AN EXAMINATION OF STATE LEVEL HOMELAND

SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

Except where reference is made to the work of others, the work described in this dissertation is my own or was done in collaboration with my advisory committee. This dissertation does not include proprietary or classified information.

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AN EXAMINATION OF STATE LEVEL HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

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AN EXAMINATION OF STATE LEVEL HOMELAND

SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

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Joe Benton Davis, son of Jules and Jane Davis, was born April 17, 1951 in Opp, Alabama. He graduated from Opp High School as the Valedictorian and Student Council President. He then attended the United States Military Academy at West Point where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army in June 1973. While on active duty, he earned a Master of Science in Business Administration from Boston University in 1978 and a Master of Education from the University of Oklahoma in 1988. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1986 and the U.S. Army War College in 1997. He is a member of the National Political Science Honor Society, Pi Sigma Alpha; the National Public Affairs and Administration Honor Society, Pi Alpha Alpha; and the Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi. Joe retired at the rank of Colonel after serving over 30 years on active duty and was appointed as the Assistant Director for the Alabama Department of Homeland Security in November 2003. He is responsible for Alabama homeland security strategic planning, information technology, grant management, programming, accounting, and office administration. He entered the Auburn University and Auburn Montgomery joint doctoral program in 2004 and received his doctoral degree in Public Administration and Public Policy with an emphasis in homeland security and non-profit management in 2008. Joe is married to Sheila Everidge, originally from Columbus, Georgia. They have been married for over 33 years and are blessed with three daughters.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF STATE LEVEL HOMELAND

SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

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The requirement for homeland security within the United States became apparent following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Prior to the attacks, neither the federal nor state governments were organized or prepared to combat the emerging terrorist threat. The national debate that ensued involved a variety of complex issues. The federal reorganization for homeland security has been a controversial topic of significant discussion, but in comparison, the state level reorganizations for homeland security have received little attention from political analysts and public officials.

The purpose of this exploratory research was to examine the state level homeland security organizations that have been created in the past six years. The researcher used a

mail survey to the homeland security directors in the 50 states, and 70% of the serving homeland security directors provided input. As a result, we now know that states have reorganized in a variety of ways to manage critical issues relating to homeland security, and these organizations are becoming more institutionalized. Additionally, we have found that collaboration in the homeland security shared power environment is flourishing, and a host of formal networked organizations have been created at the state level to address the most complex issues that are not easily solved by one organization.

The research findings reveal that the majority of states have merged the homeland security and emergency management functions, or the same manager was responsible for both organizations. A significant majority of the respondents reported that merger is preferable due to improved coordination and unity of effort. The research also reveals that formal networked organizations are now prevalent and extremely important in the homeland security environment at the state level. These collaborative organizations have enjoyed an extremely high success rate, and the majority of serving homeland security directors report that none of their networks had been disbanded. In most instances, the initially established organizations continue to serve their intended purpose.

The final portion of this research explores the lessons that have been learned with regard to collaboration and the networked organizations that have been created to foster or encourage collaboration in the shared power environment. The lessons that have been documented could be used as the foundation for additional case study research of existing networked organizations. They also provide excellent insights regarding networked organizations that could be useful in other areas throughout the public sector.

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The author would like to express thanks and gratitude to those who were instrumental in development of this research study. I am especially indebted to Dr. James Seroka who served as the chairman of my committee. He was always available on short notice, providing invaluable assistance, insight and guidance during all phases of the research. Dr. Thomas J. Vocino, Dr. Cynthia J. Bowling, Dr. Brad Moody, Dr. Anne Permaloff, and Dr. Robert A. Norton were also instrumental in this research, and I appreciate their support and advice.

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Finally, my wife and best friend, Sheila, has provided the solid foundation for our family through the years and has kept us all on a steady course during the occasional tribulations associated with military life and trials associated with this research study. Thank you for your unwavering love, patience, encouragement, and understanding.

Style manual used:

Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (2001)

Computer software used:

Microsoft Word (2002)

Microsoft Excel (2002)

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CHAPTER I

AN EXAMINATION OF STATE LEVEL HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Statement of the Problem

The requirement for homeland security within the United States became apparent following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The national debate that ensued has involved a number of diverse and complex issues. The issues relating to homeland security are often blurred because the nation is dealing with a new meaning of conflict, a new threat on American soil, and a new security concept—all requiring changes relating to how we must now defend the United States, its citizens and our critical infrastructure. The federal reorganization for homeland security has been one of the most significant and controversial topics of discussion. In comparison, little has been written and there has been limited discussion about the state level reorganizations that have evolved over the past several years.

Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the federal nor state governments were organized or prepared to combat the terrorist threat. The results were catastrophic. General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said "'The right organization will not guarantee success. But the wrong organization will guarantee failure'" (Stubbs, 2002, p. 35). One

of the challenges in the homeland security arena is to create "right organizations" at all levels of government in order to counter the terrorist threat.

Homeland security organizations at both the federal and state levels play an important role in protecting our citizens, preventing terrorist activity, and responding when necessary to terrorist related events. The federal government sets the strategic course with regard to homeland security programs, but states are also significant partners. States level organizations and local law enforcement agencies play a supporting role and assist federal law enforcement officials with regard to prevention and protection. State level organizations are the lead activity and have primary responsibility with regard to response and recovery for both natural and manmade events. A significant amount of literature in recent years has addressed the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reorganization and their role in preventing terrorism. Unfortunately, we know very little about homeland security at the state level and the organizations that have been created to address the most difficult and complex issues in a shared power environment.

Overview of the Subject

Within days following the September 11th terrorist attacks, President Bush attempted to create the "right organization" for managing our nation's terrorist related programs by using his executive authority and establishing the Office of Homeland Security. He designated former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security, and a staff of about 200 was quickly assembled. Within weeks, most states created an ad hoc advisory committee to address the challenges in the homeland security arena associated with preventing future terrorist

attacks. Many also designated a homeland security advisor or point of contact, typically by selecting an existing state official to focus on homeland security related matters in addition to his or her normal duties. In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security published the first national strategy entitled *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)*. The strategy highlighted our nation's highest priorities with regard to the terrorist threat, and it suggested states should establish organizations to accomplish homeland security related actions and coordination. Although the federal government encouraged states to create formal advisory committees to focus on terrorist related issues, it provided no guidance to states concerning the types of homeland security organizational structures that might be appropriate.

The organizational structure for homeland security at the federal level can trace its roots from two prominent commissions that were chartered in late 1990s. These commissions provided warnings to the President, Congress, and the Department of Defense concerning the escalation of terrorism and the likelihood of a major terrorist event within the continental United States. They also provided recommendations pertaining to the reorganization required by the federal government which would be necessary to deter terrorism. Most political analysts agree that the warnings and recommendations were ignored by many of our political leaders since there was no significant homeland security related governmental reform or federal reorganization prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks.

Within a couple of months following the terrorist attacks, the homeland security debate at the national level began in earnest. In the fall of 2002, Congress passed legislation creating the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (US DHS), a cabinet level

agency. The establishment of the US DHS in March 2003 represented the largest federal reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947 which was also inspired by a catastrophic attack on our homeland, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. The sweeping changes that followed September 11th resulted in a massive federal reorganization. The new federal homeland security organization was created by merging 22 separate agencies and over 180,000 employees. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was initially formed as a hierarchical organization along functional lines, and it included several bureaus responsible for infrastructure protection, intelligence gathering and information sharing, science and technology, and emergency preparedness and response. Although it was created by Congress and the organization was well defined in 2003, senior US DHS officials have accomplished at least two major reorganizations during the past several years. The debate concerning the appropriate organizational structure at the federal level and the US DHS missions and functions still continues.

In 2002 while politicians, scholars, government analysts and the media debated the federal realignment required for establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, they engaged in limited public discussion regarding homeland security organizational structures that might be required at the state level. Although the topic of homeland security organizational structures at the state level received little attention, it would seem to be a relevant consideration in view of the federal doctrine for emergency response and recovery.

For the past several decades, emergency response for natural disasters within the United States has been based on the concept that the federal government would provide coordination and assist with resources, but state and local authorities were responsible for

managing and responding to catastrophic events within their jurisdictions. This same doctrine was applied to the emerging terrorist threat that faces our nation. If states are indeed significant participants in the homeland security process and are primarily responsible for responding to terrorist related events, then it follows that the organizational structures required in each state must be compatible and capable of complementing and executing federal programs in homeland security.

During the six years following September 11th, little information has been published and the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations has not been documented or analyzed. How did states initially organize for homeland security, and how have they have evolved during the past several years? Is collaboration necessary in the homeland security arena at the state level, and what causes or encourages collaboration? To what extent have collaborative organizations been created to solve the most difficult problems in the shared power environment?

As a result of this research, we now know that states have organized and reorganized in a variety of ways in order to manage critical issues relating to homeland security. Additionally, collaboration in the homeland security environment is flourishing, and a host of formal networked organizations have been created at the state level to address the most complex issues that are not easily solved or cannot be solved by only one organization. Multi-organizational collaborative networks often cut across the various levels of government, and these public sector led organizations may also include participants from the private and nonprofit sectors. This work examines in detail the homeland security organizational arena at the state level and sheds light on collaboration

and the state level organizations that have been created and evolved since the terrorist attacks in 2001.

Research Questions

The following questions guided this study:

1. What types of homeland security organizations were established at the state level immediately following the terrorist attacks in September 2001?
2. What types of homeland security organizations exist today?
3. How can current state level homeland security organizations be categorized with regard to organizational location, personnel and funding?
4. What do we know about the background and experience of managers who presently lead these organizations?
5. What causes or encourages collaboration and the creation of formal networked organizations in the state level homeland security arena?
6. To what extent do networked organizations exist in states?
7. How can these networked organizations be defined with regard to their size?
8. How durable are state level homeland security networked organizations, how many networked organizations were created and later disbanded, and why?
9. Does the homeland security arena at the state level lend itself to certain types of networked organizations, and can these networks be defined with regard to their purpose?
10. What lessons have homeland security managers learned regarding collaboration in the shared power environment and the networked organizations that have been created to facilitate or encourage collaboration?

Significance of Research Questions

A great deal of literature from the past several decades addresses U.S. governmental reorganization in general, and numerous case studies analyze the challenges relating to federal agency reorganization. An abundance of contemporary literature exists regarding the federal homeland security reorganization. Unfortunately, very little literature documents homeland security related organizational issues and alternatives available to government officials at the state level. In an era where states must provide a greater range of services with fewer resources and where the federal government is clearly the lead agency for homeland security related programs, a significant void of information exists regarding the organization for homeland security below the federal level. This lack of information could have serious implications, specifically with regard to the state level organizations that are created to protect both citizens and critical infrastructure.

The purpose of this research is to trace the evolution of state level homeland security organizations, examine collaboration in the shared power environment, and to define the current networked organizations that have been created to solve the most complex and difficult multi-organizational problems. The research questions serve as a guide for this study and help provide focus for the findings.

The findings from this study provide information regarding the organizational alternatives available to state officials. The research also provides initial insights regarding collaboration and networked organizations in the state level homeland security arena. The exploration of these research questions and the findings of this study add to the knowledge base and provide valuable information concerning the durability of

networked organizations and their importance within the homeland security context. Additionally, the research and analysis associated with this study addresses the lessons that homeland security managers have learned regarding collaboration and networked organizations.

Theoretical Focus of the Study

The theoretical focus of this study centers around three bodies of literature related to governmental reorganization. These include the institutionalism of governmental organizations, collaboration in the public sector, and the networked organizations that have been created to solve the most difficult or complex problems.

The institutional component of this study addresses U.S. governmental reorganization in general and is supported by over two centuries of literature following the birth of our nation. Institutionalization is defined as the organizational evolution and maturing that involves embedding norms, policies, procedures and behavior within an organization. The institutional portion of this study addresses the specific theoretical topics relating to formal and informal adaptation by organizations, cooptation within organizations, and the nature of bureaucracy.

The second body of literature involves the theories pertaining to public sector collaboration in the 21st Century. Collaboration is defined as the coordination accomplished in a shared power environment between individuals from multiple agencies located within the different levels of government. This component briefly addresses the evolution of intergovernmental relations, the necessity for greater coordination between

all levels of government, and the importance of the collaboration in a shared power environment.

The final theoretical body of literature in this study focuses on networked organizations within the public sector. Networked organizations are defined as the formal organizations that are established in a shared power environment to facilitate or encourage collaboration. Networked organizations are created to solve the most difficult or complex problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by one organization. The network portion of the literature review specifically examines the characteristics of formal networked organizations and their benefits and challenges.

Methodology

The research topic for this specific study focuses on the evolution of homeland security organizations at the state level, collaboration, and the networked organizations that have been created. This research study seeks to better understand how state level organizations have become institutionalized over time, what inspires or encourages collaboration, and to what extent and why collaborative organizations have been created during the past six years. The qualitative paradigm is best suited in this instance since the problem involves exploratory research in a natural setting and the variables are unknown. Additionally, this study seeks to create a holistic picture based on the views of the homeland security directors at the state level and existing historical documentation.

Qualitative studies often include the following research types: case study, descriptive, ethnographic, and action research. The qualitative perspective in this research study involves a phenomenological view where reality is based on the views of

the homeland security directors at the state level. The research type involves a combination case study and descriptive research. The descriptive element of this research project focuses on the evolution of homeland security organizations at the state level and seeks to answer questions relating to who, what, where, how many, and how much. The case study component of the research seeks to better understand collaborative management and focuses on how, why, and to what extent networked organizations have been created. The methods used in this research involve administration of a survey to state level homeland security directors and a review of existing documentation.

This study describes, explores, and explains in detail state level homeland security organizations as they exist in their natural setting. A blend of two strategies, the survey and case study, is used in a complementary manner in order to examine multiple sources of information and provide a better description of homeland security organizations at the state level. The case study portion of this research study seeks to better understand the process of collaboration and focuses on how, why, and to what extent networked organizations have been created. The survey of state level homeland security directors is the primary source of information for the case study. The survey, along with other available historical documentation, provides information for the descriptive element of this research project. These sources of information are used to trace the evolution of homeland security organizations at the state level, and the analysis seeks to answer questions such as who, what, where, how many, and how much.

This research provides a description of homeland security organizations at the state level, offers new insights about how these organizations have evolved over time, validates the emerging theories pertaining to collaboration in the contemporary public

setting, and provides an initial indication and categorization of the homeland security networked organizations that have been created. Since state level homeland security organizations are not well documented in existing literature, this research provides significant new information about these organizations as they currently exist and documents how organizational relationships have changed over the past six years.

The survey method for this research involved use of a single mode mail questionnaire sent to homeland security directors in each of the 50 states. Thirty-five directors responded, resulting in a 70% response rate. The survey focuses on homeland security organizations at the state level, the organizational relationships that have evolved over the past six years, the characteristics of the senior homeland security managers, the various types of networked organizations that have been created, what has caused collaboration and the proliferation of networked organizations, and the lessons learned by senior homeland security officials regarding collaboration and networked organizations.

Limitations of the Study

The qualitative methods used in this study have produced a wealth of information from the homeland security directors who responded to the survey. This method, however, lacks the potential for statistical comparison and aggregation of data offered by quantitative methods. Qualitative methods serve to increase our understanding of the cases and situations studied, and the validity of qualitative studies often hinge to a large degree on the rigor, competence, and skill of the researcher.

The questionnaire used in this research was designed to minimize survey error and to maximize both internal and external validity. The target population included the

homeland security directors in the 50 states. Due to the small size of the target population, a census survey was conducted and the possibility of sampling error was eliminated. The researcher has significant experience in the homeland security arena, and meaningful survey questions were constructed using appropriate technical terminology. Appropriate questions that are technically sound assist in providing a valid survey tool and eliminating survey error. It is difficult to judge the level of non-response error, but since an excellent response rate was achieved for individual questions, the researcher anticipates minimal error associated with this area. The researcher also expects a high level of external validity as a result of the 70% response rate.

Reliability equates to repeatability, and the researcher anticipates that this survey is highly reliable. The same results would be achieved in the same circumstances. This prediction of reliability is based on the consistency of the data, lack of significant variance between responses, and the researcher's knowledge of the topic. Since it is not possible to test survey reliability with a different set of respondents, analysis of the data provided is the only method available for considering the reliability of the instrument.

Subjects typically have unique characteristics, different orientations, and different perceptions. As a result, individual bias is possible in any survey. The researcher constructed questions to be unambiguous, but misinterpretation by respondents is also possible in any survey. In addition to the potential for misinterpretation of questions, some respondents may not have been as familiar with the terms "collaboration" and "networked organizations" as some of the other respondents. It is possible that a few respondents may not have focused on the definitions provided in the administrative section of the survey.

As is the case with any self-administered survey, the administrator could not control the testing environment. As a result, the surveys most likely were not completed under the same conditions or within the same time periods. Normal daily activity in the work place may have had an impact on individual responses. Real world events or crisis situations also may have impacted the survey results.

Since homeland security directors have unique skill sets, different orientations, and different perceptions, the potential for bias in this survey or any other survey is possible. Survey literature also indicates respondents may provide the perceived "correct response" to a question rather than offering a response that reflects the actual situation.

The longevity of a respondent in his or her current assignment may have also influenced survey responses and the overall survey results. Some directors with a short tenure may have opted not to participate in the survey, while others with similar tenure may have provided only partial or inaccurate responses based on limited experience. Each of these situations offers a potential for error that is difficult to predict.

Although this research may have the possibility of the typical error associated qualitative research or any self-administered survey, the 70% response rate serves to reinforce its validity and provides an indication of the overall quality of the data. The exploratory research documented in this work offers an initial understanding of the networked organizations that presently exist at the state level and also provides a baseline for comparing networked organizations and homeland security lessons learned to the theoretical lessons provided in contemporary literature. The data collected for this research also provide an excellent foundation that could be used in case studies of individual homeland security networked organizations.

Overview of Chapters

In order to properly address the organizational structures that have evolved within the homeland security arena at the state level, the literature review provided in Chapter II examines three primary areas. These include the institutionalization of governmental organizations, collaboration in the public sector, and the networked organizations that have been created to solve the most difficult and complex problems. It examines the traditional body of information relating to U.S. governmental reorganization in general and the more specific organizational theories relating to adaptation, cooptation, and the nature of bureaucracies. Chapter II also addresses the contemporary body of literature pertaining collaboration and the networked organizations that have been created in the shared power environment of the public sector.

The evolution of the state level reorganization for homeland security has not been well documented, and as a result, the federal reorganization for homeland security may offer initial insights. Chapter III provides a historical background and briefly traces the homeland security evolution in the United States during the past several years. The formal organizational structure for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security traces its roots from two prominent commissions that were chartered in late 1990s— the Gilmore Commission and Hart-Rudman Commission. In order to address other possible sources of influence regarding the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations, this chapter also briefly examines our nation's first homeland security strategy published in 2002, a collection of state reports complied by the Office of Homeland Security in the same year, U.S. Government Accountability Office reports,

federal homeland security policy guidance to states, federal grant guidance, and National Governors Association reports.

Chapter IV documents and explains the framework for this research. It discusses what was done, how it was done, and why it was done that way. Specifically, this chapter identifies the approach used to answer the research questions identified in Chapter I. It provides a discussion of the research design, survey method, units of analysis, and sample selection. Chapter IV also addresses the internal and external validity, methods of analysis, and limitations of this research study.

Chapter V examines the organizations within the homeland security arena at the state level. Specifically, it documents and analyzes institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations. The findings document several of the primary characteristics relating to organizational location, the number of personnel assigned, amount of federal grant funding provided, percentage of state funding provided, and the prior experience and tenure of the homeland security directors who are responsible for these organizations. It provides initial insights and analysis regarding collaboration and the homeland security networked organizations that have been established at the state level. Chapter V also provides a summary and discussion of lessons learned with regard to collaboration and networked organizations based on the insights of the 35 state level homeland security directors who responded to the survey.

Chapter VI provides the conclusion for this study. It highlights the significance of the study and addresses the theoretical implications of the findings. This final chapter also offers the researcher's recommendations and provides suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to properly address the organizations that have evolved within the homeland security arena at the state level, a literature review of three primary areas is appropriate. The components of this theoretical review include: (1) institutionalization of governmental organizations, (2) collaboration in the public sector, and (3) the formal networked organizations that are created to facilitate or encourage collaboration.

In examining institutionalization of governmental organizations, this review first focuses on the traditional body of information relating to U.S. governmental reorganization in general. It then addresses specific organizational theories pertaining to adaptation, formal and informal cooptation, and the nature of bureaucracies.

The second portion of the literature review addresses the contemporary body of literature pertaining to collaboration in the public sector. It examines topics relating to intergovernmental relations and collaboration in the shared power environment.

The final section of the literature review focuses on collaborative governance, networked organizations, and the management of these networks. It examines in more detail the necessity for governance and the collaborative organizations that have been created in shared power and multi-jurisdictional environments to solve the most difficult problems that cannot be solved or are not easily solved by only one organization.

Institutionalization of Governmental Organizations

The institutionalization of governmental organizations potentially involves many different factors. A host of theories regarding institutionalization have evolved through the years. Institutionalization is defined as the organizational evolution and maturing that involves embedding norms, policies, procedures, and behavior within an organization. In order to analyze the institutionalization of homeland security organizations at the state level, this review first focuses on the traditional body of literature involving U.S. governmental reorganization in general. It then addresses specific organizational theories that may have a significant impact on the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations in the contemporary setting. These theories include adaptation, formal and informal cooptation, and the nature of bureaucracies.

U.S. Governmental Reorganization

Although theories relating to public organizations and hierarchical structures have existed for centuries, theories relating to U.S. governmental reorganization are relatively new in comparison. The organization of public agencies and their occasional reorganization was not a significant topic of debate during the first few years of our nation's history, taking a back seat to the more pressing issues facing a new nation. The Constitution does not specify "… which executive departments should exist, how many are needed, and how these departments should be organized" (Garnett, 1987, p 35). It would have been nearly impossible for our founding fathers to predict the demographic, social, economic, technological, and information-related changes which have occurred

during the past century. It would have been equally impossible to determine the federal agencies that would be necessary in modern times.

After the American colonies gained independence from England, state's rights advocates were skeptical of any attempts to centralize or reorganize government. Even though federal reorganization was often viewed cynically by politicians and special interest groups, it is sometimes the only way to deal with the new and challenging social problems in a changing world. Reorganization may be viewed by public officials and administrators as one of their few tools available to them in order to accomplish change. As a result, "… reorganization of the federal government has had a long and somewhat stormy history: since the earliest days of the country's political history, reorganization has been a continuing source of conflict between the Congress and the executive branch of government" (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 12).

Hobbs (1953) indicates that in the years prior to 1930, Congress was sometimes indifferent to matters involving executive reorganization. This was not the case during President Roosevelt's administration when the nation faced significant challenges. Polenburg (1966) suggests that government reorganization was necessary to address the pressing social issues of that era. He indicates:

> When Roosevelt's critics charged that he sought to establish an executive dictatorship they were following an old tradition. Every strong President had faced a similar accusation. Such attacks seem to have derived their strength from a deep aversion to powerful government; Americans have tended to view authority as alien and arbitrary. (Polenburg, 1966, p. 194)

Three decades later, Emmerich (1950) suggested that administrative reorganization movements of earlier years could be "… viewed as a kind of revivalism in governmental reform. There is a widely held notion that reorganization occurs only as a result of surges of outside agitation for reform and major deliberate efforts to rationalize administrative organization and methods" (p. 1).

In the early 1970s, Davis and North (1971) attempted to explain federal reorganization by indicating that "… a new organization will be created when it is profitable to do so" (p. 10). From these and other writings related to federal reorganization, it appears reorganization may be accomplished for a variety of reasons, including attempts to gain political power or as a method of government reform. Following the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, some political analysts concluded that the federal reorganization for homeland security was simply accomplished in an effort to gain political power and to expedite government reform (e.g., intelligence reorganization and civil service reform).

In analyzing other factors that might lead to the creation and reorganization of federal agencies, Grafton (1984) concludes there was very little literature produced during the 1960s and 1970s. Relatively few theorists have analyzed and attempted to explain why federal agencies were created and how they were later reorganized. He points out that federal reorganization is often preceded by a "novelty event" of significant proportion, and that the majority of federal agencies, especially the largest and most important, were created in response to this significant event. He defines novelty as an unprecedented, large scale discontinuity. When it occurs, interest groups and government officials normally seek to understand its implications. Typically, questions are asked,

issues debated, and political conflict is prevalent. Grafton also indicates that novelties normally affect the lives of large numbers of people. The terrorist attacks of September 11th had an impact on the lives of millions of Americans throughout the nation. The reaction by federal officials to this attack on our homeland reinforces the hypothesis that novelty events of significant magnitude often result in major government reorganization.

Theorists during the past several decades have analyzed the governmental reorganizations of the 20th Century, and many have concluded that reorganization is initiated in an effort to gain governmental power or in response to a significant event or both. Contemporary theorists in the years preceding the terrorist attacks of 2001 also focused on the political nature of reorganization involving governmental attempts to address pressing problems or to seize executive control. Szanton (1981) theorizes that "Establishment of an executive department is basically a political act. It is one way of expressing national concern in dealing with urgent problems such as the energy crisis or symbolizing national commitment and values" (p. 37). Radin and Hawley (1988) indicate "Most twentieth century presidents … have made government reorganization a part of their search for executive control…" (p. 1).

In addressing the political battles associated with governmental reorganization, Garnett (1987) suggests major reorganizations are always controversial—the political stakes are high and the controversy is often great. He concludes that "These reorganization battles over structure, power, process, and doctrine have often been so pitched that opponents or advocates of reorganization have accused the opposition of insanity, tyranny, godlessness, naiveté, backwardness, and questionable ancestry" (Garnett, 1987, p. 35).

The traditional body of literature relating to U.S. governmental reorganization in general serves as an excellent foundation for providing initial insights pertaining to the institutionalization of homeland security organizations at the state level. Specific organizational theories that may have had a significant impact on the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations are also worthy of focus. These include adaptation, formal and informal cooptation, and the nature of bureaucracies, and are addressed in the sections that follow.

Adaptation and Cooptation in Organizations

In addition to understanding what actions motivate governmental reorganization and why it is accomplished, it is also relevant to understand the rationale for how governmental organizations evolve and take shape. In his book entitled *TVA and the Grass Roots,* Selznick (1949) addressed a variety of theories pertaining to organizations and organizational behavior. He theorizes that organizations are complex, and they adapt to deal with their environment. He also describes cooptation as a process absorbing new elements of policy in order to modify the organizational structure in an effort to avoid threats to its stability or existence. Selznick suggests that cooptation is a central force driving bureaucratic behavior and directly related to the established democratic principle of participation.

Selznick (1949) also describes organizational behavior relating to both formal and informal cooptation. Formal cooptation involves an attempt to obtain the consent of the governed in order to exercise control and retain power. In this regard, "crisis participation" might involve representation of various groups in councils of government

in an effort to gain support in a time of national crisis or stress. This technique may also be used to gain support for the implementation of new and controversial programs. On the other hand, informal cooptation might also be associated with a response to pressure from certain elements in a local community. Selznick theorizes that both formal and informal cooptation often result in a sharing of responsibility for programs through local participation in voluntary groups, associations, committees, and councils. He indicates adaptive responses relating to cooptation ultimately serve to change the character of the bureaucracy, the role of the organization, and involvement of its governing body.

Selznick's (1949) theories regarding adaptation and cooptation are relevant to the creation and reorganization of state level homeland security organizations since state level organization may have evolved as an adaptation of the federal model or other state models. Cooptation may often serve as a primary motivation for collaboration in the public setting, resulting in the creation of networked organizations in the shared power environment. It likely plays a role with regard to the various councils and committees with stakeholder participation that have been created in the state level homeland security arena.

Contemporary theorists have a new and controversial federal reorganization to analyze—creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. It is uncertain at this point whether scholars and political analysts will also focus their attention on the homeland security organizations that are being established the state level. Nevertheless, the study of the body of literature pertaining to government reorganization theory may offer insights regarding adaptation and other motivations for homeland security

reorganization at the state level. Additionally, understanding the nature of bureaucracies may shed light on ongoing state level organization and reorganization.

The Nature of Bureaucracy

In considering how organizations adapt and become institutionalized, the nature and characteristics of bureaucratic organizations is a relevant consideration. In this regard, Goodsell (2004) made significant contributions to the traditional literature pertaining to public organizations. Specifically, he addresses bureaucracies and their negative image, pointing out that a wide gap exists between their reputation and actual record. He argues that bureaucracy in general works quite well and many public organizations operate efficiently and effectively. In his writings, Goodsell defines bureaucracy in the macro sense as the various body of institutions within the public sector rather than public administration in general, an organization, or a specific process. This view of bureaucracy was in contrast to the traditional explanation which described bureaucracy as a hierarchical organization with specified functional attributes. His views contradict the traditional negative connotations associated with the word "bureaucracy." Goodsell (2004) makes a logical case in support of bureaucracy by pointing out that bureaucracy is not just one standard organizational model. In actuality, it is comprised of thousands of separate organizations. In reality, the various types of bureaucracies and their functions are significantly different. Public institutions in most instances have little to do with one another, and smaller governmental organizations are more common than larger organizations. Goodsell's theories support the likelihood of a significant difference between the federal homeland security organization and the various

organizational models at state level. His theories also support the possibility of significant variance among state level organizations depending on the size of the state, its demographics, and risk for terrorist attack.

Collaboration in the Public Sector

The second portion of this literature review addresses the contemporary body of literature pertaining to collaboration in the public sector. Collaboration is defined as the coordination accomplished in a shared power environment between individuals from multiple agencies located within the different levels of government. This portion of the literature review examines theories relating to intergovernmental relations and collaboration in the shared power environment. The evolution of federalism and intergovernmental relations through the years has fostered the necessity for collaboration between the various levels of government. As our country has matured and as our nation's problems have become more complex, collaboration in the contemporary shared power environment has become a fundamental building block for success in the public sector. Intergovernmental relations and the necessity for collaboration are discussed in the sections that follow.

Intergovernmental Relations

The evolution of federalism and intergovernmental relations within the United States necessitates the requirement for collaboration between the various levels of government. Recognized as the eminent scholar regarding federalism and intergovernmental relations, Wright (1988) provided early insights into the emerging

importance of collaboration, governance, and networking in public organizations. In addressing the future directions of public administration, he suggests that the complexity of our intergovernmental system will not allow for strategic solutions developed in a vacuum by the top levels of government. Instead, intergovernmental management of the future will be accomplished through the three defining concepts relating to problem solving, coping capabilities, and networking.

According to Kettl (2002), the theories of public administration have been built on a foundation of hierarchy and authority. The present structure of public administration is less hierarchical, and public officials manage less through authority and more often based on other methods. He argues that there is an emerging gap between the traditional study of public administration with regard to bureaucratic organizations and the way public administration is actually practiced today. In our contemporary setting, collaboration and the appropriate governance are becoming important factors in solving the most difficult problems in the public sector. Historically, theorists have sought to better understand public organizations by analyzing and understanding their hierarchical underpinnings. In the new collaborative environment of the 21st Century, it is now prudent to understand the new dynamics relating to collaborative organizations and their governance structures.

Contemporary literature reinforces the early insights provided by theorists such as Wright (1988) and Gray (1989) regarding the shifts in intergovernmental relations, improved cooperation between multiple levels of government, and the necessity for more and improved collaboration. Their predictions are revealed by a gradual shift in the existing theoretical base of knowledge relating to public organizations as indicated by

Kettl (2002). Instead of focusing exclusively on the traditional views of bureaucracy and hierarchical organizations, scholars are directing more and more of their attention to collaboration in the shared power environment of the 21st Century, and the networked organizations that are being created to solve the most difficult problems.

Collaboration in a Shared Power Environment

In her ground breaking work, Gray (1989) explained that managers must participate and interact in a collaborative manner. In this regard, she defines collaboration as "…a process in which those parties with a stake in the problem actively seek a mutually determined solution" (Gray, 1989, p. xviii). She indicates that "collaborating alliances" are a viable method for solving inter-organizational problems. Gray describes the five elements of joint decision-making that are critical to the process. They include:

- Stakeholders are interdependent;
- Solutions are achieved by dealing constructively with differences;
- Joint ownership of decisions is involved;
- Stakeholders assume collective responsibility for future direction; and
- Collaboration is an emerging process. (Gray, 1989, pp. 11-17)

In analyzing collaboration in a shared power environment, Gray (1989) develops the foundation for better understanding the entire process. In highlighting the new public environment, she describes the underlying motivations for collaboration, the process, the dynamics of politics and power, collaborative designs for solving shared problems, collaborative designs for resolving conflicts, and methods to overcome obstacles for

successful collaboration. According to Gray, "Central to the notion of collaboration is the concept of shared power. Stakeholders in a collaboration essentially share the power to define a problem and initiate action to solve it" (p. 112). She also provides a reminder that collaboration is not necessary if the political power and the resources necessary to solve a problem reside in one agency. In our modern shared power environment, collaboration and networked organizations appear to be a necessity for solving the most difficult problems.

The challenges relating to public administration in our emerging shared power environment may be analyzed from many perspectives. Prominent scholars have provided initial insights by focusing on emerging trends in intergovernmental relations, discussing collaboration as a method for solving inter-organizational problems, and analyzing the various aspects of leadership in a shared power environment. Building on these early themes, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) significantly add to the contemporary knowledge base with regard to collaboration in a shared power environment and collaborative public management. Their work goes beyond just stating the importance of intergovernmental management by providing a timely analysis and practical advice on how to manage the collaborative process. Agranoff and McGuire provide the contemporary definition of collaboration that is most often cited in a significant majority of journal articles and publications on the subject. They define collaboration as:

> …a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multiorganizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations. Collaboration is a purposive relationship

> designed to solve a problem by creating or discovering a solution within a given set of constraints. (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4)

They also indicate that the terms “collaboration” and “cooperation” should not be confused. Collaboration involves working jointly with other individuals and organizations to achieve an end. Cooperation means those who are working together seek to be helpful rather than hostile.

In making the case for collaboration, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) provide an extensive literature review of both the traditional and contemporary theorists that have contributed to their analysis of collaborative public management. They indicate relevant contributing research comes from the body of knowledge pertaining to intergovernmental relations, intergovernmental management, inter-organizational relations, policy implementation, and also from studies relating to economics and business. It is noteworthy that intergovernmental relations and collaboration between the different levels of government has been a gradual and evolutionary process. In this regard, the writings of Agranoff and McGuire on collaboration are based in part on the earlier work and theories of a host of prominent scholars including Lindblom (1959), Elazar (1964), Dahl (1967), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Wright (1988), Gray (1989), Mandell (1990), Kaufman (1991), Rose (1993), Kettl (1993), Milward (1996), O’Toole (1997), Bardach (1998), Wright and Krane (1998), and others.

As a result of their empirical studies and analysis, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) theorize that the skills and knowledge required for public officials to successfully operate in a collaborative setting are different than those required to manage a single organization. They also contend that if collaborative management is indeed different,

then it would be prudent to develop an extensive knowledge base similar to that which has well served the study of bureaucratic management over the past century. They agree with other scholars such as Kettl (1993), Milward (1996), and O'Toole (1997) who suggest that research and conceptualization regarding this core activity, now prominent in the public sector, must be accelerated. Finally, Agranoff and McGuire suggest that in order to adequately prepare public managers for operating in a collaborative setting, future research is required. At a minimum, research topics should address:

- Specific skills necessary for collaborative public management;
- Decision making in collaborative settings and how it might differ from traditional decision making models;
- Cohesion in collaborative management settings;
- Issues involving power, authority, and influence in collaborative management;
- Methods of accountability; and
- Effectiveness of collaboration and insights regarding whether collaboration actually produces results that would not have otherwise occurred in single, hierarchical organizations. (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003, pp. 175-196)

The *Public Administration Review* published a special edition in December 2006 entitled "Special Issue on Collaborative Public Management." It was devoted exclusively to exploring the topics associated with collaboration in the public sector. The articles provide insights on the complete spectrum of collaboration, including case studies that focus on different disciplines. This special edition provides a wealth of information regarding collaboration in a shared power environment and many of the articles provide insights relevant to this research.

In one of the *Public Administration Review* special edition articles, Perry and Thomson (2006) define the five dimensions of the collaboration process as governance, administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms. They suggest public managers must be familiar with these dimensions and manage them in order to collaborate effectively. Thomson and Perry indicate the collaboration process is complex and costly—collaboration for the sake of collaboration or in an attempt to achieve only individual organizational goals is likely to result in failure. They also conclude that the most costly resources of collaboration are time and energy rather than money. The time invested includes the actual time spent in the collaborative process and the lapsed time dealing with issues of accountability and other organizational priorities technically outside the collaborative process.

In another article in the *Public Administration Review* special edition, McGuire (2006) builds on his previous writings and his work with Agranoff in 2003, and indicates that research pertaining to collaborative public management is flourishing. Recent research points to the prevalence of collaboration in the public sector, helps identify the components of emerging collaborative structures, focuses on the managerial skills that are unique to collaborative management, and explores the effects of collaboration. With regard to the prevalence of collaboration, McGuire contends that public collaborative management is increasing in incidence and importance. He suggests it has also been occurring in the public sector for several decades.

While examining the next government required in the United States during the 21st Century, Kettl (2007) identifies several strategies for a new and more effective government. In this work, he specifically addresses a strategy for improved collaboration

and the greater use of networked organizations to solve difficult problems. Kettl used the immediate response to the September 11th terrorist attacks to highlight the new network strategy and to offer a case study, describing how public organizations can better support its citizens. He suggests that the first responder organizations in New York City were trapped in silos. They were unable to communicate with each other, and relationships were strained between fire and law enforcement communities. He contrasts this failure with a different model in Arlington County, Virginia where first responders had previously engaged in a collaborative process in order to plan for emergency situations. As a result, the agencies from various disciplines were more efficient and effective, working in a cooperative manner. The case study reveals that successful collaboration in a shared power environment is facilitated by collaborative networks with appropriate governance and steering processes.

Collaborative Networks

Collaborative networks are created to facilitate or encourage the process of collaboration. These networks may either be formal or informal. Informal networks typically involve the interaction of two or more individuals within different agencies in order to accomplish coordination and achieve cooperation with regard to common issues or programs. These informal networks are not formally chartered by the agency, and coordination between individuals in multiple agencies is typically conducted based on the personal initiative of managers or employees within the different organizations. Formal networks are created to foster or encourage collaboration between multiple agencies from the different levels of government. These networks are created in order to solve the most

difficult or complex problems in a shared power environment that cannot be solved or are not easily solved by a single agency. The literature review in the sections that follow addresses the necessity for collaborative governance and establishment of formal networked organizations. It also addresses the management challenges associated with these organizations.

Collaborative Governance

In a guide to collaborative governance published by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henton and Melville (2002) describe collaborative governance as:

> …an emerging set of concepts and practices that offers prescriptions for inclusive, deliberative, and often consensus-oriented approaches to planning, problem solving, and policymaking. Collaborative governance typically describes those processes in which government actors are participants and/or objects of the processes. (p. 1)

Collaborative governance is comprised of two basic concepts: collaboration and governance. Collaboration relies on cooperation to achieve common goals and normally involves working across boundaries in multi-sectors. Cooperation is typically based on reciprocity. Governance involves steering the process that influences actions and decisions in the private and public sectors.

In a bold declaration concerning the relevance of traditional models of bureaucracy and the modern movement towards collaborative governance, Henton and Melville (2002) indicate:

> The need for collaborative governance emerges as some of the basic premises of the industrial mode of thought become less evident. The legitimacy associated with traditional and bureaucratic authority is weakened as the inherent value of hierarchy is questioned. Instead, people are becoming more comfortable with the ideas of adaptation, experimentation, and decentralization. (p. 7)

In describing the emerging field of collaborative governance, Henton and Melville (2002) use a quote from Dahl's (1998) book entitled *On Democracy*, indicating that "Perhaps our institutions created in democratic countries during the nineteenth and twentieth century are no longer adequate. If so, then democracies will need to create new institutions to supplement the old" (p. 8). They also indicate that a complex adaptive system involving collaborative management often selects from a host of strategies to achieve desired outcomes. Selecting the relevant elements of various strategies often produces the best results. Outcomes typically result from a process of trial and error and through the interaction of individuals and organizations. In collaborative management, trial and error is often used to set agendas and make decisions. There is no one best way or proven methodology. Rather than attempting to achieve goals that are dictated by a group leader or higher authority, participants of a collaborative process often achieve outcomes using a bottom up approach, resulting from deliberation and participant selection of strategies.

Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) also focus on collaboration and the governance required for solving the most complex problems in the public sector. In addressing the components of structure and governance, they indicate that many scholars believe structure in collaborative organizations is significantly influenced by context or the

strategic purpose of the partnership or network. Additionally, structures may also be dynamic due to ambiguity relating to membership and participation or due to the complexity of the activity. Bryson et al. suggest the following propositions with regard to the structure and governance of collaborative organizations:

- Collaborative structure is influenced by environmental factors such as system stability and the collaboration's strategic purpose;
- Collaborative structure is likely to change over time because of ambiguity of membership and complexity in local environments;
- Collaboration structure and the nature of the tasks performed at the client level are likely to influence a collaboration's overall effectiveness; and
- Formal and informal governing mechanisms are likely to influence collaboration effectiveness. (p. 49)

As indicated by Henton and Melville (2002) and Bryson et al. (2006), governance is a key element in the collaborative process. These and other contemporary theorists report that collaboration in the shared power environment of the 21st Century is flourishing, and establishment of collaborative networked organizations with appropriate governance is fundamental for success.

Networked Organizations

Networked organizations have been created as result of the necessity for increased collaboration within the public sector. Collaborative networks or networked organizations are defined as the formal organizations that are established in order to facilitate or foster collaborative processes. These networks are created in order to solve

the most difficult and complex problems in a shared power environment that cannot be solved or easily solved by a single organization. The sections below examine the theories relating to networked organizations and the management of networks.

In 1990, an early article pertaining to the new shared power environment described the network form of organization as neither market nor hierarchy. Powell (1990) indicated that networked organizations are typified by patterns of communication and represent a viable form of organization in the years ahead. He contrasts the three modes of organization (market, hierarchy, and network) and made a case that each type is significantly different from the other types. Market organizations offer flexibility, opportunity, and choice. Hierarchical structures have clear departmental boundaries, defined lines of authority, and formal decision making procedures. They are well suited for mass production and distribution. Networked organizations are typically more agile than hierarchies, and transactions occur through networks of individuals rather than as a result of discrete exchanges or administrative directive. Networked organizations are particularly appropriate in situations when there is a need for efficient, reliable information and the problems are complex.

With regard to networked organization research, Powell (1990) indicates that additional qualitative material is required. This qualitative information would serve as a starting point for empirical study and would be helpful in the generation of new theory. He suggests that the networked form of organization based on collective action may be categorized as one in which:

- Cooperation can be sustained over the long run as an effective arrangement;

- Networks create incentives for learning and the dissemination of information, thus allowing ideas to be translated into action quickly;
- The open ended quality of networks is most useful when resources are variable and the environment uncertain; and
- Networks offer a highly feasible means of utilizing and enhancing such intangible assets as tacit knowledge and technological innovation. (p. 323)

In focusing on the future research agenda, Powell suggests a variety of possible topics and questions including:

- Is there a relationship between governance structures and state policies?
- Is there a discernable pattern regarding the emergence of networked organizations among diverse organizations?
- Do participants "experience" networks as qualitatively different from market transactions or careers in hierarchical firms?
- Do members of networks exhibit greater loyalty or commitment?
- Do participants in network arrangements face novel problems of control?
- How do people cope with relationships that are both collaborative and competitive?
- What are the liabilities of networks?
- When do networks create new levels of complexity that are incommensurate with their intended benefits?
- Does participation in a network arrangement alter one's orientation toward future collaboration? and

- Do the partners of a successful network relationship change their calculus and act in different ways because of this experience? (pp. 327-328)

Several years later, O'Toole (1997) reported that networked organizations are becoming more important in the world of public administration, and they are different in the respects that matter with regard to the conduct of administration. He explains networks as:

> …structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement. Networks exhibit some structural stability but extend beyond formally established linkages and policy-legitimated ties. The notion of network excludes mere formal hierarchies and perfect markets, but it includes a wide range of structures in between. (O'Toole, 1997, p. 45)

O'Toole also indicates that complex networks are relatively common and are likely to increase in importance and number. He suggests five reasons in support of this claim, including:

- Policies dealing with complex issues are likely to require networked structures for execution and complex issues are likely to remain on the policy agenda;
- The limitations often established to limit the reach of direct governmental intervention serve to encourage rather than dampen networked approaches;
- Political imperatives dictate networking beyond what might be required by policy objectives;

- As information is gained regarding the second order program effects of networked organizations, efforts have been made to capture the lessons learned and institutionalize the positive aspects; and
- Multiple policy mandates and cross cutting regulations provide another justification or incentive for networked management. (O'Toole, 1997, p. 45)

With regard to the descriptive agenda that might be required for networked organizations, O'Toole (1997) indicates three primary kinds of efforts are warranted. He believes we must determine what networks, and what kinds of networks, can be found in today's administrative settings; examine the historical dimension of network formation and development; and explore the array of networks in a broadly comparative perspective.

O'Toole (1997) concludes by indicating models of networked organizations "…must combine both vertical elements of hierarchy and the horizontal components of functionally induced interdependence" (p. 49). He suggests the research agenda must include the following questions:

- How much of a manager's time and effort are devoted to the network context?
- Which kinds of managers are engaged in networked relationships and from what fields?
- What do managers do to seek influence within their networks?
- What types of policy programs and problems are appropriate for networks?
- What types of network structures presently exist?

- Do certain strategies or tactics for network management practiced by public administrators seem to be more successful? and
- What are the types of policy problems addressed in the network context that are a marked deviation from the stability provided by the hierarchical organization? (O'Toole, 1997, p. 50)

Agranoff and McGuire (2001) provide additional insights concerning networked organizations and describe a changing intergovernmental system in terms of the new network model that is emerging. This model involves the interaction of multiple interdependent government and nongovernmental organizations pursuing joint action. They describe a network model that involves governance and public policy making consisting of various actors including individuals, coalitions, and organizations. Networks are often comprised of a variety of public and private organizations, and each has its own goals and policy strategies. Within the network, there are often no predefined relationships, no pre-established goals or policies, and no single actor that provides overall command and control. The various parties reach joint decisions regarding direction, operations, and governance. The role of management in the network model involves problem resolution and creating an atmosphere for interaction. This model also includes the necessity for creating an environment for better coordination and improved communication. In outlining their network model, Agranoff and McGuire describe a new facet of public management in which public organizations have entered the information age. The foundation of the new model is a system of networked organizations. They suggest that "While bureaucracy was the hallmark of the industrial age,

interorganizational teamwork and networks are the hallmark of the information age" (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, p. 679).

Wise (2002) also provides insights concerning the relevance of traditional models of bureaucracy and the movement towards networks and collaborative organizations. He cites prominent theorists including Selznick (1966), Thompson (1967), Hall (1996), Rainey (1997), Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and others, indicating that government managers often create or rely on organizational structures within their comfort zone when performance criteria are unclear, technologies are poorly understood, and the environment is uncertain or complex.

Wise (2002) suggests the federal homeland security organization should be built based on the emerging networked model rather than on the traditional hierarchical model. He also indicates the role of managers working in networked organizations will be different than that of managers working in traditional organizations. Managers will have to employ significant leadership and managerial skills in networked models in order to overcome the myriad of obstacles and complex problems associated with the homeland security environment.

In a paper in the *Public Administration Review* December 2006 special edition, Agranoff (2006) discussed the findings of an empirical study of 14 networks and provides 10 practical lessons for public managers. The lessons are based on the feedback from the managers who participated in the empirical study, and Agranoff stresses the importance of obtaining insights from government managers who are actually working in networked environments. He indicates that issues are derived from a methodology of grounded theory, and theoretical findings are generated from field based data and

qualitative information. As a result, methodology must place significant emphasis on the input from public managers who are actually engaged in network activities. Agranoff's lessons for public managers indicate:

- Networked organizations are not the only vehicle for collaboration;
- Managers continue to do most of their work within the hierarchy;
- Networks offers advantages in order to keep busy administrators involved;
- Networks are different from organizations but not completely different;
- Not all networks make the types of policy and program adjustments suggested in contemporary literature;
- Collaborative decisions or agreements are the products of mutual learning and adjustment;
- The most distinctive collaborative activity of all of the networks is their work in public sector knowledge management;
- Despite the cooperative spirit and aura of accommodation in collaborative efforts, networks still have conflicts and power issues;
- Networks have collaborative costs and benefits; and
- Networks alter the boundaries of the state only in the most marginal ways; they do not appear to be replacing public bureaucracies. (p. 56-62)

Agranoff (2006) indicates that in his earlier work with McGuire in 2003, they defined collaborative management in a networked environment as "…the process of facilitating and operating in multi organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations" (p. 56). According to

Agranoff, the study of networks must go beyond considering informal networking among individuals. Future research must focus on networking in inter-organizational or intergovernmental entities that emerge based on the interaction between formal organizations.

Agranoff (2006) also suggests that networked organizations share a place along side thousands of interagency agreements and are not necessarily the only answer with regard to collaborative management. He indicates there are many forms of collaboration, but legitimate studies of formal networked organizations should actually focus the networks described within the definition. Agranoff reports some scholars have suggested that networks are different and are replacing bureaucracies. In actuality, managers have found a mixture of the old and new organizational practices. He indicates networks are different in the sense that they are non-hierarchical and the members at the table accomplish actions using consensus. Networks are not different from traditional organizations in the sense that they must be managed and require governance, organization, rules, procedures, structure, goals, and objectives.

Based on his research, Agranoff (2006) concludes there is much less difference between networks and hierarchies that might have initially been envisioned. He points out that some scholars have suggested that networks are replacing bureaucracies, but this does not seem to be the case. Networked organizations exist to support traditional bureaucracies, and governmental officials are typically the core participants in the network. Networks facilitate solutions to complex problems, but governmental organizations often retain the fundamental power with regard to decision making.

Although this research focuses on state level networked organizations, a recent study in Florida may offer insights from a different vantage point regarding collaboration and regional networked organizations that have been created in that state. Caruson, MacManus, Kohen, and Watson (2005) indicate the new requirements of homeland security have placed significant demands on our system of federalism. Successful implementation requires cooperation and coordination between all levels of government. In an effort to study the dynamics of intergovernmental cooperation, they surveyed city and county officials in Florida to identify the organizational structures that might be most effective in promoting coordination in the complex environment of homeland security. The research reveals that the most complex regions have more networks, regions with the greatest risk or vulnerability report improvements in intergovernmental cooperation as a result of these networks, and regions with strong networks report higher levels of homeland security preparedness. Caruson et al. conclude that the regional approach within the homeland security arena fosters intergovernmental cooperation and results in strong networked organizations.

The contemporary theorists highlighted above report that collaboration in the shared power environment of the 21st Century is flourishing. They also suggest that networked organizations are being created in record numbers to solve the most difficult and complex problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by a single organization. While numbers of networked organizations and their size are increasing, the management of these networks is becoming increasingly important in order to ensure success.

Network Management

In focusing on network management and the managerial resources devoted to networking, McGuire (2002) explains the term "network" is used to categorize joint situations where multiple organizations must rely on each other to perform a task. The term describes administrative structures involving multiple nodes, including both agencies and organizations with multiple linkages. The term "network management" is used to convey the steering function of government which is different than the command and control managerial processes in a bureaucracy. In this regard, the public manager charged with managing the process and achieving a specific goal in a networked environment must be aware of the most critical activities. These critical activities typically relate to operations and include:

- Identifying and working with the proper players and resources;
- Keeping the players committed;
- Defining the roles of players; and
- Facilitating effective interaction among the players. (McGuire, 2002, p. 600)

McGuire (2002) indicates the most important research agenda pertaining to network management involves a simple but elusive question: "Do the actions of a manager contribute to the effectiveness of multiorganizational arrangements, and if so, how" (p. 600)? He suggests that measuring management in networks is often difficult because managerial resources devoted to network structures are fluid. The managerial resources devoted to a given networked project vary across time and space. McGuire indicates that research agenda for network management must also include a description of the behaviors chosen by the network manager, an explanation of why managers make

such choices, and an evaluation of these choices (when, why, and how network managers behave).

In a pamphlet entitled *Leveraging Networks: A Guide for Public Managers Working Across Organizations*, Agranoff (2003) indicates:

> Network management is considered to be a different type of non-hierarchical management, where information and expertise is substituted for authority structure, through a self-organizing process, held together by mutual obligation that develops over time, by reaching consensus-based decisions, and by blending knowledge bases from different organizational arenas into innovative technologies that can become the "DNA" of networks. (p. 6)

In this pamphlet, Agranoff describes his research that examined 12 networks operating in the Midwest states and analyzed the findings to provide a guide for public managers who work in a networked environment. The study attempted to determine if managers operate differently in networked organizations than they do in their hierarchical organization, and whether management is different in the two types of organizations. The research study focused on several questions, including:

- How do public managers promote networks?
- What management processes are different and tend to replace traditional approaches in networked organizations?
- How do managers working across organizational lines replace authority with trust and mutual understanding?
- How do network managers broker decisions and results? What processes are required to reach agreement and decisions?

- How are technical information, knowledge, and expertise mobilized to promote information exchange? and
- What advice can network managers offer public managers regarding various techniques that have been successful? (Agranoff, 2003, p. 8)

The managers involved in Agranoff's (2003) case studies were asked to provide suggestions regarding operations in a networked environment compared to managing in a single organization. This offered managers an opportunity to contrast the differences in management between that in traditional hierarchical and networked organizations. The lessons learned from this study include:

- Effective network participants must represent and strike a balance between the parent agency and the network;
- Network participants must take a share of the administrative burden;
- The work in networks must be orchestrated rather than free flowing;
- Participants in a network must recognize shared expertise-based authority;
- Network members must stay within the decision bounds of the network;
- Participants must accommodate and adjust while at the same time, maintaining focus on the ultimate purpose or goal;
- Networks must be as creative as possible and think outside the box;
- Members of networked organizations must be patient and use the complete range of interpersonal skills;
- Networks must continually recruit for new members and subject matter experts as the scope of knowledge increases and problems become more complex;

- The incentives and benefits of working in a networked environment must be continually emphasized in order to maintain appropriate participation. (Agranoff, 2003, pp. 28-31)

Summary

This chapter addressed the body of literature and the theories pertaining to institutionalization of governmental organizations, collaboration in the public sector, and the networked organizations operating in a shared power environment. With regard to the institutionalization of governmental organizations, it examined the traditional literature relating to U.S. governmental reorganization in general, and focused on organizational theories relating specifically to adaptation, cooptation, and the nature of bureaucracies. The second portion of the literature review addressed the contemporary body of literature pertaining to collaboration in the public sector. It examined topics relating to intergovernmental relations, collaboration in the shared power environment, and collaborative governance. The final section focused on networked organizations and network management. It examined the collaborative organizations that have been created in shared power and multi-jurisdictional environments to solve the most difficult problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by one organization.

While Chapter II provides an overarching review of the theoretical body of literature pertaining to institutionalization, collaboration, and networked organizations, Chapter III narrows the focus and highlights the federal and state reorganization for homeland security. It provides a historical background, briefly tracing the homeland security evolution in the United States during the past several years. It also addresses the

actions that may have influenced the creation and institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL REVIEW: FEDERAL AND STATE REORGANIZATION FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Authors during the past several decades focused on the governmental reorganizations of the 20th Century, and have typically concluded that federal reorganization within the United States has been accomplished as a means to achieve political power or in response to a significant event or both. Theorists in 21st Century have had a new and controversial federal reorganization to analyze—creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. It is uncertain whether scholars and political analysts will also focus their attention on the organizations that have been created, or on the reorganizations that are inevitable at the state level. Since the federal reorganization for homeland security likely influenced state level reorganization, it is appropriate to consider both the federal homeland security evolution and the other possible influences on state level homeland security organizations.

This chapter provides a historical review and briefly traces the homeland security evolution in the United States during the past several years. In order to address other possible sources of influence regarding the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations, it also briefly examines our nation's first homeland security strategy published in 2002, a collection of state reports complied by the Office of Homeland Security in the same year, U.S. Government Accountability Office reports,

federal homeland security policy guidance to states, federal grant guidance, National Governors Association reports, and other materials.

Influences on Homeland Security Reorganization at the Federal and State Levels

The formal organizational structure for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security can trace its roots from two prominent commissions that were chartered in late 1990s— the Gilmore Commission and Hart-Rudman Commission. Both commissions provided warnings concerning the escalation of terrorism and the likelihood of a major terrorist event within the continental United States. They also provided recommendations pertaining to the reorganization required by the federal government which would be necessary to deter terrorism but provided little insight regarding reorganization that might be required at that state level. A summary of the most significant findings and references to both the federal and state level organization for homeland security is provided in the paragraphs that follow.

The Gilmore Commission

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction commonly known as the Gilmore Commission was chartered by the U.S. Congress in 1998. The material summarized in the paragraphs below and a complete history of this panel including its charter, an executive summary, enabling legislation, panel members, new releases, and its five annual reports are located on the RAND Corporation internet website in the National Security Research Division section. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Attorney General, the

Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency entered into a contract with the RAND Corporation National Defense Research Institute to establish the advisory panel. The advisory panel was chaired by former Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore, and he was assisted by a representative panel of 17 members (James Clapper, Jr., Paul Bremer, Raymond Downey, George Foresman, William Garrison, Ellen M. Gordon, James Greenleaf, William Jenaway, William Jones, Paul Maniscalco, Ronald Neubauer, Kathleen O'Brien, Dr. Patricia Quinlisk, Patrick Ralston, William Reno, Dr. Kenneth Shine, and Ellen Embry). The Gilmore Commission's study involved assessing our capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction within the United States, and recommending strategies for ensuring effective coordination and response by all levels of government. Specifically, the Congressional charter required the advisory panel to:

- Assess federal efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
- Assess the progress of federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
- Assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications equipment and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions;
- Recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts;

- Recommend strategies for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; and
- Assess the appropriate roles of state and local governments in funding effective local response capabilities.

In compliance with this charter, the Gilmore Commission examined response and recovery capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Significant focus and emphasis was placed on the latter two levels. The advisory panel provided annual reports to the President and Congress starting in December 1999. Five reports were presented to Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and the U.S. Congress each December from 1999 through 2003. Of the advisory panel's 164 recommendations, approximately 90% have been adopted, either partially or in total, by the federal government.

In its first report on December 15, 1999, the Gilmore Commission provided an alarming and eye opening prediction of the future in the opening lines of the preface, indicating:

> Many government officials and concerned citizens believe that "it is not a question of *if*, but *when*" an incident will occur that involves the use by a terrorist of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapon—a so-called "weapon of mass destruction" (WMD)—that is designed, intended, or has the capability to cause "mass destruction" or "mass casualties". (p. i)

The advisory panel concluded that the United States must have a viable national strategy in order to develop comprehensive and truly integrated national domestic preparedness plans to combat terrorism. The plan must recognize that the federal role will be defined

by the severity of the incident but will generally be supportive of state and local authorities. The plan must also recognize that the state and local authorities have traditionally had and will continue to have the fundamental responsibility for response. Finally, the panel concluded that the plan must clearly distinguish federal, state, and local roles and responsibilities and articulate clear direction for federal programs and priorities.

In its 2000 annual report, the Gilmore Commission indicated that in the past five years there have at least six Congressional attempts aimed at reorganizing the Executive Branch in order to better combat the emerging terrorist threat. Each of these attempts failed. The report indicated that the federal government's programs and organization for combating terrorism is uncoordinated, fragmented, and politically unaccountable. The advisory panel also strongly recommended creation of an office of homeland security within the President's Executive Office. The panel suggested that this new office should not take operational control from the existing agencies within the federal structure.

The three remaining annual reports continued to build on the foundations established in the first two reports. In its 2001 report, the Gilmore Commission focused on improving health and medical capabilities, improving immigration and border control, clarifying the roles and missions of the use of the military, improving security against cyber attacks, and improving state and local capabilities through grant programs established to provide equipment and training for weapons of mass destruction and all hazards. In its 2002 report, the Gilmore Commission focused on establishing a national counter terrorism center and organizing intelligence resources at the federal level, improving health and medical capabilities, defending against agricultural terrorism, improving the protection of our critical infrastructure, and establishing appropriate

structures, roles, and missions for the Department of Defense. In its fifth and final report in 2003, the Gilmore Commission provided a road map for "America's new normalcy" and several benchmarks that should be achieved within the next five years. These include further empowerment of individual freedoms with regard to measurable advances to secure the homeland; improved ability at all levels to prevent terrorist attacks; a standardized process for information sharing among all stakeholders; improved preparedness and readiness across state and local governments and the private sector; an improved definition of the acceptable uses of the military domestically; identification of standard processes for engaging academia, business, and all levels of government in implementing research, development, and standards across the technology and public policy arenas; and well defined plans for protecting the nation's critical infrastructures.

Although the advisory panel did not directly address the requirement for a state level homeland security organization or recommend an appropriate structure, it certainly opened the door for the discussion based on the topics it addressed in its five reports. The topics included an analysis of who's in charge during an emergency event, the proper organization at the federal level to deal with Congress and matters of homeland security, and empowering state and local response. The key principles repeated throughout each of the panel's reports also point to the importance of the role of state and local government in the homeland security arena and set the stage for discussions at the state level regarding the proper organization for homeland security. Three of the panel's key principles relevant to this research include:

- All terrorist events are local and require close coordination between federal and state authorities;

- To be most effective, plans and programs should be built based on state and local management structures and command and control mechanisms; and
- Effective preparedness for combating terrorism (planning, training, exercises, and operational structures) requires a fully integrated network for federal, state, and local organizations.

Based on these stated principles, it appears the advisory panel considered organizations and management structures as an important element in the homeland security equation. The panel also emphasized the idea that federal, state, and local organizations must work together in a close partnership and collaborative efforts must be supported by a network homeland security organizations at each level, but they fell short in addressing the types of organizations that might be useful at the state level.

The Hart-Rudman Commission

While the Gilmore Commission was engaged in assessing our capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents and focusing on our national strategy, another committee was busy analyzing our future national security requirements. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century commonly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission was chartered by the Secretary of Defense in 1998. The material summarized in the paragraphs below and the primary works of this commission are located at the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century internet web site.

The Hart-Rudman Commission's charter was to accomplish a comprehensive review of the U.S. national security requirements for the next century. Former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman served as the commission's co-chairs and 12

commissioners (Newt Gingrich, James Schlesinger, Andrew Young, John Galvin, Norman Augustine, Anne Armstrong, John Dancy, Leslie Gelb, Lee Hamilton, Donald Rice, Harry Train, and Lionel Olmer) were appointed to the panel. Phase I of the study was completed in September 1999 and focused on the future security environment and understanding how the world would likely change during the next 25 years. Phase II of the study was completed in April 2000 and focused on the national security strategy to cope with that world. The strategy addressed the future, specifically how to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities that will constantly confront our nation. Phase III of the study was completed in January 2001 and was aimed at reforming government structures in order to implement that strategy. This phase specifically focused on changes to the national security structure and the security related processes. The intent was to provide recommendations which would enable our national security structure and its organizations to deter terrorist activity and protect our citizens in the future security environment.

In order to make credible recommendations to improve the national security apparatus, the commission determined that it would be necessary to first understand the existing national security structure and processes. The document, entitled the *Road Map for National Security,* was developed to provide the description of our national security organizations and processes as they existed in mid-2000. The addendum consists of seven volumes and analyzes key organizations and processes in federal government, including both interagency and inter-branch levels. The volumes provide a valuable reference source for researchers who are interested in the existing federal organizational structures and processes at that time. It also provides key observations and overarching

processes, and a summary of the security related functions and activities performed by the Executive Office of the President, Congress, Department of Defense, Department of State, the intelligence community, and other Executive Branch offices.

With regard to the overall findings, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century final report in 2001 warned bluntly that terrorists will attack the U.S. with chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons within the next 25 years. They outlined significant reorganizations for the Pentagon, State Department, National Security Council and other agencies, saying these organizations had become bloated and were unfocused. The report even urged Congress to streamline its own committee structure to minimize its interference in national security matters. Finally, the commission also recommended "… creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security" (U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001, p. viii). Although the study focused on the necessity for new federal organizational mechanisms, the roles and missions of local and state organizations were also addressed and emphasized.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 provided the impetus for change and set in motion a national debate, resulting in the strengthening of homeland security capabilities throughout the United States. Both commissions concluded that the responsibility for homeland security must reside at all levels of the U.S. government—federal, state, and local. In analyzing the findings of the two commissions with regard to their recommendations for federal reorganization, Wise (2002) indicated:

> Even though the issue of organization for homeland security involves the question of the organization of a headquarters under the president, it extends considerably beyond that. In fact, the organization issue of homeland security implicates the organizations of various venues, including the organization of individual federal departments and agencies, state and local governmental organizations, and private sector organizations, as well as their relationships with each other. (p. 2)

Clearly, the federal reorganization for homeland security would ultimately cause a ripple effect, resulting in the creation of new organizations and reorganizations at the state and local levels of government. Although neither commission specified the exact types of organizations that might be required at the state level, both concluded that homeland security organizations would be required at all levels of government to successfully combat the terrorist threat. Other organizations such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) may have influenced both the federal and state reorganization for homeland security. The influence of the GAO and several of its reports are highlighted in the paragraphs that follow.

U.S. Government Accountability Office Reports

In its reports and testimony to Congress during the past several years, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has often discussed the federal reorganization for homeland security but provided only an occasional mention regarding the requirements for state level homeland security organizations. The GAO works for Congress, conducts congressionally directed studies, and evaluates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars. Clearly, the GAO focuses on the activities of

federal agencies, but they also often address the implications of federal programs that extend to the state and local levels. The GAO web site lists over 350 GAO homeland security related reports and congressional testimonies that were prepared during the period September 2001 through June 2007. These reports address a wide range of homeland security topics from airport security to interoperable communications, from science and technology to the cost of vulnerability assessments, and from anthrax detection to infrastructure protection. Several reports discuss the necessity for a national homeland security policy and the organizational issues relating to the new federal organization. In the early stages of the Congressional debate regarding the federal homeland security reorganization, the GAO (2002) published a report entitled *Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues*. The report summary indicates:

> The government faces a unique opportunity to create an organization that is extremely effective in protecting the nation's borders and citizens against terrorism. There is likely to be considerable benefit over time from restructuring some of the homeland security functions, including reducing risk and improving the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of consolidated agencies and programs….The new department will need to articulate a clear overarching mission and core values, establish a short list of initial critical priorities, develop effective communication and information systems, and produce an overall implementation plan for the new national strategy and related reorganization. (GAO, 2002, ¶ 1)

GAO reports make occasional reference regarding the critical role of state and local partners in the homeland security process, but they make no mention of the

organizational structures that might be required at the state level to implement the multimillion dollar federal programs related to homeland security. As an example, in a 2002 report entitled *Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership*, the GAO (2002) indicated that although coordination at all levels has improved, "…concerns remain particularly with state and local government and collaboration with the private sector needs greater emphasis" (¶ 2). More recently, a report entitled *Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents* reinforced the necessity for improved coordination, indicating:

> Effective emergency preparedness and response for major events requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple players from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as nongovernmental entities. Effective emergency preparedness and response requires putting aside parochialism and working together prior to and after an emergency incident. (GAO, 2006, ¶ 1)

GAO reports highlight the necessity for improved coordination and cooperation with state and local officials. They also point out the critical role of state and local partners in the homeland security process, but make no mention of organizations that might be required at the state level to implement the new federal programs.

Other Literature

In addition to GAO studies, books and handbooks published in the last five years also provide some information regarding the spectrum of homeland security topics,

including occasional references to organizational issues. As is the case in other sources, the information found in homeland security related reference materials primarily focuses on the organizational structure at the federal level. This literature typically has little or no mention of state level homeland security organizations.

White and Collins (2006) edited an excellent handbook that provides an introduction to the many aspects of homeland security. It addresses a host of homeland security related issues, but the four chapters pertaining to organizational development are limited to the federal structure with no mention of state level.

Kamien (2006) provides an even more comprehensive homeland security handbook, containing 72 chapters contributed by various authors. The book begins by addressing Al-Qaeda, global jihad, and terrorism beyond Al-Qaeda. An entire section with several chapters is devoted to the role of government, but there is no mention of the organizational requirements of state level homeland security organizations. The remaining sections of the book address other homeland security topics such as intelligence analysis, risk management, critical infrastructure, emergency management, medical preparedness, science and technology, civil liberties, politics, and the role of the private sector. This and most other homeland security related books in print today address the federal homeland security organization and its structure. They typically make little or no reference to state level organizations.

In his fifth edition textbook, White (2006) addresses a myriad of topics regarding terrorism and homeland security. He also identifies the leading terrorism subject matter experts, highlights their theories, and provides a balanced analysis regarding the motivations for terrorism, the threats resulting from terrorist groups, and the various

religious, ideological, nationalistic, and ethnic terrorist movements currently taking place around the world. The Hawala system and international terrorism, drug trafficking and terrorism, the impact of the media on terrorism, various types of possible terrorist attacks (chemical, biological, technological, cyber, and nuclear), the new economy of terrorism, models of suicide bombing, the evolution of jihadist networks, the U.S. Patriot Act and civil liberties, and the organization and functions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security are the major topics that are addressed. The material pertaining to the US DHS provides only a brief overview of the federal organization and offers no mention of the requirement for state and local organizations.

Institutionalization of Homeland Security Organizations at the State Level

In addition to tracing the federal homeland security evolution in the United States, it is also important to examine other sources that possibly influenced institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations in the past several years. The remainder of Chapter III briefly examines our nation's first homeland security strategy published in 2002, the updated strategy published in 2007, the FY03 Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program, US DHS policy guidance, US DHS information bulletins, US DHS annual grant guidance, US DHS Program and Capability Review, and several homeland security related reports published by the National Governors Association.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security

Our nation's first homeland security strategy, entitled *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)*, was published and distributed by the Office of Homeland

Security in July 2002. Its stated purpose was to mobilize and organize our nation in order to secure our homeland from terrorist attacks in the future. The strategic objectives in priority order included preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and providing for a speedy recovery if attacks do occur. After addressing the purpose, objectives, and emerging threats and vulnerabilities, the strategy continued with an entire chapter focused on organizing for a secure homeland. The organization chapter of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)* started by providing a reminder that:

> American democracy is rooted in the precepts of federalism—a system of government in which our state governments share power with federal institutions. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states and to the people all power not specifically delegated to the federal government. Our structure of overlapping federal, state, and local governance…. provides unique opportunities and challenges. To meet the terrorist threat, we must increase collaboration and coordination…. Each level of government must coordinate with the other levels to minimize redundancies in homeland security actions and ensure integration of efforts. (p. 11-12)

With regard to intergovernmental coordination, the strategy indicates there is a vital need for significant cooperation between federal, state and local governments on a scale never previously required. In outlining the necessity for support from other elements of government, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)* states:

> Because of our large number of local governments, the federal government must look to state governments to facilitate close coordination and cooperation among

> all levels of government—federal, state, and local. Therefore, the President calls on each governor to establish a single Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) for the state, to serve as his or her primary coordinating body with the federal government. The HSTFs would provide a collaborative, cost effective structure for effectively communication to all organizations and citizens. They would help streamline and coordinate all federal, regional, and local programs. They would also fit neatly into the regional emergency response network that the Department of Homeland Security would inherit from FEMA. (p. 14)

With this verbiage, the President called for a homeland security coordinating committee in each state to serve as the primary agent for coordination with the federal government. In additional to providing governance for state level homeland security matters, its mission would involve collaboration, coordination, and communication. Although the exact structure of this state level task force was not defined, the implication seemed clear—a homeland security organization of some nature would be required to coordinate the federal, regional, and local programs and to manage a myriad of details associated with the administration of federal homeland security grant programs.

In October 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security published an update to the *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)* entitled the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. The stated intent was for the new strategy to guide and organize our homeland security efforts. The purpose of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* was to provide a common framework for federal, state, local and private sector partners and to focus the nation's homeland security efforts on four goals: prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key

resources; respond to and recover from incidents that occur; and continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long term success.

One of the major goals of this strategy, strengthening the foundation, addresses the systems and institutions that support activities to secure the homeland. In this case, the "institutions" referred to the U.S. Congress and the national policy suggested that Congress should streamline the organization and structure of the numerous committees that authorize and appropriate funds for homeland security funding. No mention is made of state level organizations charged with response and recovery.

This 2007 national strategy stresses the necessity for shared responsibility and reiterates the critical role of state and local governments with regard to protecting and defending our nation. It specifically mentions our constitutional foundations of limited government, requiring significant participation, responsibilities and capabilities of state and local governments. The reference regarding federalism serves as a reminder that the federal government will probably prescribe the direction of the major programs but will rely on the state's prerogative to properly structure and create organizations to best execute these programs within the jurisdiction. Although this new strategy reiterated the critical role of state and local governments with regard to protecting and defending our nation, it did not specifically address the types of organizations or the collaborative structures that might be required at the state level.

State and Local Actions for Homeland Security

In July 2002 as the first homeland security national policy was being distributed, the Office of Homeland Security also published a companion document entitled *State and*

Local Actions for Homeland Security. In his transmittal letter, former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge indicated:

> All disasters are ultimately state and local events. A key objective of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* is to develop a framework that ensures vertical coordination between local, state and federal authorities so that our actions are mutually supportive…. Partnerships at every level of government, and with the private sector, are key to the success of the homeland security effort. (¶ 3)

This document provides a narrative summary of the ongoing homeland security activities for each state, including identification of the state homeland security advisor, a description of the state's organization for homeland security and the terrorism related councils that had been created in the months following the terrorist attacks, and a summary of ongoing initiatives and priorities. This state by state accounting of homeland security related activities provided the first insight regarding the evolving state level reorganization that had been accomplished to address the federal requirements of an evolving federal homeland security program. Table 1 summarizes the organizational location of the state homeland security advisor (HSA) for each of the 50 states as of July 2002.

The collection of state reports complied by the Office of Homeland Security and published in the document entitled *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security* offers an excellent initial baseline and interesting snapshot regarding how states organized for homeland security in the weeks and months immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11th. It also provides valuable insights regarding homeland security

Table 1
Organizational Location of State Homeland Security Advisors as of July 2002

Title or Location	Frequency	Percentage
Existing Staff HSA Designations (Most Common)		
The Adjutant General	12	24
Director of Public Safety	12	24
Director of Emergency Management	7	14
	31	62
Existing Staff HSA Designations (Least Common)		
Lieutenant Governor	2	4
Governor's Chief of Staff	1	2
State Attorney General	1	2
	4	8
New HSA Designations		
Homeland Security Office	8	16
Special Advisor to Governor	4	8
HS Task Force	3	6
	15	30

Note. Summary of information from the Office of Homeland Security, 2002, *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security*, pp. 5-112.
n = 50.

governance and other collaborative committees with multi-agency participation that were initially created at the state level.

Based on the data provided in the *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security* document, the majority of governors (70%) designated an existing cabinet level official or member of the staff to serve as the Homeland Security Advisor (HSA) rather than appointing a new individual. In most states (62%), governors initially appointed homeland security advisors from three primary departments within state government: the State Military Department, the Department of Public Safety, and the Emergency Management Agency. In some states (8%), governors initially appointed other existing officials such as the Lieutenant Governor, the Chief of Staff or the Attorney General to serve as the HSA. Only 30% of governors appointed a special advisor or created a new homeland security office or task force to focus on homeland security related issues.

With regard to governance, the majority of governors (85%) created an ad hoc task force or council to address homeland security matters. Governors in the remaining states incorporated homeland security planning and responsibility into an existing advisory committee. Of the 41 states reporting the use of homeland security task forces and advisory councils, most reported participation exclusively by state officials. Only three states (7%) reported federal agency participation or collaboration within these councils.

During the same timeframe in which the state homeland security task forces were being created, the Federal Bureau of Investigation created a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in each of its regions, and the U.S. Attorney created an Antiterrorism Task Force (ATTF) in each state. The charters for both the JTTF and the ATTF encourage

representation from the appropriate federal, state and local agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney have at least one jurisdiction in most states. As a result, each state would have at least one JTTF and one ATTF operating within their jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that only six states mentioned participation in either the JTTF or ATTF in the *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security* document. It appears interagency coordination between the federal and state levels may have been minimal at this point in time since only a few states (18%) reported participation in either the federal or state steering committees. Table 2 provides an indication of the homeland security governance, including the task forces and advisory councils that were created in the nine months following September 11th.

Table 2
State Level Homeland Security Governance as of July 2002

Type of HS Governing Body	Frequency	Percentage
HS Task Force (new ad hoc)	35	85
HS Advisory Council (existing)	6	15

Note. Summary of information from the Office of Homeland Security, 2002, *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security*, 2002, pp. 5-112.
n = 41.

Following publication of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)* and *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security,* Wise (2002) predicted the federal homeland security reorganization would have significant implications, creating organizational issues at the state and local levels. The prediction proved accurate, but the

literature of the past several years provides only an occasional reference regarding the necessity to organize at the state level. There seems to have been no public debate regarding the range of organizational alternatives or discussion of specific organizational requirements at the state level. The document prepared by the Office of Homeland Security in 2002 entitled *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security* is an excellent source document regarding the initial homeland security organizations at the state level. It provides an excellent point of departure for research pertaining to the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations and a good initial indication of where homeland security advisors were located within state structures.

FY03 Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program

The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) was one of the 22 federal agencies initially realigned under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security when the department was initially created by Congress. In FY03 and at the infant stage of organization for homeland security at the state level, ODP announced a major needs assessment entitled the *FY03 Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program*. Its stated purpose was to assess threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities related to preparedness for terrorist incidents involving use of weapons of mass destruction at the state and local levels. This early planning requirement for state and local jurisdictions may have contributed to institutionalizing the necessity for a formal and more robust homeland security organization at the state level. The needs assessment was complex, comprehensive, and not easily accomplished or managed by a part time staff. It was certainly not a project

that could be legitimately accomplished simply by the oversight of a homeland security committee or council that met on a monthly or quarterly basis.

The FY03 ODP needs assessment was developed around the six critical mission areas as defined by the *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002).* These include intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response. The ODP survey was developed in coordination with several federal agencies and professional associations including the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Governors Association, and the National Association of Counties. The stated purpose of the ODP assessment was to allow the federal government to obtain vital information on the capabilities and needs of emergency responders on a national scale, serve as a planning tool for state and local jurisdictions, and assist ODP and its partners in improving allocation of federal resources for homeland security.

The ODP needs assessment was an extremely lengthy, complex, comprehensive, and optimistic undertaking. It consisted of 240 pages of questions and 100 pages of instructions, references, and definitions. The primary questions for data collection related to the identification of potential targets and potential incidents by category (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive). The primary assessment questions related to weapons of mass destruction response capabilities and the training required for each first responder discipline. There was also a comprehensive set of questions relating to the equipment requirements for each of the 10 responder disciplines (law enforcement, emergency medical, emergency management, fire services, hazardous materials, public

works, government administration, public safety communications, healthcare, and public health). Finally, the major tasks within each discipline were subdivided into the following areas: plans, organization, equipment, training, and exercises. Each task was divided into event subcategories relating to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive. The researcher provides this brief description of the ODP needs assessment in order to highlight the significant scope and complexity of the survey without delving too deeply into the technical aspects of the survey.

The ODP assessment was an internet based survey and data were collected during a 12 month period. Counties provided their input to the state, and the information was consolidated and forwarded to ODP. Although states were responsible for administering the survey, state administrators were not allowed to edit the input from each county or view the consolidated data. By conducting a 100% survey, ODP theoretically eliminated the probability for sampling error, but the survey was not constructed to control inflated reports of agency shortfalls. Without a standard baseline for people, equipment and training requirements, local jurisdictions were at liberty to define their requirements, and these varied significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Grantsmanship may have contributed to the inflated numbers. As a result of nationwide inflated reports, the data base created from the survey was of little value for state and local planners.

Prior to administering the survey, ODP issued a policy directive indicating future federal grants for each state would be withheld until the needs assessments were completed by all jurisdictions. Since the assessment was not optional, state and local administrators invested significant time and energy into completing the report. Although the data was of little value, the gaps in state level planning and programs surfaced and

were magnified. As a result, some state level organizations hired additional planners to address the perceived shortcomings.

In FY04, homeland security federal funding for states peaked. The annual grant guidance for this fiscal year allowed states to use a portion of federal homeland security funding to hire additional personnel to serve as homeland security planners. The ODP assessment and the additional federal funding for personnel likely influenced the creation of more formal and robust homeland security organizations at the state level.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Policy Guidance

A stream of U.S. Department of Homeland Security policy guidance began to flow in 2003, and it has increased steadily during subsequent years. Both the policy guidance and the technical information provided to states have increased in volume as the US DHS matured as an organization. The policy guidance has resulted in a host of new requirements associated with grant management and implementation. The workload generated as a result of both grant and policy guidance may have contributed to the initial creation or restructuring of homeland security organizations at the state level even though the federal government did not specifically provide guidance concerning the organization of state level departments. Larger organizations were required to keep pace with the new requirements generated by the US DHS and its contractors.

Requirements were levied on state and local jurisdictions through a variety of venues, including homeland security assessments, policy guidance with regard to emerging homeland security programs, US DHS information bulletins, fiscal year grant guidance, and a recommended strategic planning process. These and other federal policy

initiatives may have served to institutionalize the requirement for a formal and more robust homeland security organization at the state level.

U. S. Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletins

To date, the US DHS web site reflects that its directorates and agencies have published over 287 numbered information bulletins, providing both policy guidance and technical information for emerging and existing homeland security programs. The topics addressed in these information bulletins include critical infrastructure, transportation, port security, border security, identification requirements for citizens, interoperable communications, homeland security governance, information sharing, cyber security, intelligence procedures, mutual aid, training and exercise information, grant reporting requirements, and more. The information bulletins are a valuable source of information and assist with interpreting previously published grant guidance and identifying homeland security requirements. At the same time, they often outline the provisions of new programs or supplement the guidance pertaining to existing programs. The new and modified programs often result in requirements for additional staffing.

U. S. Department of Homeland Security Grant Guidance

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides annual grant guidance, providing technical instructions relating to priorities, programs, authorized expenditures and other administrative matters. This grant guidance is modified significantly each year in order to influence state and local homeland security programs and to keep pace with the constantly changing terrorist related threats. State homeland security programs have

been impacted by the content of the grant guidance, and at the same time, state level organizations are impacted by its magnitude, technical nature, monitoring requirements, and the significant amount of change from one fiscal year to the next.

Homeland security grants typically cover a 24 to 36 month period and can be extended for 12 to 18 months following the initial federal deadline. As a result, homeland security offices at the state level often manage grant programs for three or four different fiscal years at any given point in time. Grant managers and other homeland security staff members must understand the entire grant lifecycle, and they must also be familiar with the technical aspects and changes that occur between fiscal years in order to ensure compliance with federal regulations. The verbiage in FY06 US DHS grant guidance serves an excellent example regarding the impact of grant guidance on state organizations. The grant guidance in the fiscal year influenced establishment of intelligence fusion centers, authorized funding for intelligence analysts, and was largely responsible for creation of new networked organizations in many states. State level organizations must constantly adapt and reorganize in order to keep pace with the constant change in the homeland security arena.

U. S. Department of Homeland Security Program and Capability Review

In addition to homeland security assessments, policy guidance pertaining to emerging homeland security programs, information bulletins with technical and policy content, and constantly changing grant guidance, the homeland security strategic planning process initiated in FY06 has created a significant additional workload on state

level organizations. In some cases, organizations have reorganized or added manpower in order to accommodate the new requirements associated with the planning process.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security refers to the strategic planning process as the "Program and Capability Review." The planning process entails reviewing all the homeland security programs and capabilities that exist within the state. States are given 90 days to complete the initial component of the planning process and 60 days at a later point in the year to finalize the plan and distribute the grants. The planning window varies, but typically starts during the second quarter of each fiscal year.

The process begins with a thorough analysis of the current posture of homeland security within the state. The planners and stakeholders from all functional areas then identify the desired program state in the future but do not consider the availability of resources at this time. The resulting gap between the present state and the desired future state serves to identify program gaps. When the gaps are identified, programs are developed and prioritized.

At this point in the planning process, SMART objectives (i.e., specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time phased) are developed in order to create investment justifications. Each state may submit up to 15 investment justifications to the US DHS. At the conclusion of the process, states must obligate the grant funds and issue grant agreements to jurisdictions and state agencies.

States are engaged in the strategic planning process for approximately five months of each year. A new component, the State Preparedness Report, was added to the process in FY07, and this documentation may take an additional two additional months to

complete. As the federal requirements continue to grow, states must continually adapt and make adjustments to their homeland security organizations.

National Governors Association Reports

In contrast to the limited state level information provided in other sources, the National Governors Association (NGA) periodically develops issue papers and reference materials that are focused specifically on the state level. According to its internet homepage, the NGA was founded in 1908 and is a bipartisan organization of the nation's governors. Its stated mission involves promoting state leadership, sharing best practices and speaking out from a state level perspective on national policy and other issues. The NGA provides governors and their senior staff members with services that include representing states on Capitol Hill and in the White House with regard to key federal issues. This representation includes developing policy reports on innovative state programs and hosting networking seminars for state officials. Since the charter of the NGA is to share best practices and focus on the state perspective, this organization is the most likely to address state level organizational issues.

Since 2001, the NGA has published over 50 issue papers and studies specifically addressing state level emergency response and homeland security issues. Although the studies and best practices often provide timely information focused on state level issues, only one recent paper addressed state level homeland security organizational structures. In August 2002, the NGA published an issue brief entitled *States' Homeland Security Priorities*. The paper provides helpful information focused on coordination at all levels of government, dissemination of intelligence information, development of interoperable

communications, protection of critical infrastructure, enhancement of bio-terrorism preparedness, homeland security funding, protection of sensitive security information, security of borders and ports, defining the role of the National Guard, and integration of incident command systems. The report makes no mention of the homeland organizational structure that might be required to accomplish this coordination.

In a 2005 paper entitled *Homeland Security in the States: Much Progress, More Work*, the NGA reported the results of a survey in which states were asked to describe their progress in five areas. The survey topics include questions pertaining to structure, strategy, and governance; preparedness; coordination; communication; and information and intelligence.

With regard to structure, respondents reported that the homeland security official is a cabinet level official in 50% of the states and reports directly to the governor. Twenty-six percent of homeland security advisors wear two hats. They advise the governor regarding homeland security matters while serving in another area (military, public safety, or emergency management). The survey revealed that in a few states (20%), homeland security offices are incorporated within an existing state agency. The NGA (2005) survey report indicates:

> The vast majority of respondents (92 percent) are satisfied with the amount of authority the state homeland security office has to implement strategy, and they are equally satisfied that the roles and responsibilities of key agencies and personnel have been clearly delineated for the purpose of the homeland security strategy. For example, 94% of states have worked diligently to determine the roles and responsibilities for National Guard resources in their state. (p. 2)

Based on the data received from the 2006 State Homeland Security Directors survey, the NGA reports that "At all levels of government, homeland security organizations are still in their infancy" (p. 1). The issue paper addresses several key homeland security findings and emerging trends unrelated to organizations, but failed to provide additional insights regarding state level homeland security organizations. When asked to identify their top 10 future priorities, the fourth most frequent response by homeland security directors related to improving coordination between state and local agencies. The ninth most frequent response involved organizing state resources for homeland security. These priorities provide an indication that state level homeland security organizations are continuing to adapt and evolve.

In July 2007, the NGA published a comprehensive document focused on governance entitled *Overview of States Homeland Security Governance*. This document provides an update to the state organizational structures initially identified by the Office of Homeland Security and published in July 2002. It describes how the state level homeland security organizations were created and provides the internet home page for each state. The report provides a brief mission statement for each organization, but does not address the advantages and disadvantages of the various organizational alternatives.

In January 2007, the NGA also published an executive guide to homeland security entitled *A Governor's Guide to Homeland Security*. The guide provides a separate chapter pertaining to state homeland security governance and addresses other topics related to the executive power, roles, and responsibilities; media strategies; mutual aid; National Guard and military assistance; major disasters; federal assistance; intelligence

and information sharing; interoperable communications; and critical infrastructure protection. With regard to governance, the NGA executive guide indicates:

> The state homeland security structure should have sufficient budget oversight and authority to allocate funds based on the overarching strategy, and the state homeland security director should understand and be able to manage the diversity of related disciplines, including public safety, the National Guard, and emergency management. (p. 7)

The guide also categorizes the three major types of existing state level organizational structures, including a homeland security advisor with a committee or coordinating council, a homeland security department with statutory authority, and a homeland security branch located within an existing state agency. Additionally, it offers examples of states in each category and provides specific information regarding how they are organized. In summarizing the organizational portion of the report, the NGA (2007) advises governors that:

> One common shortcoming in state homeland security structures is a lack of connections among management, operational, and budgetary functions, which often are split among several agencies. This is detrimental to the efficient allocation of resources at the state and local levels and has resulted in turf battles among state agencies. Although these issues remain unresolved in some states, other governors are consolidating public safety functions into cabinet level departments of homeland security. (p. 19)

The identification of this common shortcoming by NGA serves as an exception to the rule regarding analysis and advice concerning the organization for homeland security

at the state level. US DHS policy guidance, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, GAO reports, and other literature suggest the necessity for improved coordination and collaboration at all levels, but do not address the possible organizational models that might be appropriate at state level.

Summary

The historical review in this chapter regarding the homeland security organizational evolution traces the establishment of the US DHS and highlights the potential influences on the state level reorganization for homeland security. The federal reorganization was both massive and controversial. As the US DHS began to address the numerous problems and issues associated with the threat of terrorism in our homeland, the directorates within the new organization began levying a host of new requirements on states through multiple avenues, including an ODP needs assessment in 2004, annual grant guidance, and periodic policy guidance.

Historical documentation reveals that each state initially appointed an existing official as the state homeland security point of contact and designated or created a committee to address homeland security issues immediately following the terrorist attacks on our nation. Within months, the newly appointed officials and committees began to understand the magnitude and complexity of the challenge, and states began to reorganize to meet the new and increasing requirements of the federal government. The institutionalization of homeland security organizations at the state level began with these initial appointments, and the evolutionary process has continued since that time.

By July 2002, many states (62%) placed the requirement for homeland security within an existing organization (i.e., the State Military Department, the Department of Public Safety, or the Emergency Management Agency) while only a few states (16%) created a separate homeland security office to address emerging issues. The remaining states relied on an existing official, a newly appointed special assistant, or a task force to address the increasing demands and complex issues. This initial wave of reorganization served as the starting point for the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations, and the evolutionary process has continued since that time.

The documentation and influences highlighted in this chapter explain in part the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations. While conducting this review, the researcher located a few references in historical documentation regarding the necessity for better coordination at all levels but found no information regarding the networked organizations that might be created to foster collaboration in a shared power environment.

The significant body of contemporary theoretical literature summarized in Chapter II typically documents the merits of collaboration and the importance of networked organizations. In contrast, the documentation reviewed in this chapter offers only an occasional comment concerning the importance of coordination. Additional research is required in order to gain a better understanding of the importance and extent of collaboration and networked organizations in the state level homeland security arena.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

This chapter explains the framework for this research, discussing what was done, how it was done, and why it was done that way. Specifically, it identifies the approach used to answer the research questions identified in Chapter I. It also provides a discussion of the research design, survey method, units of analysis, and sample selection. Finally, this chapter addresses the internal and external validity, methods of analysis, and limitations of this study.

Research Design

Creswell (1994) indicates "the design of a study begins with the selection of a topic and a paradigm" (p. 1). The paradigm may be either quantitative or qualitative and selection is dependent upon nature of the research topic. A quantitative study involves testing a theory in a controlled environment through statistical analysis to determine if predictive generalizations hold true. A qualitative study involves a process or study conducted in a natural setting that seeks to better understand a social or human problem. It is accomplished by building a holistic picture created with words and based on the views of informants. According to Creswell, the qualitative paradigm is best suited when the nature of the problem involves exploratory research and the variables are unknown.

It is also well suited when the context is important and there is a lack of a theory base for the study.

Ultimately, the purpose of this research is to learn from those who have broken ground in the homeland security arena at the state level. The research topic for this specific study focuses on the evolution of homeland security organizations at the state level and the networked organizations that have been created. The research study seeks to better understand how state level organizations have evolved over time and to what extent and why collaborative organizations have been created during the past six years. The qualitative paradigm is best suited in this instance since the problem involves exploratory research in a natural setting and the variables are unknown. Additionally, this study seeks to create a holistic picture based on the views of the homeland security directors at the state level and existing historical documentation.

The qualitative perspective in this research study involves a phenomenological view where reality is based on the views of the homeland security directors at the state level. The research type involves a combination of case study and descriptive research. The descriptive element of this research project focuses on the evolution of homeland security organizations at the state level and seeks to answer questions relating to who, what, where, how many, and how much. The case study portion of the research seeks to better understand collaboration in the shared power environment and focuses on how, why, and to what extent networked organizations have been created. The methods used in this research initiative involve administration of a survey to state level homeland security directors and a review of existing documentation.

Yin (2003) defines the five strategies for conducting research as experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case study. Each strategy has its advantages and disadvantages depending on the research questions, whether the investigator has control over events, and whether the focus is contemporary or historical. Case studies and surveys should be used when control of behavioral events is not possible. Both focus on contemporary events. Surveys seek to answer the following types of research questions: who, what, where, how many, and how much. In contrast, case studies seek to answer questions such as how and why. According to Yin, two research strategies might be equally attractive, and the five overall strategies are not mutually exclusive. Multiple strategies can be used in any given research study.

This research project describes, explores, and explains state level homeland security organizations as they exist in their natural setting. A blend of two strategies, survey and case study, is used in a complementary manner in order to examine multiple sources of information and develop an accurate picture of homeland security organizations at the state level. The case study portion of this research study seeks to better understand collaboration in networked organizations and focuses on how, why, and to what extent networked organizations have been created. The survey of state level homeland security directors is the primary source for the case study. The survey, along with other historical documentation, provides the information for the descriptive element of this research project, tracing the evolution of homeland security organizations at the state level and answering questions such as who, what, where, how many, and how much.

Leedy and Ormrod (2005) provide additional insights regarding practical research, qualitative analysis, and case studies. They indicate the world is complex, and

there is no single or definitive truth. As a result of this complexity and the various perspectives of the actors involved, the qualitative researcher plays a key role in interpreting and making sense of the key elements of information in order to better understand a social phenomenon. The multiple perspectives held by different individuals may have equal validity and can serve to help create the real "truth." In this regard, one goal of a qualitative study is to reveal these multiple perspectives in order to better understand a phenomenon or program as it presently exists. A qualitative study can also help define what is important and draw attention to areas that might require additional study.

The research design for this project is consistent with the insights provided by Creswell (1994), Yin (2003), Leedy and Ormrod (2005), and others. It provides a description of homeland security organizations at the state level, offers new insights about how these organizations have evolved over time, validates the emerging theories pertaining to collaborative management in the contemporary public setting, and provides an initial indication of homeland security networked organizations. State level homeland security organizations have not been well documented or explained. This research provides significant new information about these organizations as they currently exist and documents how organizational relationships have changed over time.

Survey Method

Dillman (2000) suggests that designing a quality survey must begin with the fundamental assumptions that responding to a self-administered survey requires both cognition and motivation, and multiple survey attempts are necessary to achieve

satisfactory response rates regardless of the method of administration. People must clearly understand what is expected of them, and they must be properly motivated to go through the process associated with understanding the questions and returning the survey. An executive's time is limited, and there must be a legitimate reason to devote a portion of this precious commodity on a questionnaire. As a result, surveys should appear to be short, easy, interesting, and relevant. A cover letter is an important element in reinforcing these appearances. Also, a tailored design is helpful in providing the procedures and methodology for conducting successful surveys, producing both high quality information and response rates. A key element of a successful survey involves reducing the overall survey error, especially as it pertains to non-response and measurement.

According to Thomas (1999), putting the finishing touches on the survey is an important step. The survey should be checked by individuals who represent the target group and understand the technical aspects of the program. Pilot testing helps determine if the cover letter is persuasive and to the point. It also assists in determining if any questions are unclear and require revision. Finally, it's also important to ensure the format and survey layouts are both pleasing to the eye and professionally done.

The survey method for this research involved use of a single mode mail questionnaire sent to homeland security directors in each of the 50 states. The initial cover letter (Appendix A) stressed the importance of study and offered to share the results with respondents. A second letter (Appendix B) requested participation from those who had not previously returned the survey. The four page survey (Appendix C) is relatively short, but asked meaningful questions that were relevant to homeland security

directors. The researcher possesses a detailed knowledge and technical understanding of state level homeland security operations and designed the survey questions with appropriately technical language. The researcher tested the survey with two individuals who are familiar with the technical aspects of homeland security programs and with an individual who had no direct knowledge of federal or state level homeland security programs. As a result of the appropriate survey construct and the perceived importance of the research topics by homeland security directors, the researcher achieved a 70% response rate and obtained excellent data.

Homeland security directors for each of the 50 states were the single category of respondent for this research study. Since the actual population of state level homeland security directors is small, a census survey is appropriate in this case. The study focuses on homeland security organizations at the state level, organizational relationships that have evolved over the past six years, the characteristics of the senior homeland security managers who now serve, collaboration in a shared power environment, the networked organizations that have been created, and the lessons learned by senior homeland security officials regarding collaboration and these networked organizations. For this research study, it was important to obtain initial information from senior homeland security officials in order to provide a solid foundation and the base for future research. Using this research as a point of departure, future case studies could be designed to focus on the actual participants of networked organizations and the processes within these structures in order obtain a different perspective and to gain insights on the management and inner workings of these types of organizations.

Discussion of the Questionnaire

The questionnaire (Appendix C) used in this research study contains both open and closed format questions. It includes a brief statement concerning the purpose of the study, voluntary participation by respondents, a pledge of confidentiality, and instructions on how to complete the questions.

Survey questions fall into three categories relating to the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations, collaboration in the homeland security arena, and the networked organizations that were created to solve the most complex and difficult problems. The survey asked homeland security directors to provide information pertaining to their background, years of both overall and homeland security experience, and the source of appointment to their current position. Additionally, they were also asked questions about the location of the current homeland security organization, how it was created, how many employees serve in the organization, FY07 state funding information, and whether the homeland security agency had been merged with the emergency management agency. Also, the survey requested information concerning the different types of networked organizations. The networked organization section of the survey includes questions regarding how many have been created, how they were created, what types of organizations were created, whether these organizations have been successful, and whether organizations have been disbanded and for what reasons. Finally, respondents were asked to provide their insights concerning both the positive and negative lessons learned with regard to the management and operations of networked organizations.

Internal and External Validity

Dillman and Salant (1994) describe the four errors that prevent perfection and absolute accuracy in surveys. They include:

- Coverage error: every person in the target population would have an equal opportunity of selection;
- Sampling error: enough people in target population would be sampled randomly in order to achieve required precision;
- Measurement error: clear questions would be asked in the survey so all respondents would be equally motivated to respond and capable of answering the question correctly; and
- Non-response error: every person in the survey would respond or non-respondents would be similar to respondents with regard to characteristics.

Although each of the four errors has the potential to render survey results useless, some degree of error is expected in most surveys.

Fink (1995) indicates that in order for a survey to be useful, it must be both reliable and valid. Simply stated, a reliable survey is consistent because it produces the same results every time. A valid survey is accurate because it is free from error. Validity involves both internal and external considerations. "A design with external validity produces results that apply to the survey's target population. A design is internally valid if it is free from nonrandom error or bias" (Fink, 1995, p 56).

Patton (1990) indicates that validity in a quantitative study depends primarily on a carefully constructed instrument so the instrument measures what it is supposed to

measure. Validity often hinges to a large degree on the rigor, competence and skill of the researcher.

The researcher designed the questionnaire used in this research to minimize survey error and to maximize internal and external validity. The target population included the homeland security directors in the 50 states. Due to the small size of the target population, the researcher conducted a census survey, sending a questionnaire to each of the 50 state level homeland security directors. This eliminated the possibility of sampling error. The questions were clearly constructed and an appropriate level of technical terminology was used in the survey. Survey recipients realized as a result of the introductory letter and question construct that the researcher had detailed knowledge of the subject matter and issues involved. As a result, respondents were both motivated to respond and capable of answering the questions correctly. It is difficult to judge the level of non-response error with precision, but since the researcher achieved a 70% response rate, the error is potentially minimal. The external validity is also high as a result of the excellent response rate.

Since reliability equates to repeatability, a survey would be considered highly reliable if it came up with the same result in the same circumstances. The results would be similar time after time even if administered by a different researcher. In this case, the survey is technically sound, and the researcher administered it to the appropriate population. Based on the consistency of the data, lack of significant variance between responses, and researcher knowledge of the topic, it seems likely that the survey is highly reliable.

All subjects have unique characteristics, different orientations, and different perceptions. As a result, the potential for bias in any survey is a possibility. The researcher constructed the questions to be unambiguous, but self-administered surveys typically have the possibility of misinterpretation. In this survey, the possibility of misinterpretation exists with regard to the exact number of employees, the precise amount of time invested in various programs, and the exact funding percentage for a specific fiscal year. Respondents typically have knowledge of the approximate numbers, but some managers may not have known or taken the time to obtain precise information.

Since this was a self-administered survey and the researcher could not control the testing environment, it is likely that respondents did not complete the surveys under the same conditions. Different events or situations in the work place may have had an impact on the respondents and their responses. Also, a respondent's tenure and level of experience may have had a slight impact on the final results. For example, in two instances the previous homeland security director had just departed the organization, and the newly appointed director declined to complete the survey, citing limited experience. In another instance, a director with only three months experience responded. Both extremes are potential sources for error and could have a slight impact on the survey results.

Methods of Analysis

Patton (1990) indicates that qualitative research methods may involve either deductive or inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning starts from an existing theory base and uses logic to determine what should exist in the real world. Inductive reasoning

uses an approach that begins without expectations regarding the subjects or organizations that will be observed. The patterns and categories of analysis emerge from the data that are collected. Interpretation is a key element of the inductive process and requires the researcher to explain the findings. This includes answering the "why" questions, describing the significance of certain results, and placing the patterns in an analytical framework.

The inductive approach was used in this research. Existing documentation provides an indication of the initial homeland security organizations that were created immediately following September 11th. The researcher located only one source of information regarding how homeland security organizations might be currently organized and discovered very little data regarding the extent of collaborative endeavors and the networked organizations that have been created at the state level. Prior to the survey, the researcher found only limited information addressing the background experience of the state level homeland security directors and organizational realignments. The researcher used a comparative analysis of homeland security directors, state level organizations, and networked organizations in order to develop categories and examine the patterns that emerged from the data that were collected.

Weaknesses and Limitations

Since homeland security directors have unique characteristics, different orientations, and different perceptions, the potential for bias in this or any other survey is a possibility. The term "networked organizations" may mean different things to different individuals. For example, one view of "networking" might involve an individual in one

organization coordinating informally with an individual in another. This traditional view of "networking" differs significantly from the definition of "networked organizations" in contemporary literature which involves creation of a formal organization consisting of participants from multiple levels of government who are focused on solving the most difficult problems.

As is possible in any survey, some questions may have been answered by the respondent based on the perceived "correct answer." For example, if large number of networked organizations is perceived as good, then a respondent may have overlooked the formal definition of networked organizations and reported ad hoc or informal organizations that do not actually meet the criteria. If disbanding a networked organization was perceived as bad, the respondent may have reported the organizational change as a restructuring rather than providing a negative response.

Although any survey is subject to the potential for bias or misinterpretation, the construct and design of this survey serves to minimize its weaknesses and limitations. The 70% response rate by senior government officials supports the expectation of excellent validity with minimal error.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the research data and provides findings pertaining to the organizations currently functioning within the homeland security arena at the state level. The findings and analysis are framed within the three primary areas of this research relating to the institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations, the motivations for collaboration in the state level homeland security arena, and the networked organizations that have been created to solve the most difficult problems.

Chapter V specifically documents and analyzes state level homeland security organizations, including several of the primary characteristics relating to organizational location, the number of personnel assigned, amount of federal grant funding provided, percentage of state funding provided, and prior experience and tenure of the homeland security directors who are responsible for these organizations. It also provides initial insights and analysis regarding collaboration and the homeland security networked organizations that have been established in the shared power environment at the state level. Finally, this chapter provides a summary and discussion of lessons learned with regard to collaboration and networked organizations, based on the insights of the 35 state level homeland security directors who responded to the survey.

This research and the findings and analysis in chapter are centered on the three primary concepts relating to institutionalization, collaboration, and networked organizations. Institutionalization is defined as the organizational evolution and maturing that involves embedding norms, policies, procedures and behavior within an organization. Collaboration defined as the coordination accomplished in a shared power environment between individuals from multiple agencies located within the different levels of government. Networks or networked organizations are defined as the formal organizations that are established in order to facilitate collaborative processes and solve the most difficult and complex problems in this shared power environment.

Institutionalization of State Level Homeland Security Organizations

Institutionalization involves the embedding of norms, policies, procedures, and behavior within an organization. The institutionalization of state level homeland security organizations has gradually occurred over the past six years and can be explained in part by the characteristics of these organizations and their senior managers. The findings and analysis of state level homeland security organizations and directors are provided in the sections that follow.

Characteristics of State Level Homeland Security Organizations

At the state level, homeland security organizations are typically either a separate office or department reporting directly to the governor, or they are a branch layered within an existing organization. Separate offices are created through executive authority, and cabinet level departments are created by legislative authority. Executive authority is

also typically used to create a separate branch or division layered within an existing organization. Table 3 provides a categorization of the types of current state level organizations and describes where homeland security organizations are presently located within the state governmental structure, based on survey responses from 35 homeland security directors.

Table 3
Types of State Level Homeland Security Organizations as of March 2008

Type HS Organization	Creation Authority	Frequency	Percentage
	Separate Organization		
Department	Legislature	10	29
Office	Governor	7	20
		17	49
	Subordinate Organization		
Branch	Governor	18	51

Note. n = 35.

The data reveal that approximately half of the state level homeland security organizations report directly to the governor. This includes both the departments that were established by the legislature and the offices that were created using the executive authority of the governor. The remaining homeland security organizations are layered within an existing state organization and report to a senior official or cabinet member on

the governor's staff. Although this research does not seek to address the various aspects of politics and power within the homeland security arena, the data could serve as the basis for additional research and analysis in these areas.

When queried concerning the recommended organizational location, only 25 of the 35 state homeland security directors responded to the question. Table 4 provides a summary of the recommended organizational location for state homeland security organizations. Only one individual indicated that a legislatively created department would be a better alternative, while the other 24 respondents thought the status quo with regard to the current organizational location was preferable.

Table 4
Comparison of State Level Homeland Security Organization Current Location to the Location Recommended by State Homeland Security Directors as of March 2008

Type Organization	Current Location Frequency (%)	Recommended Location Frequency (%)	
		Separate Office or Department	Branch Within a Department
Department	10 (29)	7 (28)	0 (0)
Office	7 (20)	5 (20)	0 (0)
	17 (49)	12 (48)	0 (0)
Branch	18 (51)	0 (0)	13 (52)

Note. n= 35 for current location and n = 25 for recommended location.

The homeland security directors favoring a separate office or department indicated:

- Cabinet level status or direct report to the governor is necessary in order to provide unfettered advice to the senior decision maker;
- Cabinet level status is necessary in order to coordinate effectively with the other state and federal agencies; and
- A separate homeland security office or department is important in order to maintain the appropriate focus on homeland security related issues rather than competing with other related issues, e.g. military, public safety or emergency management (natural disasters).

Those who favored the status quo and thought that an office layered within an existing organization is preferable offered the following logic:

- This configuration offers the opportunity to leverage resources within an existing organization rather than duplicating administrative functions;
- An organizational location under public safety is preferable because the intelligence and law enforcement missions reside within this agency (consolidation of both the homeland security and emergency management functions under the military department is optimal); and
- An organizational alignment under the state National Guard is preferable since its charter includes defending the homeland (consolidation of both the homeland security and emergency management functions under the military department is optimal).

The 25 responses were proportionally divided among the three organizational categories (department, office, and layered within an existing organization). The 10 who elected not to respond to this question were also proportionally divided between the three categories. Half of those who failed to respond were from separate departments and offices created by the legislature or governor, and the other half were located in homeland security branches or divisions layered within an existing organization. The non-response for other questions in the survey typically ranged from zero to five. Since the non-response was proportional between individuals in the three organizational categories, it is difficult to speculate why over 28% of the individuals who took the time to complete the survey opted not to respond to this question. The lack of response might have been predictable if it had come primarily from individuals in organizations that did not report directly to the governor. In this case, one might have assumed that managers responsible for the critical tasks relating to protecting citizens and critical infrastructure from the terrorist threat would have preferred a more prominent organizational location and a status allowing direct access to the governor. The non-response option may have been selected since senior managers typically prefer not to formally express dissatisfaction with an organizational decision made by the executive authority.

One possible explanation for the large percentage that expressed satisfaction with the status quo is that some senior managers may prefer an elevated status associated with a cabinet level position while others may prefer a buffer from political activities and the relative anonymity associated with serving as a branch or division chief within a department. Another explanation for the apparent satisfaction with organizational location expressed by those who responded to the question might be derived from Miles'

Law which indicates that "Where you stand depends on where you sit" (Miles, 1978, p 399). An individual typically has an institutional perspective that is derived and based on the organization within which he or she serves. An individual's perspective is often modified when a change of organization or responsibility occurs. Individuals do not typically rise above their institutional perspective or temporarily detach themselves from their organizational perspective.

The relationship between the homeland security and emergency management functions within each state is another topic that is often debated both at the federal and state levels. In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the President used his executive authority to create the Office of Homeland Security, but the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) remained as a separate organization within the Executive Branch. Later in the fall of 2002, the U.S. Congress considered a request from the President to create a cabinet level department for homeland security. The proposal to include FEMA within the new homeland security organization along with 21 other federal agencies created a significant topic of debate which has continued through the present time. Ultimately, Congress passed the legislation, and the legislators included FEMA in the federal homeland security legislation which took effect in March 2003. Since that time, senior leaders in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have accomplished two major reorganizations, and the homeland security and emergency management functions have gradually merged at the federal level over the past several years.

During the weeks and months that followed September 11th, the majority of governors (70%) initially assigned responsibility for the new homeland security function

to an existing cabinet level official or staff member. The remainder created a new office for homeland security, appointed a special advisor, or created a homeland security council. The homeland security mission was initially assigned to the emergency management department in only seven states. Table 1 in Chapter 3 documents the initial state level organization for homeland security.

Table 5 provides a categorization of how state level homeland security organizations are currently organized with regard to the homeland security and emergency management functions.

Table 5
Current Organizational Relationship Regarding Homeland Security (HS) and Emergency Management (EM) Functions as of March 2008

Relationship	Frequency	Percentage
HS Director Supervises Both Organizations		
HS and EM Merged	18	51
HS Oversight of EM	2	6
	20	57
Different Managers for HS and EM Organizations		
HS and EM Co-located	4	12
HS and EM Not merged	11	31
	15	43

Note. n = 35.

Based on the survey results, 57% of the states have either merged the two functions or the same manager is responsible for both. The other 43% have not merged, but in four states the two functions have been co-located to enhance coordination and collaboration. It is noteworthy that 69% of states have made an effort to increase collaboration either through merger or collocation of the two functions. Networked organizations are typically created in an effort to facilitate and foster collaboration. The necessity for improved collaboration and coordination also seems be the motivation for the gradual merger of the homeland security and emergency management communities at the state level.

With regard to whether the homeland security and emergency management functions should be merged, 30 homeland security directors responded and five opted not to respond. Of the five homeland security directors who opted not to respond, four serve in organizations that have not been merged and one serves in an organization that has been co-located. Table 6 provides a summary of homeland security director responses indicating whether the two functions should be merged. Only six individuals (20%) reported that the two functions should not be merged, and they all serve in organizations that have not been merged. These six respondents suggested the two organizations should not be merged because the functions of homeland security and emergency management are separate and distinct. Several indicated that the homeland security organization focuses on preventing terrorism and protection from terrorist activities, and the emergency management agency focuses solely on response and recovery from either natural or manmade disasters. One respondent reported that the two organizations work closely and there is no reason to merge. Satisfaction with the status quo (Miles' Law) or

the hesitancy to appear critical of a decision by the executive authority may serve to provide an explanation for this response.

Table 6
Organizational Relationship with Regard to Homeland Security (HS) and Emergency Management (EM) Functions as Recommended by State Homeland Security Directors as of March 2008

Organizational Relationship	Current Frequency (%)	State Homeland Security Director Recommended Frequency (%)	
		Merge	Do Not Merge
HS Director Supervises Both HS and EM Organizations			
Merged	18 (51)	17 (56.6)	0 (0)
HS Oversight	2 (6)	2 (6.6)	0 (0)
	20 (57)	19 (63)	0 (0)
Different Managers Supervise HS and EM Organizations			
Not merged	11 (31)	5 (17)	4 (13)
Co-located	4 (12)	0 (0)	2 (7)
	15 (43)	5 (17)	6 (20)

Note. n = 35 for current frequency and n = 30 for recommended frequency.

On the other hand, a significant majority of respondents (80%) indicated the two functions should be merged in order to:

- Improve collaboration and coordination;
- Create a true all hazards forum;

- Provide unified direction for all preparedness efforts in the state;
- Provide clear direction for all planning initiatives in the state; and
- Improve efficiency by minimizing duplication between staff elements.

Based on the positive response to this question and the logic provided for merger, the majority of currently serving homeland security directors make a convincing case that merger of the homeland security and emergency management functions is the most appropriate course of action.

In addition to the organizational location and the relationship with regard to homeland security and emergency management functions, homeland security organizations at the state level can also be explained, in part, based on the number of personnel assigned, the federal grant funding available, and the amount of state funding that is appropriated. Table 7 provides information regarding the numbers and types of employees assigned to state level homeland security organizations.

The survey divided assigned personnel into the following three categories of employees: state, contract and other employees (e.g., liaison personnel assigned to organizations from various levels of government, including federal, state, or local). Based on the survey results, the researcher categorized organizations with 10 personnel or fewer as small, 11 through 50 personnel as medium, and those with over 50 as large. The median number of employees assigned was 27 and the overall average was 43. Half of the states responding have 25 or fewer employees, while the majority of states (82%) have fewer than 80 employees. The workforce composition for medium and large size homeland security organizations consists of 11% contract and other personnel while

Table 7
Number of Employees Serving in State Level Homeland Security Organizations Compared to the Types of Employees Serving in these Organizations as of March 2008

Organization Size (Frequency/%)	# of Employees	% Employees by Type		
		State	Contract	Other
Small (10/31)	1-10	96	2	2
Medium (12/38)	11-50	89	10	1
Large (10/31)	51-205	89	8	3

Note. n = 32.

that of small organizations is significantly smaller (4%). The researcher anticipates the smaller percentage for contract and other personnel within small organizations since the smaller organizations may have less visibility and fewer resources compared to larger organizations within the state.

Table 8 summarizes the federal homeland security funding provided to states in fiscal year 2007 (FY07). At the time of this research, the US DHS had not published the FY08 funding allocation for states and the allocations are not expected until the fourth quarter. The researcher used the sum of the two primary grants provided to states by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for FY07 as the basis for the comparative analysis. These grants, the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) grant and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) grant, are the two largest, and they adequately represent the overall family of homeland security related grants provided to

states. The several smaller, competitive and special purpose grants provided to states are insignificant in comparison.

Table 8
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) Funding Provided to States in Fiscal Year 2007

Size of Funding	Amount of FY07 HS SHSP and LETPP Funding ($M)	Organization Frequency (%)
Small	6.6	10 (28.5)
Medium	6.7-19	15 (43)
Large	20-96	10 (28.5)

Note. n = 35.

The U.S. Congress recently intervened and required the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to make grant allocations based primarily on risk. As a result of this Congressional involvement, US DHS used heavily weighted risk-based funding formulas in the FY06 homeland security grant allocation. The formulas were modified and updated the following year. The FY07 homeland security grant funding provided to states in July 2007 represents the most current federal grant data available.

Although the exact formulas used for state allocation are classified and for official use only, U.S. Department of Homeland Security officials have indicated that the formulas are heavily weighted with regard to risk, and the primary grant allocation represents the collective risk within a given state. Based on FY07 grant guidance, the US

DHS provided a guaranteed minimum homeland security funding level to each state regardless of actual risk. The smallest grant size of $6.6M represents the floor or minimum grant level based on the formula for states with the least risk. For FY07, $11M was the median amount of homeland security federal funding provided to states, and the average amount was $17.8M. The difference between the two seems to indicate that states with higher risk receive significantly more funding, and this drives the overall average up. The data in Table 8 provide a baseline and serve as the basis for comparison.

Based on the homeland security federal grant formulas, fiscal year funding levels provide insights regarding the overall risk within each state. It is likely that states with the greatest risk would employ a large staff in order to combat terrorism. Also, a state that administers a $150M federal grant program would require a significantly larger grant staff than a state administering a $6.6M grant program. The overall size of an organization could also be based on other factors, including the political situation within a given state, power, experience or preconceived notions of senior leaders, or the amount of the supplemental state funding that is available. For example, a senior manager seeking power might opt for the largest organization possible, while a manager with a different motivation might seek to keep the organization lean for political or other considerations.

The amount of funding appropriated by the state legislature for homeland security programs may shed a different light on the factors influencing organizational size and could serve as the basis for additional research. Table 9 provides an indication of the size of the state legislative appropriation for homeland security compared to the overall federal homeland security grant provided to states. The survey requested the percentage

of funding since the actual amount may have been considered sensitive and could have negatively impacted the response rate.

Table 9
FY07 State Funding for Homeland Security Programs Compared to the FY07 Federal Homeland Security Funding (SHSP and LETPP) Provided to States

Size of Funding	Proportion of State HS Funding to Federal HS Funding (%)	Organization Frequency (%)
None	0	11 (34)
Small	1-20	8 (25)
Medium	21-50	9 (28)
Large	51-100	4 (13)

Note. n = 32.

Three respondents elected not to answer the question pertaining to state funding. Non-response to this question is within the normal range for this survey. The researcher expects the question may have been left blank because the exact dollar amounts were not readily available or because some homeland security directors may have considered this information to be sensitive in nature.

At the present time, the federal homeland security grant is a non-matching grant, and it does allow for funding for personnel salaries and certain management and administrative expenses. It seems noteworthy that 34% of state legislatures appropriated no funding for the state level homeland security office, even in view of the significant federal funding provided to states on an annual basis. Only four states with significant

risk fell in the highest category for state appropriated funding. One state appropriated 88%, and the other three states provided a 100% match for federal grant funding. An analysis of the political motivations for state level homeland security appropriations would provide an excellent basis for additional research.

With regard to the characteristics of state level homeland security organizations, this research sought to answer the following questions:

- What types of homeland security organizations were established at the state level immediately following the terrorist attacks in September 2001?
- What types of homeland security organizations exist today? and
- How can current state level homeland security organizations be categorized with regard to organizational location, personnel and funding?

Tables 1 through 9 provide a summary of data regarding the characteristics of homeland security organizations. With regard to the types of organizations that were established immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks, we now know that governors in 31 states (62%) designated an existing cabinet level official to serve as the Homeland Security Advisor (HSA) rather than appointing a new individual. These homeland security advisors were appointed from three primary departments within state government: the State Military Department, the Department of Public Safety, and the Emergency Management Agency. Governors in eight states (16%) created a new homeland security office and appointed a new director to focus on terrorism. Governors in four states (8%) appointed a special advisor for homeland security. In four states (8%), governors initially appointed other existing officials such as the Lieutenant Governor, the Chief of Staff, or the Attorney General to serve as the homeland security

advisor in addition to their normal duties. In three states (6%), governors created a homeland security council consisting of existing staff members. With regard to governance, 70% of governors created a new council or committee to address homeland security matters. In other states, 12% incorporated homeland security planning and responsibility into an existing committee. Historical documentation does not address this topic for the remaining states.

With regard to the types of homeland security organizations that exist today, as a result of this research we now know that states have significantly reorganized since September 2001. Based on the responses from 35 homeland security directors, 10 states (29%) have legislatively created homeland security departments, seven states (20%) have homeland security offices created by executive authority, and 18 states have homeland security branches layered within an existing organization. The data revel that approximately half of state level homeland security organizations report directly to the governor, and the remainder report through an existing senior official on the staff.

With regard to the merger of homeland security and emergency management functions, the survey data reveal that 57% of the states have either merged the two functions or the same manager is responsible for both. The other 43% have not merged, but in four of these states, the two functions have been co-located to enhance coordination and collaboration. It is noteworthy that 69% of states have made an effort to increase collaboration either through oversight, merger, or collocation of the two functions.

With regard to funding, as a result of this research we now know for FY07 that 28.5% of states received a small amount of federal funding ($6.6M), 43% of states

received a medium amount of federal funding ($6.7-19M), and 28.5% of states received a large amount of federal funding ($20-96M). We also know for FY07 that 34% of states received no state appropriation for homeland security funding. For states receiving a state appropriation for homeland security, we know that 25% of states received a small appropriation (1-20% of the federal HS grant), 28% of states received a medium appropriation (21-50% of the federal HS grant), and 13% of states received a large appropriation (51-100% of the federal HS grant). Respondents indicated that only 9% of states matched the federal homeland security grant.

With regard to the size of state level homeland security organizations and the number of number of personnel serving within the organization, as a result of this research we know that small state level homeland security organizations have been established in 31% of states, and they have from one to 10 personnel serving within the organization. Medium state level homeland security organizations have been established in 38% of states, and they have from 11 to 50 personnel serving within the organization. Large state level homeland security organizations have been established in 31% of states, and they have from 51 to 205 personnel serving within the organization.

Based on the types of homeland security organizations exist today, their current locations, and their similarities with regard to personnel and funding, the researcher concludes that state level homeland security organizations have evolved and become more institutionalized over the past six years. The findings and analysis regarding the background and experience of state level homeland security directors is addressed in the section that follows.

State Level Homeland Security Director Profile

In addition to focusing on organizational locations and funding, homeland security organizations may also be explained, in part, by examining the characteristics of the senior manager within the organization. The survey provides an initial base of information regarding the currently serving homeland security directors, by considering the amount of homeland security experience or tenure of respondents, by examining the amount and type of prior experience, and by focusing on the appointing authority for each of the homeland security directors.

Table 10 summarizes the number of years of homeland security experience for 34 of the currently serving homeland security directors. Based on the survey results, the data reveal that homeland security directors have a significant amount of homeland security experience, and these positions throughout the nation are fairly stable with regard to turnover. Only 15% of the 34 respondents had a small amount of experience

Table 10
Years of Homeland Security Experience for Currently Serving Homeland Security Directors as of March 2008

Years of HS Experience	Amount of HS Experience	# of Directors (%)
Less than 1	Small	5 (15)
At least 1 but less than 3	Moderate	14 (41)
3 to 6	Significant	15 (44)

Note. n = 34.

ranging from three to six months. Forty-one percent had between one and 2.5 years of service. A similar proportion of directors (44%) had three or more years of service. The median service reflected by the survey results is 2.5 years, and the average service is 2.7 years.

Only 12% of the respondents have served in the same capacity since establishment of their state's homeland security organization. Since the majority of directors have less than six years of service, it seems likely that at least one and or more changes in leadership have occurred in the past six years. Changes in leadership often serve as the catalyst for organizational change. The senior manager turnover and organizational evolution documented in this research seems consistent, but the survey was not constructed with questions that would allow for a precise comparison or in-depth analysis. Senior manager turnover at the state level often results from changes of administration or shifts in political power. The tenure of senior officials in the homeland security arena at the state level could possibly provide the basis for additional research and interesting analysis.

Prior experience of senior managers also provides a basis for comparison and may provide additional insights regarding homeland security organizations. Prior experience may be documented and examined based on the overall number of years of work experience, the most prominent experience within a first responder discipline, and the background experience based on the extent of experience within different disciplines or other functional areas. Table 11 provides an indication of the total years of work experience for senior homeland security managers prior to their current homeland security assignment. The median for senior homeland security managers is 28 years, and

the average is 26 years of prior experience. Prior experience is significantly skewed to the positive side of the scale, with 71% of the directors having over 20 years of experience, and 38% having over 30 years of experience. The survey data indicate that homeland security managers have an extensive amount of experience, and the researcher anticipates the most seasoned managers are typically selected to serve in these positions.

Table 11
Total Years of Non-Homeland Security (HS) Work Experience for Currently Serving Homeland Security Directors as of March 2008

Years of Non-HS Work Experience	Amount of Work Experience	# of Directors (%)
Less than 10	Small	1 (3)
10 to 20	Moderate	9 (27)
21 to 29	Significant	11 (32)
31 to 36	Extensive	13 (38)

Note. n = 34.

Prior to September 11th, there were no homeland security organizations or homeland security managers. Following the terrorist attacks, a variety of homeland security organizations were created in the 50 states, and senior managers were selected to oversee this function. Based on the information documented by the Office of Homeland Security in *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security* in July 2002 and summarized in Table 1, we know that that 62% of the newly appointed homeland security advisors were associated with the state's military (24%), public safety (24%) or emergency

management (14%) disciplines. We also know that the responsibility for homeland security was assigned to the Lieutenant Governor in two states and the Attorney General or the Governor's Chief of Staff in two states. The primary background of these four and 15 other advisors is not available in existing documentation from 2002.

At least 10 of the currently serving homeland security directors have multidisciplinary experience with prior service in two or more of the major first responder disciplines (i.e., law enforcement, military, fire, and emergency management). Table 12 provides an indication of the primary background experience for currently serving homeland security directors. The researcher categorized background experience based on the greatest amount of prior service in a specific discipline.

Table 12
Primary Prior Experience of Homeland Security Directors Serving in July 2002 Compared to Currently Serving Homeland Security Directors as of March 2008

Primary Prior Experience	# of Homeland Security Directors (%)	
	*2002	2008
Law Enforcement	12 (34)	13 (37)
Military	12 (34)	11 (31)
Emergency Management	7 (20)	7 (20)
Fire	0 (0)	1 (3)
Other	4 (12)	3 (9)

Note. *Summary of information from the Office of Homeland Security, 2002, *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security*, pp. 5-112.
n = 35 for 2002 and n = 35 for 2008.

Homeland security directors typically have a primary background in either law enforcement, military, or emergency management. Based on input from the 35 individuals responding to the question, law enforcement experience is presently the most prominent discipline, followed by the military and then emergency management. It is also interesting to note that the proportions between the three disciplines have remained fairly constant over the past six years.

Since the survey population is small and information is not available for 15 homeland security senior directors, it should be noted that a small change or addition to any of the three categories could alter the proportions among the three disciplines. With regard to future homeland security director appointments, the exact mix may vary depending on the preferences of the appointing authority and the availability of experienced or qualified personnel. Many of the work related activities within the homeland security arena involve a blend of law enforcement, military, and emergency management functions. It is likely that these three communities (law enforcement, military, and emergency management) will continue to provide the primary pool of candidates for future senior manager homeland security assignments at the state level.

Table 13 provides an indication of the selecting officials for state level homeland security directors. The governor is the primary selecting official in most states (84%) and serves as the appointing official for the homeland security offices created by executive authority. With regard to the departments created by legislative authority, respondents reported the governor serves as the selecting official, but the survey question was not precisely constructed to determine if the governor actually serves as the nominating official, and the legislature provides the formal approval. This form of nomination and

approval process is likely since state governments may be patterned after the federal model for selection of cabinet level officials.

Table 13
Selecting Official for State Homeland Security Directors as of March 2008

Selecting Official	Frequency (%)
Governor	27 (84)
Director of Public Safety	4 (13)
The Adjutant General	1 (3)

Note. n = 32.

Five respondents indicated either the Director of Public Safety or The Adjutant General as the selecting authority for the homeland security director position in their states. In these instances, the selecting officials likely confer with the executive authority prior to final selection. Two of the homeland security directors reported that they are merit employees and were selected through a competitive selection process. Although the selecting authority was not indicated for these two positions, a cabinet level member of the governor's staff is likely the selecting official. Since only two of the 34 respondents are merit employees and the majority is appointed, the normal turnover rate for homeland security directors will likely be consistent with that of other appointed employees at the state level. The tenure of homeland security directors, as documented earlier in this chapter, suggests homeland security directors might serve for longer

periods than other senior appointed officials that typically serve during a four year term. An in-depth examination of the tenure of homeland security officials and longevity of other first responder appointees (law enforcement, military, and emergency management) compared to other appointed officials was not within the scope of this study and would require additional research.

With regard to the state level homeland security director profile, this research sought to answer the following question:

- What do we know about the background and experience of managers who presently lead these organizations?

Tables 10 through 13 provide a summary of data regarding the profile of state level homeland security directors. With regard to homeland security experience, we now know that 44% of currently serving homeland security directors have a significant amount of homeland security experience (3-6 years), and 41% have a medium amount of experience (1-3 years). Only 15% had a limited amount of homeland security experience (3-6 months).

With regard to overall experience, we now know that a significant majority of the directors (71%) have over 20 years of experience, and within this group, more than one third (38%) have over 30 years of experience. Homeland security directors typically have a primary background in either law enforcement, military, or emergency management. For prior experience, law enforcement is presently the most prominent discipline, followed by the military and emergency management. The proportions between the three disciplines have remained fairly constant over the past five years.

Based on the research data, the researcher concludes that state level homeland security directors have a significant amount of homeland security experience, and they also have significant background experience in areas other than homeland security. Homeland security directors are well seasoned managers, and they typically have background experience in one or more of three primary disciplines of law enforcement, military, and emergency management.

Homeland security organizations are a relatively new addition to the state level governmental structure. To this point, little has been known regarding the characteristics of these organizations or the senior managers selected to manage them. The information collected regarding these organizations and their managers provides an initial base of knowledge on which to build. This knowledge also sets the stage to examine, analyze, and better understand the contemporary topic of collaboration within the homeland security environment. The necessity for collaboration in the state level homeland security arena is documented and analyzed in the section that follows.

Collaboration in the State Level Homeland Security Arena

Collaboration often involves coordination between individuals in different agencies within multiple levels of government. The process of collaboration is accomplished in a shared power environment in order to solve the most difficult or complex problems that can be solved or are not easily solved by one organizations. The extent of collaboration and the specific motivations for collaboration within the homeland security arena have not been well documented. The findings and analysis regarding why collaboration is accomplished and what motivates the creation of networked

organizations in the homeland security arena at the state level are provided in the paragraphs that follow.

When homeland security directors were asked why networked organizations were created and what causes or encourages collaboration, they provided five primary responses. Listed in priority order with the most frequent response at the top, homeland security directors reported that networked organizations were created to:

1. Foster stakeholder participation and gain consensus (100%);
2. Accomplish collaboration and coordinated planning (97%);
3. Address and solve difficult problems and common issues (94%);
4. Improve communication and information sharing (88%); and
5. Assemble subject matter experts from the private sector, non-profit sector, and academia for assistance with problem resolution and policy advice (66%).

These five primary reasons for collaboration in the homeland security arena provide an excellent basis for understanding why similar collaborative organizations might be useful throughout the public sector to solve other types of difficult problems. Homeland security directors reported the most frequent reason for creating networked organizations was to foster stakeholder participation and gain consensus. Participation and cooperation from first responder disciplines (e.g., law enforcement, fire, emergency management, and medical), multiple levels of government (i.e., federal, state, and local) and all sectors (i.e., public, private, and nonprofit) are required to solve problems in the homeland security arena. Change is often difficult to accomplish, and the organizational resistance to change has been well documented through the years. When stakeholder participation is high, the consensus necessary for change is more easily obtained.

Improving communication between people and organizations is always an important goal, as is accomplishing coordinated planning and collaboration. Finally, senior managers typically understand that assembling subject matter experts and members of academia is an excellent method for identifying and solving difficult problems.

In addition to the top five reasons, homeland security directors also provided more information regarding the logic for collaboration. The remaining reasons provide additional insights and could be equally important to managers considering the merit of establishing formal collaborative arrangements. Rather than oversimplifying or unnecessarily categorizing, it is instructive to identify, analyze, and seek to better understand the less typical reasons for collaboration. The remaining responses from homeland security directors regarding the necessity for collaboration and creation of networked organizations are provided below in no priority order. Homeland security directors reported that collaboration is required to:

- Solve problems that are too numerous for just one organization to solve;
- Comply with the national priority regarding regional collaboration;
- Facilitate crossing boundaries and improve state agency coordination;
- Leverage scarce resources;
- Provide integrated and coordinated program delivery; and
- Provide a forum for development of strategy and program oversight.

According to the most common definition in contemporary literature, collaboration is a process that involves the coordination accomplished in a shared power environment between individuals from multiple agencies located within the different levels of government. Collaboration is accomplished in order to solve the most difficult

or complex problems that cannot be solved or are not easily solved by one organization. In practical application, the actual motivations for collaboration may involve several factors, sometimes including subtle logic. For example, one homeland security director reported that networks were created to solve problems that were "numerous" rather than "difficult" as indicated in the literature. Suggesting that networks are created to solve numerous problems may seem inconsistent with definition provided by contemporary theorists. In reality, a myriad of unsolved numerous problems may be the equivalent of a difficult problem. A small problem such as undocumented radio frequencies or incompatible radio systems between local fire and law enforcement agencies could result in a major problem during response to a significant event or disaster.

In addition to providing a forum for addressing difficult problems, collaboration may provide other benefits. Examples include improving communication, crossing traditional boundaries, and improving state agency coordination. Based on politics, power or other organizational dynamics, coordination between state agencies may be problematic in some states. Some state agencies do not work directly for the governor, and political or turf issues may serve to restrict communication between agencies. Some directors of state agencies work for independent commissions rather than reporting directly to the executive authority. At times, competing political agendas limit effective coordination and communication. In local jurisdictions, officials such as county commissioners, sheriffs, and mayors are typically elected. Elected local officials may have differing agendas and are responsible only to their constituents. As a result, jurisdictional issues relating to prevention, protection, and response to terrorist related events may present a challenge due to the lack of a unified chain of command. In these

instances, collaboration between multiple agencies and jurisdictions serves to improve communication and cut through traditional boundaries.

With regard to the necessity for collaboration and networked organizations, this research sought to answer the following question:

- What causes or encourages collaboration and the creation of networked organizations in the state level homeland security arena?

Based on this research study, we now know that collaboration is accomplished and networked organizations are created for five primary responses. Listed in priority order with the most frequent response first, homeland security directors reported that collaborative networks were created to foster stakeholder participation and gain consensus; improve communication, information sharing, intelligence sharing, and reduce duplication of effort; address and solve common problems that are difficult and often complex; accomplish coordinated planning and collaboration; and assemble subject matter experts from the private sector, non-profit sector, and academia for assistance with problem resolution and advice with regard to policy development and funding.

In addition to the top five reasons, homeland security directors also provided additional insights that could be equally important to managers considering the merit of establishing formal collaborative arrangements. Homeland security directors reported (in no priority order) that collaboration is required to: solve problems that are too numerous for just one organization to solve; comply with the national priority regarding regional collaboration; facilitate crossing boundaries and improve state agency coordination; leverage scarce resources; provide integrated and coordinated program delivery; and provide a forum for development of homeland security strategy and program oversight.

Based on the insights provided by state level homeland security directors, the researcher concludes that the logic for collaboration and creation of networked organizations in the state level homeland security is consistent with the definitions and theories provided in contemporary literature. Collaboration is being conducted in a shared power environment in order to identify and solve the most difficult or complex problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by just one agency. Networked organizations are being created to encourage or facilitate the collaborative process and to open channels for communication. These organizations also assist in development of homeland security strategy and coordinated program delivery. The process of collaboration and the establishment of networked organizations have evolved and become more institutionalized within states over the past six years.

In addition to understanding what causes or encourages collaboration, it is also important to better understand the formal networked organizations that have been created to facilitate the process of collaboration in a shared power environment. The findings and analysis regarding the characteristics and types of formal networked organizations are addressed in the section that follows.

State Level Homeland Security Networked Organizations

Networked organizations are the formal organizations that are established in order to facilitate or encourage collaboration. The terms "networked organization, network, or collaborative network" are used interchangeably in this research to refer to the formal organizational structures that are created to solve the most difficult or complex problems in a shared power environment. State level homeland security networks can be explained

in part by their characteristics and the types of networks that have been created. The findings and analysis regarding state level homeland security organizations are provided in the sections that follow.

Characteristics of Networks

Very little has been published regarding state level homeland security organizations. Even less has been documented or is known about collaboration in the homeland security environment and the networked organizations that have been created at the state level to address the most complex issues that are not easily solved or cannot be solved by only one organization. Multi-organizational collaborative networks often cut across the various levels of government. These public sector organizations may also include participants from the private and nonprofit sectors.

As an example, information sharing in the homeland security arena involves the coordination, collaboration, and problem solving formally accomplished by representatives from the US DHS, FBI, U.S. Attorney, Secret Service, Customs and Immigration, state level Department of Public Safety, state level Homeland Security Department, state level law enforcement associations, and local law enforcement agencies. The "networked organization" created from representatives of these agencies would be the organizational structure that has been formally chartered by state government to accomplish collaboration with regard to information sharing. Typically this networked organization would be referred to as the State Information Fusion Committee. The network would address issues such as the sharing of classified information between agencies at different levels, data standardization between federal

and state agencies, protection of information in automated systems, or the proper channels for information dissemination.

Homeland security networked organizations at the state level may be described and categorized in several ways. This includes the total number of networks created within a given state, the number currently operating, the number disbanded, and the resources devoted to collaboration within these organizations. Table 14 provides the number of homeland security networks within states and a categorization of the amount of the total homeland security networks within states.

Table 14
Frequency of Networked Organizations within States as of March 2008

Network Frequency	Total Amount of Networks	# of States (%)
1-2	Small	10 (30)
3-6	Medium	11 (32)
7-18	Large	13 (38)

Note. n = 34.

Based on the survey results, 70% of states have established a significant number of networked organizations, ranging from 3 to 18. The median number of networks is 4.5, and the average is 5.6. Contemporary theorists indicate that collaboration is increasing throughout the public sector and represents one of the most fundamental changes to public administration in the 21st Century. Many suggest the numbers of

networked organizations are on the rise, and these organizations are playing a more important role in public administration. To this point, researchers have provided little empirical evidence regarding the actual role or importance of networked organizations. The data collected from this nationwide survey of state level homeland security directors support the notion that collaborative organizations are increasing in numbers and size, and they are becoming a more prominent fixture in the landscape of the public sector.

The number of homeland security networks within a state could possibly be influenced by several factors including senior manager experience or the federal funding available to the state. Tables 15 and 16 provide cross tabulations comparing the numbers of networks to senior manager experience. Based on the data displayed in these tables, the amount of overall experience or homeland security specific experience possessed by homeland security directors appears to have no significant impact with regard to the overall number of networks within a state.

The number of networks may have also been influenced by several other factors including the educational background of the manager or the actual previous experience rather than just the overall number of years of experience. For example, if a manager previously served in a position with many challenging problems requiring multilevel collaboration or as a result of education was aware of the value of formal networks, then the director may have been inclined to establish more networked organizations to facilitate collaboration. The overall number of networks also could have been influenced by an earlier homeland security director or by a senior official external to the homeland security department. Case studies focusing specifically on the creation and establishment of networked organizations are required in order to obtain additional empirical evidence.

Table 15
Number of State Level Homeland Security Networks Compared to the Amount of Homeland Security Director Total Experience (Including non-HS) as of March 2008

Network Frequency	Total Amount of Networks	# of States (%)	Years of HS Director Total Experience (%)			
			Small	Moderate	Significant	Extensive
1-2	Small	10 (30)	1 (2.9)	2 (5.9)	4 (11.8)	3 (8.8)
3-6	Medium	11 (32)	0 (0)	3 (8.8)	3 (8.8)	5 (14.7)
7-18	Large	13 (38)	0 (0)	4 (11.8)	2 (5.9)	7 (20.6)
			1 (2.9)	9 (26.5)	9 (26.5)	15 (44.1)

Note. n = 34 for # of states and n = 34 for years of HS director total experience.

Table 16
Number of State Level Homeland Security Networks Compared to Homeland Security Director Total Homeland Security Experience as of March 2008

Network Frequency	Total Amount of Networks	# of States (%)	Years of HS Director HS Experience (%)		
			Small	Moderate	Significant
1-2	Small	10 (30)	1 (2.9)	5 (14.7)	4 (11.8)
3-6	Medium	11 (32)	2 (5.9)	4 (11.8)	5 (14.7)
7-18	Large	13 (38)	2 (5.9)	5 (14.7)	6 (17.6)
			5 (15)	14 (41)	15 (44.1)

Note. n = 34 for # of states and n = 34 for years of HS director HS experience.

The number of homeland security networks within a state also may be influenced by the potential terrorist threat and by the amount of federal funding provided to the state. A high risk or threat of terrorist attack should provide significant incentives for creating the collaborative organizations necessary to mitigate the risk. Additionally, a significant amount of funding would provide the monetary resources necessary to support and sustain such organizations. Since the risk within states is closely related to the federal homeland security funding provided to states, comparing the number of state level homeland security networks within a state to the federal funding provided to the state also serves to provide the comparison for risk.

Table 17 compares state level networks with regard to federal funding and risk. Based on the US DHS funding formulas, the researcher anticipates that states receiving medium or large amounts of federal funding are typically those states with the greatest risk or potential for terrorist related activity. These states would face greater challenges and should need more networks to solve their most difficult problems. Similarly, states with a small amount of federal funding and low risk should have smaller numbers of networks.

The cross tabulation in Table 17 provides an indication that the expected relationship exists for those states with the most federal funding and the greatest risk, but the evidence is less than conclusive for those with a small and medium amounts of federal funding. Since the overall population in this research is small, a small variation in the data would possibly create a difference in the relationship. Also, the survey instrument used for this research did not request specific information with regard to the

Table 17
Number of State Level Homeland Security Networks as of March 2008 Compared to Amount of FY07 Federal Homeland Security Funding (SHSP and LETPP) for States

Network Frequency	Total Amount of Networks	# of States (%)	Amount of FY07 Federal HS Funding # of States (%)		
			Small	Medium	Large
1-2	Small	10 (30)	4 (11.8)	3 (8.8)	3 (8.8)
3-6	Medium	11 (32)	5 (14.7)	3 (8.8)	3 (8.8)
7-18	Large	13 (38)	2 (5.9)	6 (17.6)	5 (14.7)
			11 (32.4)	12 (35.2)	11 (32.4)

Note. n = 34 for # of states and n = 34 for amount of FY07 federal HS funding.

structure and subcommittees within existing networks. Some states might have only one network that is organized with two subcommittees. Other states might seek to solve similar problems with three separate networked organizations rather than using a parent structure and two subcommittees. Case studies focusing specifically on the creation and establishment of networked organizations would be required in order to obtain additional data and more precise empirical evidence.

The number of personnel involved in a formal collaborative undertaking may also provide an indication regarding the prominence of networked organizations and the resources required to solve problems in a shared power environment. Although there is no existing baseline, an examination of the personnel participating in formal networked organizations will provide insights and add to the base of knowledge. Table 18

categorizes networked organization size within states based on the numbers of personnel participating in the network.

Table 18
Networked Organization Size Based on the Total Number of Personnel Participating in the Network as of March 2008

# of Personnel in a Network	Network Size	# of States (%)
5-20	Small	9 (29)
21-40	Medium	10 (32)
41-100	Large	12 (39)

Note. n = 31.

In 29% of states, the networks are relatively small, with an average size of 5 to 20 personnel participating in the organization. The size of the networked organizations is significantly higher in the remaining states. The median size of networked organizations is 30 individuals, and the average size is 42 individuals. The average size of the networked organizations examined in this study was driven higher because five states reported an average of 100 individuals participating in each of their collaborative networks.

The total number of personnel participating in a homeland networked organization may be explained in part by the overall size of the state level homeland security organization or the amount federal grant funding available to the organization. If the homeland security organization has a large number of employees, then it is likely to

be involved with a greater number of programs. In this instance, a larger number of individuals would be available to participate in networked organizations. Additionally, since federal funding is proportional to risk, the researcher expects states with the greatest risk would have the most difficult problems. These states should also have a significant number of personnel involved in collaborative organizations and focused on solving these problems. Tables 19 and 20 provide cross tabulations addressing the total number of personnel involved in homeland security networked organizations.

Based on the data presented in Table 19, the researcher found no significant relationship between the numbers of personnel employed in a state level homeland security organization and the overall number of participants within a network. Several explanations are possible. One individual could serve in multiple collaborative initiatives

Table 19
Total Number of Personnel Participating in State Level Homeland Security Networks Compared to the State Level Homeland Security Organization Size (Based on Number of Personnel Serving) as of March 2008

# of Personnel in a Network	Network Size (# of States/%)	Size of Homeland Security Organization # of States (%)		
		Small	Medium	Large
5-20	Small (9/29)	4 (13.8)	2 (6.9)	2 (6.9)
21-40	Medium (10/32)	4 (13.8)	5 (17.2)	1 (3.4)
41-100	Large (12/39)	4 (13.8)	3 (10.4)	4 (13.8)
		12 (41.4)	10 (34.5)	7 (24.1)

Note. n = 31 for network size and n = 29 for size of homeland security organization.

and participation of this nature by one person would not have been captured by the survey instrument in this research. Actual participation in networked organizations may be dependent on the specific purpose of the network and the nature of the problems to be solved. Another possibility is that the number of participants in networked organizations from the state level homeland security organization may be fairly constant. One or two individuals from the homeland security organization may provide adequate representation in a network regardless of the overall size of the networked organization, the total number of other agencies involved, or the nature of the problem to be solved.

The data in Table 20 provide an indication of the relationship between the overall size of networked organizations and the risk or amount of federal funding provided to the state. States with the lowest risk and minimal funding typically have smaller networked organizations. States with medium and high risk have larger networked organizations. The researcher expects this relationship since states with more risk typically have more complex problems and challenges requiring participation by a large number of agencies and individuals. Case studies of specific networked organizations would be appropriate for additional analysis and would serve to shed additional light on this relationship.

The data obtained in this exploratory research also provide initial insights concerning the success and longevity of homeland security networked organizations and collaborative management undertakings. Only one respondent indicated that a networked organization within the state had not been successful, while 97% reported success. Based on the complexity of these organizations and their relative newness within the public sector, the one respondent most likely correctly reported an unsuccessful network that did not meet expectations. Some of the respondents who reported success may have, in

hindsight, overlooked problem areas or failures that occurred in the past. They may have also provided what was considered to be the "correct response" to the survey.

Table 20
Total Number of Personnel Participating in State Level Homeland Security Networked Organizations as of March 2008 Compared to FY07 Federal HS Funding for States

# of Personnel in the Network	Network Size (# of States/%)	Size of FY07 Federal HS State Funding # of States (%)		
		Small	Medium	Large
5-20	Small (9/29)	5 (16.1)	2 (6.5)	2 (6.5)
21-40	Medium (10/32)	1 (3.2)	5 (16.1)	4 (12.9)
41-100	Large (12/29)	3 (9.7)	3 (9.7)	6 (19.3)
		9 (29.0)	10 (32.3)	12 (38.7)

Note. n = 31 for network size and n = 31 for size of FY07 federal HS state funding.

When asked if the same results could have been achieved through a different avenue, 88% of the homeland security directors reported they could not have achieved the same results without collaboration or the use of networked organizations. Seventy-eight percent reported that none of their collaborative networked organizations had been disbanded, and the initially established organizations continue to serve the intended purpose. Three managers reported that new networked organizations had been created to replace those that were no longer necessary, and two reported a network had been terminated because it had served the intended purpose. Only one homeland security director reported that a network had been abolished because it was not productive. With

regard to this research, the data support the premise in contemporary literature that networked organizations have been an extremely successful management tool for administrators in the 21st Century.

With regard to the characteristics of state level homeland networked organizations, this research sought to answer the following questions:

- To what extent do networked organizations exist in states?
- How can these networked organizations be defined with regard to their size?
- How durable are state level homeland security networked organizations, how many networked organizations were created and later disbanded, and why?

Homeland security networked organizations at the state level may be described and categorized in several ways. This includes the total number of networks created within a given state, the number currently operating, the number disbanded, and the total number of personnel participating in collaborative efforts within these organizations. Tables 14 through 20 provide a summary of data regarding the characteristics of homeland security organizations.

With regard to the total number of networks created, we now know that the majority of states (70%) have established a significant number of networked organizations in the past several years, ranging from three in some states in to 18 in others. With regard to the types of organizations that were established immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks, we know that 41 of the reporting states (100%) created either a homeland security task force or revised the charter of an existing advisory committee in order to address homeland security related issues. As a result of federal guidance at that time, it is very likely that each of the remaining nine states (for which

there is no documentation) also created a similar networked organization. No states reported more than one state level task force or council. As a result, the researcher concludes that in the infant stage of homeland security organization in 2002, each state had on average one networked organization. Six years later, states report a significant increase in networked organizations, and on average, states now have five networked organizations. Based on the reports from 31 homeland security directors, 38% of the states have between seven and 18 networked organizations. This is a significant increase in the number of networked organizations operating at the state level.

With regard to network size, as a result of this research we now know that small networked organizations, with five to 20 personnel participating in the network, have been established in 29% of the states. Most states (71%) have a significant number of personnel participating in networked organizations, ranging from 21 to 100. The average participation in state level networks is 42 individuals, but five states reported an average of 100 individuals participating in each of their collaborative networks. The largest networks within the homeland security arena are typically located in states with the greatest risk and most federal funding.

With regard to the durability of state level homeland security networked organizations, 78% of the homeland security directors reported that none of their collaborative networked organizations had been disbanded, and the initially established organizations continue to serve the intended purpose. Three managers reported that new networked organizations had been created to replace those that were no longer necessary, and two reported a network had been terminated because it had served the intended

purpose. Only one director reported that a network had been abolished because it was no longer productive.

Based on the significant number of networks that have been created, their size and durability, the researcher concludes that these networked organizations are becoming more institutionalized and are now a prominent organizational fixture in the state level homeland security environment. When asked if the same results could have been achieved through a different avenue, 88% of the homeland security directors reported they could not have achieved the same results without collaboration or the use of networked organizations. The data support the premise in contemporary literature that networked organizations are flourishing and have been an extremely successful management tool for administrators in the 21st Century. In order to provide a complete the analysis of networked organizations, the various types of networks are documented and discussed in the section that follows.

Types of Networks

In addition to providing valuable information regarding the characteristics of networked organizations, survey respondents also provided excellent insights regarding the specific types of collaborative organizations that have been created. Future research will be facilitated by developing an inventory and categorizing existing state level homeland security networked organizations. This will also assist in providing a better understanding of the nature of these networks and the problems they seek to solve. The five most common types of networked organizations reported by state homeland security directors include:

- Homeland Security Task Force or Anti-terrorism Advisory Committees;
- Intelligence Fusion Committees;
- Interoperable Communications Councils;
- Regional Advisory Committees; and
- Infrastructure Protection Steering Groups.

Homeland security task forces or advisory committees are the most common type of networked organizations operating within each state. These committees were typically created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11th. This type of networked organization normally serves as the governing body for homeland security related issues and as the advisory committee to the governor and state legislature. These organizations are primarily responsible for focusing on issues at the strategic level and recommending allocation of resources within the state.

The remaining four most common networks are also prevalent and were found in 20% to 50% of the states surveyed. Intelligence fusion centers and their steering committees have been strongly encouraged by US DHS and were supported with language in recent annual federal grant programs. Intelligence steering committees focus on the problems associated with information and intelligence sharing between the agencies at different levels of government and jurisdictions. Interoperable communications committees address the significant problems associated with first responder mobile radio communications, typically the inability of many agencies and jurisdictions to communicate with each other due to incompatible radio systems. Regional advisory committees seek to solve local problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, infrastructure protection steering groups focus on protecting critical

infrastructure within the 18 infrastructure sectors defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

In addition to the five most common types of networked organizations reported by state homeland security directors, five other less prevalent collaborative organizations were found to be operating in 10% to 19% of the states. These five types of networked organizations include:

- Mutual Aid Steering Committees;
- Citizen Corps Councils;
- Domestic Preparedness Working Groups;
- Campus or Government Facility Security Committees; and
- National Incident Management System (NIMS) Steering Committees.

Mutual aid steering committees address problems associated with the training and operation of prevention and response teams. Mutual aid teams are formed within fire and law enforcement agencies in local jurisdictions, and their charter involves crossing jurisdictional boundaries to provide regional support. Citizen Corps Councils are often multi-jurisdictional and multi-level networks that seek to solve the operational, logistical and legal hurdles associated with employing local volunteer groups that have been formed to assist emergency situations. Domestic Preparedness Working Groups are typically planning organizations that are created to address preparedness issues relating to the prevention of terrorist activities and the response to manmade disasters. Campus or government facility security committees are specialized networks that seek to provide protection for government and academic facilities. Government infrastructure is one of the 18 critical infrastructure sectors defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security. In some states, each of the critical infrastructure sectors is established as subcommittees under the infrastructure protection steering committee rather than as independent networks. Finally, National Incident Management System steering committees have also been formed in several states to address federal, state, and local issues with regard to the command and control challenges associated with response to large scale disasters.

In addition to the ten most common networked organizations highlighted above, several other less common networks have been established in from one to three states. These collaborative networks include:

- Public/Private Partnership Councils;
- Transportation Working Groups;
- Port Security Committees;
- Agriculture Security Committees;
- First Responder Advisory Committees;
- Bioterrorism Coordinating Councils;
- Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Working Groups;
- Geospatial Information System (GIS) Steering Committees;
- Public Health Advisory Committees;
- Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Steering Committees;
- Search and Rescue Working Groups;
- Emergency Management Working Groups; and
- A Preparedness College.

Several of the less common networks are focused on infrastructure protection within a specific sector. Others focus on narrow mission areas or highly technical areas such as geospatial information systems, bioterrorism, public health, hazardous materials or search and rescue. The Preparedness College is an example of an uncommon but interesting network reported by one homeland security director. This particular network is a research based think tank (comprised of academics, subject matter experts, and first responder practitioners) located in a state with a large population and significant risk. Its charter is to cut across the entire homeland security spectrum and to focus on the most difficult problems that cannot be solved at the local levels. Each of the less common networked organizations offers state level homeland security directors with additional problem-solving venues. Additional research and case studies would be appropriate to determine the actual effectiveness of specific collaborative organizations and to explore in more detail the types of problems they seek to solve.

With regard to the types of state level homeland security networked organizations, this research sought to answer the following question:

- Does the homeland security arena at the state level lend itself to certain types of networked organizations, and can these networks be defined with regard to their purpose?

Based on the data obtained in this research, we now know there are five types of networked organizations most commonly operating within states. These include homeland security task forces or anti-terrorism advisory committees, intelligence fusion committees, interoperable communications councils, regional advisory committees, and infrastructure protection steering groups. Homeland security task forces or advisory

committees are the single most prevalent type of networked organization operating within each state. These committees were typically created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in September 2001. This type network serves as the governing body for homeland security related issues and as the advisory committee to the governor and state legislature. These organizations are primarily responsible for focusing on issues at the strategic level and recommending allocation of resources within the state.

The remaining four most common networks are also prevalent and found in many states (20-50%). Intelligence steering committees focus on the problems associated with information and intelligence sharing between the agencies at different levels of government and jurisdictions. Interoperable communications committees address the significant problems associated with first responder mobile radio communications, typically the inability of many agencies and jurisdictions to communicate with each other due to incompatible radio systems. Regional advisory committees seek to solve local problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, infrastructure protection steering groups focus on protecting critical infrastructure.

In addition to the five most common types of networked organizations reported by state homeland security directors, five other less prevalent collaborative organizations were found to be operating in several states (10-19%). These networked organizations include mutual aid steering committees, citizen corps councils, domestic preparedness working groups, government facility security committees, and national incident management system steering committees. Mutual aid steering committees address problems associated with the training and operation of prevention and response teams. They seek to cross jurisdictional boundaries and address the problems associated with

providing support on a regional basis. Citizen Corps Councils are multi-jurisdictional and multi-level networks that seek to solve the operational, logistical and legal hurdles associated with employing local volunteer groups that have been formed to assist emergency situations. Domestic Preparedness Working Groups are planning organizations that are created to address preparedness issues relating to the prevention of terrorist activities and the response to manmade disasters. Government facility security committees are specialized networks that seek to provide protection for government and academic facilities. Finally, national incident management system steering committees have also been formed in several states to address federal, state, and local issues with regard to the command and control challenges associated with response to large scale disasters.

Based on the data obtained from state level homeland security directors, we now know there are 10 types of networked organizations typically operating in many states. In addition to the 10 most common networks, there are at least 13 other types of networked organizations operating in a few states. As a result of this study, the researcher concludes that different types of state level homeland security networked organizations have evolved and become more institutionalized over the past six years. In addition to understanding more about the most common types of networked organizations and the purposes they serve, this research also seeks to better understand the lessons that have been learned regarding the operations within collaborative networks. The findings and analysis regarding the lessons we have learned from participation in collaborative endeavors and from the networked organizations that have been created are addressed in the section that follows.

Collaboration and Networked Organization Lessons Learned

The threat of terrorism crosses a broad spectrum, and terrorists continually modify their patterns, techniques, and activities in order to adapt to the evolving security environment. Networks are well suited for complex and constantly changing environments, and these organizations seek to effectively address and solve the most difficult problems. As reported in contemporary literature, collaborative networks are extremely effective in a constantly changing or uncertain environment. In order to quickly adapt to the constantly changing threat of terrorism, it is important for homeland security directors and other public officials understand the lessons learned from operating in a collaborative environment. The lessons learned from other organizations serve reduce the learning curve and allow organizations with similar challenges to more quickly address the evolving threats. The lessons addressed in the remainder of the chapter pertain specifically to collaboration and networked organizations within the state level homeland security arena.

When homeland security directors were asked about the lessons they had learned regarding collaboration and networked organizations, they provided five primary responses. Listed in priority order with the most frequent response at the top, homeland security directors reported:

1. Appropriate governance and a well defined structure are essential if the network is to be successful. A formal charter, a clear mission, and well defined goals are also important. Committees and individual members must be assigned specific responsibilities and tasks;

2. Representativeness and stakeholder participation from all levels are required for successful networks. Participation by the different disciplines and local representation is essential. Membership must be inclusive and organizers should think out of the boundaries to ensure the correct participation is achieved;
3. Networks are complex organizations and require strong and committed leadership. Executive level participation is essential. A committed and organizing individual is needed to ensure a cohesive network. A strong and skilled facilitator is a must. In certain instances, a contract or outside facilitator may be preferable;
4. Efficient and productive networks require an action oriented agenda to keep everyone on track. The organization must be process oriented and mission focused; and
5. Networks facilitate good relationships, and these relationships are critical in emergency situations. Partnerships ensure comprehensive solutions and better programs. Collaboration helps with conflict avoidance.

These primary lessons pertaining to networked organizations in the homeland security arena may serve as a model regarding collaborative management and the operation of networked organizations in other areas throughout the public sector.

Homeland security directors most frequently reported that governance and a well defined structure are essential if networks are to be successful. Members of the network must understand the decision making authority of the organization. When a decision is made, network participants must accept ownership for the decision and be prepared to defend that decision with their parent organization. A well defined structure is important

so members understand the mission and objectives of committees and the roles of all participants. Successful organizations typically have a clear mission and well defined goals. The mission, goals, and objectives are often identified, documented, and prioritized through the strategic planning process. Committees and committee members must be assigned specific responsibilities and tasks in order for everyone to have an active and meaningful role in the process. Maintaining membership is often problematic and attrition is reduced if everyone actively participates and is working together to achieve a common goal.

In addition to a clear mission and well defined structure, representativeness and stakeholder participation from all levels is typically a key ingredient in the most successful networks. Participation by the different responder disciplines (e.g., law enforcement, fire, emergency management, medical, and others) is important in order to obtain a complete understanding of the nature of the problem and achieve a balanced solution that is supported by all agencies and disciplines. Local representation is essential in state level networked organizations since most first responders and their equipment are located at the local level. Without grass roots support, difficult problems are sometimes impossible to solve, and programs are less successful. For example, some federal law enforcement agencies in past years may have seemed aloof, and local law enforcement agencies often withheld information and support. With the establishment of Intelligence Fusion Centers at the state level, law enforcement officials from all levels now collaborate to facilitate the collection of information, and they share intelligence in order to solve difficult problems associated with prevention of terrorist related activities and protection of citizens and critical infrastructure. Finally, network organizers should

think outside agency and jurisdictional boundaries to ensure the appropriate participation of all agencies and organizations. Difficult and complex problems have no boundaries. Additionally, when personnel from many agencies are engaged in solving problems, the solutions are typically more comprehensive and more easily implemented.

Scholars have written extensively about the importance of leadership in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Good leadership is normally considered as a major contributing factor for success in both private companies and public organizations. The requirement for leadership in networked organizations is no exception. Collaborative endeavors are typically complex with regard to both their structure and the problems they seek to solve. As a result, networks require strong and committed leadership, and executive level participation in the process is essential. When senior leaders are actively involved, the importance of the mission is echoed throughout the organization. Senior leaders must be committed to success, and managers with credibility and organizational skills are needed to establish a framework that will support the mission. To be successful, networks must be well organized and cohesive. A skilled facilitator is often helpful to ensure input is obtained from all participants without overly delaying the process or excessively watering down the final solution. In certain instances, an outside facilitator may be preferable in order to keep the process moving and to help participants focus on the most significant actions.

In addition to a clear mission and good leadership, productive networks require an action oriented agenda to keep everyone on track. Large numbers of problems or the complexity of difficult problems may overwhelm both managers and network participants. An action oriented agenda is required to keep everyone focused on solving

problems one step at a time while gaining consensus along the way. Throughout the years, scholars have well documented the dynamics and challenges regarding group interaction within both the private and public sector. The process of group decision making is time consuming and often results in less than optimal solutions. In order for a network to maintain both efficiency and effectiveness, it must be process oriented and mission focused.

Finally, networks facilitate stakeholder participation and result in good working relationships between individuals in different agencies and jurisdictions. The partnerships and relationships established during participation in a networked organizations help achieve comprehensive solutions to problems and assist in development of homeland security programs that serve all responder disciplines within all levels of government. As a side benefit, the collaborative process helps with conflict avoidance both within the network and in the daily operations involving multiple agencies. Good relationships between individuals and agencies are critical for appropriate response in disasters and emergency situations.

In addition to the top five lessons learned, homeland security directors also provided a variety of other lessons pertaining to networked organizations. The remaining lessons provide additional insights and may be useful to managers considering other avenues for collaborative endeavors. The remaining lessons were typically provided by two or three directors and are listed in no special order. It is also noteworthy that some of the lessons seem contradictory, but the contrasting lessons may in fact be appropriate depending on the network and the specific situation. Homeland security directors reported:

- Collaboration is a difficult process, and you can't please everyone;
- Participation in networked organizations is time consuming. Consensus takes time, dilutes the final solution, and is often difficult to obtain when the membership is extremely broad;
- Constant communication within the network and between individuals is essential. Managers must keep network membership informed and provide them with meaningful information. Members of networked organizations must have clear lines of communication with their parent organizations and must constantly update their agency regarding network priorities, activities, and decisions;
- Networked organizations are rarely abolished and tend to take on a life of their own. Some networks should be disbanded when the work is complete;
- Meetings should be conducted only when necessary rather than too often;
- Regularly scheduled meetings are required to keep the members engaged;
- Networks must be nurtured to keep participants active and organizations on track. Network leaders must actively recruit participants and promote participation. Funding and incentives may be necessary to motivate agencies and individuals to participate. Active participation by all members is necessary for a healthy organization.
- Some network members are nonproductive and hide in committees to justify their existence;

- Network leadership should constantly monitor participation. It's important to know which organizations are represented, and it's equally important to know which agencies are represented;
- A full time staff is necessary to provide administrative support for networked organizations;
- Dual chairs should be considered when federal and state agencies are involved;
- Include federal agencies but continuously assert state priorities;
- Subject matter experts are an important key to success but should report to the main body for policy decisions;
- Contract support may be required and contractors are often essential for efficient operations; and
- Networked organizations contribute significantly to transparent government.

In addition to gaining insights from the most typically reported lessons, we may also better understand the art of collaboration through examination of the 15 less prevalent lessons. Based on the survey results, we know that collaboration in the homeland security arena is a complex process. It is extremely difficult to please everyone. By providing a collaborative environment and allowing an opportunity for team members to voice their opinions, managers promote teamwork and foster shared solutions to difficult problems. When individuals have the opportunity to participate, they become part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

Collaboration in a shared power environment also requires commitment and takes a significant amount of time. Gaining consensus is a lengthy process when many agencies and individuals are involved in the process. Difficult problems that involve

multi-level agencies and cut across boundaries do not typically have simple solutions. The final solution is often a compromise and may not have been the exact course of action preferred by all participants or agencies.

Consensus is difficult to obtain when the membership is extremely broad and many agencies are involved, but it is facilitated by good communication. One homeland security director stated succinctly that constant communication is essential. In order to keep participants active and engaged, network membership must be kept informed and provided with meaningful information. If important information is not shared, or if the accomplishments are considered routine, membership and participation will suffer. In addition to good internal communication, members of networked organizations must have clear and continuous lines of communication with their parent organization, constantly providing updates regarding network priorities, activities, and decisions. Collaborative efforts serve no purpose if managers in the parent organizations do not support or participate in the implementation of the collaborative solution.

One homeland security director reported that networked organizations are rarely abolished and tend to take on a life of their own. Another reported that networked organizations tend to be self perpetuating, and some networks should be disbanded when their work is complete. History teaches that public organizations are rarely abolished. Political considerations, organizational resistance to change, and other factors may often result in reorganizations and realignments rather than abolishment of an organization. The same dynamics seem true for homeland security networked organizations at the state level. Seventy-eight percent of the homeland security directors reported that none of their collaborative networked organizations had been disbanded and continue to serve the

intended purpose. Three managers reported that a new networked organization had been created to replace one that was no longer necessary, and two reported a network had been terminated because it had served the intended purpose. Only one individual reported a network had been abolished because it was no longer productive.

With regard to other lessons, one homeland security director suggested that it is preferable to conduct meetings only when required, rather than meeting too often or on a regularly scheduled basis. Others reported that regular meetings are required to keep the members engaged. There is no precise formula for determining the frequency of meetings. Each network is different and the frequency and length of meetings will vary depending on the individual participants, agencies involved, and the nature of the problems to be solved.

In addition to focusing on time management, managers indicated that networks must be nurtured to keep participants active and engaged in the process. Network leaders must actively recruit participants and promote participation. Funding and incentives may be necessary to motivate agencies and individuals to participate. Active participation by all members is necessary to maintain and sustain a healthy organization. In this regard, one homeland security director indicated that network leadership should constantly monitor participation. It is important to know which organizations are represented, but it is equally important to know which agencies are not participating.

With regard to the organizational structure within a network, a full time staff may be necessary to provide administrative support. Individuals participate in networked organizations on a part time basis and must balance the competing demands of their primary job and other priority assignments. Administrative requirements slow the

collaborative process, robbing valuable time and energy from the difficult work at hand. In this regard, administrative support for networked organizations should be considered as the charter is being developed. Also, contract support should be considered as an option, and full time support may be essential for efficient operations in some cases.

In addition to addressing the administrative requirements of networked organizations, other organizational requirements should also be considered. One director reported that dual chairs are necessary when both federal and state agencies are involved. This arrangement fosters the close working relationship that is required between federal and state agencies. Another director took a more parochial view, indicating that federal agencies should be included in the process, but state level officials should continuously assert state priorities. Issues relating to federalism and the appropriate roles and functions of the different levels of government must be a consideration in any collaborative endeavor. Finally, one homeland security director reinforced the importance of subject matter experts with regard to solving difficult problems, but warned that experts should be integrated into the collaborative process, reporting to the main body for policy decisions.

Concerning the lessons that have been learned regarding collaboration and state level homeland networked organizations, this research sought to answer the following question:

- What lessons have homeland security managers learned regarding collaboration in the shared power environment and the networked organizations that have been created to facilitate or encourage collaboration?

As indicated, this research documents the lessons learned from operating in a collaborative environment, and homeland security directors report five most significant lessons. The most significant lesson is that appropriate governance and a well defined structure are essential if the network is to be successful. A formal charter, a clear mission and well defined goals are also important. Committees and individual members must be assigned specific responsibilities and tasks.

The second most significant lesson is that representativeness and stakeholder participation from all levels are required for successful networks. Participation by the different disciplines and local representation is essential. Membership must be inclusive and organizers should think out of their organizational boundaries to ensure the correct participation is achieved.

The third lesson is that networks are complex organizations and require strong and committed leadership. Executive level participation is essential. A committed and organizing individual is needed to ensure a cohesive network. A strong and skilled facilitator is a must. In certain instances, a contract or outside facilitator may be preferable.

The fourth lesson is that efficient and productive networks require an action oriented agenda to keep everyone on track. The organization must be process oriented and mission focused.

The final lesson is that networks facilitate good relationships, and these relationships are critical in emergency situations. Partnerships ensure comprehensive solutions and better programs. Collaboration also helps with conflict avoidance.

The lessons learned in the state level homeland security arena are consistent with the lessons provided by contemporary theorists, but several are specific to homeland security environment. Stakeholder participation and involvement by all first responder disciplines is essential. Another significant lesson is that collaboration and networked organizations facilitate the good working relationships that are critical in emergency situations.

Summary

This chapter documents and analyzes the organizations within the homeland security arena at the state level, and it also answers the research questions that guided this study. The two types of organizations include the state level homeland security organization responsible for planning and coordinating all homeland security related actions throughout the state, and the networked organizations responsible for solving the most difficult or complex homeland security related problems in the shared power environment. Based on the data obtained from this research, we now know that state level homeland security organizations and their networked organizations are prominent organizational components at the state level, and these organizations are becoming more institutionalized. We also know that collaboration is flourishing, and networked organizations have been extremely successful in the homeland security arena at the state level.

With regard to state level homeland security organizations, the analysis addresses several of the primary characteristics relating to organizational location, the number of personnel assigned, amount of federal grant funding provided, percentage of state

funding provided, and prior experience and tenure of the homeland security directors who are responsible for these organizations. The survey revealed that half of the directors are located in organizations reporting directly to the governor, while the remaining directors serve in a branch that is layered within an existing organization. The majority of respondents (96%) expressed satisfaction with their current organizational location.

In considering whether the homeland security and the emergency management functions should be merged, 57% of the homeland security directors reported that either the two functions had been merged or the same manager was responsible for both organizations. It is noteworthy that 68% of states have made an effort to increase collaboration either through oversight, merger, or collocation of the two functions. When asked if the two functional areas should be merged, 80% of the respondents reported that merger is preferable primarily due to the improved collaboration and coordination that would occur.

With regard to state funding, it is noteworthy that 34% of state legislatures appropriated no funding for homeland security even in view of significant federal funding provided to states on an annual basis. Small to medium funding levels (1-50% of federal funding) were provided in most states (53%). A significant funding level (51-100% of federal funding) was provided in only 13% of the states. A 100% funding match was provided only in three states with significant risk.

The data obtained from the survey reveal that homeland security directors are typically seasoned managers with 71% having over 20 years of experience. Within this group, more than a third has over 30 years of experience. Immediately following September 11th, homeland security directors were appointed from three primary

disciplines: law enforcement, military, and emergency management. The majority of presently serving homeland security directors still have primary background experience in one of these areas.

This chapter also provides analysis and insights regarding the homeland security networked organizations that have been established to facilitate or encourage collaboration at the state level. Prior to this research, little documentation existed regarding collaboration in the homeland security environment or the networked organizations that were created at the state level to address the most difficult and complex issues. Based on the survey results, 71% of states have established a significant number of networked organizations, ranging from three to 18. The data provide no indication that the experience possessed by homeland security directors has significant impact with regard to the overall number of networks within a state. Most likely, the number of networks is influenced by the actual environment and requirements in a specific location. As expected, states with the highest risk and the most difficult problems typically have the largest number of networks.

The median size of networked organizations is 30 individuals, and the average size is 42 individuals. The data reveal no correlation between the size of a homeland security department, and the number of personnel from that organization participating in networked organizations. Participation may be dependent on the specific purpose of the network and the nature of the problems to be solved. As expected, the data reveal a positive correlation between the overall size of networked organizations and the risk or federal funding available to the state.

The numbers of networked organizations within each state and their size reveal that networks are prevalent in the state level homeland security environment. Additionally, homeland security directors report that networked organizations have enjoyed a 97% success rate. These reports of success are consistent with the network success claimed in contemporary literature. Finally, 78% of the respondents reported that none of their networks had been disbanded, and the initially established organizations continue to serve the intended purpose.

According to contemporary theorists, collaborative organizations in the public sector are created to solve the most difficult and complex problems in the shared power environment that cannot be solved or are not easily solved by one organization. In addition to solving problems, the data reveal that many homeland security networked organizations were specifically created to encourage stakeholder participation and to gain consensus. These networks also serve to improve communication, foster information sharing, and reduce duplication of effort.

Several types of networked organizations have been created at the state level. The most prominent include the homeland security task forces or anti-terrorism advisory committees, intelligence fusion committees, interoperable communications councils, infrastructure protection steering groups, and regional advisory committees. Eighteen other types of networked organizations have been created in limited numbers. Identification of these less common networks may provide insights for homeland security directors regarding other types of networks that could be established in their states.

In addition to identifying the characteristics of homeland security networked organizations and learning why they were created, this exploratory research also serves to

document the lessons learned from operating in a collaborative environment. Homeland security directors report five most significant lessons, including: networks require appropriate governance and a well defined structure; stakeholder participation from all levels is essential; strong and committed leadership is important; executive level participation is necessary; an action oriented agenda for networks is essential; and the good relationships built in networks are critical in emergency situations.

In summary, state level homeland security organizations and their networked organizations are gradually evolving toward similar patterns and are becoming more institutionalized. Lessons learned in the homeland security arena allow organizations to share best practices and quickly adapt to the constantly changing terrorist threat. The five primary lessons pertaining to networked organizations provide a model for collaboration within the homeland security arena, and also may offer insights regarding collaboration and networked organizations in other areas throughout the public sector.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This exploratory research traces the evolution and provides a better understanding of the state level organizations that have been created to address homeland security issues within each state. It also provides initial insights regarding collaboration in a shared power environment and the homeland security networked organizations that have been created at the state level to solve the most difficult or complex problems. In addition to shedding light regarding organizational alternatives available to state officials, this research also examines the different types of networked organizations and explores the challenges and lessons learned with regard to collaboration and networked organizations.

Significance of the Study

The issues relating to homeland security are both numerous and complex. The nation is dealing with a new meaning of conflict, a new threat on American soil, and a new security concept—all requiring changes relating to how we must now defend the United States, its citizens, and critical infrastructure. During the past several years, the federal reorganization for homeland security has been a significant and controversial topic of discussion. In comparison, political analysts and public officials have had only limited discussions regarding the state level reorganization.

Although the topic of homeland security organizational structures at the state level has received little attention from academics, public policy think tanks, and politicians, it is a relevant consideration in view of the federal doctrine regarding emergency response. For the past several decades, emergency response within the United States has been based on the concept that the federal government would provide coordination and assist with resources, but state and local authorities were responsible for managing and responding to catastrophic events within their jurisdictions. The federal government applied this same doctrine to the emerging terrorist threat that faces our nation. Because states are significant participants in the homeland security process and have primary responsibility for responding to terrorist-related events, it is logical that the organizational structures required in each state to complement federal programs should be considered as a critical building block for success.

As a result of this research, we now know that states have organized and reorganized in a variety of ways in order to manage critical issues relating to homeland security. Several patterns have emerged, and state level homeland security organizations are becoming more institutionalized. A significant number and variety of networked organizations have been created at the state level to address the most difficult or complex issues that are not easily solved or cannot be solved by only one agency. This research also provides us with a better understanding of the existing networked organizations.

The findings from this study provide significant information regarding the organizational alternatives available to state officials. The research also provides an initial base of empirical data and insights regarding the formal homeland security

networks at the state level. This data could be used as the foundation for future case studies focused on specific networked organizations.

Theoretical Implications

The theoretical focus of this study centers around three bodies of literature related to governmental reorganization. These include the institutionalism of governmental organizations, collaboration in the public sector, and the networked organizations that have been created to facilitate or encourage collaboration.

The institutional component of this study addresses U.S. governmental reorganization in general. Institutionalization is defined as the organizational evolution and maturation that involves embedding norms, policies, procedures, and behavior within an organization. In addition to addressing governmental reorganization in general, this portion of the research study also addresses the specific theoretical topics relating to formal and informal adaptation by organizations, cooptation within organizations, and the nature of bureaucracy.

With regard to governmental reorganization in general, Szanton (1981) suggests the establishment of an executive department "… is one way of expressing national concern in dealing with urgent problems such as the energy crisis or symbolizing national commitment and values" (p. 37). Grafton (1984) indicates that federal reorganization is often preceded by a "novelty event" of significant proportion, and that the majority of federal agencies, especially the largest and most important, were created in response to the significant event. He also points out that novelties normally affect the lives of large numbers of people. Garnett (1987) indicates that major reorganizations are always

controversial, and the political stakes are high. The terrorist attacks in 2001 resulted in the death of nearly 3000 individuals and has significantly impacted the lives of millions of Americans. Within days of the attack, the President created the Office of Homeland Security in order to deal with this urgent problem and to symbolize the national commitment to protect our citizens. In the fall of 2002, Congress passed legislation in order to create the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The legislation resulted in the merger of 22 federal agencies and over 180,000 individuals. The federal reorganization was filled with controversy, especially with regard to the transfer of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, Secret Service and other federal agencies into the newly created department. The actions relating to the federal reorganization for homeland security clearly support the theories regarding major governmental reorganization provided by Szanton (1981), Grafton (1984), and Garnett (1987).

With regard to cooptation, adaptation, and the institutionalization of organizations, Selznick (1949) suggests "crisis participation" might involve representation of various groups in councils of government in an effort to gain support in a time of national crisis or stress. This technique may also be used to gain support for the implementation of new and controversial programs. He theorizes that both formal and informal cooptation often result in a sharing of responsibility for programs through local participation in voluntary groups, associations, committees, and councils. Adaptive responses relating to cooptation ultimately serve to change the character of the bureaucracy, the role of the organization, and involvement of its governing body. The reorganization involving federal and state level homeland security organizations and the

creation of networked organizations support his theories related to "crisis participation" and establishment of various groups in councils of government. Selznick's writings over a half century prior to the terrorist attacks on our nation provide the logic and predict the necessity for creation of networked organizations. His theories also help us better understand the forces and influences relating to the institutionalism of homeland security and other public organizations.

The institutionalization of both federal and state level homeland security organizations is also explained in part by the writings of Goodsell (2004). He defines bureaucracy as the various body of institutions within the public sector rather than public administration in general, an organization or a specific process. Goodsell makes a logical case in support of bureaucracy by pointing out that bureaucracy is not just one standard organizational model. In actuality, it is comprised of thousands of separate organizations. The various types of bureaucracies and their functions are significantly different, and smaller governmental organizations are more common than larger organizations. The empirical evidence in this research supports Goodsell's theories, and we now know that state level homeland security organizations vary significantly in size, construct, and purpose. We also know that there are many different types of networked organizations, and they vary significantly from state to state.

The second body of literature in this study involves the theories pertaining to public sector collaboration in the 21st Century. Collaboration is defined as the coordination accomplished in a shared power environment between individuals from multiple agencies located within the different levels of government. This component of the study addresses the evolution of intergovernmental relations and its impact on

increased collaboration at all levels of government. It also addresses the necessity for collaboration in the shared power environment.

Wright (1988) provided early insights into the emerging importance of collaboration, governance, and networking in public organizations. In addressing the future directions of public administration, he suggested that the complexity of our intergovernmental system will not allow for strategic solutions developed in a vacuum by the top levels of government.

Wright (1988) viewed the necessity for collaboration and networks through the lens of intergovernmental relations. Gray (1989) sharpened the focus, indicating that future managers must participate and interact in a collaborative manner. She defined collaboration as "…a process in which those parties with a stake in the problem actively seek a mutually determined solution" (Gray, 1989, p. xviii). She theorized that "collaborating alliances" are a viable method for solving inter-organizational problems in a shared power environment. In a collaborative undertaking, stakeholders from various organizations and levels of government essentially share the power, define the problem, and take action to solve it. The data in this research confirm the theories of these two ground breaking authors. State level homeland security directors report that collaboration is being accomplished throughout the states and is required in order to obtain stakeholder participation and support. Gray's "collaborating alliances," now referred to as networked organizations in contemporary literature, are a prominent fixture in the homeland security landscape and are flourishing.

Kettl (2002) suggests there is an emerging gap between the traditional study of public administration with regard to bureaucratic organizations and the way public

administration is actually practiced today. He indicates that in the new collaborative environment of the 21st Century, it is prudent to understand the emerging dynamics relating to collaborative organizations and their governance structures. The data in this research reflecting the necessity for collaboration, the lessons learned by homeland security directors, and the size and extent collaborative networks support Kettl's position. Within the homeland security arena, much of the work is done in a collaborative environment. In 2002, each state had only on homeland security task force or council. Just six years later, we now know that the number of networked organizations within states has significantly increased.

Agranoff and McGuire (2003) indicate that collaboration involves the process of working jointly with other individuals and organizations in order to achieve a specific result. They theorize that the skills and knowledge required for public officials to successfully operate in a collaborative setting may be different than those required to manage a single organization. Agranoff and McGuire contend that is prudent to develop an extensive knowledge base similar to that which has well served the study of bureaucratic management over the past century and future research is required. The responses from the majority of state level homeland security directors (70%) support their theory regarding the skills that are necessary in a collaborative environment. Based on the data obtained from the survey, we know that collaboration is a difficult process, and it is difficult to please everyone. Consensus is a key element in the collaborative process, and it is often difficult to obtain when the membership is extremely broad. We also know that constant communication within the network and between individuals is essential. Managers must keep network membership informed and provide them with meaningful

information. Members of networked organizations must have clear lines of communication with their parent organizations and must constantly update their agency regarding network priorities, activities, and decisions. In networked organizations, information flows both vertically and horizontally, whereas in hierarchical organizations, some managers may be accustomed to communication that flows only up and down.

The final theoretical body of literature in this study focuses on networked organizations created in the public sector. Networked organizations are defined as the formal organizations that are established to facilitate or encourage collaborative processes. Formal networked organizations are created to solve the most difficult or complex problems in a shared power environment. The network portion of the literature review examined both the characteristics of networked organizations and the benefits and challenges associated with these organizations.

Theorists, including O'Toole (1997), Kettl (2002), Henton and Melville (2002), Agranoff and McGuire (2003), Thomson and Perry (2006), McGuire (2006), and others, contend that public collaboration is flourishing, and networked organizations are increasing in incidence and importance. O'Toole indicates that complex networks are relatively common and are likely to increase in importance and number. McGuire suggests formal collaboration has been occurring in the public sector for several decades. Homeland security directors confirm the literature pertaining to networked organizations and indicate that networked organizations are prominent fixtures within states. Based on the empirical evidence, many states (70%) have established a significant number of networked organizations. On average, over five networks have been chartered within each state, and states with significant risk have up to 18 networks.

Thomson and Perry (2006) indicate the collaborative process is complex and costly. They also conclude that the most costly resources of collaboration are time and energy rather that money. Although this research did not seek to identify the monetary cost of networks, homeland security directors report a significant amount their time is devoted to managing and participating in networked organizations. They also report a significant number of personnel are devoted to collaborative networks. In some instances, networks may have up to 100 participants within a single organization.

Wise (2002) theorizes that managers will have to employ significant leadership in network models in order to overcome the myriad of obstacles and complex problems associated with the homeland security environment. Homeland security directors report that networks require strong and committed leadership. Executive level participation in the collaborative process is essential. When senior leaders are actively involved, the importance of the mission is echoed throughout the organization. Senior leaders must be committed to success, and managers with credibility and organizational skills are needed to establish a framework that will support the mission.

The theoretical knowledge base provides a variety of practical lessons for managers involved with networked organizations, and the insights provided by state level homeland security directors are consistent with the literature. Agranoff (2006) stresses the importance of obtaining insights from government managers who are actually working in networked environments. He indicates that issues are derived from a methodology of grounded theory, and theoretical findings are generated from field based data and qualitative information. This research study provides the lessons from a

significant majority of state level homeland security directors (70%) who are engaged in collaborative processes and manage networked organizations.

Agranoff and McGuire (2001) provide additional insights concerning networked organizations and describe a changing intergovernmental system in terms of the new network model that is emerging. The role of management in the network model involves problem resolution and creating an atmosphere for interaction. This model also includes the necessity for creating an environment for better coordination and improved communication. The data from this research support this theory and highlight the importance of communication in networked organizations.

McGuire (2002) theorizes that public managers charged with managing the process and achieving a specific goal in a networked environment must be aware of the most critical activities. The activities include identifying and working with the proper players, keeping the players committed, defining the roles of players, and facilitating effective interaction among the players. Homeland security directors reported and stressed the importance of an identical set of critical issues.

In case studies conducted by Agranoff (2003), managers were asked to provide suggestions regarding operations in a networked environment compared to managing in a single hierarchical organization. Managers indicated that network participants must take a share of the administrative burden, network members must stay within the decision bounds of the network, members of networked organizations must be patient and use the complete range of interpersonal skills, networks must continually recruit for new members and subject matter experts as the scope of knowledge increases and problems become more complex, and the incentives and benefits of working in a networked

environment must be continually be emphasized in order to maintain appropriate participation.

Homeland security directors provided similar lessons that are consistent with Agranoff's (2003) case studies and research. They indicated that a full time staff is necessary to provide administrative support for networked organizations. The administrative burden associated with networked organizations must definitely be addressed, and in some cases, should be accomplished by hiring contract staff. They also indicated that a strong and skilled facilitator is essential, and in some cases, a contract or outside facilitator may be preferable. One director reported that subject matter experts are an important key to success but should report to the main body for policy decisions. Directors also reported that recruiting for networks is important, and incentives must be developed to retain membership.

In his more recent work, Agranoff (2006) theorizes that networks are not completely different from traditional organizations, because they must be managed and require governance, organization, rules, procedures, structure, goals, and objectives. He indicates that some scholars have suggested that networks are replacing bureaucracies, but this does not seem to be the case. According to Agranoff, networked organizations exist to support traditional bureaucracies, and governmental officials are typically the core participants in the network. The information provided by homeland security directors supports Agranoff's findings. State level homeland security offices and departments exist in all states, and these organizations have not been replaced by networked organizations. Directors indicate that appropriate governance and a well defined structure are essential if the network is to be successful. A formal charter, a clear

mission, and well defined goals are also important. Committees and individual members must be assigned specific responsibilities and tasks in order to keep networked organizations focused and on track.

Many theorists, including Powell (1990), O'Toole (1997), Agranoff and McGuire (2001), Wise (2002), McGuire (2002), and Agranoff (2006), indicate that additional research and empirical evidence is required. This study answers the call for additional research and provides the first base of empirical evidence regarding the homeland security organizations and the networked organizations operating at the state level.

O'Toole (1997) suggests the research agenda must include how much of a manager's time is devoted to the network context, which kinds of managers are engaged in networked relationships and from what fields, what types of policy programs are appropriate for networks, what types of network structures presently exist, and what is the success rate and longevity of these structures. This research provides significant insights to the research agenda suggested by O'Toole. Some managers spend up to 50% of their time engaged in network management. Currently serving homeland security directors come from three primary fields including law enforcement, military, and emergency management. The most prominent types of state level homeland security networked organization have now been identified and categorized.

This research also provides insights concerning the success and longevity of homeland security networked organizations. Only one respondent indicated that a networked organization within the state had not been successful, while 97% reported success. When asked if the same results could have been achieved through a different avenue, 88% of the homeland security directors reported they could not have achieved

the same results without collaboration or the use of networked organizations. Seventy-eight percent reported that none of their networked organizations had been disbanded, and the initially established organizations continue to serve the intended purpose.

The data provided by state level homeland security directors support the theories in contemporary literature that networked organizations are flourishing and are an extremely valuable tool for administrators in the 21st Century. This research also reinforces the notion that networked organizations must be nurtured, and they require the participation and involvement of senior managers.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This exploratory research examines in detail the homeland security organizational arena at the state level and sheds light on collaboration and the formal networked organizations that have been created since September 11, 2001. The theoretical focus of this study centers around three bodies of literature pertaining to governmental organizations. These include U.S. governmental reorganization, collaboration in the public sector, and the networked organizations that are created to facilitate or encourage collaboration.

This work helps provide a better understanding of the state level homeland security organizations that have been created. It also provides empirical evidence and initial insights regarding collaboration in the homeland security arena at the state level and the networked organizations were created to solve the most difficult multi-organizational problems. In addition to exploring the organizational alternatives available to state officials, this study also examines the challenges and lessons learned

associated collaboration and the management of networked organizations. These lessons provide valuable insights to both homeland security directors and other managers within the public sector.

As a result of this research, what recommendations do we have for governors and their homeland security managers? With regard to organizational location, governors will have to decide whether they prefer a separate homeland security department or office, or whether the function should be a branch that is layered within an existing organization. The two existing patterns for organizational location are evenly split throughout the states. Directors responsible for a separate office or department preferred the autonomy and visibility associated with a cabinet level organization that reports directly to the governor. Those managing a branch within an existing organization preferred the support provided by the parent organization and a buffer from the political arena. Governors should choose an appropriate homeland security organizational location based on the successes and failures of the current organizational location and the strengths and weaknesses of the senior managers on the state staff. If a branch within an existing organization is preferred, the governor should initially consider locating the branch within the Department of Public Safety or within the State Military Department based on the most prominent existing organizational patterns within other states.

With regard to reorganization, governors should consider merging the homeland security and the emergency management functions in order to facilitate collaboration and to minimize the duplication of effort between the two organizations. At this point, over half of the states have either merged the two functions or the same manager is responsible for both. In some states, the two functions have been co-located to enhance coordination

and collaboration. It is noteworthy that a majority of states (69%) have made an effort to increase collaboration either through merger or collocation of the two functions. It is also noteworthy that a significant majority of homeland security directors (80%) recommend consolidation and merger of the two organizations. According to currently serving homeland security directors, the benefits of merger include improved collaboration and coordination, creation of a true all hazards forum, unified direction for all preparedness efforts in the state, clear direction for all planning initiatives in the state, and improved efficiency by minimizing duplication between staff elements.

The importance of collaboration in the homeland security shared power environment at the state level cannot be overstated. The researcher encourages senior managers at all levels to promote collaborative endeavors as a primary vehicle for solving the most difficult or complex problems that cannot be solved or are not easily solved by one organization. The current literature and the empirical evidence from homeland security directors are clear on this point.

Finally, senior homeland security officials should nurture and actively participate in formal networked organizations within the state. Networks are complex organizations and typically require strong and committed leadership. Executive level participation is essential. Networked organizations provide the forum for collaboration and are well suited for dealing with the most difficult problems in an uncertain or rapidly changing environment. Although networked organizations may be difficult to manage and require a significant commitment of time and effort, the cost is well worth the benefit. When asked if the same results could have been achieved through a different avenue, a significant majority of homeland security directors (88%) reported they could not have

achieved the same results without collaboration or the use of networked organizations. Seasoned homeland security managers make an excellent case for collaborative networks, indicating that collaboration and networked organizations facilitate the good working relationships that are critical in emergency situations.

Future Directions

Although this research provides an initial baseline and documentation for state level homeland security organizations and their networked organizations, several areas are worthy of additional research. With regard to homeland security organizations, the survey results reveal that approximately half of the state level homeland security organizations report directly to the governor. This includes both the departments that were established by the legislature and the offices that were created using the executive authority of the governor. The remaining homeland security organizations are layered within an existing state organization and report to a senior official or cabinet member on the governor's staff. Although this research did not seek to address the various aspects of politics and power within the homeland security arena, the data provided could serve as the basis for additional research and analysis. Also, since approximately half of the homeland security organizations are layered within an existing organization, an examination of the effectiveness and efficiency of these organizations compared to organizations that report directly to the governor would be appropriate. Do homeland security organizations with direct report have a greater degree of power or influence necessary to address and solve difficult problems? Are homeland security organizations

layered within an existing organization buffered from political influence and better positioned to develop more meaningful programs?

In addition to organizational location, the relationship between the homeland security and emergency management functions within each state is another topic worthy of additional research and analysis. Relocation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency as a subordinate activity under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was extremely controversial and debated for years. Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, only seven states opted to place the responsibility for homeland security within the existing emergency management agency. Based on the survey results, over half of the states (57%) have either merged the two functions or the same manager is responsible for both. The others have not merged, but in several states the two functions have been co-located to enhance coordination and collaboration. It is noteworthy that the majority of states (68%) have made an effort to increase collaboration either through merger or collocation of the two functions. It is also significant that 80% of serving homeland security directors indicated the two functions should be merged. They suggest merger would improve collaboration and coordination, create a unified direction for preparedness efforts, provide clear direction for planning initiatives, and improve efficiency by minimizing duplication between staff elements. Additional research would be appropriate to examine the actual duplication of effort within the two functional areas and to analyze organizational changes that may serve to improve effectiveness and efficiency.

With regard to local funding for homeland security programs, it is noteworthy that 34% of state legislatures appropriated no funding for homeland security in FY07 even in view of the millions of dollars in federal funding provided to states annually. Only a few

state legislatures (13%) appropriated a significant amount of funding (88-100% of the federal funding provided in FY07). The remaining states provided less than 50% of the federal funding provided in FY07. An analysis of the politics associated with state level homeland security appropriations and the dynamics regarding state funding priorities would serve as an excellent topic for additional research.

The importance of leadership and the role of the senior manager is an organizational topic that has been well researched and documented through the years. The data in this study reveal that homeland security managers have an extensive amount of experience. Typically, the most seasoned managers are selected to serve in these positions. Homeland security managers have an average of over 26 years of prior experience, primarily in law enforcement, military, or emergency management. A significant majority of homeland security directors (71%) have over 20 years of work experience, and of these, 38% have over 30 years of experience. Although this research provides initial insights concerning the qualifications and experience of homeland security managers, additional research would be appropriate to determine the organizational influence of the more seasoned leaders compared to those with less experience. Research might also examine the political motivations for creation of networks or compare the specific techniques used by managers to nurture participation in collaborative organizations. Specifically, to what extent does educational background, training, and prior experience influence the creation of and participation in networked organizations? Do political factors weigh more heavily in the creation of these organizations than the background and experience of the senior manager?

This research also provides insights involving the success and longevity of homeland security networked organizations and collaborative management endeavors. Only one respondent indicated that a networked organization within the state had not been successful, while 97% reported success. When asked if the same results could have been achieved through a different avenue, a significant majority of the homeland security directors (88%) reported they could not have achieved the same results without collaboration and networked organizations. This research supports the premise in contemporary literature that networked organizations have been an extremely successful management tool for administrators in the 21st Century. Additional research could investigate and attempt to measure the actual successes of networked organizations. Longitudinal studies might be used to determine if specific networks continue to serve a meaningful purpose over time or if they continue to exist simply based on inertia.

Contemporary literature addresses the overall importance and general success of networked organizations, but there is limited data highlighting the specific types of networked organizations. Collaborative organizations are established to solve the most difficult problems, but little is know regarding the specific organizations that have been created. This research study categorizes the different types of homeland security networks and explains the purpose of each. Additional case studies might examine the specific problems addressed by each type of organization and attempt to determine the success rates associated with different problems and organizations.

Summary

We have had over six years of homeland security and what have we learned? Based on this research, we now know that states have organized and reorganized in a variety of ways in order to manage the critical issues and solve the difficult problems related to securing our homeland. Homeland security organizations vary in size, but most have evolved into similar organizational patterns. State level homeland security organizations are gradually evolving and adapting to a constantly changing environment filled with challenges and complex issues.

This research study supports the contemporary literature regarding collaboration in a shared power environment and the networked organizations of the 21st Century that are created to foster or encourage collaboration. As result of this research, we know that collaboration in the state level homeland security environment is flourishing. A host of networked organizations have been created by state level homeland security managers to address the most difficult and complex problems that are not easily solved or cannot be solved by only one organization. These networked organizations are similar in many regards, but also differ significantly with regard to purpose and size. The homeland security directors who manage these formal networks share similar challenges with regard to nurturing the organizations, fostering stakeholder participation, and maintaining open channels for communication.

As a result of this study, the researcher concludes that state level homeland security organizations are becoming more institutionalized, collaboration is an essential element within the state level homeland security shared power environment, and networked organizations are indeed a prominent and vital element within this landscape.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Department of Homeland Security
State of Alabama

November 1, 2007

Title & Name
Address
City, State Zip Code

Dear Title & Name:

Please take a moment to participate in a research study conducted by my Assistant Director, Joe B. Davis, a doctoral candidate in the Public Affairs and Public Administration program at Auburn University. Joe's research focuses on state level homeland security organizations and examines the various alternatives for organizational configurations. It also focuses on other formal organizations, commonly referred to as "networked organizations," created specifically to address difficult homeland security problems that cut across organizational boundaries. Networked organizations may include organizations like a homeland security task force, mutual aid steering committee, or information sharing committee.

This study will provide useful insights about organizational configurations in homeland security and offer lessons learned about the use of networked organizations. Once completed, Joe will be happy to share his findings with you.

The attached questionnaire is being sent to the homeland security advisors for all 50 states. It should only take you 15 minutes to complete. If desired, Joe will schedule a short phone interview to discuss your state's survey results. The survey is completely voluntary and the information you provide will be completely confidential.

Thank you in advance for your time and participation with this survey. If you need additional information, please contact Joe directly at (334) 956-7253 or email joe.davis@dhs.alabama.gov.

Sincerely,

Jim Walker
Director

APPENDIX B

Department of Homeland Security
State of Alabama

December 3, 2007

Title & Name
Address
City, State Zip Code

Dear Title & Last Name:

I serve as the Assistant Director for the Alabama Department of Homeland Security and am a doctoral candidate in the Public Administration and Public Policy program at Auburn University. I am conducting a research study and your input will be extremely valuable for this analysis. I appreciate your busy schedule and it should only take 15 minutes to complete the survey.

The research focuses on state level homeland security organizations and examines the various alternatives for organizational configurations. It also focuses on other formal organizations, commonly referred to as "networked organizations," created specifically to address difficult homeland security problems that cut across organizational boundaries. Networked organizations may include organizations like a homeland security task force, mutual aid steering committee, or information sharing committee.

This study will provide useful insights about organizational configurations in homeland security and offer lessons learned about the use of networked organizations. The attached questionnaire has been sent to the homeland security advisors for all 50 states. The survey is completely voluntary and the information you provide will be completely confidential. Once completed, I will be happy to share my findings with you.

Thank you in advance for your time and participation in this survey. If you need additional information, please contact me at (334) 956-7253 or email joe.davis@dhs.alabama.gov.

Sincerely,

Joe B. Davis
Assistant Director

APPENDIX C

Survey of State Level Homeland Security Organizations

This research will focus on state level homeland security organizations and will examine the various organizational configurations. **Your answers are completely confidential and anonymous.**

Participation is voluntary and no reference will be made in oral or written reports which could be linked to you. **You may choose not to answer any questions** with which you are not comfortable. The data will be completely confidential and will be stored in a secure location.

Your response is important for this study. If you have any questions, please contact Joe Davis at (334) 956-7253 or email joe.davis@dhs.alabama.gov.
Please complete the survey and return it in the postage-paid envelope to:
Joe Davis, PO Box 304115, Montgomery, Alabama 36130-4115.

We sincerely appreciate your time and effort. Thank you again for your participation.

Background Information on the State Level Homeland Security Organization

1. Name and title of the respondent.
Name: _____ Title: _____
2. How long have you served in your current position?
Number of years: _____
3. In which state do you serve and what is the name of the homeland security (HS) organization?
State: _____ Name of HS organization: _____
4. Are you the Homeland Security Advisor (HSA) [the state's single point of contact for HS matters]?
☐ yes ☐ no ☐ other/comment_____

5. Are you the State Administering Agent (SAA) [state's single point of contact for administering HS funding]?

☐ yes ☐ no ☐ other/comment_____

6. Were you appointed to your current position by?

☐ the Governor ☐ the Legislature ☐ another official/comment_____

7. Prior to your current assignment, how much work experience did you have in other areas?

a. Fire: _____ years

b. Law enforcement (federal): _____ years

c. Law enforcement (state): _____ years

d. Law enforcement (local): _____ years

e. Military: _____ years

f. Emergency management: _____ years

g. Other (_____): _____ years

h. Other (_____): _____ years

8a. How would you best categorize the location of the HS organization in your state?

☐ A legislatively created, separate cabinet level department
☐ A separate office chartered by executive authority
☐ An office incorporated into an existing state agency or organization
☐ Other/comment:_____

8b. Which of these organizational locations is optimum? Why?

9. Have the homeland security and emergency management agencies been merged or co-located within the same agency?

☐ Merged ☐ Co-located ☐ Other/comment_____

9b. Should the homeland security and emergency management agencies be merged or co-located? Why or why not?

10. How many full time employees serve within your homeland security organization?

_____ # state employees _____ # contractors _____ # others/comment _____

11. What percentage of your overall FY07 homeland security operating budget was provided by state appropriated funds?

_____ % comment:_____

Information on State Level Homeland Security
Networked Organizations

12. Please provide a descriptive title for each of your state level homeland security networked organizations. [Networked organizations are created to address difficult problems that cut across organizational boundaries. Examples may include the homeland security task force, a mutual aid steering committee, or an information sharing committee.]
13. Why were networked organizations created within your state?
14. How were networked organizations created within your state?
☐ Executive order ☐ Legislative ☐ Ad hoc/comment _____
15. What percentage of your time is devoted to attending network organization meetings and working on network organization related problems?
_____ % of total time
16. What is your estimate of the total number of participants actively engaged in the average network?
Total number of participants in network: _____ Total number from your organization: _____
17. Have networked organizations been successful in your state? Why or why not?
18. Could you have achieved the same results without creating networks? Please explain.
19. Have you ever disbanded a networked organization? Why?

Lessons Learned Regarding State Level Homeland Security Networked Organizations

20. Your experience with networked organizations, both the positive and negative, is critical to this survey and will be significant in helping develop lessons learned and best practices for other homeland security managers. Please provide your most significant insights regarding establishing, managing or participating in networked organizations.
Lesson Learned #1:
Lesson Learned #2:
Lesson Learned #3:
Lesson Learned #4:
21. Please feel free to provide additional comments on state level homeland security organizations and related issues.

Thank you for completing this survey.
Please return the survey in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.