 31 Maverick was relatively smal (about 50 pounds), internaly guide ?fire and forget? antiank weapon with arnge of about welv miles ? wel outside of range of enmy defnse ? and could be used by the A-10, with afew modifcations, in al weather conditons. The IR seker head located the thermal iage of atrget, and then projectd it ont atelvison-like picture on acokpit display, after whic the pilot lcked on to the selcted target and fired. 145 Like LANTIRN and AMRAM, IR Maverick was plagued with problems, especialy in the igh-tech seker head. Thes problems, its relatively hig cost, and the idea of ahig-tech, al-weather weapon mounted on the simple A-10 made the Critcs apolecti.146 FALOWS? MAY 1980 ARTICLE In May 1980, in his own stroke of prescience, Falows rote another article in The Atlantic onthly tiled ?America?s High Tech Weaponry.? The article lambasted the hig-tech weapons that Crech was pushing and quoted Sprey at length, as wel as mentionig Spiney?s extraordinary Plans and Reality Mismatch? briefing.147 A few months the asertions in the article apeard to be confirmed when the Air Force?s premier F-15 unit, the First Tactial Fighter Wing, failed what should have ben aroutine Operational Readines Inspection (ORI). This was epecialy embarsing because the First Wing was colcated at Langley AFB with TAC headquarters and considerd the best wing in the comand. Crech quickly fired the wing comander, but he damge had ben done. The media gve the failure a great deal of atention ad wrote anumber of scathing (but acurate) stories about he situation. Both ABC and CBS had prime-tie programs on the failure; CBS caled the F-15 a?turkey,? and ABC caled the F-15 a ?dinosaur.? 148 314 The First Wing?s failure higlighted the problem with lack of spare parts. Increase in the dfense budget in the later years of the Carter administration had helpd, but most of the improvemnts came from an elaborate ?shel game? Crech used to kep aircaft flying by moving spare parts and using wartime suplies. 149 But his was not a negative point. Crech realized that TAC nede to cntiue its program of realistic flying trainig, and used his ful tol kit of mangemnt options to kep TAC?s aircaft lying. While Crech was later to claim credit for the improvemnt i flying time and sortie rates and that he improvemnt i TAC ?came wel before the Reagn build-up dolars kiced in,? the failure of the First Wing shows that was not he case ? the shortage of spare parts was til the isue. With Falows? article, the contiuing problems with te F10 engie, and the unfavorable publicty from the First Wing?s failed ORI, Crech realized that he Critcs? arguments wer beginig to gain traction. He understod that he ad to publicly demonstrate that he cause of the problems with TAC?s advanced aircaft was lack of spare parts, not he aircaft hemselvs. This author belives that Crech, evr the ?company man,? understod that he failures wer ading to President Carter?s credibilty problems on defnse, and he tok action to kep TAC aligned with, and suportive of, national defnse policy. In mid-1980, Crech gave the Carter administration amuch nede bost with an impresive dmonstration f TAC?s combat capbilty, as wel as demonstration what he saw as the ral problem, lack of spare parts. Crech knew the nuances of TAC?s uply stem and so he snt asquadron f the much-maligned F-1Fs to their wartime base in Egland with aful complent of suplies taken from War Resrve Suply Kits (WRSK). In Egland, under combat conditons, the F-1s 315 flew tice their wartime scheduled sortie rates and had 150 percnt icrease in their fuly mision capble (FMC) rates, that is, the number of aircaft hat wer ready to fly the nxt day?s misions after ady?s flying. A few months later, in the fal of 1980 and just before the lection, i an exrcise caled ?Combat Eagle? Crech sent asquadron f F-15s from its home base at Eglin AFB, Florida, to its wartime base at Bremgarten AFB, Germany, this time with its normal (but fl) complent of suplies. Ther al the F-15s flew thre sorties ady, twice their wartime sortie rates, and had higer ?mision capble? (MC) rate at he nd of the day than t heir home base in the United Staes. 150 The mesage Crech was endig was clear. The Air Force?s hig-tech sytems worked fine if they had enough parts, but hat required more money. 1. James C. Slife, Lt. Col. USAF, ?Crech Blue: Genral Bil Crech and the Refortion f th Tactial Air orces, 1978-1984? (Thsi: Schol of Advc Air Pwr Studies, Maxwel ir Frce Bas, AL, 202), 12. 2. Jack Van Lon, Col. USAF, -mil to author, 9 June 205. 3. John Corder, t. Gen, , phone interviews ith author, 23 March, 28 March, 10 April, 13 April 205; C.R ?Dick? Adrg, Col. USAF, Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam (Washington, D.C: Air Frc Histor ad Musms Program, 201). 76-8, pasim. 4. ?Headqurters USAF United Staes Air Force Staistical Digest Fiscal Year 1978,? Air Forc Mgazin, May 197, 10. 5. Ander, 46. 6. Richard . ?ody? Suter, Col. USAF, ?Corna Ace? interview by Lt. Cols. Gordn Nelson ad Jhn Dick, 26 January 197, AFHR, 56; Jack Van oan e-mail 13 May, 15 May 205. 7. John Corder, Lt. Gen. USAF, phone interview by author, 13 April 205. 8. Va Lan -mail, 13 May, 15 May 205. 9. Slife, 24. 10. Tom Clancy and Genral Chuck Horner, USAF, Every Man Tiger: The Story of the Gulf Air Wr (New York: Pengin Ptam, 19), 137. 1. ilbur Crch, Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview by Hugh Ahman, 19 June 92, K239.0512, AFHRA, 56-8. 1. Ibid., 94-8. 3. Ii., -10, 25. 316 14. Ibid., 76. 5. For abrief but relatively complet acount of this atempt o build up Army avition, se J. Kristophr Knr, Th Hlipter Invtion i the Unite States Ary (Cmbridg, MA: IT Security Studies Working Paper, 201). 16. Crech Oral History, 71. 7. John Vickery, Cl. USAF, e-mail, 19 June 205. 18. Crech, Oral History, 30-1, psim. 9. Ibid., 157. 20. Jones quoted in Slife, 36; Crech also makes it clear in corespondence that he was mre itrest i air-to-ground tn ir-t-ir. Crh -mail, March 18, 20, provid to author by Keith Feris; Crech e-mail to Jack Van Lon ?Boyd nd Falows,? 13 March 203, frward to author by Jak Vn Ln July 21, 205. 1. Dixon Orl Histry, 281. 2. Crech ral istor, 46. 3. Miael Mosley, Gen. USAF (curent Air Force Chief of Staf), e-mail to Wiliam ?Snk? Clark, Lt. Col. , pasd to authr 4 Jun 206. 24. Bradley Hosmer, t. Gen. USAF, e-mail t tor 28 J 5. 5. Robrt B. Fisk, Major SF, ?ir orce Pilot Retntion ? 198? (Resarch Study 8-0915: Air Comnd and taf Clg, Air Univrsity, Maxwel AFB, AL, 198), 2. 6. John D. Rhodes, Lt. Col. USAF, ?Pilot Retntion: An Historical Analysi,? (Resarc Report: Air War leg, ir University, Maxwel FB. AL, 1986), , 13. 27. Crch, Oral History, 24-27. 8. Ibid., 26-7. 29. Crech, Oral History, 26. 30. Bradly osmer, Lt. Gen. USAF, e-mail to author, 7 July 205. 1. Genral Lary Wlch, SF, quotd in Slife, 47. 32. Crch, Orl History, 27. . Suter, ral istr 86; Vickery e-mail to author, 2 June 205; Everts e-mail to author, 5 Fb 205. 34. Dixon, Oral History, 29-301. 5. Rudlf ?Rudi? Peksens, Brig. Gen. USAF, interview ith te author Septmber 20, Bostn MA. 36. Carto in author?s colection. 7. Slife, 25-6. 38. Wilbur Crech, Gen. USAF, dres to the Air Force Asociation, Los Angels, CA, 1 Novemr 1981, typd transcript in Crec Papers, 168.739-754, AFHR. 39. Slif, 13; Crech, Orl History, 120, pasim, AFHRA. 40. Robert . Matis, Gen. USAF, ?Tactil Air Comand 1980,? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comndrs from the Ofie of the Scretry of the Air Forc, February 1980, 31-7. 4. James A. Coley, Maj. USAF, ?Red Flag ? Is Realism Worth te Cost?? (Student Thesi: US ry War Coleg, Carlisl Barcks, PA, 1987), 59. 317 42. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 1981, Volume One (Langley AFB, VA: TAC Hedqurters, March 1982), 8-30. 43. istory of the Ttical Air Comand, Jan-Dec 1978, Volume One (Langley AFB, VA: TC Hadquarters, March 197), 237-238; Crech, Oral History, 32-3, pasim. 4. Crech Oral History, 34. 5. Ibid., 19-192. 46. Irving B. Holey, Jr., ?An Eduring Chalenge: The Problem of Air Force Doctrine,? Uited Stas Air Force caemy (USAF) Harmn Mrial Letur # 16, 1973, htp:/w.usf.af.mil/df/fh/dos/Haron16.doc (cesd Novembr 205). 4. TAC History, 1978, 296. 8. Slife, 53. 49. Jams A. Knight, Lt. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview, 17 Augst 198, K23.0512-54, FHRA, 254. . Slife, 17. 51. Th rate varied because ach omand kept rack of its own pilots, and the numbers wer don on a monthly bsi. Jh D. Rhodes, Lt. Cl. USAF, ?Pilot Retntion: An Histricl Aalsi? (Resarc eprt: Air War oleg, ir University, Maxwel FB. L, 1986), 12 (with crt), psim. 52. Knight, 25-25. 3. Crec, Oral History, 91. 54. Raymond C. Prestn, Lt. Col. USAF, ?The New Oficer Efectivens Report,? Air Universit Reviw (March-April 1974). htp:/w.airpor.mxwel.af.mil/airchronicles/aureviw/1974/mar-pr/reston.html (acesd Octber 205). Th ed of te Air Forc Miltary Personel Centr was Gnral Wiliam V. McBride, strngly blived in the sytem, ad may ars lter stil could ot understand why it was o widely islike. Wilia McBrie, Gen. USAF, Oral Histry Itrviw, 29-31 Janury 198, K239.0512-18, AFHRA, 20-21. 5. John P. Flyn, Lt. Ge, USAF, Oral History Interview, 13 ugst 98, K239.012-187, 304-305. AFHR; Crech, Oral History, 27. 56. Knight, 219-2. 7. Walter T. Brown, Jr., Lt. Col. USAF, ?OER Inflation, Quotas, and Rating-the-Rater,? Air University Reviw, Septmber-ctober 1975, 65-9. 58. This rsion found in Andreg, 192. 9. ?Wy I?m Getig Out,? rmd Forces Journal, 15, (November 1978): 4-5. 60. Se, for exaple, aspech by Thmas Wetkm, Maj. Gn. USAF, at Hil Air Force Bas, w.lonationl.org/il/docuents/ MG percnt20Wetkam percnt20CDI pernt20Spech perct20- percnt20letr.doc (acesd Septmbr 205). 61. Cr, Oral History, 91. 2. Slife, 80. 63. Fisk, 2. 4. Crech, Oral History, 21. 318 65. T. R. Milton, Gen. USAF, "Why Pilots Get Out," Air Force Magzine, Septmber 1978, 138. 6. TAC History 1978, 56-7 (graph and chart). 7. Wilbur Crech, Gen. USAF, dres to TAC Wing Comanders and Vice Wing Comanders, Langly AFB, 3 eptmbr 1978, typed trascript i Crch Pprs, 168.739-751, AFHR . Chain quoted in Walter Kros, Miltary Reform: The High-Tech Debate in the Tactial Air Frcs (ashington, DC: Nationl Dfnse Univrsity Prs, 1985), 32. 69. Hans Driesnck, Ge. USAF, ?The Key to Radies: O&M,? Air Force Magzine, Octobr 1980, 59. 70. Congresional Budget Ofice, ?Trends in Selcted Indicators of iltary Readines, 1980 thrugh 1983,? CBO Paprs (Washingto, DC: GPO March 194), . 71. Congresional Quarterly, US Defnse Policy: Weapons, Strategy nd Comitets, Scd Eiton, 60. 72. CBO, ?Trens,? 4. 3. Slife, 85-94. 74. Robrt Drews, The Air Force and the Great Engie War (ashington. DC: National Defns University Pres, 1987), 94. 75. Gral Alto Sla, quotd in Drews, 98. 6. Victori M. Hyes, ?Analysi of th Air Force and the Great Engie War? (Student Thesi: Air Forc Istiute f Tecnolgy, Dfs Tchnicl Iformtion Centr, Alxandria, VA, 198), 20-1; Drwes, 93-4. 7. Cogresionl Quarterly Almanc, 95th Congres, 2d sesion, 1978, Volume XIV, 319. 78. Ibid., 2. 9. Eger Ulsmer, ?In Focus,? Air Force Magzine, February 1980, 18. 80. Conrsional Quarterly, US Defns Policy, Third Eiton, 3. 1. gresil rtrl, fse li, Secon dit, 59-61, 5-A. 82. Conrsional Quarterly Almanc, XV, 251. 3. gresil rtrl l , I, 39. 84. Jams Falows, ?Journalism: From Citzens Up: The Puf Ader's Nest of Modern Journlism,? Bate Awrds Keynte Adres, 196, htp:/w.pewcentr.org/baten/falows.html (pril 205). 85. Robrt Rotheber, Th Neliberals: Creating the New American Politcs (New York, Simn ad Scustr, 1984), 16-7, 23-; for te nolibrals? viws n miltary spendig, 12-13. 86. James Falows, ?Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership,? spech give to the Miler Creative Rsrch Prject, University of Virgii, 1 Mrc 197. Ta suplid by Unirsity of Virginia, now i authr?s clection. 87. Ibid. . Falows, ?Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership?; James Falows, ?When George Mets John,? The Atlanti Mothly July/Augst 204, 24-6. 319 89. Samuel P Huntigton, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politcs of Civl-Miltry Rlatios (Cambridg, MA: Belkap Prs of Harvard Uiversity Pres, 1957), 37. 0. Falows, Baten Awards Adres. 91. Jcb Neufild, iterview ith author, 16 April 205, Washington, DC; Robert Coram, Boyd: Th Fightr Pilot Wo Cnged the rt of ar (Bost, Litle, Brwn, 202), 65. 9. The point hat Spiney was no-flying Air Force oficer is worth noting. Only two f t Critcs wer fightr pilots; l Bod had ny mbat xperice ad that i very simple jts; Ricioni?s flying was ls in very simple fighters. Th point is tt noe of the Critcs had ny experice ith te complx, hig-tc sytms tey wer critquing. 93. James Falows, ?Muscle Bound Super Power: The Stae of America's Defnse," The Atlntic Monthly, Octobr 197, 62. 94. Joh Byd, Col. USAF, Corna Ace interview #K239.0512-06, AFHRA, 63. 5. Ibid., 84. 96. Davi ?Catfish? Gish, Capt. USAF, ?-4 Air-to-Air Trainig,? Fighter Weapons Reviw, Fl 1975, 2-5; Red Bron Reports Volume Thre (Nelis AFB, NV: Tactil Fighter Weapons Centr, 1975) 17-20. 97. Flws, ?Muscle Bound,? 64; Robert Futrel, American Aces and Aerial Victories (ashington, DC: Air Force Histry, 1985), 8; Flows, Bte wrds Speh. 98. James Falows, National Defnse (New York: Random House, 1981), 2. . Flows, Bten Awrds Spch. 10. Hard Kurz, ?James Falows Fired After Stormy Tenure At U.S. News?, Washington Post, 30 Jne 198. htp:/w.ashingtnpst.com/wp- srv/style/fatures/falows.htm. (acesd Augst 205). 10. Grnt T. Hmond, Th Min of War: John Boyd and American Security. (Washingto, DC: Sithsian Pres, 201), 71. 102. James Falows, "America's High Tech eapons," The Atlantic Monthly, May 198, 9. 103. Falows, ?Muscle Bound,? 62. 4. Pier Sprey, Oral Histry Interview by Jacob Neufield, 12 June 1971. K.239.015296, AFHRA, 2, 5, 12. 1. Ibid., , 8. 06. Ii., 64-6. Also se Falows National Defnse, 120. 17. Author?s interview ith Neufeld; Flws, ?Muscle Bound,? 64. 08. Walter Isacson, ?US Dfns Spendig: Are Bilins eig Wasted?? Time, 7 March 193, 26-8; Sprey Oral History, 19, 46. 0. Falows, Batn Awrds Spech. 1. Wiliam Jes, ?Pragmatism: A New Name For Some Old Ways of Thinkig,? Wiliam Jaes: Writngs 1902-190 (e York: Th Libray f Americ, 1987), 572-573. 320 1. Falows, ?Muscle Bound,? 62. 2. Ibid., 59. 13 Ii., , 61. For aself-description f the group, se Gary Hart and W. S. Lind, America Can Win: The Cs for Miltary Reform (Bethsda, MD: Adler & Aler, 1986), 4-1. 14. Falows, ?Muscle Bound,? 75. 5. Ibid., 78. 16. Mike Worden, The Rise of the Fighter Genrals: The Problem of Air Leadership, 1945-1982 (Maxwl AFB, AL: ir Uiversity rs, 197), 128, 17 (chrt), asim. 17. Pier Sprey and Jack Merit, ?Quality, Quantiy or Trainig,? Fighter Weapons Rviw, umer 1974, 7-14; for the conter, se Wilford Demin, Col. USAF, ?A Frce Structre Decison,? Fighter Weapns Rviw, inter 1974, 1-8. 18. tevn Canby, ?A New Lok t Iterdiction,? Air Powr Journal, April 197, 24-30. 19. htp:/w.jimycarterlibray.org/documents/peches/u80jec.phtml (acesd November 205). 120. Paul Davis, Observations of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, Rand, 198, htp:/w.rnd.org/pubs/paers/P6751/ (acsd Nvember 205). 12. Congresioal Qarterly, US Defnse Poliy, Third Eiton, 14, 2; Congresial Quarterly, US Dfnse Policy, Scnd Eiton, 24. 12. Congresional Quarterly Alman, XVI, 37. 3. Ibid., 39. 124. Ii., 18. 5. Congresional Quarterly, US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton, 23, 26. 126. Harld Brw, Secrtar of fs, staemnt 2 Augst 1980, quoted in Suplemnt o Air Forc Poliy Letr for Comndrs, October , -1. 127. Cgresinal Quarterl, US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton, 26. Ther remains the urban lend tht he SR-71 was origaly named te RS-71, RS standig for ?Rcoisace-Strik,? the same crnym pli to th canceld -70 bmber. When President Johnson anouncd the progra he acidetly rversd the dsignation to SR, a th Air Frce hd t rapily cme up wit nw acronm for SR, stli ?trtegic Reconaisan.? Clrence L. ?Kly? Johso, ?Devlpent of the Lockhd S-71 Blckbird, Studis in Iteligence, Sumr 1982, 58. 128. Congresional Quarterly, US Dfns Poliy, Third Eiton, 27. 9. rech Orl History 136-137, pasim. 130.Slif, 192. . Ibid., 57-8. 132. Serge Herzog, Defnse Reform and Technolgy: Tactial Aircaft (Westport, CN: Pragr, 194), 27, 32. 13. Slife, 62. 4. Ibid., 3-5. 321 135. The Pave Tack pod had laser designator that lowed the carying aircaft o guide the wpons rther tan epndig o utside lser signtor. Herzo, 35. 136. Crech, Oral History, 17. 7. ongres, Senate, Cmite on Armed Services, Department of Defnse Authorizati for Fiscl Yar 1980, Harigs, 96 th Congrs, 1st es., 2 April 197, 213. 8. Clifton Bery, ?TAC: Ready to Fly and Fight,? Air Force Magzine, Decmber 197, 5. 139. Anderg, 120. 40. Hrzo, 74. 1. Ibid., 63. 42. Herzog, . 13. Tad J. Oelstron, Lt. Gen. USAF, interview ith author, 17 October 205. Cambridge, MA. 14. Hrzog, 57. 5. John Crel, ?The Many Batles of Maverick? Air Force Magzine, March 1983, 98-103. 146. For cost, se Joseph Large, Cost Estimates and Estimating Procedures in the IR Maverick and AMRAM Progrms (Sant Monic, CA: Rand Project Air Forc, 198), 12, psim. For the Critcs? view, se Flows, ?High Tech Weapns,? 25. While the IR averick di av difiultis, it bcame areliable wapon. "Mverick Scores Svn Bulsys, One Mis," Defnse Wek, 17 Augst 1981, . 2. 147. Falows, "Amrica's High Tech Weapons,? Atlantic onthly, May 1981, 25. 8. ABC, ?eri?s Fiter Airaft? 20/,? 1 May 1980; CBS ?Defnse of the United Staes, shown 14-9 June 1980; as n example of the nwspaer articls, ?Air Forc Hving Truble Kepig F-5 Jets Airborn,? Wasigto Str [ conservative paer], 19 Jn 1980, 1. 149. Crch Oral History, 23-24, 216-218. 50. History of the Tactial Air Comand, Volume One, 1 Jan 1980-31 Dec 1980 (Langley AFB, VA: ctil ir Heaqartrs, 98), 234-26; Crh, Oral Histor, 135, pasim. 32 CHAPTER TWELVE: THE RAGN YEARS INITIAL BUDGETS The Iran hostage cris, the disatrous rescue atempt, and the seming American impotence in the face of the Soviet invasion f Afghanistan contributed to a percption f America?s decline. For a vriety of reasons, not he last of whic was this percption, the awkish Republican Ronald Reagn defated Carter in November 1980. Reagn?s campaign emphasized giving ahig priority to rebuilding America?s armed forces, and the Air Force, as wel as the rst of the miltary, was imensely gratifed by his elction. The Air Force Chief of Staf said in apost-elction article tiled ?USAF?s Renwed Spirt? that ?the 1980 elction signaled without adoubt asignifcant icrease in patriotism and the national wil.?1 Many pundits wer surpised when Reagn chose businesman Caspar Weinberger to be Secrtary of Defnse, but he proved to be in many ways an ispired choice. hile Weinberger had litle xperince in defnse, he knew the ins and outs of politcal bureaucratic infighting and quickly established his dominace over the Defnse Department by firng, with Reagn?s tacit aproval, the Reagn campaign advisor n defnse and arling of the conservative hawks, Wiliam R. Van Clev. 2 Weinberger?s limited xpertise in defnse policy, combined with te White House?s extnsive philosphical veting of hig-levl Pentagon civilan positons, meant hat her wer long delays in filing many Do positons, and miltary men filed the gap s id518255 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 32 Weinberger?s advisors. Howevr, since both Reagn ad Weinberger agred that it was time iltary men had more influence in the various decison-making process, it made litle difernce on the overal philosphy of Do. Everyone involed ? Reagn, Weinberger, and the miltary ? agred that American miltary capbilties wer in danger of being eclipsed by the Soviets.3 The Reagn defnse buildup formaly began ten days after the inaugration when Weinberger and Budget Director David Stockman ded $32.6 bilion to the Carter defnse budgets for FYs1981-2, whic had lready provide $20 bilion i real growth over the two years. The justifcation for the increase was seris of inteligence rports that said from 1974 to 1980 the Soviets out-produced the United Staes 2.3:1 in tanks, 3: 1 in other armored vehicles, and 9:1 in artilery/rocket launchers.4 Weinberger told aSenate comite on 4 March 1981 that, ?The principal shortcoming of the dfense budget we inherited is not so much it omited programs entirely?but rather that [the Carter administration] failed to provide ful fundig for many programs it conced wer necsary but felt unable to aford.? 5 The main thrust of the larger budgets was to procure the same aircaft and misiles Carter and Secrtary of Defnse Brown had prosed, but to produce more of them at faster ate - for example, an icrease of about $2 bilion to begin a program of ulti-year procuremnt for the F-16. 6The plans for multi-year aircaft procuremnt would, it was hoped, cut cost, but her was considerable question if it would or whetr it would simply ad stabilty to the proces. 7 This was the bginig of aprogram to odernize very aspect of America?s miltary arsenal. The most ubstantial ditons wer the rstarting of the B-1 bomber program, the first teps towards building a60-ship navy with more aircaft cariers, and asharp 324 increase in O&M fundig. More than half the money alocated to ?genral purose forces? was given to tactial viation because the Reagn/Weinberger defnse trategy was til basicaly Brown?s ofset strategy? that caled for the tactial ir forces to fset the Soviet numerical superiority in ground sytems. The nw defnse program caled for expandig the TAF from twenty-four to twenty-six active tactial fighter wings and from twelv to furten resrve wings by FY1986, for a total of orty modern fighter wings. Inteligence rports indicated the Soviets wer out producing the West 1.2:1 in tactial aircaft, so given the Soviets? greatr numbers it was ceptd as given that American aircaft had to be hig-technolgy force multipliers. 8Thes wer the types of orce multiplying tactial ir sytems Crech ad ben pushing, so his programs and the doctrine they suported contiued to be aligned with te national defnse strategy. The budget also cntained $35 milion to cntiue the competive fighter ngie program betwen Prat & Whitney?s F10 and GE?s F10, as wel as the funds Crech requestd for his long-range, al-weather interdiction Dual-Role Fighter. 9 Reagn also caled for a $18.4 bilion icrease in Carter?s FY1982-1986 five-year defnse program, up from $1.27 trilion to $1.46trilion, and the nlarged budget caled for the purchase of 4,80 aircaft instead of Carter?s 4,20. Most of the difernce ame from contiued production of the F-15, whic Carter had planed to end after 1983. 10 The increase in the dfense budgets was not surpisng, but while it was ubstantial, many considerd it relatively smal. The Reagn administration had ben expectd to make an evn more drastic break with post-Vietnam defnse budgets, but it di not because of concerns about projections of large budget deficts, deficts caused not nly b the increased efnse budgets but also because of inflation, tax cuts, and congresional 325 reluctance to cut domestic spendig. The feling was that flod of new money into defnse would have st he conmy on awartime foting and that he uniformed services could not have used asuden large increase in funds wisely. 1 As concerns about inflation mounted, in Septmber 1981 Reagn anounced areduction i the dfense budget for FY1982-4 by $13B. 12 The specifc uts wer submited in October and include acut in O&M funds, whic was not wel recived by Congres. O&M funds had become a mater of great interst o the armed services comites in both ouse, driven i part by the disatrous failure of the Iran hostage rescue operation that was blamed on por tainig and lack of money for spare parts, in part by presure from the Critcs? congresional lies, but mainly b miltary leaders who had ben agitaing for more O&M funds for many ears. For example, in FY1976 the Air Force asked for $8.1 bilion i O& and recived $7.4 bilion; i FY197 the Air Force asked for $8.7 bilion i O&M and recived $8.1 bilion; i FY1978 the Air Force asked for $9. bilion i O&M and recived $8.3 bilion; i FY 197 the Air Force asked for $9. bilion i O& and recived $9.2 bilion. The rductions in the rquest came almost equaly from the administration ad from Congres. 13 The atempted O&M cuts wer mildly disturbing to the miltary, because the srvices had gred that Reagn?s FY1981 budget increase in O&M had finaly alowed them to balnce their budgets betwen procuremnt and combat readines. In the nd, Congres rejcted the Reagn cuts in O&M funds, and both armed services comites voted to extnd their authority over O& funds o they could reviw the portions of utre O&M budgets that would afect ombat readines of perational units. 14 326 Reagn?s formal defnse budget request for FY 1982 was $208.2 bilion, and in the end Congres aceptd it basicaly in its entirety. Ther wer atempts by liberal Democrats, notably Represntaive Pat Schroedr (D-CO), to sequestr $8 bilion because of ?waste, fraud, and abuse,? but hes wer stilborn. 15 Howevr, the waste, fraud, and abuse isue was taken seriously. It was clear that, s the Congresional Resarch Service noted about his period, ?higer defnse lvels could be justifed only if longstandig problems are adresd seriously, and measures taken to reform the acquistion proces.?16 While Weinberger and the administration expresd confidence in the basic integrity of the proces, they di belive anumber of procedural changes wer necsary in the sytem. In April 1981, Weinberger, in a tempt o prempt critcism and undercut he congresional foes of increasing defnse budgets, anounced the formation f the Defnse Acquistion Improvemnt Program (DAIP), chaired by Deputy Secrtary of Defnse Frank Carluci. Its charter was to lok at virtualy evry facet of the acquistion proces from weapons elction to final deployment. The group alowed Weinberger to acurately say he ad lready instiuted programs to lok at he acquistion problem, and that cuts uch as Schroedr prosed wer simply a disguised atempts to reduce the defnse budget. 17 THE RSURGENCE OF THE CRITICS A major encounter betwen the Critcs and Do suporters of hig-tech weapons ocured on 4 Decmber 1980, just after Reagn was elcted president, at meting of the Senate Armed Services Subcomite on Manpower and Personel Hearings chaired by Senator Sam Nun (D-GA). It was clear that with Reagn?s elction icreased efnse 327 budgets with more hig-tech weapons wer on the way, and the arings focused on the impact of technolgical sophistication ad complexity in the nw eapons ystems. Though only two senators wer presnt, two itness provide aclasic description f the difernces betwen the views of the Critcs and Do. The Critcs? witnes was Franklin ?Chuck? Spiney, who gave avriation f his ?Defnse Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch? briefing, focusing enraly on the problems of TACIR and specifcaly on the F-15. On the Do side was Dr. Wiliam Pery, President Carter?s Under Secrtary of Defnse for Defnse, Resarch, and Engiering. Nun opend by staing that, in his judgment, America?s hig-tech weapons had not only falen short f expectaions but had lso ben plagued by cost increase, and he echoed the Critcs? view that he low reliabilty of thes ystems ight comproise operational efctivens. Nun also refrenced a GAO report hat conclude, ?the sophistication f many weapons ystems devloped today is one of the contributing factors that has led to budget problems, inventory shortfals, and alow stae of readines in certain categories,? and that betr balnce btwen performance and reliabilty had to be achievd. 18 Spiney led of with is ?Plans/Reality Mismatch? briefing, loking back over the history of miltary budgets and focusing mainly on the tactial ir forces. Spiney said that he Air Force planers always expectd efnse budgets to increase, and expecting higer budgets the Air Force bought more hig-tech airplanes. While higer technolgy made the Air Force asume the sytems would be more rliable, Spiney said in fact hig technolgy made the sytems les reliable, because the interactions betwen ureliable hig-tech parts increased failure rates for the ntire sytem. High technolgy also meant 328 critcal delays in itegration ad frequently unexpectd technical problems, as wel as delays betwen sytem acquistion ad maturation. High-tech also afectd readines because it made the sytems ore dificult o maintain. Finaly, Spiney said, the Air Force ?forgt? or ?foled themselvs? about how much money they nede for O&M for hig-tech sytems. This was epecialy damgin because O&M cost increased for complex and thus expensive sytems. The cost increased because, Spiney claimed, O&M cost wer a constant percntage of agiven sytem ? his ?fixed O&M percntage? theory. Not nly wer thes cost afixed percntage, but he cost of spare parts was s afectd by price inflation as the weapons sytems, and the rsult was that he more xpensive the sytem, the greatr the spare parts cost. As aresult of thes unaticpated O&M and spares cost, the Air Force had to cut the number of aircaft it bought o pay thes higer cost, and aircaft mainteance rlied increasingly on the canibalization f usable piecs of hig-tech equipment from other aircaft, eroding combat readines.19 The rsult was the weapons ystems the Air Force was buying had to few spares to be useful in wartime. 20 Spiney contiued by pointig out hat o pay for spare parts and O&M, the Air Force had to cut he number of aircaft it bought, thus increasing the unit cost per aircaft. When the Air Force ralized O&M and spares cost wer out of hand and the budgets would not increase, rather than buy more spares, the Air Force stoped fundig its presnt sytems and moved on to new, evn more complex sytem with teir promise of more rliabilty and les cost. This cyle was hy the Air Force bought new hig-tech aircaft, not counter new threats. 329 Spiney said the overmphasi on hig technolgy had riven the cost of modern weapons out of control, and evn worse, the aded operational performance from hig technolgy raely justifed the cost. He used the F-15 as prime xample of his points, presntig aseris of graphs that showed how the number of sorties and flying hours for the F-15 and its pilots had roped from 1976 through 197, and he also linked this lack of lying time to faling pilot retntion rates, aluding to Keys? Dear Bos? letr.21 The period from 1976 to197 was n especialy rich one for Spiney?s historical minig, because it coverd the priod f the F10 engies? main problems, as wel as the limited fundig for spare parts in the Carter defnse budgets. Spiney then moved to the F-16, whic he noted had gone from an uster visual day fighter when first devloped to a?lower performance, radr misile air-to-air fighter with avionics intede to atck ground forces at night or under advers weather conditons.? Spiney said the F-16?s cost had grown substantialy since the Air Force aded thes sytems, and questioned whetr the changes wer buying increased combat capbilty or simply increasing technolgy for technolgy?s ake. He disposed of the ?force multiplier? argument by saying the Air Force said that it nede fewr ?smart? weapons because it exchanged numbers for lethality, but hen Spiney aded, without providing evidence, that he ?smart weapons? would not work in combat.2 Spiney was to later say the Pentagon had brought on a?constiutional cris? because miltary spendig was o ut of control it could be ?puting the nation i peril. Many of the weapons we gt are not designed for the threats we face, and some of them ay not work at l.?23 Spiney then moved into the larger are of grand strategy to use the ?reinforcing experts? technique. He launched on along discourse on how ?mechanistic? American 30 miltary planig was, then contrasted this mechanistic method with John Boyd?s ?briliant? strategy in Boyd?s new ?Paterns of Conflict? briefing, whic debunked the curent way the American miltary preared for combat. Boyd?s briliant heories, Spiney noted, caled for large numbers of reliable, low-tech weapons, just he kind of equipment he Air Force oposed.24 The folwing day Dr. Pery provide the snators with arebutal, mainly devoted to a defnse of the F-15 because ?Mr. Spiney chose the F-15 as his example of what he percives a genral tendency to embrace overly complex solutions for ur mision neds.?25 Pery?s arguments focused on the rquiremnt o met he Soviet hreat s the rationale for the igh-tech weapons, not echnolgy for technolgy?s ake. He noted that over Europe in the winter it was either night or bad weather, on average, twenty hours aday, but he Critcs? prosed simple aircaft di not have radr, adr-guide misiles, or any sort f al-weather capbilty. During those priods, imple fighters would be usels. Pery contiued by pointig out hat he Soviets recognized this reality and ?the myth we are competing with an oponet who as strategy of simple, cheap, reliable quipment is just not borne out by the facts.? The Soviets wer rapidly requiping the Warsw Pact forces with al-weather fighters with radr and radr-guide misiles, and the simple, air-to-air misile sytems that Spiney advocated wer much les capble than the nw Soviet air-to-air misiles. Pery also nted that he nw Soviet aircaft wer more complex and expensive than their American counterparts, and their mainteance ost wer increasing along with te cost of the aircaft.26 The main problem in the American tactial ir forces, Pery said, was ith Air Force equipment designed in the 1950s and 1960s and built in the 1960s and 1970s, atransiton 31 period in aircaft and weapons devlopment. To fix this problem, the United Staes was using technolgy to reduce ost and complexity and to increase rliabilty.27 Using the most up-to-date numbers and ot Spiney?s outdated ones, Pery pointed out he F-15 and F-16 wer requirng les mainteance bcause of built-in test ystems, and ew eapons such as the AMRAM had simplicty and reliabilty built in from the start. Turnig specifcaly to the F-15, without mentionig the Israeli Air Force Pery pointed out hat ?evry country that has evaluted the F-15 for its defnse forces has declared its capbilties as unexceld,? and that he countries that bought e aircaft found that ?this jump in capbilty was companied by a reduction i complexity.? He also spun the Critcs? argument hat AIMVAL/CEVAL had shown the superiority of smal, cheap ircaft into an dvantge for the F-15, saying that he rsults wer, in fact, an rgument for lng-range radr misiles and beyond visual range combat capbilty. In other test, he said, the F-15s had kil ratio f 10: when they could use their long-range misiles, and this was borne out by combat experince with te aircaft.28 Pery atcked the GAO report Nun had raised head on, empathicaly pointig out that he rport was more than four years out of date (a point Nun conced) and that major changes in the procuremnt and evlopment proces had ben implented to solve thes problems. The other problems wer a cryover fom the arly ears of the Carter administration, when low defnse budgets had forced achoice btwen acquistion of weapons ystems and spare parts. The srvices opted for acquistion, and the rsult was that hig-tech weapons had ben brought into the inventory before they had ben fuly testd and enough spares bought. This resulted in the curent mainteance problems, 32 whic wer being corectd by modernization programs to improve rliabilty ? not performance.29 Pery also exploited Crech?s coup of sendig the F-1F and F-15 squadrons to Europe just before the arings, pointig out hat he F-1 dat that Spiney used was from the arly model F-1. The modern F-1Fs that had ben sent o Europe with aful set of spare parts flew for thre weks and completd 94 percnt of their sorties. Thes figures also showed how technolgy could make older sytems ore rliable. 30Because Spiney had made F-15 reliabilty an isue, Pery noted the squadron f F-15s ent o Europe with anormal kit of spare parts had flown for thre weks and completd 96 percnt of their sorties, howing what he F-15 could o with enough spare parts. The problem was not he rliabilty of the aircaft; it was that her was not enough money for O&M and spare parts. Pery also responde to Spiney?s traight-line futre projections that more xpensive sytems left les money for sytems and spare parts, aying Spiney?s argument hat O&M and spares? cost wer a fixed percntage of asytem?s cost was ?imply wrong.? New sytems would use tchnolgy to cut cost and improve reliabilty, resulting in the ned for fewr spares.31 The arings higlighted apoint hat was to haunt Spiney?s briefing, that it was fatlistic. For Spiney?s projections to work, he ad to asume that budgets wer not threat based and that defnse budgets would be lvel or decrasing, no mater what he threat. If Spiney?s predictions of decrasing spendig levls wer wrong, or if the budgets wer in fact linked to the prception f an icreasing Soviet hreat, then his briefing was fatly flawed. By the time of the arings, Reagn had ben elcted and it was clear that defnse budgets wer to increase dramticaly, based on what he nw 3 administration saw as the threat. Much of Spiney?s thesi, whic depnde on levl or decrasing real defnse budgets and had semed so pwerful in Falows? 197 article, was breaking down. THE LIBERALS? COUNTERATCK While it sems counterintuitve that liberal Democrats could realisticaly atempt o cut defnse budgets after an elction that semed to turn o Reagn?s greatr comitent o improving America?s defnse, some of the Critcs, including Senator Hart?s aide Gary Lind, saw an oportunity to atck the increase in the dfense budget while claiming to be ?strong on defnse.? Lind felt he dfense budgets had ben so publicly increased that hey would raw more scrutiny, and the loming budget deficts made critcism of ?wasteful? defnse pendig politcaly aceptable. The liberal Democrats wer able to credibly atck the budget increase in sevral ways. One was the argument Represntaive Schroedr had made aginst ?fraud, waste, and abuse.? The nxt was to use the Critcs? wel-honed argument hat he large Reagn budgets wer underfundig ?readines? and spendig to litle on amuniton ad trainig time. Led by Hart, the Democrats wer able to reclaim soe of the pro-defnse hig round by making a number of prosals to ad money for amuniton ad other readines-related programs that had ben rejcted by the Republicans.32 Falows helpd the Democrats by atcking the Reagn defnse budgets a major cause of inflation. I an rticle in Augst 1981 in The Atlantic Monthly, Falows aid, ?defnse spendig is inherntly more inflationary than other spendig? and that ?increased efnse spendig?provkes an important idustrial sector t behave in precisely the [upward] inflationary way the government is trying to thwart.? 3 34 The Democrats also asertd that, like the Critcs, they wanted more dfense than the Reagn administration, but nder their plan, it would cost les. Falows and the media helpd this argument along by pushing descriptions of weapons ystems failures and wasted public money as part of the contetion that he weapons ystems purchased by the larger defnse budgets wer not strengthenig America?s defnse but actualy weakenig them, thus making Democrats? prosed solutions more apealing to the public. 34 The Congresional Quarterly pointed out hat he Democrats wer ?jubilant hat the party had evoled an proach tat let nearly al Senate Democrats opose the administration from ?pro-defnse? positons.? 35 THE CRITICS? BRIEFINGS To atck the Reagn budget, the Critcs devloped aformal set of arguments in unclasifed briefings that hey claimed showed causation betwen weapons complexity and low combat readines. The Critcs? modus operandi was to fer thes unclasifed briefings to intersted, potentialy suportive parties. The briefings wer constantly updated, but copies wer raely provide to particpants; they wer also neither fotnoted nor the sources of their dat provide. This meant he briefings wer amoving target, whic proved very efctive for the Critcs but frustrating for Do oficals and Air Force oficers who er asigned to cunter them. 36 The intelctual inchpin of the Critcs? case was Boyd?s four-to-five hour long briefing tiled ?Paterns of Conflict,? whic he constantly changed and updated as he gatherd more information ad as the whim struck him. The briefing proved aperfct vehicle for the glib, higly charismatic Boyd. Sprinkling about such terms a the ?asymetric fast ransit conception f tactis and strategy idea? nd using a combination 35 of widely scaterd and unliked historical refrences, trong personality, glitering glimpse of the obvious mixed with astrong dose of mysticsm ? Boyd said he ?spent alot f time bulshiting people? and ?loved estroying mental worlds? - his ?Paterns of Conflict? became poular with te Critcs? and their suporters. 37 In refrencig miltary history, Boyd would cal up the names of ancient comanders like Belisarius (whom he discoverd in the writngs of the great Britsh miltary historian Basil Lidel Hart) and Humayun. 38He would then ask his audience ?have you evr heard of Humayun?? Given the inevitable ?no,? Boyd would then move on to explain that his ?miltary genius? suported his theories. 39 For those who knew miltary history and might chalenge him, Boyd threw in a vriety of ther efrences, including Kurt G?del, the Heisnberg [Werner] Principle, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, al of whic he claimed suported his theories. 40 The briefing was o lng, complex, disjointed, and broad, that anyone with questions hardly knew her to begin. Aditonaly, Boyd was n expert at keping control f the audience; mebers of the audience who disagred with any of Boyd?s point wer simply shouted own or insulted until the disentr gave up. 41 Despite the lngth and seming breadth of the briefing, Boyd folwed Falows? example by giving the audience asimple theory that Boyd claimed to have inventd, the ?ODA? (Observation, Orientaion, Decison, Action) lop. This ?lop? involed a steady patern of seing an emy first, observing his actions, then acting faster to counter them, what Boyd caled ?geting inside the lop.? It was, in esnce, simply doing the right ing faster than the nemy. 42 This was platiude like ?hit ?em wher they ain?t the ral isue is not what o d, but rather how to d it ? but Boyd?s theory was claimed by the Critcs and many in his audiences a ?genius.?43 Even though most 36 of Boyd?s thoughts wer taken from truly original ? if not always corect ? miltary thinkers like Basil Lidel Hart and J.F.C. (John Fredrick Charles) Fuler, the Critcs claimed the ideas wer orignal to Boyd and caled them ?aneuver? warfre as oposed to what hey asertd was the American strategy of ?atriton? warfre. 4The Critcs claimed that ?maneuver? war ould provide much lower casualties than triton warfre and would epnd on les ophisticated and les expensive weapons with a premiu on numbers, reliabilty, and simplicty. 45 Pier Sprey?s briefing on tactial ir warfre, ?The Case for More Efective, Les Expensive Weapons Systems,? used one of Sprey?s and inde, the Critcs? - standar tactis in the tile of the briefing, because the tile made it sem that nyone who posed Sprey?s ideas was oposed to the more fective weapons at lower cost. Sprey first oferd what he claimed wer the most important considerations in air combat - surpise, numbers, maneuverabilty, and firepower ? then claimed that modern Air Force tactial air sytems wer not efctive by thes tandars. 46 Sprey also claimed to have found ahistorical patern of privately devloped ?cheap winers? while the American miltary devloped ?expensive losers,? using the World War I North AmericanP-51 Mustang as an example of a?cheap winer? and the Lockhed P-38 Lightnig as n ?expensive loser.?47 The xpensive and large P-38, Sprey said, had ben devloped by the Army Air Force but it had ben a filure bcause its performance was inadequate, while the privately devloped P-51 Mustang had ben the ?war iner? over Germany. 48 Turnig to the presnt day, Sprey charcterized the F-16 that he and Boyd had championed in its imple air-to-air form as ?cheap winer? that cost half as much as the F-15 but was ble to fly thre times ore sorties per dolar. More important, Sprey 37 claimed that he F-16 was more fective than the F-15 in thre of his elf-defined four categories critcal in air combat. To make the F-16 more fective than the F-15 in thre of the four categories, Sprey unhesitaingly made a seris of asertions. First, he asertd that he F-15?s radr would be usels in air combat because it was easily detcted and jamed. Once Sprey had isposed of the F-15?s radr detction capbilties, he could safely say that, since the F-16 was half the size of the F-15, it was much arder to se and would have the advantge of surpise ? one of his thre categories. Next, the F-16 was both ceaper, so more could be ought, and more rliable (though it used the F10 engie), so alrger number would be flyable. Thus, for the same oney, ther would be thre times a many F-16s in the air as F-15s. Because numbers wer another of Sprey?s criteria for sucesful air combat, this was second are wher the F-16 was uperior t the F-15. Sprey said that he F-16 was both more maneuverable and had longer ange than the F-15 - the first higly debatble and the range asertion simply false ? but his alowed him to claim athird are wher the F-16 was uperior t the F-15. For the final isue, firepower, Sprey said the two er esntialy equal in firepower ith four heat-seking misiles, ince as part of his first asertion the F-15s four adr-guide misiles wer usels because the radr would be jamed in combat.49 Sprey used the AIMVAL/CEVAL test to suport his arguments, aying AIMVAL/CEVAL showed that numerical superiority was the dominat factor in air combat nd that radr misile-quiped fighters had no advantge over fighters equiped with advanced heat-seking misiles. Sprey also used 1973 Midle East combat results to bolster his arguments, pointig out hat he Israelis, though tey had F-4s equiped with radr misiles, used the vry simple French-built Mirage I to score virtualy al their 38 kils with guns and heat-seking air-to-air misiles. None of Sprey?s arguments wer fotnoted nor the sources of his dat provide.50 Franklin ?Chuck? Spiney's briefing, ?Defnse Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch,? remained somewhat he same as the one h ad given to the Senate Armed Services Comite in Decmber 1980, though e contiualy updated the numbers. Spiney had recoverd from his brief mbarsment when the Reagn defnse budget increase destroyed his inital 1978 contetion that defnse budgets would gradualy decline and this would evntualy lead the Air Force to become inefctive, caught in a cyle of evr newr, more xpensive aircaft with evr fewr spare parts. Now Spiney changed his thrust, conceding that budgets could rise, but now conteding that he increased budgets would stil give no more combat efctivens because they wer being used to buy the wrong weapons that would not work in combat. This was caused by an imoral liance btwen defnse contractors, congresmen who anted money for their districts, and miltary oficers who benfited both teir carers and retiremnt job prospects by pushing for expensive weapons ystems.51 Spiney contiualy questioned the miltary?s motives for the purchasing complex new eapons, aying ?the pople who are most optimistic about new and complex weapons are often the pople with astake in building or buying them,? sugesting that her was payof or the miltary oficers, either finacial or in terms of promtion, at he nd of the procuremnt proces. 52 Falows tok up Siney?s moral cudgel, saying ?Do has l the symptos of being corupt, incompetnt, and incestuos to an larming degre,? then going on to describe how contractors? control Do evn more than [the administration?s] politcal pointes? and 39 that ?after the lection f Ronald Reagn, the contractors anounced that [their profits] wer sure to sar.?53 FALOWS? NATIONAL DEFNSE The Critcs? briefings and arguments, presnted in alonger, more cohernt, and more unifed form, became the core of Falows? first bok, National Defnse. The bok was published in May 1981, along with an rticle that sumarized the arguments, ?America?s High-Tech Weapons,? in The Atlantic Monthly that same onth. 54 National Defnse became a best elr and the Critcs? bile, and was the igh water mark of what had become known as the Defnse Reform Movemnt (DRM). The bok recived aoring reviws from the liberal establishment and won the National Bok Award, but he reviws er much les favorable from the dfense and public policy ognoscenti, who considerd Falows? arguments wel riten but superfical. 5One ational security reviwer noted that Falows as ?weaving scaterd facts and opinios into acohernt whole that barely touches the true complexity of the isues,? and another said, ?the Israeli air force, for whic Falows has nothing but praise, buys and use F-15's - should he not have asked himself why??56 Much of the focus of National Defnse was on a few carefuly selcted urban legnds from AIVAL/CEVAL that wer used to ?prove? that large numbers of smal, cheap F-5s could efat he larger and more xpensive F-15s, and this became a metaphor for the ?simple vs. complex? argument. Falows probaly expectd the Rules of Engaemnt would be ignored by his audience as complicated ?inside basebal,? and he was corect. The slectd portions of AIMVAL/CEVAL Falows higlighted in National Defnse once agin drove ditors into afrenzy. The rsults wer discused, as mentioned arlier, 340 on the TV programs ?20/? and CBS ?Defnse of the United Staes? and in umerous newspaer articles; the Chicago Tribune, for example, in a rticle tiled ?High-Tech Jets are Low in Kils: Magic Planes That Failed,? said ?the proud air superiority fighters, the F-15 and F-14, costing upward of $30 milion apiec, had ben fought o al but adraw by acompartively crude $4 milion F-5 that Northrop built for export o smal countries.?57 But Falows used the AIMVAL/CEVAL results to sugest an etirely new idea, that a force of smal, simple fighters could efat n equal size force of complex fighters. The idea cme from Everst Ricioni, ow orking for Northrop. In National Defnse Ricioni clamed F-15s could fly very few sorties in combat, thus the Air Force had ?phantom flet,? the type of simple, asy-to-understand ?buz phrase? Falows loved. 58Ricioni said that he Air Force ould buy 1,0 ?advanced F-5s? (the F-20 was the advanced F-5) for the cost of 250 F-15s, and in wartime this F-5 force would genrate 10 times ore sorties (2,50 v. 250) than the F-15 force. To prove the Ricioni?s ?phantom flet? argument, Falows used the ?cirular experts? technique as Sprey and Spiney suported Ricioni?s arguments and agred that complex weapons ystems produced anet los in combat capbilty aginst he Soviets. 59To the Air Force, the ?phantom flet? argument marked apradigm shift. If aforce of simple aircaft could genrate tn times the number of sorties a complex aircaft and cost only one quarter as much, asmal force of simple aircaft ? say 50 ? could, acording to Ricioni?s numbers, til genrate five times the sorties 250 F-15s could, or the same number of simple aircaft (250 v. 250) could genrate two and ahlf times as many sorties. The ?phantom flet? argument meant he Critcs wer no lnger arguing for a 341 larger number of simple weapons in place of the igh-tech weapons. Now they wer arguing for close to the same number of lw-tech weapons a hig-tech weapons because the low-tech weapons could be used more often, making them equaly efctive.60 For those in Congres who anted to cut he dfense budget, the idea was compeling ? replacing America?s hig-tech fighters with an equal number of ighters that wer both more fective and much les expensive. THE DBATE BTWEN THE AIR FORCE AND CRITICS I: THE BVR AENA Much of the dispute btwen the Air Force and the Critcs entred on what was caled the ?beyond visual range? (BVR) air-to-air arena, that is, the range wher the combatnts canot se ach other. To fight e ?BVR batle? at hat ime, a fighter had to be quiped with along-range, radr-guide misile and alrge, active radr - one that sends out beams to lcate nemy aircaft, similar to aflashlight - to find its target and guide the misile, as wel as the asociated fire control sytems. Radr misiles wer larger, heavier, more complex, and more xpensive than heat-seking misiles, but radr misiles had huge advantge bcause they had much longer ange and wer ?al aspect? ? they could be fired at n emy from al angles, and wer especialy efctive from the front quarter ? while smaler, simpler heat-seking misiles wer only efctive from behind, wher engie hat was trongest. Radr misiles could also be used at night and in bad weather, while to use aheat-seking misile one had to se the target, and at night and in bad weather, especialy in clouds that disipated heat, heat sekers wer practialy usels.61 THE CRITICS? POSITION. The Critcs, in genral, nd Sprey, in particular, wer very critcal of the radr-guide misiles and wanted them replaced by the ls expensive but, 342 they claimed, more fective hat-seking misiles, whic wer ?fire and forget? because they caried their own guidance sytems. It was true the arly AIM-7s had very por record in Vietnam, but Sprey was lso critcal of the AIM-7?s replacemnt, the AMRAM, whic the Air Force laimed would corect most he AIM-7?s problems. Sprey said the AMRAM was to expensive to be ought in large quanties and to complex to function wel in combat. Sprey also argued that radr would be jamed in wartime, and also claimed that he F-15 di not have areliable method f identifying the radr target as enmy, and thus could not fire at argets beyond visual range for fear of fratricde.62 Sprey oferd an evn more xtrem argument, that he radr equired for BVR combat would endanger the fighter that used it. Sprey said that fighter with an inexpensive, ?pasive? (no-emiting) radr detction reciver, caled Radr Homing and Warnig (RHAW), could folw the signal from ardar-equiped aircaft o atck by surpise with eat-seking misiles or, evn betr, with anti-radition misiles that would home in o the radr-equiped fighter?s radr signal. 63 Overal, Sprey said the radr misile was ilustrative of how ?[the Air Force?s] now-entrenched efnse of hig-cost, hig-complexity programs [that] blocks us from using advanced, briliant-simple technolgy to achiev the large increase in both quantiy and quality of weapons that he nation eds esperately evry ear.?64 THE AIR FORCE POSITION. n amacro scale, the argument over the ned for adr in a fighter ilustrated not nly the Critcs? techniques of argument but also the lngths the Air Force ned to g to provide aful explantion. The Air Force knew Sprey and the Critcs wer disregarding real world at. The latest model of the AIM-7, the AIM-7F, 34 was the Israeli Air Force?s weapon f choice in the late 1970s and early 1980s and had solid record of ver 40 percnt hits (many that di not hit mised because the target had already ben destroyed) when fired by Israeli F-15s over Lebano. 65 They also knew that Sprey?s emingly logical, ?comon sense? argument hat simple fighter could use an iexpensive RHAW device to flow an emy aircaft?s radr to lcate the nemy and fire a rdar-homing misile was compeling to the uniformed, but completly wrong. This argument was based on ?urban legnds? pased on to Sprey from the AIMVAL/CEVAL test, wher the F-5 Agresors used simple RHAW sytems, including ?fuz busters? from Radio Shack, to tel when F-15s detcted them and wer prearing to atck, aproces caled ?locking on.? 6 The Air Force knew ?fuz busters? worked uring AIMVAL/CEVAL because lectronic emisions over the test are at Nelis wer always limited and very tightly controled to prevnt hem from being picked up by Soviet lectronic surveilance. With no ther adrs emiting in the are, the simple ?fuz buster? type radr homing devices functioned wel, but in acombat situation ther are hundres of radr and other lectronic emiters, both friendly and enmy, broadcasting. In combat, s the Americans and Israelis had learned, asimple RHAW sytem like the one Sprey recomende would be overwhelmed and unable to tel whic signal is guiding amisile or wher it is coming from.67 This was wel-known and acknowledged problem in elctronic warfre cirles, and one bok on elctronic warfre noted: [One limitaion is] ambiguites in the radr fequency spectrum whic cause fridly, ey, nd etral radr misions to apar siilar [and] mk acurat platform targting n isile guidace dificult. Thes abigites wil cntiue to worse [i futr wrs] s the freqency spectrum bcomes or dnse and overcode.68 34 Aditonaly, ahome-on-radr misile of the type Sprey recomende, caled an Anti-Radition Misile (ARM), while simple in concept, was very expensive and extraordinarily dificult o perfct. The first American ti-radition misile used in Vietnam, the AGM-45 ?Shrike,? used an AIM-7 chasi with adifernt seker head, but its hit rate ? one confirmed hit in 678 firngs - made ven the AIM-7 hit rate of about 5 percnt lok god.69 The folw-on to the Shrike was the uge Standar ARM, whic had longer ange and somewhat greatr capbilty but was 15 fet long and weighed about 150 pounds (most air-to-air misiles weigh from 150-20 pounds and are about six fet long).70 It was not until the late 1980s that he first realy efctive ARM, the High-sped Anti-Radition misile (HARM) was perfcted, but it o was large - over 80 pounds and fourten fet long - expensive, and epndent on hig technolgy. It also had long, dificult, and expensive dvelopment history and, considerd objectively, was exactly the kind of weapon the Critcs abhored.71 But he ultimate frustration for the Air Force was often the Critcs imply di not el the truth. The most prominet ? but by no means only ? example of this was hen the Critcs aid that he AIM-7 was not useful in BVR combat because the Air Force di not have asytem that could ientify ardar target as n emy aircaft. In fact, such long-range identifcation sytems had ben avilable since World War I, and an Air Force sytem, caled ?Combat Tre,? had ben used sucesfuly in Vietnam from 1971-973. Aditonaly, anewr and evn more fective long-range identifcation sytem, caled ?Non-Coperative Target Recogniton? (NCTR) had ben devloped for the F-15 to use with te AMRAM. 72 Sprey had worked on fighters in Do since the mid-60s and 345 certainly knew that Combat Tre and its folw on sytems existed, but o make his point aginst he AIM-7 he ignored it, as di Spiney, another Do employe very familar with weapons ystems. 73 Because Combat Tre and the NCTR sytems wer clasifed, the Air Force ould not publicly counter the Critcs? false contetion that Air Force fighters with radr misiles had no way to identify targets at long range. One is left o wonder if the Critcs deliberately made this false argument knowing that, because of clasifcation, the Air Force would not refute it. THE DBATE BTWEN THE AIR FORCE AND THE CRITICS I: LONG-RANGE, AL-WEATHER INTERDICTION Interdiction, whic the Air Force dfines a ?the mployment of airpower to destroy enmy trops, uplies, and equipment before they reach te batlefild, or therwise to hinder ear rea movemnt so as to delay or prevnt he arival of trops and suply at he front,? was the other are of conflict betwen the Critcs and the Air Force. 74Interdiction had ben extremly efctive in World War I, especialy aginst German rmored formations in Europe, and had ben efctive if not decisve in Korea nd Vietnam. 75 Interstingly, because it was dificult o quantify how efctive interdiction was until enmy records could be acesd, American alyst wer more critcal of the fects of interdiction i Korea nd Vietnam than the nemy, who cnsiderd them very efctive. 76 The main dificulty with interdiction eforts in Korea nd Vietnam, as noted, was the enmy oved at night and bad weather when the Air Force had, at he time, only limited capbilty to lcate them and atck. THE CRITICS? ARGUMENT. he Critcs? argument was simple one: interdiction required xpensive, complex, al-weather sytems that would not work in combat nd 346 divertd money from reliable sytems. Because no simple, inexpensive sytem could be perform al-weather interdiction, the Critcs? alternative was to simply to put interdiction into the ?to hard to d? box and focus on close air suport with large numbers of simple aircaft, like the A-10, that could fly hig sortie rates. With large numbers of thes simple, reliable sytems, the Critcs argued, the Soviet armored thrust could be efctively counterd at he front and the interdiction requiremnt would be unecsary.7 THE AIR FORCE OUNTER. The Air Force had sen the problems with interdiction first hand in Korea nd Vietnam and conced that efctive interdiction required al-weather navigation ad atck sytems that wer complex and expensive. Nevrthels, thes ystems wer necsary to cary out he mision the Air Force was required to perform in the national miltary strategy. The Air Force ould not simply abrogate its asigned responsibilty to perform the interdiction mision i aconflict in Europe, Korea, or the Persian Gulf. Instead, the answer as to devlop the al-weather targeting sytems and work on them until they wer reliable and efctive in meting the interdiction requiremnt. It should be noted that interdiction was not just amindles Air Force doctrinal requiremnt. The Army agred interdiction was necsary and found the idea of switching al the interdiction resources to close air suport folish.78 CAS was hard to control and, from World War Ion, has ben oe of the most dangerous misions to perform. Based on the IAF experince in 1973, sendig hundres of cheap ircaft o the front o try and perform close air suport would not nly overwhelm the US comand and control sytem but also guarnte huge Air Force asualties with few results.79 347 THE CONGRESIONAL MILITARY EFORM CAUCS Falows genrated the rsults he wanted with te punditocray, and as he ad hoped his ?lots of simple, reliable, cheap weapons? ideas wer also influencig congresmen who ad to deal with dual realites: the American people wanted Congres to fund real improvemnts in the American miltary, while at he same tie daling with aburgeonig defict. Just after Reagn?s inaugration i early 1981, Senator Gary Hart, aide by Wiliam Lind, wrote awidely read piec in the Wal Stret Journal, ?The Case For Miltary Reform,? whic aled for simple, reliable weapons ystems technolgy that would yield alrger, more fective force for the same or alesr amount of money.80 The piec was intriguing and proved to be the ?tiping point? for a movemnt for change in Congres. In June and July 1981, some embers of Congres, led by Hart and Represntaive G. Wiliam Whitehurst (R-VA), formed the Miltary Reform Caucs (MRC). The MRC claimed it would have no designated leaders, but it became one of the informal, daptive groups that re often quite important i Congres. Its goal was the education f congresmen with te aim of reaching consesu on defnse rform. Though some of the mebers had t least an ideolgical filation with te Critcs, astudy one by the National Defnse University noted ?the MRC as n istiution does not apear to be anti-defnse,? and that ?the divers mebership?has ensured a wide variety of views on evry isue in the group.? 81 The MRC was to give the Critcs acongresional power base, but many MRC mebers wer not Critcs and some later bemoaned that fact hat ?reform? was include in the tile of the group.82 348 The formation f the MRC was prominetly featured in Newsek magzine on 14 Septmber 1981. The group quickly aded five more mebers, most of whom had reputaions for being intersted in defnse ? Senators Wiliam Cohen (R-ME), Sam Nun (D-GA), Republican Represntaives Newt Gingrich (GA) and Dick Chaney (WY), and Democratic Represntaive Thomas Downey of New York. By the 1982 elctions, the number totaled fity-six.83 Most of the foundig congresmen wer intersted in being sen as fighting fraud, waste, and abuse, as wel as haring a comon concern that money was ?being wasted on the wrong ew eapons: they also woried about underminig the curent ?defnse consesu? among Americans ? and, by extension, the increase in miltary spendig [the mebers of the MRC] think is necsary.?84 Whitehurst aid later that he mebers wer also intersted in capitalizng on miltary history and working it into planig, considering low-tech, les expensive weapons, loking at he al-volunter miltary and the adequacy of curent planig and ecison making in the national defnse stablishment.85 The more agresive mebers of the MRC wanted it o become an ?alternative dfense anlysi instiution? to fer critcal anlysi of the administration's polices and to act as catlyst for public debate on defnse, but later the MRC focused on readines, whic leant itself to simpler solutions like more fundig, because many of the mebers wer not intersted in the more complicated questions of procuremnt and strategy.86 Some in the MRC belived that, in the post-Watergate ra, ther had ben increasingly efctive congresional oversight in evry are of the government except one: the shaping of miltary force structre. Weapons ystems elctions wer sen by many in the MRC as critcal because they drove the dfense budget and ultimately what 349 kinds of wars the armed forces would be able to fight. Thes mebers folwed the Critcs? arguments and wer concerned that he Pentagon ad Do subordinated policy judgments to the bureaucratic or the carer interst of defnse oficals and efnse contractors. 87 As time pased, many of the ideas of the MRC would be suported by the Heritage Foundation, the Brokings Instiution, and the New York-based public resarch Council on Econmic Priorites. 8 Those in the MRC who suported the Critcs wer helpd by the fact hat he organization had no staf, and congresional represntaives who ad particular point of view could use their own staf to spearhead ctions that wer then presnted to the ntire MRC. This provide some staf mebers, notably Senator Hart?s tafer Wiliam Lind, with an usualy hig public profile and alowed them to set he agenda, or at least make sure their views reached the MRC and thus the public ey. During 1982 the MRC had eighten metings to discus reform isues and recive formal briefings on subjects of interst, and Lind insured al Critcs? briefings wer include so the mebers wer exposed to the Critcs? views about he utilty of hig-tech weapons in modern war, the cost of such weapons, and their suportabilty and reliabilty. 89 To sharpen the focus on thes arguments and evlop apolicy for the group, the MRC creatd an ?Options Comite? composed of stafers and efnse anlyst, mostly Critcs, to sugest inputs for the FY1983 budget. 90 The Options Comite tok inputs from Sprey, Boyd, Lind, and Canby, and evntualy devloped alist of inputs that mirored the Critcs? views. The prosal, caled ?Options for Action i the FY83 Defnse Budget,? include twenty-eight options, ixten of them relating to miltary hardware, and include stoping production f the F-15.91 Though te ?Options for 350 Action? was nevr adopted as n MRC positon - and given the informal nature of the MRC, it is unclear what mechanism would have ben used to frmaly adopt it - it put the miltary on otice that parts of the MRC wer wiling to put forward firm prosals for change in lie with te Critcs? agenda. The ?Options for Action? raised the question f whetr the MRC was using the Critcs a simply one source among many to provide information ad iscusion topics, or whetr the Critcs wer manipulating the MRC agenda to promte their own views. An impartial study raised this question to the mebers and found most wer awre of the atempts to influence the group, but ?thought e MRC leadership had the change-agent role in proer perspective.?92 1. Lew Alen, Gen. USAF, ?USAF?s Renwed Spirt,? Air Force Magzine, Novembr 1981, 54. 2. Congresional Quarterly Almanc, 97th Congres, 1st Ses., 1980, Volume XVI, 19. 3. Stephen Cimbal, The Reagn Defnse Program: An Iterim Asesment (Wilmingto, DE: Scholarly sourcs, 1986), 37-8. 4. Cresional Qurterl, US Defnse Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Comitents, Third Eiton, April 1984, 147-149. 5. Cogresional Quarterly lmanc, Volume XVI, 92nd Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1972, 40; imbl, 42. 6. US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton, 154-156; Congresional Quarterly Almanc XVI, 193, 12. 7. Congresional Quarterly XVI, 24. On the disagrement if multi-year contracts wr rly efctiv, se US Defnse Policy, Third Eito, 154-156. 8. US Defnse Poliy, Third Eiton, 12-12. 9. Congrsioal Quarterly XVI, 9, 6. 10. Ibid., 27. . US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton, v. 12. $2 bilio i 82, $5 bilion i 83, $6 bilion i 84. Congresional Quarterly XVI, 40-24. 351 13. USAF Comptroler chart, in Walter Kros, Miltary Reform: The High-Tech Debate in the Tactial Air Fores (shingtn, DC: Ntional Dfens University Pres, 1985), 32. 14. Congresional Quarterly XVI, 21, 20. 5. Ibid., 218-219. 16. Davi Lockwod, ?Defnse Acquistion Reform: Isues for the 10th Congres,? Congresionl Resarch Servic, 2 Dember 1987, 2-3. 17. Cgrsionl Quarterly XVI, 23. 8. onres, Seate, Armd Services Comite, Manpower and Personel Subcomit, Impct of Tchnolgy on Miltary anpower, Rquiremnts, Radines, and Operations. 96th Cng., 2d ses., 4-5 Decmber 1980, 2051. Th GAO report refrd t is Operating ad Suport Cost of Nw Wapons Systems Compard t Their Precsors, U.S. Gerl Acuntig Ofice Report the nat ite on Apropriatins, 197. 19. Ibid., Spiney testimony, Dec 4, 205-60. 20. Frank C. piny, ad J. C. Thompson, Defnse Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch (Boulder, CO: Westview Pres, 1985), 42, pasim. 21. Ibid., 2068-2071. . Ii., 75-9. 23. Spiney interview ith Bil Moyers, February 202. htp:/w.bs.org/o/transcript/ranscript_spine.html (acesd Septmber 205). 24. Ibid., 2095-210. 5. Ii., 18. 26. Ibid., 2-12. 7. This i avriation f More?s Law postulated by Gordn More, cofunder of Intel, in 1965. More?s law says that he number of transitrs per squar inh o itgrated ciruits would ouble very ar for th freseabl futre, (lter canged to eihtn months). Bilt int this i th fct hat computrs prforming at h sm rat wil bece ceaper ad more rliable. htp:/w.wbodi.c/TERM//ores_Law.html (acesd October 205). This is intuitvely vius to anyone who as wnd coputers ovr aperid f yars. In te 1970s and 80s compter crshs er como; tday thy are rltivly rae. At he same tie, pries ar u lower and apbilty muc gretr. It is an exmpl of t fundantal corctnes of th igh-tech rguent he Air Force d Do wer making ? techolgy an ot ly increase apbilty bt lowr cst and imprve rliabilty. 28. Sente Armed Servis Comite, Impact f Teholgy, 201-209. 9. Ibid., 25-29. 30. Ii., 43-4. Ther are avriety of reasons an ircaft might not complet asortie (a single mision) bsids n ircaft prblm, icluding exrcise are wathr nd airfild probls. Frm the author?s experince, any sortie rat over 85 prcnt is very hig. 31. Ibid., 256-1. 2. Congresional Quarterly XVI, 19. 352 3. James Falows, ?"Defnse, Taxes, and the Budget,? The Atlantic Monthly, Augst 1981, 7-8. 34. Se, for example, James Falows, ?M-16: A Bureaucratic Horr Story,? The Atlantic Mnthly, 19 Jun 1981, 56-5. The - was th stndr Army rifle. For a compilatio f te claims and arebutal nalysi tht forme the ir Force rspnse, se Jhn Crel, ?Byond the $916 Stol Cp,? Air Force Magzin, Septmbr 1983, 65-67. 35. Congresional Quarterly XVI, 196-198. 6. Waltr Krs, Miltr Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactial Air Forces (Washington, D.C.: National Dfnse Univrsity Prs, 1985), 16-7. 37. Jh Boyd, l. USAF, Cora Ace interview. #K239.052-106, 14 Augst 196. AFHRA, 82-3, 128; also se Boyd?s brifing slides for ?Paterns of Conflict,? John R. Boyd Papers, PC 54, Prsnal Papers Colection, Archivs ad Special Clectins rnch, Libray of the Mrie Cors, Quanti V. 38. Flavius Belisarius (50-56) was wel regrde genral of the Byzantie Empire. Richrd Homes, Oxford Compnio to Miltary History (US: Oxford Uivrsity Pres, 203), 127-128. n the ther had, Nasirudin umaun (1508 ? 156), second Mughal Empero f India, is unmntione in Holmes? long d comprehnsiv tm a sems to hav had mixe iltary rcrd. htp:/w.islicart.co/libr/empires/india/humayun.html (acesd July 205). 39. Boyd Orl Histry, 162. 40. Ibi., 135. 1. Roert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Bostn: Litle, Brwn ad pan, 202), 12. 42. Joh Boy, ?Pters of Conflict? Briefing Slides, Slides 34-5, in John R. Boyd Papers, PC 2854, ersonal Papers letion, Archivs and pcial Colectis ranch, Libry of the Marin Crps, Quantico V. 43. Se, for exmple, ongres, Huse Comite on Armed Services, The Impact of the Persian Gulf War nd the Dcline of th Sviet Uni How th Unitd States Des its Dfse Bsines, Hearings Befor te Comite o Armed Services, 102nd Congres, 1st s., 2 April 191, Pier Sprey comnts 54-546; Snator Gary Hart cmnts, 671. 4. This author belives that Boyd wanted to be considerd another Fuler, who wrote te tre vlum Th Decisve tls f th Wster Worl d Thir Influence Upn History, (London: Eyr & Spotiswode, 1954-6) as wel as numerous boks o avariety f subjects, icluding The tar in Th st: A Critcal Esy Upn the Wrs f Alistr Crowly (Lono: Waltr Scot Publishing o., 1907), Yoga: A Study of the Mystical Philsophy f the Brhmins and Bdist (Lndon: W. Rider, 1925), as wl as sevrl biograies of miltary figures. oy nevr wrote apublish work. 45. This i tuchstone of th Critcs? argumnt and is reated thrughout he Critcs? work. A smary is fund in Gary Hrt, "Wht's Wrong wit te Miltary?" New York Times Magzine, 12 Febrary 1982, 12-8. 35 46. Pier Sprey, ?The Case for Betr and Cheaper Weapons,? in The Defnse Reform Dbate: Isus and Anlysi, d. As lrk IV, Ptr Chiareli, Jfry S. McKitrick nd James Re (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopins res, 1984), 198-19; also se Sprey?s iput in Th Miltry Rfrm ebate: Directios for the Miltary Establishment for te Remainder of the Cntury, Snior Cnfernc X (United Staes Miltry Acadmy, Wst Poit, Nw York, 3-5 Jue 1982, 18. 47. Sprey?s ephasi n the private dvelopmnt of the P-51 is important because at this time r was orkig as consultant Nrthrp, wo built he F-20 s privt project and as trying t sel it the Air Force. Te F-15, hic Spry violently s, ws Air Forc program. 48. Sprey in Defnse Refr Debate, 198. 9. r i Clark, 20, pasim; Snior Confernce X, 186-187, 19 (table). 50. Sprey in lr, 1-205; enior nferc , 204-20. As apoint of act, the reason for th F-4/Mirage disparity was that h Israelis used their F-4s fr grund tack bcuse te Mirage hd no ground tck pbiltis. In fact, t - had bot he sme kil ratio as the irae, 20:1, bt i amuh smaler umber of engaemnts. Petr Mersky, Isrli Fightr Aces: The Definitve History (North Brach, MN: Spcialty Prs, 197), 13, 21, pasim. 5. Franklin C Siney and J. C. Thompson, Defnse Facts of Life: The Plans/Relity Mismatch (Bouler, O: Westview Prs, 1985). The bok covrs thes rgumnts it detail, toug Spiny provids no fotntes or endts fr his numbrs. 52. Spiny, quted by Falows, ?Public Percpti, Plitcal Actions, ad Plic Policy,? i Clark, Th Dfense Refrm Deat, 342. 53. James Flows, "Amrica's High Tch Weapons," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1981, 1-32. 54. Falows, ?High Tech Weapons,? 31-3. . Se, fr exampl, Hrbrt Scvile, ?Indefnsible,? New York Reviw of Boks, 1 Jun 1981, 45-8; Christopher Lehman-Haupt, ?Boks of th Tims,? revi f Natioal Defnse, New Yrk Tims, 9 Jue 1981, C16. The later eviw said that nyone wh reds th bok il be ?betr informd about miltary mtrs thn te miltar establishment itself,? though Mr. Lehan-Hpt ads ?It isn't ecsarily that Mr. Flows i corct in wat e says it's just hat he s pitched an motinl subject on such an usualy omonssicl evl.? Flows rceiv t Ntinal Bok awrd fr History (Paperbck). htp:/w.nationalbok.rg/nbawiners1980.html (aces Augst 205). In terms of ritg, this uthr has foud that Falows does xlnt work in cting through uch f the jaron tat ends t permet the miltary?s argumets about weapns ystems. 56. Wiliam Pry, reviw of National Defnse, ?Falows Falcies: A Reviw Esay,? Interntional Scurity 4, (Sprig 1982): 174-182; Thoms L. McNaugher of Brokigs Politcl iene Quarterly (Fal ), 69-670; F-15 quote from Elit Chen reviw f Natioal Dfens in Comentary 72, (Augst 981), 34. 57. Falos discused AIMVAL/EVAL in sevral places, including National Defnse, 47. ABC, ?Amrica?s Fighter Aircaft? o ?20/,? 1 May 1980; CBS, 354 ?Defnse of the United Staes,? shown 14-8 June 1980; Chicago Tribune, 7 Decmber 1981, A16. 5. Falows, National Defnse, 42-3. 9. Sprey, ?The Cse for Btr Weapons? in Clark, 19-20. 60. Falows, National Defnse, 41, sim. 1. Petr Jaret, The Modr ar Machine: Miltary Aviation Since 1945 (London: Putnam Aronutical Boks, 20), 134-136 for misile chrcteristis ad iagrams f perforance velopes. 62. Flows, ?High-tech Weapons,? 26. 3. Ibid., 24-5. 64. Al taken from Sprey in Clark, 201-205 5. Isreli dctrine at h time cled for firng two AIM-7s at each target. Author?s notes whil air ath? to Israel, 1980. 6. ?Locking on curs when amisile guidance radr singles out aprticular target and switches t arow ?gidac od? to i th misile. This witch is detctbl o RHAW sytems. Jaret, 136. 67. Merav Halperin ad Aharon Lapidot, G-Suit: Combat Reports from Israel?s Air Wars, trans. Lwrnc Rifkin, (Ld: Sher Boks, 190), 125, 142, pasi; Jck Broughto, Col. USAF, Thud Rige (Philadlphia: Lipincot, 96), , sim. 68. Alfred Price, War in the Fourt Dimension: US Eletronic Warfre Fro Vietnam to th rsnt (Lodo: Grenhil, 205), 132, pasim. Ther r many ther xples f tis a early as the Vitam War, when RHAW sets wr first used. S Jacob van Stavern, Grdul Failure: The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965-196 (Wshigto, DC: Air Force History and Musems Program, 202), 14-, pasim; ayne Thmpson, T Hani and Bck: Th U.S. Air Frce nd North Vietnm, 196-1973 (asingt, DC: Smithsoian Istiution Pres, 20), 12-4, pasi. 69. Wiliam A. Hewt, Maj. USAF, ?Platig th Seds of SEAD [Supresion f Enemy Air Defnse]: The Wild easel in Vietnam,? (Thsi, chol of Advancd Air Powr Studis: Maxwel AFB, AL, 193), 19. 70. Ibi., 20-1, 30. 1. Iid, 54; author?s interview ith Genral Rudolf ?Rudi? Peksens, comander of Coaliton efnse presio air forces durig Desrt Shie/Desrt Stor and log time Wild easl pilot, Stmber 205, Bostn MA. 72. For Cmbat Tre, s Marshal L. ichel, Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam, 1965-972 (Anapolis, D: Nval Instiute Prs, 196) 8-9; NCTR is ahigly clasifed sytem, but he xistence of the program is acknowledged. Author?s interview ith Lt. Gnral Tad Olstro, had of AMRAM prgram at TC hadquarters, 197-1980. NCR is part f t least one modern jet fihter P flight simltor game, Lock On: Modern Jet Combt. 73. Spiny, Defse Facts of Lif, 90-1. 4. Robert F. utrl, The United States Air Force in Korea (Washington, DC: Ofice of Air Frc History, 1964), 654. 35 75. Se, for example, Hans Von Luck, Panzer Comander: Memoirs of Colnel Hans von Luck (Nw York, Preager, 1980), 180, pasi, th clasic Franz v Melthi, Maj. Gen. OKH, nzr Batles: The Study of Employment of Armor in the Scond World Wr (Norman, OK: Univrsity of Oklaha Pres, 1956), 316, pasim. 76. Brian C. s, The Efectiens f Air Interdiction i the Koren Wr (Washingto, D: Ofice of Miltary History, US rmy, Marh 196). Fr th emy?s views, e Xiaoming Zhang, ?Chin and the Air War in Kore, 50-1953,? Journal of Miltary Histry 62 (April 198), 35-370, and Phog hng Quan, Ky Su, Tap I (Air and Air Defnse Forces, Chronicle, Volume 3), publiser ad te unkown, cquired by the author i Hani n 198 ad translatd from the Vitnmes by Rger Haine-Col, Adlid, Austrli. 7. Gary Hart and Wiliam Lind. America Can Win: The Case for Miltary Reform. (Bethsd, MD: Aler and Adler, 1986), 14, 23, psim. 78. Ther was, howevr, agod eal of controversy before this was etled. Se Slife, 3-9. 79. For the Air Force?s view, se Kros, 132-160, with carts and iagrams. 80. Gary Hart, Senator, "Th Cas fr Miltary Reform," Wl Stret Journal, 23 January 1981, 8. 8. Salvtore Chidichimo, Lt. Col. USA, ?The Miltary Reform Caucs and its Impact on Ntinal Defnse? (Resarch Report: Nationl War Cleg, Ntiol Defnse University, 1983), 8; Clark in Clrk, 2. 82. Chidichimo, 3. 3. Davi M. Alpern ad J. . Lindsay, ?Fighting to Win the War,? Newsek, 26-30, 14 Septmber 1981. 8. Ibid ,27. 5. G. Wiliam Whitehurst, ?Congresional Miltary Reform Caucs,? Staemnt, 14 Dec 1981, quoted in Cidicimo, 5. 6. Red in lark, 348. 87. Congresionl Quarterly, US Defnse Policy, April 1984, 124-125. . Nacy J. Beard nd Ewin A. agl, Jr., "Congres and the Defnse Budget" in Americn Defns Policy, 4th dito., ed. John E. dicot Roy W. Stafor, Jr. (Baltior, M: Jhns Hopkins Pres, 1986), 37. 89. ichael Leaey, Cmandr, USN, ?The History of Defnse Reform Since 1970,? (Studnt Thsi: Navl Postgraduate col, Mntery, CA, Dcber 198), 47. . Alto K. Marsh, ?Miltary Reform Caus Seks Targets,? viation Wek and Space Technlgy, 29 arch 1982, 16. 91. Ibid., 50. 2. Chiichimo, 9. 356 CHAPTER THIRTEN: COUNTERATCK THE AIR FORCE?S FRUSTRATION It sems fair to say the Air Force was tuned that he Critcs wer taken seriously, and the srvice was rong-foted by the poular esonace of the Critcs ?imple sytems? arguments. The Critcs? arguments emed clearly to be arecipe for disater by giving up America?s basic advantge over the Soviets, but with te suces of National Defnse and the formation f the Miltary Reform Caucs and its Options Comite, sudenly the dbate was becoming important and the Air Force bcame vry concerned. Up to this point, the Air Force and its Congresional lies had used the clasic strategy of controling and limitng the ways Congresmen could search out alternatives to the Air Force?s prosals. Now the xistence of the MRC provide aforum for amore open (and, in the Air Force?s mind, les expert) discusion f defnse isues, and ther was fear that he Critcs? implistic arguments would gain traction, afear stoked by pres coverage of the MRC and the parts of its agenda ominated by the Critcs.1 A higly frustrated Air Force Chief of Staf, Genral Lew Alen, told suporters at he 1981 Air Force Asociation Convention: [Even though] te American public strongly suports our neds, anumber of critcs ha aled that w re icompett ad wasteful?that our forces ar unwieldy nd unrlible nd that difrnt proch (gnerly nspifd) ol give both econmy a efctives. We are lad to rspod to cnstructi critis, and w hope to b the first o rcgnize ur faults and the ed for improvemnt. But is dialgue as cased t be costrctive. My of you in this audinc have rspone fctively to thes ritisms. W ned ur id586413 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 357 suport. We ned the thoughtful, inteligent anlysi of the many of you who seak ut o balf of atrly strog atiol defnse.2 Other Air Force laders and suporters ounde the same them. 3 In Congres, the MRC had thre mechanisms to exrt some control ver defnse policy - stautory, no-stautory, and informal. In the arly 1970s, the stablishment of the Congresional Budget Ofice, the Congresional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and expande comite and personal stafs had enhanced Congres? abilty to scrutinize and ?tinker? with defnse programs. 4 The Air Force?s fear sems to have ben that he MRC would use the budget proces to raise pecifc isues from weapons selction to genral strategy, and bring thes before Congres for debate. This was especialy troubling because it would bring complex defnse isues outside of what had ben their taditonal purview, the Armed Services and Apropriations comites. The problem for the Air Force was that Falows? theory - simple, compeling arguments would win out over complex ones in the public forums and in the media - semed to be corect. While the Air Force rsentd the way the arguments wer being made, they found that he Critcs? implistic arguments tok long, detailed xplantions to cunter, the kind of arguments that wer not f interst o the poular media nd with many mebers of Congres. In areviw of Falows? National Defnse for the Air Force?s widely read Air University Reviw, the rviewr noted almost hystericaly, ?[The Critcs] outmaneuver the srvices to undermine hard-won programs, usaly in aforum wher the services have litle influence. As aresult, ahndful of critcs are close to precipitaing afundamental change in U.S. miltary strategy and forces ? not because [the Critcs] are 358 right but because they make their case more prsuasively in Congres and in the media than do the miltary services.?5 Falows? refusal to cnsider facts and his elctive ignorance was lso afrustration. I 1981, Falows aid ?the costly and complicated sytems ake it o costly, or impractial, for soldiers to spend time in realistic trainig,? despite five yars of an evr-increasing umber of Red Flags, more Agresor squadrons in the TAF, and the Army?s National Trainig Centr.6 In aother xample, Falows constantly harped on the idea that the way to promtion was by eing a procuremnt oficer. What Falows and the Critcs di not understand or acknowledge was that her wer in many ways two Air Forces, the ?Operational Air Force? and the ?Procuremnt Air Force.?7 Had Falows done rsearch on promtion paterns, he would have quickly found that he path to promtion was not in procuremnt but in flying operations, especialy fighter operations, and that Air Force procuremnt oficers wer quite frustrated at heir limited promtion portunites. 8Ther was lso alevl of personal nimus because the anti-miltary rhetoric of Falows and the Critcs. One Critc said that miltary leaders demonstrated aptern of ?persitent profesional malpractie that in ay other profesion would constiute grounds for disbarment, denial of tenure, or legal ction.?9 Falows as notably hpocritcal in this are, saying he ?di not mean to imply miltary oficers are nglient or corupt,? while not comentig on Spiney?s ugestions of coruption r such Sprey asertions as, ?The crazy genrals down at TAC headquarters;? the Secrtary of Defnse din?t have the guts to tel the Air Force to change the F-15;? the Air Force Vice Chief of Staf was very, very weak nd raely showed much wilingesto d what was right;? and 359 ?[Genral Belis, director f the F-15 SPO] is not competnt i air plane dsign, he?s not competnt i technical decison making.?10 Thes ad homine atcks and Critcs? lack of respect for the miltary as profesion ofers an explantion for the often-heatd nature of the rsponse by the miltary particpants in the dbate. The rhetorical use of such indictments of miltary oficers? performance, combined with Spiney?s claims, repated by Falows, that oficers wer corupt, was hardly conducive to pen ad reasoned comunication. Falows as to nte later that he was taken abck by the miltary?s trong response, and he saw in their response prof that he Critcs wer right.1 In this, he folwed awel-established theory that ny real inovation spurs abcklash from those who ave a stake in the staus quo.12 Howevr, this theory is debatble and, evn if valid, the rsitance is eparte from the merits of the inovation. Inovation has no automatic intrinsic merits ? it may be god or bad, right or wrong. It is also worth noting that Falows gives trong response to various chalenges to his field, journalism, and aparently ses nothing unsual in the strength of his reponse.13 At he same tie, the Critcs? rhetoric helps explain why the rformers have had such a dificult ime in gainig real suport in Do and in much of Congres. Reading congresional hearing transcripts and acounts by senior Air Force oficers of numerous metings with Congresmen leads one to the that most mebers of Congres, while they might ave specifc ritcisms of miltary programs, di not like direct, personal, nd public ritcisms of miltary oficers. Even among those who strongly oposed some programs and suported the Critcs ther sems genraly to have ben a?hate the sin, love the siner? aproach. This was epecialy true in the Armed Services and 360 Apropriations comites, wher respect for the uniform was the norm, and it was thes comites that would etrmine the influence of the Critcs? arguments. CRECH AND THE CRITICS Because most of the Critcs? focus was on the TAF?s hig-tech programs, Crech was especialy frustrated. In Crech?s mind, he ?was? the Tactial Air Force, and he sems to have prsonalized Falows? critcism.14 In the fal of 1981, Crech invited Falows to Tactial Air Comand Headquarters at Langley Air Force Base to talk about TAC programs, uch te same tacti that had worked with Ron Keys after his ?Dear Bos? letr. Falows met with Crech and tok aflight in the F-15, whic he duly recorde in an article in the November 1981 Atlantic Monthly, ?I Fly With te Eagles.? In the course of their meting and iscusion f the F-15 and other hig-tech weapons Crech ? who, unlike the Critcs, had combat nd leadership credntials - made some hadway. In the article Falows admited that if the basic national strategy argument was granted ? that ther was plausible danger of aRusian ivasion f Europe, and that such awar ould not go nuclear ? then the basic structre of American forces hould reflct his and the concetration f resources on the F-15 made prfect sense. He also nted, ?Air Force planers alude to cst, but heir first instinct is to ask for what hey think we ned, regardles of the cost. It is proer for them to d so.?15 But in the nd Falows as not persuade, perhaps because Crech was not ?edgy? enough. As he told his escort ficer, Dick Anderg, ?evrything Iknow about air combat Ilearned from John Boyd, and he does not agre with Crech? - though Boyd, unlike Crech, ad no leadership experince and very litle combat experince.16 361 In retrospect, Crech was probaly wrong when he thought it would help his cause to bring Falows to Langley to fly in the F-15. A more sophisticated reading of Falows might ave ld Crech to understand that what Falows as realy chalengi was not hig-tech weapons, but he profesional competnce and intelctual honesty of the American oficer corps. Boyd, Sprey, and the other Critcs had conviced Falows ? though ter are many indications he tok very litle convicing - that miltary leaders wer incompetnt, that hey wer not leaders but mangers, that hey wer ignorant of the demands of combat, nd only intersted in working for the arms industry after etiremnt. It was thes flaws in the ladership that led the miltary to buy hig-tech weapons, and it was of apiec with te idea that miltary oficers wer not rue profesionals. Crech ad n option. Istead of bringi Falows to Langley, Crech ould have snt him to Red Flag. Ther Falows ould have found the ?dgy charcters? he wanted in the pilots and comanders of the Agresors and the units that deployed ther. Howevr, probaly because Crech was confident of his powers of persuasion ad because h sems to have ben tirely focused on his hig-technolgy weapons programs and the Critcs? chalenges to them, he sems not have ben awre of the larger isues Falows raised. Crech perhaps mised an oportunity to truly influence the TAF?s most important critc. As the Critcs? arguments emed to become ore and more part of the media?s conventional wisdom, Crech became aprehnsive that some of his programs would be canceld. He told asympathetic audience of his concern about he ?modern ?Ludites? who say that we must urn our back on technolgy.our precison guide munitonsthat wil kil targets in multiples,? and said that he Soviets had moved to hig-tech aircaft, so 362 sendig the Critcs? low-tech fighters into cmbat would ?result in apaling American loses.? He contiued, ?Im not sure I?m going to win o some of the things I?m trying to bring into TAC, like night capbilty through te LANTIRN program. We?r winig more of thes batles than we?r losing, but it is absolutely open guerila warfre. Day b day. Imean we just fight, fight, fight, fight. Toth and claw.? 17 Crech?s and the Air Force?s fear was that he Critcs would bring Congres to try to play n idepndent role in weapons ystems elction. Crech knew ? and was demonstrating ? that doctrine drove sytems, but he also knew that sytems could rive doctrine. If the Miltary Reform Caucs was ble to cnvice Congres to alocate funds for cheap, unsophisticated quipment at he xpense of the sytems the Air Force wanted, the srvice would be unable to fulfil its role in the national defnse trategy. Ther had already ben achiling example of this in the 197 ?Enforcer? program. That year the Critcs had persuade Congres, notably Senator Strom Thurmond (D-SC), to ad funds for the ?Enforcer,? a modifed World War I P-51, as n iexpensive, simple ground-atck aircaft. Thurmond, one Air Force gneral rembers, ?kept asking us why e din?t buy the ?En?fo?su? and kept ading money for the project o the dfense budget.? 18 The Enforcer ignored the threat of the Soviet?s houlder-fired SA-7, asmal, single-round, throway heat-seking SAM known as the ?Saturday night special of the misile world.? The SA-7 was cheap, easy to use, and widely suplied to Warsw Pact field units. While it was usels aginst jets, it was dealy aginst proelr-driven aircaft and helicopters, and had literaly run the South Vietnames Air Force?s proelr-driven ground atck aircaft out of the skies, evn i the dsperate days of 1975. 19 The Enforcer finaly fade awy hen this point became clear, but he program was cautionary tale 36 for the Air Force about how evn a extraordinarily folish idea might make its way into the dfense budget, and that he Critcs ould be areal threat. THE FY1983 BUDGET In January 1982, Secrtary of Defnse Weinberger prosed aFY1983 defnse budget of $263 bilion, an icrease of 13. percnt i real terms, evn though te fderal budget defict was expectd to be higer than the Administration estimate of $91.5B.20 The Critcs and Congresional movemnt for defnse rform wer in ful dugeon, and the Congresional Quarterly noted ?the air was thick with sweping prosals to kil of expensive weapons programs and radicaly alter US defnse trategy.?21 Congres spent he first five months of 1982 debating the dfense budget, but he only concret action taken was to trim about 5 percnt from the orignal prosal, nd importantly Congres let he Pentagon alocate the rductions acording to its own priorites. 2 The 1982 congresional hearings on various tactial ir programs howed the contrast betwen the views of the gneraly pro-miltary mebers of the rlevant comites and the rhetoric of the Critcs. In the Senate Armed Services Comite hearings on 26 February 1982, Senator Bary Goldwater (R-AZ) opend the tstimony of Genral Crech by asking why the Air Force was contiuing to buy more of the simple A-10, the Critcs? favorite aircaft. Goldwater, an Air Force Resrve brigadier genral, said, ?I have talked to sme of the guys in the A-10 outfits.they would much prefr to d ground suport with te F-16.? The problems the A-10 pilots identifed to him wer caused by the vry things the Critcs had insited on ? simple avionics and o sphisticated standof weapons capbilty. The A-10 pilots complained to Goldwater that without navigation sytems they had ificulty findig targets and thus wer forced to liter in hig-threat 364 ares, that ny sort f bad weather kept hem from flying, and the that he lack of standof weapons meant hey had to get dangerously close to their targets. Aditonaly, to kep cost down, the A-10 di not have the ?Hands on Throtle and Stick? (HOTAS) mechanism that lowed the pilot change weapons without loking inside the cokpit, evn though evry other modern Air Force fighter had it, and evn F-4s had ben retrofited with te sytem. The rsult was n A-10 pilot, while flying at low levl and trying to atck a trget and odge SAMs and A, had to lok inside the cokpit and change five switches to change from bobs to his canon, while an F-16 pilot made the same weapons change with one movemnt of a?pinkie? switch on the throtle. Al this vastly increased the vulnerabilty of the A-10, and the F-16 fighter-bomber semed uch more surviable. Goldwater conclude by saying, ?I don?t hink it would break lot f hearts in the Air Force if we don?t authorize the purchase of any more A-10s.? 23 Crech, tough e thought Goldwater corect, hose not adres the A-10 isue directly.24 He di say the Air Force was comited to its hig-technolgy weapons, that the srvice would contiue to acquire F-15s and F-16s through te 1980s, and the F-15s and late model F-16s would recive radr modifcations o they could use the AMRAM misile.25 The improvemnts in the radr Crech refred to include ano-coperative target recogniton (NCTR) mode that lowed thes fighters to distinguish enmy from friendly aircaft at long ranges. 26 The NCTR was higly clasifed, but it sems likely Crech briefd the snators on the sytem and its capbilties in closed sesion. The awrens of NCTR and Combat Tre would have fectively, if not publicly, eliminated the Critcs? contetion that he AMRAM was usels because nemy aircaft could not be positvely identifed beyond visual range. 365 Crech said the Air Force was lso cntiuing work on the nw long-range Dual Role Fighter (DRF) al-weather atck aircaft, whic would either be atwo-seat version f the F-16, the F-16E, or f the F-15, the F-15E, equiped with LANTIRN and IR Maverick. 27 A wek later, at nother Senate Armed Services Comite meting, Genral Robert D. Rus, Chief of Air Force Operational Requiremnts and one of Crech?s boys,? sumed up the Air Force argument aginst he Critcs? concept of simple, air-to-air fighters. ?I don?t belive it is prudent o have ady, clear weather only fighter force and give the enmy the capbilty to fight around the clok..I think the increased capbilty that it gives us i worth te money.? 28 In the nd, espite objections from the Critcs and many in the Miltary Reform Caucs, Congres not nly aceptd production f LANTIRN but also ful-scale production f AMRAM to replace the AIM-7; probaly the NCTR sytem calmed their fears about Abram?s operational usefulnes. Ironicaly, F-16 squadrons wer the first o recive the AMRAM, to give them the al-weather air-to-air capbilty the Critcs abhored. COUNTERING THE MILITARY EFORM CAUCS I: THE ARED SERVICES COITES Genraly aryed aginst he Miltary Reform Caucs wer the House and Senate Armed Services comites. Senator John Tower (R-TX), who became chairman of the Senate Armed Services Comite in 1981, was epecialy suportive of Reagn ad his defnse buildup. Majorites of both comites agred that it was esntial to ensure the United Staes would not be ?second best? in ay conflict and to maintain armed forces to protect American iterst throughout he world. They also agred that he Reagn 36 defnse buildup was fordable and aceptd the basic ?ofset? strategy that American forces would be outnmberd and could not match te Soviets ystem for sytem. For this reason, the firepower of American weapons had to be greatr than that of Soviet weapons and this inevitably led to the ighly capble ?force multiplier? weapons Crech advocated. Aditonaly, the congresmen o thes comites wer genraly very knowledgeable about weapons ystems and ot swayed by simplistic arguments, and this helpd the Air Force. 29In the past, ther had ben critcism of thes comites because of their close ties to the miltary. During the Johnson administration, McGeorge Bundy said the Senate Armed Services Comite?s positon is that ?the gnerals and amirals are right simply because they are profesionals. The Comite does not demonstrate the miltary value of the course it urges; it simply tels us the gnerals and amirals are for it?. [But] nothing is les valuble, in hard choices, than the unsuported opinio f men who are urgin the value of their own chosen istrument?.? 30 This was charcterization Falows and the Critcs probaly would have agred with, but he last part of the quote could just as easily be used as n argument aginst he Critcs. The Air Force influenced its uporters in ad out of Congres by asteady rumbeat of speches to sympathetic groups, notably the Air Force Asociation (AF), an ?indepndent, onprofit, civilan education rganization promting public understandig of aerospace power and the pivotal role it plays in the scurity of the nation.?31 The AF not nly oferd a forum for Air Force gnerals and Do oficals to speak bout curent isues, but he organization?s monthly Air Force Magzine gave thes oficers achance to make their arguments in along form ? usaly articles of sevral pages ? that 367 specifcaly counterd specifc Critcs? arguments as wel as providing the ?party line? on isues of interst o the corprate Air Force and its uporters. As the Critcs? arguments became louder, the rsponse in Air Force Magzine increased. The Air Force provide many of the longer esponse and, while the magzine?s articles wer not verly sophisticated, they wer more nuanced and etailed than the Critcs' work.32 COUNTERING THE MILITARY EFORM CAUCS I: THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE The Israeli Air Force and its comander, Genral David Ivry, wer also strong suporters of the USAF?s hig-tech weapons, in direct opositon to the Critcs. Crech and Ivry had picked up the TAC/IF relationship wher Genrals Peld and Dixon had left of, and Ivry was strong pronet of Crech?s hig-technolgy weapons to fset superior Arab numbers, just as Crech and the Air Force planed on using them to fset Warsw Pact numbers. Crech and Ivry chose not flaunt he close USAF/IF relations because of sensitve base ngotiations with Saudi Arabi and other Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region, but hat di not diminish teir fiendship. At Crech?s behst, Ivry, like his predcesor Benie Peld, nevr pased up an oportunity to tel visting congresmen ad Jewish leaders about how important American hig-technolgy weapons ystems wer to Israel?s urvial nd how strong relations wer betwen the IAF and the USAF.3 The IAF had no interst in the type of F-16 the Critcs wanted, asingle-role air-to-air fighter, but rather wanted the same type of F-16 the USAF wanted ? adual role fighter-bomber with ahigly acurate dlivery stem for ?dumb? ombs and an dvanced radr sytem for air-to-air combat. The IAF made it clear to Genral Dynamics from the first 368 time the IAF visted the company that he IAF plan was to use the F-16 as long-range strike aircaft o suplemnt and evntualy replace the F-4, whic it wanted to use oley for SAM supresion. 34The other are the IAF specifcaly disagred with te Critcs was on the ned for long range in fighter aircaft. Sprey had said, ?Ther?s no faster way to kil the performance of afighter than to ask for to much range,? but he IAF found that range was not nly useful for dep strikes, but it also gave the nw fighters ?persitence.?35 It was comon for F-15s to have practie dogfihts with one group of Mirages or F-4s then, when the Mirage/F-4 group ran out of uel, another group replaced them, while the F-15s had enough fuel to stay nd fight e scond group. 36 The IAF also demonstrated the fectivens of the advanced US sytems in combat. The F-15s had lready had great suces aginst Syrian MiGs, and when the IAF recived its first F-16s on 2 July 1980, it son put hem to work. On 7 June 1981, les than year later and just after the publication f Falows? National Defnse whic ritcized the dual-role F-16, a strike package of eight Israeli F-16 bombers with six F-15 escorts flew around-trip mision f over 1,30 miles to destroy the Osirak nuclear eactor utside Baghda. 37 It was mision that, had the Critcs had their way nd made the F-16 ashort-range air-to-air fighter, would have nver taken place. Falows and the rst of the Critcs ignored the implications of the strike, and also ignored IAF?s interst in the rst of America?s hig-technolgy air weapons. A further demonstration f hig-tech weapons? efctivens came in June 1982, just after the Reagn/Weinberger FY1983 budget was proved by Congres, when Israeli ground forces pushed into Lebano in Operation ?Peace for Galie.? To protect its 369 ground forces from air atck, the Syrians deployed SAM units to Lebano?s Beka Valey, but left other SAM sites in Syria proer to protect he Beka Valey bateris. This modern IADS, with acombination f SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 misiles, posed astrong chalenge to the IAF, whic stil remberd the loses caused by SAMs in the 1973 war. The Israeli government di not want o atck the misile sites in Syria for fear of sparking a wider conflict, but he dilema vnished when, on 8 June, the Syrian SAMs moved from Syrian teritory in the Golan Heights into the Beka Valey wher the IAF could strike them without bombing Syria. On 9 June, the IAF excuted aplan it had reharsed in Red Flag type xercise in Israel's Negv desrt for a month before the operation. I a?rol back? operation similar to the type Crech advocated, IAF -4 Phantoms atcked the SAM bateris and air defnse radrs with anti-radition misiles and precison-guide munitons, destroying sevnten of the nietn Syrian SAM bateris within two hurs without losing an irplane. They returned the nxt day nd destroyed the last wo. 38 While the F-4s truck the misile sites, IAF -15s and F-16s provide air cover aginst Syrian MiGs that ried to block the atcks on the SAM bateris. As the MiGs aproached, ahigly sophisticated IAF airborne comunications jaming sytem, similar to asytem Crech ad orderd for TAC, blocked Syrian ground control radr staions trying to pas information to their fighters while American suplied airborne radr surveilance E-2C aircaft, caled the ?por man?s AWCS? and heavily critcized by Falows, downliked its radr pictures to the IAF comand post in Tel Avi to give Ivry areal-time picture of the air batle.39 In the first half hour, IAF -15s and F-16s hot 370 down tenty-six Syrian MiGs, and by non the nxt day IAF pilots had shot down about eighty-two Syrian fighters without losing any aircaft in air combat. The kils wer about evnly divide betwen F-15s and F-16s.40 The IAF?s American-suplied hig-tech sytems dominated the Syrians? ?inexpensive, reliable? Soviet sytems, and IAF tactis wer another blow to the Critcs. Pier Sprey had claimed that superiority in umbers was critcal factor in air combat, but he combat experinced pilots of the IAF knew that having a smal number of ighters in a engaemnt aginst alrge number of enmy aircaft was n advantge, because in esnce almost evry aircaft one ses i atrget. The IAF prefred the nemy to have greatr numbers in air combat engaemnts, and IAF headquarters fed flights of our aircaft, one flight at time, into the fight, and then puled ach flight out after they scored kils and replaced them with another flight. 41 The IAF also demolished another of Sprey?s theories of combat efctivens,? that fighter adr would be jamed and usels in combat. The lading IAF -16 MiG kiler, Colnel Amir Nahumi, said after the war (and six kils) that he rason the F-16 was o efctive was because its lok-down pulse Dopler adr alowed the F-16s to lcate the Syrian MiGs trying to sneak in at low levl, something that had ben imposible with earlier adrs. 42 This was the radr Sprey said would be usels and that Falows and the Critcs would have lft out of the aircaft. The Critcs laimed their focus was on technolgies that would met he tst of combat, so the sucess of America?s hig-tech weapons in the Beka Valey wer inconvenit for their arguments. To try to redem themselvs, the Critcs aid the IAF suces ?had very litle to d with stae of the art echnolgy and alot do with tactial 371 insight,? whic presumably the American miltary was incapble of duplicating.43 Unfortunately for the Critcs, those who actualy fought e batles disagred. IAF comander David Ivry, who yield to n man i his opinio f the IAF?s intagibles, gave much of the credit o American technolgy. 4 Neither Falows nor the Critcs evr acknowledged Ivry?s coments, and Canby?s ilence was epecialy noteworthy, since h had said for years that he IAF thought ?rol back? was n ivalid concept and belived in going in at low levl to atck SAM sites. 45 Crech recived regular updates on the war fom Ivry through te Israeli Defnse Atach? in Washington, and he and his taf wer elated. His biographer noted: ?The stunig suces erved to reinforce Crech?s vison that emrged at he 1978 Warfighter Confernce and had ben practied regularly at Red Flag exrcise.?46 WINIG THE NGIE WAR President Reagn?s resurection f the B-1 program provide an imediate bnefit to the TAF. The Air Force had lready had F10 engies instaled in sevral F-16s, and the ngies wer performing extremly wel. When Reagn orderd the production f aforce of 10 B-1s, each powerd by four F10 engies, Genral Electric opend an F10 engie production lie and the program became finacialy sound. Now the F10 was viable alternative for Prat?s F10. With te blesing of Congres, in Augst 1981 the Air Force gave GE a contract for ful-scale dvelopment of aslightly modifed F10, designated the F10, similar in size to the F10 so it could fit in both F-15s and F-16s.47 With tes devlopments and areplacemnt for the F10 areal posibilty, Genral Alton Slay t Systems Comand orderd a competion for the nxt purchase of Air Force fighter ngies. In April 1983, the Air Force isued aRequest for Propsal (RFP) to GE 372 and Prat for the purchase of 2,0 engies for the F-15 and F-16 during the fiscal years 1985-190. 48 The Air Force?s push for an egine competion recived abost when aseris of investigations in mid-1983 found that Prat was making huge profits from spare parts for the F10, in some case quadrupling their cost o the Air Force.49 The prices Prat charged for spare parts atracted the atention f the pres and Do, inspirng Secrtary of Defnse Weinberger to say, ?Thes are trible contracts. We are not going to pay thes prices any more.? 50 Prat tried avriety of ways to sabotage the competion, icluding saying that it would increase acquistion cost and elay deliveris, but despite thes contetions and active interventions by congresmen from the districts wher Prat was located Weinberger and the Air Force stod fast. 51 The Air Force F10/F10 competion prosal had sevral posible production schems the two cmpanies wer to examine, including dividing the ngie buy into 25 percnt/75 percnt portions or ?fity-fity.? The prosal lso demande a warnty clause for the ngies that guarnted the ngie would perform 3,0 cyles before the turbine blades malfunctioned, as wel as genral ?corection f deficencies? clause.52 Prat maintained an Ispector Clouseau-like imperviousnes to what was taking place. When it came tie to make its bid, Prat?s prosal said that if the company wer awrde les than 10 percnt of the contract, its cost for maintainig the smaler percntage of engies would be triple that of maintainig the ntire buy. What Prat bluntly oferd the Air Force and Do was esntialy an ?al or nothing, take it or leave it? prosal. 53 37 It was mistake. Weinberger and Secrtary of the Air Force Verno Or wer furious, and it ok considerable work by their stafs, fearful of restablishing another no-competive situation with GE in control, to kep Weinberger fom awrding 10 percnt of the buy to GE. 54 In the nd, GE got 75 percnt of the order while Prat got he minium buy, 25 percnt, and the Air Force anounced that hey wer going to cntiue competions for futre ngie purchase betwen Prat & Whitney and Genral Electric. Beginig in FY1985, GE engies powerd about 75 percnt of the F-16s purchased by the USAF, with te rmainder powerd by the Prat &Whitney ngies. 5Both new engies proved to be much more durable and virtualy fre from stal/stagnations.56 The dcison recived rave rviews from the nws media, Congres, and the GAO, but Falows and the Critcs nevr acknowledged this acomplishment, perhaps because they had not sugestd having a competion betwen manufactures for the ngies.57 Another posible rason was that idea for the F10/F10 competion ad its implentaion was entirely the work of Genral Alton Slay, ab?te noir of the Critcs because of his work in turnig the F-16 into amulti-role fighter. THE 1984 BUDGET By early 1983, Congresional suport for steady large increase in the dfense budgets had waned, and Congres di not give awarm recption to Reagn?s FY1984 $273 bilion defnse budget when it arived on Capitol Hil. 58 The FY1984 defnse budget played into the ands of the Critcs and their congresional suporters, who claimed that he administration was til comited to procuremnt at he xpense of O&M, spare parts, personel, and the other lemnts of ?readines.? This new budget, the Critcs laimed, meant both igher cost and les combat capbilty. The Critcs? 374 arguments contiued to resonate, and the Congresional Quarterly noted, ?major weapons procuremnt, long the target of liberal Pentagon critcs, began to draw fire from a much larger span of the politcal spectrum.? 59 A few months later, the Critcs cored amajor coup when, on 7 March 1983, Time magzine?s lead story was ?US Defnse Spendig: Are Bilions Being Wasted?? The isue fatured Critc ?Chuck? Spiney on the cover, described as ?Pentagon Maverick.?60 The article said that Spiney, ?a quiet but doged anlyst,? was the ?unlikely hero f an itensifying reform ovemnt hat is changi the way the Pentagon establishment is doing busines.? Much of the story was presntaion f Falows? and the Critcs? positons, especialy focusing on Spiney?s coruption them. The article noted ?the symbiotic ties betwen the miltary and efnse contractors, reflcted in the revoling dor that lows top ficals of the Pentagon to g to work for the firms they dealt with, drives [weapons?] cost stil higer. In aditon, stars are awrde for pushing a major project o cmpletion, whatevr the price.? 61 Endorsemnts of Spiney?s work wer in the standar Falows form of ?cirular experts? and came from ?defnse xperts? like Pier Sprey and John Boyd. At same tie, the article prceptively higlighted the problems the Critcs faced trying to bring defnse rform to the American sytem, noting that he Miltary Reform Caucs mebers and liberal Democrats wer ?as usceptible as ny meber of Congres in seking pork for their constiuents? and ?the scramble for godies ems to be their overiding concern.? The article pointed out hat MRC founder Wiliam Whitehurst insited that wo more nuclear ircaft cariers wer necsary (the Reagn administration wanted one), both to be uilt near his district in Norflk, Virginia. Miltary Reform 375 Caucs meber Senator Sam Nun insited on keping the C-5 transport line open i his home stae of Georgia, nd Senator Richard Cohen of Maine forced the ineficent spliting of the building of sevral arge Navy warships of the same clas o sme could be uilt in Maine shipyards. The article also nted that Democratic liberal ?doves? wer part of the proces ? House Speaker Tip O?Neil and Senator Edward Kenedy of Maschusets uported the F-18 (a modifed F-17) for the Navy, parts of whic wer built in their home stae; Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) enrgeticaly pushed the ighly controversial B-1 bomber mainly built in California; nd Senator Wiliam Proxmire (D- WI), who regularly hande out he ?Golden Flece? awrd to the miltary and its contractors, aded $10 milion, to the FY1983 defnse budget for a minesweper to be built in Wisconsi that would have to be moved to acoast. House Defnse Apropriations Subcomite Chairman Joseph Adabo (D-NY), ?usaly eager to cut defnse spendig,? insited the Air Force triple its A-10 buy because the A-10 was built in his district.62 But while the article brought Spiney to the public ey, it also increased the scrutiny of his arguments. In the Air Force view, an alyst hould not have ben concerned with whic side won the argument; the anlyst? role was imply to provide impartial nalysi. One Air Force gneral oficer, himself a trained anlyst, noted the Falows? anlyst wer manipulating the dat to suport heir own personal views. Refring specifcaly to Spiney, he said ?an alyst and an alyst? packagin must nevr, epat nevr, be designed as vehicle by whic the dcison maker is aked to ratify the bliefs and conclusions of the anlyst.?63 Others in Do simply thought Spiney was ?lousy anlyst,? and Weinberger insited that Spiney?s work was ?historical? and ?things wer 376 being changed.?64 Major Genral Jack Chain, the Air Force XO, said Spiney?s report reflcted ?a very limited ensity of experince? and the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Comite, Senator John Tower, said Spiney?s ideas wer ?ridiculos.?65 More sriously, the Congresional Budget Ofice (CBO) preared an i-depth study of Spiney?s claims and methodlogy tiled ?Two Methods of Projecting Neds for Defnse Operations and Suport Funds.? The study found that Spiney?s method f projecting the proer amount of O&M funds was to lok at historical dat and asume, based on that dat, that O&M readines required afixed share of the dfense budget. If they di not reach tat fixed share, using Spiney?s method they wer under funde. 6 The study then compared Spiney?s fixed share? method with amore complex method used by anlyst Wiliam Kaufman of the Brokings Instiution. Kaufman said that he prcentage of the budget aloted to O&M and readines was not fixed but would vary from budget o budget and sytem to sytem. Two things caused the varition. First, as new sytems came into the inventory, their O&M cost wer low because ther wer few of them, especialy new sytems that had long devlopment imes and slow production rates. Typicaly, O&M funds for thes sytems laged by two r thre years. Aditonaly, newr sytems had lower O&M cost later in their life bcause nw facilties that wer built before the sytems came on lie di much of the work. Thes new facilties wer in the procuremnt budget, not he O&M budget, but once thes facilties wer complet they wer no lnger a cost item but stil contributed to the basic O&M function.67 The CBO study also nted that he same iltary leaders who ad critcized low miltary readines in the late 1970s now said it was ?hig and improving,? and that 37 ?contray to Spiney?s hypothesi, thes large improvemnts have ben achievd [evn though te O&M and spares? cost wer] adeclinig share of the overal defnse budget.? 68 The study conclude, ?[Spiney?s] conclusion that O&M must maintain aconstant share of the budget is not suported.?69 THE ND OF THE RAGN DEFNSE BUDGET INCREASE It was obvious in 1983 that Congres would only comit o asmal real growth in defnse, and in the nd the FY1984 budget was cut by about $1 bilion, leaving about a4 percnt real increase. 70The final FY1984 budget spent more money on personel, consumables, pare parts, amuniton (iventories of air-air misiles wer especialy increased), and trainig, providing for flying time increase that lowed the Air Force tactial crews to average 250 flying hours in FY1984, compared with 210 in FY1983.71 Though litle noted, at his time the simplistic but semingly logical idea that large, long-term buys produced savings began to fade. The Air Force stretched out aforty-eight plane F-15 buy because the F-15?s manufacture, McDonel-Douglas, aid it could achiev its most eficent rate of production at hirty per year, so ther was no cst benfit in building at faster ate. Capbilty was lso an isue. The F-16 buy increased from 120 to 14, not because it was more conmical but because the AMRAM was coming on line, giving the F-16 the al-weather air-to-air capbilty it had lacked and making it more desirable to have in the inventory. 72 At he same tie, Congres agred with te Critcs on the ned for more indepndent asesments of weapons, and - with te suport f Weinberger - moved to take amore active role in the weapons acquistion proces by seting up anew Inspector Genral?s ofice for Do, as wel as n idepndent Operational Test and Evalution fice and a 378 Cost Analysi Indepndent Group (CAIG) in the Secrtary of Defnse?s ofice.73 Ironicaly, the first head of the indepndent Test and Evalution fice was Jack Krings, McDonel Douglas chief test pilot fr the F-15 program.74 THE CRITIC?S LAST AND In 1984, Senator Gary Hart published America Can Win: The Case for Miltary Reform. Writen with is aide Wiliam Lind, Hart demande congresional intervention on weapons? acquistions and focused on the Critcs? two main critcisms of American defnse trategy, the plan to fight both te air-to-air and air-to-ground batles in al- weather conditons and at night, and the ned for dep interdiction, both of whic Hart and Lind oposed. In the bok, Hart oferd specifc prosals for his ideal mix of Air Force tactial sytems in the FY1985 and futre dfense budgets. The prosals include stoping production f the F-15 and replacing it in the air-to-air ole with anew lightweight fighter - the F-16 was now considerd to heavy - that would have no radr and would cost one-third les than the F-16. Al work on the Air Force F-1 and F-15E dep interdiction aircaft would be stoped and the AMRAM and LANTIRN would be canceld, in part because Hart said that using LANTIRN puts ?unreasonable operating stres on fighter pilots and subjects them to dangerous ground fire? (pilots using the LANTIRN, evn i the single sat F-16, disagred). 75 The TAF would focus oley on close air suport, replacing the F-1 and F-15E with anew, very simple (ven compared to the A-10) aircaft caled the Combined Arms Fighter armed only with aheavy canon. Thousands of thes wer to be produced, at cost of les than five milion dolars acopy.76 379 With te Time article and Hart?s bok, the Critcs? arguments emed to be taking over the dbate. The Critcs had the suport f much of the Miltary Reform Caucs and, more important for Falows, the nwspaer ditorial elites and the pundits wer on their side. If Falows? theory was corect, thes elites and pundits could influence Congres enough to bring changes not nly in the tactial ir sytems the Air Force bought but also in overal American miltary strategy. They would push Congres to exrt civilan control over the miltary b forcing it o buy the Critcs? imple weapons, and cut defnse cost at the same tie. Based on the semingly poular ceptance of their ideas, the Critcs semed to be poised to have amajor impact on the types of aircaft and sytems the TAF purchased from the mid-1980s on. But he prosals of the Critcs, the Options Comite of the Miltary Reform Caucs, and America Can Win wer nevr adopted. When Genral Wilbur Crech retired in Septmber 1984 after six and ahlf years a comander of TAC, the isue of whic weapons the tactial Air Force was going to fight with at he nd of the dcade was setled. The Air Force had won virtualy al the arguments, not in the pres, but wher it counted, in the administration ad in Congres. Because of the long lead times of devlopment and production, thes decisons, made in the arly and mid-1980s when the Critcs emed at heir zenith, reached ful fruiton ly in the late 1980s. When the Air Force nterd the Gulf War in late 190, it had Crech?s force - 80 F-15s, including the first F-15Es, 80 A-10 atck aircaft with more sophisticated avionics and the IR Maverick, and 1,60 F-16s, not he auster day ir-to-air fighter the Critcs had vocated but afighter-bomber quiped with awide variety of sophisticated avionics for the task.7 The Air Force stil had the long-range interdiction mision using the F-1F and the nw 380 F-15E Strike Eagle. Both could perform this mision at night and in bad weather, the F-1F with te Pave Tack pod and the F-15E with LANTIRN, though in late 190 most F-15Es caried only the navigation pod because ther wer delays in the laser target designation pod. 78 The AMRAM radr-guide air-to-air misile was coming into operational service but not deployed. Despite the claims of the Critcs that he Air Force would have fwer fighters because of their hig cost, the srvice actualy had more fighters at he nd of the 1980s than it had t he nd of the 1970s or 1960s, and of an exponetialy higer quality. 79 CRECH?S LEGACY For much of his tenure as TAC comander, Crech ad ben the most powerful man in the Air Force, perhaps in the American miltary, and uring this period the Air Force leadership completd its change from aSAC orientd bomber-centric force to atctial fighter force. As early as 1982, ther wer no ?bomber genrals? in the top four-star genral ranks of the Air Staf in the Pentagon, while ther wer eight ?fighter genrals.? Outside Washington, ther wer nie ?fighter genrals? as major comanders but only five ?bomber genrals.?80 Crech and the Reagn defnse budgets recived credit for the turnaround in TAC (though Crech laimed he dserved most of the credit).81 From 1980 to 1984, TAC?s pilot retntion icreased from 41 percnt o 73 percnt, the comand?s flying hours increased 20 percnt and the fuly mision capble rate for al TAC aircaft was up 40 percnt. In 1984, its Clas A acident rate was 3.2, down from 5 in 1980 and tied for the lowest in TAC history. The comand increased its number of Disimilar Air Combat 381 Trainig (DACT) sorties by 40 percnt per year fom 1980, and the number of crews flying Red Flag exrcise also increased by 40 percnt ayear during this period.82 Like Dixon before him, Crech ad his ?boys,? agroup of young enral oficers who wer completly loyal to him and whom Crech sepherde to higer anks. 83 Twenty-one oficers who served under Crech at TAC evntualy became four-star genrals, and evry Air Force hief of staf rom 1986 to 205 either had ben a TAC wing comander or n the TAC staf during Crech?s tenure. 84 Crech was detrmined that his ?boys? cary on his programs, but when he rtired in Septmber 1984 he was replaced not by one of his ?boys? but by Genral Jerome ?Jery? O?Maley, an ergetic, outgoing, personable former SR-71 pilot and aclose friend of Air Force Chief of Staf, Charles Gabriel, the first fighter pilot hold that positon. Both ad graduated from West Point, had served togethr as trainig oficers for the first clases at the Air Force Academy, and O?Maley had ben Gabriel?s vice omander at Udorn i 1971-972 during the Lavel bombing afir. Both ad their promtions to brigadier genral delayed by Congres while their ole in the afir was examined (Genral Alton Slay?s promtion was held up for the same rason), but al thre wer evntualy exonerated. O?Maley?s time at Udorn ad his asociation with Gabriel, who ad ben a prime over in Dixon?s realistic trainig revolution, put him squarely on the side of realistic trainig. When O?Maley tok over fom Crech, e said, ?I think that TAC?s most important mision, and Ithink the one it has done bst under Genral Crech, is trainig. Ithink TAC pilots are the bst-rained pilots the tactial ir forces have ver known ? during World War I, Korea, Vietnam, or any time since Vietnam.? 85 Whetr or not his was n idication that O?Maley was going to move awy from Crech?s 382 comitent o hig-tech weapons and shift he mphasi back to trainig is not known, but al indications are h and Gabriel intede to put heir own stamp on the Air Force and on the TAF. 86 It nevr hapend. On 20 April 1985, before O?Maley had chance to make a signifcant impact, he, his wife, and al thre crewmebers wer kiled when the light transport jet he was flying ran of the nd of the runway on the way to a Boy Scout fundraisng banquet in Scranto, Pensylvani. Crech, evn though retired, stil exrted considerable influence in the Air Force and O?Maley was replaced by one of Crech?s boys,? Genral Robert Rus. Rus had worked for Crech at TAC then moved to Air Force hadquarters a Director f Operational Requiremnts, wher he was responsible for validating the rquiremnts for Crech?s hig-tech weapons. He rturned to TAC as Crech?s vice omander in 1982, then Crech arnged for him to ove back to the Pentagon as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staf or Resarch, Devlopment and Acquistion, wher he contiued to shepherd Crech?s programs. While Rus was comander of TAC, he was in constant ouch with Crech until May 191, when Rus retired. Rus was replaced by Genral Michael Loh, who ad ben Crech?s Deputy Chief of Staf or Requiremnts at TAC and then TAC?s Deputy Chief of Staf or Operations. 87Wags aid that while Rus and Loh ad the ofice, Crech ontiued to be comander of TAC. 1. Salvtore Chidichimo, Lt. Col. USA, ?The Miltary Reform Caucs and its Impact on Nationl Dfnse? (Resarch Reprt: National Wr Colg, Ntionl Defse Uiversity, 1983), 14-5. 2. Lew Alen, Gen. USAF, "USAF?s Renwed Spirt.? Air Force Magzine, Novembr 1981, 54. 38 3. Robert D. Rus, Maj. Gen. USAF, ?Tactial Fighter Devlopment: We Have Debated Lng Enogh,? Air Forc Magzine, April 1981, 31-5; Edgar Ulsamr, ?ow th fse Budet Batle is Heatin Up,? ir Force Magzine, My 1982, 54-9. 4. Public Law 93-4, 8 St 297 (1974), 31 U.S. C. 1301; John Elwod and James Thurber, ?The Ne Congresional Budget Proces: The Hows and Wys f House- Senat Difrncs,? i David C. Kozak nd Jhn D. Macrtney, es. Congres Rcosiderd, Third Eiton (Washingto DC; ogresioal Quartrly Prs, 1976), 17; 304-305. 5. Walter Kros, Lt. Col. USAF, ?Miltary Reform Past and Presnt: Reviw of Nationl Dfnse,? Air University Reviw, Jul-Augst 1981, 3-14. 6. James Falows, "mrica's High Tech Weapons," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1981, 27. . Crech, Oral History, 18. 8. Air Fore procuremnt oficers wer virtualy al ?no-rated,? that is, not pilots or navigators. In 1974, 87 prcet f Air Forc genrl oficers wr rated,? 9 percnt n-rted. By 1984 5 percnt of the gnerals wr ?rated,? and 20 percnt no-ratd,? but of this 20 percnt wo-thirds wr o-str genrls. Ther wer no -rated four-star genrals and oly thre ut of thirty-nie thr-star gnrals. Chris L. Jefris, Lt. Col. USAF, ?The Navigator: What Now?? Air University Reviw, May-Jun 1985. htp:/w.irpower.maxwel.f.mil/airchroicls/auri/1985/may-jun/jefries.html (acesd March 206). 9. David C. Hendrickson, Reforming Defnse: The State of American Civl-Miltary Relations (Baltimor, Johs Hpkins Uivrsity Prs, 198), 9. 10. Jaes Falws, ?Public Percption, Politcal Actions, and Public Policy,? in The Defnse Rform Debate: Ises and Analysi, ed. s Clark, Petr W. Chiareli, Jefry S. McKirtick, and Jms W. R (Bltimor, MD: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1984), 345; Pier Sprey, Orl History Interview by Jacb Neufield, 12 Jue 1971. K.23.012-96, AFHRA, 3; 17; 29; 50. 1. James Falows, ?Journalism: From Citzens Up: The Puf Ader's Nest of Modern Journlism,? Bate Awrds Keynte Adres, 196. htp:/w.pewcentr.org/baten/falows.html (acsed Augst 205). 12. Bary Pos, The Sourcs f Miltary Dotrin: France, Britain, and Germany Betwen the Wrld War (Itha, Cornel University Pres, 1984), 8, psim. 13. Falows, Bten Awrds Kyot Adrs. 4. Crech, e-mail, March 18, 20, prvie to author by Keith Feris. 15. Ibid. Crch sys tt Falows agrd wit im ut could not say so publicly. This ems unlikely to the authr. One cn evison Falows ayig ?the rgment makes sens give th asumptions,? wich might lad Crech t belive Falows ard, sinc Crch ard with te asumptions. Falows, s th artil shows, di nt. Jmes Falows, ?I Fly it Egles,? The Atlntic Montly, November 1981, 76-7. 16. Author interviw it Dick derg, April 205, Washington DC. 384 17. Wilbur Crech, Gen. USAF, dres to the Air Force Asociation/Aeronautical Systems Divison Eginrig wars Dinr, Wrigt Patrson ir Frce Bas, Ohio, 2 October 1981, typed transcript, 1 [68.739-749], Crech paers, AHRA. 18. Crch, Oral History, 83; Benjamin F. Schemr, ?Congrs Set o Fund USAF ?Enforcer? Test,? Armed Frces Jourl (Novebr 197): 17. 19. Byron E. Huck, A-1 Cmbat Journal, Chapter Sevn, ?Sandy Lead,? htp:/skraider.org/ho/journalset/jrnChap7.htm (csd Februr 206). 20. Congrsinal Qarterly Almac, 98t Congres, 1st Ssion, 1983, Volume XIX, 205. 21. Congresional Quarterly, US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton, 5. . Ibid., 7. 23. Congres, Senate Armed Services Comite, Preparednes, 97th Congres, 2 nd Sesion, 26 Fbruary 1982, 102-4. 24. Crech, Orl History, 9-50. 5. ongresional Quarterly, US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton, 134. 26. Authr iterview ith Tad Olstro, Lt. Gen. USAF, Cambridge, MA, October 205. 27. McDonel-Douglas evntualy won the contract in February 1984, leading to a production rdr for the F-15E, qickl dubd t ?Begl? (Bomb Eagle) or ?Mud Hen.? 28. Congres, Senate Armed Services Comite, Tactial Air Warfre, 97th Congres, 2d Ssio, 2 March 1982, 312. 29. Congresinal Qurterly, US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton (ashington, DC: GPO, 184), 125. 30. McGeorge Bundy testimony before Senate, 1967, quoted in Alan Ethoven ad K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Eugh? (at Monica, CA: Ra Corp. 205), 310-31. 31. Air Force Asociation web site, htp:/w.af.org/AboutUs/default.asp (acesd ebruary 206). 32. S, for exmple, John Corel?s Scoping the Spares Problem,? Air Force Magzine, January 1984, 12-5; ?Bndig the Tecnolgy Cst Curv, ir r zi, Agst 3, 5-48; Why Spars ar Shrt,? Air Force Magzine, Septmber 1983, 56-2. . Author?s notes of metings betwen Genral Crech and Genral Ivry while acompanyig Geral Crch ad mbrs of the TA stf o thir vist o Isral, Septber 197. 34. Author?s notes from the first IAF -16 team vist, led by Genral Peld, to lok at he F-16, ugst 1976. Autor was one of two USAF scort ficrs. 35. Sprey Oral History, 12. 6. Author?s notes n his own flights in Israeli F-15s and conversations with Israeli F-15 pilots, Tel Nf AFB, Israel, 1978-1980. 37. Merav Halperin ad Ahron Lapidot, G-Suit: Combat Reports From Israel?s Air Wars (London: Tim Wrer Bks UK, 190), 140-148. 385 38. Ibid., 149-158; Walter Boyne, ?Interview With IAF Comander David Ivry,? Air Force Magzine, Augst 1982, 0-28. 39. For the E-2C, se Falows, National Defnse, 123. Petr Mersky, Israeli Fighter Aces: The Dfinitve History (Nrth Brch, MN: Spcialty rs, 197). 134-136. 40. Halperi and Lapidt, 158; oyne, 26. 1. Boyn, 27-8. 42. Mersky, 13; Amir Nahumi, Col. IAF, interview ith author, October 1983, while author was Irael Desk Oficer, Jint Chiefs of Staf, J-5. 43. Stevn Cnby, ?Miltary Rform ad t Art f Wr,? International Security Reviw 1, 1 (Sprig 198), 263. 4. Crech, Oral History, 41; Boyne interview ith Ivry, 28. 5. Stpen Cnby, ?Miltary Refrm ad th Art of War,? in Clark, 143. 46. Jams . Slife, Lt. Col. USAF, Crec Blue: Genrl Bil rech and the Refortion f the Tactial Air Forces, 1978-1984 (Maxwel Air For Bse, AL: ir University Pres 205), 49. 47. Robrt W. Drews, R. W. The Air Force and the Great Engie War (Washingtn. DC: National Defns University Prs, 1987), 13-14 48. Ibid., 12-124; Victoria M Hays, ?Analsi of the Air Force and the Great Engie War? (Student Thesi: Air Force Instiute of Tecnolgy, Dfse Tcnicl Iformation Centr, Alxandria, V, 198), 46-7. 49. Drews, 16-17. 50. Winberger, quoted in Walter S. Mosberg and Eward T. Pounce, ?How Prat and hitey Gains Frm th y th U Buys Spre Parts,? Wl Stret Journal, 3 October 1983, 25; also se Carles or, ?Pentagon Audit Finds aharp Increse for Parts,? Nw York Tims, 23 July 1983, A13. 51. Congres, House Comite on rmed Services, Defnse Department Authorizati and Ovrsight, 98th Cgres, 1st s, 27 April 1983, 15. Cogreswoman Scredr?s coments are specialy notworthy. 52. Drews, 120. 3. Comptroler Genral, ?Reviw of the Alternate Fighter Engie Competion? (GAO/NSIAD-84-104), (Wshington, DC: GPO, 17 April 1984), 1, 7. 54. Kenedy, 39-0. . Drws, 12. 56.Hayes, 76. 7. Congrsional Quarterly Almanc XIX, 93, 214; Richard Witkin, ?Decison Big Setback for Prt,? New York Ties, 4 February 18, 38. For later, ful assmet of th rsults by the particpants, e Wiliam Hes, Louis Kratz and Jcqes Gnslr, Efective Competion Durig Wapons Syste Acquistin (McLe VA: Mongraph for th Natinal ontract Manemnt Asociation, 31 Dec 1985). 58. Cogresionl Qurtrly lman XIX, 98-20. 9. Ibid., 20. 60. Time agzine cover, 7 March 1983. 386 61. Walter Isacson, ?US Defnse Spendig: Are Bilions Being Wasted?? Time, 7 March 983, 24. 62. Ibid., 8-29 3. Harol Rosenberg, Lt. Gen. USAF, spech to the Air Force Asociation (AF), 12 November 1981, quotd in Air Force Magzine, January 1982, ?Snap Shts,? 12. 64. Isacson, 30. 5. R. Jefrey Smith, ?High-Cost Lemons in the U.S. Arsenal,? Science New Seris, 21, 492 (April 1981), 31. 6. Wiliam Kaufman, Congresional Budget Ofice, ?Two Methods of Projecting Neds For Defnse Opertis ad Suprt Fns,? (Washingtn, DC: GO, Sptmber 1986), 4-6, pasim. 7. Ibid., 26 68. Ii., , 24. 9. Ibid., 3. The Air Force, through te Air Force Asociation, also responde vigorusly to Spiny?s chargs. Se, fr xample, snior editr Jh Crl, ?Bing the Technlgy Cost Curve.? Air Force Mgzin, Augst 1983, 45-8. 70. Coresinal Qartrly XIX, 17. 1. ngrsiol urterl, US Defnse Policy, Third Eiton, April 1984, 159, 163. 72. Ibid., 158. 3. Ii., 72-173, 193. 74. Ibid.,193. The author knew Krings from the author?s time flying the F-4 (Krings di the scon round of F-4 spi tst) ad the F-15, s wel as Krings? vist to Israel. 75. Gary Hart, ?Ned for Miltary Reform,? Air Univrsity Reviw, Sept-Oct 1985, 43-4; Kros, 10. 76. Gary Hart and Wiliam Lind, America Can Win: The Case for Miltary Reform (Bethsd, MD: Aler and Adler, 1986), 172-174. 7. Numbers from iliamson Muray, Air ar in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviatin Publishing, 195), 14-5. 78. Ibid., 34. 9. Wiliam Pery, ?Desrt Storm and Detrence,? Foreign Afairs 70 (Fal 191): 6-7. 80. Mike orden, The Rise of the Fighter Genrals: The Problem of Air Leadership, 1945-1982 (axwl AFB, AL: ir Univrsity Prs, 197), 24-25. 8. Slife, 93-49. 2. Point Papers preared 17 January 1985 by TAC Staf or Genral Gerald O?Maley iterviw ith Air Force Mgzine (unpublished). 83. Slif, 90-3. Many f ths oficers wre favorits of both Crech and Dixon. 4. life, 15. 85. Bnjamin Schemer, ?Interview With New TAC omander Genral Gerald O?Maley,? Ared Forcs Joural, 12 (January 1985): 71-9. 86. Sandra . Gregry, Lt. Col., USAF, ?A Man?s Flight Through Life: A Leadership Profile of neral Jerme F. O?aley, Resarc Reprt, Industrial Coleg 387 of the Armed Force, 194. This work is quite hagioraphic, but he biography is acurate and t intrviews acurately prtay the stm felt for O?Maly. 87. Slif, 105-106. 38 CHAPTER FOURTEN: THE GULF WAR From 197 until the mid-1980s, the Critcs atempted to reduce the dfense budget by reorientig American miltary strategy, and at he same tie move from relatively smal numbers of expensive, sophisticated, hig-tech, ?force multiplier? weapons ystems to larger numbers of simpler, more robust, and les expensive sytems. The Critcs also atempted to change the ?corupt? procuremnt proces they said was responsible for devloping and purchasing thes weapons. By any measure, they failed. Stil, through te 1980s and through Augst 190, the Critcs wer in a enviable positon. They had genrated avigorus ubcultre that critcized the dfense establishment and brought em regular tention i the media, nd life inside their subcultre had many charms. The Critcs? ideas required no burden of prof and wer unasilable bcause, since they had nevr won apolicy batle, their ideas wer untestd. Unecumberd by the ned to apease interst groups and by the grind of runig bureaucraies, they considerd themselvs marter, bolder, more strategic minde, and more historicaly awre than those who er responsible for selcting weapons and trainig the forces to use them. At he same tie, almost unoticed, uring this period ther ocured the first sucess of post-Vietnam realistic trainig and the nw hig technolgy. On 19 Augst 1981, two Navy F-14s hot down to Sviet-made Libyan fighters over the Gulf of Sidra id629725 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 389 in a engaemnt hat lasted les than oe minute. In early April 1986, abomb kiled or wounde sixty-thre US service men i a Berlin disco. The atck was blamed on Libyan leader Muamar Qadafi, and in response on the late venig of 15 April 1986, aforce of eighten F-1s tok of rom England and made a6,40 mile, thirten hour flight o strike targets around Tripoli n Operation El Dorado Canyon. The F-1s wer carying the latest hig-tech sytems, Pave Tack laser designator pods and ew 2,0-pound GBU-10 laser guide bombs, as wel as unguide 50-pound bombs pecialy designed for delivery at very low altiude. Only four of the F-1s droped their bombs sucesfuly, sevral mising their targets and the rst not droping because they could not proerly identify their targets. One F-1 was lost, but despite the smal number of aircaft hat hit heir targets post-mision alysi indicated that dificulty in identifying the targets caused most of the problems, not sytems alfunctions. But he videotapes of the F-1 bombs that di hit heir targets wer very clear nd shown o national telvison ad to Air Force units around the world. The positve raction to the tapes made the Air Force awre that it now had viid way of displaying the combat results of its new, hig-tech sytems, and the video tapes of laser guide bomb strikes wer son to become apotent weapon i the Air Force?s public relations arsenal. 1 Then, i Augst 190, what had ben a theoretical rgument betwen the Air Force and the Critcs moved into the world of reality when Sadam Husein?s Iraqi army invade Kuwait. The United Staes moved forces into the rgion i Operation Desrt Shield and preared to remove the Iraqis, and the forces the United Staes deployed wer the type of hig-technolgy stems that he Critcs had eplored since the mid-1970s. 390 Not nly di they include the Air Force?s hig-tech weapons ? the F-1, F-15E, multi-role F-16, LANTIRN, and AWCS, to mention afew ? but hey also include the US Army?s hig-technolgy main batle tank, the M1A ?brams.? Falows had specifcaly critcized the tank in National Defnse bcause it had smothbore main gun, saying this was folish since "veryone knows" that he rifled barels on the Iraqis? Soviet anks wer more acurate and had longer ange. The Abrams also had complex fire control sytem and a night vison sight, both of whic wer anthema to Falows and the Critcs.2 Critc Chuck Spiney had writen, ?the acid test of war is the only unambiguos indicator f capbilty,? and given their previous anlysi the Critcs belived the war would be adisater. 3The American miltary had the wrong leaders, the wrong doctrine, and the wrong equipment. American miltary comanders would be inadequate bcause ?wariors? and ?inovators? like Boyd wer not promted. American miltary strategy was comited to atriton warfre that would cause hig American casualties. BVR air combat nd the use of precison-guide munitons would be imposible bcause of radr jaming and target identifcation problems. Long-range, al-weather interdiction would be inefctive bcause of the igh-tech sytems? failure rate, and in genral America?s hig-tech sytems would have low in comision rates and fly very few sorties. Sadam Husein shared the Critcs? view of American ir power, teling Dan Rather of CBS news in a interview ?the United Staes depnds on the Air Force. The Air Force has nevr decide awar in the istory of war.? 4 Once the Air Force units arived at heir base in the Persian Gulf, the ?combat cultre? mindset ok over.5 Unlike the units deployed to Linebacker in 1972, thes 391 squadrons had particpated in avriety of ther ealistic exrcise with other Air Force units. The crews knew the capbilties of the other sytems they would be flying with because they had flown ith tes ystems at Red Flag, and the xercise had lso given the crews and comanders arobust IPN. When they began to plan their atcks, they wer working with people they knew or with whom they had only one or two degres of separtion. The wide rach of the Red Flag exrcise gave the aircews alingua franca that was used not nly b Air Force rews but also crews from the Navy and Marine Corps, as wel as crews from the RAF. The laders of the Coaliton air forces also knew what would ecide the batle, and once the crews er established they began rigorus trainig and exrcise program with te other units they would be operating with in combat. 6Howevr, ther wer some problems. The force that deployed to the Gulf had over 95 percnt of the Air Force?s avilable guidance sytems, but after being short f laser-guide bomb (LGB) designator sytems during Linebacker, almost wenty ears later the Air Force stil only had few more than 10 sytems.7 Forty wer in the F-17 Stealths, ther wer about sity-four Pave Tack sytems ounted on F-1Fs, and towards the nd of the war few LANTI laser designator pods wer avilable for the F-15Es.8 The result was that he forces in the theatr had tens of thousands of laser-guide bombs, but wer short f guidance sytems. The150-plus laser guide bomb Pave Spike dsignator sytems that wer in service in the TAF in the late 1970s had ben droped from the inventory for easons that re unclear, but probaly because Pave Spike was intede for use with te F-4, whic was being phased out, and because it was ?clear weather only? 392 sytem. Ironicaly, the Britsh brought eight Pave Spike sytems to the theatr given to them by the USAF as urplus, and they performed very wel.9 The plan devloped for the atcks on Iraq wer a vriation f Crech?s rol back? doctrine. Phase Iwas to begin with an tack on the Integrated Air Defnse System headquarters in the Baghda rea by F-17 Stealth aircaft armed with laser-guide bombs, as wel as trikes by F-1s and F-15Es on avriety of strategic targets, including chemical weapons facilties. The F-17 strikes wer planed to wipe out he Iraqi air defnse comand and control centrs, o the surface-to-air misile sites would be unable to protect or suport each other and could be picked of one by one. Howevr, for the first few nights the F-1s and F-15Es til had to hit heir targets, and the question f Dixon?s going low? doctrine as oposed to Crech?s medium altiude? doctrine bcame an isue. The comander of the Central Comand Air Forces, USAF Lieutnat Genral Charles Horner, left he dcison to the comanders of the dep interdiction wings, Colnel Hal ornburg of the F-15E wing and Colnel Tom Lemon f the F-1F wing. Both elcted to atck at low levl as they had one during sevral Red Flag exrcise. It was wek before they felt comfortable flying some misions at medium levl, ?rol back? or not.10 (Ironicaly, Hornburg was Crech favorite and was to become comander of TAC in early 20.) America?s hig-tech weapons began Spiney?s acid test? on 17 January 191 with the medium altiude F-17 strikes and the F-15Es and F-1s coming in low. The F-17 strikes, as planed, isabled the Iraqi IADS and few hours later, at dawn, two huge strike packages of Coaliton aircaft, using tactis devloped at Red Flag nd honed in exrcise 39 during the run p to the war, moved towards their targets in Iraq nd Kuwait. The Iraqi radr and misile sites, unable to cordinate their actions, al come on the air at he same time to met his masive atck, but he first aircaft in the packages wer not strikers but anti-SAM F-4G ?Wild easels,? the scond phase of the rol back operation. The Iraqi radrs and misile sites disolved in a valnche of new, hig-tech HARMs (High Sped Anti-Radition Misiles), and then the misile atcks wer folwed up by the Wild Weasels droping cluster bombs on the sites. For that point on, Iraqi radr-guide SAMS played alimited role in the war. 1 The Air Force used the videotapes from the LGB designators to flod the media with images of precison guide weapons hiting their targets, and it semed the inital ir campaign was tunigly sucesful. Nevrthels, on 3 February 191, James Falows wrote in the Washington Post hat he rsults o far proved ?nothing about he Reagn defnse budgets on hig-tech weaponry.? He noted that her wer fewr hig-tech weapons because they wer so expensive and cautioned, ?we do nt know ho efctive our weapons wil be in the unpredictable cirumstances of real war? because the ?procuremnt sytem has bias gainst realistic testing.? The war as epecialy dangerous, he contiued, because the oficer corps who ad planed the raids and wer flying the misions wer ?budget bosters instead of miltary leaders.? The air war ould be the tst, he said, to se ?if our [hig-technolgy] weapons proved fective nough to forestal grisly land warfre, nough to justify their great cost.?12 By the scond wek rol back was complet, and the Coaliton aircaft begin to fly to their targets at medium altiude. With te rlatively smal number of laser designators, 394 most of the Coaliton air strikes wer old fashioned, umb omb strikes. The F-16s bombing sytem proved higly acurate, but he A-10s most efctive weapon, its 30m canon, often brought it o close to Iraqi smal arms fire, so the A-10s weapon f choice was the Maverick misile. A-10s fired 5,274 Mavericks during the war, and thes misiles ? whic the Critcs di not want i the inventory ? acounted for most of the A-10s? vehicle kils.13 In the vent, after action reports gave Coaliton air power credit for kiling 1.70 Iraqi tanks (40 percnt of their force), 90 armored personel cariers (30 percnt of their force), and over 1,450 artilery piecs (47 percnt of the force). 14 The Coaliton forces kil ratio ver the Iraqis in al ares was bout 1,0:1, and credit for the kil ratio went o the tchnolgical edge in weapons ystems, asignifcant superiority in leadership, and superb trainig ? exactly the oposite of what he Critcs had predicted. 15 Thirty-six of the forty Iraqi aircaft shot down i air-to-air combat wer destroyed by F-15s, twenty-six with te ?asily jamed? radr-guide AIM-7s, with no F-15 loses. F-16s, armed with te Critcs? favored heat-seking misiles but not yet quiped with radr-guide AMRAMs, cored no kils.16 The Coaliton forces uferd an extraordinarily low los rate of ne aircaft or evry 250 combat sorties (the USAF lost one aircaft evry 40 sorties), and the aviest air loses wer with te Critcs? favorite A-10 ? 1/3 of al air loses ? and the RAF Tornados using the low-levl tactis advocated by Critc Stevn Canby. After losing four Tornados the first hre days of lw-levl atcks, the RAF switched to USAF style medium-altiude atcks and suferd no further loses.17 Former TAC comander Wilbur Crech noted that had the Air Force used Canby?s tactis, based on the RAF experince the TAF would have lost 160 fighters 395 instead of the 13 fighters it actualy lost. Crech also nted that, while the lvel of suces might ave not ben the same in awar ith te Soviets, the rliabilty of the weapons sytems ? the Critcs main point - would have ben uafectd.18 The Air Force used ep, long-range interdiction strikes throughout he war, led by the F-1s and the stealthy F-17s.19 Although te F-15E Strike Eagle?s LANTIRN sytem was not fuly combat-ready, the F-15Es played a vital role in the campaign. When the Iraqis began to launch Scud misiles at Israel, ther was huge presure on the Coaliton from the Israeli government o find the misiles and their mobile launchers, combined with te threat hat if the Coaliton could not find them the IAF would. It was critcal to Coaliton iterst that he Israelis not be involed in the war, and Genral Norman Schwarzkopf later told David Frost, ?If srael had entred the fray fter the first Scud atcks Idon?t hink we could have hld the coaliton togethr.? 20 The F-15Es pent much of their time sarching at night for and atcking the Scud misile launchers with their partial LANTIRN sytems.21 While the atcks had mixed results, the diversion f the F-15Es, whic the IAF was very familar with and had ben trying to buy, let he Israeli government know that America was using its most ophisticated weapons to try and find the Scuds. This, combined with te dployment of Patriot misiles and adecrase in Scud launches, probaly caused by F-15Es? tandig patrols, gave the Israeli government he rationale it nede to resit public presure to interven. 2 As far s the igh-tech Air Force sytems? aintainbilty in combat, the fuly mision capble (FMC) rate for Air Force hig-tech aircaft was 92 percnt, much igher than its peacetime rate. The Air Force had 50 percnt of the air asets in the rgion but its 396 hig-tech fighters flew 59 percnt of al sorties while incuring only 38 percnt of the loses.23 F-1s and F-15Es flew alrge number of dep-interdiction strikes to cut of the front line from suplies, and later F-1s flew ?tank plinkig? misions evry night. On thes misions, flown at medium altiude, the F-1s used their hig-tech, al-weather infraed and low-light elvison target location sytems to find Iraqi tanks by the at of their eturn ad rop recison guide bombs, one at time, on each tank. The F-1Fs wer often able to destroy as many as ten Iraqi tanks on asingle mision.24 The Air Force hig-tech weapons had huge impact on seasoned miltary journalist. After the war the Washington Post? miltary corespondent, Rick Atkinson, said that in the istory of the 20th century up to that ime, only one war had ben decide in oe day, the 1967 Six Day Midle East War by the first day of Israeli Air Force strikes. At he nd of the first night of the Persian Gulf ar Atkinson said ther wer now to wars decide by air power in a single day of ighting.25 Wiliamson Muray, the wel-known historian of air power and o friend of the Air Force, noted that ?the squabling about he numbers of tanks destroyed mises the point?death for amiltary force ocurs, as in ahuman being, not when some fixed percntage of critcal componets fail but when the degrading synergies cause acomplet colapse of the whole?the air atriton campaign caused this breakdown.?26 The suces of the igh-tech weapons was not limited to the TAF. In ?the ultimate test of combat,? the M1A brams? oth bore gun that Falows disparged outranged the Iraqis? Soviet anks rifled guns by over 1,0 metrs, while the Abrams? hig-tech 397 sights let he tank guners make numerous one-shot kils at ranges of ne to two miles evn i the sand and wind of the dsert.27 But while the spectaular pictures of guide weapons demolishing target after target led many to rush to credit he igh-tech weapons for the victory, the miltary leaders gave credit not nly to the weapons but also t the wel trained American forces who ad devloped the apropriate tactis for the tchnolgies under ealistic field conditons in exrcise such as Red Flag.28 Air Force rews that flew in the operation wer also efusive in their praise of the trainig they had recived. One said, ?We?d sen it al before; we know exactly what o d?the rason we are doing so wel in this war is because we are so wel trained.?29 Another said, ?We fought like we trained? [and] trainig saved our lives.?30 The chief of Desrt Storm air operations, Major Genral John Corder, had ben oe of the major pronets of realistic trainig and who, as one of the ?iron majors,? had given the disatrous writen test o TAC crews in 1972 that led to the Agresor Squadron. He told this author that, with te rlatively smal number of LGB guidance sytems devoted arly in the war to hig-value point argets, most of the TAF misions wer similar to Red Flag misions using cordinated strike packages and conventional weapons. The misions wer higly sucesful, and he gave the credit o the cultre of realistic trainig introduced by Genral Dixon, Mody Suter, and the iron majors in the 1970s, aying ?Red Flag preared pilots for the actual environment i whic they would fight and gave them the capbilty to adpt o the conditons [of combat].?31 398 When he rturned after the war, Corder caled Genral Dixon, and rembers, ?I told him that what hapend in the Gulf was because of what he ad one with trainig while he was comander of TAC. He got al choked up and Ithought e was going to cry. Very un-Dixon? 32 Post war, afew of the Critcs di acknowledge they might ave ben wrong. In mid-191, Falows admited in The Atlantic Monthly, "I am beginig to think that he only way the national government can do anything worthwile is to invent asecurity threat and turn the job ver to the miltary."3 Others conced some points, but ried to fer alternate xplantions for the victory. Dr. Stephen Bidle of Harvard said that ?Iraqi erors alowed new Coaliton technolgy to perform at rainig round efctivens?[and] without he Iraqis mistakes the outcome would have ben would have ben far difernt i spite of the Coaliton?s technolgy, and Coaliton casualties would likely have rached or excede prewar expectaions [as hig as 45,0, including 10,0 kiled].?34 He aded grudginly ?[nevrthels] many previous armies have displayed combat skils no betr that he Iraqis, but without producing results anything like those of 191; only a powerful interaction betwen skil imbalnce and ew technolgy can explain the difernce.?35 POST WAR SESMENTS In a seris of congresional hearings in April 191, the backers of hig-tech weapons di not conceal their satisfaction. I aHouse Armed Services Comite hearing on the Persian Gulf, Former Reagn Navy secrtary John Lehman said ?hig-tech, and the mphasi on hig-tech to make our strategis work was vlit in Desrt Strm. Th weapns ystems 39 worked. The vry expensive and very hig-tech trainig ranges r?w a dmostrt that b using ig-tech omand and control, very hig-tech trainig, igh-tech precison weapos, hig apbilt weapons ystems, we can dfat huge armis f totalitrin regims that hav no cpuction bot providing cnon fodr. 36 Jack Krings, the director f Do?s Operational Test and Evalution uit hat he Critcs had presd for so hard in the 1980s, aid, ?the igh/low-tech debate is over?we designed and evloped xpensive and higly sophisticated weapons, investd heavily in trainig, then testd them operationaly for efctivens and suitabilty?important Congresional mebers and stafers uported the rsponsible advocatesnow evrybody knows hig-tech works.?37 Krings also nted that investments in improved reliabilty and maintainbilty had sharply increased the cost of weapons but dramticaly increased their value. His conclusion was that, s predicted, ?very large difernces in casualties apear to result from very large diferntials in combat echnolgy.?38 Doctr Wiliam Pery, atrue tchnolgist and long-time advocate of hig-tech weapons, agred with Krings. Pery pointed out hat he los rate was one aircaft per 40 sorties, wheras in the past alost rate of rom .5 to 1 percnt ? one to two aircaft per 20 hundre sorties ? had ben considerd very low. He also pinted out hat combat showed the Critcs? contetion that sophisticated weapons would be inefctive in the ?fog f war" was entirely wrong. 39 He also nted that Stealth was ?relatively invulnerable to [Soviet-ype] air defnse.?40 Pery also paid ahuge complient o the ralistic trainig programs begun i the late 1970s by saying I was urpised how efctively the sytems wer used?.I couldn?t beliv tat [t airmn] would gt ful fctivns out f thes w sytems, and Iwas rn in that estimatethe 40 miltary planers not nly used the nw sytems, but hey built their tctil plas arud thm o the blif that he stms would work efctively, an tey wr right.41 The Critcs, howevr, wer unimpresd. Sevral peard in front of the same House Armed Services Comite and contiued to thunder that, despite their early insitence that combat was the ultimate tst of weapons, not al combat was equal. Senator Gary Hart said, ?The victory was not he victory it semed to be? and that he ?Persian Gulf War di not prove that hig-tech is betr than low-tech weaponry.? 42 Pier Sprey claimed that he rsults had ben ?shamefuly doctred,? that despite the fact hat no F-17 Stealth aircaft had ben lost over the most heavily defnde are of Baghda ?the Stealth [F-17] is probaly not stealthy?and [is] easy to track,? that he M1A brams ?had not ben testd in combat,? and that Iraqi antiarcaft guns ?defated a major portion of ur air flet? [and] ominated the air defnse situation.? A cynic might say l of this must have come as intersting ews to the Iraqi miltary. Sprey also said that her wer huge problems with Senator Hart?s favorite airplane, the Marines? Harier atck aircaft, because of its hort ange (aparently Sprey had forgten that he ad earlier said, ?The quickest way to destroy afighter is to give it o much range?). Sprey also said the A-10 ?suces tory? had ben the single most important miltary efct of the war nd ?saved the air campaign,? ading that Air Force Genral Chuck Horner, chief of the Gulf War ir campaign, had not wanted the A-10 brought o the Gulf.43 Horner denid this and caled Sprey a liar in e-mails to the author. He aded, ?my son was n A-10 pilot in the war nd so Ihad prety god iea bout how the A-10 di.? 4 401 Les Aspin, the House Armed Services Comite chairman, semed to expres the sentiments of the ntire comite when he said, ?evrybody would agre the miltary performed wel, that he ladership was uperb, that he quality of the trops was very, very god.? 45 Everybody, that is, except Critc John Boyd. Boyd made abrief staemnt o the comite claiming his ideas wer responsible for the victory, that ?air power as not decisve,? then went on a long tirade about how, because one of his ?acolytes? was not promted to genral, the ?miltary supress briliant and unconventional young oficers.? Boyd contiued by saying miltary promtion sytem (the one that gave the American miltary Colin Powel, Norman Schwarzkopf, Charles Horner, and the other Gulf War genrals) was flawed and urged Congres to ?get involed with te isue of selction f people [to genral],? sugesting that Congres take over al genral oficer promtions from the miltary.46 The transcript of the aring indicates the congresmen semed apaled by the idea. Former Navy secrtary Lehman, who as iting on apnel with Boyd and was very familar with miltary promtions, was horifed at he idea of Congres elcting flag oficers. Respondig to Boyd?s prosal, he said ?Congres should not get into the busines of naming people and micro-mangin.?47 One otable aspect of the congresional hearings was that Hart, Sprey, and Boyd al gave credit for the victory to Boyd?s briliance? and ?genius,? and said that he rason the Coaliton won the war as because it adopted Boyd?s maneuver warfre principles and got inside the Iraqi?s observation-rientaion decison-action (ODA) lop.48 Inconvenitly, Critcs who er much more knowledgeable about maneuver warfre 402 disagred. Wel known miltary anlyst and author Martin van Crevld joined Critc and maneuver warfre nthusiast Stevn Canby in examinig the rsults of the war, and after making the Critcs? usal aments that ?the facts are not al in?[but] many ofical pronuncemnts during and after the war er hyperboleskewd to influence futre budgetary batles on Capitol Hil? and that ?unit cohesion ad trainig proficency wer not hig,? the two tok strong exception to the other Critcs? coments before Congres.49 Van Crevld and Canby said that, despite Hart?s, Sprey?s and Boyd?s declartions, ?the notin of entring into the nemy?s ODA lop nevr came into play? and closed with te coment hat ?Desrt Storm was not agod example of maneuver warfre.?50 1. Robert E Venkus, Col. USAF, Raid on Qadafi: The Untold Story of History's Longest Fightr Mision by the Pilot Wh Direct It (Nw Yrk, t. Martin's Pres, 192), 178-1; als se Josp T. Stanik, El orado Canyon: Reagn's Udeclard War ith Qadfi (Anaplis, MD: Nval Instiute Pres, 202). 2. James Flows, Ntional efnse (ew York: Random House, 1981), 86, pasim. 3. Frnklin C. Spiney d J. C. Thompson, Defse Facts f Lif: The Plans/Relity Mismatch (Boulder, O: Wstview Pres, 1985), 85. 4. CS, Dan Rather interi ith Sadam Husien, 29 Augst 19, transcript FBIS-NE-90-170. 5. Diane T. Putney, Airpower Advantge: Planig the Gulf War Air Campaign 198-191 (Washigto, DC: ir Force History d Musms Progrm, 204), 259. 6. John Corder, Lt. Gen. USA, phone interview ith authr, 13 April 0. 7. Te Navy had umber of laser dsigators but only few laser guide bombs, and the distnce from the carirs t th taret reas made it practily imposile fr Air Forc aircaft o use Navy designators. Putny, 124, psim. 8. 193 Glf Wr Air Powr Survey, Volume Four, (Washington, DC: epartment of the Air Force, 193), 19-12. 9. ndrw Valnce, Group Captin RAF, ?RAF Operations,? part of ?Air Power in Desrt Shiel/Desrt Storm: Part I,? Air Power Historian 38, 3 (Fl 191): 38. 10. Ibid., 261. . 193 Gulf War Air Power Survey, (GWAPS), Volume I (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 193), 1-3; Putney, 259-260; Davis, 36. 403 12. Washington Post, 3 February 191, A16. 3. Stewrt M. wel, ?Scd Wr, Round Two,? Air Force Magzine, April 192 26-0. 14. GWAPS, Volume I, Section I, Efects and Efectivens, 34-6. 5. Se, for exapl, Wiliam Pery, ?Dsert Storm and Dternce,? Foreign Afairs, 70 (Fal 191): 67-8. 16. Wilimson Muray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation Publishig, 195), 326; Vlc, 36. 17. ery, 75; uray, 0. 8. Crch, Oral Histor, 28. 19. The F-17s cried two bmbs, the F-1 twelv, but he ?stealthy? F-17s wer more usful aginst heavily efnde targts. 20. Genrl Normn Schwarzkopf, telvison iterview ith David Frost, 27 March 191, avilable n PB VH tpe, Air Uniersity Libray, Maxwel AB, AL. 2. Dvid E. Sodgras, Maj. SF, ?Atacking the Thetr Mobile alistic isile Threat.? (Thesi: chl of Advnced ir Power Studis, axwel Air Force Base, AL, 193), -6. 2. Muray, Air War Persian Gulf, 168-174; for the Israeli view, author interview with Yiftach Spector, IAF Dirctor f Operations in 191, 7 Sptmber 204 i Tl Avi, Isrel. 23. Muray, Air War Persian Gulf, 310. 4. ?F-1 Opertions Dsert Storm,? Apendix 21 to Anex C to 1730.13.7/S-078/92, 0 ebruary 192. Maxwl AFB: FHRA; Michael J. Bodner and Wiliam W. Bruner I, Majors, USAF, ?Tnk Plinkig,? Air orce gzine, Octobr 193, 10-4. 25. Rick Atkinson, ?rotlie? iterview, htp:/w.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontli/gulf/ (acesd February 206). 26. Muray, Air War Prsi Gulf, 321-32. 7. Normn Friedmn, Desrt Victory: The War For Kuwait (Anapolis, MD: Navl Instiute Pres, 191), 5, pasim. 28. ry, ?Desrt Stor,? 7-8. 9. Special Study, ?Histry of the 35th Tactial Fighter Wing (Provisonal): Operation Dsert hiel and Desrt Storm,? AFHRA, 7. 30. ?F-1 Opratios srt tr, pendix 21 to Anex C to 1730.13.7/S- 078/92, 0 ebruary 192, AFHRA, 25-26. 31. Author phone interview ith John Corder, Lt. Gen. USAF, 23 March 206. 2. Ibid. 3. James Falows, ?Miltary Eficency," The Atlantic Monthly, Augst 191, 8. 4 Prwar stimates of csulties for US/Coalito fores raged as hi as 45,0, 10,0 of hic would b fatlits. Mst estimtes rangd from 9,0 to 30,0. Se, for instance, Miael K. Frisy, ?US Isn't St for Casulties, Dctrs Say,? The Bostn Glob, 15 Janury 191, 4; and Reutrs Nrth American Wire, 9 Jnur 191 w.reutrs.com. (April 206). 40 35. Stephen Bidle, ?Victory Misunderstod: What he Gulf War Tels Us About he Futre of Coflict,? Intrnatinal Secrity 21, 2 (Fal 196). htp:/w.cmw.org/rm/fultext/vitor.html (cesd March 204). 36. Congres, Huse Comite n Ared Srvics, The Impact of the Persian Gulf War nd the Dcline of th Svit Uio n How the Unitd Sttes Des its Dfse Busies, 102nd Cgres, 1st es., 2 April 191, 67. 37. Ibid., 536-537. 8. Ii., 40-41. 39. Ibid.,563-56. 40. Ii., 70. 1. Ibid., 51. 42. Ii., 672. 3. Ibid., 543-548; 572-573; for Sprey?s coment on range, se Pier Sprey, Oral History Interview ith Jacob Neufield, 12 June 1971. K.239.0152-96, AFHRA, 9. 4. Horr -mail t uthr 12 Fbruary 206. 5. Cngres, The Impact of the Persin Gulf War, 567. 46. Ibid., 69; 68-69, 695-698, pasim. 7. Ii., 701-704; 8 48. Ibid. For Sprey?s coments e 543-54, pasim; Hart?s coments 672. 9. Martin van Crveld and Stvn Canby, Air Power nd Maneuvr Warfre (Air University Pres: Mxwl Air Force Bse, L, 194), 231. Va Crld is wl known miltar historian ho teaches at Hbrw University and the uthor f anumber of bks on iltary istry, ntbly t clsic Suplyig Wr: Logistics Frm Wlnstin to Paton (Cmbridge, UK: Cambridge Universit Pres, 197). 50. Ibid., 214, 20. 405 CHAPTER FITEN: CONCLUSIONS WHY THE ?IRON MAJORS? EALISTIC TRAINIG INOVATIONS SUCEDE Inovation is not just incremntal improvemnt but arevolutionary change in the way existing task are prformed, acompanied by the asociated changes nede to acomplish te task.1 When Dixon ad the iron majors pushed the Air Force from ?fly safe, around the flagpole? trainig to ?realistic trainig? with Red Flag, it was t least inovative, but could more proerly be caled revolutionary. The change tok les than year, aremarkably short ime for acomplet change of direction for such a lrge organization i acritcal rea. Equaly remarkable was the change to ?train the man?; this was completly out of charcter for the Air Force, whic traditonaly embraced technolgical inovation but not inovation i no-technical reas. Because true inovation is o dificult and, in this case, counter-intuitve, the changes in Air Force trainig beg the question f how and why the inovation was o sucesful. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTRE, LEADERSHIP, AND FOCUS. Dixon, and later Crech, was the sole had of awel-disciplined, hierachal organization. They wer able to decide unilateraly on a direction the organization would move and be sure the mebers of the organization would folw their guidance. In the case of Red Flag, Dixon was ble to implent he xercise asily since it required almost no coperation from id688540 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 406 other organizations.2 It was the same for the other ealistic trainig inovations, whetr done by Dixon r Crech. Later Crech was the single prson i charge of TAF requiremnts and had fre hand in selction f new sytems. Strong, consitent leadership was lso key, and the two TAC comanders complented ach other as they implented the ralistic trainig regime. Dixon, the sytem builder, had the strength of personality to push Red Flag through and resit he presure from Chief of Staf Genral David Jones to lwer the lvel of realism to bring down the acident rate. While it is questionable if Red Flag would have come about if Crech ad ben comander of TAC when Suter apeard in 1975, Crech, te "Bricklayer," certainly was iling to take Dixon?s realistic trainig programs and make major improvemnts. The difernce was that Crech di not do this in aconfrontaional way but by using the trust his uperiors ? Air Force Chiefs of Staf Jones and Alen ? had in him. Dixon ad Crech onstantly kept he TAF focused on the rquiremnt o be able to fight amajor war nd, while their priorites wer difernt, they wer not mutaly exclusive. Dixon put his first priority on trainig but stil actively pursed improved weapons ystems, while Crech put his first priority on sytems but stil actively improved TAC?s exrcise programs. The ladership?s tight focus on thes ares meant that he staf, despite frequent, regular turnover, was lways ure of the way head. WILINGES TO ACEPT OUTSIDE IEAS. MIT?s Owen Cote blievs that intersrvice ompetion ad rivalry can often be the source of inovation, and it certainly apears to be true in this case, but expande to an iternational evl. Suter and the iron 407 majors di not have the ?NIH? (Not Inventd Her) syndrome, an version to ideas that they di not devlop themselvs. As instructors at he Fighter Weapons Schol and vetrans of SEA combat operations, the iron majors wer more inclined to improvemnt by trainig than by new hig technolgy weapons ystems, whic they had sen fail to often i combat. To thes oficers, the simplest and best way to improve combat capbilty was to adopt he ideas of the two programs that hey knew orked, the Navy?s Top Gun program and the Israeli Air Force slection ad trainig program. The iron majors borwed liberaly from each, but hey found that he theoretical wilinges to acept new ideas was one thing; real changes wer often painful and involed some serious oul searching. In oe case, when the Fighter Weapons Schol instructors began flying regularly with te Navy Top Gun istructors, one eapons Schol instructor noted ruefly ?we er badly outflown for two reasons, lack of proficency and outmode tactis.The Navy used superior tactis asociated with Lose Deuce [two ship]? [and] wer almost always able to defat our numericaly larger but les optimu four-ship fighting wing tacti. It was biter pil to swalow.? But swalow it hey di; the duels with Top Gun fialy, in late 1975, led the Air Force to slowly change to two-ship formations.3 While the iron majors identifed their problems from Linebacker and tok the improvemnts from both Top Gun ad the Israelis, the Israeli experince semd to have more influence on Dixon, probaly because as hig-rankig Air Force oficer it would have ben politcaly imposible for him to acknowledge the Navy?s uperiority in air combat rainig.4 Nevrthels, Dixon?s contacts with IAF comander Benie Peld led 408 him to the same conclusions the iron majors had reached, so the path e folwed to the conclusions ems unimportant. In fact, because Mody Suter had ben the Israelis? instructor in the Fighter Weapons Schol, it gave Suter another levl wher he was ble to relate to Dixon, and probaly increased Dixon?s comfort levl with Suter?s concepts. A PROGRAM TO DEVLOP BROAD SUPORT A L EVLS. uter and the iron majors devloped the Red Flag exrcise in the Pentagon using a crefuly manged politcal proces. By stematicaly taking the plan through al the lvels of the Air Staf and agresively loking for problems with te program, they wer able to resolve any potential dificulties and wer preared to answer any question that might come up. By the time Suter gave the Red Flag briefing to Dixon, it had ben carefuly scrutinized by intersted oficers throughout he Air Force and had the aproval of most of the gneral oficers on the Air Staf, as wel as the Chief of Staf. At he same tie, Suter and his cohrts knew hile many in the igher chelons focused on resources, the lower levls of the TAF wer hungry for ealistic trainig that would truly preare them for the nxt war. From their time at Nelis and their informal IPNs, they wer confident hat he aircews and suport personel would enthusiasticaly implent Red Flag, and they wer right. LACK OF RESITANCE. xperts on miltary inovation ? in fact, al types of inovation - often identify one of its definig charcteristics a ?meting resitance.? The rsitance arise because inovation genraly sems to be azero-sum gae, wher changes and improvemnts in oe are tend to demphasize another are.5 Howevr, in the case of realistic trainig, ther was virtualy no resitance. While Dixon?s power is a 409 partial explantion, the ral reason semed to be flying safety di not have a constiuency that depnde on the flying safety for its taus in the organization. The idea of ?flying safety over verything,? of lying safety as n ed in itself instead of ameans to greatr combat capbilty, proved to be ahouse of cards. But it is important o nte that he idea of lying safety was redfined, not droped, and in some ways it became ore important. Dixon ad the iron majors hifted the mphasi from safety to realistic trainig, but hey realized that cidents would jeopardize the ralistic trainig program, so flying safety remained an important aspect of TAF operations. After Red Flag nd the other ealistic trainig programs began, Air Force flying safety programs began to fcus more on concret sugestions on how to fly realistic ombat rainig misions afely, rather than mer exhortaions and ?nanyig.?6 LOW COST. he fact hat he inital realistic trainig inovations - Top Gun, the Agresors, Red Flag - began s low cost programs helpd. Their low cost limited the ?down side? of implentig them, and once they began d wer obviously sucesful cost became uch les of an isue. At first glance, it might sem surpisng that he realistic trainig programs came at time of lw budgets and agenral ack of regard for the miltary, but his i not surpisng to the miltary inovation cognoscenti. Stevn Rosen of Harvard noted that ?initating an inovation ad bringi it o the point wher it proved astrategicaly useful option has [often] ben acomplished when money was tight?Rather than money, talentd miltary personel, time, and information have ben the ky resources for inovation.?7 410 THE DISAPEARNCE OF THE ?UNIVERSAL PILOT? PROBLEM. Lack of realistic trainig was only one of the Vietnam-era problems the iron majors aw. The other was the Air Force ?universal pilot,? the unqualifed pilot who as ent o fly fighters and who absorbed ahuge amount of trainig time, drove the ntire program to alow levl, and often proved inadequate in combat. The ?universal pilot? isue afectd the ntire Air Force, and an tempt o change the concept of the ?universal pilot? to suit TAC?s ideas might ave brought strong instiutional resitance from the other comands, but he problem sems to have simply gone awy. From 1978 on, ther is virtualy no mention f problems with te ?universal pilot? either in the literature, in oral histories or in anecdotes. The problem sems to have disapeard for avriety of subtle, complex, and unrecorde reasons. With te nd of the Vietnam War, the fighter force stabilzed. Ther was no lnger aned for a rpid turnover of ighter pilots to replace those who ad finished acombat our, so nly arelatively smal number of new fighter pilots wer required to kep fighter cokpits filed. Thes new fighter pilots came almost entirely directly from flying schol, not from other aircaft. Anecdotal evidence sugest they wer from in the top art of their flying schol clas, because flying fihters was clearly the way to promtion i the Air Force and, in aditon, was fun. Also, the nd of the war eliminated the presure on TAC to rush out acertain umber of ighter pilots by afixed time, so trainig could take longer. After graduating from flying schol, the nw pilots wer now sent o a?fighter lead-in? course wher those who lacked the skils wer eliminated quickly and inexpensively, while others wer given basic skils o they wer 41 preared to transiton ito perational fighters.8 The longer tainig time, plus the nw ?building block? trainig methods, led to perational squadrons being maned, in the main, by higly qualifed pilots. WHY THE CRITICS? ATEMPT A INOVATION FAILED Both te Air Force and the Critcs presnted views of the futre and theories of how to make America?s defnse stronger, but both suporters and those who disagred with the Critcs genraly agre that hey had litle fect on American defnse policy. Why the Critcs failed is acomplex question. The question f an idea being ?right? or ?wrong? has litle to d with te idea being aceptd in the American sytem; the question is why the Critcs? theories wer not acted upon, iregardles of whetr they wer corect or not. The folwing sem to be the most compeling reasons. THE CRITICS LACKED LEADERSHIP, FOCUS, AND A UNIFED PROGRAM FOR REFORM. Without asingle lader or aunifed, agred program, the Critcs? arguments wer unfocused and incohernt. One scholar of miltary afirs, Samuel Huntigton f Harvard, noted, ?[The Critcs?] overiding oal is, obviously, to reform. But o reform what? Answer ould apear to be almost evrything.? Huntigton went on to say he was unable to find asingle cohernt, overaching purose in the Critcs? arguments. He noted their major prosals wer ashift rom atriton warfre to maneuver warfre and to buy more, cheaper weapons, and then contiued, ?But what is the rlationship betwen the two? It is hard to se.? 9 A result of the lack of ocus was that he Critcs wer unable to agre on specifc remdies. While TAC under Crech was ble to frge ahead with its weapons ystems 412 devlopments, the Critcs di not fer many realistic alternatives. They wer not wiling, as one of their oponets noted, ?to set aside the solitary grandeur and arogance of radical chi in favor f the practial strugle to cmunicate and persuade.?10 Aditonaly, in contrast o the Air Force ladership who fcused on betr tainig and weapons ystems, Falows and the other Critcs focused on acult of the prsonality, the rsult of Falows? deliberate and contiuing atempt o push is experts a ?kokie but expert individual charcters? to kep the interst of the media. Many suporters cautioned aginst focusing on idividuals instead of ideas, but his advice went unhede. A suporter of the Critcs noted they wer ?a ggle of individualist prima donas who use ?reform? for their own particular nd widely varying ostrums, rather than seking abroad based cohernt aproach to the larger isues of national defnse.?1 The cult of personality was lso ahndicap in the mid-1980s when the Critcs, notably Falows and Sprey, lost interst in defnse policy and moved to ther ares, while the TAF leaders contiued on their steady course of realistic trainig and acquirng hig-tech weapons. The gradual fading awy of the ladership oend the Critcs to the argument hat hey wer simply gadflies and iletantes. The one snator who cntiued to pres for changes, Gary Hart, falterd because of personal indiscretions in 198, leaving the Critcs leaderls. Ading to the lack of ocus was the liberal politcal establishment?s embrace of the Critcs. Having lost he 1980 elction to Reagn ad the conservatives, liberals emed intet on using the Critcs and their alies to win more money for social programs by the stealthy arguments for more dfense for fewr dolars. 413 This further difused and limited the Critcs? arguments, ince they ideas had to fit into apolitcal context o cntiue to genrate suport. UNWILINGES TO CMPROMISE OR ?WORK WITHIN THE SYTEM.? Even though many in the Air Force aceptd some of the Critcs? ideas for eplacing complex and expensive sytems with les complex sytems - Mody Suter, for ne, was constantly pushing for ?weapons that worked? - the Critcs di not atempt o frm aliances, and evn the Critcs? trongest uporters recognized this problem.12 This unwilinges to try to slve problems uports the argument hat he Critcs wer not reformers, but rather individuals who er only intersted in argument.13 THE CRITICS REFUSED TO CRITIQUE THEIR OWN IDEAS. While the Critcs chalenged the miltary and Do?s articles of aith,? they had their own theolgy, their own revaled truths - that her was ned for a fundamental change in the American miltary mindset, that he American miltary was led by incompetnts totaly comited to expensive, overly complex weapons, that he procuremnt proces was probaly corupt and il-suited for acquirng weapons that would be fective in combat. Al of thes prositons wer taken as "givens" that required no prof, when they wer actualy arguments and points of disagrement. Part of Falows? push for ?simple ideas, imply put? to kep the atention f his target audience meant he Critcs arguments toped at he first levl of cursory facts nede for Op-Ed piecs. This made the arguments atractive bcause they wer simple and clear, but he simplicty that made the ideas tractive to editorial writers and the gneral public acted aginst he same arguments in serious debates when precise dtails and in-depth 41 knowledge wer required. 14 Aditonaly, Falows? cirular experts? technique meant that he Critcs had consitently to suport each other, limitng their wilinges and abilty to scrutinize ach other?s arguments closely. Even their suporters noted the inacuracies in their arguments, but he Critcs nevr devoted any efort answering thes disagrements, nor di they dispasionately examine their asumptions.15 This was in sharp contrast o Mody Suter and the iron majors, who spent more than year agresively picking over and shoring up the weak points in their arguments in prearing the Red Flag briefing. The problem this posed for the Critcs was that heir oponets easily demolished many of their arguments in serious forums. One specifc example was the Critcs? constant alegation that ?gold plating? increased weapons ystems? cost increase far beyond similar projects in the public and private sctor. This was factualy incorect. Packard?s econd comision, formaly tiled the ?President?s Blue Ribon Comision on Defnse Mangemnt,? in its April 1986 briefing ?A Formula for Action,? noted that Do weapons ystems cost overuns wer genraly below cost overuns in other public sector projects. 16 The Critcs nevr acknowledged this or econsiderd their argument, and this had consequences for their positon. When asked about he Critcs? claims about cost overuns, Do oficals could simply say, ?that is not rue,? quote the Packard Comision Report, thus both winig the argument and amgin the Critcs? credibilty. In aother xample, one of Franklin Spiney?s main points was his comparisons betwen aircaft hat showed how more complex aircaft wer les reliable, but he used 415 difernt aircaft with difernt misions for his comparisons o they wer ?aples to oranges.? The Air Force used the volution f asingle aircaft, the F-16 to cunter this argument. As noted espairngly b the Critcs, the latest version f the F-16, the F-16C, had the final ful panoply of hig-tech sytems, including LANTIRN and AMRAM. Nevrthels, avriety of dat showed the more complex F-16C had fewr malfunctions and its ubsytems wer more rliable than the ?simple? F-16A. 17 Another esult of the lack of rigorus anlysi was evident when the ful efcts of the Critcs? prosals wer considerd. To kep the cost of their eforms low, the Critcs di not include the cost of suport sytems, ainteance, spares and personel, and trainig. The savings the Critcs promised become ls dramtic or noexistent because larger numbers of aircaft meant more spare parts, more base, more pilots and mainteance personel - critcal in the al-volunter force - more flying schols, more suport sytems, and much more flying space for tainig.18 Jimy Carter?s Secrtary of Defnse, Dr. Harold Brown, as epecialy pointed in his critcism of the Critcs in this are. In his 1983 bok, Thinkig About National Security, he tok the Critcs to task, saying that cepting the Critcs? prosals would result in doubling the number of mebers of the miltary, increasing procuremnt budgets by 50 percnt, and buying foreign weapons instead of American made weapons, ?noe of whic would be aceptable to the American public.?19 Falows might ave ben helpful for the Critcs a ?devil?s advocate? to sharpen their arguments as he brought them togethr in boks and articles, but Falows had early on relased himself rom this burden by claming inorance of miltary maters. 416 THE CRITICS OULD NOT MOVE CONGRES. Unlike Dixon ad Crech, who controled ahierachal organization ad could easily make changes, the only chance the Critcs had for making real changes restd in a outside organization, Congres. The part of Congres that was most responsive to the Critcs? views, the Miltary Reform Caucs, in the nd proved inefctive in the weapons ystems and procuremnt ares wher the Critcs focused.20 While the MRC di provide aforum for the Critcs and had the fect of burnishing Falows? experts,? it was plinterd from the bginig by difernt agendas. Many of the mebers joined the MRC because it made politcal send to pres for more dfense at lower price, but hey di not embrace the Critcs? objective of overturnig Reagn?s national defnse policy.21 Aditonaly, on apractial, structral evl, the MRC was not rganized to devlop aspecifc reform agenda. It nede its own iternal staf to alow it o fcus on specifc isues and become influential in the dbates, but his taf nevr materialized. Whetr the lack of apermanet staf or f a lck of consesu was the cause of the MRC?s lack of influence is, in the nd, unimportant. Senator John Tower oferd another eason for the MRC?s impotence when he dismised the group with te coment, ?[When] you get the rform group togethr and start going through specifc programs, you wouldn?t get them to agre on ay of them.? 2 He sems to have ben corect. THE CRITICS FACED STRONG RESITANCE. Unlike the Air Force?s move to realistic trainig, the Critcs faced heavy opositon from the Air Force and Do, and the efctivens of their esponse hurt he Critcs in Congres. 417 The Air Force ladership kept repating to Congres that he rationale for its hig-tech weapons was the rquiremnt for sytems that fit he national defnse strategy. Unles the strategy was changed, the Air Force argued, the sytems flowed logicaly from it. Real world miltary devlopments also helpd the Air Force ase. Ther was the impact of Israeli sucess with US hig-tech weapons in Midle East combat, nd the Soviets also unitentionaly helpd the Air Force when they began to build new fighters with radr, adr-guide misiles, and other sophisticated sytems that mirored American devlopments. The Israeli combat sucess and their desire for hig-tech American weapons, as wel as the Soviets? eforts to devlop the same type of hig-tech weapons as the United Staes uported the idea that he USAF was on the right rack and had to kep devloping such weapons to kep the advantge. The Air Force also vigorusly fought back with public staemnts, but sed a difernt echnique to cunter the Critcs? arguments. The Air Force, deliberately or not, semed to view the dbate about hig-tech weapons a not apolitcal campaign, as Falows viewd it, but as seris of trials wher solid evidence was required and verdicts deliverd by those who ad heard al the vidence ? Congres and the administration. I refuting the Critcs, the Air Force tok advantge of the fact hat many of the Critcs had not vetd their arguments and the bulk of their arguments proved asy to cunter, given suficent ime for detailed xplantions. In practie, most of the Critcs? arguments wer destroyed by asimple, inconvenit fact ? the weather during the winter in Europe and along the Soviet/Iran border was genraly bad uring the winter, and the winter nights wer long. The Critcs? ystems wer only usable in day nd clear weather, and the 418 logical extnsion f the Critcs? imple sytems argument would have rquired aAmerican dministration to cmit o adefnse trategy that was ome varition f ?we are only going to fight if the weather is god? an ulikely national defnse policy declartion. The Air Force also tok advantge of its credibilty. Editorial writers could use Sprey or Spiney as ?experts? in a op-ed piec, but in front of Congres, the no-flying, genraly no-miltary ?expert? Critcs with no cmbat experince wer not as credible as a string of uniformed Air Force gnerals with real combat experince and ep expertise. Senator Gary Hart might say publicly that he LANTIRN was unsafe to fly at low levl in an F-16, but an Air Force gneral who testifed before Congres, ?Ive flown a F-16 with LANTIRN at low levl at night and it is not unsafe? probaly caried more weight.23 Aditonaly, Air Force laders could ? and id ? sit in front of ften skeptical Senate and House comites for hours going over not nly the ?big picture? but also the dtails of the sytems, the rquiremnt for the sytems based on aspecifc Soviet hreat, nd al the nuances and etails of their plans. In lie with its ?trial? aproach, te Air Force publicly promulgated etailed arguments in articles in the Air Force Asociation?s Air Force Magzine intede to help Air Force suporters and congresional stafs. The Critcs played into the Air Force?s hands by not respondig the articles ? presumably, they felt his was ?inside basebal? and involed alevl of detail that was unecsary to adres ? but hes articles gave suporters of Air Force programs ahuge amount of information to use in the programs? defnse. 419 The Air Force further helpd its credibilty with programs that showed real, not rhetorical, improvemnt. The Air Force ould explain to knowledgeable Congresmen and their stafs that he Critcs misrepresnted the AIMVAL/CEVAL test to show hig-tech fighters had no advantge over low-tech fighters, when i fact AIMVAL/CEVAL was n inovative, combat-orientd way for the US miltary to detrmine w misile rquiremnts. The Critcs ignored Genral Slay?s forcing of the Prat & Whitney-GE engie competion, but Slay?s actions howed Congres the Air Force was erious about changi the procuremnt proces, much as the constant complainig from Air Force laders about cuts in O&M funds that showed the srvice was erious about readines and programs like Red Flag showed the srvice was erious about prearing for the nxt war. Finaly, the images Congres had of the Air Force and Do oficals wer at ods with te ones painted by the Critcs. While the miltary leaders di not met Falows? idea of ?edgy,? the mebers of Congres on the miltary comites regularly saw genrals like Wilbur Crech, Norman Schwarzkopf, Colin Powel, and Charles Horner, and the congresmen had n etirely difernt view of them than the Critcs - and it was the view of the congresmen that counted. THE CRITICS IGNORED THE RALITIES OF THE PROCUREMNT PROCES. The Critcs also hurt hemselvs by a lck of understandig of the procuremnt proces. They only oferd one solution, one that provide them with te moral hig round ? simpler sytems by eliminating the ?gold plating? that led to bth igh cost and to incetives for miltary oficers to push for their programs.24 The money saved by 420 eliminating ?old plating? would provide money for more simple sytems and their spare parts. But his ?gold plating? argument was based on aprticularly pervasive inacuracy, the Critcs? revoling dor? argument hat contractors hired miltary oficers to work for their companies after the oficers retired so the oficers could influence the awrding of futre contracts. The Critcs laimed that her was causation betwen the number of former iltary oficers on acompany?s payrol and the number of defnse contracts awrde to the company. While this ems logical on its face, in-depth studies howed that his was not rue. Ther was no crelation, and certainly no causation, betwen the number of ormer iltary oficers a company employed and the miltary contracts it recived.25 Aditonaly, the Critcs ignored the fundamental question about he American sytems of weapons procuremnt: are procuremnt problems curable or, more basicaly, are they realy problems? Wher the Critcs aw colusion betwen the miltary and the contractors to ?gold plate? weapons ystems in order to make more money for the contractors, others, especialy politcians, aw the sytem siply working as it should. Former Secrtary of Defnse Harold Brown adresd this point after he lft ofice: I want o nte the basic limitaion f any atempt o mange the Defnse Deprtmet in a idelized textbk fshion. The ul of t nd to b abl to fight wr, if ncsary, wil always limit he pacetime ficency of the dfense stablishment ?.The pul of conflicting dostic intrst reprsnts dmocrtic govrment.T mage dfese fietly and at th lowest psible st alng prsued busins lins of mangmet organization is ausful stdar. Bt hre are prices we cot aford to py for metig it exactly. One is the abndonmnt of dmrtic ntrl. Anther is the los of war. Dfns ct be "age" like abusis.26 421 The Critcs also culd not sugest ways to change the ?domestic proces,? the critcal role of Congres in weapons ystem selction. Miltary contractors and the jobs they provide are apowerful constiuency in many districts, and in the proces of devloping a new sytem any contractors try to sub-contract parts of the project around the country to build apolitcal constiuency for the sytem. Thus ? as noted in the Time agzine article ? evn congresmen who are higly critcal of miltary programs uport programs that benfit heir districts. Congresional influence on the procuremnt of weapons ystems i part of the American sytem and, in a broad sense, the proces is aprt of ?civilan control f the miltary.? The lectd Congres brings in money b pasing tax laws, and has the right o dispense the money to cntractors building weapons ystems. The fact hat congresman ay want some of his constiuents? money to g back to his are is normal, and ot inherntly bad, and many strong suporters of national defnse programs, notably those in the rual South, reap relatively smal rewards for their districts.27 It should also be noted the suces or failure of asytem is not linked to whetr or not it is produced in a powerful meber of Congres? district. The Critcs? favorite model for aprogram and aircaft was the F-16 from Genral Dynamics in Texas, evn though it was the ome of the vry powerful Republican Senator John Tower, astrong suporter of hig-tech weapons. This was lso the same Genral Dynamics that produced the F-1, one of the Critcs? favorite targets. While this may sem to ake the miltary acquistion proces the slave of Congres, two charcteristics of the proces hould be considerd. First, simply because aproject 42 has ubcontractors around the country and the concomitant hig degre of congresional suport does not mean the project is not aworthwile project. A weapons ystem coes into existence first because of arequiremnt, and congresional suport r the number and istribution f subcontractors do nt influence the rquiremnt ? it is threat driven. The ful procuremnt proces begins with te miltary detrminig requiremnts and then contractors etimating the cost of iling the miltary requiremnt. The problems arise after the rquiremnt is etablished and the proces of devloping the sytem begins. In ay stem, not just amiltary one, most of the cost is concetrated arly in the program when ucertainty is the ighest. The uncertainty of the cost and problems in acomplex sytem are compounde because of the ned to integrate various ubsytems. A problem in ay one of thes ares wil slow the proces down ad increase cost. Aditonaly, an improvemnt hat wil increase capbilty wil usaly slow the proces as wel as increase the cost, and requires a decison as to whetr or not ad it. Building any complex sytem is thus aconstant but inevitable balncig act in solving problems, deciding on the cost benfits of improvemnts, and trying to kep cost under control fr the ntire dvelopment period. It is mesy, and evry change is an oportunity for anew problem, but his i endemic to the sytem. The Critcs wer corect in saying that once the proces begins, the Air Force program angers and the contractor acquired an iterst in seing it suced, but hey wer wrong in their anlysi of the cause. Because the Critcs di not understand the procuremnt proces, they focused only on the cost and made the mistake of asuming making money was the primary motivation for the dvelopment of aweapons ystem, 423 once agin ignoring the most important part of the proces, the rquiremnt. The primary motivation for Air Force program angers and the contractors was to provide asytem that filed amiltary requiremnt. They wanted their sytem to work because if it failed the money would have ben wasted, but he rquiremnt stil had to be adresd. 28 FALOWS? THEORY THAT EDITORIAL EITES COULD CHANGE AMERICAN DEFNSE POLICY WAS RONG. From the bginig, Falows belived the ditorial elites could change public opinio, so he suported an elction-style politcal campaign to influence thes elites. In a elction campaign, the majority of the voters have litle knowledge of the dtails of the isues, but only agenral feling, and Falows belived it would be the same in his target audience of editorial writers.29 He was corect; they folwed his lead nd fulfiled Falows? prediction that once simple, compeling ideas wer in the public ey, whetr they wer right or wrong, they would resound for six months and reach many in Congres. Nevrthels, while the Critcs? case was not rivial, neither the Critcs nor their editorial writer suporters could influence Congres, probaly because they oferd no useful framework for change, nor they could counter the Air Force?s detailed xplantions of the rationale for their programs. Ultimately, evn with the suport f the media, the Critcs? arguments di not show ther was uch asevre failure of American miltary and security doctrine ? notably the ?ofset strategy? of weapons procuremnt - that he United Staes hould aopt an etirely new defnse policy with te concomitant risk and unitende consequences. 42 WHAT DI THE CRITICS ACOMPLISH? Probaly the Critcs? most lasting impact was the F-16. The Critcs? idea of alightweight fighter blende nicely with Laird?s and Packard?s desire to test heir ideas of aircaft acquistion through prottyping, as wel as for the Air Force?s ned for force structre based on the xpectaion f along period f limited efnse budgets. Once the Air Force aceptd the F-16 and changed it into afighter-bomber, it gradualy became the most important miltary aircaft in the world. Today more than 430 have ben produced, and it is til in production.30 One can rgue that he Light Weight Fighter/F-16 was not he right choice for the Air Force. The F-15 oferd considerably more potential s afighter-bomber. A normal F-15 could cary eighten 50-pound bombs to the F-16?s four, as wel as having much more rom for internal growth for improved weapons ystems. The FAST Packs, whic aded 60 pounds of uel, gave it arnge of 350 miles, more than twice the range of the F-16. Had the Air Force opted to buy more F-15s for use as fighter-bombers, it would have had an ircaft with much greatr ange and load carying capbilty than the F-16 and would have avoide the dlays involed in the AMRAM and LANTIRN programs caused by having to make the sytems al enough to fit on the F-16. An F-15 fighter-bomber could also have used the Pave Tack al-weather targeting device imediately, rather than waitng for LANTIRN. Howevr, the F-15 versu F-16 arguments only aply to the USAF. rguably, the main impact of the F-16 was in its acquistion ot nly b America?s alies but also by 425 the Air Force?s National Guard and Resrve forces. While the Israelis provide the combat experince, the F-16s gave the NATO alies, the National Guard, and the Resrves amodern, credible fighter, and one that was completly compatible with first-line USAF equipment. The rsult was that hroughout he 1980s westrn air forces wer far more capble than those of the Warsw Pact. The Critcs also claim credit for the A-10, evn though it came into existence as n Air Force rquiremnt o replace the A-7 and kep the close air suport mision. The utilty of the A-10 is acomplex question ad closely linked to the question f who should do the close air suport mision, the Air Force or the Army. While the A-10 was useful in the Gulf War, after the war Air Force Chief of Staf Meril McPeak oferd to give the A-10s to the Army in exchange for its Patriot surface-to-air misiles and long-range surface-to-surface misiles. 31 The ofer came to nthing, and today the Air Force stil owns the A-10s and the mision, but oday, like the F-16, the A-10 is not he simple sytem the Critcs wanted. Before it was ent o the field, the A-10 had numerous avionics improvemnts, notably the capbilty to fire the IR Maverick, and its usefulnes today is directly tied to improved hig-tech avionics and other sytems.32 In the nd, if the Critcs had not apeard on the scen, the rsult would have ben felt mainly in force structre. While they stimulated many arguments, the questions of the utilty of increased efnse budgets would have ben a ongoing debate btwen liberals and conservatives ven without he Critcs. The Critcs may have shaped the form of the argument, but di not influence the outcome. 426 THE CRITICS? MODERN ESURECTION While one might expect hat he Critcs would have fade awy after the suces of the weapons they oposed in the Gulf War nd in American miltary ventures ince that time, in fact hey stil maintain considerable cahet in the poular pres. The dichotmy Falows et up betwen the uniformed iltary, the Do and the dfense cognoscenti on one side and ?koky? charcters who prefred simple, cheap weapons ystems has contiued, and Falows? theory that simple ideas, corect or not, that fit into ideolgical predispositons ? in this case, that defnse budgets are to hig - wil contiue to resonate proved to be corect. The Critcs? ideas til have their folwers and today the ?coruption? of the procuremnt proces and the ned for simple weapons has become part of many of the lite ditorial writers? conventional wisdom. 3 Bizarely, many of thes pundits claim that he Critcs wer ?visonaries? who er responsible for the suces in Gulf War I. Falows, ho frely admits he owes much of his fame to the Critcs, led the way. He gave the Critcs redit for bringi the Air Force out of the ?trough of wastefulnes, unprearednes, and low self estem? and argues that the (unamed) reforms the Critcs pushed in the arly 1980s ?emed subversive, unreasonable, and beyond the pale of serious consideration wer, by the arly 190s, simple comon sense.? 34 Spiney contiued to work for the Department of Defnse, nevr ealy answering the question f how he could justify working for such a corupt organization. He has become an ocasional darling of the liberal media who share his moral indignation about miltary 427 spendig at he xpense of social programs, and in January 202, he was warde the Project for Government Oversight (POG) ?God Government? awrd. POG, orignaly known as the Project on Miltary Procuremnt, ?works to expose outrageously overpiced miltary spendig? and belives that ?represntaion ad acountabilty?are under atck as our fedral government is more vulnerable than evr to the influence of money in politcs and powerful special interst.? It judges its uces by ?whetr or not policy reforms or spendig cuts have ben implented?by a Congres that is beholden to monied interst.? 35 Liberal journalist Bil Moyers interviewd Spiney after he rceivd the awrd, and both agred the Pentagon was ?moral sewr on the Potmac.? Spiney contiued his old arguments, aying that miltary budgets wer intede to ?kep money flowing into [congresional] districts? and that he budget was ?scandal? that ?won?t fix our [defnse weapons ystem] problems.? To Moyers? eming disapointment, Spiney admited Do had taken o disciplinary action aginst him for his views and writngs.36 Pier Sprey moved from cleanig water to making compact disk as owner of Mapleshade Records, but stil contiues relntlesly to self-agrandize his years in the Pentagon. I news tories in 20 he claims to have ben a ?principal designer of the F-16 and A-10 fighter jets.? In fact, Sprey had nothing to d with designig either, and today betrays an mazing inorance of aircaft design. I 205 he said that he radr reflcting shape of the igh-tech ?Stealth? aircaft would ecrase tabilty and performance, when i fact he ighest performing fihters in the world today, the 428 American Lockhed F-2 and F-35, are both ?stealthy,? and their flight control sytem is basicaly the same one used on the F-16 Sprey ?designed.?37 But of al the Critcs, the one who as recived the greatst atention is John Boyd or, as he prefred to be caled, ?THE John Boyd.? 38 When the Critcs temporaily vanished after the Gulf War, Boyd, who ad preached aginst hig-tech weapons but wisely put litle in writng, became their only link to ntoriety. Because Boyd was the only Critc who ad ny claim to iltary credibilty, the rst of the Critcs onstantly defred to him as their leader and at some point, they deifed him and began caling themselvs his ?acolytes.?39 After he rtired, Boyd became ls and les involed with te Air Force but contiued to push is briefing ?Paterns of Conflict? on ayone who ould listen. He rceivd a huge bost in 197 when he bgan relationship with te United Staes Marine Corps, whic was having dificulty convicing Congres that he Corps? unique mision f making contestd amphibious landigs was viable. The Marines began loking for a new doctrine that would alow them to fight aconventional and war, but adoctrine that would be posible with te Corps? traditonaly limited resources. The ad of the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfre Schol, Colnel Mike Wyl, knew Critc Wiliam Lind, and Lind sugestd that yl push ?maneuver warfre? to alow the Corps to ?fight smarter? using cheap weapons. Lind also persuade Wyl to use Boyd?s name for credibilty, because Boyd had given his ?Paterns of Conflict? briefing to senior Marine laders at he Amphibious Warfre Schol. 429 Wyl worked Boyd?s ideas into adoctrinal theory of maneuver warfre ?on the cheap,? and to suport him Lind wrote an rticle in the Marine Corps Gazet in March 1980, ?Definig Maneuver Warfre for the Marine Corps,? using Boyd?s name and the concept of the ODA lop. From 197 until 193, ther wer more than fity articles in the Marine Corps Gazet on maneuver warfre, and the concept was gradualy adopted by the arine Corps, notably b one of the comandants, Genral Al Grey. 40 Boyd ied in 197, but in 202 he was resurectd in Robert Coram?s bok, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Coram got much of his information from Falows (to whom he pays tribute to in the bok) and ot surpisngly, his bok was hymn to Boyd. It was doringly and uncritcaly recived and was higly recomende in the Air Force Times.41 The Air Force Times reviw of Coram?s bok outraged many in the Air Force, specialy retired former TAC comander Wilbur Crech. Crech ad ben Boyd?s bos early in his carer and had many run-is with Boyd from 197 on, and Crech blamed Boyd for the problems he ad seling the igh-tech weapons that proved so sucesful in the Gulf War nd later. Crech said that Boyd and the rst of the Critcs di ?their most enrgetic best o shot down evry single program that we had to provide the aircaft and weapons that we used so sucesfuly in the Gulf?the sytems that alowed the Air Force to have only thre pilots kiled in the war,? and that Boyd made ?many, many bad contributions to the Air Force.? 42 This went unoticed in the pres. The consecration f Boyd shows that, while Falows? theory about simple ideas adopted by editorial writers could influence national policy was rong, he was ble to turn at least one of his ?kokie? charcters into acelbrity and, to an extnt, ?kep the 430 dream [of reducing miltary budgets] alive.? Boyd?s wide-rangi ?Paterns of Conflict? briefing has become aBible to modern oponets of defnse spendig, because like the Bible it ofers infiite posibilties for interpetaion. Today critcs of hig defnse budgets can get ahearing in the media if they simply say that American weapons are to expensive, to complex and wil not work in combat, then lik this to Boyd?s ideas. Boyd?s name has become the mainstay of antimiltary groups like the Defnse and National Interst, whose web site that gives aforum for Spiney, Sprey and other groups such as Fedration f American Scientist to cntiue to critcize miltary procuremnt and weapons elction. Articles on the website in mid-November 205 include "The F-2 Program: Fact Vs. Fiction,? writen by retired colnel and long time Critc Everst E. Ricioni, who nw charcterizes himself as ?retired USAF fighter designer, and tactian,? and Spiney?s Thre Reasons Why the ATF [now F-2] Should Not Be Aproved for Engiering and Manufacturing Devlopment.?43 THE ONCE AND FUTRE Despite the isues raised by the Critcs, the critcal rea of American defnse policy and weapons acquistion remains the purview of profesionals in the Department of Defnse and uniformed iltary, the pople who d the day-to-day nalysi to make the weapons choices they belive fulfil national policy, and who then implent heir work in acoperative fashion. The suces of American forces in combat sems to guarnte the dcisons about weapons procuremnt wil remain i the ands of thes profesionals and the congresional specialist comites until American forces and/or weapons are 431 found wantig in combat or, in specifc ase, the cost of the sytems leads them to colapse under their own eight. For the Air Force, its futre course sems to have ben set after the Gulf War. It would folw the path laid out by the iron majors and Genrals Dixon ad Crech, very higly trained crews using the ighest echnolgy weapons avilable. At he same tie, it wil not depnd on the latest echnolgy for its uces; whatevr the fate of its hig-cost programs, the Air Force wil contiue to cntrol its trainig, and the ralistic trainig ?combat cultre? introduced post-Vietnam War contiues to thrive and has become the Air Force?s cultre - ?the values, norms, instiutions, and modes of thinkig to whic sucesive gnerations atch primary importance.?4 1. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic ks: 198), 2, psim. 2. Thes requiremnts are also discused in Harvey M. Sapolsky?s, "On the Theory of Miltary Inovatio," MIT Brkthroghs, MIT Cntr for International Studis (CSI), Sprig 20, 274. 3. David ?Catfish? Gish, Capt. USAF, ?-4 Air-to-Air Trainig,? Fighter Weapons Reviw, Fl 1975, 2-5. 4. Dixon, Oral History, 258-260. 5. Bary Posen, The Surces of Miltary Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Betwen the Wrld Wars (Itha, NY: Cornel Uivrsity Prs, 1984), 7, psi; Muray and Milt, 4-5, pasim; Stevn P. Rse, Winig the Next War: Inovation ad the oern iltary (Ithca, NY: Corel University Prs, 191), 0, pasim. 6. Se, for example, ?F-15 Ardyamics: God Reading for F-15 Flyers? and ?An Ace Loks At Flying Safty: Top Gun Speaks Frm Experince,? Unitd Sttes ir For Flying Safet Mgzine, Janary 1981, 8-13, 15-8. Today th tile of th safety magzie of th Air Combat Comd (AC) - formed by cmbinig TAC and SAC nd ow primarily afighter can ? is ombat Eg, whi speaks volumes. htp:/ .ondotimes.com/2/topics/5/sciety/74/621 (acesd Spt 205); for Air Combat Coma, s htp:/w.a.af.mil/ (acesd Fbruary 206). 7 Rsen, 25. 8. Lawrce R. Benson, Maj. USAF, ?The New USAF ighter Lead-in Program.? Air University viw, arch-April 1975. 432 htp:/w.airpower.maxwel.af.mil/airchronicles/aureviw/1975/mar-pr/benson.html (acesd Setmbr 205); Dve Sit, Capt. USAF, ?Baby Steps: The Nw Figter Ld-In Cours,? Fighter Weapons Reviw, Sring 1980, 4-7. 9. Samel Huntiton, ?Itrduction,? in The Defnse Reform Debate: Isues and Analysi, d. Asa Clark, Petr . Chiareli, Jefry S. McKirtick, and Jms W. R (Bltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1984), xi. 10. Jhn . Oset, ?A Ovriw of the Reform Debate,? in Clark, 45, 1. . Comer in Clark, 14. 12. Richard M. ?ody? Suter, Col. USAF, ?Corna Ace? interview by Lt. Cols. Gordn Nelson Jhn Dick, 26 January 197, 12, psim; Falows in Clark, 35. 13. Timthy Lupfer, ?The Chlege of Miltary Refor,? in Clark, 28. 4. Ricard K. Bts, Dubious Rfrm: Strtegism Vrsu Mgerialism,? in Clark, 23. 15. Oseth in Clark, 45, 47. 6. Hary alcut, Colnel USAF. ?Cost Growth in Do Major Programs: A Historicl Perspetive,? (Excutive Resarch Prject: Idustril Cle f the rmed Frces, National Dfnse Uniersity, 193), Slid #7, 14. This i an xcelnt, uanc work on lrge project ost growth. 17. Hrzo, 12-3. 8. untigton i Clark, xi; Asa Clark in The Defnse Reform Debate, 23; McKirtick i Clark, 316; Wiliam Pery lso rgularly mad this argunt, specialy after the Gulf Wr; se Pery, ?Dsrt Strm and Detrence,? Forei Afairs 70 (Fl 191): 6-7, pasim, and his coments to Cogrs, Th Impact f the Persin Gulf War, 53. 19. Harold Brown, Thinkig about National Security: Defnse and Foreign Policy in a Dangerus Wrld (Ne Yor: Westview Pres, 1983), 243. 20. In the author?s judgment, th MRC di have some notable sucess. It sucede i gting an ipdet central ofic f waps tsting and valution, mor morn weapos for the Natioal Gurd, warnties for certai sytems, nd aprgra f cost stimating for wepns ystems, though al f thse wr suporte by the Regan dministrtio. It had its major and very sinifcnt impact in oe ar, ?joints,? the abilty f te srvices t fight ogther. The Miltry Refrm Cucs was the catlyst bind the Goldwater-Nihols Act f 1986, afr-eaching organizational cnge that compltly rergnizd te United Staes miltry omad structre. After Goldwtr-Nihls, th Prsidet?s miltary avic by law cae fr the Chairman of the Jint Chiefs of Staf alon, and the power of the ?rfighting CINs,? coders-in-cief of t gegrphic regio f t glb (Europ, Midle East, and Paifc) was vastly nhancd. ht:/w.jcs.mil/oldwater_nichl_act1986.html (cesd Februry 205). 21. D. C. Hendrickson, Reforming Defnse: The State of American Civl-Miltary Relations (Baltimore: Jhs Hpkis Uivrsity Prs, 198), 97. 43 2. Walter Isacson, ?US Defnse Spendig: Are Bilions Being Wasted?? Time, March 7 1983, 27. 23. The author atende abriefing of Brigadier Genral Harley Hughes, Air Force Operations Dpty, for Cogresioal testimony in Fbrury 1984 on tactial ir sytms. Gnrl Hughes, an F-16 pilt, said h would sa to Congres that flyig with LANTIRN, low levl at night, ws afe if the isue came up; it di, acording to his aide, and his respns as oted. 24.While the Critcs wul give ocasional examples of ?gold plating,? they nevr defined it; it sms to have ben ay stem thy di not like/unerstd. For Spr, for xampl, radr was ?gld platig.? Spry, Oral Histry, 17. Th Air Force insited that wht he Critcs le ol ltin was imply fiting the sytem t arquirmnt. 25. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Miltry Establishmet: Its Ipacts on Aerica Society (New ork: Harper & Row, 1971), 62-8. 26. Harold Brwn, Scrtary f Defnse, ?Mangin' the Defnse Department-Why It Can't Be Dne," speh at he Univrsity of ichi i March 1981, author?s colection. 27. Salvtore Chidichimo, Lt. Col. USA, ?The Miltary Reform Caucs and its Impact on Ntinal Defnse? (Resarch Report: Nationl War Cleg, Ntiol Defnse University 1983), Apdix D and E. 28. Walter Kros, Miltary Reform: The High-Tech Debate in the Tactial Air Forces (Washington, DC: Nationl Defns Univrsity Prs, 1985), 132-160, with crts and digrms. 29. Jaes Falows, ?Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership,? Spech at he Miler Creative Rsrch Prject, University of Virgii, 1 Mrc 197. 30. htp:/w.af.mil/factshts/factshet.asp?fsID=03 (acesd January 206) 1. Verno Loeb nd Dn Priest, ?Nationl efnse,? Wshingto Post May 28, 203 htp:/discus.washingtonpost.com/zforum/03/r_nation_loebpriest052803.htm (acesd ay 205). 3. ?The A-10s New Teth,? Air Force Times, 3 June 206, 1-2. . S ?Stil Shortchangi the Trps,? Nw York Times, 0 February 206, A26. For ?conventional wisdm? Iuse t definiton a hndy way to ?know? something about whi w have t investd th time a truble to stu clsel ad understad fuly.? Tis definiton ad afulr explantion f ?convntinal wisdom? i ?Itroucing the Seris,? Audit f the Convtiol Wisdm, MIT Cetr for International Stdies, 205, 1, 3. 4. Falows, Baten lecture. Falows nevr mentioned what hes reforms are. 35. htp:/go.rg/p/x/impct.html (acsd Octbr 205). 6. For the transcrit he Siney/Moyers interview se htp:/w.pbs.org/ow/transcript/ranscript_spiy.html (acesd Septmber 205). 37. Ken Silverstein d Jef og, ?The Pentagon's 30-Bilion-Dolar Bob,? Mother Jos, January/February 20 Isu. Also 43 htp:/w.motherjones.com/news/feature/20/01/stealth.tml (acesd Septmber 205). Pres Rlas, Obrli Colg, 2 November 205. htp:/w.oberlin.edu/newserv/stries/pry_rlas.html (acesd January 206). 38. Jhn By, Col. USAF, Corna Ace interview. #K239.0512-06, 14 Augst 1976. AFHRA, 83. 39. obert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Bostn: Litle, Brwn ad pan, 202), 9, pasim. 40. Jefrey L Cow, Maj. USAF, ro ?Air Force Fighter Pilot Marine Corps Warfighting: olnel Jhn Boyd, His Theries on War, and tir Unexpectd Lgacy,? (Thesi for Master of iltar Stuies: Unitd Staes Mrie Corps Coman and Stf Colg, rin Crps University, Quatico, Virginia, 20), 3-4, asi. 41. Bradley Penisto, ?Th Fighter Jk Who Chnged the Wy You Fight,? Army Times, Nvy Tims, Air Frce ims, Marine Crps Tims, Januar 27, 203, 16. 42. E-ail fro Creh, 18 arch 20, rovide to the thor by Keith Feris. 3. htp:/w.d-ni.et/; Septmber 5. htp:/w.d-ni.et-fcs-pdf-3_reasons_hy_atf_ot_into_d.f (acesd February 206). 4. Samuel P Huntigt, The Clsh of Civlizations nd the Remaking of the World Order (New York, Simo and Scuster, 196), 41. 435 BILIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES BOKS Anderg, C.R. ?Dick,? Col., USAF. Siera Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam. Washington, D.C: Air orce Histry and Musms Program, 201. Aronstein, David C. and Albert C. Picirlo. Have Blue and the F-17: Evolution f the ?Stelth? Fighter. rlington, VA: mericn Istiut of Aeronautics ad Astronautics, 197. Bles, Fredrick C. ?Bots,? Brig. Gen., USAF. Check Six: A Fighter Pilot Loks Back. Nw Yor: Ivy, 191. Broughton, Jack, Col., USAF. Thud Ridge. Philadelphia: Lipincot, 196. ____Going Dwntown: te War Aainst Hnoi nd Washigton. New York: Orion Bks, 198. Brown, Harld. Thinig about National Security: Defnse and Foreign Policy in a Dngerous World. Blder, CO: Wstview Prs, 1983. ____ Making Defnse Rform ork: A Rport of the Joint Project on Monitoring Defnse Reoraization. Washingtn, DC, Freign Plicy Istiut: Cetr fr Stratgic and Interntil Studies, 198. Canby, tevn. ?Miltary Reform an th Art of War.? In The Defnse Reform Debate: Isus ad Anlsi. Ed. As . Clark IV, Petr Ciarli, Jfry S. McKitrick and Jmes Red, 126-146. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1984. Carter, Jiy. Kping Faith: Meoirs f a Presidet. New York: Bantm Boks, 1982. lncy, Tom and Charles ?Cuck? Hrner (Gn. USAF rt.) Every M Tiger: The Stry of te Gulf Air War. New York: Peguin Putnam, 19. Enthoven, Alain C. and K. yn Smith. Hw Mch is Eough? Shaping the Defnse Progrm, 1961-96. Sat Monica, CA: Rand Crp. 205. Falows, Jaes. National Defnse. New York: om House, 1981. Hlperin, Mrav nd Ahro Lapidot. G-Suit: Cobat Reprts From Israel?s Air Wars. Lodon: Time Warner Bks UK, 190. Hart, Gary a Wilia Lid. America Can Win: The Case for Miltary Reform. Bethsda, MD: Aler and dlr, 1986. Hucke, yron E. A-1 Combt Journal. htp:/skyraider.rg/hok/jrlset/jrnChap7.htm (acesd February 206). id740194 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com 436 Kohn, Richard H. and Joseph P. Harhan, ed. Strategic Air Warfre: An Iterview ith Genrls Curtis LMay, Leon W. Johnson, David . Burhinal, d Jack J. Caton. Washington, DC: Ofic f Air Frce Histry, 198. Lehman, Jo F. Cmand of the Sas. Nw York: Scribner, 198. ind, iliam S. ?The Cse fr Mneuver Dctrine.? I Th Defnse Reform Debate: Isues nd Analysi. Ed. Asa . Clark IV, Ptr Ciarli, Jfry S. McKitrick and James Red, 8-10. Bltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1984. McNmr, Robrt S. The Esence of Scurity: Reflctis i Ofic. New York, NY: Harper and w, 1968. cNmr, Robert S. The Esence of Security: Reflctions in Ofice. New York: Harper and w, 1968. Members of Congres for Peace Through Law Miltary Spendig Comite. The Ecnmics of Defns: A Bipartisn Reviw of Miltary Spendig. Nw York, NY: Praegr, 1971. Momyer, Wilim. Air Power in Thre Wars: WI, Korea, Vietnam. Washington, DC: Air Force Histry and Musms Program, 1978. Packard, David. Mangemt of Aerica's Ntional Defnse. Washington, DC: American Etrpise Instiut for Public Plicy Rsarch, 1987. Pery, Wilia J. ?Defns Rform and the Qalit-Quantiy Quandary.? In The Defnse Reform ebat: Isues and Alysi. Ed. Asa . Clark IV, Petr Chiarli, Jfry S. McKitrick nd Jams Re, 182-192. Bltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1984. Record, Jefry. ?Implications of aGlobal Strategy for U.S. Forces.? In The Defnse Rform Debate: Isues nd Anlysi. Ed. Asa . Clark IV, Petr Ciarli, Jfry S. McKitrick nd Jams Re, 147-165 Bltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1984. Spiney, Franklin C. and J. C. Thompson. Defnse Facts of life: The Plans/Reality Mismtch. Bouler, O: Westview Prs, 1985. Spiney, Franklin C. Dfnse Powr Gams. Washington, DC: Government Reprints Pres, 201. Sprey, ir. ?The Case for Betr and Cheaper eapons.? In The Defnse Reform Debate: Isus nd Analysi. E. As . Clrk IV, Petr Ciarli, Jfry S. McKitrick and James Red, 193-210. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Pres, 1984. Taylor, axwel D., Gen. USA. The Uncertin Trupt. New Yrk, arer & Brothers, 195. Venkus, Robert E., Col., USAF. Raid on Qadafi: The Untold Story of History's Longest Fightr Misin by the Pilot Wh Directd It. Nw Yrk, t. Martin's Pres, 192. Weinberer, Casper W. Figting fr Peac: Svn Critcal ears in the Petagon. New York, NY: arner Boks, 190. 437 CONGRESIONAL HEARINGS U.S. Congres. House. Comite on Apropriations. Hearings on Miltary Posture and H.R. 9714. Staent by Scretary f Defse Robrt cNamr. 87th Cng., 2 ses. Februry 1962. U.S. Congrs. Hose. Comite on Armed Services. Investigating Subcomite. Report n th Unauthorizd Bbing of Miltary Tarets i North Vietnam, 92 nd Cng., 2d ses., 15 Decmber 1972. U.S. ores. Hous. Comit on Armed Services. Miltary Posture and HR 12604. 93rd Cong., 2nd ses. 19 February 1972. U.S. Congres. Hous. Comit on Armed Services. Report o the 94th Congres. 2nd ss, Jhn . Stesn, Secrtary of th Air Forc, and Genral David Js, Chief of Staf, UAF. 4-5 Fbrur 1978. U.S. Cngres. House. Comite on Armed Services. Report o the 96th Congres. 96th o., 2nd ss. Dctor Has Mark, crtary of th Air Frc and Geral Lew Alen, Chief of Staf, USAF. 12 February 1980. U.S. Congrs. Hus. Comite on Armd Services. The Impact of the Persian Gulf War nd the Decline of th Sviet Unio n how t United Stats Dos its Defse Busins: Harings Bfor the Cmite o Arm ervices, 102 nd Cong., 1st es., 2 April 191. U.S. res. Snat. rmed Services Comite. Preparednes. 97th Cong., 2nd ses., 26 Fbrury 1982. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Apropriations. Department of Defnse Apropritio fr 196. 90 th Cg. 2nd ses., 26 Fbrury 1968. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Srvices. Air orce Authorization Request. 94th Cog., 2nd ss., 10 Fbruary, 1975. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Department of Defnse Authoriztio fr Apropriatis for Fiscal Yar 1982. 97th Cng., 1st s., 1981. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Department of Defnse Authoriztio fr Apropriatis for Fiscal Yar 1981. 96th Cng., 2d ss., 1981. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Department of Defnse Authoriztio fr Apropriatis for Fiscal Yar 1983. 97th Cng., 2d ss., 1982. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Department of Defnse Authoriztio fr Fiscal Yar 1980. 96 th Cong., 1st s., 2 April 197. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Impact of Technolgy on Miltary Mapowr Rquirents, Radis, and Oprations. 96th Cog., 2nd ses., 1980. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Mpower and Personl Subcomit. Ipact of Tcholgy on Miltary anr, Rquiremnts, Readines, and Oertins. 96 t Cn., 2d ses., 5 Decmber. "Lightwight Fightrs: No Paca," report put ito the rcord by Snator Ricard Canon (R-NV), 281-282. 438 U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Manpower and Personel Subcomit. Ipact of Tcholgy on Miltary r, Rquirmnts, Readines, and Oertins. 96t Cn., 2d ses., 4-5 Decmber 1980. (Mr. Spiy, 4 Dec, Dr. Pry, 5 Dec.) U.S. Congres. Senat. Comite on Armed Services. Readines. 96 th Cong., 2nd ses., 18 Fbrury 1981. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Tactial Air Warfre. 97th Cong., 2d ss., 2 Mrch 1982. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Tactial arfre. 97th Cong., 2nd ss., 16 rch 1982. U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. Weapons System Acquistion Prcs. 92d ng., 1st s., 6 Dcbr 1971. (Fitzhugh Coision Report.) U.S. Congres. Senate. Comite on Armed Services. eapons System Acquistion Prcs. 92d ng., 1st s., 8-9 Dcmbr, 1971. U.S. Congres. Senate. Subcomite on epartent of Defnse Apropriations. Dpartmt of Defnse Aprpriation, 90th Cg. 2nd ss., 26 Februry 1968. U.S. Congres. Senate. Subcomite on Department of Defnse Apropriations. Statmt of cretary f Dfse Mlvin R. Laird o th 1971 Defse Program nd Budget. 91st Cong., 2nd ses., 25 February 1970. U.S. Cogres. Snate. Subcmit on Dpartment of Defnse Apropriations. Statmt of cretary of Defse Melvin R. Laird o th FY 1972-1976 Defnse Progra and th 1972 fns Budgt. 92nd Cong., 2nd ses., 4 February 1971. REPORTS O CNGRES Cliford, Clark. Statemnt of Secretary of Defnse Clark M. Cliford, The Fiscal Year 1970-1974 Dfse Progrm nd 1970 Dfnse Budget, January 15, 196. Washington, C: GO, 196. Comptroler Geral. Report o the Congres. Reviw of the Alternate Fighter Engie Cmption. GAO/NSIAD-84-104. Washingtn, DC: GPO, 1984. Comptroler Geral Report o the Congres. U.S. Geral Acountig Ofice. Efctivns of US Frcs a B Increasd Through Improved Wapon System Desig. PSAD-81-7, 29 Jnury 1981. Congrsional Budget Ofice. Two Methods of Projecting Neds For Defnse Operations ad Sport Funds. Washingtn, DC: GO, 1986. Congresional Budget Ofice. Treds i Selcted Indicators of Miltary Readines, 1980 thrugh 198. CB Paprs. Washington, DC: GPO, 1984. Coper, Bert H. ongresionl Resrc Service Report for Congres. Air Force Procuremt f F-16 Fightr/Atack Plans: Isues ad Implications. Washington, DC: GPO, 193. Fitzhugh Comisi (Blue Ribon Defnse Panel). Report o the President and the Secretary of Defns on the partmt of Dfns, 1 July 1970. Wshigton, DC: GPO 1970. 439 Kaufman, Wiliam. Congresional Budget Ofice. Two Methods of Projecting Neds For Defnse Operatis d Sport Funds. Wasingtn, DC: GPO, 1986. Libray f Cgrs. Unitd States/oviet Miltary Blnce: A Framework of Refrence for onres. Washington, DC: GPO, 1975). Lockwd, David. Congresial Resarch Service. Defnse Acquistion Reform: Isues for the 10 th rs, 2 Dcmber 1987. Report f t Dfense Science Board Sur Study Panel on Operational Readines With High Prforma Systems, April 1982. Staemnt by Secrtary f Defns Robert McNamra. The Fiscal Year 196-1973 Defns Progrm and 196 Dfnse Budget, 13 Marh 1968. U.S. Congrs. Cnresiol Budget Ofic. Staf Working Paper. Tactial Combat Frces of th United States Air Fore: Isues ad Alterntivs. My 1984. U.S. Genral Acutig Ofic. Masurs f Miltry Capbilty: A Discusion f Their Mrits, Limitations and Interltionships. NSIAD-85-7, 13 June 1985. U.S. Genral Acountig Ofice. Rport te Senate Comite on Apropriations. Operting ad Suport Cost f New Wpos Systes Cmared t Their Prdcesors. Washingtn, DC: GPO, 197. US Foreign Poliy fr te 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace. Report o the Congres by Richard Nixon, Prsident of th Unitd Staes, 18 Fbruary 1972. Washiton, DC: GPO, 1972. CONGRESIONAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS Congresional Quarterly Almanc. 92nd Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1972, Volume XVI. rsil rtrl l . 3 rd rs, 1st si, 3, l I. Congresional Quarterly Almanc. 9rd Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1974, Volume X. rsil rtrl l . 4th rs, 1st si, 5, l I. Congresional Quarterly Almanc. 9th Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1976, Volume XI. rsil rtrl l . 5th rs, 1st si, , l I. Congresional Quarterly Almanc. 9 th Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1978, Volume XIV. rsil rtrl l . 6th rs, 1st si, , l . Congresional Quarterly Almanc. 9th Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1980, Volume XVI. rsil rtrl l . 7th rs, 1st si, 1, l I. Congresional Quarterly Almanc. 9th Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1982, Volume XVI. rsil rtrl l . 8 th rs, 1st si, 3, l IX. Congresional Quarterly Almanc. 9th Congres, 2nd Sesion, 1984, Volume XL. rsil rtrl. US Defse Plicy: Wapons, trategy and Citents. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978). Congresionl Quarterly. US Defnse Policy: eapons, Strategy and Comitents. Scd Eiton. (Washigto, DC: GPO, 1982). Congresional Quarterly. US Defnse Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Comitents. Third Eiton. (ashingto, DC: GPO, 1984). 40 SPECHES AND STAEMNTS Brown, Harold. ?'Mangin' the Defnse Department-Why It Can't Be Done." University of Michig, arc 1981. Carter, Jimy, President. Stae of the Unio Adres, 16 January 1981. htp:/w.jimycrtrlibray.rg/dcumnts/peches/u0jec.phtml (acesd November 205). Crech, Wilur, Gn. USAF. dres to the Air Force Asociation/Aeronautical Systems Divison Egiering wards Dinr. Wright Patersn ir Frc Bse, Ohio. 2 Octber 1981, typd trnscript, Crech paers, Mxwel AB: AFHRA, K168.73. ____Adres. TAC Wing Comander and Vice Wing comanders, Langley FB, V. Sptember 3, 1978, typ trscript in Creh Ppers, K168 .739-751, Maxwel AFB: AFHRA ____dres. ir orce sociation, Los Angels, CA. 13 Nov 1981, typed transcript in Crech Paprs, K168.739-754, Maxwel FB: AFHRA ____Adres. Asoition f the United Staes Army, Washington, DC. 21 October 1981, typed trascript i Crch Pprs, K168 .739-749, Maxwel AFB: AFHRA Falows, James. ?Rhetoric and Presidential Leadership.? Miler Creative Resarch Projct, Univrsity of Virgiia, 1 Mrch 197. ____ ?Jouralism Frm Citzens Up: Te Puf Ader's Nest of Modern Journalism.? Bten Awards Kyote Adrs. 196. htp:/w.pewctr.org/baten/falws.html. (acesd Augst 205). Rosenberg, Harold, Lt. Gen. USAF. ir Force Asociation Arlington, VA. 1 Nov 1981 typed trnscript, Crch paers, Maxwl FB: FHR, K168.739. Taylor, Maxwel D., Gen. USA. ?Th Uncertain Trumpet.? US Army War Coleg, Crlisl Barcks, P, 5 February 1950. Wetkam, Thoms, Maj. Gen. USA. Hil Air Force Base, w.lantionl.org/hil/documents/ MG prnt20Wetkam percnt20CDI percnt20Spech percnt20- prct20letr.doc. (acsd 12 Fbruary 06). Whitehurst G. Wiliam. Rrsetaive from Virginia. ?Congresional Miltr Reform Cacus.? Stent, 14 Dc 1981. BILIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION AIR FORCE GNERAL OFICERS htp:/w.af.mil/bios/ OFICIAL DOCUMENTS AFSC Reviw of ACEVAL/IMVAL Preliminary Test Plan. 17 March 1976. ?ir-to-Air Misile System Capbilty Rviw.? NAVIRSYCO: Navl Historical Centr, Washington, D, 17 February 197. 41 Air Force Wright Aeronautical Labs. "Miltary Capbilties and Concepts Through Thnoly.? Pper deliverd at 197 Air Univrsity Smpsium. Marc 10, 197. ?An nalysi of Factors Afecting Pilot Proficency.? Study Report, Fighter Divison, Air Force Centr fr Studis ad Analysi. Washington, DC: The Pentagon, Dmbr 1986. Boyd, John. 1964. Aerial Atack Study. Las Vegas, NV: USAF ighter Weapons Centr, 1964. Chapman, Ane W. The Origins and Devlopment of the National Trainig Centr 1976-1984. TRADC Historicl Mongrah Sries. Fort Mre, Viriia: US Army Trainig and octrine Cmad [TRADOC], 197. "Concept Briefi Subjet: Rd Flg Employment.? Slides. Provide to the author by John Vickery, March 206. Departmet of th Air Fore Aircaft. 1970. No publisher listed; probaly Washington, DC: Headquarters USF. Dixon, Robrt R., Gn. A. ?Tactial Air Comand Isue Paper Adresing AIMVAL Fial Report Reomendatins.? Air Univrsity Libray, Maxwel FB, . Executive Order 987 (change to 950 Executive Order 950) Revoking Executive Order No. 987 of July 26, 1947, prescribing th Functions of th Armed Fors; Signed: April 1, 8; Fedral Reister: 13 R 219, pril 23, 1948. (Washington, DC: GPO). Feasibilty Study t Predict ombat Efectivens in Selcted Roles: Fighter Pilot Efectivens. ARDA Cntrct Study MDA 903, 76 C0169, MDC E1643, St. Louis, Misouri: Mcoel Doglas, 2 pril 197. ?Final Reprt, Red Flag, 29-Nvmbr-20 Dec 1975.? USAF Tactial Fighter Weapons Cnter: Nlis AFB, V, 21 January 6. Contained in the Twelft Air Frce History 1 Jul -31 Dec 75, Bergstrom Air Frce Bs, Texas, 197. 432nd Tactial Reconaisane Win Tactis Manual. Udorn, hiland, 1970. Author?s oletion. Gabriel, Charls, Col., USAF. Comander, 432nd TRW. ?End of Tour Report.? 14 Septmber 1972, Maxwel AFB, AL, FHA. Geigr, Clarenc C. History of th -16: Prottype to ir Combat Fighter, 1971-975. Vol. 1, Nartive. Wrigt-Patersn Air Forc Base, OH: Air orc Systems Cmnd, Jun 197. Gorman, Paul, Ge. USA. ?Phase IDivison Restructring Study, Volume I, The Heavy Divison. Apendix C. Towards aCmbined Arms Trainig Centr.? Novmbr 9, 1976. Fort More, VA: TRADO. Ful nex published 1 March 197. Janson, Charles R. and Knth C. ogers, rigin of th F-16 Multinationl Program (1970-197), Vol 1, Nartive. Kirtland Air Frce Base N: Air Frce Systes Comand, 17 Octber 1983. 42 Memorandum from Air Force Secrtary Harold Brown to Air Force Chief of Staf John McConel, X Sur ltion Plns, 25 Sep 68. uthr?s fils. emorandum from Robert McNamra, SECDEF, to Eugen Zckhart, SAF, ?Close Sport and SAW [Speil Air Warfre] Aircaft,? 7 Jan. 65. ir orce Hi Ofice, Washigto, DC. Memorndum, Jhn S. Foster, to DR&E, to Harold Brown, SECDEF, ?Devlopment Cocept Paper,? 30 Oct 1968. emorandum, John McLuas, Underscretary of the Air Force to Roger Kely, Asitant Secrtary of Defs, Mnpwer and Resrv Afairs. ?Equal Oportuity Complianc: F-15 Cotract,? 24 Ja 1970. Mesage, Nixn/Haig t Kisiger, 9 ay 197, in President Richard M. Nixon atioal Security Council Papers, 2, Natioal Archives, Coleg Park, MD. esage, Tctil Fighter Weapons Cnter Comnder (Maj. Gn. Hildrth) to Tactial Air Comand CV, (Lt. Ge. Kight). "Recap of ACEVAL- IMVAL Briefings Wek f 27 Feb-3 Mar 78." 27 Marc 1978. Mosman. Brian C. ?Th Efectivens of Air Interdiction i the Korean War.? shigto, DC: Ofi of iltary History, US Army, 196. 193 Gulf War Air Power Survey. Five Volumes. Washington, DC: epartment of the Air Force, 193. Packard, David Dputy Secrtary of Defnse. Letr, F-16, to Stuart Symington, US Sentor. 10 Setmbr 1971. Maxwl AFB, AL; FHRA. Public Law 93-4, 8 Sta 2 (4), 31 U.S. C. 1301. rojet Forecast, Volume One, Limited War. Dayton, OH: Air Force Systems Comand, 1964. Red Baron Reports Volume One. Washington, DC: Weapons System Evalution Group (WSEG), 196. Red Baron Reports Volume Thre, Nelis AFB, NV: Tactial Fighter Weapons Centr, 1975 Red Baron Reports Volume Two. Nelis AFB, NV: Tactial Fighter eapons Centr, 1974 ?Red Flag Implentaion Order.? TAC Programing Plan Number 20-75, Headquarters Tctial Air Cma, Langley ir Frce Base, Virginia, 1 Nov 1975. Sidernko, lbert, ol., USAF. "Tctial ightr Forc Structre Mix: Quality vs. Quantiy." Tactial ir Comnd briefing, 1980. Maxwl AFB: AFHRA. Smal Woder: Devlopment f the F-16 Fighti Falcon, 1975-1980. Vol. 1, Nartive. right-Patrsn Air Forc Base, OH: Air re Systems Comand, July 1986. ats, Bary. ?Situtio warens in Air-to-ir Combat nd Frictin.? Pper #52, Fort McNair Papers. Wshigto, DC: Natinal Wr Coleg, 204. 43 OFICIAL HISTORIES ?F-1 Operations Desrt Storm,? Apendix 21 to Anex C to 1730.13.7/S-078/92, 0 Fbrury 192. Maxwel FB: FHRA. Futrel, Roert. Americn Acs and Aerial Victories. Washington, DC: Air Force History, 1985. Twelfth Air Force History, 1 Jul 1975-31 Decmber 1975, Volume One. Bergstrom Air Force Bas, TX, 976. USA Tatil Fighter Weapons Schol, 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, USAF ir Demonstration Squdr Histry, 1 July-31 Dcmber 1975, Volume One. Nelis Air Frce Bse, NV, 1976. Tactial ir Comand History, Jul-Dec 1975, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Bse, VA, 1976. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 1976, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Base, VA, 197. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 197, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Base, VA, 1978. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 1978, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Base, VA, 197. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 197, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Base, VA, 1980. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 1980, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Base, VA, 1981. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 1981, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Base, VA, 1982. Tactial Air Comand History, Jan-Dec 1982, Volume One. TAC HQ: Langley Air Force Base, VA, 1983. Special Study, ?History of the 5 th Tactial Fighter Wing (Provisonal): Operation Desrt hiel and Desrt Storm.? Gulf Wr Air Power Study (GWAPS). Mxwel AFB: AFHRA. ORAL HISTORIES Agan, A.C. Gen. Oral History Interview by Jacob ?Jack? Neufield, 10 February l973. K.239.0152-857, Maxwl AFB: AFHRA. Boyd, John, Col., USAF. Corna ce interview. K239.0512-06, 14 Augst 1976. Maxwel FB: HRA. Casey, Aloysius Lt. Gen. ir Force Oral History Interview K.239.0512-175, 13 October 1978. Maxwl AFB: AHRA. Clark, Albert P Lt. Gen. USF. Oral istory Interview #85 by Jacob ?Jack? Neufield May 2 l973. Maxwel AB: AFHRA. Crech, Wilbur, Gen. USF. Oral istory Interview by Hugh Ahman, June 192, K239.0512, axwel AFB: AFHRA. 4 Dixon, Robert, Gen. USAF. Oral History Interview, 21 Septmber 198, K239.0512-1591, Maxwl B: AFRA. Dixon, Robert Gen. USAF. ?dendum to USAF Oral History Interview,? K239.0512-1591, 9 October 19. Laf to Dixn pendix A; Welch to Dixon, Apendix C; John H. Edwards? letr, Apedi D. Hargis, alvi. Oral History intrview #86 by Jacob ?Jack? Neufield, 21 March 1973, Mxwel AFB: AFHRA. Jones, David C., Gen. US. Oral History Interview by Maurice Maryanow, Augst 1985-arch 1986. K239.0512-64, Maxl AFB: AFHRA. Knight, James A. Lt. Gen. USAF, Oral History Interview, 17 ugst 198, K239.0512-154, Maxwel AFB: HRA. McBride, Wilim V. Gen. USAF. Oral History Interview, 29-31 Jan 1980, K239.0512-18, axwel AFB, HRA. Rhodarmer, Roger K., Maj. Gen. Oral History Interview by Jacob ?Jack? Neufield, 29 March 1973. .239.0512.029, Maxwel AFB: AFHRA. Rogers, F. iael., Gen. Oral History Intervi by Jacob ?Jack? Neufield, 17-8 June 1974. K.239.0152-862, Maxwel AFB: AFHRA. Sprey, Pier. Oral History Intervie by Jacob ?Jack? Neufield, 12 June 1971. K.239.0152-96, Maxwl AFB: AFHRA. Suter, Richard M. ?ody?, Col., US. ?Corna ce? interview by Lt. Cols. Gordn Nelson ad Jhn Dick, 26 January 197. Mxwl AFB: AFHRA. AUTHOR INTERVIEWS Amir, Nahumi, B. Gen. IAF. Interview ith author, October 1983, Tel Avi, Israel. nderg, R.C. ?Dick,? Col., USAF. Interview it authr, 4 April 205, the Pntagon, Washington, . Corder, Jo, Lt. Ge. USAF. Phone interview ith author, 23 March, 28 March, 10 April, 13 April 205. Feris, Keith. Interview ith author, 16-7, March 20, Moris Hils, NJ. Haig, Alxadr. Intrvies wit author, Wsington, DC, April 19. Mnclark, Jck, Col., USAF. Interview ith authr, Petagon, Washington, DC, 14 April 205. Neufield, Jacob ?Jack.? Interview ith author, 16 April 205, ashington, DC. Olstrom, Td J., Lt. Ge. USAF. Interview ith author, Cambridge, MA, October 205. Peksens Ruolf ?Rudi, Brig. Ge. USAF. Interview it uthor, Sptmber 205, Bostn MA. Salmon, vrahm, Lt. Col., IAF. Interview ith author, 17 Sept 204, Ramt Ha Sharon, Isrel. Salvuci, Josph D., Col., USAF. Phone interview ith author, February 206. petor, Yiftac, Brig. Gen. I. Itrviw ith autor, 14 Sept 204, Ramt Ha Sharon, Isrel. 45 Wagner Robert Col., USAF. uthor?s interview by phone, 15 May 205. Wagner was n f the IAF?s instrctrs at Gorg. E-MAILS Altchek, Jason, Col., USAF. ?Mody, Red Flag, Crech, and Dixon.? Private -mail to uthr, 24 June 205, Aces th sme day reiv. Crech, Wilbur to Jack Van Loan. ?Boyd and Flows,? 13 March 203, personal e-mail forwarde t uthor 21July 205. Acesd the same dy recivd. Crech, ilbur, Gn. USAF, e-mail. ?Boyd?, March 18, 20, prsonal -mail provide to author y Keith eris, 16 Mrch 206. Aesd the same dy recived Everts, Rs Cl., USAF. ?ody, Red Flag, Crc, and Dixon.? Priat -mail to author, 5 February, 24 June, 29 July 17 Sept, 205. Al acesd the se day recived. Everts, Rus, Col., USAF. ?Mody, Red Flag, Crech, and Dixon.? Private-mail to athor, 5 February 205. Acs the sam dy recived. Feris, Keit. ?Mody, Red Flag, Crech, and Dixon.? Privat -mail to author. 8, 17, 23 Fbruary, 12 arch 205. Ase the same day recived Habney D. B. Col., USAF. ?Mody, Rd Flag, Crch, nd Dixon.? Private -mail to author, 23 June 205. Aces the sme day recive. Hamilton Ricard, Col., USF. ?ody, Rd Flg, Crh, and Dixon.? Private -mail t author, 23 June 205. Aces the same day recive. Hips, Bob, Lt. Cl., USAF. ?Mody, Red Flg, Crch, and Dixon.? Private -mail to authr, 17 June, 23 June 205. Acsed the same y recived. Horner, Carles ?Chck,? G. USF. Moy, Rd Flg, Crh, an Dixon.? Private-mil to autor, 12 February 206. Aces the same day recived. Hoser, Bradley, Lt. Gen. USAF. ?ody, Rd Flag, Crch, nd Dixon.? Private -mil to author, 15 Jue, 18 June, 25 June, 28 June, 7 July, 18 July, 18 Octobr, 20 Octber, 14 Nvembr 205. Acsd th sam day recived. Kelog, Jams, Col., USAF. ?Mody, Re Flag, Crech, nd Dixon.? Private -mail to uthor, 28 June, 30 June 205. Acsed th same ay recived. Kovach Jery, Col., USAF. ?ody, Red Flag, Crech, nd Dixon.? Private -mail to author, 24 June 205. Aces th sm day reive. LeForge Jck, Col., USAF. ?Mody, Red Flag, Crech, and Dixon.? Private -mail to author, 23 June, 27 June 205. Acesd th sme ay recived. Moran Joe, Lt. Col., USAF. ?ody, Rd Flag, Crech, nd Dixon.? Private -mail to author, 25 June 205. Aces the sme day reive. Neufield, Jacb ?Jack.? Boyd, Rd Flag, and th F-15.? Priate -mails to author, 8 Augst 204; 5 Februar, 5 Mrch, 2 April, 6 April, 18 My, 24 My, 7 June, 4 st, 1 Octor, 20. Al aesd the same day recived. Raudenbush, Paul, Cl., USAF. ?ody, R Flag, Crch, nd Dixon.? Private -mail to ator, 23 June 205. ces the sme day reive. 46 Rud, Wiliam ?Wil,? Col., USAF. Col., USAF, ?Mody, Red Flag, Crech, and Dixon. Private -mail to authr, 13 May, 7 Septmbr, 10 Septmber 205. Acesd th se dy recived. Acesd th sae day rcivd. Rusch, Tim, Col., USAF. ?Mody, R Flag, Crec, nd Dixon.? Priate -mail to authr, June 23 05. Acesd the sm day recived. Spector, Yiftach, Brig. Gen., IF. ?IAF Vist o US.? Priat -mail to author, 12 Februry, 15 April, 25 May, 6 ugst 205, 15 February, 7 Mrc, 206. Acsed the same day recived. Terino, John Sr., Lt. Col., USAF. ?oy, Red Flag, Crech, and Dixon.? Private -mails to authr, 20 June ,8 Jul, 19 July, 205. Ase the same day rcived. Thopson, Fred, Col., USAF. ?Mody, Red Flag, Crech, and Dixon.? Privte -mails to author, 30 June, 27 July, 30 Jul 205. Acsd te sme day recid. Van Lon, Jack, Col., USAF, Col., USAF. ?Mody, Re Flag, Crch, and Dixon.? Privte -mails to authr, 13 May, 15 a, 19 June, 2 June, 12 July, 18 July 205. Acesd the sme day recived. Vickery, John, Col., USAF, ?Mo, Rd Flag, Crech, and Dixon.? Private -mails to autr, 5 May, 16 ay, 2 ay, June 17, 19 July (2), 0 July, 21 July 205. Acesd the sme d recived. MISCELANEOUS NPUBLISHED WORKS Boyd, John. 191. Conceptual Spiral. Air University Libray, Maxwel AFB, AL. ____A Discurs on Winig nd Losig. Air University Libray, Maxwel AFB, L. ____Organic Design for Comand and Control. Air University Libray, Maxwel AFB, AL. ____The Strategic Fame of? And? Air University Libray, Maxwel AFB, AL. Patrns of Conflict,? Briefig Slides, undated, John R. Boyd Papers, PC 2854, ersal Papers Colction, Archivs Spcial Colectins Brnch, Libray of the Mrin rps, Quatio VA. Crech, Wilur, Cl., USAF. Project Corna Harvest End of Tour Report as Director f Operations, 86th Tactial Fighter Wig, 2 Fbruary 1970. ?TACIR juveated.? Briefin Givn by Gen. Wilr Crech, Circa 1984, Crech Papers, Mxwl AF: AFHRA. CONFERNCE PAERS Lupfer, Timothy. ?The Chalenge of Miltary Reform.? The Miltary Reform Debate: Directins for t Miltary Establishmnt fr te Rmainder of th Cntury. 1-6. Snior Cfernce X, United Staes Miltary Acadey, Wst Poit, New York, 3-5 June 1982. Lind, Wiliam S. ?The Case for Maneuver.? The iltary Reform Debate: Directions for the Miltary Estblishment for th Rmaindr of th Cntury. 17-4. Snir Confrence X, Unitd Staes iltry Acaemy, West Point, New York, 3-5 47 June 1982. Sprey, Pir. ?The Case for More Efective, Les Expensive Weapons Systems.? The Miltary Rform Dbat: Dirtions for th Miltary Estblishment for the Reminder f the Century. 7-8. Seir Confernce X, Unitd Staes Miltary Acadey, Wst Poit, New York, 3-5 Jue 1982. Pery, Wilim. ?The Quality Vrsu Quality Qandary.? The Miltary Reform Debate: Directions for the Miltary Estblishmet for the Rmainder of th Century. 79- 103. Sir Cnfrnce X, United Stas Miltary Acmy, West Poit, New York, 3-5 Jue 1982. LETERS Arnold, Henry ?Hap,? Gen. Army Air Force to the Secrtary of Defnse, 4 January 194. Maxwel AFB: FHR Genrals Disoay nd erguson to Genral McConel, 9 Mar 1968. No subject line, but subject ws kepin the F-15 progrm separt from the F-4. HQ TAC to HQ/USAF Deputy Directr fr Rquiremnts/Oprations, ?Qualitaive Operational Requirment for aSTOL Fightr Aircaft Weps System (TACQO 65-14-E)?, 6 Oct 1965. Packard, David, Deputy Secrtary of Defnse, to Stuart Symington, US enate, 10 Septmbr 1971. Maxwel AFB: AFHRA Ritchi, tve, Captin USAF to Gen. Wiliam W. Momyer, ?Air Superiority,? TAC Comnder, 30 October 1972. AFHRA STAF BACKGROUND PAERS Background paers for TAC omander Gen. Gerald O?Maley for interview ith Mr. Bejmin F. Schemer, editor f Armd Forces Journl, udatd. Air University Libray, Maxwl AFB, AL. Background pers for TC omander Gen. Gerald O?Maley for interview ith Mr. James Can, senior editr of Air Forc Mgzine, 17 Jan 1985. Air University Libray, Mxwl AFB, AL. JOURNAL RTICLES Augstine Norman R. "Augstine's Laws & Solutions." Miltary Science & Technolgy, 1, 4 (1981): 3-19. Enthoven, Alain. ?Econmic Analysi and the Department of Defnse.? The American Ecomic Reviw. 53, (M 1963): 413-423. Lotka, Alfred. ?Th Frquency Distribution f Scientifc Productivity.? Journal of the Washington Acadm of Sciences, 16 (1926): 317-32. Rozel, Mrk. ?Presient Carter ad th Pres: Perspectives from White House Comunicatios Advisors.? olitcal Scin Quartrly, 105, 3, (190). 419-43. 48 Valnce, Andrew, Group Captin, RAF. ?RAF Operations,? part of ?Air Power in Desrt Shiel/Dsert Strm: Prt I.? ir Power Histori, 38, 3 (Fal 191): 35-8. MAGZINE ARTICLES Alen, Lew, Gen. USAF. ?The Air Force is Strong and Ready,? Suplemnt o the Policy Ltr for Comaders from t Ofi f the cretry of the Air Forc, Marc 1981, 2- 7. ____?Meting the Chalenges,? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from th Ofic of te Scrtary of th Air Frc, Augst 1981, 8-12 ____?Cief?s View on Key Isues.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from th Ofice f th Scrtary of th Air Frc, Otbr 1981, 2-8 ____?USAF?s Renwd pirt.? Air Frce Magzine, Novemer , 54-7. Anderton, David. POM a POST: Keystons of TAC Radins.? Air Force Mgzine, January 197, 42-7. Bery, F. Clifto. ?TAC: Ready to Fly and Fight? (interview ith Gen. Wilbur Crech), Air Frce Magzin, Decmber 197, 47-5. ____ ?TAC?s Traiig Payof.? Air Force Magzine, February 1983, 4-37. Bles, Fredrick . Bots,? Bri. Gen. US. ?An ce Loks t Fling Safety.? United Stats Air Frce Flying Safty Magzine, Jauary 1981, 5-18. Bodner Michael J. and Wiliam W. Bruner I, Mjors, USAF. ?Tank Plinkig.? Air For Mgzie, October 193, 10-4. Boyne, Walter. ?Interviw ith IAF Comander David Ivry.? Air Force Magzine, Augst 1982, 0-28. Boyd, John, Lt. Col., USAF and Tom Christie. ?Expande Maneuverabilty Theory,? USAF ighter Wepos Reviw, Dcmber 196, 1-4. Brown, Geore S., Gn. USAF, Chairman Joint Chifs of Staf. ?Miltary Posture: Fiscal Yar 197? Suplemnt o te Policy Letr fr Cmnders from the Ofic of the Scretary of th Air Frc. April 1978, 29-31 Brown, Harold, Scretary of Defnse. ?What re US Interst?? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr fr Comndrs from th Ofic of the crtary of th Air Frc, May 1980, 2-10. ____?Sumary of Do Anual Report.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders frm the Ofice of th Scretary of the Air Frc, April 1978. 20-8. ____ Wilia Pry. ?Stalt Airaft Tchnlogy.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comnders from the Ofice of te Scretar of th Air Frc, Octber 1980, 9-1. Burke, Kely, Lt. Gen. USAF. ?Tactial Warfre Program.? Suplemnt o the Policy Ltr for Comanders from the Ofic of the Scretary of th Air Frc, Ma 1981, 2-6. Burns, Joe Le, Major, USAF. ?Points on the Star.? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Wintr 1974, 21-3. Carol, Robert. ?F-6: Swing Force Fighter for the 80s.? Air Force Magzine, April 1976, 31-5. 49 Carson, Charles W., Lt. Gen. USAF. ?TAC ir ? Part of Strategic Detrence.? Suplmnt o th Policy Letr for omnders from th Ofic of th Secretary of the Air Frce, Januar 1975, 23-9. Carsn, Dnald D, Capti USAF, ?Disimilar Aerial Combat Tactis ? New Techniques i Btle Trinig.? ir orce Magzin, Mrch 1973, 57-61. ____?achi Tactis in TAC?s iGs.? Air Force Magzine, March 1974, 4-47. Clemnts, Ed Capt. USAF, ?Agresively Speaking.? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Sumer 1974, -5. Cobleigh, Ed, Captin, USAF. ?Top Gun, Navy Style.? USAF ighter eapons Reviw, Winter 1972, 5-8. ____?Fluid Two.? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Fal 1974, 2-5. Corel, John. Air Frce Logistics Comnd Prepars for Wr.? Air Force Magzine, Septmber, 1983, 46-50. ____?Byond the $91 Stol Cap.? Air Force Magzine, Septmber 1983, 65-7. Scpig t Spares Prblem. ir r zi, January 4, 12-. ____?Bendi the Tchnolgy Cost Curve.? Air Force Mgzie, Augst 983, 45-8. ____?Why Spares are Short.? Air Force Magzine, Septmber 1983, 56-2. Te Mny Btls f Maverick.? Air Forc Magzin, March 1983, 98-103. ?Credibilty Rstord.? Air Force Asoiation Policy Paper. Air Force gazine, November 1984, 8-94. Crech, Wilur, Gn. "Comitent o Excelnce: Tactial Air Comand Readines." November 1981. Suplmt th Air For Policy Letr fr Comrs, 12-15. ____?Tactial Air Comand Readines." Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comnders fro the Ofice of th Scretary of th Air Frc, Augst 1981, 3-20. Curie, James B., Maj. Gen. USAF. ?Tactial Air Programs.? Suplemnt o the Policy Ltr for Comadrs from the Ofice of the Scretary of th Air Frc, Septmber 197, 17-20. Day, Bonr. ?Th Pros and Cons of aMultimision Fighter Force.? Air Force Magzine, April 197, 60-5. Deming, Wilford, Colnel, USAF. ?A Force Structre Decison.? USAF ighter eapns Reviw, Fal 1974, 1-8. ?Der Baron? (Sutr, ichrd M. ?ody,? Col., USAF). ?anything els is rubish?, Fighter Weapons Reviw, Sumer 1972, 3-7. Disoway, Gabril P., Lt. Gn. UAF. ?Tactial Air Power: Past, Presnt, and Futre,? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comandrs from th Ofice of the Scrtary of th Air Frc, June 1963, 8-12. Dixon, Rbert J. Gen. USAF. ?Tacir Operational Readines.? Suplemnt o the Policy Ltr for Comanders from th fice f th Scrtary of th Air Frc, Januar 197, 2-10. 450 Driesnack, Hans, Gen. ?The Key to Readines: O&M.? Air Force Magzine, October 1980, 57-63. ___?Zero Based Budgeting: A Critque.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from th Ofice of the Scrtary of the Air Frc, April 1978. 32-9. Falows, Jaes. ?"Dfense, Taxes, and t Budget.? T tlantic Monthly, ugst, 181, 7-8. ____"I Fly With Eagles." The Atlantic Monthly, November 1981, 70-7. "Muscle Bound Super Power: The Stae of Arica's Defnse." The Atlantic Monthly, Otber 197, 59-78. ____"A Case for Reform." The Atlantic Monthly, June 192, 19-123. "mrica's High Tec Wapos." The Atlantic Monthly May 981, 21-3. ____?Trouble Wit Air Fore's Egle.? tlti tl, Jnuary 98, 64-6. ____?When George Mets John.? The Atlantic Monthly, July/Augst, 204, 12- 14. ____?Miltary Eficency," The Atlantic Monthly, Augst 191, 8. Wh the Coutr Neds It? [respse t ?To Draft or Not Draft?]. The Atlantic ontly, April 1980, 4. ?Force Moderizati and Readines.? Air Force Asociation Policy Paper, Air Force agzine, Mrch 1976, 10 Frisbe, Joh L. ?The Cief Discuses USAF?s Prospects.? Air Force Magzine, February 1974, 32. Gish, David ?Ctfish,? Capt. USAF. ?-4 Air-to-Air Trainig.? Fighter Weapons Reviw, Fl 1975, 2-5 Grifith, Edward, Col., USAF. ?Aimval-ceval.? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Winter 197, 4-9. Gropman, Dr Alan L. ?An irman?s Quinte.? Aerospace Power Journal, Sumer 1987, 20-4. Guarino, G. B., Maj. USAF. ?aith Restored - The F-15 Program.? Air University Reviw, Jnury-ebrury, 1976, 24-30. Hart, Gary, ?The Ned for Miltar Reform.? Air University Reviw, Sept-Oct 1985, 40-47. Hehs, Eric. ?F-16 Evolution.? Gen. Dynamics Code One Magzine, July 197, 1-5. wt, John A., sitat Secrtar of the Air Frc. ?Prspectivs on the 9 Defnse Budget.? Suplemnt o the Plicy Lter for Comandrs frm t Ofic of th Secrtary of th Air Frc, 16-3. Hilikar, John. ?Fater of the -.? Gen. Dynamics Code One Magzine, April 191, 8-12. Holway, Bruce K., Gen. USAF. ?Air Superiority in Tactial Air Warfre.? Air University Reviw 19, 3 (March-ril1968): -16. Hosingto Edward, Brigadier Gen. USAF. ?Supervison Down the Line.? Flying Safety, 16 (Janury 1960): 16-9. Isacson, Wlter. ?US Defnse Spendig: Are Bilions Being Wasted?? Time, March 7 1983, 12-30. 451 Johnson, Clarence L. ?Kely.? Devlopment of the Lockhed SR-71 Blackbird.? Studies i Intlignce. Sumer 1982, 4-59. Johnsto, Maurice, Captin USAF. ?Disimilar Aircaft Engaemnts.? USAF ighter Wepons Nwsletr, March 1968, 26-8. Jones, David, Ge. USAF. ?The Air Force Is aWay of Life.? Air Force Magzine, May 197, 12-5. ____?FY 1976 Posture Staemnt.? Suplemnt o Air Force Policy for Comanders April 1975, 21-42. ____?Rins: The Central Requiremnt.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from the Ofic of th Scrtary of the Air Forc, Septmbr 197, 7-10. ____?An ir Fore utlok.? uplemnt o the Pliy Ltr for Comanders from the Ofice f th Secretary of th Air Frc, June 1978, 2-8. Jumper, Jn, Capt. USAF. ?Air-to-Air: Trainig to Wi.? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Winter 1976, 16. ____?Traiig for the Threat.? USAF ighter eapons Reviw, inter 1976, 7-10. ____?Trainig Towards Combat Capbilty.? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Winter 1976, 2. Laird Melvi R., "What Price aGod Volunter Miltary?" Acros the Board, June 1980, 7. Lind, Wiliam S. and alter Kros. "More on aneuver to Win." Miltary Reviw, June 1982, p. 75-7. Marsh, Alton K. ?Miltary Reform Caucs Seks Targets.? Aviation Wek and Space Techlogy, 29 rch 1982, 16. arsh, Robrt T., Gen. USAF. ?Devloping the Futre.? Air Force Magzine, January 1982, 8-94. Mathis, Robert C., Gen. USAF. ?Defnse Myths - And Facts.? Air Force Magzine, Jun 1982, 15-8. ____?Tactial Air Comand 1980.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comnders fro the Ofice of the crtary of te Air Fr, Fbruary 1980, 31-7. ____?Our Tactial Force Structre.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from th Ofie of th ecrtary of te Air Fr, Octber 1981, 8-1. McInerey, James E. Jr. Maj. Gen. USAF. ?Air Force Programs: An Overiew.? Suplnt o the Policy Lter for Comandrs fr the fic of th Secretary of the Air Frc, a 1980. 34-1. McLucas, Jon, Sertary of the Air Force. ?USAF?s Increasing Operational Eficency.? Air Frc Mgzine, May 1975, 48-53. ilton, T.R. Gen. USAF "Wh Pilots Get Out." Air Force Magzine, Septmber 1978, 138. ____?Lesons of Vietnam,? Air Force Magzine, arch 1983, 106-10 Momyer, Wiliam W. Gen. ?Evolution f ightr Tctis in SEA,? ir Force Magzine, Air Force Magzie, July 1973, 58-62. 452 Muray, Richard D., Brig. Gen. USAF. ?Air Force Operation ad Mainteance.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Cmandrs frm the Ofic of th Scretary of th Air Frc, Ma 1981. 7-2. ?Piper Enfrcer,? Air Force agzine, Augst 1983, 29-30. o, Bryce, Gn. US. ?Loistics: W Have Work to Do.? Suplemnt o the Policy Ltr for Comanders from the Ofic f the Scretary of th Air Frc, Ma 1980. 23-8. Pres, Mike, Captin USAF, ?Met he Agresors,? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Fal1973, 0-3. ____?Agresively Speaking,? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Fal 1974, 1-3. Record, Jefry. ?Th Fortuns of War. Harpers, April 1980, 42-8. y, Vincnt, Maj. USA. 1971. ?Double Atack Revisted.? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Spring 197, 2-32. Rumsfld, Donald, ecrtary of Defnse. ?Why Americans Want aStrong Defnse.? Suplemt o the Plicy Ltr for Coandrs from the Ofice f th Scrtary of th Air Frc, Januar 197, 24-5. Rus, Rbert D, Maj. Ge. USAF. ?Tactial Fighter Devlopment: We Have Debated Long Enough.? Air Force Mgzine, April 1981, 31-5. ____?Spisticatin.? Suplemt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from the Ofice of the Sretary of th Air Frc, Marh 1981, 20-4. ____?Tactial Air Wrfare: Te Next Twenty Years.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from th Ofice of th Scrtry of th Air Frc, Jul 1980, 7-12 Seamns, Robert C. Secrtary of the Air Force. ?Tac Air: Lok at he Late 70s.? Air Frc Magzin, Jnur 1973, 2-36. Slay, Alton D., Lt. Ge. USAF. ?Air Force Aircaft and Misiles, Part I.? Suplemnt o the Policy tr for Comanders from the Ofice of th Scretry of th Air Forc, Jul 197, 1-8. ____?Air Force Aircaft and Misiles, Part I.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from the Ofice of th Scretry of th Air Frce, Augst 197, 18-39. ____?Our Shrinkig Industrial Base.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders from the Ofice of th cretary of the Air Fre, July 1980, 2-6. ____?Fcig Up t Cang.? Suplemnt the Policy Letr for Comanders from the Ofice of the Scretary of th Air Forc, Otbr 1980, 12-7. Smith, Deny, Rprsntaiv. ?Th Rts and utre f Modern Day Reform.? Air Uiversity eviw. Septmber-October 1985, 1-8. Smith, Da, Capt. USAF. ?Bay Stps: Th Nw Fighter Lead-In Course.? Fighter Wepons Reviw, Spring 1980, 4-7. Sprey, Pir ad Jack Merit. ?Quality, Quantiy or Trainig?? USAF ighter Weapons Reviw, Sumr 1974, 7-14. Simpson, Jfery P. Lt. Cmdr. USN. ?Top Gun Revisted.? The Hok, Winter 1983, 21- 26. 453 Suter, Richard M. (ody), Col., USAF. ?Janus: A Concept for a Multipurose Autonmous Fighter.? Air niversity Reviw, May-June 1981, 4-50. ?TC eval,? Tac Atack, Dcmber 1961, 4. Ulsamr, Edwrd. ?TC's Fous i ?Lean d Lethal.?" Air Force Magzine, March 1975, 27-32. ____?Invisble Airplanes and Super-Smart Weapons.? Air Force agzine, April 197, 59-63. ____?Urgent Air Force Neds for 197.? Air Force Magzine, February 197, 68-71. ____?No Rom for Amateurs in Combat Logistics.? Air Force Magzine, Decmber 1983, 60-5. ____?Th Finite Limits of Afordabilty.? Air Force Magzine, Septmber 1983, 7-83. ____?Smart and Standig Of.? Air Force Magzine, November 1983, 58-61. How the Defse Budget Batle is Htin Up.? Air Forc Magzine, May 1982, 54-9. ____?USAF?s R&D Priorites for 1974.? Air Force Magzine, January 1975, 34-37. ____?Streamlinig Airpower for Theatr Warfre.? Air Force Magzine, February 1978, 16-24. ____?The Quiet Revolution i USAF?s Capbilties.? Air Force agzine, Septmbr 1975, 38-4. ____ ?YF-6: On Time, On Track, On Budget.? Air Force Magzine, January 1974, 51-4. Vogt, John, Gen. USAF. ?Alied Air Power in Europe: The View From the Top.? Iteratioal Defns Rvie, January 1974, 3-4. Weinbergr, Csper. ?Imagiation Shpes the Futre.? Air Force Magzine, November 1983, 98-10. ____?Curent US Defnse Policy,? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comandrs from th Ofic f the crtary f t Air Fr, Augst 1981, 2-7. Welch, Jasper A., Maj. Gen. USAF. ?Systms Anlsi and Do.? Suplemnt o the Policy Letr for Comanders fro the Ofice of the Scretary of th Air Frc, Januar 197, 1-23. Witze, Chrles. "The Budget is Not Stable." Air Force Magzine, January 197, 8. Zocklr, Eric. ?Maner?s Mem.? nohmish (WY) County Busies Journal, June 203, 12-4. htp:/snohishcuntybusinesjral.com/archive/j03/zockler-jun.htm. (acesd Octber 205). NEWSPAER ATICLES ?The A-10s New Teth.? Air Force Times, 3 June 206, 1-2. Brodr, David ?Ho Much is T Much,? Washigton Post, June 19 76, A10. Falws, Jmes. Nt Over in the Glf. sint st, Febrary 3 19, 6. 45 Haloran, Richard. ?Caucs Chalenges Defnse Concepts.? New York Times, 12 Jan 1982, B-8. Hart, Gary. "What's Wrong with te Miltary?" New York Times Magzine, 12 February 1982, 12-8. ____"The Case for Miltary Reform." Wal Stret Journal, 23 January 1981, 8. Kurz, Howard, ?Jms Falws Fird After Stormy Tnure At U.S. News?, Washington Pst, 30 June 30, 198. htp:/w.washingtopost.com/wp- srv/style/fatrs/falows.tm. (acesd Aust 205). ?McDonel Hirng Plan Aprved,? Th Washington Post, 1 February 1970, D10. Penist, Bradley. ?The Fightr Jock o Ced the Way Yo ight.? Army Times, Nvy Tims, Air orce Times, Marine orps Tims, Jnuary 27, 203, 16. ?The F-15 and Fair Emplynt,? Saint Louis Pst Dispatch, 6 February 1970, 0. DISCUSIONS/CONVERSATIONS FROM AUTHOR?S NOTES OF PREVIOUS REPRT Author?s discusions with McDonel-Douglas represntaives, Tel Avi, Israel, 197-1978; the rpresntaives wr tryin to k the IAF from buying F-16s. 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Hlion, Richard P. ?A Trobling Past: Air Frce ightr Acquistio Since 1945.? Air Power Journal, Winter 190, 20-34. Hendersn, Pter, Mj. USAF. ?What he Captin Realy Means? Air University Reviw, January-February 1976. 96-10. 463 Hurley, Michael, Capt. USAF. ?The Beka Valey Air Batle, June 1982: Lesons islrnd?? Aerospace Powr Journl, Winter 198. 12-. "Maverick Scores Sevn Bulsys, One Mis." Defs Wek, Augst 17, 1981, p. 2. Johnson, Herbrt W. Maj. USAF. ?Air Force Fightrs: Simpl or Complex?? Air Uivrsity Reviw, ay-June 1983. htp:/w.airpoer.mxwl.af.mil/airchronicles/aureviw/1983/May-Jun/Johnson.htm#jhnso. (cesd Augst 205). Kapln, Rbert, ?Supreacy b Stealth.? The tlantic Monthly, July-Augst 203, 42-50. Lcombe, Philp. Acquirng stms, Step by Step.? Air Frce Magzine, Augst 1983, 53-5. Lind Wiliam S. and Walter Kros, "More on Maneuver to Win," iltary Reviw, June 1982, p. 75-7. Lyn, Lawrence, and Richard Smith. ?Can the Secrtary of Defnse make a Difernce?? Vol. 7, No. 1, Interntional Security, umer 1982, 45-69. More, Dan, Capti, USN. ?A TOPGUN For Air-Ground Ops.? Navl Instiute Procedings, October 202, 42-8. uray, Wiliamso. ?Ds Miltary Cultre Mater?? Orbis, Winter 19, 27-42. Nefield, Jcob ?Jack The F-15: Origins and Dvlopment, 1964-72.? Air Power Histry, Spring 201, 2-0. ?On A Wing And a Payof: Northrop faces an F-20 Probe.? Time, June 20, 198, 54-5. Powel Stewart M. ?Scud War, Rund Two.? Air rc Magzin, April 2, 6-30. rston, Rymond C. Jr. Lt. Colel. ?he New Ofier Efectives Report.? Air Uiversity Reviw, March-April 1974. htp:/w.airpoer.mxwel.af.mil/airchronicles/aureviw/1974/mar-ar/reston.html (acsed Noveber 205). Scovile, Hrbrt. ?Idefnsibl.? Reiw of James Falows National Defnse. New York Rview of Boks, Jue 1, 1981, 45-8. Snow, Donald M. ?Levls of Strategy and American Strategic Nuclear Policy.? Air Uiversity Riw, Nvmbr-Decbr 1983, 64. Ulsamer, Edgar, ?The Lighteight Fightr Halts the Cost Spiral,? Air Force Magzine, October 1973, 64-7. ____?Nde: A New Family of EW Systems.? Air Force Magzine, February 1976, 27-31. ____?YF-6: On Time, On Track, On Budget.? Air Force agzine, January 1974, 51-4. Vos, John. ?Red Flag: Realism on the Range.? Air Force Magzine, Augst 1978, 40-4. Waler, F., Maj. USAF ?re Oficers Incompetnt? The iltary Reform's Case Against the Oficer's Corps.? Air University Rviw, 1985: 12-6. eis, Hrbrt K. ?Systems nalysi Problems of Limited War.? Anals of Reliabilty and Maintainbilty, Jul 196. Werl, Keeth P. ?Those Wer the Days: Flying Safety During the Transiton to Jets, 194-1953. Air Pwr Histor, Winter 205, 40-53. 46 Winston, David. ?New MiGs Imperial US Air Superiority.? Aviation Wek and Space Technolgy: 2. ____ ?Sviets ay Be Shifting Design Emphasi.? Aviation ek and Space Technolgy: 3. Witze, Claude. ?View From aHospital Bed.? Air Force Magzine, Decmber 1975, 16-18. Zhang Xiaoming. ?China nd the Air War in Korea, 1950-1953.? Journal of Miltary Histry, 62 (April 198), 35-370. JOURNAL RTICLES Bryan, Wiliam. ?Congresional Influence on Weapons Procuremnt: The Case of Lightweight Fihtr Cmoality.? Public Plicy, 28, (Fal 1980), 43-43. Canby, Stevn. ?Miltary Refor and the Art of ar.? Internationl Security Reviw, 1, 1, (prig 198), 245-265. Dor, Robert F. ?-5 Eagle.? World Airpower Journal. 9, (Sumer 192): 17-30. Hamnd, Paul Y. ?A Functinal nalysi f Defse Departnt Decison Making In the McNamra dmiistrtio.? The Amrican Politcl Sci Reviw. 62 (arh 1968): 57-96. Hanse, Rndal and Desmond King. ?Eugenic Ideas, Politcal Interst, and Policy Varice: Imigrati a Sterilzatio Policy in Briti ad the U.S.? Wrld Polits 53, 2 (01) 237-263. Korb, Lawrence J. ?The Budget Proces in the Department of Defnse 1947-197: The Strgths and Waknss f Thre Systs.? Public Admiistration Reviw, 37, 4 (Jul-Aug 7): 34-36. Lane, Jack C. ?The American Miltary Past: A Ned for New Aproaches.? Miltary Afirs, 41, 3 (Ot 7): 109-13. Longley, Charles H. ?McNamra nd Miltary Behavior.? American Journal of Politcal Scienc, 18, 1 (Februry 1974), 1-2. Lotka, Alfrd. ?The rqnc Distribution f Scientifc Productivity.? Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, 16: 317-32. Lyn, Lwrece, ad Rihard mith. ?Can the Secrtary of Defnse make a Difernce?? Intrnationl Security, 7, 1, (Sumr 1982), 45-69. McNaugher, Thmas L. ?Weapons Procrent: The Futilty of Reform.? International Scurity. 12 (Fal 1987): 63-70. cNaugher, Thomas L. Reviw of National Defnse by James Falows. Politcal Science Qarterly, 12, , (Fal 1981): 69-670. Pery, Wilim. ?Falow's lcies: A Reviw Esay.? Reviw of National Defnse, by Jaes ls. International Scurity. 6 (Spring 1982): 174-182. ____?Desrt Storm d Detrene.? Foreig Afairs. 0 (Fal 91), 6-84. Schemer, Bnjamin F. ?Congrs St o und USF ?Enforcer? Test,? Armed Forces Jourl, 17, (November 197): 17. ____?Interview With Nw TAC omander Gen. Gerald O?Maley.? Armed Forces Journal, 12, (January 1985): 71-9. 465 ____?F-14 vs. F-15: Wil it Come to aShotut?? Armed Forces Journal, 95, (October 970, 20-. Sgourev, Styan d Ezra Zuckerman. ?Levragin the Power of Per Networks? [also tiled ?Improving Cpabilties Throuh Idustry r Ntworks?]. MITSlon Mangent Reviw, 42, , (Winter 205), 3-8. Smith R. Jefry. ?High-Cost Lemons i th U.S. Arsenal.? Science New Seris, 21, 492 (April 1981), 309-312. ?Why I?m Geting Out,? Armed Forces Journal, 15, (November 1978): 4-5. Ye, Albert. ?The Casal Efct f Idas Polices.? Intrnational Organizations 50, 1, (Winter 196), 9-108. SPECH Holey, Ira B. Jr., ?An Eduring Chalenge: The Problem of Air Force Doctrine,? Unites Stes Air Force Acaemy (USAF) Harmn Mrial Letur 16, 1973. htp:/w.usaf.f.il/df/fh/armoneorial.cfm (csd July 205). UNPBLISHED THESI, DISERTAIONS, AND STUDENT REPORTS Angerman, Wiliam S. ?Coming Ful Circle With Boyd?s ODA Lop Ideas: An Alysi of Invati Difsion ad Evolutin. Master f Scinc Thesi, Air Force Instiute of Technolgy, 204. Calcut, Hary M, Cl., USAF. ?Cst Growth in Do aj. Programs: A Historical Perspective.? Executive Resarch Project, Industril Cle of the rmed Forces, National Dfns Unirsity. 193. Chidichim, Slvatore, Lt. Col., USA. ?The Miltary Reform Caucs and its Impact on National Dfns.? Resarch Report. Ntionl War oleg, Ntioal Defse University 1983. Coley Jams A., Maj. USAF. ?Red Flag ? Is Realism orth te Cost?? Student Thesi: US ry Wr Coleg, 1987. Cowan, Jefre L., aj. U.S. Air Force. ?From Air Force Fighter Pilot Marine Corps Warfighting: Col., John Byd, His Theries n War, and their Unexpctd Lecy.? Thesi fr Master of Miltary Studis, Unite Stas ari Corps Comand and Staf Colg, arine Corps niversity, Quntico, Virginia, 20. Dahl, Arden B., ?The Wrthg: The Best Dal the Air Forc Nevr Wanted.? Resrch Stuy: National Defnse Univrsity, 204. Devorshak, George A., Maj. SAF. ?An nalysi of Fighter eapons Trainig Dirctivs and Resources.? Resarch Stud, Air Univrsity, 1971. Fisk, Robert B. Mjor USAF. ?Air Forc Pilot Retntio, 198.? Resarch Study 8-0915: Air Cmand and Staf Coleg, Air Uiversity, Maxwl AFB. AL. Gentry, Jeruald, aj. USAF. ?Evolutin f the F-16 Multinationl Fighter.? Student Rsrch Pper, #163: Indstrial Colg of the Armed Frces, 1976. Gregory, Sandra A, Lt. Col., USAF. ?A Man?s Fligt Trough Lif: A Leadership Profile f Ge. Jerome F. O?Maley. Resrch Report: Indstrial Colg of te Armd 46 Force, 194. Hayes, Vitria M. ?Analysi of the Air Force and the Great Engie War.? Student Thesi, Air Force Instiut of Technlgy. Dfns Techical Informatio Centr, Alxandria, VA, 198. Hewt, Wilim ., Maj. USAF. ?Plantig the Seds of SEAD [Supresion f Enemy Air Defnse]: The Wild esel i Vitnam.? Thesi, chol of Advacd Air Powr Studis: axwel AFB, AL, 193. Leahey, Michael, Comndr, USN. ?The History of Defnse Reform Since 1970.? Studnt Thesi: Navl Postgraduat Schl, 198. Neufiel, Jacob ?Jack?. The F-15 Ele: Origins and Devlopment 1964-1972. Wshington, DC: Ofice of Air Force History, 1974. Og, Jon Stepe, ?Metamorphsi of Busins Strategis and Air Force Acquistion Plics in th Arsace Prplsio Idustry: Cse Stuy f th Great Egie War.? aster?s Thesi: Maschusets Instite of Tchnolgy, Jun 1987. Padget Thoms C., Major, USAF. ?A Stdy of Atituds Coerin Uethical Behavior in te Air Force.? tudent Thesi: Air Cman and Staf Colg, Mxwl Air Forc Base, AL, ay 1976. Rhodes, Jhn D, Lt. Col., USAF. ?Pilot Retntion: An Historical Analysi.? Resarch Report. Air War oleg, ir Univrsity, Maxwel AFB. L, 1986. Rusing, nald L., Mj. USAF. ?Preparig the Fightr Force ? Red Flag/Composite Force.? aster?s Thesi: US Army Comand and Gn. Staf ole, 1980. Slife, Jams C. Lt. Col., USAF. ?Crech Blue?: Ge. Bil Crech nd th Rformation f the Tactial Air Forces, 1978-1984.? Thsi: Schol of Advace Air Pwer Studies, Mxwel Air Force Base, AL, 202. Snodgras, David E., aj. US. ?Atcking the Theatr Mobile Balistic Misile Thret.? Thesi: Schol of dvaed Air Powr Studis, Mxwel Air Forc Bas, AL, 193. TELVISON PROGRAMS Atkinson, Rick. Washington Post reporter. ?Frontlie? interview, htp:/w.pbs.r/wgbh/ags/frontlie/gulf/ (acsd February 206). ABC. ?America?s Fighter Aircaft.? On ?20/,? 1 My 1980. S. Dfns of te Unitd Stes. Shown 14-8 June . chwarzkopf, Nrma, Ge. UA. Telvis interviw ith David Frost. Mar 27 191. CBS. Dn Rather interviw ith Sadam Husi. 29 Augst 19, transcript FBIS-NES-90-170. WORLD WIDE WEB PAGES AIM-7. htp:/w.fas.org/man/do-10/sy/misile/aim-7.htm (acesd Septmber 205). Air Force Asociation. htp:/w.af.org/AboutUs/default.asp (acesd February 206). 467 Defnse and National Interst, htp:/w.d-ni.et/ (acesd Septmber 205). F-16: htp:/w.f.mil/factsets/factshet.asp?fsID=103 (acsd January 206) -20: t:/ .wpafb.f.mil/usem/rsrch/fighter/f2-3.jpg (cesd March 205) Goldwater-Nichols: htp:/w.jcs.mil/goldwater_nichol_act1986.html (acesd Fbruary 206). National Bok ward for History (Paperback). htp:/ .ntinalbk.org/nwiners1980.html, Augst 17, 205 (acesd October 205). Phoenix misil. htp:/w.chinfo. navy.mil/navpalib/ factfile/misiles/wep-hoe.html (acesd Setmber 205). Progrm on Govrnnt Ovrsight (POG) htp:/og.org/p/x/impact.html (acesd Octber 205). Silverstein Kn ad Jef Moag. ?The Pentagon's 30-Bilion-Dolar Bomb.? Mother Joes. htp:/w.mtherjons.com/ews/feature/20/01/stealth.tl (acsed Sptmber 205). Sprey Pres Rlas, Oberlin Coleg, Nov 2, 05. htp:/w.orli.du/nwsr/stries/prey_relase.html (acesd January 206). NEWSPAER ATICLES Gingrich, Newt. "Think Now, Buy Later." Washington Post, April 21 981, A19. Lehman-Haupt Cristpher. ?oks of the Times.? Reviw of National Defnse. New York Times, 9 Jun, 1981. C6. Loeb, Vern and Da Priest. ?National Defnse.? Washington Post, May 28, 203 htp:/discus.wshingtonpost.com/zfrum/03/r_ation_loebpriest052803.htm (acesd May 205). ohr, Charles. ?Pentagon Audit Finds aSharp Increase for Parts.? New York Times, July 23 1983, A13. Mohr, James. ?Pentagon Audit Finds aSharp Increase for Parts.? New York Times, July 23 1983, A13. osberg, Walter S. and Eward T. Pounce. ?How Prat and Whitney Gains From the ay th U Buys Spre Parts.? Wal Stret Jourl, Octobr 3 1983, 25. Witkin, Ricrd. ?Decison Big Setback for Prat.? New York Times, 4 February 1984, 38. OCASIONAL PAERS Kener, J. Kristopher. The Helicopter Inovation i the United States Army. Cambridge, MA: IT Scurity Studies Workig Pper, 201. Hayes, Wiliam, Lois Kratz an Jacques Ganslr. Efective Competion During epons System Acquistion. McL VA: Mongraph fr th Natioal Contract Mangemnt soiati, 31 De 1985. 468 LECTURE NOTES ?The Politcs of Defnse,? course taught by Profesor Harvey Sapolsky, MIT. Author?s leture nts from 16 October 205 lectur.