

MARKETING WAR: A CASE STUDY COMPARISON OF WARS BETWEEN THE  
UNITED STATES AND IRAQ

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MARKETING WAR: A CASE STUDY COMPARISON OF WARS BETWEEN THE  
UNITED STATES AND IRAQ

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

MARKETING WAR: A CASE STUDY COMPARISON OF WARS BETWEEN THE  
UNITED STATES AND IRAQ

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Being able to convince the American public that they need to send their sons and daughters into harms way is not an easy task but one which every United States President may face during his or her tenure. Rallying public support for war is fraught with many different variables that change over the course of time. Through the use of three product marketing models, Philip Kotler's states of demand and corresponding marketing tasks, Theodore Levitt's Product Life Cycle, and Seymour Fine's 7P's, this research demonstrates how two presidents, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush used various policy marketing tactics similar to product marketing tactics to gain public support for two separate wars in Iraq. By analyzing the pre-war strategic environment, this author

introduces a war policy environment spectrum in which future and past conflicts can be compared to ultimately provide a better decision making tool and war policy marketing model.

A most similar systems comparison case study research of Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is utilized to explore the policy marketing tactics used by the two presidents and how their marketing campaign was implemented to aid in swaying the public's support. Through the use of polling data, this research demonstrates that as the president's changed marketing tactics, public support for their respective conflict was affected. Additionally, the author briefly analyzed three other conflicts, Afghanistan, World War II, and Kosovo, using the three marketing models mentioned above.

Findings show other variables that could affect public support such as the popularity of the president and support from the U.N. did not contribute to an increase in America's support to the same extent that the president's marketing tactics contributed. Polling data demonstrates that after each president repositioned their respective war through the use of marketing tactics, American support increased along with the job approval ratings for each president.

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

As a military officer, this author knows that sending troops to war is always an option for the President of the United States (U.S.). The application of military power to deal with political dilemmas has witnessed an upswing, especially since the late 1980's. Jon Western in a 2004 article observed, "since 1989, the U.S. has intervened in Panama, Kuwait, northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq," (p. 1). Within the context of American wars, public support for "going to war" is often uncertain. Looking back at wars during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, one could easily identify strong public consensus for World War II after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. What made the public's call to arms so clear for this war vice the murkiness of many other 20<sup>th</sup> century military engagements?

This author suggests that the level of public support for war at the pre-war stage is intrinsically linked to the moral justification perceived by the public. This author further suggests that the president plays a powerful role in shaping the public's justification for war by establishing a war policy marketing campaign. Reinhold Niebuhr suggests that, "every nation is caught in the moral paradox of refusing to go to war unless it can be proved that the national interest is imperiled..." (as cited in Western, 2004). As late as 2500 years ago, the ancient master of strategy, Sun Tzu, noted that the art of war is governed by several key factors, one of which he called Moral Law. Taken from his book, "*The Art of War*," Sun Tzu describes the significance of the moral component of


public support as the force which, “causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger,” (cited in Phillips, 1985).

In World War II, the attack on Pearl Harbor was the spark that lit the cannon of unambiguous support, at least at the pre-war stage. The apparent great injustice of a surprise attack on the very homeland of the U.S. put the question of, “Should we go to war?” on a solid moral footing. The majority of U.S. engagements in the 20<sup>th</sup> century did not have the same solid moral footing—the case of World War II is a rare one. If moral footing is linked in some way to public war support as this author suggests, how does a president achieve the public support necessary to employ military power, especially during circumstances such as the second Iraq war where offensive pre-emption ruled the pre-war debate. In such a case, the moral foundation of the political objective is less surely rooted and requires a policy marketing strategy on behalf of the president to bring a sense of moral obligation to the minds of the public. What tactics does the President utilize to convince the public that war is the morally right thing to do? Or, does the President achieve public war support solely based on how popular he is, or whether he has U.N. support for his war policy? This research seeks to analyze these questions.

The question of public war support lends itself to an apparent spectrum of situational scenarios and moral dilemmas. This author suggests the spectrum idea works well as a conceptual model to help frame a discussion of public support as it relates to war and war policy. On one edge of the spectrum, there is the clear and present danger of an attack on U.S. soil -- the prime example being the attack on Pearl Harbor. In this

instance, the attack came as a physical and moral shock to the public; the President entered into war without having to market, or “sell,” the idea. (See Chart 1.1)

**Chart 1.1 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



On the opposite end of the spectrum would seemingly be a case where the U.S. conducts a surprise pre-emptive attack on an unsuspecting nation with little or no justification. To achieve public support for such an endeavor a president would have to overcome the public’s initial perceptions of moral injustice for leading the nation into an unnecessary war. The marketing effort would need to convince the public that an even greater moral injustice was being avoided – a marketing message might include communicating a sense of immediate fear for personal and national interest.

With the two opposing edges of the public war support spectrum touched on above, the middle ground of the spectrum warrants discussion. This author contends that most of the “public support for war” debates of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have occurred in the portion of the spectrum labeled the *policy marketing zone*. This author contends that war policy marketing begins to require more energy and resources just to the right of 50% public support. Mid-spectrum can be described as the point where

national objectives have the potential to move in a direction counter to the public's perceptions of moral and physical necessity. Mid-spectrum is also where a president begins to require policy marketing to align public support. Policy marketing in the context of this paper is the art of aligning the moral compasses of a constituency to a given political direction. To successfully navigate through the *policy marketing zone* of the spectrum, a president's marketing campaign must overcome forces of ambiguity and ambivalence and replace them with clear justifications.

This author hypothesizes that when a president utilizes specific marketing tactics to convince the public that national interests are in danger, he will be able to increase public support for his war policy. While every President markets their various policies, how they choose to market war policies still lacks in research data. Understanding the "decision" to market war and whether there are successful techniques to sell war policy is the focus of this paper.

Why is public support necessary or important to the President? To a first term president the first response might be re-election. But, what if a President is already serving his second term in office? History has demonstrated that a popular president is more likely to have fewer oppositions or critics on Capitol Hill when it comes to passing the administration's many other policies. Many Representatives are hesitant to vote against a popular President's policies because they are concerned with how they will be perceived by their own constituents, which in-turn could hamper their own re-election. (Iyengar & McGrady, 2007). The media also plays a role allowing a well-liked President to frame policy using positive rhetoric, in addition to shying away from criticizing a popular President (Ibid, 2007).

It must be clarified at the beginning that support for the troops does not equal support for the war. Support for the troops can be defined as showing encouragement and pride in our military personnel for the job they have been assigned to do by the President, while not necessarily supporting the mission they have been sent to do. On the other hand, support for war would be defined as accepting the arguments for war and encouraging the President and his cabinet to continue fighting the conflict.

With this distinction in mind, when does a President decide that public support is essential to an overall strategy to go to war? If a President deems public support lacking and at the same time vital to the cause, what are the situational factors involved in a decision to launch a campaign to raise public support? Once a marketing campaign for war is underway, what are some specific marketing tactics used, and do these tactics ultimately lead to an increase in public support for war?

In analyzing these questions, this research will utilize a situational spectrum of national security scenarios with moral implications as touched on above. This author suggests that the pre-war strategic environment and the moral dimensions of the environment determine how much marketing is required for a war policy and also influences options for marketing tactics.

The author will explore the pre-war environment of two U.S. President's, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush in each of their respective wars, Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and analyze how the environment impacted their overall war policy marketing decisions. The author will further identify the marketing tactics employed by each president and draw conclusions as to the overall success of their war policy marketing campaigns.



This first chapter provides an overview of the research, the research questions, definitions for the various terms, an explanation of the data and methodology utilized, and briefly summarizes the subsequent chapters. For this research, Desert Storm and OIF were analyzed using a most similar systems (MSS) comparative politics research design. This research method calls for identifying two cases which have a number of similarities, but also have at least two or more differences. The similarities are used as control items and will not be relevant to this study. The controlled items for these two cases include the following: 1) both cases are recent wars, 2) they are/were between the same two countries, the U.S. and Iraq, 3) both were fought outside the U.S., and 4) both were fought with voluntary U.S. forces. The key differences between the two cases are the marketing campaign and tactics used by both presidents.

To tie together the marketing concepts of each president's war policy campaign, three marketing models developed by marketing experts, Philip Kotler, Seymour Fine, and Theodore Levitt are discussed. Kotler's eight states of demand and correlated marketing tasks, Fine's 7P model, and Levitt's product life cycle are compared to describe the marketing environment within the context of the strategic environment and will aid in offering plausible tactical marketing alternatives. While Kotler's and Levitt's models focus on products, this author will take each author's concepts and show the parallel between marketing products and marketing policies. Fine's model does not focus on products per se, but on public and non-profit organization policies, his 7P model provides a template for developing a marketing plan. All three models will be analyzed to determine which model's marketing tactics were successful, which were not, and what was missing from each model in aiding the President to increase public support for war.

This research demonstrates based on polling data, that both Presidents utilized various marketing tactics, which increased American public support for war. For purposes of this research, marketing tactics are defined as the methods employed to execute marketing strategies. Examples include prime-time television appearances by the President and his cabinet members, highly publicized speeches, and similar slogans or sound bites utilized by both the President and his cabinet members when speaking about the war. Before going further, the research questions must be introduced.

### **Research Questions**

#### **Research Question 1:**

**Under what circumstances does a President decide to actively market a war policy?**

#### **Research Question 2:**

**How does the President sway the public's opinion in regards to policy at the pre-war stage?**

These two questions compliment each other. The answer to the first research question requires that the pre-war strategic environment be examined, while the second research question requires an examination of the pre-war tactical environment. Prior to answering either research question, the terms used in this research must first be defined.

## **Policy Marketing**

The term “policy marketing” is not common. It has been referred to as “advertising policy,” “packaging politics,” “social marketing,” “spin,” and even “media politics,” (Franklin, 1994, Iyengar & McGrady, 2007, and Fine, 1990). In 1985, the American Marketing Association’s formal definition of marketing, which had been used for twenty-five-years, was revised. The new definition now states, “Marketing is the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion and distribution of ideas, goods and services to create exchanges that satisfy individual and organizational objectives” (as cited in Fine, 1990). The new definition adds the term “ideas” to “goods and services,” implying that each of these concepts can be marketed similar to a product (Fine, 1990). This is significant because the new definition now highlights the “evolution of social marketing” by highlighting the “dissemination and exchange of ideas,” (Fine, 1990, p.1).

While Fine (1990) refers to marketing an idea as social marketing, Parsons’ (1999) uses the term policy marketing. “Policy marketing involves not simply the identification of voter needs and wants or the issues and problems which concern them, but also the use of techniques to influence, create, and stimulate ‘public opinion’ on an issue or problem,” (Parsons, 1999, p. 125). The word “techniques” in the definition above is synonymous with marketing tactics for this analysis.

## **War**

In addition to policy marketing, the term “war” must be defined. Clausewitz, one of the most studied and well-known writers on war defines the term as, “...an act of

violence, pushed to its utmost bounds....a mere continuation of policy by other means” (as cited in Gatzke, 1987). “This act of violence, moreover, is not divorced from the political life of a nation, it is not an abnormal situation, but merely the forceful realization of a political aim,” (Gatzke, 1987, p. 310). Leading a nation to war is fraught with difficulty and unpredictability. Warden (2000) suggests, “War is the most complex of human endeavors,” (p.1). If war is known to be complex and violent, what would make a President decide to encourage a nation toward supporting war?

There are many theories as to why that decision is made. Jentleson states there seem to be two reasons why a President would send American troops into combat. “The first is a response to one nation violating another nation’s sovereign boundaries. The second is when internal conflict in another country cannot be resolved without foreign military intervention,” (as cited in Rosenblatt, 1998). Desert Storm obviously falls into the first category since Iraq did invade Kuwait. However, OIF does not seem to have such a clear-cut agenda. Critics would argue President George W. Bush had his own “murky” agenda.

Blainey (1988) suggests power is the crux of many explanations of war and peace. Even so, most people argue that a nation too powerful endangers peace, while others, to include Clausewitz (1984), state that a dominant nation can preserve the peace by keeping inferior nations in control. On the other hand, Blainey (1988) believes that a lopsided balance of power will promote war.

With that being said, how does the President rally the public support needed to send American troops into harms way when there is no clear opponent? Does the President strategize and use tactics, similar to a general on the battlefield, to rally the

public and sway their opinion to support his decisions? To answer these questions, the term “public opinion” must first be defined.

### **Public Opinion**

The concept of public opinion is not new. In fact Gunn (as cited in Parsons, 1999), noted it was developed in eighteenth-century Britain as, “an identifiable body of views held by a defined group and to whose opinions government attached a standing and a significance.” This is still true today. “Without a doubt, the most closely watched political indicator in the United States is the president’s approval rating...” (Erikson and Tedin, 2005, p. 108). There are many definitions and explanations of public opinion. Erikson and Tedin (2005) provide this definition, “public opinion is the preferences of the adult population on matters of relevance to the government,” (p. 6). Parsons (1999) provides an even more defined explanation for this research:

Public opinion is to the political market what consumer demand is to the economic market place. In a democracy one could argue that public policy is a function of public opinion. Policy demand determines policy supply. And, the fact that opinion is measured and is treated with such attention by policy-makers gives weight to the argument that the policy agenda is set by the interlay of public opinion and public power. (p. 110)

However, Parsons (1999) takes this a step further and states “the main characteristic of the conceptual transformation of public opinion has been that of the desire to measure it and account for its changes and influence.” (p. 111). While Gunn noted that in the eighteenth century the government found the opinions significant, it was

not until after World War II that opinion polls and marketing research became popular (Wilson, 1957). In fact, in 1945, social scientist, Julian L. Woodward stated,

Sooner or later, the government itself will have to go into the polling field and provide both its administrators and its legislators with adequate and sound information on what the public thinks. Eventually this sort of information will become as necessary as census data and will be provided by an agency with a reputation for unbiased research equal to that now enjoyed by the present Census Bureau. (as cited in Gosnell and David, 1949)

Today, polls are an ever present mechanism of political life. With our growing technology, polls can be conducted during television news programs. People can either call or email their answers, thus allowing the American people to be heard—if they so desire, with the results presented immediately. Today, polls have definitely become well-established tools and guides to be used for making policy decisions. Even so, if the president does choose to utilize polling data, he must weigh whether public opinion is more important to him so he may remain in office, or if he should pursue his own agenda and risk not only losing office, but also public support and satisfaction.

Complicating the effectiveness of polls, Erikson and Tedin state, “public opinion polls show that people do not follow foreign affairs closely and often do not know enough about the specifics of a particular issue to form opinions,” (p. 94). They further argue that “an important policy matter can easily grab the public’s attention and profoundly affect the popularity of the president or the outcome of the next election,” (p. 94).

The use of polls, such as Zogby, Harris, and Gallup have become tools to measure the marketability of a policy and find out what Americans are thinking. This information can be used by presidents to make sure certain issues are mentioned or not mentioned in a speech when trying to sway the public's opinion. While studies have shown that Presidents do take note of what the public is supporting, the President can also use his office to market his policies to lead the public toward supporting him (Page and Shapiro, 1984). Now that the terms have been explained, it is important to take a look at the data and methodology for this research.

### **Data and Methodology**

This research utilizes a most similar systems (MSS) comparative politics research design, which means the two cases chosen have a number of similarities, but also have at least two or more differences. The similarities are used as control items for the study. The controlled items for Desert Storm and OIF include: 1) both are recent wars, 2) both wars are/were between the same two countries, the U.S. and Iraq, 3) both were fought outside the U.S., and 4) both were fought with voluntary U.S. forces, meaning no draft was initiated. The differences which will be explored consist of the various pre-war marketing tactics utilized by both Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush.

To conduct this research, the author utilized polling data for both Desert Storm and OIF from the Gallup Poll Archives at <http://brain.gallup.com>. "The Gallup Brain is a searchable, living record of 70 years of public opinion, with more than 136,000 questions, and responses from more than 3.5 million people interviewed by The Gallup Poll," (<http://brain.gallup.com>).

This vehicle of measurement was chosen because it consolidates all polling data from Gallup and various other polls such as Newsweek, CNN, and USA Today, thus providing a larger, more accurate, public support gauge. This aided in alleviating the possible inaccuracies which could occur by focusing on only one poll's data. In addition, by utilizing several polls, the number of respondents was increased to add to the accuracy and legitimacy of this research. Before exploring the data further, the subsequent chapters must be introduced.

### **Summary of Subsequent Chapters**

A summary of the subsequent chapters is provided here. Chapter two discusses three popular marketing models in an effort to provide a baseline for analyzing war policy marketing efforts of two presidents in subsequent chapters. Chapter three discusses the methodology and data utilized, along with the pros and cons of conducting comparative politics, conducting research on-line, and using polling data. Chapters four and five provide the analytical findings utilizing the two case studies, Desert Storm and OIF respectively, with analytical inputs utilizing polling data to demonstrate how the public's support varied depending on the various marketing tactics employed. Chapter six provides examples of three other conflict case studies, Afghanistan, World War II, and Kosovo, and discusses whether the respective presidents marketed for public support and if so, how they chose to market. And finally, chapter seven focuses on a summary of the hypotheses tested, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the analytical findings, proposes a new marketing model for war policy marketing, and provides suggestions for future research.



## **CHAPTER 2: MARKETING MODELS**

This chapter will begin with an introduction to marketing and discuss the three different marketing models utilized in this research. The three models include Kotler's (2000) concept of demand states and associated marketing tactics, Fine's (1990) discussion of the 7P's of marketing, and Levitt's (1965) concept of marketing using a product life cycle. Each model will be looked at to determine if these three current marketing models provide an adequate conceptual framework in which to analyze war policy marketing. In later chapters, these models will provide a back drop for discussion of the actual war policy marketing efforts of two different presidents. The emphasis will be on determining the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of each model and to determine how the various marketing concepts were or were not utilized by policy makers.

### **Introduction to Marketing**

Within the marketing literature there are numerous authors from which to glean marketing information and concepts. One of the primary goals of this research is to analyze current marketing concepts to find out if they present an adequate framework to describe the marketing strategy and tactics used by a president to gain public support for war policies at the pre-war stage. Although there is a wide array of marketing models

available, this author has chosen to focus on three primary marketing models because of the marketing expertise and the history of each of their concepts: 1) Philip Kotler's eight states of demand and correlated marketing tasks, 2) Seymour Fine's 7P model, and 3) Theodore Levitt's product life cycle. While Fine's 7P model may not be as highly recognized as Kotler's and Levitt's models, he does provide an interesting, more modern concept than the historical 4P model, which Fine's 7P model is based upon. Each of the three authors has written numerous books and articles and is well known in the marketing field. With pre-war marketing as a central element of the frame work of this research discussion, these models were compared to analyze the marketing environment within the context of the national strategic environment. This author explores whether these models aid in offering plausible tactical marketing alternatives to a president involved with preparing a war policy marketing campaign.

While Kotler's and Levitt's models focus on products, this author will take their various product based scenarios and correlate them to policy based marketing tasks (tactics). Although Fine's model does not focus on products per se, but on public and non-profit organization policies, his 7P model provides a template for developing an overall marketing plan and leaves the business of tactics to other models. All three models were analyzed together to determine which model provided the best overall marketing framework for a president involved with increasing public support for war.

At the root of marketing is manipulating another to entertain your idea. For example, the potential employee must market himself during his initial interview to his possible future employer. Potential candidates running for government office must market themselves to the public to receive their votes. The same can be said for policy

marketing. When an elected official, in this case, the President of the United States, wants a particular policy to be supported by the American people, he must first market that policy. The President can begin by discussing the policy in an effort to inform the public. “Public opinion is ... highly dependent on the information the public receives,” (Western, 2005, p. 101). Speeches can be scheduled through various means such as television, radio, Congress, and talking with local and national reporters. These marketing tactics are supposed to bring the policy to the forefront of the public’s mind. Often, the American people are receiving only one side of the issue--what the president says in his speeches. “Even in a thriving democracy, information can be shaped to frame the public’s understanding and interpretation of events,” (Ibid). The majority of Americans will not delve deeper to research the issue. Western (2005) states,

Because most citizens rarely have the time, inclination, or expertise to form independent opinions on national security matters, their perceptions of the costs and stakes involved in a particular crisis are routinely influenced principally by the information presented to them. Elites such as the president, senior administration officials, congressional leaders, and representatives of the national media organizations play a significant role in the transmission of information about foreign events to the public. (p. 101)

Western (2005) states out of the elites mentioned above, “presidents are particularly important and influential,” (p. 101). In essence many Americans believe the president has more insight into the issue than they do. As Richard Brody points out, the president can keep the information closely held, thus allowing him to “establish the initial framing of a

crisis,” (as cited in Western, 2005). The public may not even realize that a marketing tactic is being implemented.

In the world of product marketing, marketing managers are used “...to influence the level, timing, and composition of demand to meet the organization’s objectives,” (Kotler 2000, p. 5) While Kotler calls them marketing managers, in the world of politics, they are known as the president’s public relations team and speechwriters. They advise the president on his speeches, how soon in the speech he should mention the policy, how often, and how long he should discuss it. In addition, they follow up by reporting polling information to the president on how well the speech and policy were received by the public. Now that marketing has been explained, the three marketing models will be discussed below.

### **Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks (Tactics)**

Philip Kotler’s (2000) millennium edition book entitled *Marketing Management* has withstood the test of time making this book his tenth edition. His reputation as one of the world’s leading marketing experts has spanned for several decades. He is quoted in numerous books and articles, and is a prominent marketing advocate.

Although, Kotler’s demand states and correlated marketing tasks model does focus on marketing products, he was an early advocate of classifying nontraditional products:

A typology of marketing activity can also be constructed on the basis of the product marketed. Under the broadened concept of marketing, the product is no longer restricted to commercial goods and services....A product classification of

marketing consists of goods marketing, service marketing, organization marketing, person marketing, place marketing and idea marketing. (as cited in Fine, 1990)

Although Kotler readily admits that product marketing can be interchangeable with ideas, services, goods, organizations, person, and place marketing, his critics do not agree that his product definition is so easily interchangeable. In particular, Bruce Marcus (2002) states that marketing professional services is multi-dimensional and cannot be plugged into the same marketing plan as a product. He states that in so doing Kotler attempts to fit unique and complex characteristics of professional services into an antiquated mold of product marketing,” (p. 1). He further states that professional service marketing is much more complex than product marketing and suggests that “positioning is one of the most important concepts in professional services marketing today,” (Marcus, 2002, p. 1). In essence, “It takes as its starting point the most specific and urgent need of a market, and demonstrates how a firm understands and can meet that need,” (p. 1). He further explains, “One cannot arbitrarily impose a position on a market, simply because the service offered is in the inventory,” (p. 1).

While Marcus believes Kotler is oversimplifying marketing, by trying to demonstrate that product marketing can be implemented for various disciplines, this author believes Kotler’s states of demand and correlated marketing tasks fit very nicely into marketing a war policy. They do take into account the specific and urgent need of the market or public. By utilizing Kotler’s various scenarios, this allowed the author to demonstrate where the public’s support was focused in the pre-war strategic environment. Before delving further, Kotler’s model must be explained.

Kotler’s demand states and correlated marketing tasks (tactics) model consists of eight different scenarios, which he refers to as demand states (See Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand—no one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand—unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand—many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by an existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand—reduction for the demand of a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand—not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	Full Demand—organization is pleased with the demand	Maintain current level
7	Overfull Demand—demand is higher than the organization can or wants to maintain	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand—doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

These demand states, or scenarios, are analogous to various national security strategic environment scenarios. His model states that the strategic environment must be looked at and provided a label from one of his eight demand states. Once the strategic environment has been identified, the next step is to utilize the associated marketing tactic to achieve the desired public support for the “product” or in this case, the war policy. Kotler applies his model to product marketing and this research will take Kotler’s model a step further by applying his marketing tactics to demonstrate how a President markets

his war policy. But first, each of Kotler's demand states and marketing tactics must be described.

Kotler's (2000) first state of demand is entitled *negative demand*. This is simply defined by stating no one likes the product, or in this case, the policy. At this point the marketing tactic would be to decide whether the policy must be readdressed, explained in a different manner or possibly dropped all together.

The second state of demand is *no demand*. Kotler (2000, p. 6) defines this as the target audience being "...unaware of or uninterested in the product...The marketing task is to find ways to connect the benefits of the product with the person's natural needs and interests." For example, the president must now convince the public their way-of-life or freedom is in jeopardy to convince them a war is needed to maintain their current lifestyle.

*Latent demand* is Kotler's third state of demand. This is simply stated, "Many consumers may share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product...the marketing task is to measure the size of the potential market and develop goods and services to satisfy the demand," (Kotler 2000, p.6). Utilizing polling data, the president can get a "feel" for where the public's support would lie if he introduced or encouraged support for a new war policy.

Kotler's fourth state of demand is *declining demand*. This is simply the reduction of demand for a particular product, or in this case, policy. "The marketing task is to reverse declining demand through creative remarketing," (Kotler 2000, p.6). If the policy is no longer being supported, the president must decide if it is still warranted. If he still wants the policy, a new campaign to remarket it must be launched.

*Irregular demand*, the fifth state of demand can be defined as not making constant demands. The demands will vary depending on when the product or policy is needed. Kotler (2000, p.6) gives an example of “museums which are under visited on weekdays and overcrowded on weekends.” His marketing task consists of altering the irregular demand through various incentives.

*Full demand* is Kotler’s sixth state of demand. He states, “Organizations face full demand when they are pleased with their volume of business. The marketing task is to maintain the current level of demand in the face of changing consumer preferences and increasing competition,” (Kotler 2000, p.6).

*Overfull demand*, number seven, occurs when an “organization faces a demand level that is higher than they can or want to handle,” (Kotler 2000, p.6). The organization must, “...find ways to reduce demand temporarily or permanently,” (Kotler 2000, p.6). The correlation to policies occurs when a nation is either over tasked or the policy put forth is more than it chooses to handle.


The final state of demand, *unwholesome demand*, is defined as doing away with the desire for something which is not good for you. Kotler’s (2000, p.6) “...marketing task is to get people who like something to give it up, using such tools as fear messages, price hikes, and reduced availability.” For example, cigarettes have now been proven to be hazardous to your health however many individuals do not believe they will die of cancer if they continue to enjoy smoking so they continue to smoke. One issue that Kotler does not discuss is who makes the decision as to whether something is good for each individual.



## Levitt's Product Life Cycle (PLC)

Theodore Levitt has written numerous articles and books on marketing. He has been quoted in several marketing literatures including Kotler. Levitt discusses the concept of the life cycle of a product, which this author will correlate to the life cycle of a war policy. He states that for a product to be successful, the product typically goes through four stages over time. These stages consist of:

### Chart 2.1 Levitt's Product Life Cycle (Bell Curve)



**Table 2.2: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support-- Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

Introducing a new war policy (product) into society can be filled with many uncertainties. Levitt’s *market development stage* is the first introduction the public would have to the president’s war policy. At this introductory stage, Levitt’s model assumes the public is unaware of the product or policy; this author suggests the president would need to frame his concept of a proposed war policy in terms of a moral imperative, thus pulling their moral compasses toward convincing them that war is necessary. In other words, the president must create demand for his product—his war policy. “How long this takes, depends on the product’s complexity, its degree of newness, its fit into consumer needs, and the presence of competitive substitutes of one form or another,” (Levitt, 1965, p. 3).

Levitt’s second stage—the *growth stage* is typically where demand and support take place. During this stage, competitors begin to step in with their own products, or ideas. This stage is where opposition to the president’s war policy may begin to emerge. The marketing tactics to be implemented take on a more direct approach. The president

must now convince the public to prefer his framing of the war policy and support his policy over the opposition.

The *maturity stage* consists of the time when the president “must now, more than ever, communicate directly with the consumer,” or public (Levitt, 1965, p. 4). There must now be a new type of marketing tactic implemented to compete for the public’s support. “Depending on the product...there will be attempts to create and promote fine product distinctions through packaging and advertising, and to appeal to special market segments,” (Levitt, 1965, p.4). This stage can linger for months, even years, or can be passed through quickly.

The final stage, the *decline stage*, demonstrates the decrease in demand for the product (war policy). The support for the war policy has decreased. The president must now “initiate a variety of aggressively depressive tactics, propose mergers or buy-outs, and generally engage in activities that make life thanklessly burdensome for all,” (Levitt, 1965, p. 4-5). This could be correlated to replacing people in his administration and agreeing to certain conditions to achieve the support of Congress in the effort to increase the public’s support.

Levitt (1965) believes marketing a product or policy should be similar to playing a game of chess. Being able to foresee the life cycle of the proposed new war policy will aid the president in developing tactical future moves after the war policy is introduced to the public. In addition, having the foresight to map out the life cycle will provide the president with a competitive advantage in maintaining or extending the public’s support for his war policy.

Levitt mentions in stage three that how a product (policy) is packaged plays a significant role in the appeal the policy will have to the public. Packaging and marketing can include how early in a particular speech the mention of supporting the war occurs, what examples are used to persuade the audience, and who delivers the speech, the president or someone in his cabinet.

In Bob Franklin's 1994 second edition, *Packaging Politics*, Franklin states there are several reasons why the emphasis has increased when it comes to how policies are packaged. First, today's politicians are more at ease with television appearances and understand it can make or break their political career depending on how they are perceived by the public. For example, when the public saw Howard Dean conduct his so-labeled "war call" during his bid for the presidency many would-be voters pulled their support because they did not think this presented a good image for the President of the United States.

In addition to being more at ease with the camera, Franklin states there are an increasing number of media outlets such as radio, magazines, newspapers and the internet. This allows more opportunities for the president to get his policies across. The president still hosts his weekly radio show in addition to his televised speeches. Additionally, there are now several television talk shows, political programs, and 24-hour news channels. O'Shaughnessy, Sabato, and Perry, all agree with Franklin that how policies are packaged and marketed, does play a critical role in whether a policy is supported, (as cited in Parsons, 1999).

While several researchers do agree with Franklin, Brendan Bruce argues that marketing is highly over exaggerated and does not play a big role, (as cited in Parsons,

1999). He states that no matter how the product, in this case, the policy is packaged and presented, if the consumer does not want it, the consumer will not be persuaded to support the policy. Bruce gives the overall public much more credit by declaring they have common sense and will not be fooled.

However, Conover and Sigelman (1982) found that knowing what the president supported did make a difference to the public. A study conducted by Conover and Sigelman (1982) asked each person in the sample a policy question. After the person answered the question, they were told what the president supported. Respondents were then asked to reformulate their previous answer. The research found that by knowing what the president supported, did make a difference in their response. Their second response was tailored more toward supporting the President's preferences.

While Levitt does present a compelling case for keeping the product life cycle in the marketing world and Moon (2005) readily acknowledges his 1965 *Harvard Business Review* article in which Levitt introduces the concept, is a classic lasting over four decades, Moon also states the product life cycle "has given marketers tunnel vision," (p.2). Moon states that due to the bell curve of the product life cycle, marketers tend to focus on only one way to determine a successful product and that is if the product follows the curve. "Not all products exhibit a bell-shaped PLC. Researchers have identified from six to seventeen different PLC patterns," (Kotler, 2000, p. 304). Even so, Moon (2005) believes companies tend to focus on the bell curve and take on the same augment approach. In other words, as a product nears Levitt's stage 3, *market maturity*, they introduce new benefits to an old product in an attempt to rejuvenate support for the

product. Moon states it is difficult to be successful in such a competition and in the end the product curves into Levitt's stage 4, *market decline*.

To alleviate this decline, Moon (2005) states that, "By positioning—or, often, repositioning—their products in unexpected ways, companies can change how customers mentally categorize them," (p.2). "When a breakaway product succeeds in leaping out of its category and into a new one, it can redefine its competition," (p. 7). This can result in products or policies being returned to Levitt's stage 2, *market growth*, in which demand will begin to accelerate, rather than decrease. "It is not unusual for products to gain "second lives" or even "reincarnation," (Dhalla and Yuspeh, 1976, p. 102). This is a flaw in the product life cycle according to Dhalla and Yuspeh (1976) because proponents of the model tend to view everything as mortal. In the biological world, each of the cycles of life is set in fairly predictable lengths and terms and cannot be entered into out of sequence, nor can the cycles be reversed. This is not the case for the product life cycle.

Critics, Dhalla and Yuspeh (1976) continue by stating, "A major disservice of the PLC concept to marketing is that it has led top executives to overemphasize new product introduction," (p. 107-108). However, Capon (1978) defends the product life cycle by stating, it "forces managers to think about the future" (p. 10). This will aid the manager in allocating his/her resources, modify a product, remarket, or decrease the price. Most importantly, using the product life cycle model or concept allows the person introducing the new product to take on a more proactive leadership style (Capon, 1978).

Kotler (2000) disagrees with Capon stating, "The PLC concept is less useful as a forecasting tool because sales histories exhibit diverse patterns, and the stages vary in duration," (p. 315). He continues by saying,

The PLC concept is best used to interpret product and market dynamics. As a planning tool, the PLC concept helps managers characterize the main marketing challenges in each stage of a product's life and develop major alternative marketing strategies. As a control tool, the PLC concept helps the company measure product performance against similar products launched in the past. (p. 315)

This correlates nicely with how the president and his administration must plan and strategize to develop various marketing tactics to promote his war policy in addition to being able to use historical data to compare previously introduced war policies. This could possibly aid them in deciding when they need to adopt a different marketing tactic. However, before discussing marketing tactics, the third model must be reviewed.

### **Fine's 7P's**

Seymour Fine is a marketing professor who has published numerous articles and books on commercial and social marketing topics. He defines social marketing as "the application of marketing methods to the dissemination of ideas" and considers it an art, (Fine, 1990, p. xiv). Kotler and Roberto on the other hand look at social marketing differently and define it as a "strategy for changing behavior," in addition to labeling it as a science, (as cited in Bates, 1991, p. 109). Bates (1991), states that Fine's definition is more practical for the field and his "generic social marketing plan...based on his 7P's model," is easy to use (p. 109).

Fine (1990) introduces a 7P marketing model; *producer, purchasers, product(s), price(s), promote, place, and probing*, which he bases on the long standing 4P model

which lists: product, price, promotion, and place (Fine, 1990, p.4). The 4Ps “found in the marketing toolbox are the independent variables used to influence the desired outcomes of the target markets, the dependent variables,” (Kotler and Lee, 2007, p. 12).

Revising the 4P model is not a new concept. Numerous people have added anywhere from six to sixteen new concepts (Kotler, 2000). As Jobber reasons, “The strength of the 4Ps approach is that it represents a memorable and practical framework for marketing decision-making and has proved useful for case study analysis in business schools for many years,” (as cited in Constantinides, 2006).

Even so, for purposes of this research, Fine’s 7P version was chosen because his expanded 7P model provides a “broad framework needed to prepare an effective plan and achieve the optimum mix,” (Fine, 1990, p. 5). In addition, his marketing plan is adapted to fit both products and ideas, or objectives. And, with Fine’s three additional elements, *producer, purchasers, and probing*, they further enable his model to be more conducive to this research concept, since the *producer* can be correlated with the president, the *purchasers* can be the American public, and *probing* can be the polling data. Each of Fine’s 7P’s will be discussed.

Fine (1990) states the first step to developing a marketing plan is to use his 7P model to create specific questions:

1. Who is the *producer*, the source of the promotional message?
2. Who are the potential *purchasers* in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3. What specific *product(s)* can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4. What *price(s)* must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?



5. How can the marketer *promote* (communicate with) the given market?
6. Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best *place* and time (best for the purchaser)?
7. What *probing* will be necessary to evaluate the marketer's campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5).

By utilizing his 7P approach, Fine (1990) states the marketer, or in this case, the president, will need to decide how to allocate his resources. By identifying “the optimum marketing mix” the president and his administration should be able to increase public support, (Fine, 1990, p. 4). The optimum marketing mix would mean the president has allocated the right amount of resources to each “P” in Fine’s model to achieve an increase in the public’s support. Fine (1990) suggests that, “the question is no longer whether social sector institutions should adopt marketing, but how to implement marketing strategy,” (p. xiii).

Utilizing the 7P’s for this research, Fine’s fifth “P” *promotion* is where the marketing tactics would be devised in his 7P model. While Fine does not attach specific marketing tasks to promoting a product, he does ask the question “How can the marketer promote (communicate with) the given market,” (Fine, 1965, p. 5). Kotler and Lee (2007) answer this question by suggesting the producer can use promotion “...to inform, educate, and persuade target markets,” (p. 12). Kotler and Lee (2007) further state:

Developing these communications is a process that begins with determining the key messages (what needs to be communicated). It then considers who will

deliver these messages or at least who will be perceived as delivering them. Next, communication channels are selected, driven by the content and format of the messages. The target audiences are the source of inspiration and the ones who opinion and response matters. (p. 12)

While Fine's 7P model does provide a road map to develop the overall marketing plan, unlike Kotler's demand states and marketing tasks and Levitt's PLC models, as stated earlier, Fine's 7P model does not provide a list of specific marketing tactics, which can be implemented depending on the strategic scenario as Kotler and Levitt's models provide. Instead, Fine relies on other models for these marketing tactics.

Kotler (2006) while admitting his own guilt in adding to the 4P's, critiques the models based on the 4P's, such as Levitt's 7P concept. He suggests add-on models such as Levitt's 7P's are lacking in consumer focus. Kotler proposes that instead of focusing on adding additional "P's" to the mix one should focus on the consumer or citizen and add the 4C's to the mix. Robert Lauterborn suggests the 4C's be considered, "product becomes customer's needs and wants, price becomes cost to customers, place becomes convenience, and promotion becomes communication," (as cited in Kotler, 2006). Once the 4C's are thoroughly understood, then an applicable 4P's marketing mix can be developed (Kotler, 2006).

Even though there are numerous marketing frameworks similar to the 4P's, Kotler (2006) states a framework is needed, "...for organizing our analysis and planning....the best framework will include no more than four or five elements," (p. 51). Until this occurs the marketing world may still rely on the historical 4P's and the numerous other models, which stem from the 4P's, such as Fine's 7P's.

While each of the marketing models bring unique ideas to the so-called marketing table, each model's marketing tactics and concepts will be further analyzed in chapters four and five respectively. This will allow the author to distinguish between the models success in aiding the president to increase public support for his war policy.

## **CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA**

This chapter will discuss the research design and methodology chosen for this analysis. It will also discuss why Desert Storm and OIF were the two case studies chosen for comparison. In addition, the chapter will provide a discussion on the pros and cons of the comparative politics case study methodology used for this research. And, finally, the advantages and disadvantages to conducting research on-line along with the use of polling data will be reviewed.

### **Research Design**

Research design can be defined as a plan of action for going from here to there. The “here” is defined as the starting point and presents the research questions to be answered, while “there” represents the analytical findings, or answers, to these questions (Yin, 1994). The specific research questions to be answered are:

#### **Research Question 1:**

**Under what circumstances does a President decide to actively market a war policy?**

## **Research Question 2:**

**How does the President sway public opinion to support a war at the pre-war stage?**

This particular research utilized the comparative politics research design (Lim, 2006). The two comparative research designs are most similar systems (MSS) and most different systems (MDS) (Lim, 2006). The MSS research design “is based on finding two or more very similar social systems, typically ‘countries,’ (Lim, 2006, p. 34). The design involves finding two states which are very similar in a majority of issues however they have at least two or more differences. The purpose of identifying similarities is to use these as control items. As control items they will offer consistency and will not be relevant to the study. This allows the author to focus on the dissimilar items between the states, thus allowing a causal factor to be narrowed down.

The second research design, MDS, is the opposite of MSS. In this particular design, the researcher must “find two systems that are different in almost every respect, except for the variable(s) under investigation,” (Lim, 2006, p. 41). The focus is to identify significant similarities between very different systems.

In contrast to the MSS design, variance on the dependent variable is *not* required. In fact, the dependent variable should be the same in all cases, for, in an MDS design, the researcher is attempting to show that the relationship between the presumed independent variable(s) and a dependent variable holds across a wide variety of vastly divergent settings. This means, in practical terms, that the

comparativist will often select cases in terms of the dependent variable. (Lim, 2006, p.41)

There are many critics who believe choosing case studies based on the dependent variable is inappropriate. Peters (as cited in Lim, 2006) stated, “there are disputes over the appropriateness of selecting cases on the dependent variable, with qualitative researchers arguing that this is essential, and quantitative researchers arguing that it invalidated most findings.” However, the MDS approach is a viable option used in research today.

For purposes of this research, the MSS design was utilized. The first step in laying the foundation for this MSS approach was to identify two similar case studies. The cases chosen for this research were the first war in Iraq known as Desert Storm and the second war in Iraq known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The next step in the MSS approach was to identify similar control variables between the two cases. The control variables for these two cases consisted of the following: 1) Both wars were fought between the same countries (the U.S. and Iraq), 2) both wars are recent events (within the past two decades), 3) both wars were fought with a voluntary U.S. military force (no draft was initiated) and 4) both wars were fought in the same geographical location. While these similarities aided in keeping some variables constant, in the MSS design, the researcher must focus on the dissimilar variables to narrow down a causal factor. For the purpose of this research, the dissimilar variables include the marketing strategy and tactics employed by each President. The author will demonstrate that these marketing strategies and tactics act as independent variables which ultimately manipulate public support--the dependent variable. The marketing strategies and tactics described in this research are taken from

three established marketing models as outlined in chapter two: Kotler's demand states and marketing tasks, Fine's 7P approach, and Levitt's product life cycle. The author compared and contrasted these marketing models to distinguish which marketing tactics were successful in raising public support and which marketing tactics were less successful in raising public support.

To aid in measuring the effectiveness of the various models, this research was framed within the context of time, prior to the beginning of the war (the pre-war stage). Both cases are discussed in more depth in chapters four and five respectively. After each marketing tactic was initiated, for example, a televised speech, U.N. speech, or high-profile cabinet members' speech was made an analysis of the poll data on <http://brain.gallup.com> was analyzed. The data for the first case, Desert Storm, was drawn from polls which asked the following questions:

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president?
2. Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling this current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait?
3. If the current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait does not change by January 15<sup>th</sup>, would you favor or oppose the U.S. going to war with Iraq in order to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait?

The data for the second case, OIF, was drawn from polls, which asked the following questions:

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?

2. Would you favor or oppose invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power?
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling—the situation with Iraq?

Where possible, consistency in the wording of questions between cases was maintained. This consistency was necessary to alleviate the possibility of misleading the respondents by rewording the question and skewing the research data. Although, in order to determine whether specific marketing objectives were met for each case study, unique questions specific to those marketing tactics were required. The unique questions used to gather data for Desert Storm are:

1. Now that U.S. Forces have been sent to Saudi Arabia and other areas of the Middle East, do you think they should engage in combat if Iraq...Refuses to leave Kuwait and restore Kuwait's former government?
2. Now that U.S. Forces have been sent to Saudi Arabia and other areas of the Middle East, do you think they should engage in combat if Iraq...Invades Saudi Arabia?
3. Now that U.S. Forces have been sent to Saudi Arabia and other areas of the Middle East, do you think they should engage in combat if Iraq...Attacks U.S. Forces?
4. Do you favor or oppose direct U.S. military action against Iraq at this time?
5. All in all, is the current situation in the Mideast worth going to war over, or not?



The unique questions used to gather data for OIF are:

1. Would you say you do—or do not—have a clear idea why the United States is considering new military action against Iraq?
2. Do you think each of the following is – or is not – a major reason why the bush administration is considering taking military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq? How about – To accomplish what the previous Bush administration did not do in the Persian Gulf War?
3. As far as you know, what are the reasons why the United States may take new military action against Iraq?
4. Do you think the Bush administration has a clear and well-thought-out policy on Iraq, or not?
5. Do you think the Bush administration has—or has not—made a convincing case about the need for the U.S. to take military action against Iraq?
6. Do you think the United States action in Iraq is morally justified, or not?
7. Do you think it is necessary for the Bush administration to get a resolution of support from the Congress before it attacks Iraq, or not?

The percentage rates were annotated for both presidents to see if there was an increase or decrease in their ratings based on how their marketing tactic was utilized.

The poll data for both cases was compared to analyze how presidential policy marketing tactics affected the two research questions:

**Research Question 1:**

**Under what circumstances does a President decide to actively market a war policy?**

## **Research Question 2:**

**How does the President sway the public's opinion in regards to policy?**

### **Methodology**

The method of study for this research is comparative politics. Lim (2006) states that, "As a method of study, comparative politics is—not surprisingly—premised on comparison. As a subject of study, comparative politics focuses on understanding and explaining political phenomena that take place within a state, society, country, or political system," (p.5). Ragin states that, "it entails two main predispositions. First, it involves a bias toward qualitative analysis, which means that comparativists tend to look at *cases as wholes* and to compare whole cases with each other. Second, is to value interpretation and context," (as cited in Lim, 2006). Lim (2006) takes the second predisposition a step further and explains, "*It means, in other words, demonstrating a meaningful continuity between the past and the present,*" (p.20).

Utilizing qualitative analysis will provide a better tool to aid in explaining the relationships of the variables. While quantitative analysis may show a relationship exists between the variables, it does not allow for an explanation of what the relationship may be (Lim, 2006). Utilizing qualitative analysis allowed this author to look at each case as a whole and explain how each independent variable, or marketing task, from the three marketing models, affected the dependent variable, which in this case is American public support. In addition, the research questions aided in focusing on actual trends and links that needed to be correlated over time, rather than just by coincidence (Yin, 1994).

Because case studies consist of multiple facets and numerous moving pieces they are often complex, but they still have a very important role in evaluative research. As stated, they are used to distinguish any causal links that may occur in real-life cases that are too difficult to explain or demonstrate with a mere survey or other experimental strategies (Yin, 1994). Now that the research design and methodology have been explained, an explanation of why these two cases, Desert Storm and OIF, were chosen follows.

### **Why These Case Studies?**

One of the most important decisions in comparative case study analysis is choosing the right cases for the research. The first thing a researcher must do is to understand the case(s) chosen for the study. It is important to note the researcher is not analyzing a case to make sense of other cases. (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg 1991; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). The focus must remain on the case(s) at hand.

This author chose to conduct a comparative politics case study analysis utilizing a MSS research design. This entailed identifying cases that were very similar. The two cases chosen were Desert Storm and OIF. As stated, with the MSS research design, the case studies must have similarities to use for control factors. The similarities in Desert Storm and OIF consist of: 1) both wars being fought within the past two decades, 2) both wars are/were between the U.S. and Iraq, 3) both were fought outside the U.S., and 4) both were fought with voluntary U.S. military forces. These factors were used as control variables and allowed the researcher to focus on the dissimilarities as the causal factors.

The dissimilarities consisted of the various marketing tactics employed by both presidents.

The fact that both cases occurred in the past 16 years allowed the researcher to readily find current documentation. This is an important point in conducting case study research to make sure the researcher and reader can gain as much knowledge as possible about the case studies, (Stake, 1995). In addition, many of the people who were involved in both wars, are now coming forward and telling their version of the events which led up to each war, thus providing a current flow of updated material.

Even so, no research method is infallible. The pros and cons of using the comparative politics case study method are discussed next.

### **Pros and Cons of Comparative Politics Case Study Methodology**

No methodology or research design is without its supporters and critics. While this research focused on the use of comparative politics utilizing the MSS research design there are limitations which will be discussed.

One of the most frequent criticisms of case study research is generalization. Critics state that the results of case study research are not widely applicable to real life, (Tellis, 1997). Yin disagrees with the critics and provides this explanation, “In analytic generalization, previously developed theory is used as a template against which to compare the empirical results of the case study,” (as cited in Tellis, 1997). The issue is that critics assume that a small sample of cases have been taken from a larger universe of cases. In assuming this, critics view a single case as a single respondent, which is incorrect, (Tellis, 1997). A case study is made up of various people’s ideas, inputs,

actions, and reactions. It can consist of several people, but may focus on one, such as the President. However, in doing so, this author will also focus on the reactions of others involved in each case study, such as cabinet members and the American public.

Another criticism of case study research is that it cannot be replicated and it is unscientific. Stake and Feagin (as cited in Yin, 1994), major supporters of case study research, refute this criticism. In addition, Yin (1994) states that it is essential to have a protocol for more than one case study since the rules and procedures developed will aid in the reliability of the research. The protocol should include:

An overview of the case study project—this will include project objectives, case study issues, and presentations about the topic under study

Field procedures—reminders about procedures, credentials for access to data sources, location of those sources

Case study questions—the questions that the investigator must keep in mind during data collection

A guide for the case study report—the outline and format for the report. (as cited in Tellis, 1997)

Yin's protocol listed above aided this author in enhancing the reliability of the analytical process and findings by providing an overview of this study, discussing the procedures and sources, annotating the research questions, and providing the outline for the research. In addition this structure will aid other researchers in replicating this research in the future.

A third possible criticism amongst research investigators is that case study research is not as rigorous and can allow for inaccurate or biased views to encroach upon

the analytical findings and conclusions, (Yin, 1994). Yin (1994) attributes this criticism to the possibility that these critics may have confused the teaching vice the research of case studies, where the teaching of case studies does allow study materials to be altered to effectively teach, or demonstrate a particular point, while in research altering of case study data is strictly forbidden. However, bias can enter into any experiment, survey, or research case study if the researcher is not acutely aware of this possibility and does not take the necessary steps to overcome it. By utilizing several key experts and researchers to support the data for this comparative case study, this author does take the necessary steps to alleviate the author's bias.

Another possible limiting factor for this research design is, that "a comparison of only two cases does not and cannot provide a strong enough empirical basis for making 'big' claims," (Lim, 2006, p. 38). While it can aid in pointing to a potential causal factor, there is also the possibility that it is a coincidence. While this research does focus on two main cases, Desert Storm and OIF, the author also provides synopsis of three other case study conflicts in chapter six to increase the validity of the research data. These conflicts include Afghanistan, World War II, and Kosovo. Even so, future in-depth research along the same lines is imperative.

A final limitation to the research is that even though the MSS research design is being utilized, the two wars "are not exactly alike," (Lim, 2006, p. 38). In fact, some may argue they are very dissimilar. Because of this, "we should think of the term 'most similar' as relative to other systems," in this case as relative to other wars, (Lim, 2006, p.38). Due to the numerous dissimilarities, it can be difficult, "to establish exactly which differences have causal significance and which do not," (Hopkin, as cited in Lim, 2006).

However, it is important not to over-emphasize the results of the research as being the only causal factor, but allowing for the possibility of others through future research.

Due to the nature of this research, a significant portion was conducted on-line. The advantages and disadvantages of on-line research will be discussed next.

### **Advantages and Disadvantages to Research On-line**

Our ever-evolving information technology allows access to past presidential speeches, cabinet member speeches, reviews, and historical polling data, which are just a fingertip away. However, with this advance in technology there are also limitations, such as editing embarrassing moments, misspoken phrases, etc. from the “historical archives” with just a touch of a finger. For example, according to Shaw, Shapiro, and Jacobs (1996):

The messages published in the Public Papers of the Presidents are said, according to the White House press secretary, to reflect accurately what was actually stated, and checked against sound recordings whenever possible, but there is no assurance that sanitizing does not occur in the office of the press secretary. (p. 504)

Shaw et al. (1996) noted that:

...at least two embarrassing press briefings concerning the White House Travel Office firings in May of 1993 were conspicuously absent from materials provided by the White House to the various electronic archives. ...This selective

suppression of some embarrassing documents suggests the clear possibility of the occasional, selective sanitizing of the documentary record. (p.504)

The possibly edited historical archives could be considered a limitation to this research due to the fact this author had to rely on electronic archived speeches. However this editing issue does not affect the studies, journal articles, and archived polling data used in the research. Even so, because the majority of the analytical data for this research does come from <http://brain.gallup.com> it is important to look at the advantages and disadvantages to using polling data.

### **Advantages and Disadvantages to Using Polls**

Today, polling data is very accessible to everyone, from the President of the United States to the average American. When Congress was faced with voting on whether to support Desert Storm, they turned to polling data to aid them in making their decision. They knew they must vote on whether to support George H. W. Bush and send American troops to war during Desert Storm, however, they wanted to know if the public, the voters, supported the President. To find their answers they turned to the polls, (Mueller, 1994).

While the polls seem like a viable vehicle for decision making, they can also be misleading. Mueller (1994) suggests, that how a question is worded, will play a role in how the person answers the question. Due to question wording difference, he does not believe that polls are able to accurately measure how respondents think about an issue. For example, a Gallup poll taken January 11-13, 1991 asked the question, “All in all, is the current situation in the Mideast worth going to war over, or not?” The results showed



that 46 percent believed the situation was worth going to war over, 44 percent did not believe it was worth it, and 10 percent did not know. In contrast, a poll was taken by ABC, ABC/Washington Post on January 13, 1991, which asked the question, “Do you agree or disagree that the United States should take all action necessary, including the use of military force, to make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait?” Seventy four percent agreed with the use of force, 24 percent disagreed, and 3 percent did not know. Mueller (1994) believes the different results are a direct result of question wording. The first question, uses the actual word “war,” and receives very low levels of support, while the second poll uses the phrase, “use of military force.” Mueller (1994) conjectures that the use of the word “war” seems to be a more proactive term, while the latter term “use of military force” seems to be a possibility if nothing else seems to work. Thus, as the polls demonstrate, the latter does receive much higher support.

While Mueller (1994) does not believe the polls can tell us how many people support the president taking our nation into war, he does believe they can be useful to view trends over time. For example, utilizing the data from the example poll questions above, the same two questions were asked continuously beginning August 23, 1990 through January 13, 1991. This allowed the researcher to trace the trends of the questions. Overall, the results remained consistent with both questions. As demonstrated by the example above, while conducting opinion polling can seem to be simple, the slightest oversight or dissimilar word phrasing can result in useless poll data or data that can be misleading, (Roll, Jr. & Cantril, 1972). To alleviate this possibility, the author only utilized poll data that used the exact wording for each question asked in the poll.

In the next two chapters, four and five respectively, both Desert Storm and OIF will be analyzed in more depth to provide the reader with a better understanding of the strategic pre-war environment, both President's objectives, their level of public support at the pre-war stage, what lead up to the presidential decision to go to war, and the marketing tactics they each used.

## **CHAPTER 4: PERSIAN GULF WAR—DESERT STORM**

This chapter will analyze how the strategic environment impacted the president's overall war policy marketing decisions and will identify the marketing tactics employed by President George H. W. Bush to draw conclusions as to the overall success of his war policy marketing campaign. The chapter begins by exploring the pre-war strategic environment that President Bush found himself from the period beginning just prior to the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and leading up to the beginning of military force in Iraq on January 16, 1991.

### **Strategic Environment**

It is important to understand the pre-war strategic environment prior to analyzing the marketing plan. In the context of this paper, the strategic environment consists of analyzing the threats, the president's objectives, and public opinion. These three components ultimately lead to the marketing plan.

### **The Threat**

To understand the threat, some of the events which led up to Desert Storm must first be discussed. To the average American citizen, Desert Storm began on January 16, 1991 and ended 27 February 1991, however, to the many military and political leaders

involved in this war, they know it began much earlier. On August 2, 1990, President Saddam Hussein ordered his Iraqi Army to invade Kuwait. Prior to this, the majority of Americans had little knowledge of Iraq or Kuwait, yet alone their history. Americans quickly became intimate with both countries as the operation to build up coalition forces in the region began.

Prior to the invasion, on July 24, 1990, President Hussein ordered two Iraqi armored divisions made up of 30,000 troops to position themselves on the Kuwaiti border (Karsh, 1990). The following day, on July 25, 1990, Ms. April Glaspie, the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad visited President Hussein and reportedly listened to a belligerent President Hussein explain why he had sent his troops to the border of Kuwait. He stated it was a scare tactic to get Kuwait to come to the negotiation table. He demanded that Kuwait give Iraq Kuwait's portion of the Rumaila oilfield, \$2.5 billion in reparations from Kuwait for the oil they removed from the field, and another \$14 billion in lost Iraqi revenue. Finally, he demanded the cancellation of \$12 billion in loans made to Iraq from Kuwait during the Iraq/Iran War (Chadwick, 1991).

This meeting was important because President Hussein knew he must find out the intentions of the United States', as the lone super power. In the past, Iraq had been provided loans and encouragement from the Soviet Union. Now, President Hussein knew that the Soviet Union had too many internal problems of their own to either aid him or to bother with the invasion of Kuwait, but he did not know how the U.S. would respond to his invasion of Kuwait, (Kennedy, 1987). Some have argued that after his conversation with Ms. Glaspie, President Hussein felt he had a green light from the U.S. to invade Kuwait with no interference from America.


According to the Iraqi transcripts, Ms. Glaspie never warned President Hussein of American troop involvement if he invaded Kuwait. Critics in the State Department say this conversation was the last signal President Hussein had needed to put his plan into action. Even so, after the war, Ms. Glaspie testified she did inform him that the U.S. would not sit idly by if a military operation was undertaken (Leyden, 1997). The American State Department transcripts have not been released.

Back in Washington, the White House and the State Department overruled the reluctant Joint Chiefs of Staff to place a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea in late July, as a warning to President Hussein (Record, 1993). On 24 July, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) and ordered him to prepare a response to President Hussein's threatening actions (Leyden, 1997). On August 1, 1990, General Schwarzkopf briefed Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney that he anticipated an attack (Ibid, 1997). Approximately 24 hours later, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Now that the events leading up to Desert Storm have been explained, this author suggests the war policy environment spectrum, which was discussed in chapter one, is a useful conceptual tool for analyzing whether the president needed to market Desert Storm to receive public support. Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a pre-emptive attack on an *allied* country, and *did not* directly involve territory of the U.S., this author suggests that public support for such an action would initially fall toward the middle of the spectrum than toward the extreme right or left. The facts were that one country invaded another country, but the moral implications of the invasion were not instantly known and in the

days after the attack, the U.S. public attempted to find answers as to which country deserved the moral high ground.

**Chart 4.1 War Policy Environment Spectrum**




The Gallup Poll News Service, Monday, Aug 6, 1990, vol 55, No. 13b

The first Bush administration wasted little time in helping shape the public’s answer – Iraq was the aggressor, Kuwait the victim. Even so, according to a Gallup poll on August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2007 when the following question was asked, “Do you favor or oppose direct US military action against Iraq at this time?” 68 percent of respondents answered that they opposed direct military action. In such a scenario, given President Bush’s objective to free Kuwait from Iraqi aggression, he needed to present a marketing campaign to convince the public that war might be necessary.

In fact, “this act of war in an area of importance alarmed most world leaders,” (Mueller, 1994, p. 18). And, when President Hussein began to seize Westerners in both Iraq and Kuwait as hostages in response to a possible coalition attack against him, this aided the Bush administration in leveraging the moral high ground in his marketing campaign. Although the spectrum would dictate that President Bush did not need to market the war too strongly, he broadened his marketing message to include that

President Hussein was trying to acquire nuclear weapons and needed to be stopped. This accusation caused deep concern for the American people, and began to move public support for Bush’s war policy upward with new moral clarification.

**Chart 4.2 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



Gallup Brain, Accessed Oct 7, 2007, Question qn13 (August Wave 3)

**President’s Objective**

Prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President George Bush did not take a hard-line stand against President Hussein. In fact, his Iraqi policy was to “placate” Saddam Hussein, (Mueller, 1994, p. 141). After Iraq invaded Kuwait President George Bush took immediate action and ordered two aircraft carriers to deploy to the area. He froze both Iraq and Kuwait’s assets and barred trade between U.S. companies and Iraq. On August 8, 1990, President Bush announced his decision to deploy troops to the region after a formal request for assistance from Saudi Arabia.

By October 1990, President Bush began to have concerns that his actions were not effective. In addition, he did not think he would be able to maintain the American public and coalition support if he did not act quickly. In essence he knew he could lose the

respect and popularity needed for re-election, (Mueller, 1994). His answer to this dilemma was to change his policy. In November 1990, he increased troop levels substantially in the Middle East. This new policy concerned many and was seen as a “rush to war;” the argument being that sanctions had not been given enough time to be effective, (Mueller, 1994, p. 20). Even so, on November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of military force against Iraq if they did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, (Mueller, 1994, p. 16).

President Bush had already made up his mind on U.S. military action prior to asking the opinion of his principal military advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General Colin Powell. Even after General Powell was informed of President Bush’s war decision, he did not offer the President any of his professional counsel because General Powell opposed a war with Iraq, (Woodward, 1991). While General Powell supported the defense of Saudi Arabia, he had serious concerns about Kuwait’s forcible liberation, (Ibid, 1991). This did not deter President Bush from going forward with his war policy plans, nor did General Powell’s concerns sway the U.N.’s support.

President Hussein had aided in painting himself as the ultimate villain and the U.N. now supported using military force against Iraq if they did not leave Kuwait. Even so, President Bush’s war plan did not include removing President Hussein from power in Iraq. The Bush administration knew the international military coalition would not stand for further operations to capture President Hussein or the continued destruction of Iraqi forces after Kuwait had been liberated, (Leyden, 1997).

After several days of debate, on January 12, 1991, Congress voted to allow President Bush to use military force to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait if Iraq did not leave



by midnight on January 15, 1991. Only known to a select few in the military and the White House, the decision to go to war was made on January 15, 1991. On January 16, 1991, aircraft began heading towards Iraq. At 0235, on January 17, 1991 (Baghdad time) it was apparent the air war had begun, (Leyden, 1997).

### **Public Opinion at the Pre-war Stage (prior to marketing)**

During the month of February 1990, Gallup, Gallup/Newsweek, Gallup/USA Today, and CNN conducted surveys to detect the American people's view on how satisfied they were with President George Bush. Each respondent was asked "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president?" The results showed that on average 73 percent approved and 16 percent disapproved of the way George Bush was handling his job.

During July 1990, President Bush's approval rating had begun to slip. According to Gallup Poll Monthly (1992), at this time, Bush had an overall approval rating of 60 percent for how he was handling his job as president and a disapproval rating of 25 percent from the American people. This author speculates that President Bush may have been concerned that if he declared war on Iraq and President Hussein his approval ratings would dip even lower. President Bush knew he could not sit idly by and let President Hussein control a major provider of Middle East oil.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, as stated above, President George Bush ordered two aircraft carriers to deploy to the area, he froze both Iraq and Kuwait's assets, and barred trade between U.S. companies and Iraq. On August 3-4, 1990, a survey was conducted which asked, "Do you favor or oppose direct U.S. military action


against Iraq at this time,” (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Sixty-eight percent were opposed to using direct U.S. military action, while 22 percent favored using U.S. military action. During this timeframe, respondents were also asked, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling this current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait,” (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Fifty-two percent approved of President Bush’s actions, while 16 percent disapproved. On August 8, 1990 President Bush announced his decision to deploy troops to the region after a formal request for assistance from Saudi Arabia. Immediately following this announcement, President Bush’s overall approval rating increased to 74 percent, with a disapproval rating at 16 percent, while public support for how President Bush was handling the current situation in the Middle East increased from 52 percent to 80 percent (Gallup Poll Monthly, December 1992 and Gallup Brain, January 15, 1991, accessed October 7, 2007).

### **Strategic Environment Summary**

While the invasion of Kuwait warranted some concern for Americans in the beginning of August 1990, it was not to the point where they were ready to support sending U.S. troops to war. At this point, the majority of Americans did not feel threatened, but they did believe that something morally unjustified had occurred. They still highly approved of how President George Bush was handling his job as president, with an increase of 14 percent from July to August 1990. In addition, 80 percent of the American public approved of how President Bush was handling the situation in the Middle East, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

During this time, public support existed for the economic sanctions that President Bush initiated, such as freezing Iraq and Kuwait’s assets, halting trade between U.S. companies and Iraq, and sending aircraft carriers into the region. However, during January 11-13, 1991, approximately five days out from the beginning of the war, 55 percent of those who were asked, “If the current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait does not change by January 15, would you favor or oppose the U.S. going to war with Iraq in order to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait,” favored going to war with Iraq, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

**Chart 4.3 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



Gallup Brain, Accessed Oct 7, 2007, Question qn13 (January Wave 2)

President Bush had managed to convince over half the Americans to support going to war with Iraq without initiating a major marketing campaign. How were President Bush and his administration able to maintain America’s support for war for five months? To answer this, the president’s marketing plan and tactics must be analyzed.

## **President's Marketing Plan**

One of the key reasons President Bush did not need to expend a great deal of effort marketing a war policy was due to President Hussein's own actions and rhetoric, which was merely amplified by the Bush administration. A majority of the American public were in agreement that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait lacked moral justification. In addition, President Bush had the support of the U.N., which the American public had stated it wanted prior to war. In fact, when the war did occur, over half of Americans surveyed supported the decision. Since President Bush did not initiate an aggressive marketing plan, Mueller (1994) does not believe President Bush sold the American public on the idea of war, but that the American people began to "feel trapped" and believed war was inevitable, so they took on the attitude, "Let's get it over with," (p. xv). Mueller (1994) further states, President Bush was able to lead America into war:

not because he notably convinced a growing number of Americans of the wisdom of war, but because of his position as foreign policy leader: because he and his aides enjoyed what appears to have been a fair amount of trust in this matter; because President Saddam Hussein played the villain role with such consummate skill; and because people generally anticipated that the war would be beneficial in resolving a pressing and important issue and that it would be comparatively quick and low in casualties. (p. xv)


Even so, based on the polling data, for a span of five months, President Bush managed to keep the majority of Americans supporting him and his decision to go to war.

## Tactics

Even though Mueller (1994) did not believe President Bush marketed and sold his war policy to the American public, the perception by some analysts was that President George H. W. Bush was able to market the war well enough to convince the public the war needed to occur. If this is the case, did President Bush use marketing tactics to maintain and even increase the public's support for going to war?

From August 9-12, 1990 through December 6-9, 1990, support for how President Bush was handling the situation between Iraq and Kuwait began to decrease from 80 percent in August to 57 percent in December, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). (See Chart 4.4)

**Chart 4.4 Polling Data:** *Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling this current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait?*



(Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007)

The Bush administration believed this decline was due in large part to the fact that none of the indirect sanctions or polices initiated by the president against Iraq were working. As a result, President Bush took on a more direct approach to the war by

providing President Hussein with an ultimatum and began very clear preparations for an impending use of military force. Even so, after announcing on November 8, 1990 that troop deployments would increase, on November 15, 1990 the public support remained virtually the same with 46 percent stating the situation in the Middle East was worth going to war over, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Even though this number fluctuated slightly at times, by January 11-13, 1991, it was back at 46 percent.

President Bush believed that he needed to take America into war to avoid a possible World War III. Woodward (1991) and Barnes (1991) stated that, “Bush became emotionally absorbed, even obsessed, by the crisis,” (as cited in Mueller, 1994). Whether President Bush aggressively marketed to sell his war policy or whether President Hussein sold President Bush’s war policy may not be clear. What is clear is that when asked during January 11-13, 1991 if the situation between Iraq and Kuwait did not change by January 15, the deadline the U.N. imposed on Iraq, 55 percent of the American public favored a war as opposed to 36 percent on November 15, 1990; a 19 percent increase, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). During this same timeframe, President Bush had a 64 percent approval rating for how he was handling his job as president. While President Bush may not have needed to market to sell the moral justification for war in the American public’s minds, he did need to maintain the public’s support for five months.

To be able to maintain the public’s support, President Bush needed to keep the war in the forefront of the public’s minds. Utilizing the three marketing models discussed previously in chapter two; Philip Kotler’s demand states and marketing tactics, Theodore Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC), and Seymour Fine’s 7Ps an analysis based on the

polling data is discussed next to analyze how President Bush’s marketing campaign fit into each model and which marketing tactics were successful.

### **Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tactics**

Utilizing Kotler’s (2000) demand states and marketing tactics model, the first step the Bush administration needed to do was analyze the strategic environment, or demand state. According to a Gallup poll on August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2007 when the following question was asked, “Do you favor or oppose direct U.S. military action against Iraq at this time?” 68 percent of respondents answered that they opposed direct military action. This would indicate the strategic environment, or demand state, was at *no demand*. According to Kotler’s model, President Bush would need to connect benefits of the war policy with the public’s needs and interests. (See Table 4.1) In such a scenario, given President Bush’s objective to free Kuwait from Iraqi aggression, he needed to present a marketing campaign to convince the public that war might be necessary.

**Table 4.1: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	<b>No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product</b>	<b>Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests</b>
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business	Maintain current level
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

On August 8, 1990 President Bush announced his decision to deploy troops to the region after a formal request for assistance from Saudi Arabia. Immediately following this announcement, President Bush's overall approval rating increased to 74 percent, with a disapproval rating at 16 percent, while public support for how President Bush was handling the current situation in the Middle East increased from 52 percent to 80 percent (Gallup Poll Monthly, December 1992 and Gallup Brain, January 15, 1991, accessed October 7, 2007). In addition, the American public was asked: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling this current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait," (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Fifty-two percent approved of President Bush's actions, while 16 percent disapproved. When President Hussein began to seize Westerners in both Iraq and Kuwait as hostages in response to a possible coalition attack against him, this aided the Bush administration in leveraging the moral high ground in his marketing campaign.

During the time following the invasion of Kuwait, when asked during August 23-26, 1990 if the situation in the Mideast was worth going to war over, or not, 48 percent believed it was, while 40 percent said it was not, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). President Bush had almost half of the American public supporting a war largely due to President Hussein's actions instead of an overt marketing campaign. The demand state could be considered *full demand* for sending U.S. ground troops into Iraq meaning almost a majority of the population favored the war policy and supported the idea of going to war. The next step in Kotler's model is to identify the correlated marketing tactic. For a situation at full demand, Kotler's tactical recommendation is to maintain the current support. That's exactly what President Bush was able to do. (See Table 4.2)



**Table 4.2: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	<b>Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business</b>	<b>Maintain current level</b>
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

During August 9-10, 1990, President Bush had a 75 percent job approval rating and 77 percent approval rating of how he was handling the situation in Iraq and Kuwait. Forty-one percent of Americans polled at this time approved of U.S. forces engaging in combat if Iraq refused to leave Kuwait, while 67 percent approved of U.S. forces engaging in combat if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, and 94 percent approved of U.S. forces engaging in combat if U.S. forces were attacked, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). The Bush administration knew to maintain the public’s support they needed to let President Hussein continue to paint himself as the villain, which he did very well. He detained Westerners as hostages, threatened to destroy Israel, and threatened to launch another World War. Due to President Hussein’s erratic behavior and seemingly unstable stature, President Bush received support from the Soviet Union, the U.N., and Congress. Kotler’s model does not specifically state what marketing tactics work best to maintain full demand. President Bush took the approach of amplifying President Hussein’s immoral actions. The marketing tactic President Bush used could be considered a

passive-aggressive marketing tactic since due to President Hussein's villainous self-marketing, support for war seemed to be maintained.

As soon as President Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait, President Bush became convinced that this was an issue of "paramount importance," (Mueller, 1994, p. 51). As stated earlier, some say he became obsessed with the issue and often compared it to World War II, believing that he must stop President Hussein and in turn would be preventing a possible World War III, (Ibid).

Even though President Bush immediately responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, by October he was frustrated with the response of Iraq. In addition, Americans had turned their attention away from the impending war, and were now focused on the heated budget debates. During this time President Bush broke his most notorious campaign pledge, "Read my lips: no new taxes," (as cited in Mueller, 1994).

By November 1-4, 1990, President Bush's approval rating for handling the situation involving Iraq and Kuwait had dropped from 80 percent on August 8, 1990 to 61 percent, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). In addition, support for going to war with Iraq if the situation did not change by January, 1991, had only a 36 percent approval rating during November 15-18, 1990, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). At this point President Bush was concerned the pre-war strategic environment was changing. Looking back at Kotler's model, as demand for the product begins to decrease the pre-war strategic environment needs to be reassessed. Due to the decrease in support for how President Bush was handling the situation and the support for war at this time, the pre-war strategic environment could now be considered a *declining demand*

environment. According to Kotler’s model, President Bush must now use creative remarketing to increase the demand for his war policy. (See Table 4.3)

**Table 4.3: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	<b>Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product</b>	<b>Creative remarketing</b>
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business	Maintain current level
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

Although President Bush was not known for being a strong persuader, he repositioned his marketing stance and now spoke boldly as he announced the increase of deployed U.S. troops, (Mueller, 1994). He insisted the U.S. needed to stand up to Iraq to maintain a peaceful world. He continued to compare the impending war to World War II and in turn began to convince some Americans that their freedom was at stake, (Ibid). President Bush was making the moral argument even stronger to increase the public’s support for his war policy.

By December 6-9, 1990, with his new forceful tactic in place, 52 percent now favored President Bush’s war policy that if the situation in the Middle East did not change by January, a U.S. force would be used to remove Iraq from Kuwait and 47 percent believed the situation was worth going to war over, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). President Bush’s creative remarketing tactic, focusing on the moral

argument, increased support for war by 16 percent, up from 36 percent on November 15, 1990 (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

Since the polling data demonstrated an increase in public support for the war policy, according to Kotler’s model another assessment of the strategic environment is necessary. At this point the pre-war strategic environment could be labeled at *full demand* since support has increased. And the correlating marketing tactic returned to a focus on maintaining the current demand. (See Table 4.4)

**Table 4.4: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand	Use various incentives
6	<b>Full Demand</b>	<b>Maintain current level</b>
7	Overfull Demand	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

Some critics do not believe President Bush was able to convince the American public war was needed. Their argument suggests the public was leaning more toward apathy and the feeling of wanting to “get it over with.” The polling data for January 11-13, 1991, approximately 3 days out from the beginning of the war, demonstrates that President Bush’s job approval rating had increased to 64 percent and the approval for how he was handling the Iraq/Kuwait situation was now at 62 percent, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Even though only 46 percent believed the situation was worth going to war over, 55 percent favored going to war with Iraq if the situation did not change by January 15<sup>th</sup>, 1991, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). This author

suggests that the January 15<sup>th</sup> deadline coordinated and publicized at the U.N. level played a role in America's support for war. After the U.N. established the January 15, 1991 deadline and approved military force American support for war did increase.

While some critics still do not believe President Bush was able to successfully market the war to receive high public support percentages, the polling data demonstrates that his slight change in marketing tactics and emotional rhetoric did help him pull off receiving the support of over half of the American public, the U.N., the Soviet Union, and Congress, (Mueller, 1994).

President Bush genuinely believed the war was necessary and launched the war by stating:

*We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations....what we're doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next hundred years. (as cited in Mueller, 1994)*

### **Levitt's Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

Utilizing the same Desert Storm examples above for consistency in analyzing the three marketing models, Levitt's Product Life Cycle (PLC) will now be applied to the Bush administration's marketing plan. Levitt's (1965) PLC model states that as with human life, every product or policy has a cycle of progression over time. The PLC model states that in stage one, *market development*, a new product is developed and brought to the public before the public knows "it needs the product," (Levitt, 1965, p. 3). The correlating marketing tactic states the president must now create a need for the war

policy. This is the stage where President Bush would begin to introduce his new war policy to the public. (See Table 4.5)

**Table 4.5: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

Stages	Correlated Marketing Tasks
<b>Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it</b>	<b>Introduce and create demand for the product</b>
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

In the case of Desert Storm, President Bush’s war policy did not need a strong introduction since President Hussein had already initiated war by invading Kuwait and had provided a moral justification for going to war by his own actions. The public already had a moral sense that it needed the “product” so little time if any was needed in Stage 1.

Even so, President Bush initiated his containment, mobilization, and action war policy responding immediately to President Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait by sending two aircraft carriers to the region and establishing economic sanctions against Iraq. These actions did not seem to deter President Hussein. Instead of ordering his troops to leave Kuwait, President Hussein began to detain Westerners in both Iraq and Kuwait in case he was attacked. This act of aggression caused many Americans to view President Hussein as a villain. The public’s support for war in the region quickly accelerated from 22 percent who favored military action to 49 percent who believed the situation in the Middle East was worth going to war over, (August 3-4, 1990 and September 27-30, 1990,

Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). This could be considered the “take-off” stage in Stage 2, *market growth*, of the PLC model, which states that demand begins to accelerate. (See Table 4.6) It is important to note that the difference between marketing a product and a policy utilizing the PLC model is the speed of dissemination. A product company does not have the access to media power that the President of the U.S. does. This access aided the president in communicating the issue to the public extremely fast and aided in increasing the public’s support.

**Table 4.6: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
<b>Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”</b>	<b>Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors</b>
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

Even so, this take-off stage was short lived. By October 1990, as approval for how President Bush was handling the situation in the Middle East continued to decline, he became more concerned that his previous actions were ineffective and that public and coalition support may fade. By November 1-4, 1990, President Bush’s approval rating for handling the situation involving Iraq and Kuwait had dropped from 80 percent on August 8, 1990 to 61 percent, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). In addition, support for going to war with Iraq if the situation did not change by January, 1991, had only a 36 percent approval rating during November 15-18, 1990, (Gallup Brain, accessed October

7, 2007). In addition, Americans were now focused on the budget debates between President Bush and Congress rather than the war, (Mueller, 1994). At this point President Bush’s war policy entered Stage 3, *market maturity*, of the PLC Model. (See Table 4.7)

**Table 4.7: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
<b>Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline</b>	<b>Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important</b>
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

During Stage 3 of the PLC model, communication with the public is essential, along with creative marketing of the product. President Bush’s solution to the decline in support was to announce an increased build-up in troop deployment to the region in November, 1990. This upsurge in troop deployments to the area caused some critics to wonder if war was really that necessary. President Hussein aided President Bush’s case for war by portraying an erratic leader who needed to be stopped. In addition, on November 29, 1990, the U.N. announced its support for military action if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991. These combined events throughout November saw an increase in public support for war. At this point in the PLC model, President Bush was



able to recycle his war policy and place it back in Stage 2, *market growth*, rather than allowing the policy to flow to Stage 4, *market decline*. (See Table 4.8)

**Table 4.8: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
<b>Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”</b>	<b>Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors</b>
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

By November 29, 1990, there was a 16 percent increase from 36 percent on November 15, 1990 to 52 percent during December 6-9, 1990, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). This increase could be contributed to several factors. During November, President Bush changed his marketing tactics, presenting a bold, determined stance to the public, along with announcing increased troop deployments. Also, he proposed a meeting between the U.S. and Iraq. In addition, the U.N. established January 15, 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait, and approved the use of military force if they did not leave, and by the end of October, the President and Congress had reached a decision on the budget. While this data could suggest that the U.N. does play a role in America’s support for war since there were so many changing factors during this time, it is difficult with the current polling data used for this research to provide a definitive answer.

President Bush continued to receive increased public support for the war and by January 11-13, 1991, 55 percent favored war if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Those who said the Middle East situation was worth going to war over were at 46 percent during January 11-13, 1991. The war started three days later.

President Bush's war policy did not flow through all four stages during the pre-war stage. Initially the war policy flowed through the first three stages as stated in the PLC model. Instead of allowing the public's support to continue to decline to Stage 4, President Bush creatively marketed his war policy and was able to recycle the policy back to Stage 2. If the timeline were extended, perhaps the policy would have transitioned to stage four.

### **Fine's 7P's**

Unlike the previous two models discussed, Fine's 7P's model is used to create a marketing plan, rather than correlating various stages or demand states with marketing tactics. Fine's model focuses on achieving the optimum mix of his proposed 7P's by allocating resources efficiently to each "P". To accomplish this, the marketer must first answer each "P" question. After the seven "P" questions listed below are answered, the next step becomes how to allocate the resources available to each "P" to achieve a successful marketing campaign. This is known as the optimum mix. By achieving the optimum mix, the president will increase the public's support for his war policy. (See Table 4.9)

**Table 4.9: Fine’s 7P’s Model**

	<b>7P’s</b>	<b>Further defining questions for 7P’s</b>
1	Producer	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	Promote	How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?
6	Place	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer’s campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

As stated above, to create an effective marketing plan for President Bush, the questions posed in Fine’s 7P’s model must first be answered. The answers for each “P” are answered in Table 4.10 below.

**Table 4.10: Fine’s 7P’s Model**

	<b>7P’s</b>	<b>Answers</b>	<b>Further defining questions for 7P’s</b>
1	Producer	President Bush	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	American Public, Congress, U.N.	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	War policy	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	Possibly high casualties and high monetary costs	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	<b>Promote</b>	<b>Marketing tactics</b>	<b>How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?</b>
6	Place	Administration; Media channels	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	Polling data	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer’s campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

Examining the answers provided, Fine’s fifth “P” *promotion* is where the marketing tactics would be devised in his 7P model. Fine (1990) asks, “How can the

marketer promote (communicate with) the given market,” (p. 5)? In other words, how can the president market his war policy effectively to the American people?

President Bush had already decided the cost was worth going to war over as he allocated more troops to the region in November 1990. He decided to allocate his resources by focusing on communicating how dangerous President Hussein could be to the world. President Bush’s marketing tactic was to boldly insist the U.S. needed to stand up to Iraq to maintain a peaceful world. He continued to compare the impending war to World War II and in turn began to convince some Americans that their freedom was at stake, (Mueller, 1994). President Bush was making the moral argument even stronger to increase the public’s support for his war policy.

By December 6-9, 1990, with his new forceful tactic in place, 52 percent now favored President Bush’s war policy that if the situation in the Middle East did not change by January, a U.S. force would be used to remove Iraq from Kuwait and 47 percent believed the situation was worth going to war over, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Even though President Bush changed his marketing tactic, during the same timeframe, the U.N. made the announcement that it would support using military force against Iraq if President Hussein did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. As stated previously, the data could suggest that the American people were supportive of the impending war because the U.N. now supported the war policy or the support could be due to President Bush’s own marketing tactics. Public opinion researchers Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame credit this increase in public support to President Bush’s bold actions and statements rather than using rhetoric, (as cited in Darley, 2005). President Bush did promise the American public that the war with Iraq

would not be another Vietnam, (Schanberg, 1991). In addition, Woodward states President Bush became obsessed with the idea of sparing the world another World War, (as cited in Mueller, 1994). Communicating the war policy effectively was crucial to achieving public support for going to war. As the Bush administration noted, it did not have to solely rely on President Bush to persuade the American people, President Hussein was also a viable marketing tactic. President Hussein's words and actions were enough to convince half of the American people and the U.N. a war was needed. Even the Soviet Union, who President Hussein had relied on in the past, aligned itself with the U.S. during this time.

As stated above, Fine's 7P's model does not provide a list of marketing tactics. This author has labeled President Bush's bold new stance as a marketing tactic. Because President Bush was not known to be a strong "persuader," to begin to make bold statements and initiate bold actions was a creative marketing tactic on his part. According to the polling data, this marketing tactic did work for President Bush as he launched the war with 55 percent of Americans supporting the war since Iraq did not leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991. In addition, 64 percent of Americans approved of the way President Bush was handling his job as president and 62 percent approved of how he was handling the situation in the Middle East. President Bush's job approval rating consistently stood between 58-64 percent throughout the two months prior to the war in January. According to the polling data, President Bush achieved the optimum mix discussed in Fine's model, albeit perhaps through some passive communication via President Hussein.

## Summary

While evidence suggests that President Bush did not need to launch a large-scale marketing campaign, he did need to market his war policy to increase public support and more importantly, he needed to maintain public support for several months. Initially the public was not supportive of using military force against Iraq. Many believed the use of economic sanctions would be enough, but President Bush did not want to stop there. He presented a marketing campaign that was initially passive. President Bush was able to take the rhetoric and aggressive actions of President Hussein (such as invading Kuwait, seizing Westerners in Iraq and Kuwait as hostages, and threatening to begin the war of all wars) and amplify their aggressiveness over the U.S. airwaves. At this point, President Hussein was aiding in increasing public support for war.

Even so, as President Bush and Congress could not come to an agreement on the budget, American's interests turned closer to home as they focused on increased taxes. During this time, public support for the war began to decrease. President Bush knew he needed to refocus the public's attention on the war to increase support. He began to actively market the war by speaking of the Middle East crisis at every opportunity, increasing troop deployments to the region, and suggesting he was saving the world from another world war. His bold new rhetoric along with the U.N.'s support increased the American public's support for war when providing the Iraqis with a January 15, 1991 deadline.

It is debatable whether it is accurate to state the public "supported" the Gulf War during the pre-war stage since it depends on how the question was worded. As this research has shown, the polling data suggests President Bush was unable to persuade an

increasing number of Americans that war was either desirable or necessary when asked if the situation in the Middle East was worth going to war over. While he may not have increased the support, he was able to maintain the 46-47 percent who favored going to war throughout the five month pre-war stage and kept that percentage from declining. In addition, when the public was asked if the situation in the Middle East remained the same after January 15, 1991, would they approve going to war, 55 percent approved. This was an increase from 36 percent. While some critics believe this was due to U.N. support, others believe it was President Bush's own change of marketing tactics, and still others give the credit to President Saddam Hussein who played the ultimate villain. It is important to take into account that American public opinion was extremely high in reference to President Bush and his policies. According to the polling data, President Bush had a high job approval rating and a high approval rating for how he was handling the situation in the Middle East. And, President Bush had U.N. and U.S. Congressional support. Even so, worth noting, that if the pre-war vote in Congress is taken to reflect public opinion, the U.S. entered the Vietnam War with wide support while it entered the Gulf War with support deeply divided, (Mueller, 1994). A further summary of the analysis of the marketing models and President Bush's marketing tactics is discussed in Chapter 7.

## **CHAPTER 5: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)**

This chapter will explore the pre-war strategic environment of President George W. Bush beginning with the attacks on September 11, 2001 and leading up to the beginning of military force in Iraq on March 30, 2003. The author will analyze how the strategic environment impacted the president's overall war policy marketing decisions and will identify the marketing tactics employed by President George W. Bush and will draw conclusions as to the overall success of his war policy marketing campaign.

### **Strategic Environment**

As noted in Chapter 4, understanding the pre-war strategic environment is the first step in formulating a marketing plan. For example, if high public support for a product already exists, a smaller scale marketing campaign may occur. Once the strategic environment is assessed, marketing strategies can be considered and a marketing plan can be formulated. In the context of this paper, the strategic environment consists of analyzing the threats, the president's objectives, and public opinion.



## **The Threat**

For President Bush, the strategic threats to be analyzed post 9-11-2001 were many. There was the threat of a second round of terrorist attacks in the U.S. or against one of its allies. There were the threats of impending military action in Afghanistan against the Taliban. There was the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), both at home with the Anthrax scare, and abroad with the possibility of such weapons finding their way into the hands of terrorist cells.

In relation to Iraq's potential WMD's, heated debates were being waged around these threats as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pushed for early war, while senior military officials were more cautious. Rumsfeld's supporters argued that President Saddam Hussein could initiate an attack at any time due to his aggressive behavior, his WMD program, and support of terrorism, while senior officers argued Iraq did not present an immediate threat to the U.S. (Bodansky, 2004). There was heated debate about the validity of the WMD information and the fact that the United Nations (U.N.) inspectors had found no evidence to suggest President Hussein and his regime were doing anything incriminating.

After months of marketing for a war against Iraq by the Bush administration and trying to get the U.N. to support the U.S. in this endeavor, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution in November 2002 that allowed weapons inspectors to go back into Iraq. The U.N. warned President Hussein that he needed to cooperate with the inspectors to avoid dire circumstances. After several months, the Bush administration became impatient that President Hussein was not in compliance with the Resolution and declared action must be taken. (Fritz, Keefer, & Nyhan, 2004).

In January 2003, Hans Blix continued to remind the U.N. Security Council that Iraq still had not provided any answers about their arms program to include the whereabouts of massive quantities of Anthrax. At the same time, Blix told reporters that no “smoking gun” had been discovered to demonstrate that Iraq had resumed any secret programs (Blix, 2003). As time went on, with no evidence, with the UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq supposedly operating without any resistance, and with Iraq stressing their cooperation to clear up any misconceptions, support from other countries for going to war against Iraq began to wane. By January 25, 2003 President Bush had a 77 percent approval rating, while American public support for sending U.S. ground troops into Iraq remained in the mid-fifties, at 54 percent, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

### **President’s Objective**

One of the factors that contribute to the overall strategic environment is the president’s objectives. At the beginning of the war, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined the objectives for OIF. (See Table 5.1)

**Table 5.1 OIF Objectives**

Priority	Objective
1	End the regime of Saddam Hussein.
2	Identify, isolate, and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
3	Search for, capture, and drive out terrorists from that country.
4	Collect such intelligence as we can relate to terrorists networks.
5	Collect such intelligence as we can relate to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction.
6	End sanctions and immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and many needy Iraqi citizens.
7	Secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people.
8	Help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.

(as cited in Spring, 2003)

The first five objectives were used by the Bush administration throughout the majority of its marketing campaign. Americans heard from President Bush and senior White House officials concerning the need for regime change in Iraq, WMD, and the connection to terrorism. The last three objectives were not utilized as often in the marketing campaign by the Bush administration.

**Public Opinion at the Pre-war Stage (prior to marketing)**

A review of the polling data after the September 11, 2001 attacks indicated to the Bush administration that it had public support for going to war against terrorists or those that supported them. Eighty-six percent of Americans viewed the 9-11 attacks as an act of war and 71 percent favored conducting military strikes against the responsible terrorist organization even if it took months to identify, (Moore, 2001). The moral compass was

clearly pointing in favor of military action against terrorists in Afghanistan, but against the leaders of Iraq?


In the aftermath of 9-11, the American public may have been eager to find links back to Iraq that may or may not have been real. Because Americans were in shock over the attacks on American soil, Scheer, Scheer, and Chaudhry (2003) state the American public believed attacks on Iraq were justified and openly trusted that removing President Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq would make the U.S. a safer place. In the pain of 9-11, many Americans had the moral justification they needed to conclude war with Iraq was the right thing to do. The Bush administration knew it must capitalize on the moral high ground by framing its “case for war in Iraq not as a war of choice, but as one of necessity to meet a ‘grave and growing threat,’” (Western, 2005, p. 104).

On September 20, 2001, George W. Bush spoke to Congress and the American people. He stated:

*Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time—now depends on us. Our nation—this generation—will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause, by our efforts and by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (as cited in Tanner, 2004)*

Some argued that this speech launched a “rallying around the flag” effect. During November 26-27, 2001, a Gallup poll showed that 74 percent supported using military force to remove President Hussein from power in Iraq, while 20 percent opposed. (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007.)

**Chart 5.1 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



Gallup Brain, Gallup News Service, Feb 11, 2003, accessed on 7 Oct, 2007

Even though Americans may have found moral justification, supported President Bush, and approved of how he was handling the job as president, they were still unwilling to invade Iraq without approval from the U.N. according to the polling data. Fifty-seven percent of Americans opposed initiating military action without a new U.N. vote, (Gallup Brain, February 7-9, 2003, accessed October 7, 2007). On February 8, 2003, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated:

*Unfortunately, Iraq still did not comply with all the obligations it accepted in 1991, under the terms of the cease-fire. In particular, it did not satisfy the Security Council that it had fully disarmed itself of weapons of mass destruction. This is not an issue for any State alone, but for the international community as a*

*whole. When States decide to use force, not in self-defense but to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations Security Council. (UN Press Release)*


After the release of the U.N. Secretary General's comments, American public support witnessed an increase from 58 percent to 63 percent, while President Bush's popularity remained high at 75 percent, (Gallup Brain, February 7-9, 2003 and February 9, 2003, accessed October 7, 2007). To say this increase in public support was due to Americans believing the U.N. Security Council may possibly vote to support the war based on the U.N. Secretary General's comments would be premature. Even so, polling evidence suggests American's did favor receiving approval from the U.N. prior to invading Iraq. This did not occur.

President Bush and his administration decided to move forward with war without a Security Council authorization from the UN for military action against Iraq. By March 15, 2003, less than five days out from the U.S. invasion of Iraq and with authorization from the U.N. for an invasion, 57 percent of Americans favored a U.S. attack with ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and George W. Bush was at a 76 percent job approval rating, (Gallup Brain, October 7, 2007). In addition, over half of the Americans polled, 55 percent, approved of how President Bush was handling the situation in Iraq. Based on the polling data at the time, President Bush had managed to successfully convince the majority of the American people to go to war with Iraq even though clear links to 9-11 were more speculative than real.

## Strategic Environment Summary

Without any new proof of a correlation between the September 11, 2001 attacks and Iraq, the Bush administration managed to receive the needed support of both the House and the Senate for the use of force in Iraq. He also managed to maintain the support of the majority of the American public, over a span of fifteen months, (Western, 2005 and Kull, Ramsay, & Lewis, 2003-2004). While the Bush administration failed to convince the U.N. Security Council to support an invasion of Iraq, this did not seem to affect the American support for war. Throughout the fifteen months, President Bush maintained public support for sending U.S. troops into war above fifty percent.

**Chart 5.2 Polling Data: Invading Iraq with U.S. Ground Troops**



Date	Favor	Oppose
2001 Nov 26-27	74	20
2002 Jun 17-19	61	31
2002 Aug 19-21	53	41
2002 Sep 13-16	57	39
2002 Oct 14-17	56	37
2002 Nov 22-24	58	37
2002 Dec 19-22	53	38
2003 Jan 23-25	52	43
2003 Feb 7-9	63	34

(Gallup Brain, accessed on October 7, 2007)


In fact, just ten days after the U.S. invaded Iraq, 63 percent of Americans approved of the way George W. Bush was handling the situation in Iraq, up from 55 percent; while 81 percent approved of how he was handling the job as president, which was an increase from 76 percent (Gallup Brain, March 30, 2003, accessed October 7,

2007). Although the underlying factors for wanting to remove Saddam Hussein from power may be unclear, no one can dispute the Bush Administration's marketing campaign at the pre-war stage was a resounding success. How was President Bush able to build such high support from both the public and political sectors? To examine how President Bush and his administration managed to accomplish this feat, the marketing tactics employed will be analyzed next.

### President's Marketing Plan

From a marketing perspective, the war policy environment spectrum shown earlier in this chapter shortly after the 9-11 attacks, suggests a clear moral impetus from the population such that the president would not need to spend much energy marketing to achieve high public and political support for military force.

### Chart 5.3 War Policy Environment Spectrum




Gallup Brain, Gallup News Service, Feb 11, 2003, accessed on 7 Oct, 2007

Unlike Pearl Harbor, where the enemy was very obvious, the ties between Iraq and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were more assumed than



clearly defined. Bush used the anger of the moment to his advantage. Attacking Afghanistan did not require significant marketing energy because al Qaeda was unequivocally linked as the enemy and Afghanistan was its base. Even so, instead of focusing on one country, President Bush wanted to tie into the anger focused on Afghanistan and use it to justify attacking Iraq. Outside of the terrorist attacks of 9-11 and the implications against al-Qaeda, justification for war with Iraq was weaker and would require President Bush to launch a large-scale marketing campaign to convince and maintain public support to go to war. One year after the initial wave of anger from the 9-11 attacks, the need for a marketing campaign was made evident as the same question shown in the chart above received quite different results.

#### **Chart 5.4 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



Gallup Brain, Gallup News Service, Feb 11, 2003, accessed on 7 Oct, 2007

After September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush and his national security advisors met daily to discuss how to respond to the attacks. Within a week, they had come to the conclusion, based on intelligence reports, that Iraq was not responsible for the attacks, (Western, 2005). According to Woodward, even though the evidence did not show a link between the attacks and Iraq, President Bush stated, “I believe Iraq was involved, but I’m not going to strike them now. I don’t have evidence at this point,” (as

cited in Western, 2005). Bush's administration knew that in addition to providing a link between the 2001 attacks and Iraq, it must also maintain the public's support for war while the U.S. military build-up took place.

"One of the basic features of democratic politics is that military force is not used without some consideration of the will of the public," (Western, 2005, p. 100). History has demonstrated that if Americans feel threatened, they will support going to war, though the majority of Americans prefer having U.N. support for war prior to military force. President Bush and his administration knew they must use various marketing tactics to maintain the public's support to include framing the case for war, selectively releasing classified information that helped their case, and making sure his administration presented a united front.

To establish the political and public support the Bush administration desired, it needed to launch an intensive marketing campaign to demonstrate to the House, Senate, U.N., and the American public that an actual link did exist between Iraq and the people who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. President Bush also took on the objective to convince the public that President Hussein must be ousted from power for the safety of the U.S. and the Middle East.

## **Tactics**

Based upon the pre-war strategic environment analysis, even without U.N. support, President Bush knew his job approval rating was high and support for sending troops into Iraq was above fifty percent. President Bush and his administration knew that with a "carefully crafted and executed public-relations campaign, they could mobilize

and sustain the public support necessary for taking on Saddam Hussein,” while allowing the necessary time for a military build-up in the region, (Western, 2005, p. 109). The administration had to carefully plan how to disseminate information to the public, since “public opinion is...highly dependent on the information the public receives,” (Ibid, p. 101). The President in particular plays a significant role in how the public perceives foreign events by the information he relays to the public. As stated above, after September 11, 2001, Bush’s administration knew it had the public’s support for going to war, but it also knew it had to maintain that support. To accomplish this, Bush’s administration knew it must develop a marketing plan to keep not only the support for war high, but also the president’s approval ratings. Based on the polling data, for a span of fifteen months, Bush’s administration conducted a successful marketing plan to keep the majority of Americans supporting him and the decision to go to war. Western (2005) states this was largely due to five factors:

- 1) the administration tightened control over the dissemination of national security information
- 2) the administration was largely united
- 3) the administration controlled the agenda and the timing of the debate
- 4) the administration framed the campaign to co-opt the argument of its leading opponents
- 5) the administration made arguments that it knew the public was willing to accept. (Western, 2005, p. 103-104)

President George W. Bush and his administration knew that the strategic environment following September 11, 2001, did not warrant initiating a pre-emptive war

against Iraq. The evidence linking Iraq to the attacks was nonexistent at this point. Even so, after the public's shock began to subside, Americans were ready to lash out and according to a Gallup poll taken between November 26-27, 2001, three-fourths of those polled (74 percent) approved using military ground force to remove President Hussein from power, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Even though the polling data demonstrated it had the public's support for war, the Bush administration knew it would take several months to coordinate an attack against Iraq. What it did not know, was how long the public's support could be sustained and "if that support for war would transfer from a hypothetical question to a real military deployment," (Western, 2005, p. 102).

The Bush administration knew that it needed time to allow for a military build-up in the region. To achieve that needed time, it would be necessary to keep the 9-11 attacks in the forefront of American's minds. In addition, the administration needed to leverage the moral justification it had created for conducting a pre-emptive strike against Iraq. And, finally the Bush administration had to prepare for how to maintain the high American public support with a possibility of no U.N. support for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq. To accomplish these feats, the Bush administration knew they had to develop a creative marketing campaign to demonstrate how dangerous President Saddam Hussein would be to the world if he were left in power in Iraq.

Applying a similar method as used in Chapter 4, the following sections will analyze how President Bush and his administration decided to actively market the war and utilize various marketing tactics to sway the public's opinion in regards to supporting its war policy. By applying the three marketing models discussed previously in chapter two; Philip Kotler's Demand States and Marketing Tactics, Theodore Levitt's Product

Life Cycle (PLC), and Seymour Fine's 7Ps an analysis based on the polling data was conducted to demonstrate which marketing models and tactics were successful for the Bush administration and which marketing models and tactics were unsuccessful.

### **Kotler's Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tactics**

Utilizing Kotler's (2000) Demand States and Marketing Tactics model, the first step the Bush administration needed to do was identify the strategic environment, or demand state. During the time immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the marketing environment for war policy against Iraq best fits into Kotler's demand state called *full demand*. The Bush administration was pleased with the public support for sending U.S. ground troops to Iraq. During November 26-27, 2001, 74 percent approved of sending U.S. ground troops to remove President Hussein from power, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Using Kotler's model for *full demand*, he recommends adopting tactics to maintain the current level of approval for war in Iraq. (See Table 5.2)

**Table 5.2: Kotler's Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person's needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	<b>Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business</b>	<b>Maintain current level</b>
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

The Bush administration knew it needed to protect the ambiguous connection of Iraq with terrorism and WMD's while it attempted to find factual evidence to convince Americans their security or way of life was in jeopardy. Beginning in November 2001, the administration began to release selective classified information to bolster its case for a pre-emptive attack on Iraq, (Western, 2005 and Kaufmann, 2004). Due to the president's high approval rating during this time, he was "given wide latitude and deference on national security issues" and "used the presidential bully pulpit" to market his war policy, (Western, 2005, p. 102-103). Bush's critics accused him and his administration of even trying to bully the intelligence agencies into creating significant conclusions to support going to war with Iraq, (Kaufmann, 2004). President Bush led the American people to believe he had access to classified information that confirmed Iraq had WMD's. Since the information was classified, the press did not have access to verify its accuracy. The Bush administration made unclassified exaggerated claims also, which could have easily been scrutinized by the media. Because the media limited its follow up on these exaggerated claims, in a sense, the media failed the American public prior to the war (Fritz, Keefer, & Nyhan, 2004 and Kaufmann, 2004).

On January 29, 2002, President Bush spoke to Congress and millions of American people as he delivered his State of the Union address. President Bush stated:

*North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.*

*Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.*

*The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens—leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.*

*States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. (as cited in Fritz, Keefer, & Nyhan, 2004)*

For many this address is known as the “axis of evil” speech. To some, this was President Bush’s first attempt to begin his marketing campaign for war in Iraq. The Bush administration knew it had to provide the missing link between President Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, or at least project the perception that a link existed, (Western, 2005). President Bush’s speechwriters developed the term “axis of evil” to deliberately convey that Iraq and al Qaeda were “linked, irrational, and containment would not work against either of them,” (Western, 2005, p. 109). The reaction to President Bush’s speech was exactly what his administration was hoping to accomplish. In a January 29, 2002,

CNN/USA Today poll, 90 percent of Americans believed the policies George W. Bush proposed would move the country in the right direction and 61 percent believed his proposals on how to deal with terrorism would be very effective, (Gallup Brain, accessed November 4, 2007). In addition, he had begun to link Iraq to the acquisition of WMD's. According to Kotler's model, the Bush administration so far was accomplishing its marketing goal by maintaining high public support for the president and his war policy.

Even so, as expected by the Bush administration, this support did not last. By the summer of 2002, as the Bush administration began to speak in more concrete terms, such as costs and logistics of going to war with Iraq, public support began to decline. In addition, the Bush administration no longer presented a united front. Secretary of State Colin Powell and other senior officials began to speak out about slowing down the move toward war with Iraq. By the end of summer 2002, "public support for invading Iraq began to drop: from a peak of 74 percent in November 2001 to....53 percent in late August 2002," (Western, 2005, p. 110). In addition, the public began to express concerns that the Bush administration had not made a clear enough case as to why it wanted to invade Iraq. Between August 5-8, 2002, 56 percent of Americans stated they had no "clear idea why the United States was considering new military action against Iraq," (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

At this point, President Bush's overall job ratings began to slip, but not significantly. He was still convincing well over 50 percent of Americans that he was doing a good job as President. A Gallup Poll conducted July 24, 2002, showed that 63 percent of the American people approved of how President Bush was handling his job as president, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).



On September 18, 2002, a Gallup Poll asked the question, “Would you favor or oppose invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power?” Sixty-four percent favored sending in U.S. ground troops to remove President Hussein, while 32 percent opposed. However, when asked if they felt it was “necessary to get a resolution of support from the Congress before attacking Iraq, 68 percent said “yes,” (Gallup Brain, September 2 – 4, 2002, accessed October 7, 2007). Even though the American public wanted the president to receive Congressional support, this did not affect their approval for how he was handling the situation. Seventy one percent of Americans still approved of the way George W. Bush was handling the situation in Iraq, (Gallup Brain, September 18, 2002, accessed October 7, 2007).

Even though support for the president and how he was handling the situation remained high, support for going to war was beginning to wane as Bush’s administration began to splinter. With Colin Powell wanting to slow down the movement toward war, many Americans began to question why the Bush administration wanted to invade Iraq. They did not believe the public was given a clear enough reason. Due to the decline in support, the Bush administration knew its current marketing tactics were no longer successful. According to Kotler’s marketing model, as demand for the war policy begins to decrease, continuing the same marketing tactic is no longer viable. The strategic environment must be analyzed once again. At this point on Kotler’s model, the strategic environment can now be described as *declining demand*. Public support is no longer demanding or highly supporting the war policy the Bush administration is offering. Kotler’s marketing task that must be initiated now is to reverse the decline in demand through creative remarketing. (See Table 5.3)

**Table 5.3: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	<b>Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product</b>	<b>Creative remarketing</b>
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business	Maintain current level
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

To accomplish this, President Bush knew he must first rally his administration to present a united front to the public. He also knew that according to the polling data, it was imperative that Colin Powell supported an invasion into Iraq. Moore stated “Powell was the most respected figure in the Bush administration: his own popular approval rating (88 percent in September 2002) routinely exceeded that of Bush (78 percent),” (as cited in Western, 2005).

To unify his administration, President Bush announced he would use his September 12, 2002 speech at the U.N. to point out the U.N. Security Council’s negligence in enforcing the sanctions against Iraq. This seemed to please both sides of his administration. Colin Powell had argued the president needed to address the U.N. to receive more international support for invading Iraq, while Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld argued an international coalition would be harmful to the U.S., (Western, 2005). By agreeing to speak with the U.N., but not directly requesting support from the U.N. for war, President Bush codified both sides. This new united front allowed the Bush

administration to creatively remarket their product by capitalizing on Colin Powell's popularity and known reluctance to rush into war.

In September 2002, Colin Powell, known to be cautious about supporting the Bush administration's war policy, now encouraged Congress to support the resolution to go to war stating, "...he believed that in order for diplomacy to have a chance, 'the threat of war has to be there,' (Woodward, as cited in Western, 2005, p. 118). Meanwhile, other senior officials were being booked on television news shows, so they could continue to reiterate to the American public about Iraq's WMD and terrorism links to al Qaeda.

In October, 2002, a joint resolution, which was signed by President George W. Bush and approved by Congress, authorized the use of military force to defend the U.S. against Iraq if Saddam Hussein did not disarm. While Americans polled stated Congressional support was necessary prior to any attack against Iraq, (68 percent said it was necessary between September 2-4, 2002) polling data shows that after Congress granted authorization for the use of military force, those who favored the use of U.S. ground troops actually dropped one percent to 63 percent, (Gallup Brain, November 10, 2002, accessed October 7, 2007). Even with the one percent decrease, the majority of Americans still supported invading Iraq. Although the public seemed to be on board with President Bush's war policy, according to the polls, the public still wanted international support. Only four out of 10 Americans supported the U.S. invading Iraq without a new vote from the U.N. Security Council authorizing the use of U.S. ground troops, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7 2007).

After receiving the support of Congress, Colin Powell turned his attention to the U.N. After three weeks, he had successfully convinced the Security Council to pass a

new resolution stating, “Iraq was in material breach of its disarmament obligations,” and established January 27, 2003 as the due date for Iraq’s report, (Western, 2005, p. 123).

As Bush’s administration began to represent a united front, the strategic environment began to change yet again. Using Kotler’s model, the demand state was now at *full demand* as the public, Congress, and U.N. now seemed to be supporting President Bush’s war policy. (See Table 5.4)

**Table 5.4: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	<b>Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business</b>	<b>Maintain current level</b>
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

In addition, Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke to the U.N. Security Council on February 6, 2003, in hopes of increasing support for an Iraq invasion. He went with images, voice tapes of conversations between high Iraqi officials, and statements from Iraqi defectors. All of this information projected that Iraq had no intention of disarming. Even though he seemed to have alarming evidence against Iraq, many members of the U.N. Security Council still believed the Bush administration was trying to rush an invasion and wanted to give the inspectors more time, (Weisman, 2003). While Colin Powell’s speech failed to gain the support of all the U.N. Security Council members to

allow for military action against Iraq, it did rally Americans and increase America’s public support from a 58 percent approval rating between January 31 - February 2, 2003 for invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops to 63 percent between February 7 – February 9, 2003, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

**Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

Utilizing the same OIF examples above for consistency in analyzing the three marketing models, Levitt’s PLC will now be applied to the Bush administration’s marketing plan. Levitt’s PLC model states that products tend to follow a cycle of life with a *beginning, growth, maturity, and decline*. Associated with each stage are recommendations for maximizing demand in each phase of the product or policy’s life.

**Table 5.5: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

The PLC model states that in stage one, *market development*, a new product is developed and brought to the public before the public knows “it needs the product.” The correlating marketing tactic states the president must now create a need for the war policy. In some cases, demand may already exist. In this case, the *market development*

stage takes far less time than it otherwise would. The product would move quickly to the growth stage.

Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, President Bush and his administration were holding discussions about Iraq's responsibility in the attacks to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. They knew they needed to develop a link between the two before the public would support an invasion. The State of the Union Address was the perfect vehicle to accomplish this by introducing the term "axis of evil" and the possibility of war with Iraq. President Bush began to plant the seed that this would be necessary to extinguish the potential threat to Americans, which he claimed Saddam Hussein intended to carry out.

As the Bush administration's war policy marketing campaign began to increase in intensity, approval for an invasion into Iraq began to also increase. This is known as Stage two, *market growth*, of the PLC model and can be called the "Takeoff Stage." The marketing tactics to be implemented take on a more direct approach. The president must now convince the public to prefer his framing of the war policy and support his policy over the opposition. (See Table 5.6) During November 26-27, 2001, Americans in favor of "invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power" was at a 74 percent approval rating, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). As President Bush's job approval ratings increased, he used his popularity to stand at a "bully pulpit" and at every opportunity he spoke of the necessity to curb Iraq's threats to Americans.

**Table 5.6: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

Stages	Correlated Marketing Tasks
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
<b>Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”</b>	<b>Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors</b>
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

While this strategy seemed to be working at first, senior officials, such as Colin Powell, began to express concerns about going to war with Iraq. These concerns began to slow the war process down and stage three--market maturity, began to take affect. According to Levitt’s model, it is assumed that since the war policy has made it successfully through stages one and two, *introduction and growth*, the public did support the war policy. Even so, in stage three, *market maturity*, as the public begins to learn more about the war policy, hear opposition, and perhaps realize going to war with Iraq is no longer just talk, questions begin to arise as to whether this war policy is one deserving of public support. During this stage public support for the war policy should peak, then begin to decline. (See Table 5.7) The demand for war in Iraq had already peaked during November 26-27, 2001 with a 74 percent approval rating and was beginning to decline, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). During June 17-19, 2002, those who favored going to war had decreased to 61 percent, and by the end of August 19-21, 2002, only 53 percent favored invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops, a drop of 21 percent over a nine month period, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

**Table 5.7: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
<b>Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline</b>	<b>Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important</b>
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

The marketing tactic in Levitt’s PLC model that is crucial during stage three is communication. The president must communicate directly with the public and identify any new information about his proposed war policy. At this point, the Bush administration re-evaluated its marketing plan and knew there were flaws. President Bush knew he had to unite his administration, get Colin Powell on-board, receive Congressional support for the use of military support, and try to achieve U.N. support. President Bush was able to accomplish three of the four. The U.N. did not support using military force to invade Iraq. However, as the polls demonstrated, the U.N. support did not deter the public support in the U.S. After Colin Powell’s speech to the U.N. public support in the U.S. rose from a 58 percent approval rating between January 31 - February 2, 2003 for invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops to 63 percent between February 7 – February 9, 2003, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Instead of the war policy declining as Levitt’s PLC stage four suggests, the war policy to invade Iraq had now returned to stage two as demand began to accelerate once again.



## Fine's 7P's

Unlike the previous two models discussed, Fine's 7P's model focuses on creating a marketing plan, rather than correlating various stages or demand states with marketing tactics. Fine's model focuses on achieving the optimum mix by allocating resources efficiently. By achieving the optimum mix, this in turn will increase the public's support for the war policy.

To create a marketing plan for the Bush administration, the questions posed in Fine's 7P model must first be answered. The questions after each "P" are answered in Table 5.8 below.

**Table 5.8: Fine's 7P's Model**

	<b>7P's</b>	<b>Answers</b>	<b>Further defining questions for 7P's</b>
1	Producer	President and his administration	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	American citizens	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	War policy	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	Nation going to war with possibly high casualties and high monetary costs	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	Promote	Marketing tactics	How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?
6	Place	Administration; Media channels	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	Polling data	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer's campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

This author did not list the U.N. along with the American citizens as a purchaser of the plan, because the Bush administration did not intend to market the war policy to receive U.N. support prior to going to war. President Bush used his speech to the U.N. to unify

his administration and get Colin Powell on-board to support the war policy. The Bush administration wanted the American public's support.

Examining the answers provided, Fine's fifth "P" *promotion* is where the marketing tactics would be devised in his 7P model. Fine (1990) asks, "How can the marketer promote (communicate with) the given market," (p. 5)? In other words, how can the president market his war policy effectively to the American people? Communicating the war policy effectively is crucial to achieving the support the administration desired. Communication means more than just writing a pertinent "axis of evil" speech. Communication includes who delivers the speech (President Bush or one of his senior officials), how the speech is delivered (which words are emphasized), what is actually said or left unsaid, where the communication or speech takes place (location and audience), when the speech occurs, and why the speech is taking place. These are all factors the Bush administration took into account when developing its war policy marketing campaign.

From the very beginning when President Bush spoke of the "axis of evil" he was beginning to plant the seed that Iraq was connected to al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein was irrational, and there was a grave threat to national security as long as President Hussein remained in power. This speech aided in launching the Bush administration's marketing campaign. It was the State of the Union Address given by the president after the September 11, 2001 attacks, with the majority of Americans watching while he emphasized the term "axis of evil" and rallied the public by stating we would not sit idly by and allow others to attack us on U.S. soil.

When the administration began to splinter, with Colin Powell trying to slow the process of war, the public took note. Meanwhile, other senior officials, such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz began to use the morning news programs, newspapers, and speeches to promote the invasion of Iraq. As this divided communication was broadcast to the public, the polls noted a significant decrease in support for war with Iraq. The messenger was now noted as playing a large role in the communication marketing campaign. Due to Colin Powell's high approval ratings, the public chose to support Colin Powell's message and were no longer as eager to go to war now that it knew Colin Powell was not supporting the war policy.

The Bush administration knew to maintain the desired public support for its war policy it must present a unified front, with President Bush's senior officials all communicating the same message. President Bush used a speech to the U.N. to unify and codify his administration. Because Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld were divided about the need of the U.N., President Bush knew if he spoke with the U.N. about Iraq, this would unite his senior officials. However, while Colin Powell wanted President Bush to request U.N. support for going to war, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld believed the U.N. would hamper the United States' interests, (Western, 2005). While President Bush agreed to speak with the U.N., what he did not say to the U.N. was more important. He did not request U.N. support for a U.S. invasion of Iraq. He chose instead to speak about the U.N.'s resolutions against Iraq and encourage the U.N. to hold Saddam Hussein responsible. This gave the impression to the public that President Bush was indeed trying to bring in U.N. support for a U.S. invasion even though that was not the intent of the Bush administration. This U.N. speech did achieve President Bush's goal

in uniting his administration, which was now able to capitalize on Colin Powell's popularity and known caution to use military force.

After this unification of the Bush administration, Colin Powell spoke with Congress and in October 2002, both the House and the Senate approved President Bush using military force. Colin Powell turned his attention to the U.N. Within three weeks, the U.N. had agreed to give Saddam Hussein a deadline for an "initial inspections report," (Western, 2005, p. 124). By establishing the deadline, Colin Powell asserted that the majority of the world was now supporting President Bush's war policy. The public took note and during November 8-10, 2002, those approving invading Iraq rose 5 percent to 59 percent, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 2007).

While the polls were showing the communication tactics were working, the polls were also demonstrating the public wanted the Bush administration to work with the U.N. That included letting the U.N. inspectors have more time and even a possible second U.N. resolution. The Bush administration was not sure how long they could maintain the public's support for war if they continued to hold off invading Iraq. Woodward (2004) states Bush's senior advisors devised a plan to send Colin Powell to the U.N. as the messenger to sell the war policy to the U.N. Using Colin Powell's cautiousness toward war they believed this would add more credibility to the message and encourage those with doubts to support the invasion of Iraq.

Even though Colin Powell failed to receive the intended U.N. support, he did succeed in remobilizing America's support. After his speech to the U.N., those who favored invading Iraq with U.S. ground forces rose from 58 percent during January 31-

February 2, 2002 to 63 percent during February 7-9, 2002, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

While the *promotion* via communication tactics seemed to be a resounding success, and when measured using the polling data, President Bush and his administration did have America's support for his war policy. The one missing "P" that President Bush and his administration failed to communicate was the *price* the Nation would ultimately pay in casualties and monetary costs.

## **Summary**

Defining the strategic environment is the crucial first step prior to deciding on a marketing plan or employing marketing tactics. Once the strategic environment was defined, the president's marketing plan and tactics were discussed. Utilizing the three marketing models, the author analyzed how each model's marketing tactics were employed by the Bush administration to achieve the desired public support for the invasion of Iraq. To provide consistency for the research, the same marketing examples were used for each marketing model. This allowed the author to maintain the same dates for the polling data and compare whether the marketing tactics in each model affected the overall marketing plan. Once a marketing tactic was employed, the polling data was checked to see if this tactic increased the public's support. If it increased, the marketing tactic was seen as being successful. If the public's support decreased, the marketing tactic was seen as unsuccessful and was changed.


The three marketing models aided in describing the marketing campaign President Bush and his administration launched to receive the support for the invasion of Iraq.

While the three models are very different on the surface, they each have their own strengths and weaknesses along with some underlying similarities. A further summary of the analysis of the marketing models and the Bush administration's tactics is discussed in Chapter 7.

## CHAPTER 6: ADDITIONAL CASE STUDIES

The author used a most similar systems (MSS) research design to compare the marketing tactics used for the two case studies, Desert Storm and OIF in chapters four and five respectively. This chapter will provide brief discussions of the marketing implications involved with three other U.S. conflicts: Afghanistan in 2001, World War II, and Kosovo. In analyzing the wars of Iraq and the wars mentioned above within the context of war policy marketing, this author finds it useful to classify these wars within the war policy environment spectrum outlined in Chapter 1.

**Chart 6.1 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



The classification of wars begins with those that fall to the far left of the spectrum and which this author labels *wars of retaliation*. Such wars include Afghanistan and World War II. Public support becomes instantaneous and is energized with emotion. In

such instances, the war policy drafted by a president follows after the nation is realistically already at war. The marketing of such a war is designed more to maintain the fervor while the military ramps up to engage than to convince the public that the war is necessary.

The other classification this author finds useful, are the wars that fall to the center and right of the spectrum. This author refers to such wars as *wars of objective*. These wars are fought for strategic objectives outlined by the president's administration and require marketing. A subset of *wars of objective* is *wars of humanitarian assistance*. The key distinction for these wars is the fact that they are undertaken without any real threat to the national border or national interests. Such wars include the first Iraq war and the war in Kosovo. Although one could argue that the first Iraq war involved an attack on U.S. interests (oil infrastructure), in large part, the U.S. and its economy were in little physical danger. In the first Iraq war, the outlined objective was to respond to aggression by Iraq against Kuwait and to ultimately restore Kuwait from Iraq's grasp. In Kosovo, the U.S. objective played into a humanitarian effort to subdue perceived atrocities. As in Desert Storm, the U.S. was not in any physical danger. Marketing campaigns are essential for this type of war. For a president to convince the population that the nation's military must act when there is little threat to national integrity or national treasure, the war policy objective must be clearly stated as a moral imperative.

Another subset of *wars of objective* this author finds useful to classify is those that involve a perceived international danger or threat to national interests. This author labels this type of war a *war of threat*. Examples of the *war of threat* include the second Iraq war and the Cold War. In the second Iraq war, President Bush led the nation to war on



the premise that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that we were in the cross hairs of their use. The fact that the nation had been involved in an incident involving anthrax after the attacks on 9-11 only helped shape the message regardless of any proof. During the Cold War, although troops and weapons were committed in proxy to other parts of the world, the overpowering message was that the Soviet Union's arsenal of weapons represented a clear and present danger to the existence of the U.S. Some might argue that the Cold War was in fact the premier *marketing war*. War policy marketing for this type of war requires a substantial marketing campaign that tends to rely heavily on threats and fear. If a president has solid facts, the marketing case is made much easier as in the Cuban Missile crisis with the satellite photos showing very clearly the USSR missile tubes. In the second Iraq war, the president didn't have the "smoking gun" he needed to clinch the deal so his message played heavily on the "almost smoking gun". The president's marketing campaign was certainly aided by the fact that he was riding a wave of emotional anger after the 9-11 attacks.

### **Afghanistan**

After the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, many Americans were in shock. After the initial shock subsided, Americans wanted retribution. Throughout the month of September, 90 percent of Americans favored retaliatory military action in Afghanistan, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). Sixty-nine percent of Americans felt so strongly about retaliating for the unprovoked attacks that they were willing to support a long-term war which could result in large numbers of U.S. military casualties, (Ibid). Eighty-five percent supported attacks

against Afghanistan if they did not turn Osama bin Laden over to the U.S., (Ibid). Ninety-one percent believed that destroying terrorist operations in Afghanistan was a very important goal and 83 percent believed destroying terrorist operations outside Afghanistan was another important goal, (Ibid).

The polling data shows a strong indication that the American public supported going to war. The moral justification for the war was clearly defined—we were attacked on our own soil and now the American public wanted to retaliate. By utilizing the war policy environment spectrum, this author suggests the Afghanistan war fell to the far left of the spectrum as a *war of retaliation*. This would indicate that President George W. Bush did not have to launch a large-scale marketing plan to increase public support for going to war with Afghanistan. The American people had already rallied around him and were ready for war against those who were responsible.

Utilizing Kotler's demand states model, since 90 percent of the American public supported going to war with Afghanistan, the demand state that best represents this scenario is *full demand*. According to Kotler (2000), the correlated marketing tactic is to maintain the current level of support for the war policy. (See Table 6.1)

**Table 6.1: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	<b>Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business</b>	<b>Maintain current level</b>
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

On September 20, 2001, George W. Bush spoke to Congress and the American people. Some argued this speech launched a “rallying around the flag” effect and aided President Bush in maintaining the public’s support and fervor for going to war throughout September. President Bush launched the war on October 7, 2001, with 90 percent of Americans supporting his decision.

While only one of Kotler’s demand states was utilized during the pre-war marketing environment, Levitt’s product life cycle (PLC) model utilized two stages. President Bush’s war policy experienced a quick introduction in stage one, *market development*, and almost immediately transitioned to stage two, *market growth*, as public support for war greatly accelerated to 90 percent. This is known as the “takeoff stage.” Since the pre-war timeframe was relatively short, approximately one month, the other two stages of the PLC model, *market maturity and market decline*, of the PLC model did not emerge. (See Table 6.2)

**Table 6.2: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

Stages	Correlated Marketing Tasks
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
<b>Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”</b>	<b>Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors</b>
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

Even though Kotler’s and Levitt’s models did not enter every stage during the pre-war timeframe, Fine’s 7P’s questions can all be answered in his model. (See Table 6.3)

**Table 6.3: Fine’s 7P’s Model**

	7P’s	Answers	Further defining questions for 7P’s
1	Producer	President	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	American public	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	War policy	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	Casualties	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	Promote	Marketing tactics	How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?
6	Place	Administration; Media channels	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	Polling data	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer’s campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

As stated previously, Fine’s model focuses on communicating the war policy to the public by using various marketing tactics under his fifth “P”-- *promote*. After President Bush informed the public that the terrorists responsible for the 9-11 attacks

were in Afghanistan, the American public fully supported going to war against Afghanistan. At this point, President Bush needed to maintain the high emotional fervor of the public until an attack was launched. With 90 percent of Americans supporting a war with Afghanistan, President Bush launched the war against Afghanistan.

This author suggests that if President Bush had taken into account the war policy environment spectrum, he could readily see he did not need to launch a large-scale marketing campaign since the war was provoked and on U.S. territory. The author further suggests that even though a large-scale marketing campaign was not initiated, the three marketing models can be utilized to see what stages and demand states the war policy experienced, along with the associated marketing tactics. In addition, Fine's model provided an overall marketing plan which focused on communication. President Bush's speech was used to keep encouraging Americans, and keep the public's support high for a retaliatory strike against Afghanistan. While on the surface it may seem as if World War II would produce the same results as the war in Afghanistan because of Pearl Harbor, there were differences.

## **World War II**


Unlike the war with Afghanistan, which the U.S. launched, World War II was well under way prior to any U.S. involvement. In fact, the American public did not support getting involved with World War II. On November 30, 1940, 80 percent of Americans polled favored the U.S. staying out of the war against Germany and Italy, (Gallup Brain, accessed (October 7, 2007)). While Americans were willing to do everything they could to aid their England and France allies, there was a limit to their

support. In a poll taken on September 17, 1940, 76 percent of Americans favored doing everything possible to provide aid, except going to war, (Ibid). At this point, while Germany was taking over Europe, Americans had not attached a moral justification to the war to provide a strong enough reason to send U.S. troops to help. President Roosevelt did not feel compelled to intervene in the war and did not try to sell the war to the American people, until December 7, 1941 when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

After the pre-emptive attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans were no longer deciding whether they wanted to support allies by getting involved with the war, now they wanted to get involved to retaliate for the pre-emptive strikes on U.S. territory. Americans now had a moral justification to attach to their entry into the war. On December 10, 1941, 90 percent of Americans voted yes when asked if President Roosevelt should ask Congress to declare war on Germany and Japan, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

Because the attack on Pearl Harbor was a pre-emptive strike, by utilizing the war policy environment spectrum, this author suggests, post-Pearl Harbor World War II would lie to the far left of the spectrum labeled as a *war of retaliation*.

**Chart 6.2 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



This would mean the president already had high public support for going to war and little to no marketing would be required.

Utilizing Kotler’s model, the pre-war environment prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, could be described as *no demand* since 76 percent of Americans did not favor going to war. While Kotler states the associated marketing task would be to connect benefits of the war policy with the public’s needs and interests, since President Roosevelt had no desire to go to war, he did not try to convince the American people to support the U.S. getting involved in the war. (See Table 6.4)

**Table 6.4: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	<b>No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product</b>	<b>Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests</b>
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business	Maintain current level
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

After Pearl Harbor was attacked this changed. Ninety percent of Americans supported going to war. According to Kotler’s model, the demand state would now be

considered *full demand*. President Roosevelt’s marketing tactic would consist of maintaining the current level of public support for war. (See Table 6.5)

**Table 6.5: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	<b>Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business</b>	<b>Maintain current level</b>
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

While Kotler’s model can be used for both pre- and post-Pearl Harbor, the PLC model would be utilized post-Pearl Harbor, due to the fact President Roosevelt did not have a war policy to introduce and market that committed U.S. troops to war prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. As with Afghanistan, stage one, *market development*, was brief due to the pre-emptive nature of the strike. The war policy quickly moved to stage two, *market growth*, where it accelerated to receive 90 percent of the public’s support. The president’s war policy did not reach stage three, *market maturity*, or stage four, *market decline*, due to the brief pre-war timeframe. (See Table 6.6)



**Table 6.6: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

Stages	Correlated Marketing Tasks
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
<b>Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”</b>	<b>Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors</b>
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

While Kotler’s demand states and Levitt’s PLC stages for World War II (post-Pearl Harbor) did not all occur during the pre-war environment, as with Afghanistan, Fine’s 7P’s can all be answered. (See Table 6.7)

**Table 6.7: Fine’s 7P’s Model**

	7P’s	Answers	Further defining questions for 7P’s
1	Producer	President	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	American public	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	War policy	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	Casualties and monetary	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	Promote	Marketing tactics	How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?
6	Place	Administration, Media channels	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	Polling data	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer’s campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

Since President Roosevelt had 90 percent of Americans supporting his war policy, he did not need to launch a large-scale marketing campaign. Americans had been

provided a moral justification for the war since it was a pre-emptive attack on U.S. territory. President Roosevelt was able to maintain the high public support as he took the nation into war.

As stated, this author suggests that if President Roosevelt utilized the war policy environment spectrum, he would be able to identify the type of marketing campaign he needed for his war policy. And, as history has shown, when the U.S. is attacked, Americans tend to rally around the president and support his policies. This was evidenced in both Afghanistan and World War II. While these two wars do seem to be similar, the war in Kosovo is quite different and will be discussed next.


### **Kosovo**

As stated above Afghanistan and post-Pearl Harbor World War II could be considered *wars of retaliation*, while Kosovo is a *war of objective*. This would mean unlike Afghanistan and Pearl Harbor, the Kosovo war did not present a real threat to the U.S. President Clinton needed to market the Kosovo war and convince the American public a moral injustice was occurring to receive the public's support for his war policy.

On October 9, 1998, 41 percent of Americans believed President Clinton should conduct military air strikes, while 40 percent believed the president should not conduct military air strikes, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007). As war grew closer, America's support continued to wane. During February 19-21, 1999, approximately one month out from the beginning of the war, 45 percent of Americans now opposed the U.S. being part of military action in Kosovo, (Ibid). Because public support for war was declining, and President Clinton wanted to send U.S. troops to war in Kosovo, this author

suggests that utilizing the war policy environment spectrum, Kosovo fell to the right of the spectrum.

**Chart 6.3 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



This means President Clinton needed to launch a marketing campaign to sell the war in Kosovo to the American public.

Since President Clinton did not have public support for going to war, the demand state in Kotler’s (2000) model could be labeled *no demand* as with pre-Pearl Harbor, World War II. According to Kotler (2000), President Clinton needed to connect the benefits to going to war with the public. This meant a moral justification needed to be established. (See Table 6.8)

**Table 6.8: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	<b>No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product</b>	<b>Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests</b>
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand-Not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business	Maintain current level
7	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand-Doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

To accomplish this, President Clinton tried to appeal to the moral side of Americans by labeling Kosovo as another Holocaust. The Clinton administration referred to the thousands of people being killed and displaced due to the Serbs. In addition, news channels displayed thousands of Kosovo refugees fleeing the country. Even so, this did not sway the American public’s view. Critics stated President Clinton wanted to push for war to make sure Kosovo did not become a factor in the upcoming election, (Muravchik, 1999). Others state, President Clinton may have felt compelled to act, due to guilt over his decision not to get involved with the war in Bosnia. Whatever the case, President Clinton’s marketing tactics did not work. He launched the war without convincing the American public that war was necessary.

According to Levitt’s (1965) PLC model, President Clinton’s war policy marketing campaign reached Stage 4 without entering Stage 2 or 3. President Clinton was unable to create public support for his war policy or to remarket the war as another

Holocaust and sell that version to the American public. Due to his failing marketing campaign his war policy never experienced a “take-off stage.” (See Table 6.9)

**Table 6.9: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
<b>Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal</b>	<b>Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs</b>

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

The difference between marketing a product with this type of support and a war policy is that the product would be allowed to basically fade away if the consumer consistently chose not to purchase the product. President Clinton did not want this to happen with his war policy. He did not want Kosovo to interfere with his re-election campaign. Even though he tried creative remarketing by stating the war in Kosovo was another Holocaust the American public did not buy into his marketing campaign. According to the polling data, America did not support getting involved with a war that did not present a real threat to the U.S. And, as hard as the Clinton administration tried to present a moral justification for the war, the public was not buying the sales campaign. As a result, President Clinton sent U.S. troops to war in Kosovo against the Serbs without the support of the American public.

Utilizing Fine's (1990) 7P's model, focusing on question number five, which is *promoting* the war through communication, President Clinton tried to communicate that horrible crimes against humanity were occurring to thousands of Kosovars to provide Americans with a moral justification. (See Table 6.10)

**Table 6.10: Fine's 7P's Model**

	<b>7P's</b>	<b>Answers</b>	<b>Further defining questions for 7P's</b>
1	Producer	President	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	American public	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	War policy	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	Casualties and monetary	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	Promote	Marketing tactics	How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?
6	Place	Administration, Media channels	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	Polling data	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer's campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

Even so, as stated previously, Americans did not buy into President Clinton's rhetoric. In essence, his marketing plan and campaign were a failure. Even though he tried changing his marketing tactics, this did not aid in achieving the increased public support for the war. He launched the war with less than 50 percent of the American public supporting it, (Gallup Brain, accessed October 7, 2007).

## **Summary**

As with any product marketing campaign, there will be successes and failures. War policy marketing is no different. The conflicts which fall to the left of the war policy environment spectrum, such as Afghanistan and Pearl Harbor, are *wars of retaliation*.

Neither president during either conflict needed to launch a large-scale marketing campaign. The role of the president during these types of conflicts would be to maintain the support and fervor while ramping up for a retaliatory response.

The author suggests that *wars of objective* fall to the right of the war policy environment spectrum. Desert Storm and Kosovo are *wars of humanitarian assistance*, which is a subset of *wars of objective* and require marketing. The author suggests that OIF and the Cold War, are *wars of threat*, which are also a subset of *wars of objective*. Through the use of a marketing campaign the president sells the humanitarian need or threat to the American public to receive their support for war. This is accomplished through a rigorous marketing campaign as discussed in chapters four and five respectively.

While both the *wars of threat* and *wars of humanitarian assistance* require marketing, the difference lies in the marketing message. For the wars of threat, the message is very clear—the president sells the threat to the U.S.—whether that threat is factual (Cold War) or fabricated (OIF) by the administration. The object of the marketing campaign is to convince the American public the freedom of America is at stake.

In dealing with the *wars of humanitarian assistance*, the message is not as clear. The author suggests these wars do not present a real threat to national borders or national interests. While they do require a marketing campaign, rather than focusing on a threat, the author suggests the president's policy objective must create a moral justification for the American public to support sending U.S. troops to war. President George H. W. Bush was aided by President Saddam Hussein in providing that moral justification. President Hussein's erratic actions such as seizing American hostages, threatening Israel, and

threatening to begin World War III, aided President Bush in presenting a moral justification to the American people.

Unlike President George H. W. Bush, President Clinton did not have a belligerent villain spouting threatening rhetoric to aid in his marketing campaign. Even so, the Clinton administration knew they needed to convince the American public a great injustice was being done to thousands of Kosovars. By trying to capitalize on the American public's moral sense of injustice, the Clinton administration tried to creatively remarket the war to instill a moral responsibility within the American people. Even though President Clinton tried to remarket the war, according to the polling data, the American public was still not interested in sending U.S. troops to war in Kosovo. This did not deter President Clinton. He chose to send American troops without public support. While it may be easier to launch a war with the approval of the public, as demonstrated, not all wars are readily supported by Americans. Since this research focused on the pre-war environment, to discuss the repercussions, if any, by the American public of President Clinton's actions are outside the timeframe, but can be used for future research.



## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION**

This chapter will provide a summary of the hypotheses tested and will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the three marketing models, Kotler's Demand States, Levitt's Product Life Cycle, and Fine's 7P's, which were utilized in the research. A new model specific to war policy marketing will be proposed, and the chapter will end with suggestions for future research.

### **Summary of Hypotheses Testing**

Utilizing three product marketing models, Kotler's states of demand, Levitt's product life cycle, and Fine's 7P's, the author analyzed how various product marketing tactics could be used by the president to market a war policy. Using the Most Similar Systems (MSS) research design, the author chose Desert Storm and OIF as the two case studies to analyze due to their similarities, which were used as control factors. Using polling data the author distinguished whether each marketing tactic was effective. As the public's support decreased, the marketing tactic was seen as no longer being viable. If the public's support increased, the marketing tactic was considered successful.

Comparing two cases that were similar allowed for control factors: 1) both wars were fought within the past two decades, 2) both wars are/were between the U.S. and Iraq, 3) both were fought outside the U.S., and 4) both were fought with voluntary U.S.

military forces. The dissimilarities (marketing tactics) were analyzed to distinguish a causal factor for the increase of public support for war.

Utilizing the three marketing models, the author was able to identify the various marketing tactics each president employed to receive support for their respective war policies against Iraq. While the three models are very different on the surface, they each have their own strengths and weaknesses along with some underlying similarities. To begin with, they all assume effective communication will accompany the marketing plan. In addition, the assumption is that while each model is separated into various stages, states, and questions, all products will fit somewhere into the respective model. Also, each of the models can be adapted to ideas, such as a war policy and not just a tangible product.

Even though there are a few similarities between the marketing models, the dissimilarities are greater. Utilizing Kotler's model, the author had to first describe then define the strategic environment. Once this was accomplished, Kotler's model provided associated marketing tactics, which applied to how the Bush administration marketed the war. Even though Kotler's marketing model offered eight demand states, it is imperative with this model that the correct demand state be identified since the marketing tactics are correlated to each state of demand. For example, since the public originally supported war with Iraq in OIF, this author defined the strategic environment (demand state) as *full demand*. However, as support began to decrease, the strategic environment had to be re-evaluated and was defined as *declining demand*.

Kotler's demand states can be very subjective. Since a specific percentile is not established the author had to decide when the strategic environment needed to be re-evaluated. This occurs with both Kotler's and Levitt's models. They are both devoid of a measurement system to let the marketer know when they should advance to the next stage or re-evaluate the strategic environment. For example, if 46 percent of the people support the war policy and it drops to 43 percent, do you re-evaluate at this point, or do you wait until it has continuously declined over a specific period of time?

In addition, with Kotler's model, depending on how the polling data is being interpreted for the specific research questions, will depend on how the demand state is identified. For example, one research question may increase with popularity, while a similar research question's data may decline. Is there a possibility of overlapping two strategic environments if the public support is inconsistent between the research questions?

Finally, while Kotler provides correlated marketing tasks or tactics for each demand state, the specific lists of marketing tasks to accomplish are often subjective, i.e. *full demand* lists maintain demand as the marketing task. To maintain demand, President George W. Bush's administration utilized various marketing tasks, such as declassifying information, sending popular senior officials to speak, and providing false information for OIF. While this author defines these as marketing tactics to maintain demand, others may not.

All of Kotler's eight demand states did not occur during the pre-war five month time span for Desert Storm or for the pre-war fifteen month time span for OIF. Desert Storm started with *no demand* for the war policy, changed to *full demand* as public

support increased, then as support decreased the strategic environment was labeled *declining demand*. Through the use of creative marketing, President George H. W. Bush was able to increase the public's support and the strategic environment went back to *full demand*. OIF started with a *full demand* strategic environment because at the outset the public supported the war policy. As support began to wane, the strategic environment was changed to *declining demand*. President George W. Bush used creative remarketing, which resulted in an increase in the public's support for his war policy. At this point, the strategic environment was re-evaluated and returned to *full demand*.

This author noted that even though Kotler's model provided eight demand states, only three (*no demand, full demand, and declining demand*) seemed to be applicable to marketing Desert Storm and OIF war policies. (See Table 7.1) In addition, this author suggests that *irregular demand* and *unwholesome demand* are more adaptable to products, than war policy. *Irregular demand* means the American public did not make a constant demand for the product, but through the use of incentives, the marketers were able to increase the demand. This did not seem applicable since incentives were not offered to the American public. *Unwholesome demand* refers to convincing the public to give up something they enjoy, but that is not good for them. Once again, this did not seem applicable since neither administration was trying to convince the public to give anything up.

While the other three states of demand: *negative demand, latent demand, and overfull demand* could be applied to marketing a war policy, this author suggests they did not occur with Desert Storm or OIF. (See Table 7.1)

**Table 7.1: Kotler’s Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand—no one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand—unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person’s needs and interests
3	Latent Demand—many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by an existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand—reduction for the demand of a product	Creative remarketing
5	Irregular Demand—not making constant demands	Use various incentives
6	Full Demand—organization is pleased with the demand	Maintain current level
7	Overfull Demand—demand is higher than the organization can or wants to maintain	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently
8	Unwholesome Demand—doing away with the desire for something that is not good for you	Get people to give up something they like

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

While Kotler’s states of demand are subjective and can allow the marketer to start at any state of demand, Levitt’s PLC model is sequential beginning with stage one going through stage four. The PLC model is easy to use to visualize the introduction of the war policy, acceleration of acceptance, and the peak and decline. In addition, like Kotler’s model, Levitt has associated marketing tactics with each stage in his model, which aided in describing how during the pre-war stage of both Desert Storm and OIF the presidents were able to market their war policies through each of Levitt’s stages. However, while Levitt’s PLC model assumes products will move through all four stages sequentially the time spent in each stage will vary. For the two cases discussed, the timeframe analyzed for Desert Storm and OIF was too short to determine if stage four was reached. (See Table 7.2)

**Table 7.2: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

Stages	Correlated Marketing Tasks
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important
Stage 4: Market Decline—product begins to lose consumer appeal	Aggressively depressive tactics; propose mergers/buy-outs

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

During the pre-war stage of both Desert Storm and OIF, both war policies moved through the first three stages, *market development*, *market growth*, and *market maturity*, then due to each of the president’s creative marketing, each war policy recycled back to stage two, *market growth*, prior to the beginning of the war. Neither war policy entered stage four—the *market decline* stage. Desert Storm’s pre-war stage was only 5 months long, while OIF’s pre-war stage was fifteen months long. Even though the Bush II administration had fifteen months, ten months longer than Desert Storm’s pre-war timeframe, President George W. Bush and his administration were successful in marketing to maintain stage three, *market maturity*, without a decline to stage four. Through the use of creative remarketing both Bush administrations were able to re-energize the public’s support and the Desert Storm and OIF war policies cycled back to stage two, the *market growth* stage. While Levitt’s PLC model is a bell-shaped curve with the policy being introduced, peaking, and basically dying out, through the use of remarketing, the war policy can be recycled and moved back to the *market growth* stage as with a product. It is important prior to reaching stage 4, *market decline*, that the

president and his administration realizes aggressive creative remarketing tactics must occur in order to keep the war policy alive.

Since Levitt does not state a specific percentile to distinguish each stage, the author had to speculate that a continuous increase even if it were one to two percent, as long as it was increasing would be considered, stage two, *market growth*. The same speculation was used for stage three, *market maturity*, where demand levels may peak and begin to decline.

While Kotler's and Levitt's models demonstrate various stages or states the policy will follow, Fine's model is devoid of these parameters. In addition, Fine's model does not provide correlated marketing tactics as Levitt's and Kotler's models. Even so, Fine's 7P model was important to this research. Fine's model focuses more on the message to be communicated through the use of the 7P's. His model was used to identify marketing plans for both Desert Storm and OIF war policies. By providing data to answer each of Fine's 7P's this allowed the author to focus on how each president allocated his resources and what he chose to focus on during his pre-war marketing campaign. (See Table 7.3)

**Table 7.3: Fine's 7P's Model**

	7P's	Further defining questions for the 7P's
1	Producer	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	Promote	How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?
6	Place	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer's campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

During the pre-war stage of Desert Storm, the author asserts that President Hussein's actions became one of President Bush's biggest marketing messages. As President Hussein communicated more erratic threats, such as taking American hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, threatening to start the war of all wars, and threatening Israel, support for ousting President Hussein from power increased. Since none of the marketing models describes this marketing tactic, the author has labeled it as a "passive-aggressive" communicative marketing tactic, which would correlate with Fine's fifth "P," *promote*.

By answering Fine's 7P's for OIF, the author was able to analyze where President George W. Bush failed to allocate his resources to achieve the optimum mix that Fine describes in his model. While focusing on *promoting* and communicating its desire to receive public support for the invasion of Iraq, the Bush II administration failed to fully address the *price* question, and the media and public allowed the administration to get away with it. According to Fine (1990), the *producer*, in this case, the president must decide how to allocate his resources to the 7P's to achieve success. The Bush administration chose to gloss over the *price* question and still maintained a successful marketing campaign.

While all three marketing models have strengths and weaknesses, Fine's 7P model is better utilized as a starting point prior to implementing any marketing tactics. Fine's model was best implemented directly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the September 11, 2001 attacks. By answering the seven questions associated with Fine's 7P's, this would allow both presidents to see where to allocate their resources and know where to focus their energy. Although, since the model does not have associated marketing tactics, it does not allow either president to see where he may be failing in his



marketing campaign (which tactics are successful; which are not) or how to make the necessary adjustments.

While Fine's 7P's model does not have marketing tactics, the president's can use marketing tactics from either Levitt's PLC model or Kotler's demand states model. Levitt's PLC model does provide a step-by-step analysis of the various stages the war policy is moving through and provides the correlated marketing tactics to use in the various stages. Even so, as support began to decrease for the Desert Storm and OIF war policies, it is crucial the president recognizes the war policy is in stage 3 and allows for creative remarketing to halt the war policy moving into stage four and basically dying. Neither Bush administration wanted this to occur. Instead both President Bushes re-evaluated their applicable strategic environment or demand state as Kotler's model suggests and began to implement the associated marketing tactics needed to re-energize their respective war policy marketing campaigns and moved them from *declining demand* back to *full demand*. Unlike Levitt's model, Kotler's model does not flow sequentially from the first demand state to the second and so forth. The demand states are independent of each other and are based on defining the strategic environment. As with Levitt's model, Kotler's model does allow for a recycle back through the same demand states. Based on this information, the author proposes that both presidents utilized a combination of the three marketing models and marketing tactics thus successfully receiving the desired public support for each respective war policy.

This research suggests that the decision to market a war policy lies along a strategic environment spectrum, which draws heavily on the moral implications

associated with the possible conflict. Depending on where a war policy is along the pre-war strategic environment spectrum, the president will make the decision as to how large-scale the marketing campaign must be to convince the public the war is necessary. To receive the public's support for war, each president utilized marketing tactics from each model to convince the public their respective war was morally justified. But as demonstrated the public's support can also be influenced by other intervening variables, such as the popularity of the president and support of the U.N. Current research demonstrates that while Americans do pay attention to U.N. support, the "rallying around the flag" effect can trump this support as was demonstrated during OIF. During the pre-war stage for both cases, Americans polled preferred to have the support of the U.N. prior to using military force. Support from the U.N. was distinguished by whether the U.N. Security Council voted to support the war policy as presented to them by the president and/or his administration. The U.N. Security Council did vote to support Desert Storm under President George H. W. Bush, however, they did not vote to support OIF under the current President George W. Bush. Because President George W. Bush had a high job approval rating, it is perceived that the American public trusted him and supported going to war even though the U.N. support was missing.

Finally, this author looked at whether the popularity of a U.S. President plays a role in the public's support for war. Popularity is a variable that plays into the marketing environment and can play a role in the ultimate decision as to whether marketing is necessary. Studies have shown that a president who is well-liked will receive higher support than one who is disliked. However, other researchers have demonstrated that

while it may be easier for a well-liked president to initially receive support, if the public is not happy with the results of the war, their support will wane.

Research suggests that when a president is popular, this does correlate with more support from the public. Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) state there is some evidence that if a president is popular he can use his speeches to bully the public into supporting an issue that is important to him, thus increasing his public support by 5 to 10 percent over several months. The popularity of the two presidents was reviewed by utilizing the same polls to distinguish if the American people thought favorably of each president during the specified timeframes.

As stated in chapter four, President George H. W. Bush became obsessed with the impending war and used every opportunity to talk about the war. In addition, researchers state his emotional rhetoric did aid in increasing the public's support. President George W. Bush used the same tactic, utilizing every opportunity to paint Iraq as the enemy, and using Colin Powell to reverse his declining public support for war. These marketing tactics were successful for both presidents. By looking at the data for both wars, both presidents entered their respective wars with high public support for the job they were doing as president and for how they were handling their respective war situation.

This author agrees there is evidence that the popularity of the president and support of the U.N. can play a role in the increase or decrease of public support for entering into a conflict. Even so, these are not the only variables. After identifying the strategic environment, the president actively makes the decision as to whether he must market his war. Depending on where the conflict "falls" on the war policy environment spectrum, meaning whether the war has an explicit moral justification or if one needs to

be established for the American public, the president will develop his marketing plan.

After the marketing plan is established, the marketing tactics must be identified.

According to the polling data, the marketing tactics employed by each president aided in swaying the public's support toward supporting the war. After both presidents employed their marketing tactics and convinced the public that morally each war was justified, American public support increased.


As stated above, while all three models have strengths and weaknesses, this author suggests that Kotler's and Levitt's models were more beneficial to predict how successful the president's war policy marketing campaign was because these two models had associated marketing tactics with each stage or demand state. This allowed the author to review the polling data after each marketing tactic was employed and deem whether the tactic was a success or not. If the marketing tactic was unsuccessful, the models provided another stage or demand state to move the war policy through and provided additional marketing tactics to employ. Even so, none of the models fit precisely for marketing a war policy. The author suggests a new model for war policy marketing utilizing the strengths pulled from all three models and implementing the war policy environment spectrum. This proposed model is discussed next.

### **Proposed New Model for War Policy Marketing**

As stated above, while all three models have strengths and weaknesses, this author suggests incorporating the strengths of the three models to create a new model specifically tailored for war policy marketing. This author found that knowing the type of war from the outset was a strong determinant to identifying the level of marketing

required. The first step of the new model consists of determining the war type. *Wars of retaliation* are easily identifiable as they involve a direct attack against national borders or interests. For *wars of objective*, administrations must consult the national intelligence apparatus and situational experts to lay out strategic objectives. Once a set of objectives are crafted, polling data may be consulted. The polling data can be applied to the war policy environment spectrum introduced earlier in this paper. Depending on whether the conflict is identified as a *war of retaliation* or *war of objective* on the spectrum, will depend on the level of marketing campaign needed by the president. (See Chart 7.1)

**Chart 7.1 War Policy Environment Spectrum**



A *war of retaliation* falls to the left and requires little or no marketing. A *war of objective* that falls to the far right of the spectrum requires a large-scale marketing campaign focusing on the threat and capitalizing on the fear of Americans to gain their support for a pre-emptive strike on another country. The *wars of objective* are not due to a pre-emptive strike against a U.S. territory, nor are they wars that present a danger to the U.S. These wars are ones in which the president’s administration deems strategically necessary for the U.S. to engage in to achieve a specific objective outlined by the administration. Two

subsets of *wars of objective* could be *wars of humanitarian assistance* and *wars of threat*. These wars do require marketing. It is important to identify the correct war category prior to proceeding with the model.

After the strategic environment has been identified, Fine's 7P's can be answered. These answers will aid the president in deciding how to allocate his resources while marketing for public support. Once again, depending on what category of war the proposed conflict falls into, will depend on where the president allocates his resources. For example, if the conflict is a *war of retaliation*, the president would not be required to allocate a large amount of resources to promoting the war. Historically, *wars of retaliation* already have high support from the public. If the war is deemed to be a *war of objective*, *promoting* the war policy will require more resources. As the author has shown, focusing on *promoting* the war policy will require communication. This means it would be advantageous to have the administration presenting a united front and the president along with his administration would need to communicate the same support for the war policy. (See Table 7.4)

**Table 7.4: Fine's 7P's Model**

	<b>7P's</b>	<b>Answers</b>	<b>Further defining questions for 7P's</b>
1	Producer	President	Who is the <i>producer</i> , the source of the promotional message?
2	Purchasers	American public	Who are the potential <i>purchasers</i> in this particular market and what needs and wants do these people have?
3	Product	War policy	What specific <i>product(s)</i> can the marketer design to help fill those needs?
4	Price	Casualties	What <i>price(s)</i> must the purchasers sacrifice in order to obtain this product?
5	Promote	Marketing tactics	How can the marketer <i>promote</i> (communicate with) the given market?
6	Place	Administration; Media channels	Which parties (institutions) will participate in making the product available at the best <i>place</i> and time (best for the purchaser)?
7	Probing	Polling data	What <i>probing</i> will be necessary to evaluate the marketer's campaign and to obtain feedback from the purchasing audience?

(Fine, 1990, p. 5)

After the president has decided where his resources should be allocated based on the type of war, Kotler's demand states can be utilized next in this model. This author finds Kotler's demand states that the author has determined pertain to marketing a war policy, rather than the eight Kotler suggests for marketing a product. This new model would include: *no demand, negative demand, latent demand, full demand, declining demand, and overfull demand*. *Irregular demand and unwholesome demand* did not pertain to marketing a war policy. (See Table 7.5)

**Table 7.5: Kotler's Demand States and Correlated Marketing Tasks**

	<b>Demand State</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
1	Negative Demand-No one likes the product	Readdress; Explain in a different manner; Drop all together
2	No Demand-Unaware of or uninterested in the product	Connect benefits of the product with person's needs and interests
3	Latent Demand-Many consumers share a strong need that cannot be satisfied by any existing product	Measure size of market; Develop goods/services to satisfy demand
4	Declining Demand-Reduction of demand for a product	Creative remarketing
5	Full Demand-Organization is pleased with the volume of business	Maintain current level
6	Overfull Demand-Demand is higher than Organization can or wants to handle	Reduce demand temporarily or permanently

(Kotler, 2000, p. 6)

After identifying the state of demand in Kotler's model, the associated marketing tactics could be employed. At this point, utilizing the first three stages, *market development, market growth, and market maturity*, of the PLC model, the president could monitor the rise and decline of public support for his war policy by utilizing the bell curve. (See Table 7.6)

**Table 7.6: Levitt’s Product Life Cycle (PLC)**

<b>Stages</b>	<b>Correlated Marketing Tasks</b>
Stage 1: Market Development—new product is designed and brought to market before there is a proved demand for it	Introduce and create demand for the product
Stage 2: Market Growth—demand begins to accelerate; it might also be called the “Takeoff Stage”	Opposition emerges--More direct approach is needed; convince public product is better than competitors
Stage 3: Market Maturity—demand levels peak and may begin to decline	Competing for public’s support--Communication is key; creative marketing is needed; packaging of product is important

(Levitt, 1965, p. 3)

The author does not include stage four, *market decline*, in this model, because if the president is marketing a war policy, he does not want it to enter the declining stage in the PLC model. This model would allow for a recycling of the war policy and provide statistics, through the use of polling data, which is *probing*, in Fine’s 7P’s model, to determine if the president needed to adjust his marketing tactics. Utilizing this new model, the author suggests future research is needed to determine how efficiently it would aid the president in marketing war policies to the public. Other suggestions for future research are discussed next.

### **Suggestions for Future Research**

While this data demonstrates how successful the various marketing tactics were for both presidents marketing campaigns through the use of three marketing models, it is important to note that the use of two case studies cannot be considered as definitive proof of the causal factors. “The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). While the author did provide three other cases for support, these cases were not provided the in-depth analysis as the two primary case studies, Desert Storm



and OIF. Future research utilizing more in-depth analysis on various cases is needed to include research using the most different systems (MDS) research design.

In addition, as mentioned, achieving public support for taking a nation into war lends itself to an apparent spectrum of situational scenarios and moral dilemmas. Further research into this hypothesis is needed to identify how the public chooses to support a war policy based on the public's moral justification for the war. How the public rationalizes and assigns a moral justification to a war is tied to the information communicated about the war to the public. How the public receives this information reverts back to how the president and his administration market the war policy and the marketing tactics employed. Further research is needed to analyze the importance of the pre-war strategic environment through the use of the war policy environment spectrum.

This author hopes this data is used to bring to light how important it is to analyze the pre-war environments of past conflicts to ultimately provide a better decision making tool for future conflicts. As demonstrated, marketing tactics do play a role in manipulating the American public to support a war policy. How the president packages and delivers his war policy to the public follows the same steps as the producer of a product being delivered to the consumer. As Parsons (1999) states,

In the brave new world in which millions are spent on marketing parties and policies, it may well be that the political process in liberal democracies is becoming more involved in manipulating the voter *qua* consumer rather than mobilizing people *qua* citizens. (p.125)

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