Charles I and His Public: Religious Ideology, Political Discourse, and Ceremony, 1625-1633

by

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Abstract

This thesis looks at public debate and ceremony in the early reign of Charles I from 1625 to 1633. It analyzes the various uses of the language of “public” and “private” in the publically aired religious and political debates of the period in order to explore the nature of authority and kingship at the time. By examining the debates that surrounded the religious writings of Richard Montagu and the parliamentary debates and sermons that accompanied the ‘Forced Loans,’ it argues that the contemporary notions of “public” and “private” were part of an increasingly common method of questioning the authority and intent of those who held power. Charles’s attempts to combat these efforts eventually led to a direct confrontation over the “public” and “private” nature of the king himself, which questioned the exact nature and limits of monarchical authority. It then compares Charles’s English coronation in 1626 to his Scottish coronation in 1633 as attempts to partially resolve this conflict by reverting to more orderly public ceremonies. In contrast to a number of historians who find meaningful parallels between the abbreviated nature of the king’s 1626 ceremony and his later public policies, this thesis argues that the 1633 Scottish coronation was actually more representative of the king’s public persona throughout the reign.
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The final, dispassionate, authoritative history of the Civil Wars cannot be written until the problems have ceased to matter; by that time it will not be worth writing.

C.V. Wedgewood

The Civil War...has raged on paper ever since the blood stopped flowing.

Ronald Hutton

We are all at heart either Roundheads or Royalists.

Kevin Sharpe

R. C. Richardson was already an old master when he chose these quotes to open the third edition of his *The Debate on the English Revolution*. First published following the rise of “revisionism” in the 1970s, Richardson’s discussion of the historical debate on the Civil Wars needed updating in 1988 and again in 1998 to keep pace with the bitter disagreements among historians. Revisionists, Marxists, anti and post-revisionists, and traditionalists all raised their banner in this historiographical melee. Almost exactly 350 years after the conflict that engulfed England, Scotland, and Ireland in the middle of the seventeenth century, Richardson found so little agreement on the subject among historians that he concluded his third edition with same basic points that opened it.“The historian’s writing about the English Revolution is embroiled in, and reverberates with, the present,” he explained, before concluding that “historians’ attempts to explain and make sense of the English Revolution- a long running debate already three and a half centuries old- show little sign whatever of losing momentum.”

Strangely, however, Richardson’s twelve-year-old final prediction now seems almost entirely untrue. The bitter ideological and methodological divisions that separated historians into armed camps after the rise of revisionism in the 1970s were never really reconciled, but were

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2 Ibid., 247-248, 249-250.
eventually dismissed as part of an unproductive or unnecessary debate. Both sides attempted to overcome these divisions, shifting the study of Charles’s reign to the ever-widening geographical areas under of his control, while generally avoiding any direct explanation of the Civil Wars themselves. Recent works have bridged the divide through a mixed methodology and an emphasis on the areas of loose agreement that emerged in the 1990s, but Mark Kishlansky has pointed out that in the three and a half centuries of historical writing that Richardson describes, one point has gone almost entirely unchallenged. The overwhelming consensus regarding the basic character traits and psychological make-up of King Charles himself is a uniquely stable area in a field known for its instability.

This thesis is an attempt to better understand Charles I’s initial years as king. It looks at the statements that have traditionally defined the king’s religious and political positions in the context of the debates and events that produced them rather than as a set of preconceived mentalities (responsible for creating those controversies). In doing so, it asks a number of very basic questions: What role did Charles play in the creation of the religious and political debates that accompanied his ascension and early years on the throne? Were these beliefs or actions responsible for the increasingly tense relationship between the king and Parliament? What led Charles to employ novel and controversial explanations of his divine right in 1627? Did Charles really take a series of innovative steps to end public debates or did an unprecedented level of public debate lead Charles to take previously unnecessary steps to secure his kingship?

Though Charles and his actions and beliefs have become a fundamental part of many post-revisionist accounts, historians have been unwilling to accept any real revisions to the long established depiction the king’s character and beliefs. For example, when Kevin Sharpe’s the

Personal Rule of Charles I appeared in 1992, it provoked more condemnation than congratulations from historians studying the period, many of whom chose to ignore Sharpe’s insights rather than refute them.\(^4\) Sharpe’s numerous arguments amount to a total dismissal of most widely held claims about both the nature of Charles’s character and rule and any long-term origin or causes of the Civil Wars. He largely agrees with fellow revisionist Conrad Russell’s characterization of the limited oppositional capabilities of Parliament in the 1620s, though he vehemently rejects Russell’s later acceptance of a Calvinist consensus or orthodoxy in the Church of England before 1625.\(^5\) In the end, Sharpe claims that Charles’s decision to rule without Parliament came only after 1629. His resolution to do so was not from any tyrannical or authoritarian predispositions, but his psychological obsession with “order,” as well as his perception of a growing threat to the commonweal that he strongly felt it was the monarch’s duty to protect.\(^6\)

In contrast to Sharpe’s revisions, Richard Cust offers a more traditional portrait of Charles’s ideological and psychological make-up by emphasizing the king’s attitude toward his relationship with his subjects. In Cust’s account, the parliamentary session of 1626, not the events of 1629, was the real turning point in Charles’s relationship with Parliament, when his hopes of compromise “came unstuck.”\(^7\) Cust blames the failure of Parliament on Charles’s refusal to address the Commons’ grievances, a different interpretation than those of Russell and


\(^{6}\) Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 60.

Sharpe who blame parliament for refusing to grant the necessary funds.\(^8\) He subsequently argued that Charles’s fear of “popularity” played a crucial part in his distrust of parliament after 1626, which is traceable back to his dealings with Parliament in 1621.\(^9\)

Thomas Cogswell’s article “The Politics of Propaganda: Charles I and the People in the 1620s” joins Cust in emphasizing the importance of the Parliamentary debates of 1626, but draws on Charles’s public appeals prior to 1627 as proof of a willingness to engage the public up until that point.\(^10\) Cogswell suggests that Charles increasingly turned away from public explanations of his actions after 1627, which “contributed to the development of a momentous crisis in 1628 and to a new style of kingship.”\(^11\) The bitterness of this crisis reinforced Charles’s belief in a “hard-line attitude to the public,” which led to the reintroduction of tight Episcopal controls on the press and preaching, and to the eventual suppression of corantoes in 1632.\(^12\) Prior to 1627, however, Charles showed a real, if limited, understanding of the need and usefulness of public appeals.

Cogswell’s attention to popular politics represents the most significant and intriguing feature of the most recent historical research on Charles’s reign. His emphasis on popular politics, news, and public debate coincides with the undeniable influence that Jurgen Habermas’s ideas have had on early modern British history. Habermas’s “public sphere” has captivated, challenged, and provoked historians almost since the very moment of its English debut in

\(^8\) Ibid., 59.


\(^11\) Ibid., 213.

\(^12\) Ibid.
1989. Much of its appeal lies in its basic adaptability and flexibility. Habermas’s theory allows historians to employ its basic models and ideas without necessarily accepting all of its conditions and assumptions, enabling them to apply their own variations and adjustments. This adaptability has inspired thousands of pages of comment and analysis that have taken the public sphere to places and periods Habermas himself never envisioned. There is, however, another important element in the public sphere’s ideological allure. It presents historians with a welcome new way of looking at questions or periods that previously appeared to be bogged down in apparently irresolvable methodological and theoretical disagreement.

Indeed, Peter Lake and Steven Pincus have recently argued that a more historically oriented theory of the public sphere can be employed to create a narrative of early modern England that is fundamentally different from both the more traditional Whig and Marxist accounts of the period, as well as the “revisionist” models that challenged them. By combining the traditional printed text from the period that made up the majority of sources used in traditional Marxist and Whig narratives, with the revisionists’ emphasis on manuscript sources, Lake and Pincus suggest that it is possible produce a new narrative focused on the depiction of communication. This method explores what “really happened” along with the stories people told about what was happening. They claim that such a methodology, combined with their notion of the public sphere, allows for the analysis of various modes of communication and action in several areas of conflict and change without collapsing these areas into one another. In

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15 Ibid., 273.

16 Ibid.
other words, their notion of the public sphere allows for the production of a more integrated account of the period than revisionists have been able to produce.\textsuperscript{17}

Lake and Pincus argue that the Habermasian version of the public sphere is not sufficiently fluid to fit into the actual development patterns of early modern England as they describe it. They dismiss Habermas’s four initial phases of the public sphere (the ancient, medieval, bourgeois, and the degraded). Instead, they introduce a more nuanced account of the development of the public sphere in which a newly suggested post-Reformation public sphere from the 1590s to the 1630s eventually gave way to a post-revolutionary public sphere that produced something close to Habermas’s own bourgeois public sphere.\textsuperscript{18} Lake and Pincus argue that after this post-Reformation sphere’s initial formation during the reign of Elizabeth I, “issues of religious identity and division came together with issues of dynastic and geopolitical rivalry to create a series of public spheres” that were temporarily created by appeals to the public from within the regime itself in order to persuade the queen to take a specific action.\textsuperscript{19} They claim that this post-Reformation public sphere was framed by “novel techniques of political maneuver and communication” that were supported by members of the establishment because of the heated atmosphere created by crises, such as the Elizabethan exclusion crisis, in spite of their potentially destabilizing nature.\textsuperscript{20}

Though the conversations taking place in this post-Reformation public sphere would have ideally been held in a more private arena, those theoretically private spaces became increasingly open to public view with the circulation of newsletters and scribal manuscripts. Parliament itself

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 274.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
was an example of one such arena. It was technically a private chamber closed off from common access. As Lake and Pincus explain, at the time all sides reverted to the language of religio-political controversy and public appeals during times of crisis, whether real or imagined. These appeals, they argue, implied the existence of, or called into being, a public able to judge a matter based on information given to them, but were never considered part of normally acceptable political behavior. The pretenses of an emergency defended the initiators of these appeals from the charge of “popularity,” which Lake and Pincus describe as a “seditious appeal to the people inimical to good order and monarchical rule.”

In order to justify using potentially dangerous methods, appeals often described various plots and conspiracies that made public appeals necessary so that a return to the normal hierarchical structure after the danger ended was assumed. However, the nature of the European religious and political scene, contingencies of English politics, and the structure of the English state combined to prevent this return to normalcy from ever actually happening. Lake and Pincus claim that not until the late 1610s and early 1620s did various political, religious, and social conflicts combine to sustain a level of public discourse equal to the 1590s. In explaining that the intensity of the political conflict of the 1620s produced the “peculiar cultural politics of the 1630s,” Lake and Pincus cite Sharpe’s work as proof that Charles’s reforms were linked maneuvers designed to suppress a public sphere that had developed in the previous decade in the

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21 Ibid.; The use of “popularity” by seventeenth century commentators seems very similar to the modern concept of demagoguery. Both are based on the fear of disingenuous individuals making appeals to the fears, biases, or ignorant assumptions of the popular sort in order to advance the actors own personal ambitions or goals rather than the public or common good.

22 Ibid., 277.
context of the Spanish Match, England’s participation in the wars on the continent, and Charles’s
efforts, both inside and outside of Parliament, to fund this involvement.23

Lake and Pincus, mostly due to the nature of their project, are hesitant to flesh out the
exact details and implications of their suggestions about Charles’s actions. They jump from their
statements about Charles’s actions in the 1630s to the revolutionary “transitional public sphere”
that arose during the Civil Wars, steering clear of the historiographical quagmire surrounding the
origins of the wars themselves.24 If Lake and Pincus are correct, however, the role the public
sphere played in the decisions Charles made before and during the “Personal Rule” was critical
in shaping the events of the period. They argue that Charles’s policies during the 1630s were a
“series” of “engineered” maneuvers aimed at shutting down the public sphere that developed
during the 1620s. If, as many historians claim, these same policies were the primary underlying
cause of the Civil Wars, then the logical conclusion to draw from this is that the origins of the
conflicts in the 1640s were directly connected to Charles’s perception of and relationship to the
public debates and presentations of 1620s.25

Charles’s perception of and relationship to public debate, however, cannot be separated
from the nature of the king’s position in English society. His unique nature was reflected in the
multiple, often contradictory roles and descriptions ascribed to the monarch. For example, the
king was the head of both the church and the temporal government. Socially, because of his these

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23 Ibid., 276-277.

24 Ibid., 279.

dual positions, he was both laity and clergy. Legally, at least in the language of the law, he was both plaintiff and judge. And according to most writers, he was both divine and human. Other members of society were much more clearly represented in the traditional social order. Their places were defined by any number of natural, hierarchical relationships: father or son, lord or vassal, shepherd or sheep. These defining relationships each carried any number of expected duties that were part of the idealized, common fabric of society, upon which society’s best interest. The king protected this “commonweal” with advice from his lords and knights in Parliament. The conferences themselves, however, were private by definition and setting. They were carried out among individuals in a closed space.

Common, in contrast to the extraordinary position of the king, was an unparticular, general description of the regular state of being for unexceptional individuals, which Habermas considers to be essentially “private.” He claims that collectively the nobility in this period was neutral, that is, neither “public” nor “private,” but particular nobles publically occupied a rank within the social hierarchy. These representations of rank, according to Habermas, sought to make the invisible social hierarchy visible by demonstrating the individual’s particular worth through his proximity to a higher power, God or the king. They were a confirmation of inner, unseen virtues or properties finally made visible by the reflection of divine grace. The exceptional status of being graced by God or the king came with certain expectations and


27 Lake and Pincus, 274.

28 Ibid.

29 Habermas, 6.

30 Habermas, 6-7.
privileges. It suspended the common, unparticular state of the formerly unremarkable individual, for the public display of rank and its attendant virtues and privileges.

Sharpe points out that the “commonweal” was a divinely inspired, natural order that could never be descriptive of the world, but provided a “powerful normative picture” of the ideal.\(^{31}\) The king at the top was analogous with God in the heavens, the father in the family. The king was the head of the body of the commonweal. God was the reason or soul of everyman’s body, and in that way, every man was a king.\(^{32}\) Sharpe concludes within such a conceptualization, modern polarities of ‘private and public’ or ‘state and individual’ are out of place.\(^{33}\) Sharpe looks at these distinctions in James and Charles’s own writings and concludes that Charles saw no distinction between his public duties or actions and his private conscience.\(^{34}\) He believed that all men shared a common conscience that spoke to each, which could be denied but not vary in its common message.\(^{35}\) This is not to say that Charles believed his personal will was divine. He believed what his heart told him was right, not what may be most beneficial to his own person, was the proper course of action. His conscience was the conscience of the commonweal. Sharpe goes on to explain that both James and Charles denied there could be any distinction between a king’s “public and private voices,” and that James went to great lengths to remove any barrier between his public and private selves.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{31}\) Sharpe, “Commonwealth of Meanings,” 43.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 73.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 183-193, 193.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 181; Kevin Sharpe, “Public Duty and Public Conscience in the Writing of James I,” in Remapping, 160.
While Sharpe warns historians not to project a “private versus public” divide onto the mental process of seventeenth century actors, the words were certainly used in generally opposing ways during the period. If James and Charles explicitly denied that the king possessed separate public and private voices, James’s directions to his son in his book *Basilikon Doron* reveal he did indeed recognize a difference in the proper style and content of the king’s speech according to context, public or private. When pointing his son to the proper manner of speech, he advised his son:

> Remember also, to put a difference betwixt your form of language in reasoning, and your pronouncing of sentences, or declaration of your will in judgment, or any other ways in the points of your office. For in the former case, ye must reason pleasantly and patiently, not like a king, but like a private man and a scholar; otherwise, your impatience of contradiction will be interpreted to be for lack of reason on your part. Where in the points of your office, ye should ripely advise indeed, before ye give forth your sentence: but [after] it be given forth, the suffering of any contradiction diminish the majesty of your authority, and make the processes endless. The like form would also be observed by all your inferior judges and magistrates.37

James’s words explained the need to “put a difference betwixt your form of language in reasoning, and your pronouncing of sentences, or declaration of your will in judgment, or any other ways in the points of your office.” In reasoning, or the verbal act of decision making, his son should “reason pleasantly and patiently, not like a king, but like a private man and a scholar… otherwise, your impatience of contradiction will be interpreted to be for lack of reason on your part.”38 James claimed that the king could not be contradicted or refuted, whereas a private man or scholar needed to demonstrate his reason to others. As he used it, “private man”

37 James I, *Basilikon Doron or His Majesty’s Instructions to His Dearest Son, Henry the Prince* (1616), in *The Political Works of James I*, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1918), 47. Hereafter referred to as *Doron*. I have partially modified the spelling in direct quotes only for the sake of clarity, but I have attempted to alter them as little as possible.

38 James I, *Doron*, 47.
indicated someone without recognized authority or position that would have otherwise validated his statement regardless of its acceptableness. The king, James continued, must “pleasantly and patiently” bear being contradicted or opposed in the process of decision making or justification, though it is against the nature of kingship itself. In “points of office,” however, James advised his son that he should take wise advice before “giving sentence,” but “suffer no contradiction” after it was “given forth.” Such contradictions would “diminish the majesty of your authority and make the processes endless.”

_Basilikon Doron_ was Charles’s handbook for kingship. Its words and advice shaped his ideals of kingship and his perception of the proper place, time, and nature of public debate among his subjects, as well as his beliefs about the king’s role in and relationship with those debates. This thesis examines those very relationships during the early, formative years of Charles’s reign from 1625 to 1627. By exploring the language and nature of public debate in his early years as king, and the authorized sermons, proclamations, and declarations Charles and his ministers had published, it reconstructs the linguistic, ideological, and political contexts of the crown’s public statements in the 1620s. Though not specifically relayed through the language of the “public sphere,” the ideas and conclusions presented criticize and modify both Lake and Pincus’s theoretical narrative and the more traditional studies by Sharpe, Cust, and Cogswell.

The religious debates described in Chapter I are a specific example of the erosion of the traditional, personal authority of public men in the early years of Charles’s reign. Critics claimed that the “private” ambitions and beliefs of the individuals who filled public offices were actually threatening the universal, authorized “public” truth that their offices were traditionally...
supposed to protect. This allowed critics to dismiss the judgments of Bishops and Privy Councilors as invalid and corrupt attempts for personal gain, rather than the will of the king and the authorized interpretation of the word of law.

Chapter II describes Charles’s efforts in his early Parliaments to extend his personal authority over his councilors and servants in an attempt to protect his control of the systems of governance and judgment from these same private threats. Charles’s initial attempts to justify his dismissal of Parliament and his extra-parliamentary methods of supply show that Charles was willing to rationally explain the to his subjects events and circumstances that led to his actions without simply falling back onto arguments based in his prerogative and divine right. Charles’s failure to convince his people with these explanations was a product of the same ‘public good v. private motivations’ language and accusations that were previously used to call the individuals that held lesser public offices of into question. The result was the attempt to reconcile the king’s public office with his private conscience and his physical person through the sermons that supported the forced loan in 1627.

Chapter III looks for signs of this same process of reconciliation in the king’s public ceremonies and performances by comparing his 1626 London coronation to his 1633 ceremony in Edinburgh. Contrary to many historians’ claims that Charles was an increasingly withdrawn king, his insistence on the undeniable unity of his person and his office forced him to constantly present himself as the public king, which partially explains his often described love of ritual and ceremony and his reputation for being cold and reserved. This was the source of the ironic circumstance where the king actually became more of a public institution while his person became more withdrawn from public access.
Chapter I: Religion, Public Authority, and Private Belief

In 1624, Richard Montagu published *A New Gagg for an Old Goose*, which purported to respond to Catholic critics of English Protestantism. While refuting Catholic lies about the nature of Protestantism he described double predestination, the Calvinist belief that God chose both the saved and damned, and claimed it was “not the doctrine of Protestants.” Citing Lutherans as an example of Protestants who refused the idea, he claimed it was only “the private fancy of some men…The Church of England hath not taught it, doth not believe it, and has opposed it.” Montagu seemed to be softening the divide between Anglicans and Catholics, and challenging the Calvinist consensus that had supposedly defined the Church of England for over seventy years. The 1624 Parliament reacted to the book with hostility, and James asked Montagu to clarify his position, despite appeals from the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbot, to make an example of Montagu. Montagu did so in 1625 with *Appello Ceasarem*, in which he explained that Puritans were “intractable, insociable, incompliable with those that will not [accept their dissentions]; but in no point more, than in this their desperate doctrine of Predestination.” This doctrine, Montagu again stressed, was not found in the *Thirty-Nine*

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42 Ibid., 179.

43 Cust, *Charles I*, 86.

44 Ibid.
Articles, the document outlining the fundamental beliefs of the Church of England. Its inclusion in the decisions made at the Synod of Dort, called to resolve a division among Dutch Protestants over the issue, meant little since the conclusions at Dort were never adopted by the Church of England. For Montagu, the English ecclesiastics who participated in that synod between 1614 and 1618 only attached themselves to the decision of that body, and not the Church. Therefore, Montague “saw no reason why any of those Divines of our Church there present should take any offence at my dissenting, who had no authority…to conclude me; more than I do at them for differing from me in their judgments.” 46

Parliament’s attempt to censure Montagu continued in the 1625 session, and Appello Caesarem was added to the list of charges against him. Charles attempted to rescue Montagu from his Parliamentary critics by claiming he was a royal chaplain, and therefore exempt from Parliament’s requests, but Parliament pursued the cleric despite the king’s declaration. Eventually, the 1625 Parliament was prorogued, and the June 14, 1626 Proclamation on Religion attempted to silence the controversy surrounding Montagu’s works. Charles’s exchange with Parliament over Montagu was the first time Charles tried to protect one of his subjects from Parliamentary prosecution. As the next chapter will show, it was certainly not the last.

Montagu’s works are important because they were at the center of the intense religious disputes Charles faced from the very beginning of his reign. The story of Montagu’s works, their publication, the political and religious backlash they provoked, and their eventual condemnation, provides one of the most famous examples of public debate in the mid-1620s. They show the often complex and convoluted relationships between the crown and religious debate, Parliament’s ability to upset or interfere in that relationship, and the language each side used to

45 Montagu, New Gagg, 60.
46 Ibid., 70.
damn or defend various works. They also provide an intriguing example of the close relationship between what is essentially academic theology and parliamentary or popular politics in the period. This relationship appeared consistently throughout Charles’s reign when religious language and ideas filled political speeches and political motivations fuelled religious sermons and devotions.

Montagu’s works were printed in a period when religious debates were blatantly political, and political debate was generally only acceptable in religious disguise. The origins of the publically-presented religio-political debates of Charles’s early reign lay in the reactions of the public during the negotiations of the prince’s proposed marriage to the Spanish Infanta between 1621 and 1624, commonly known as the Spanish Match. Thomas Cogswell, whose work drew attention to this long ignored period, claims the events in these years showed that the proper political contexts could reveal dangerous public fault-lines within the nation. James wanted Charles to have a Catholic queen, just as he wanted his daughter Elizabeth to be married into a Protestant dynasty. He hoped that by positioning his descendents between the Catholic major powers and the Protestant states, they could provide an insurance policy against religious wars while improving his own political stature abroad as well as his financial position at home. James succeeded in the placement of Elizabeth, marrying her to Frederick of the Palatinate. This left the marriage of the Prince of Wales to a Catholic line as the final step in securing the kingdom’s international position. Unfortunately for James, the outbreak of war between his prospective

47 Cust, Charles I, 85.

Spanish in-laws and his Protestant son-in-law in 1620 radically altered both his foreign and domestic policies.\textsuperscript{49}

The religious conflict on the continent brought a heightened thirst for news, as well as an inflammation of Protestant opposition to the match.\textsuperscript{50} The increasingly available news from the war reported loss after loss for the Protestant cause, which inflamed popular fears about the danger of Catholicism at the very moment that James attempted to relax restrictions on Catholics as part of the Spanish negotiations.\textsuperscript{51} Many saw the proposed match as a threat to the future of Protestantism in England, and ministers began to preach sermons on the dangers of marrying a Catholic “idolator.” After dismissing Parliament for requesting a war against Spain in 1621, James was infuriated by what he perceived as a blatant case of “popularity,” and had Archbishop Abbot issue a ban on all preaching related to “matters of state” in 1622.\textsuperscript{52} Despite James’s claims that matters of policy and politics were the prerogative of the king, the protests continued. The political implications of religious debate and the spiritual fears associated with political acts combined to create a public opposition that was able to justify its public political appeals and statements using religious language.

When Montagu published \textit{A New Gagg} in 1624, the crown was negotiating with Louis XIII of France over a possible match between Charles and Henrietta Maria, Louis’s youngest sister. James had relaxed the laws against recusants during the period of negotiation with the Spanish, and his generosity toward papists continued after Charles and Buckingham’s return from Madrid in 1623. Parliament complained about lax enforcement of laws against Catholics in


\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 18.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 18-19.

\textsuperscript{52} Cust, \textit{Charles I}, 85.
1624, but James only re-issued the laws against priests and Jesuits, ignoring recusants. James certainly realized that enforcing the laws during negotiations would force him to commit to even more distasteful concessions. Parliament and the people, however, had little taste for a Catholic match of either sort. The eventual match between Charles and Henrietta Maria did little to soothe parliamentary fears of papists run amuck. It is telling that several descriptions of Charles’s speech at the convening of Parliament in 1625 specifically mention the presence of the queen’s French entourage seated at the king’s right-hand side.

II. Predestination, Parliament, and Public Doctrine

Parliament reacted strongly to Montagu’s works, particularly Appello Caesarem. While the 1624 Parliament found *A New Gagg* doctrinally misguided, the 1625 session found its sequel seditious and contemptible. *A New Gagg* was referred to Archbishop Abbot in 1624, which was unusual for a number of reasons; not least that Abbot was not even sure of his jurisdiction to act at the request of the Commons without the Lords’ or the king’s approval. In the early days of the 1625 meeting, Henry Sherfield proposed *Appello Caesarem* be added to the consideration of Montagu’s works already underway because it was “a very dangerous and seditious book.” Yet, while the first days of the 1625 parliamentary session were filled with considerations touching religion, but the majority of them dealt with the threat of Popish recusants rather than

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55 Ibid., 286.

56 Ibid., 240. The editors note that the original record of Sherfield’s proposal is written in the margins of the records from June 24, and could have been added later.
Arminian denials of absolute reprobation. The first bills heard in the 1625 session, which began on June 18, included an enforcement of the Sabbath Laws, a motion for the house to take communion and a motion to petition the king for the declaration of a fast. Not until at least the third day of meeting, and possibly not until July 7, was Montagu mentioned. The parade of French papists now accompanying the court, even at the opening of parliament, seems to have been the most immediate religious concern among the MPs.

When the Commons voted to censure Montagu, it was not specifically because of his rejection of double predestination. Instead, Montagu’s works were suppressed on the grounds that they were in contempt of Parliament, in addition to being seditious statements against the late king, and a threat to the general peace of the Church. Charles sent word to the House on July 9th that he would deal personally with Montagu, as he was his servant. The Commons should instead busy themselves with issues of supply. Parliament responded by claiming it was proceeding against Montagu only because he was in contempt of their House, and not because they believed there was any kind of theological power invested in Parliament. In reality, this was a charade. Parliament intended to persecute Montagu in any case, and continued to try to do so until it was dismissed. It initially referred *A New Gagg* to Abbot on the grounds of its theological position. It was only because Montagu published *Appello Caesarum* while under investigation by Abbot, that he could be prosecuted for contempt of the House of Commons.

The parliamentary charges against him argued that because James had written in support of Dort and against Arminianism, Montagu was dishonoring the deceased king. This argument

57 Ibid., 204.
58 Ibid., 240.
60 Ibid., 359.
ignored the positions and points of view Montagu’s work shared with James. Sheila Lambert has used Montagu’s correspondence with Richard Cosin to show just how closely James was involved with *A New Gagg*. Looking at James’s words and actions before 1624 in comparison to Montagu’s after that year reinforces Lambert’s conclusions about the king’s probable involvement. James’s effort to end the political criticism that appeared in sermons and pamphlets prior to 1624 emphasized the fundamental theological beliefs of the Church in order to prevent points of theological contention from being used to create political unrest. The language James used to explain his actions to control publically-present religious speech in 1622, whether spoken or printed, were very close to those Montagu was called to defend in 1624.

James attempted to silence the backlash over his foreign policy decisions coming from the pulpits by promoting unifying, fundamental points of faith. His directions to preachers, presented as a circulating letter in 1622, contained appropriate subjects for sermons. The letter, sent to Archbishop Abbot, explained James’s concerns about preaching and included six specific directions to all preachers. The printed form of the letter contains the original letter from James to Abbot, the six points concerning preaching that James wanted obeyed, and Abbot’s letter to Bishop Harnett explaining James’s wishes. The third of the six points point reads:

That no preacher of what title soever, under the degree of a Bishop or Dean at the least, do from henceforth presume to preach in any populous auditory, the deep points of Predestination, Election, Reprobation; of the Universality, Efficacy, Resistibility, or Irresistibility of God's grace, but leave those [themes] to be handled by the learned men, and that moderately, and modestly, by way of use and application, rather than by way of positive doctrine, as being fitter for the Schools and Universities, then for simple auditories.  

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62 I do not mean to suggest that these points also support Lambert’s conclusions about censorship in general; only that James’s views were not incompatible with Montagu’s points.

The inclusion of this specific reference to predestination places Montagu’s *A New Gagg* within a potentially seditious disagreement over Anglican doctrine that obviously began well before its appearance in print. Rather than an example of an Arminian reaction against the public discussion of the established beliefs of the Church of England, these directions show Montagu’s wording to repeat James’s own words from just two years earlier. James, apparently, did not want the tender point of predestination explained before popular audiences. Its significance is all the more in that it is the only theological point mentioned specifically in his directions.

James saw how damaging the public discussion of doctrine could be in the events before and after the Synod of Dort in the Low Countries, and had no desire to repeat the political and religious turmoil that divided the Dutch between 1613 and 1620 in England, Scotland, and Wales. Predestination was obviously a potential point of controversy before Montagu published *A New Gagg*, and James’s dismissal of it as more appropriate for “Schools and Universities” than public debate fits with what seems to have been the government policy of the time. James believed that predestination was not among the fundamental points of faith that ordinary believers needed to understand, but a relatively rarified area of theological doctrine that should not be discussed in public due to the dangerous lines of division it might draw.\(^{64}\)

This does not mean that James was an Arminian, or that he believed that the Church of England had not previously professed Calvinist beliefs. James clearly believed that the Arminian Remonstrates in the Netherlands were wrong, but in his letters to the States General he plainly explained that the discussion of predestination among the common people by either side did more harm than good. He described the “scanty benefits that came of such preachings,” which “served only to flatter and deceive their minds with the petty details of this argument, which is

\(^{64}\) Ibid., 2-3.
too high and obscure for the ordinary people.”65 Dudley Carlton wrote to the king’s secretary that James’s suggestions were being used to “authorize” the Arminian evil that threatened the Dutch church because his advice was linked to a resolution passed by the States General of the United Provinces in 1614. This resolution banned preaching on predestination, though not in schools or amongst the learned. Calvinists resisted the resolution, while Arminians used the opportunity to change the debate from predestination to the authority that granted the resolution.66 James clarified himself in a second letter, asking the States General to use its “authority to keep matters in peace, without suffering those of the true and ancient profession to be made unquiet,” until a synod could be convoked.67

In order to rescue his spiritual and secular kingdoms from the controversial spirit of some ministers, James used the same tactic that he originally suggested to the Dutch in 1614 in England in 1622. James wanted preachers to focus on those unifying, fundamental points that were publically authorized in the Church’s articles and homily books. Focusing on these fundamentals prevented doctrinal divisions from being inflamed into schism. In 1623 and 1624, James added proclamations against “disorderly printing” to his directions on preaching. While James’s 1623 proclamation was a reprint of Queen Elizabeth’s 1587 proclamation of the same title, the 1624 proclamation, entitled “A proclamation against Seditious, Popish, and Puritannical books and Pamphlets” was written specifically in response to the religious controversies of James’s own time. It declared that nothing on matters of religion, church government, or state should be published without being screened by either of the Archbishops, the Bishop of London,

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66 Dudley Carleton, Letters From and To Sir Dudley Carleton, Knt., During his Embassy in Holland, 2nd ed. (London: 1775), 58.
67 Akrigg, 359.
or the Chancellor of one of the Universities.\textsuperscript{68} James was determined to prevent differences on secondary points of belief, whether presented in print or pulpits, from questioning the unity supplied by the fundamental beliefs of the Church. The 1624 proclamation put the protection of these fundamental beliefs into the hands of the Church’s highest-ranking clerics. It linked the public authority of Church documents with the personal authority of the divines who interpreted these documents when determining what should and should not be published.

James and Montagu therefore shared an appreciation of the minority’s right to views that went against the majority. Both recognized the importance of a distinction between fundamental points of faith and insignificant trappings surrounding religious practice. James gives a very useful definition of puritans in 1603 as not only Anabaptists,

\begin{quote}
but such brain-sick and heady Preachers their disciples and followers, as refusing to be called of that sect, yet participate too much with their humours, …not only agreeing with the general rule of all Anabaptists, in the contempt of the civil Magistrate, and in leaning to their own dreams and revelations;…but particularly with this sect, in accounting all men profane that swear not to all their fantasies, in making for every particular question of the policy of the Church, as great commotion, as if the article of the Trinity were called in very controversy, in making the scriptures to be ruled by their conscience, and not their conscience by the Scripture; and he that denies the least iota of their grounds… not worthy to enjoy the benefit of breathing, much less to participate with them of the Sacraments: and before that any of their grounds be impugned, let King, people, Law and all be trod under foot.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

It is clear who James meant when he referred to “puritanes.” They could be either conformists or non-conformists who sought uniformity in beliefs and rejected the notion that there could be an acceptable level of disagreement among members of the church on theological points. This insistence on conformity made even the smallest doctrinal disputes into fundamental crises and destroyed the unifying myth of a community of believers bound by essential Protestant beliefs.

\textsuperscript{68} James I, \textit{Proclamation Against the Disorderly Printing, Uttering, and Dispersing of Books}, September 25, 1623; \textit{Proclamation against Seditious, Popish, and Puritannical books and Pamphlets}, August 15, 1624.

\textsuperscript{69} James I, \textit{Doron}, 4. Italics mine.
James used the article of the Trinity to illustrate an undeniable point of theological unity: a belief that fundamentally defines the true church. It is a public, common, and universal belief at the very foundation of Christianity, and “a point of salvation.” In *Basiliskon Doron*, James advised his son to learn to differentiate between such points of salvation and those that were indifferent, “betwixt substance and ceremonies; and [between] the express commandment and will of God in his word, and the invention of ordinance of man.” Points of salvation were clear in the scripture, and could not be overly-emphasized. The rest were private inventions of presumptuous men that sought more knowledge of God than he chose to reveal.

While James claimed that “puritans” made a “great commotion” in “every particular question of the policy of the Church,” Montagu also accepted a general difference between public and private points of faith. “There are public resolutions held of all,” he said, “and private opinions maintained by some, by men particular in their own conceits…As those [the former] are proposed, resolved, tendered and commanded: So the others are free, and disputed and questioned, not enjoyed as [decided], or subscribed, because problematical.” Public doctrine was common, universal, and irrefutable. Private was defined only in binary relation to public: it was not public, not common, and not agreed upon. It was not included in the publically-presented doctrines. Instead, it was singular and, though inconsequential for salvation, a constant danger to unity. James instructed his differing subjects to “content themselves soberly and quietly with their own opinions, not resisting to the authority, nor breaking the Law of the Country, neither above all, slurring any rebellion or schism.” As long as James’s subjects obeyed the established authority and “[possessed] their souls in peace,” he saw them as free to “press by patience, and well grounded reasons, either to persuade all the rest to like of their judgments; or

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70 James I, *Doron*, 17.

where they see better grounds on the other part, not to be ashamed peaceably to incline."72

Privately, diversity on secondary points of theology could exist, but public discussion of such points had to meet an established standard of appeal that recognized a common unity and authority under the law.

Both James and Montagu believed that while there was nothing inherently wrong with private opinions or their public presentation, presenting these opinions as somehow being anything more than private fancy was dangerous. Montagu explained that he was only drawn into publishing *A New Gagg* because the author that he was responding to did not take aim at “this man and that man of the Protestant party: not against private tenants,[…] but he drived directly at the Church of England.” Had his opponent accused specific (or generically personified) individuals or “peculiar tenants,” Montagu claimed he would have had no need to respond, as “these are singular, so let them stand or fall.” Private opinions should be left “to their authors and abettors, old enough, and able to speak for themselves.”73 Presenting one’s own opinion as a personal judgment on a secondary point was acceptable; presenting private opinion as authoritative, or public, was not.

This, however, is just what some of Montagu’s critics accused him of doing. The critics that responded to Montagu did not accept the differences James proposed between fundamental points and secondary beliefs. Some argued, most blatantly in Anthony Wotton’s case, that there were only fundamental parts of religion.74 George Carleton argued that there were never any doctrinal differences between the Church of England and “Puritans,” only a disagreement over

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72 James I, *Doron*, 4.

73 Montagu, *A New Gagg*, opposite of the page marked 2 (actually second page), fifth page (marked 3).

church government. Others refused to accept Montagu’s explanation of exactly what was “accessory” and what was fundamental. The rejection of the distinction between fundamental and secondary points of faith meant that the Church must have a binding, publically authorized position on all points of doctrine. In this view, Montagu misrepresented the Church of England’s publically authorized doctrine in order to promote an Arminian definition of God’s grace. Montagu did so by questioning the public authority of several documents that he said were never published by authority, including the Lambeth Articles, the Articles of the Church of Ireland, and conclusions of the Synod of Dort. Henry Burton, William Prynne, and the others that penned responses to Montagu were forced to defend the authority of these documents in order to prove that Montagu was overturning the publically authorized and declared position the Church of England. To these men, Montagu was not only a religious dissenter, but a seditious threat to public authority. However, the seemingly simple nature of these men’s claims was complicated by three short words on the cover of Montagu’s first book. It read “Published by Authority.”

III. Reaction to Montagu, Public Authority, and Private men

The fact A New Gagg was published by authority left its critics in a precarious situation. As shown above, James’s likely involvement in its printing understandable given the political situation the king faced, but James could not acknowledge approval of the text during the controversy that followed its printing. Gagg’s defense, Appello Caesarum, carried a personal approbation from Bishop White, but lacked the declarative “published by authority” that partially

75 George Carleton, An Examination of Those Things Wherein the Author of the late Appeal holdeth the Doctrines of the Pelagians and Arminians, to be the Doctrines of the Church of England (London:1626).

shielded its predecessor. Still, authority was a strong sub-theme in both works, not only in the
discussion of theological doctrine but in the debate over the printing of Montagu’s works
themselves. In *Caesarum*, Montagu began with a discussion of authority. He claimed that his
(parliamentary) critics’ true aim was not his own work, but the authority that published it.

Montagu explained that it was

> Not unknown unto Authority, that Puritanical Self-conceit, and Presumption, will square
> Law and Gospel too according unto that untoward Lesbian rule of their own Private
> Spirit, and special opinion… and dare challenge any Authority, old or new, for preaching,
> publishing, maintaining Errors; viz. whatsoever doth not consort or run with the Tide of
> their Private Spirits motion.

In fact, Montagu continued, these puritanical spirits “seldom or never talk of [any] misbeing,
misordering, misdemeanor, in any point or case, but that… they can lend a lash unto, or pinch
upon the credit of Authority, though most Sacred.” They only chose disputes that allowed them
to discredit or challenge authority, which “they hold … [interested] both for points of Popery and
Arminianism.” Montagu concluded his attack by saying that if his opponents intended only to
discredit him personally and not the authority that approved his publication, they could have
simply disputed his book’s claim to be published by authority. Instead, they seemed to accept the
book’s authorization, and still chose to challenge its points and the authorities that granted
them.

However, since the majority of the published responses to Montagu followed *Caesarum’s*
printing, Montagu’s critics were able to avoid directly questioning the authority that approved
the first book. White’s personal approval of the second book, displayed clearly in an unusual
preliminary approbation, placed the bishop himself in Montagu’s opponents’ crosshairs. In
Charles’s former chaplain Henry Burton’s response to Montagu, entitled *Plea to an Appeal*, the

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78 Ibid.
naïve layman Arsotus’s first question upon receiving Montagu’s book concerns White’s approval when he asks how such a devout enemy to Rome could approve such a book. The Jesuit Babylonius explains that “it is one thing what a man saith in public, for popular applause, and salary; and another, what he thinketh in his own private opinion and conscience… It is less envy to pass his judgment, under another’s name, which he thought not so fit in his own.” When Arsotus goes on to ask how this claim could be true since legally the accessory is no less guilty than the principal, the Jesuit clarifies himself by explaining the strategy behind White’s approval. He explains that “Doctor White if he see occasion, may easily wind himself out of the snare; as I hear he doth already, saying, That the Copy printed varies from that which he approved.”79 Burton was not only drawing White’s personal authority and doctrinal discipline into question, he opened the possibility of a separation of those persons who granted public or published authority from the true authority found in the public documents of the church. This privatized authority by removing the power of interpreting public texts from the men who filled the public positions that traditionally held the final word on such matters. It also provided a useful tool to separate truth from the self-perpetuating mechanisms and agents of state power: it separated authority from authorities.

Burton’s introductory dedication to Charles not only positioned his work as a legitimate form of council, but asserted that there was indeed a separation of true authority from the state’s authorizers. Calling on the king’s role as the rightful source of justice, Burton presented this division as seven “plaintiffs” that solicited the king’s assistance. First, and most important, was truth. He explained:

she complains of hard usage, how she is driven to seek corners, since she cannot pass the Press Cum Privilegio, but must be silenced, yea Gagged, least, while she refuses to

79 Burton, 4-5.
subscribe to An Appeal, she should by writing, clear her Doctrines from the infamous
term of Puritanism, and herself from being reproached for a Puritan.80

Burton’s point is undeniable. Truth was silenced by the unjust and illegitimate censorship of any
work that did not agree with Montagu. Truth had been mislabeled as puritanism. Truth, herself,
was construed as a puritan, a name previously given to only non-conformists.81

Charles attempted to end the controversy sparked by Montagu beginning in February
1626. In anticipation of the 1626 Parliament, the Duke of Buckingham hosted a theological
debate at York House where Montagu, Bishop White, and others confronted Calvinist clerics
including Thomas Morton, Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield. The conference ended without any
real declarative solutions, but most importantly, it appeared conclude that Montagu’s words did
not contradict the established orthodoxy of the Church of England.82 It made the Church’s
position on predestination and the nature of grace seem vague or ambiguous, which coincided
with Montagu’s arguments about the true position of the Church of England. Since Montagu’s
Calvinist opponents saw no possibilities for ambiguity in church doctrine, the true meaning of
the York House ruling seemed clear. According to strict Calvinists, God’s grace revealed the true
doctrine of his church to every member of the Elect. The truth of God found in the scriptures was
perfectly clear on every point, and there could be no confusion over the message it relayed to the
divinely-touched soul. It could only be misread by those who were not privy to God’s grace and
not members of the Elect. No statement could possibly be beyond the declared positions of the
Church: they could only be part of them or against them.83

80 Ibid., unnumbered page, third numerically.
81 Ibid., 17.
Shortly after the publication of Burton’s appeal, the crown made another attempt to end the debate. On June 14, the day before he dismissed the ill-fated 1626 Parliament, the king issued *A Proclamation for the Establishing of the Peace and Quiet of the Church of England.*\(^{84}\) It recognized “that of late some questions or opinions seem to have been broached or raised in matters of doctrine, and the tenets of our religion,” which were meant only to attack papist, but by the “sharp and indiscreet handling” by some has “given much offense to the sober and well grounded readers… of these late books on both sides.”\(^{85}\) The king, through his “singular providence of the peaceable government of his people,” proclaimed his contempt for anyone who “shall adventure to stir up or move any new opinions, *not only contrary, but differing* from the sound and orthodox grounds …established in the Church of England.” The king would not allow the “least innovation” in the doctrine and discipline of the Church, or in the government of state. The proclamation closed by demanding that “neither by Writing, Preaching, Printing, Conferences,” should anyone raise any “doubts, or publish, or maintain any new inventions, or opinions concerning Religion, then such as are clearly grounded…[by] the doctrine …of the Church of England.”\(^{86}\)

The proclamation revealed a clear position on public debate and the policy of the king in resolving such disputes. Charles thought it was necessary to ban all public debate on religious matters. He based this policy on the “integrity of his own heart” and his “singular providence of

\(^{83}\) Ibid.


\(^{85}\) Ibid., 91.

\(^{86}\) Ibid., 91, 93.
the peaceable government,” as well as the advice of his bishops.\textsuperscript{87} Most importantly, the proclamation declared that not only it was illegal to contradict the established Church doctrine, but it was also illegal to make any statement “differing” from the established Church doctrine. The wording of the proclamation left the exact meaning open for interpretation, potentially allowing authorities to be more subjective in their application of it. In effect, anything not specifically stated in the authorized public documents of the Church was off limits. Where previous attempts to limit religious debate, such as those issued by James, explained what ministers could not say, Charles’s proclamation seemed to define what clergymen could say based on what was outlined in the public documents of the Church.

Even with its apparently innovative restrictions, however, Charles’s proclamation failed to stem the public debate surrounding the Church of England. William Prynne responded to the 1626 proclamation as well as Montagu’s claims by claiming the \textit{Articles of Dort} were, in fact, authorized documents explaining Church doctrine. They placed a strict Calvinist theory of predestination unambiguously at the heart of the Church of England. Montagu’s dismissal of Dort’s relevance was therefore a false characterization of the Church’s beliefs.\textsuperscript{88} Prynne also defended the official nature of other documents Montagu previously dismissed, such as the \textit{Articles of Lambeth} and the \textit{Articles of Ireland}.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 91.
\textsuperscript{88} Prynne, 214-221, 223
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 223-233.
the Thirty-Nine Articles that Charles’s proclamation banned. Prynne’s work wholly shifted the
debate from one over the exact meaning of Church statements into one over which Church
statements were public and authorized.

Prynne also seconded Burton’s accusation of oppressive censorship. In his dedicatory
appeal to Archbishop Abbot, Prynne claimed that Popish and Arminian books “sweetened,
clothed and gilded over, with the name and countenance of the Doctrine of the Church of
England,” were being “printed and reprinted, sold openly and dispersed publicly without
control.” Meanwhile, he continued, “all such as would confute them can either find no license for
the press.” The few that were secretly produced were “either quelled or smothered” before they
could be published, or called in before they could be dispersed. The agents of authority, “by the
supporting and propagating of the one, and the discountenancing and suppressing of the other,”
betrayed “that truth of God which we have hitherto professed.”90 Prynne and Burton’s assertions
separated defense of truth from the operating agents of authority. These men seized upon a
contemporary rhetoric of separation between true public authority and the private, corrupt
ambition of certain authorities. Though, to Burton at least, the king was the legitimate dispenser
of true public authority, the potential for a separation of that public authority and royal aims
seems obvious.

As stated earlier, this chapter has not attempted to demonstrate that James was an
Arminian or that Montagu was not shifting the definition of “puritan” onto those who believed in
the strict Calvinist understanding of God’s grace. What it has shown is that Montagu, whether
through James’s involvement or not, professed a similar understanding to James about the

90 Prynne, third unnumbered page.
popular teaching of specific points of high-doctrine. They also shared a distinction between private belief and public doctrine, and the danger of creating unnecessary points of possible division in the Church. Though Montagu has been credited with beginning the Arminian revolution in the Church of England, some preaching on finer points of Predestination had to have been causing disturbances prior to *A New Gagg* being published for James to include the topic in his 1622 directions. James’s view was that the fewer points that subjects were required to meet, the smaller the window for unconformity and discontent: to demand conformity on every possible point of doctrine only increased the possibilities of division. Since strict Calvinists believed God inspired the Elect to the same clear conscience on points of religion, any difference in opinion implied that one of the disputants was not a member of God’s True Church (the Elect). Every opinion must either be part of the established orthodoxy of the Church or against it. There was no room for extra-orthodox beliefs within this mindset where every point of religion was truly a fundamental point of salvation. Moderation was possible only to the extent that the king was able to keep the metaphorical line from being drawn in the sand. By perpetuating myths of common belief that kept such divisions from coming to the surface, James managed to do this throughout his reign.

When these unifying myths of common beliefs were challenged, men relied on publicly-accepted, authoritative texts to prove their arguments, and these same texts were used to explain the judgment of whatever judge(s) decided the debate. But when the debate centered on what documents constituted the true publically authorized texts of the Church of England, as it did in Prynne’s response to Montagu, who (or what group) held the public authority to resolve the disagreement without provoking the same accusations of the judge’s private ambitions to overturn the true Protestant Church? The answer was unclear.
Charles helped to create this controversy through the wording of his proclamation declaring nothing outside the established doctrine presented in public Church documents should be printed, bringing exactly which documents contained this doctrine into question. Agreeing to prosecute Montagu, however, would have required Charles to rule that double Predestination was part of the orthodox doctrine of the Church of England. If double Predestination was part of the established orthodoxy of the Church, then every saved soul held equal powers of interpretation and judgment whether clergy or commoner, a position that reeked of Presbyterianism. By refusing to prosecute Montagu, on the other hand, Charles had to deny a theological point Calvinists believed the Church of England previously professed. No moderate solution was available.

Charles did not create these binary choices for himself. He inherited this controversy and the claims of access to public presentation and judgment that stemmed from it. The accusations of censorship began before Charles had even been crowned, but they threatened his relationship with his subjects all the same. In truth, this process of separation and accusation was well under way by the time Prynne’s work was published in 1626. It played out in a political and legal theater filled with natural and religious justifications: in which it was possible for the king to no longer be the idealized dispenser of public authority but a private actor like any other. The following chapters describe how Charles first attempted to win over his audience with the rhetoric and ideology of the stage that he inherited; only to finally realize that to regain his position he must change both the nature of his stage and the make-up and expectations of the audience members themselves.
Chapter II: Politics, Pulpits, and “Public”

A man can scarce allege his own merits with modesty, much less extol them; a man cannot sometimes brook to supplicate or beg; and a number of the like. But all these things are graceful, in a friend’s mouth, which are blushing in a man’s own. So again, a man’s person hath many proper relations, which he cannot put off. A man cannot speak to his son but as a father; to his wife but as a husband; to his enemy but upon terms: whereas a friend may speak as the case requires, and not as it sorteth with the person… I have given the rule, where a man cannot fitly play his own part; if he have not a friend, he may quit the stage.  

Francis Bacon, “On Friendship,” 1625

On June 15, 1626, Charles I dismissed his second parliament in as many years. In the five months they sat, the Commons agreed to supply the king, but also demanded the impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham, Lord Admiral and the king’s favorite. Charles, no matter how desperate for supply, was unwilling to allow his friend to be removed. The “Prince bred in parliaments” sent his subjects’ representatives home, and he and his ministers turned to the difficult task of funding a war with Spain without taxation. With the royal coffers empty, a wild rumor about an eminent Spanish invasion sweeping the country, and parliament apparently unwilling to trust his judgment, Charles resolved to raise his money by appealing directly to his people. This chapter considers the public appeals Charles and his ministers made between 1626 and 1628, examining the language and political contexts of the public and parliamentary debates that threatened Charles’s advisors in 1625 and early 1626 in an attempt to understand the ways

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91 Francis Bacon, Essays (1625), in Bacon’s Essays, ed., Alfred S. West (1897; repr., Cambridge: University Press, 1908), 83.
these early debates influenced the language, form, and philosophy of the crown’s subsequent public appeals.

The proclamations, declarations, instructions, and sermons Charles and his ministers published after June 1626 reveal a shift in the regime’s rhetorical and political strategies. Many recent historians see this as a turn towards a philosophy and rhetoric of kingship that was much closer to Charles’s own personal beliefs, but it was also part of an escalating discussion of Charles’s own authority and actions that contained, at the least, the same rhetoric of distrust and change that justified the religious appeals discussed in Chapter I. The same vague language of private threats to the commonweal from individuals holding public positions that threatened Charles’s spiritual advisors challenged his temporal ministers as well. Charles’s response to these challenges attempted to render his ministers’ motivations beyond question by extending his own personal authority. Instead, Charles’s own intentions and judgments increasingly came into question, leaving his future control over the systems of governance in doubt. The result was a desperate attempt to explain the unquestionable divinity of the monarchy and reconcile the person and actions of the king with the unquestionable authority of his public office.

Charles’s first parliament met on 18 June, 1625. Convened amid a serious outbreak of plague in London, the session seemed rushed from the beginning. Charles opened the meeting by emphasizing the houses’ role in his father’s decision to end the treaties with Spain in 1624, reminding the Commons of their promise “to assist in a parliamentary course” should James break the treaties. Any worries over of the treatment of Catholics or other religious matters should be left to the king himself, Charles told them, and discussions of other grievances must wait for a later session. The king believed the Commons to be “engaged,” or bound by their
honor, to support the war, and claimed it would be a dishonor to him and themselves if they did not keep their word. All of their attention in this brief session should be directed toward meeting this obligation. Where Charles and Buckingham skillfully managed the 1624 parliament by organizing a closely controlled lobby of crown supporters, no similar group was formed prior to the 1625 meeting. According to Cust, Charles believed the MPs would simply honor their oath to his father by providing the monies necessary to fund the war effort, without the lobbying and coercing. Russell, on the contrary, explains that events since the 1624 session made a similar coalition impossible in the tense opening months of Charles’s reign. Regardless of the reason, the lack of prearranged support left the crown with very little control over the 1625 meeting.

Charles’s goal for the 1625 meeting was simple: secure funding for the war as quickly as possible. Almost immediately, however, some MPs proposed an adjournment because of the plague threatening Westminster. Though this attempt failed, the Commons then began discussing the forbidden topic of recusancy laws, basically the laws against Catholics, and proposed a petition on religion that threatened to take up valuable time better spent on supply. When the motion for supply was finally made, it was woefully inadequate. Charles and his ministers were left with little choice but to graciously accept the Commons’ gift.

Initially Charles appeared content to accept the insufficient supply and to allow the MPs to finish their business and leave, but he reversed this position only a few days later. Arguing that additional supply was absolutely necessary to launch the fleet that would implement the MPs preferred “blue-water” strategy, his men in parliament claimed the initial subsidy was accepted as a goodwill gesture, traditionally given at the beginning of new reigns, and that further grants

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93 Cust, Charles I, 45-46.
94 Russell, Parliament, 212-213.
95 Cust, Charles I, 46.
were due to support the war effort. The MPs, their numbers greatly depleted by early departures, refused on a number of grounds. Charles and Buckingham further infuriated the MPs when it was announced that, instead of the dismissal many members anticipated, the meeting would be reconvened in Oxford on 1 August.96

In the twelve days parliament met at Oxford, Charles tried three more times to convince the MPs to grant additional funds. First, he attempted to win support by explaining his military strategy, before moving on to what Cust calls “a harder-nosed approach.”97 The MPs responded by returning to a few members’ earlier suggestion that Charles’s necessities were Buckingham’s fault, this time attacking the duke directly. Attempts to stem the attacks proved useless, and Charles, after talking with his council, dissolved the meeting on August 12.98

In October, Charles and Buckingham launched a failed naval attack on the Spanish at Cadiz. International events in the months that followed the dismissal did little to increase the popular appeal of Charles or his favorite. Along with the failed attack on Cadiz, the crown was seriously embarrassed when several ships loaned to the French earlier in the summer were used to attack Huguenot strongholds in September.99 James initially promised the ships to the French by as part of the marriage treaty, and in July Buckingham was forced to answer MPs’ objections by guaranteeing the ships would not be used against fellow Protestants.100 When they were employed to that very end only a few months later, the diplomatic relationship between the English and their Catholic ally quickly unraveled. By December, Charles’s ministers were

97 Ibid., 48.
98 Ibid., 48-49.
99 Ibid., 50.
negotiating a deal with Huguenot exiles in England for an English fleet to relieve the besieged French Protestants at La Rochelle. The Privy Council approved the plan on December 12, and a few days later, Charles summoned a new parliament for the following February. The king and Buckingham hoped to capitalize on the public outcry over the “loan ships” to present Charles as the defender of the Protestant faith, envisioning the very real possibility of carrying out a popular war.101

Under the impression that the 1625 session went awry because it was misled by a small number of malcontents, Charles and Buckingham took a number of steps to limit the potential grievances, and therefore distracting committees, the new members were likely to raise. Buckingham attempted to solve the Montagu crisis by holding the York House conference, described in the previous chapter, a few days later. Most importantly, Charles tried to prevent a number of those men who most adamantly resisted re-supply, along with those who had attacked Buckingham, from being elected in 1626 by appointing them sheriffs. Unable to leave their county jurisdiction, these malcontents were physically unable to attend the new session. Unfortunately for the crown, any hopes of a popular war ended just before the session met when peace broke out between Louis XIII and the defenders of La Rochelle. When the meeting opened, all the preparations of Charles and Buckingham quickly proved inadequate, as the king’s ministers had no agenda to direct the meeting due to the unexpected peace in France. Left with little to do, the 1626 parliament focused their attention on the failures of the previous year, eventually challenging the Duke of Buckingham directly.102

101 Cust, Charles I, 51.

Though the MPs picked up where the 1625 meeting left off by attacking the king’s favorite, Charles allowed them to continue. In April, the Commons agreed to grant Charles a total of four subsidies, and set the timetable for their collection. As Charles’s published account later explained to his subjects, the king immediately turned “to the Lords committees and the Council of War to hasten their resolutions…for his designs.”\textsuperscript{103} Everything was quickly prepared, according to the king, leaving “but want of money to put things into action.” Charles, expecting “that which they had promised,” appealed to the Commons to hurry the supply, and “laid before them truly and clearly how the state of things stood.”\textsuperscript{104} The House, however, “being abused by the violent and ill-advised passions of a few members” refused to close their proceedings. According to the king’s explanation, these factionalists were driven by “private and personal ends…ill-beseeming public persons trusted by their Country, as they then were.”\textsuperscript{105} Under the perverted influence of these men, the House would not proceed with anything but “the prosecution of one of the Peers of this Realm.”\textsuperscript{106} Even after Charles sent the House a public letter clearly explaining that their actions prevented the delivery of the money they had promised by the date they themselves previously prescribed, the House “never so much as permitted one reading of the Bill of Subsidy.”\textsuperscript{107} Left with no choice, the king, with “unexpressible grief,” dissolved the parliament on June 15.\textsuperscript{108}

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\textsuperscript{103} Charles I, \textit{A Declaration of the Cause which moved his Majestie to assemble and after inforced him to dissolve the last two meetings in parliament} (London:1626),18.
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\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 18,19.
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\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 19, 21.
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\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 24.
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\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 25.
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Cust argues the 1625 and 1626 parliaments were a pivotal point in the politics of Charles’s reign. For him, the new king’s failures in these two meetings “marked the point at which his honeymoon with the English people and his hopes of partnership with the House of Commons came unstuck.” Regardless of the eventual role these failures played in Charles’s later reign, the real question seems to be why were Charles and his ministers so spectacularly unsuccessful in the 1625 and 1626 parliaments? Russell and other revisionists blame the Commons’ unwillingness to financially support the war after urging the crown into it on their obsession with local concerns that made them unwilling to vote away more of their constituents’ money. He explains the 1626 attack on Buckingham as a combination of French interference, court conflicts over local and international politics, and religious distrust.

Cogswell counters this argument, claiming the Commons’ refusal was the result of the crown’s failure to meet MPs’ expectations by redressing their grievances and carrying out the “blue water” strategy it supported in 1624. For Cogswell, the problems Charles faced in parliament were the result of the type of war he was waging and its lack of success. Cust, though he seems to agree with Cogswell, places most of the blame on Charles’s shoulders, seeing the king’s inflexibility and lack of judgment as the root problem with parliament. Where Russell argued that Charles’s repeated attempts to convince parliament proved his commitment to their place in government, Cust concludes that the new king’s belief in 1626 that the Commons was out of control and his willingness to accept the possibility of “new councils” afterwards its dissolution were ominous signs. Instead of Russell’s acceptance of the “prince

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bred in parliaments,” Cust explains that Charles’s “enthusiasm for parliaments was strictly conditional, dependent on their displaying a degree of submissiveness and docility that was at odds with many of the political conventions of the period.” The next section explores the political “conventions” Cust describes through the language of “public” and “private” used by the men in the parliamentary debates between 1625 and 1626.

II. Parliamentary Language and public men, 1625-1626

The tumultuous events and unhappy conclusions of the 1625 and 1626 parliaments did not mark the end, as Cust claims, of Charles’s honeymoon with his subjects. Instead, it seems more accurate to describe his relationship with the English people as an intensely passionate courtship followed by a marriage marred by suspicion from the moment of consummation. The honeymoon lasted less than two months. The possible terms of Charles’s French match were already the subject of some popular anxiety prior to James’s death in late March, 1625, and constant delays between the marriage announcement in May and Henrietta Maria’s arrival in June allowed English imaginations to discern any number of secret motives behind them. Charles, as part of the agreement, suspended the laws against Catholic recusants on May 1. He and Henrietta Maria were married by proxy the same day. The suspension not only allowed the ceremony to take place, but also secured the first half of the queen’s dowry. Charles, simultaneously organizing and financing an elaborate funeral for his father and a war against Spain, desperately needed the money. Still, the suspension was guaranteed to be unpopular in England, particularly during a war against Catholic ambitions. Parliament was initially scheduled

to open in mid-May, but the queen’s slow pace forced Charles to delay the meeting for nearly a month. The MPs gathering in London, with little to do but wait amid the steadily increasing number of plague victims, were predictably suspicious of the delays. Charles finally met both his brides in June 1625 after waiting on the French for over a month. Unfortunately for Charles, both relationships began with sullen partners, and in the months to come, it proved nearly impossible for the king to live with both of them at the same time.114

An increase in the already widely held anti-Catholic sentiment accompanied the beginning of the war with Spain. Every unusual facet of the queen’s journey became a topic of concern among Charles’s Protestant subjects. The famous epistolary writer John Chamberlain described the fears many Englishmen felt in May 1625, writing “most think… that her [Henrietta Maria] setting forth is so long and so often deferred [because] somewhat more is to be performed for the Catholic cause before we shall see her.”115 Many believed more than the suspension of the recusancy laws was promised to the French as part of the marriage alliance. For Chamberlain, concessions to the French were just as unacceptable and as dangerous as those secretly proposed and narrowly avoided during the Spanish negotiations two years earlier. As Chamberlain dryly explained it, “thus, we are out of the frying pan into the fire.”116

When Charles met his subjects in Westminster on June 18, however, it was not the threat of Chamberlain’s papist fire, but the plague sweeping through London that created the anxious atmosphere that characterized the remainder of the 1625 session.117 Still, it was not long before the recusancy laws became an issue. After an opening prayer asking the Lord to, among other

116 Ibid.
117 Cust, Charles I, 44.
things, “remove from us...all covetous humor of advancing our own private profits,” Charles began the session by reminding the houses of their previous engagement to support the war. He also reminded them of his own zealous dedication to the True Religion, hoping to reassure those who “think him not so true a keeper of religion.” Thomas Crew addressed the recusancy laws a short time later in Speaker’s customary appeal to request the four traditional petitions granted at the beginning of parliament. Lord Keeper Williams, speaking for the king, granted all of the petitions including “unity of persons,” which presumably acknowledged the house as a body whose members could not be prosecuted individually. In return, Williams told the Speaker, the king asked the MPs to “commit to him [Charles] that which God has committed already– a care of the maintaining of the true religion.”

The Commons denied Charles’s request almost immediately. Taking up the issue of the recusancy laws and a petition on religion among their initial debates, they called Richard Montagu in on July 8. The king responded, as discussed in Chapter I, that Montagu was his Chaplain-in-Ordinary and therefore his personal servant, asking the MPs to leave the matter to him. After the move to Oxford, the mood of the house was noticeably more contentious, and on the second day in their new home, they called Montagu in again. The debate that followed, and the MPs’ reaction to the king’s request, indicated a great deal about the relationship between the king’s private servants and the public offices of both the king and MPs. Specifically, it


119 Ibid., 657.

120 Ibid., 652.

121 Ibid., 653.

122 Ibid., 653.

123 Ibid., 378-383.
suggests common conceptions of what it meant to be a “public” or “private” servant, painting a clear picture of the rhetorical and philosophical lines taken up by both the crown and its critics in the following months.

On 2 August, after the House’s attention was redirected to Montagu, Edward Coke began the debate by discussing the threat posed by divisions over religion. In Coke’s words, the ancient Britons were conquered by “the want of united counsels,” and the same disease threatened to destroy their modern descendents “in divinity if every private man may put out books of divinity.” Coke closed by suggesting “no man may put out any books of divinity not allowed by the Convocation.” Robert Phelips followed with the motion that the Serjeant bring Montagu in, but Solicitor Heath attempted to cut him off by reminding the house of the king’s earlier statement that Montagu was his servant.

Edward Alford was the first to respond to Heath, and his remarks are revealing. Though the manuscript of the Commons Journal reports that Alford “put the House in mind of the danger to exempt the King’s servants from questioning,” the Bedford manuscript gives a more detailed account of Alford’s words. After bringing up three precedents in which the House was dissatisfied with the king’s actions after James made similar requests, Alford said “all justices of peace, all deputy lieutenants are the King’s servants, and indeed no man can commit a public [offense] but by color and opportunity of public employment and service to the King.” “If we admit this,” Alford continued, “we shall take the way to destroy parliaments.”

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124 Ibid., 378.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., 379.
Thomas Wentworth picked up where Alford left off, putting “the House in mind of the Lord Chancellor and Treasurer whom the House has dealt with.” Wentworth was referring to the impeachment of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor in 1621 and Lionel Cranfield, Lord Treasurer in 1624. In both cases, being the king’s servant did not protect the men from impeachment.

Wentworth went on to describe Montagu’s offenses as, though they might be called the offenses of a private man, similar to recent incidents where impassioned preachers had physically defiled the Bible itself. In these cases, according to Wentworth, “if they were not punished by authority, by private faults, [they] would become public.” Where Wentworth claimed a private man could commit a public offense, Alford’s position relating all public servants to Charles’s private servants was much more dangerous to the king’s control of both his household and the government. In Alford’s view, all Charles’s servants were public, and allowing the king to protect his personal servants would also allow him to extend this private status to protect all public officials from parliamentary inquiry. From both sides of this debate, then, there was an emerging concern with the exact public and private nature of the king’s place in the commonweal, not just in the debate surrounding Montagu, but in all of the major issues before the MPs in 1625.

Such concern was evident in the revolutionary tone of Sir Robert Phelips’s speech. Phelips began by attributing their being called to Oxford to “a miracle,” since, as Eliot quoted him, “no servant of the King’s, no minister of state (if they must be distinguished) but approved

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128 Ibid., 382. Italics mine. The manuscript reads “officer,” but the editors agree that “offense” is truer to Alford’s meaning.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid., 379, n. 9.

131 Ibid., 382.
of what they had done” in giving the initial subsidies.\textsuperscript{132} Phelips suggested that Alford was correct to point out the unity of the king’s personal servants and the minister of state, who were obviously public men. Clearly, MPs were aware of the threat posed by the possibility that the king could extend the title of “personal servant” to any man, but the opposite was also true, meaning parliament held the power to question any servant of the king. Phelips’s use of the word “state” reflected part of this ambiguity by pointing out the absurdity of an artificial separation of the king’s servants and those of the state.

Interestingly, the obscurity Phelips pointed out between the “king” and the “state” was perfectly, though unintentionally, captured in the written reports of the speeches following that of Phelips. After an appeal by Sir Richard Weston, Chancellor of the Exchequer, begging those who would not be convinced of the king’s true necessity to consider his honor as well, Sir Edward Coke stood to speak on the matter for the second time.\textsuperscript{133} Coke began by reminding the house of the ordinance from the reign of Henry IV stating “no man should inform the King of any man’s speech in parliament.” The king could only be informed of the “direction of the house,” or its conclusions.\textsuperscript{134} Arguing the king’s present necessity to be a lesser form than those of previous occasions for supply, Coke claimed that “no king can subsist in an honorable estate without three abilities: 1, to maintain himself against sudden invasions; 2, to aid his allies and confederates; 3, to reward his well-deserving servants.”\textsuperscript{135} Necessity, Coke explained, had always been given and often abused as the argument for supply, calling it “a brazen wall”

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 540.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 543.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 398-399.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 392. This is the text in the \textit{Commons’ Journal}.
growing “by want of providence.”\textsuperscript{136} The king should be able to subsist on his own revenue as his ancestors did, but Coke argued that abuses in the king’s household prevented him from doing so. Coke’s response to rhetorical claims of necessity was to recommend instead a total reformation of the king’s household, including the proposal that the “customs and revenues of the kingdom be not employed for the maintenance of the king’s house and other private charges, but for the defense of the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{137}

Coke proceeded to outline a proposal for an important and ambitious plan amounting to total financial reform. Calling it “a major state paper” rather than a mere speech, Russell notes that its importance is underlined by the fact that more records of it survive than any other speech presented in 1625.\textsuperscript{138} The exact wording of the speech, however, differs from one recording to the next in ways that are intriguing. In all accounts, Coke began with some variation of the suggestion that, in lieu of supply, previous parliaments asked people “to pray for the state and happiness of his Majesty, the peace and good governance of the kingdom, and the preservation of unity and love between his subjects and himself.”\textsuperscript{139} Still, his point about the king’s three required abilities, the three things a king must be able to do, was not uniformly recorded in the language of the Commons’ Journal quoted above. Eliot remembered Coke as saying “three things…were requisite to a king and for those there must be a constant ability in the state.”\textsuperscript{140}

The anonymous notes in the Tanner manuscript collection and the Carreg-lwyd deposit in the

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 399. This is from the Bedford manuscript.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 659.

\textsuperscript{138} Russell, Parliament, 244.

\textsuperscript{139} Proceedings in Parliament, 1625, 544. This is Eliot’s account. All of the various accounts mentioned are included in this collection.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 545.
National Library of Wales both read “No king can subsist unless he be able to…,” closely mirroring the Commons’ Journal. The Petyt manuscript, on the other hand, begins much differently. It reads “no state can subsist of himself in an honorable estate except it has 3 things.”

Though the editors of Proceedings in Parliament suggest “himself” should be replaced with “itself” for the sake of clarity, the ambiguous antecedent in the original text is consistent with the idea that there was no clear, commonly-held distinction among the king, his ‘estate,’ the ‘state of the king,’ assumedly a physical reference to his person, and ‘the state.’ Saying “no state can subsist of himself in an honorable estate” suggested a unity of the king’s person and the state that was not at all the same as the relationship between the two implied in Eliot’s “requisite to a king and for those there must be a constant ability in the state.” In the former, the king and the state cannot easily be separated, whereas the later clearly implies a state that was independent from, though presumably serving as a tool of, the king himself.

Seymour had previously pointed out the lack of concrete and commonly understood divisions between the king’s person and the state by questioning any distinction between the king’s servants and ministers of the state, which appears in both the language of the surviving records of Coke’s speech and his suggestions regarding the king’s duties. If, as Coke suggested, the king was supposed to support his allies, defend the realm from sudden invasion, and reward his servants’ performance out of his own revenue, then there was no difference between the general good the king’s personal revenues served in funding his government and the king’s

141 Ibid., 658-660.
142 Ibid., 404.
143 Ibid., 404, 545.
private estate funded by those same revenues.\textsuperscript{144} This seems to be consistent with the unity of the king’s person and private household and the state, or public service, which Seymour suggested earlier. Still, Coke claimed revenues and customs should not be used to service the “king’s house and private charges,” but in defense of the kingdom, and though this seems to be contradictory, Coke was implying the king’s private existence to be separate from the personalized state that served him, both of which served a larger public and were somehow answerable to it.\textsuperscript{145}

Heath’s answer to Coke’s speech makes this interpretation clear. Heath began, according to the Petyt manuscript, by explaining he had two “parts to act, one as a private man and the servant of his Majesty; the other as a public man speaking for the public good,” as he was then doing.\textsuperscript{146} He went on to explain the necessity for supply was real, and “concerns the kingdom as well as the King for he would never sever them.”\textsuperscript{147} These words almost perfectly summarize the points laid out above. In the debates and proceedings of 1625, the words used by both the king’s ministers and his opponents describe an understanding of public service separated from the service of both the king and the state, in spite of the remarkable ambiguity regarding the relationship between the two. Heath’s preamble, however, begs the question of when an individual acted on his public duty and when he acted in the service of his patron as a private man? Heath asked the Commons to direct their attention to the “general” before turning to the “particular,” perhaps suggesting a depersonalized role for parliament as opposed to the very personalized role of the king.\textsuperscript{148} Still, the king, according to Heath, was not the embodiment of

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 399.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 659.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 405.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 406.
the kingdom, and could theoretically “sever” his concerns from those of his subjects. Judging from Coke’s position, the kingdom’s interest was necessarily part of the king’s interest. The king’s interest, on the contrary, could have no relationship with that of the public at large.

Heath’s appeal, predictably, had little effect on the Commons’ willingness to grant the king the additional subsidies he claimed to need, and Charles dissolved the session without receiving additional supply. The Cadiz expedition went ahead, undermanned and under supplied, and returned to England under the shameful veil of defeat just as the king and his ministers were preparing for the new parliament scheduled for February. Reports of the events in Spain, and the popular opinion they informed, were not kind to those in command. On January 19, in a letter to Carleton, Chamberlain described the public reaction to the previous year’s failures. “Some lay the blame on the design or council,” he said, while others placed the burden on “the soldiers; on their general, Viscount Sit-still (as they now style him).” “Most [men],” however, blamed “his Grace,” the Duke of Buckingham, for the expedition’s failure.149 Chamberlain followed his report with what appears in hindsight to be an insightful word of caution. “I look for no good out of this parliament,” he told Carleton, “the world being so far out of tune in every way.”150

In addition to being the object of almost universal blame for the defeat at Cadiz, Buckingham also faced questions surrounding his ability to handle foreign affairs as a result of the shift in policy toward France.151 The Duke’s closest rival at court and on the Privy Council,

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148 Ibid., 547.

149 Birch, Court and Times, 72. “Viscount Sit-still” refers to Lord Edward Cecil, commander of the Cadiz expedition.

150 Ibid.

151 Cust, Charles I, 52.
the Earl of Pembroke, disagreed with the hostile new policy toward France and seized the opportunity to challenge Buckingham’s nearly total control of policy and patronage.\footnote{Russell, Parliaments, get cite.} When the Commons began calling the duke’s policies into question in late February, Pembroke quietly supported their efforts in the Lords, while his clients in the lower house worked more openly to reduce the duke’s place. The initial challenge to Buckingham came from Sir John Eliot, who questioned Buckingham’s arrest of a French merchant ship, the St. Peter, after it was discharged by the Court of Admiralty.\footnote{Birch, Court and Times, 83-84.}

Buckingham answered the Commons’ questions regarding his conduct toward the St. Peter on March 6. Heath delivered the message to the house, explaining that Buckingham had acted under Charles’s direction, the king having given him “express commandment to stay the ship.”\footnote{Proceedings in Parliament, 1626, vol. II, 204-205.} Heath presented a narrative of the information available to the king and the Lord Admiral as they made each important decision regarding the vessel, describing the contradictory actions as the result of new information becoming available to the duke.\footnote{Ibid., 205, 210-211.}

At the same time, the Commons was attempting to call the Council of War in to answer questions about the planning of the war up to that point. When the Council answered in a single, unified reply that the Commons had no right to question the king’s council, the MPs immediately declared such an answer unsatisfactory, but had trouble determining a course of action without returning to debate their previously declared dissatisfaction with the initial answer. Debating a position that the House had already spoken on would divide the members of the Commons from the voice that spoke for the entire body, which was unacceptable. Eventually agreeing to call the
members of the Council of War in separately to be questioned, the Commons met with similarly
vague responses from almost all of the members: ironically similar to the MPs’ determination to
speak as a whole. Sir John Ogle was the first called into the chamber, answering that “he may not
be put to sever and contrary himself from the rest.”

Similarly, George Carew, Earl of Totnes,
explained “that they made a unanimous answer,” asking the Council be given time to review it.
“If there shall be cause,” the seventy year old Carew concluded, “they may unanimously reform
it.”

Lord Vere merely explained he was out of the country, and could not answer, while Oliver
St. John, Viscount Grandison simply held that they were not bound to any other answer.

Only Sir Robert Mansell specifically recognized the houses’ right to a particular answer, but even he
sought to protect his “reputation [as a] discreet man.” Since he was “one of the Council of
War,” Mansell lamented, he was “a sworn servant of the King.”

Rather than be pressed to a particular answer, Mansell asked for “leave to know the King’s pleasure.”

Much like the MPs’ unwillingness to speak against the House’s singular voice by
debating previously resolved issues, the Council of War largely answered that they spoke as a
unanimous whole. Sir Edward Coke’s reminder in 1625 that the king was only to be informed of
parliament’s conclusions, rather than any individual’s speech within their deliberations, protected
free speech within the chamber in the same way.

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156 Ibid., 242.
157 Ibid., 239, 242.
158 Ibid., 241, 242.
159 Ibid., 242.
160 Ibid., 239.
161 Ibid., 242.
servants received at the beginning of each session helped ensure their freedom to speak their mind in the chamber. Parliament, like the Council answering their inquiry, was indivisible by those outside of its body, secretly deliberating then speaking in a unified voice. This was most likely what Lord Keeper William referred to when he granted the 1625 session “unity of persons.” The MPs and their servants were inseparable from the whole body of the House, but what about the king’s other councils? When the Council of War returned to the chamber a few days later on March 11 to give individual, written answers, each of them returned the same reply, explaining the king permitted them to “give account of their warrants for the issuing of money, but not their counsels.”

On March 11, just after informing the Council of War that they were no longer needed, Eliot delivered the report of the Commons committee appointed to review the St. Peter case. The committee claimed Heath’s defense of the duke’s action contained two parts: the inducement, information provided to the duke, and the command, the king’s order to arrest the ship. The committee determined that the arrest of the ship was grounds for a grievance because the king’s command to “stay…[was] not justifiable because an order at Council Board and a decree ought not to have been contradicted but by the like authority and advice.” Clearly, the MPs suggested that, though the Court of Admiralty acted from the king’s authority, his personal authority could not justifiably undermine one of their orders without their consent. The stakes of such a declaration were clear: though the judicial and governmental apparatuses operated in the king’s name, they were beyond his personal authority and control, even in so-called “matters of

163 Ibid., 653.
165 Ibid., 264.
state.” For Charles, it was a dangerous distinction that threatened his control of both his crown and the state.

At the same time, an altogether different controversy in the House of Lords generated similar comments. From the beginning of the session, Charles attempted to keep the Earl of Bristol, the Duke of Buckingham’s primary accuser, from taking his seat. At the same time, he arrested the Earl of Arundel for opposing his orders by encouraging a marriage that Charles had forbidden. The members of the House of Lords, however, interpreted both situations to be part of the same attack on their privileges and the unity of their body. When the Lords objected to these two gentlemen being deprived, the king responded that Arundel was “restrained for a misdemeanor which was personal unto His Majesty, and lay in the proper knowledge of His Majesty.” 166 Forced to send Bristol a writ of summons, the king’s secretary sent one explaining that the king’s “meaning thereby is not to discharge any former direction to restraint.” 167 Charles’s contradictory statements did little to help his cause. In both cases, the king was forced to explain his decisions by emphasizing a distinction between the maintenance of his person or estate and the common good as recognized by the MPs. In the end, Charles lost on all accounts. Bristol and Arundel both came to the house and Charles eventually dissolved parliament.

It is perhaps easiest to make sense of the rhetoric and ideas described here by turning to a contemporary whose writing the MPs and ministers knew well. In 1623, Thomas Scott wrote from exile that a “private person is he that hath no direct or public calling to the action he undertakes.” For Scott, any public person, from the king to a local magistrate, who carried out


167 Ibid., 45.
“any act of Justice without Law...lays by the prerogative and dignity of a public person and acts the part of a private man.”168 Scott claimed the law determined what was public and proper, and therefore, as Lake puts it, “authority exercised outside the limits set by the law became ‘private’ and hence illegitimate.”169 These beliefs were entirely conventional, but for Scott, even those public men who laid aside “their swords & maces (the ensigns of their offices)” became private men “until they assume those types of their authority again.”170 The performance of public authority required the appropriate costume.

The law, for Scott, was the “will of the State,” and the king executed the law as the head of the state. “When they do their own wills,” Scott explained, “and not the will of the state (that is the law) then they become private persons in those particulars, because they cease to be executors of the law.”171 The king must act and be judged in public, make himself known to his subjects, and receive approval from the “state representative (that is the parliament).”172 Parliament, then, was the ‘state’ embodied: a microcosm of the public forum, whose will determined the proper actions of public officials. Charles’s private affairs, such as his marriage, were public affairs because his person was so important to the commonwealth. Indeed, no individual at all, public or private, had power over his own body, each being part of the commonwealth.173 As Lake succinctly puts it, the practical application of Scott’s “rigid


169 Lake, 814.

170 Scott, *Vox Dei*, 19.

171 Ibid., 20.

172 Lake, 815.

dichotomy” between public and private “left little room for the excise of the king’s judgment or initiative.”  

It also left the office of the king as an entirely public position, filled by a man who must publically perform his office like any other.

Charles, his ministers, and the MPs they appealed to in 1625 and 1626 seemed to agree that the king could act in his own interest, going against the public good. To do was the hallmark of a tyrant, however, and Charles’s ministers emphasized the connection between the king’s interests and those of the state or commonweal. Heath’s answer to Edward Coke was one example. Still, in early 1626, the crown acknowledged, if only rhetorically, it was theoretically possible for the king to act outside his public office. Following the end of the 1626 session, the crown’s position changed. Only one year later in November 1627, Heath himself famously dismissed the possibility when defending the government during the Five Knight Case.

Writing in the 1590s, James, as discussed earlier, advised his son to speak differently in his council than in his official role as king. He told his son to “reason pleasantly and patiently, not like a king, but like a private man and a scholar” when in his councils, “otherwise, your impatience of contradiction will be interpreted to be for lack of reason on your part.”

By the time of James’s death, this binary view of kingship created difficulty for public men who were unable to carry out their official duty if their actions and motivations were open to the public eye. While Scott’s theory essentially made everything and everyone public, or open to public inspection, Francis Bacon suggested a man, whether king or commoner, could only speak in the part he played. Strangely, if Scott made everything public, Bacon’s comments can be interpreted as suggesting the almost the polar opposite. As Bacon explained it, “a man cannot speak to his

175 Bacon, 83.
son but as a father; to his wife but as a husband; to his enemy but upon terms.” Bacon acknowledged public existence was impossible to separate from personal relationships. He implied a unity of personal and public that was essentially the converse, mirror image of the Calvinist connection between one’s outward person and interior self produced by Scott. If Scott’s world was entirely public, Bacon’s was entirely personal. Though a man must speak from within his role, Bacon concluded, “a friend may speak as the case requires, and not as it sorteth with the person.” Charles, throughout the initial years of his reign, cast his friends in such roles. As they were increasingly linked with his person, however, his own judgment and rule came under criticism, as described in the preceding pages. Bacon’s final words now seem prescient: “I have given the rule, where a man cannot fitly play his own part; if he has not a friend, he may quit the stage.”

III. Print, Public Appeals, Religion, and the Forced Loan, 1626-1628

Charles probably felt little desire to reason pleasantly or patiently with his subjects in June 1626, but he did not immediately turn away from public attempts to win his subjects’ support. The government’s account of the drama of the 1626 parliament, quoted above, appeared on June 30. Explaining that the MPs were driven by “private and personal ends” that were “ill-beseeming public persons trusted by their Country, as they then were,” the official explanation was a simple narrative of the events that led to his dismissal of parliament, for which there was

176 Ibid.

177 Bacon, 83.

178 Cust, *Forced Loan*, 18. There is no day of publication printed on the original.
no alternative. It set the king up as the defender of the public good, while explaining the dismissal was absolutely necessary for the good of the commonweal. It turned the accusations made against Charles in the 1625 session on their head, publically claiming that rather than a king acting in his personal interest against the commonweal, private MPs instead rejected their duty as “public men.” The explanation of necessity was also consistent with the approach his councilors took in the last days of the 1625 parliament when they pled necessity and expedience almost constantly and apparently unconvincingly. In 1626, however, Charles’s narrative was part of a larger effort to solve the problem that has historically defined Charles’s reign: how to raise money for the crown outside the traditional avenue of parliament.

After the dismissal of parliament in June 1626, Charles and his advisors attempted several different methods of extracting money from the people. In July, Charles’s ministers sent directions to the Justices of the Peace in various counties for the collection of the benevolence. These instructions informed the judges exactly how they should approach the people to request that they contribute to the crown. The document reminded the Justices of the Commons’ original grant of the money “not for our own private use, but for the common safety of us and our people.” Though the crown was assured the money would be delivered, “the disordered passion of some members of that house, contrary to the good inclination of the graver and wiser sort…misled themselves and others,” forcing the king to dissolve the meeting. The people

179 Charles I, *Declaration of Causes*, 16.

180 Ibid.


183 Ibid., 47.
would certainly understand the pressing needs that led the government to take such drastic measures. Though such desperate times threatened the common safety, and “might justly warrant” the king “to take any ways more extraordinary and less indifferent to any part thereof,” the king hoped to approach his people in “that way which might be most equal and acceptable unto them.” In other words, though he could have justifiably taken more extreme measures, the king chose the method he thought least imposing. “In a case of such unavoidable necessity,” the king wanted his people “to be a law unto themselves,” freely giving as if compelled by the formal law that was intended.  

Charles’s reasoning had little impact on his subjects. Mede reported on July 24 that when the subsidy-men were called to Westminster concerning the collection of the benevolence, “all of them (saving some thirty amongst five hundred, all of them the king’s servants) began to cry ‘a parliament! A parliament!’” Meetings in Middlesex “and five or six” other places followed a similar script, Mede reporting that “many more [were] said to refuse than grant.” In Kent, “the whole county denied” by turning Charles’s appeal for them to be “a law unto themselves” on its head. According to Mede, the Kentish delegates claimed “that subsidies were matters of too high a nature for them to with.”

After a failed request for a “benevolence” or free gift from the people, which was wholly against statutes, and a traditional Privy Seal loan, which was too slow coming in, a more innovative punitive loan based on the structure of a Privy Seal loan was devised. By the time

\[\text{184 Ibid.} \]
\[\text{185 Birch, Court and Times, 130-131.} \]
\[\text{186 Ibid., 131.} \]
\[\text{187 Ibid.} \]
the council began the process of implementing this loan, however, a foreign policy crisis forced
the crown to adopt much more innovative techniques. In addition to recording the dissent
accompanying the benevolence, Mede also reported the king’s dislike and distrust of his wife’s
French entourage. In September, he claimed the English ambassador to Louis XIII had been
mistreated by the French, and that the French king sent new ambassadors to report on the
escalating disagreement over the queen’s household. One of these men, Count de Tillieres, was
formerly the Lord Chamberlain of the Queen’s Household, only recently removed by Charles
himself. The king forbade the count from setting foot in England, further fueling the flames of an
already dangerous breach between the two crowns. Charles, already facing the problem of supply
and dissention among his subjects, confronted several serious diplomatic crises, just as his
domestic policies placed him in no positions to redress them.

On September 11, news of Christian of Denmark’s defeat at the Battle of Lutter reached
England. Mede relayed the bad news only a few days later on September 15. Charles was
sworn to supply his uncle, and, though he had done everything in his power to meet his
obligations, his payments were inconsistent from the start. Charles, possibly already weary of
his people and parliament, felt his honor was at stake. Charles’s subjects also heard about the
defeat. The same day he conveyed the news of the defeat, Mede described the total failure of
Charles’s attempts to raise funds through traditional Privy Seal loans. According to Mede,

189 Birch, *Court and Times*, 133-134.
190 Ibid., 145-146.
191 Ibid., 148.
Englishmen saw no other way for the king to raise the monies he needed except by calling another parliament, though many knew the king hoped to find another way.\footnote{Birch, \textit{Court and Times}, 148.} A few days later, their questions were answered when they received a request for a different type of loan: one that famously came to be described as the Forced Loan.\footnote{Ibid.}

Soon after the news of Christian’s defeat at Lutter reached England, the “Forced Loan” was conceived as a means of providing the immediate funds necessary to rescue the Danish king. The initial directions for the collection of the loan closely followed the same line as the orders for the benevolence the preceding summer. The king’s subjects “shall be truly informed from us of what importance and of what necessity” forced the crown to impose the loan them.\footnote{Cust, \textit{Forced Loan}, 40-43.} After explaining parliament’s failures and the unique necessities of the situation, the king assured his people:

\begin{quote}
We faithfully promise and undertake on the royal word of a King, (which we will be jealous not to break with our people), that not a penny of those monies…shall be bestowed or expended but \textit{upon those public and general services only, wherein everyone of them and the whole body of the kingdom, their wives, children, and posterity, have their personal and common interest.}\footnote{Gardiner, 52.}\end{quote}

The king, without explicitly saying so, as he had previously, swore that the funds were not for his personal use, but only for the public interest that affected every subject’s personal interest.

Charles’s council apparently knew the loan would not be well-received, and they immediately appealed to the ministers of the Church of England for support. Explaining how
close the Church and state were, differentiated “only in matters of civil and religious ends.”
Charles’s request described the way the Church called upon the state when “pressed beyond her
strength.” 198 This same call was often made by the state, asking the Church to “teach that duty
which her members know not, and to exhort them to, and encourage them, in that duty which
they know.” 199 Reminding the clergy how “not long since we ordered the State to preserve the
Church, and by a timely proclamation settled the peace of it,” now the state needed assistance in
return. The clergy and ministers should “serve God and Us by preaching peace and unity at
home.” 200 Charles told the clergy how desperate the international situation was, and how
necessary speedy supply was to the safety of both Church and state. “Neither may you forget,”
he reminded the ministers, “to inform the people committed to your charge, that this war…was
not entered rashly and without advice…but by the council of both Houses of parliament them
sitting.” 201 The king, Charles claimed, “cannot be left in that business but with the sin and shame
of all men.” It was a sin “because aide and supply for the defense of the kingdom, and the like
affairs of state, especially those advised by parliamentary council, are due to the king from his
people by law both of God and men.” 202 If the clergy preached unity and charity, “the mother of
[unity],” Charles had no doubt that God would bless the people “with that love to himself, to his

198 Instructions Directed from the King’s Most Excellent Majesty Unto All the Bishops of this Kingdom
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid., 2.
201 Ibid., 6-7.
202 Ibid., 7.
Church, and to their own preservation, which alone will be able to bind up the divided affections.”

The protests that followed the loan more than proved the crown’s fears well-founded. Mede called the loan a “pressed subsidy,” describing the way it was implemented through the traditional subsidy-men. First enacted in several parts of Westminster, Mede claimed it was greeted by multiple riots, most notably in the St. Clement’s area. As the loan was expanded to areas farther from London, Mede relayed the crown’s attempts to persuade the public by sending three members of the Council to every shire, hoping to convince men to support the loan. Just as the crown sent councilors out in support of the loan, Mede reported those against it sent advisors out into the counties to meet the loans as well. The men in charge of the resistance were the same men that previously opposed the duke in parliament, according to Mede’s account, men like Dr. Samuel Turner, who combined their attack on the loan with a full scale assault on the duke. If Mede’s sources are to be believed, the campaign was extremely effective. Londoners talked of little but the duke’s disdain for parliament, and his determination to raise the money through extra-parliamentary methods.

Mede himself confirmed this on November 11, when he claimed that a “scurvy” book called *The Duke and The Devil* was in great demand among the booksellers in St. Paul’s churchyard. Indeed, it was the same year when the author of *The Forerunner of Revenge*
famously blamed Buckingham for James’s death, simultaneously painting Charles as either an
unwitting accomplice or out and out co-conspirator. More indirect attacks on the duke were
propagated in print by men like Edward Sutton, whose description of “base, creeping flattery”
pointed out that Alexander the Great was poisoned by his cupbearer. Sutton described
flatterers as “the earwig of the mighty” and the “ordinary disease of kings.” These men, he
explained will advise the king to raise money in any number of illegal ways, “always
disgraceful,” using news to their own advantage while tilting it to disparage others. Readers
surely understood the aim of these attacks, leaving little surprise that the duke became such an
unpopular figure as the events of 1626 unfolded.

Sutton’s measured attack showed the hallmarks of being motivated by those within the
regime. Though he attacked flatters within the court, he explained each man should hold himself
within his own position, not seeking to judge those above him. None should be so base, he
continued, as to appeal to the “senseless multitude,” appeals to the “scum of the people” being
one of the most distinct characteristics of a flatter. Sutton later explained that “things
determined should not be related but to those whom without they cannot be effected.” Still,
Sutton’s attack highlighted many of the beliefs conjured in support of the crown’s opponents in

208 Ibid., 169.
211 Ibid., 9-10.
212 Ibid., 17-19.
213 Ibid., 22.
214 Ibid., 26, 40.
215 Ibid., 37.
the previous months, claiming “all at court run after their own prosperity.” Only those whose own house was in order, Sutton concluded, could sit in judgment of others: only a “clean hand could cleanse.” This final assault implicated not only the duke, whose mother and step-father were known papists, but, given the popular knowledge of the king’s troubled family, most likely drew readers’ thoughts to Charles’s own judgment as well.

Such connections between the duke and the king were not uncommon in 1626. Though another letter writer reported in early November “the Lords have not imprisoned any for refusing the subsidy, though it is said to be the king’s express command,” another of Mede’s informers wrote the same day that “the bold speakers begin to go to the pound.” Specifically, a “Captain Brodeman was sent to the Gatehouse…for speaking more than his part,” which the writer described as bordering on remarks punishable by death. The writer told Mede that though he could not repeat the man’s words, the Captain “is taught better manners, to put a greater difference hereafter between a duke and a king.” Obviously, not all of the popular reaction to the loans was focused on Buckingham, and though the majority of the outcry was focused on the duke, it would be shortsighted to dismiss any implicit connection to the king.

It was, of course, no coincidence that men like Turner and Brodeman began to speak out more frequently in November. On October 28, just after the local resistance around Westminster in mid-October, the judges refused to subscribe to the loan’s legality. In the following weeks, a

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216 Ibid., 12.
217 Ibid., 22.
218 Birch, Court and Times, 165-166, 167.
219 Ibid., 167-168.
220 Ibid., 168.
number of peers refused as well. Though Charles promised repeatedly that the loan would in no way be used as a precedent, many assumed this was a necessary untruth. The crown’s inability to prove the loan’s legality widened an already expansive avenue of criticism, but the legal and moral challenges to the crown’s points circulating in manuscripts and letters were also symptoms of growing divisions at the center of the government as well. According to Cust, the Council was divided as to how to respond to the judges and noble who refused to subscribe to the loan’s legality, as well as the issue of a new parliament. After the judges’ refusal, many believed the king would be forced to summon a parliament regardless any supposed reservations he may have held. Turner and the others, Mede wrote in November, claimed the loan to be “the duke’s last refuge.” If it failed, there was certain to be a parliament.

Buckingham, meanwhile, prepared to go to France. The relationship between Charles and his brother in law was rapidly deteriorating in the last two months of 1626. The French, upset over Charles’s refusal to meet all of the requirements of the marriage treaty and English support for the Huguenots, held a considerable number of English and Scottish ships and their cargoes in French ports. The duke planned to go to Paris to negotiate the return of these ships, as well as the infamous loan ships still under French control, when the French seized the English wine fleet at Bordeaux in December. Louis saw little reason to negotiate given England’s obvious weakness. On February 16, Mede reported that the French king had repeated Charles’s trick from a few months earlier, refusing to allow Buckingham to step foot on French soil. War with

221 Ibid., 164; Cust, Forced Loan, 54.
222 Cust, Forced Loan, 54-55.
223 Birch, Court and Times, 171.
225 Russell, Parliament, 328.
France began to seem inevitable. Many were left doubting the crown’s commitment to continuing a war with the true Spanish enemy, leaving the loan to face further internal and popular resistance from the pro-France/anti-Spanish factions in both the Privy Council and the counties.²²⁶

The loan was expanded into the counties in December, and the local meetings lasted until March 1627. The county meetings first ran into difficulty on January 12, when twenty-two Northamptonshire gentlemen joined over 200 free-holders to present the commissioners with a petition that claimed payment of the loan was “generally excused except by parliament,” essentially stating that no funds could be demanded except those passed by parliament.²²⁷ Though the commissioners merely rejected the petition, it certainly helped any opposition case when one of the Council members, Lord Manchester, admitted the loan could not avoid becoming a precedent, during the subsequent public discussion.²²⁸ Many continued to refuse the loan, and the Council was forced to take action. It first responded to the Northampton refusals by calling all of the gentlemen who still refused to London, where they were promptly detained.²²⁹ The second move came a few weeks later when Robert Sibthorpe delivered his now famous sermon *Apostolike Obedience* at the next assizes in Northampton.²³⁰

Sibthorpe announced “he that [resists] the prince, [resists] the power and ordinance of God,” whether “[the prince] perform his duty or not.”²³¹ If the subject is unable to meet the

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²²⁶ Birch, *Court and Times*, 194, 188.

²²⁷ Ibid., 184; Cust, *Forced Loan*, 168.

²²⁸ Birch, *Court and Times*, 198; Cust, *Forced Loan*, 168.

²²⁹ Birch, *Court and Times*, 194.

sovereign’s request, “subjects are bound to undergo the punishment without either resistance, or railing and reviling,” while remaining “free from conspiracy although they power and opportunity for it.”

Many times, Sibthorpe claimed, the oppressed subject’s “attempt to free their bodies and states from sovereign invasion,” only “captivated their souls under Idolatrous Superstition.”

Sibthorpe tried to uphold the loan’s legality, pointing out that “those who best know the laws of this kingdom have lent at this time.”

The entire reason for the loan, he claimed, and the war that demanded it, was the protection of the Protestant faith, explaining that “religion itself being the mark that is shot at in this business.”

Sibthorpe later claimed he originally “conceived” the sermon in response the directions sent to the all the bishops the previous September, and produced it when the loan commission asked him, along with other local divines, to provide an opinion regarding the lawfulness of the loan on January 12. It is likely, however, that the sermon was only given at the assizes on February 17, since as Sibthorpe put it, his meditations only “lately learned to speak.”

If the members of the commission asked Sibthorpe to respond to the petition and ideas that confronted them during the January 12 meeting, it was likely due to the Council’s emphasis on utilizing

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231 Ibid., 11.
232 Ibid., 13.
233 Ibid., 18.
234 Sibthorpe, 19.
235 Ibid., 19.
236 Ibid., “Epistle to King Charles,” unnumbered.
237 Ibid.
local connections to garner support and his connection to the area. Sibthorpe’s preaching of his sermon, then, seems to have been a response to the objections raised in Northampton.

Sibthorpe’s sermon was the first of the three sermons published in defense of the loans that have come to be known as the “Forced Loan sermons.” The other two will be discussed below, but what sets Sibthorpe’s apart from the others is the minister’s relative obscurity at the time of publication. The other two sermons were preached in Charles’s presence by royal chaplains, while Sibthorpe’s was produced by an unknown, providential minister and preached during the assizes far from the court. Archbishop Abbot later claimed the sermon only received royal approval through the patronage of Laud and Buckingham, and when Abbot refused to approve the sermon for print, it was Laud, not Sibthorpe, who answered his questions on the matter. Abbot’s refusal infuriated Charles, and eventually led to his being forced to retire, leaving Laud and a group of Arminian bishops to exercise his authority. As such, Sibthorpe’s sermon marked an important moment for both the strategy behind the support of the loan, as well as in the government of the Church of England.

Just a few days after the Northampton meeting that eventually produced Sibthorpe’s sermon, an anonymous manuscript dated January 24 began circulating in Lincolnshire. Directed “To all English Freeholders from a Well-Wisher of Theirs,” it was an ambitious assault on the crown’s arguments supporting the loan. Inspired, and possibly penned, by Theophilus Clinton, Earl of Lincoln, the document was widely distributed in 1627, and was an important cog in the initial campaign against the loan. Lincoln was jailed after one of his servants was caught with a number of copies of the manuscript in late February, but he remained an instrumental part of

238 Cust, Forced Loan, 112-113.
239 Ibid., 170.
240 Ibid., 170-171.
the resistance to the loan as his servants continued to circulate a number of versions of the manuscript. Lincoln’s manuscript frankly declared the loan to be a scheme to rescue Buckingham, and it cast doubt on the king’s word in the form of his promises and assurances.\textsuperscript{241} It was a call to open opposition, declaring the king bent on ruling without parliament and asking freeholders to take a stand for parliament, directly against their king.\textsuperscript{242}

Lincoln’s manuscript was far more specific than most appeals produced either in support or against the loan. Probably because of the internal delays in getting Sibthorpe’s sermon approved, his sermon was not published until May. In the meantime, another sermon supporting the loan appeared in print. Isaac Bargrave picked up Sibthorpe’s distinctions by drawing out the difference between righteous sacrifice and godly obedience. In \textit{A Sermon Preached Before King Charles, March 27 1627}, Bargrave drew upon the Old Testament book of Samuel to explain the king’s position.\textsuperscript{243} Proposing that all sin was based in rebellion, Bargrave claimed that witchcraft and idolatry were merely rebellion against God, and any resistance towards the command of kings’ was a sin equal to witchcraft. God “gives us a King,” Bargrave proclaimed, “and then as the power of that blessing, he prescribes our \textit{obedience} to our King.”\textsuperscript{244} Obedience, Bargrave went on to say, was “the best exposition of the \textit{Law}, better then the best of \textit{Sacrifices}…because the wickedest man alive may \textit{offer Sacrifices}: none can \textit{obey} but the \textit{good}.”\textsuperscript{245} Bargrave explained this point by saying “Men hath such a will as cannot be subject…We are all born enemies of God,” so they “willingly hear of God as a Savior, but if you propound him as a

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 173.

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{243} Isaac Bargrave, \textit{A Sermon Preached Before King Charles}…(London: 1627).

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 2. Italics original.

\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., 3. Italics original.
Commander, their answer is ready: our tongues are our own, who is Lord over us?246 His point was clear: “Obedience was good in its self, Sacrifice only in respect to the law that commanded it.”247

Bargrave took as his text the example of King Saul’s defeat of Agag, when the Israelites spared the defeated king and his fattest cattle after the Lord commanded them to kill all that they found. They did this “it is alleged…to sacrifice them unto the Lord: and so they made Religion a stalking horse to rebellion.” Saul, Bargrave explained, confessed to committing these sins “for fear of the people, and so made popular applause his god.”248 Current dissenters were like Saul “saying, I have fulfilled the commandment of the Lord” referring to the actions that were actually taken for political ends to win “vain glory” for the dissenter.249 They claimed to act righteously by supporting the law of God while ignoring his word; it was the “willful disobedience” of a willing mind.250 Though rebellion may be backed with reason, Bargrave reminded his listeners, Abraham “obeyed God even against reason” ready to kill his son to fulfill the Lords’ command. It was true, he claimed, that “no sacrifice was so acceptable” to God “as for the King to lay down his will at God’s altar.”251 Kings “are neither from Pope or people, as some would have it, but…immediately from God.”252 Bargrave closed with a direct challenge to the godly dissenters, obviously addressing a popular complaint of the period: “I would,” he prayed, “that there were

246 Ibid., 4.
247 Ibid., 5.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid., 12.
250 Ibid., 13-14.
251 Ibid., 16.
252 Ibid., 18.
none among us who placed their conscience too much in their will...[that] there were none to tell
us that to obey our Prince is to betray our country...who stamp it...on the clergy that they preach
obedience.” “Well Christians,” he answered, “let it be more practiced, I dare promise it will be
less preached.”

Bargrave was a royal chaplain, and his appeal was far more abstract than Sibthorpe’s
sermon before it, or Roger Manwaring’s after. Bargrave’s sermon was published less than a
week after its preaching, and, unlike Sibthorpe’s, the king himself was probably the most
important factor in its printing. There is no evidence of Laud’s involvement in the decision to
print Bargrave’s sermon, and, in fact, the two men were eventual enemies. Instead, it seems
likely that Abbot’s demise left those outside Laud’s group scrambling to ensure their continued
favor with the king, and Bargrave’s sermon may have been an attempt to prove himself worthy
of his position at court. Bargrave preached at the time when news of the Earl of Lincoln’s
imprisonment and refusal in front of the Star Chamber was a central topic of London news, just
as Sibthorpe’s sermon was preached following the first large-scale arrest of men who refused the
loan in January. Since the call for sermons in support of the loan was issued in September, but
none were specifically mentioned until Sibthorpe’s in January or printed until Bargrave’s in
March, their production was most likely a government attempt to quell any popular reaction to
the public reports of the arrest of the loan’s enemies, rather than a single, proactive campaign on
the loan’s behalf.

253 Ibid., 18-19.
254 Birch, Court and Times, 214-215.
255 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, “Issac Bargrave.” Laud blocked Bargrave’s appointment to
an important ecclesiastical position in the fall of the same year.
256 Birch, Court and Times, 207.
Indeed, the printing of the final forced loan sermon came at a time when London was enthralled by a number of controversial royal actions. Preached during the king’s progresses in July, Royal Chaplain Roger Manwaring’s two-part Religion and Allegiance was delivered just as Buckingham’s fleet finally set sail to relieve the besieged Huguenots of La Rochelle. At the same time, a large number of gentlemen previously released on bail were recommitted under the Council’s orders for refusing the loan, including the High Sheriff of Gloucestershire. Though Mede claimed the fleet departure “converted many men’s curses into prayers,” there were certainly some popular misgivings surrounding the war with France, particular given the loans initial justifications based on the Spanish war. At the same time, a number of the gentlemen held in London for refusing the loan were causing the crown more difficulty. Having realized the men’s presence provided a sort of headquarters for a more centralized opposition to the loan, the Council attempted to disperse the gentlemen, but they refused to leave. Instead, they began to press the government for a public trial over the nature of their imprisonment, which the Council desperately wanted to avoid. There is little doubt that during this type of unrest, the crown needed to ensure future support for a venture that was guaranteed to be difficult to fund from the outset, and Manwaring’s sermon was probably but one attempt to do so.

The first of the two sermons began by explaining the various relationships upon which the Godly order is determined: between the Creator and the created, husband and wife, parents and children, and finally between a servant and his Lord. The anointed of the Lord that resided

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257 Ibid., 247; Roger Manwaring, Religion and Allegiance... (London: 1627).
258 Birch, Court and Times, 249.
259 Ibid., 247.
260 Cust, Forced Loan, 61.
on the divinely-appointed thrones of Europe were, in Manwaring’s words, “Gods on Earth.”

Manwaring proclaimed that all power is created by God, and that the power of the king was not a collection of human power, but God’s own power. The power of God (and therefore the king) was not subservient or inferior to any multitude of men; indeed no power could constrain it.

Just as Adam was granted dominion before there was either Pope or people, the king was not subject to the approval or limitations of either. Nor was he bound by the laws of the nation. As the father of the country, no subject could question or disobey the will of the king “without hazard of his own damnation.” In other words, any law, tax, or levy that the king felt obliged to command were to be obeyed, and refusal to do so was a threat to one’s spiritual prosperity.

Speaking from the words of Solomon, Manwaring attacked the nature of the law and idea of council directly. The laws, he claimed, took their binding power from the will of the Lord himself. The words of the Bible themselves were the council of kings, given by the Lord, so “None may, nor can search into the high discourse, and deep counsels of kings; seeing their hearts are so deep, by reason of their distance from common men.” Manwaring explained that this meant “the heart of a King is unsearchable…and none may dare to call into question the judgment of a king because the heart of a king is in the hand of God.”

Parliaments, he preached, were not to impose “any Right to Kings, whereby to challenge tributary aides and

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261 Manwaring, 1-3.
262 Ibid., 2-4.
263 Ibid., 6-7.
264 Ibid., 9.
265 Ibid., 9.
266 Ibid., 17.
267 Ibid.
subsidy helps, but for the more equal imposing and more easy exacting thereof;” the subsidies themselves being the king’s by natural right and divine justice. 268 Those who opposed the king in these points, according to Manwaring, were driven by the desire for popularity and personal power. They dissented only “under the plausible shows of singular liberty and freedom; which if their consciences might speak, would appear nothing more than the satisfying of private humors, passions, or purposes.” 269 He closed his first sermon by explaining the necessities of the crown’s current situation, and by arguing that those who refused to give to the king only gave support to their common adversaries. 270

If Manwaring’s first sermon was unclear in its theological arguments connecting God and the king, his second clarified these points in what amounted to an all-out assault on the possibility of justified resistance to the king. This was the final attack that Charles and his government authorized against their critics. Manwaring drew an even more direct connection between God and the king, moving from the king’s connection to God in his first sermon to God as a king in the second. Shifting gradually from theology to the history of the ancient Church, he began by exclaiming that the “word of God is a mystery most deep and sacred: Sacred for the things it doth contain…as for the fountain from whence it flows.” 271 This fountain was the mind of God, “to whom the scriptures are even [more] naturally known, and with much more facility understood, than by us…can possibly be discerned.” 272 God, according to Manwaring, was the

268 Ibid., 26.
269 Ibid., 28.
270 Ibid., 30-31.
271 Manwaring, Religion and Allegiance, Second sermon, 1. Though both sermons were printed as one text, the numbering resets at the beginning of the second sermon.
272 Ibid., 2.
author of the scriptures, and all authority in it was dependent upon his singular gift. He said “the Lord God is our Law-giver; the Lord God is our Judge; the Lord God is our King” and in the natural law passed down from him as judge, “it is…what is best and most divine, that ought to rule.” The king then, was highest under God, and after God, the most divine, and God gave him power over all states and people. God not only called everyone to obey his sovereign, but “fetcheth reasons, and fills his mouth with arguments, to press and persuade the same.” In these cases, the king’s reasoning spoke with the word of the Lord, and this made his reasoning and word sacred, just as if it were the word of the Lord God. Contradicting the king’s reasoning then, was a sin in itself.

Manwaring willfully accepted the challenge of those who may ask why religion connected the king with God. The first, he explained, was “from the communion of names,” since God not only stood among the “council of Princes,” but gave them the authority to act in his name. This was a gift, he continued, that God gave “only unto such as are most near and dear to him; namely to a king, angels, and priests, to whom alone the scriptures honour with that high and noble grace to be called Gods.” As such, the permanent due that human souls owed God in the tithe was also reflected in the temporal duties that all subjects owed to their king: it was no coincidence that those denied the Lord his part also attempted to limit the king’s

273 Ibid., 9.
274 Ibid., 10-11.
275 Ibid., 11-12.
276 Ibid., 22.
277 Ibid., 23.
278 Ibid.
power. Here, Manwaring connected the spiritual and theological rifts that divided the Church to the current constitutional and legal disagreements that divided the nation.

Manwaring attacked the idea that men could play any part in the distribution of justice and law that flowed directly from God and his earthly deputy, the king. Manwaring explained that it was impossible for men to claim any part in the distribution of the ancient and divine gift of justice that flowed directly from God and the king, quoting David’s admonition that “my goodness extend not unto thee.” Men played no part in granting the king’s legitimacy, and had no role in meeting out justice other than what the king gave them. This “Indivisibility of Justice” meant that men had no legitimate means to give any royal act “merit or Recompence” because both stemmed from “imperial dignity itself.” Manwaring point was simple. At no time could the divine justice of the Lord, passed down to his highest deputy the king, be divided. Any attempt to claim the need for the people’s affirmation or disputation was unjust and illegitimate; the king was justified by God, and the parity of justice was his gift to the people. “Justice,” Manwaring concluded, “is between equals…so cannot justice be any rule or medium whereby to give God, or the King, his rights.” The king’s rights existed outside of temporal human laws, and could not be abrogated by any human effort. Manwaring was addressing the fundamental theoretical question of the period: where the king stood as a member of the temporal commonweal, or legal body of the nation, and where he stood as a member of God’s elect community.

279 Ibid., 24.
280 Ibid., 24.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid., 25.
The entire notion of the commonweal was a tool for Manwaring to explain the current objections to the king’s policy, only to be dismissed later. Taking the theme of the objections against the ancient Church fathers, Manwaring compared the objections raised against the loan to the objections that faced true Christian religion. The initial objection against the early Church was “that Christian Religion was a fatal superstition; and that the Professors thereof the Authors of new and scandalous incantations.”

Manwaring’s aim and intent here is clear. He was drawing a connection to the “innovations” many dissenters saw being made in the Church of England, dismissing them as a common technique of those opposed to proper worship. When the early professors were prosecuted, Manwaring explained, the people’s suspicions drove their kings into acting against God. These heathen people claimed that the Christians were the cause of any troubles and misfortunes that affected the commonweal. This notion of the “Roman commonweal,” Manwaring claimed, was “but a mask, or vale, for their malice…a ready way to create mischief to the harmless Christians, from such as had not judgment to weigh the cause.”

Manwaring attacked the very idea of commonweal as a vehicle for uninformed and malicious criticism, used by the vulgar and ignorant to speak about subjects beyond their knowledge. In these people’s minds, any misfortune that befell the country was a commentary on the collective sinful state of the whole country. Manwaring was not only taking aim at the criticism leveled at the loan specifically, but a noticeably expanding millennialist tendency among the English.

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283 Ibid., 31.
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
286 This is most notable in Joseph Mede’s letters to a Dr. Stuteville. They include the famous water-spout that destroyed the Duke of Buckingham’s stairs during the 1626 Parliament. Birch, Court and Times, 117.
The widely held obsession with natural acts as signs and portents was dangerous to the image of an ordered society, and Manwaring was pointing to it as a danger to both church and state. Manwaring was describing a divinely ordained social system that necessarily revolved around a direct connection between God and the king. All actions were related to the individuals’ duty to the king. To raise human laws above the king that gave them authority was ridiculous.

Charles was apparently present when Manwaring’s sermons were preached, and they were published by his command a month later. Joyce Lee Malcolm argues that the order to print the sermon was later attributed to Archbishop William Laud, but sadly, there is no citation of her source for this claim. Cust has argued that Charles had the sermon published despite a strict warning from Laud that it would be “very distasteful to the people.” Cust’s source, however, is Laud’s later defense of his actions during his 1628 questioning in parliament, where it would have been shocking for him not to attribute the sermon’s publication to the king’s direct order. Just as in the case of Buckingham in 1626, Laud’s 1628 defense was based on his claim to have acted at Charles’s command. Again, the decisions of Charles’s ministers, under increasing pressure from parliament, had to be placed under the authority of the king himself to protect Charles’s servants from parliamentary indictment.

Manwaring’s sermons were an unprecedented direct and specific application of the divine right of kings that was necessary because of the contemporary distinctions between the king’s personal actions and his actions on behalf of the state. These distinctions were not only seen in the parliamentary language cited above, but in the responses to the sermons themselves. One of

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288 Ibid., 54.

289 Quoted in Cust, Charles I, 67.
these, by a Canterbury divine also named Thomas Scott, wholly different than the one discussed above, provides a useful example. Scott’s manuscript response to Bargrave’s sermon asked if a king, who was “so bewitched…as to set his cities on fire, or his navy,…or lend or give away our ships, ordinance, powder, and mariners to our enemies,” and could not otherwise be convinced to change, “may he not be resisted?”

“Is it not lawful,” Scott continued, “in such a case to rescue King Saul (when he would have killed himself and the kingdom) from Saul the king?”

Manwaring’s answer was emphatic ‘no.’ While Scott saw the interference of the people as legitimate because, it seems, the king’s person was public property, Manwaring’s objection turned this distinction on its head by claiming the king could not act as a private person anymore than God’s existence could be separated from his actions.

Scott was utilizing a form of the theory put forward the other Thomas Scott in *Vox Populi*, which argued for a distinction between the king’s actions as a “public person” and a “private man.” Circumstances, however, led the later Scott to apply these distinctions to a much more specific situation. Though he was drawing on general political commonplaces, he pulled them to their logical conclusions, which had a revolutionary effect.

Manwaring was essentially doing the same thing. The often contradictory theories that held the commonweal in balance were finally placed in a position of irreconcilable difference. It is unfair to assume that Charles’s ideal of government during the parliaments of 1625 and 1626 was directed anymore by Manwaring’s theory than to assume that parliament’s actions were driven by those of Scott. They

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290 Cust, *Forced Loan*, 181.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid., 182.
294 Ibid.
interacted in very distinct ways, stretching common assumptions to their logical, oppositional ends.

Manwaring’s points, though they have often been linked with Sibthorpe’s, marked a different distinction between the king’s actions as a public and private person that those that had previously appeared in both the crown’s statements in parliament and in the other forced loan sermons. While Sibthorpe claimed the subject must be obedient to his king even if that king’s actions were unjust or unlawful, Manwaring argued that the king’s actions could never actually be unjust or unlawful. It is unclear exactly how much Manwaring’s words owed to a shift in the crown’s ideological position, but a markedly a new direction became apparent in the later months of 1627. Though no other sermons were published, probably replaced by the massive propaganda campaign Buckingham launched a few days later to support his landing on the Isle of Rhe, Manwaring’s words were closely echoed by Attorney General Heath during the Five Knights trial in November. Heath, who, as discussed above, argued in the 1625 parliament that the king’s interest could be separated from those of the public though the “king would never sever them,” presented a much different argument to the judges during the trial. Defending the king’s power to imprison without giving cause, Heath argued:

I do not mean that it is such a power as that a king may do what he please, for he hath rules to govern himself by, as well as your Lordships, who are subordinate judges under him. The difference is, the king is the head of the same fountain of justice, which your Lordship administers to all his subjects. All justice is derived from him, and what he does, he does not as a private person, but as the head of the commonwealth, as justiciarius regni, yea, the very essence of justice under God upon earth is in him…

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296 Gardiner, 60.
Put simply, when Heath said “what he does, he does not as a private person, but as the head of the commonwealth,” he declared all of the king’s actions to be part of his public duty. It was impossible for him to act as a private person. Fittingly, since as we have seen many believed illegal actions to be private where legal actions were public, it was also impossible for the king to act in any manner that was against the law. As Heath explained, “the common law, which hath long flourished under the government of our King and his progenitors, kings of this realm, hath ever had that reverent respect of the sovereign, as that it hath concluded the King can do no wrong.”

Heath’s argument confirmed a shift in the nature of royal justifications in 1627. Though Charles initially attempted to explain himself through the traditional, parliamentary-style arguments of the period, the same failure that prevented his success in parliament damned his initial efforts to justify the loan. Charles had attempted to explain his actions to parliament, then to his people, only to be rebuffed on each occasion. It seemed to Charles as if his people were unwilling to trust his judgment, and refused to accept any explanation other than that which blamed any failures on the king’s servants. Francis Seymour’s declaration in the 1625 parliament that the “cause of the necessity, rather than the necessity itself” was what should be addressed neatly summarized the problem. When the king refused to reveal all of the decision-making processes that led to the current situation, parliament assumed the necessity was created out of some private motivations rather than any public needs. While those private motivations were originally claimed to be those of the Duke of Buckingham, Charles’s attempts to protect him by extending his personal authority led to the king himself being questioned. No personal authority alone was enough to legitimize questionable actions. James’s advice that “if anything be asked at

297 Ibid., 62.

you that you think not meet to reveal, if you say, that question is not pertinent for them to ask, who dare examine you further?” was no longer tenable.\textsuperscript{299} The king’s judgment no longer carried enough authority to justify his minister’s actions. Charles attempted to remedy this the way his father probably would have as well. He turned to religion to reinforce his judgments, simultaneously embodying the public good with his own judgment as well. He no longer needed to justify his actions before public judgment. He was now the embodiment of the public; the single, living personage of the state.

The language, debates, and ideas described in the two previous chapters present the pinnacle of a rhetorical process that began, according to Lake, Cust, and others, in the 1570s and 80s. Cust, drawing from Lake’s earlier works, suggests the open political style of those presenting themselves as “public men” in the 1580s “helped trigger a growing sense of alarm at the threat of ‘popularity.’”\textsuperscript{300} Simultaneously, as men in the localities became increasingly wary of the corrupting influence of any link to the court, “public men” came to be viewed as outsiders able to act in the name of the public good because of their independence. In this way, the role of “public men” shifted from royal collaborators to the exact opposite; they became the court’s “sternest critics.”\textsuperscript{301} In turn, those within the regime came to portray such “individuals as “popular spirits,” stirring up the ignorant masses for self-serving, private gain. Whether or not these “public men” could defend themselves from these accusations, Cust explains, became one of the rhetorical battlegrounds of the period, though “public men” or “patriots” usually

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{299} James I, \textit{Doron}, 17.
\item \textsuperscript{300} Richard Cust, “The ‘Public Man’ in Late Tudor and Early Stuart England” in Peter Lake and Steven Pincus eds., \textit{The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern Britain} (Manchester, UK: University Press, 2007), 136.
\item \textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 135-136.
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succeeded in convincing whatever audience of their dedication to the common good. The only men who were for the most part unconvinced by the “public men’s” defenses were those connected to the court. He concludes that the result was the production and dissemination of a conspiracy theory based on the danger, not of private motives and papists, but of ‘popularity’ and ‘popular spirits.’ Those within the regime labeled these natural representatives of the localities as ‘oppositionists,’ thereby feeding a process of polarization that encouraged highly charged language and the politicization of previously neutral issues.

The pages above describe the same process Cust has so eloquently drawn out. They point out, as Cust has, that whether or not “public men” could defend themselves from accusations of private motives became one of the rhetorical, public battlegrounds of the period. The new threat of ‘popularity’ highlights an initially superficial linguistic shift that was simply the result of the regime turning the accusations made against it back onto those same critics. The accusations of “popularity,” Cust agrees, were simply another phrasing of the same charges of ‘private motivations’ those within the regime were facing: self-serving individuals promoting private ambitions under the guise of public service. In both cases, accusations of ‘private’ motives forced individual actors to employ radical justifications for their actions and positions as servants of the public good, justifications that relied on polarity and that stripped away possible areas of negotiation, compromise, and tolerance between differing opinions. The previous pages show a process of polarization that climaxed in the 1620s, but not one caused by the natural representatives of the localities being cast as ‘oppositionists’ by those within the regime. Instead,

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302 Ibid., 136.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid., 137.
305 Ibid.
the crown’s rhetoric was a product of the same processes that created the extreme justifications mobilized by those in opposition. It was a functional process of radicalization driven by the endlessly escalating rhetoric required to justify public speech and opposition, and it culminated with the expositions of ancient constitutional rights versus divine right that conclude this chapter.

Charles’s public actions after 1626 were all part of an attempt to reconcile his physical person with the public authority of his position, to prove them an indivisible part of the divinely ordained whole. Just as the language of his public appeals shifted to the natural, hierarchical rhetoric of the “forced loan sermons,” the nature of Charles’s public displays became more orderly after the tumult of the first few years of his reign. Though Charles was predisposed to orderly ceremonialism, the need to emphasize the proper order of society led to more carefully controlled public performances. The monarch’s interaction with his subjects came to emphasize the proper hierarchy of social life, meaning that the king must be performing in his public role in everything he did. This resulted in the ironic circumstance in which the king somehow became more of a public institution, while his own person was actually more withdrawn from public view.
Chapter III: Coronations, Ceremony, and Public Display

On the morning of February 2nd, 1626, Charles made the short journey from Whitehall to Westminster to be crowned King of England. He travelled down the Thames on his royal barge, landing just below the bridge at the Parliament steps. Clothed in white with an outer garment of royal purple, Charles continued into Westminster Hall, where he was placed on his throne by the high nobility of England. These nobles, each bearing a piece of the regalia or attending the king’s person, then joined with the high clergy to form the order of the solemn procession that led the king into Westminster Abbey. There, on a four foot tall stage, George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, presented the new king to his subjects at each corner of the stage. Each time, shouts of “God save King Charles” declared the audience’s approval. Charles was placed on the lesser of the two thrones that stood on the stage, where he rested during a sermon by Richard Senhouse, Bishop of Carlisle. Immediately following the sermon, Charles stood and swore an oath acknowledging his duties as king. Then, stripped to his white shirt and hose, Charles displayed his humanly form to his subjects before retreating behind a traverse specially drawn for the occasion.306

The Archbishop, shielded from the audience, recalled Samuel’s anointing of David as he poured holy oil onto Charles’s exposed skin in six specific places: his palms, the center of his breast, between his shoulders, on the point of each shoulder, each of his elbows, and finally the crown of his head. Thus consecrated, the king was adorned with the regalia of Edward the

306 This description is taken from Christopher Wordsworth, ed., The Manner of the Coronation of Charles the First (London: Henry Bradshaw Liturgical Text Society, 1898), 1-35.
Confessor, the ancient hose and sandals stretching as they were actually placed on Charles’s feet. The spurs, the swords and scepters, and the blessed crown soon followed, each given and taken away so as not to burden the king. Finally, five hours after entering the Abbey, Charles knelt to receive communion. The sacrament concluded, the entire procession reformed in the order it arrived in and slowly made its way back to Westminster Hall.\footnote{Ibid., 32-40.}

In June 1633, after eight years of delays and postponements, Charles was crowned King of Scotland in a very similar ceremony at Holyrood Abbey. While, in 1626, Charles and his advisors had removed many of the public performances and celebrations that traditionally accompanied English royal coronations, the 1633 celebration in Edinburgh saw these displays revived in all of their expected pomp and glory. Beginning with his royal entrance into the Scottish capital, Charles performed for his Scottish subjects in a manner he had previously seemed unwilling to attempt for their English counterparts. He progressed throughout the city, travelling in state to attend sermons, publically giving the ‘royal touch’ for the King’s Evil, and openly visiting a number of outlying areas of the country where he was born. After a month in Scotland, Charles travelled back to England, both the king and his councilors regarding the trip as a complete success. Historians, however, have claimed the 1633 coronation ceremonies to be the point where Charles’s relationship with his Scottish subjects began to unravel. Similarly, they have also claimed Charles’s 1626 London coronation to be a window into the eventual failures of his reign, displaying his disregard for his English subjects’ expectations and his withdrawal from his public duties. It remains to be asked how two events so different in form and display managed to produce such similar resentments, and what sort of influences created the often discussed “flaws” in each respective celebration?
Comparing the ceremonies of Charles’s Scottish coronation in 1633 to Charles’s 1626 coronation in London and other public spectacles reveals that Charles and his advisors made important innovations in well established forms of royal display. Often these changes involved the abandonment of a traditional form or observance. The political contingencies that surround such modifications in public interaction in turn suggest practical reasons inspired many of these changes. Just as any failure or innovation in public ritual and display has real political significance, the political events and situations accompanying such modifications had an undeniable role in their inception. Very practical political and fiscal factors often determined the scale and forms of public display of royal power. Still, those changes, along with other modifications that suggested actual changes in the symbolic and ideological mindsets of the court and the country during Charles’s reign, had an undeniable impact on their actual and potential audiences. As such, forms of royal ceremonies were the product of shifting ideologies, perceptions and understandings of traditional discursive performances of power, and, as first addressed here, responses to very concrete political and fiscal contexts.

Many historical studies focusing on Charles’s public presentations depict the king as an increasingly withdrawn monarch, unwilling to present himself to his subjects. According to Judith Richards, Charles refused to meet his subjects’ expectation that he make himself publically visible by filling specific public roles, though he seemed to understand these expectations. He failed to give his subjects access to his person or his personality, shunning them from his physical presence while denying them even an image or portrait of himself. Focusing primarily on changes during the king’s 1626 coronation in London and his failure to match his predecessors’ willingness to provide the “royal touch,” Richards claims “that Charles was aware
of [his subjects’] expectations throughout his reign. Why he regarded those expectations as having so little significance for so long is unclear.”

Richards relies on Clifford Geertz’s notion of “ritual signs of dominance” to argue that Charles’s failure to perform his duty separated him from his subjects and left them unable to form traditional subject-ruler relationships or bonds of loyalty. Other historians have reached different conclusions. Paul Monod claims that Charles attempted to end the public discourse of his early reign by reverting to a Renaissance style of kingship through a withdrawal from public scrutiny, but was unable or unwilling to reproduce the necessary representations of power and ceremonial reinforcement of royal authority such a style required. Monod’s assertions are largely based on the work of Richards and Malcolm Smuts, whose study of court culture during Charles’s reign emphasizes a growing cultural divide between the court and the rest of the king’s subjects. Conversely, Kevin Sharpe sees Charles’s attitude toward public presentation as a rejection of his predecessors’ use of the royal word to control discourse, attempting to position himself above public debate through linguistic, artistic, and ceremonial statements. Monod and Sharpe arrive at opposite conclusions about the outcome and success of Charles’s efforts. While Monod claims the king’s withdrawal inflamed a growing cultural divide between court and country by shutting down the public discourse Calvinist doctrine demanded, gradually leading to revolt in all three of Charles’s kingdoms, Sharpe concludes that Charles effectively conquered debate. In stark contrast to Monod’s belief that Charles’s attitude towards public display was


309 Ibid., 83.

among the origins of the rebellions of his later reign, Sharpe explains that only the Scottish invasion of 1637 ended the “authority of silence” and shaped a “new politics of discourse” where power “depended on the articulation of the royal voice.”

Sharpe, along with Mark Kishlasky, has recently countered Richards’s claims by suggesting that Charles actually travelled through more of his kingdom than any of his predecessors, but Sharpe also concedes that Charles was less adept at cultivating his people’s support than his predecessors. Sharpe attributes this problem to Charles’s personal obsession with order and the king’s awkward and reserved nature towards even his closest advisors. This obsession explains the king’s often noted preference for ceremony and ritual in even the most trivial actions. More than the result of personal preferences, however, this ritualization reinforced the perception of the mystical magic of monarchy by strictly controlling the actual physical space around the royal body. Charles was not only controlling the presentation of the royal image, he was attempting to limit all possibilities of physical contact with the royal body.

Most historians’ explanations of Charles’s reformation of public presentations of authority still seem to privilege psychological and intellectual determinants and to neglect immediate political and fiscal contingencies, as well as the social goals and objectives that Charles’s alterations were designed to meet. Even before his coronation in London in 1626,

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311 Kevin Sharpe, “The King’s Writ: Royal Authors and Royal Authority in Early Modern England” in *Remapping*, 144-145.


313 This is surprising given Sharpe’s position of ‘radical’ revisionism. He is seemingly willing to present Charles’s psychological obsession with order as the primary factor in many of his cultural initiatives. Psychological tendencies, however, are not usually singular determinant forces, nor are they always developed privately or domestically without outside social contributors. This is not to say Sharpe is wrong to suggest Charles was inclined toward orderly ceremony, only that such tendencies must be viewed in connection with any number of contingent factors. In the name of fairness, I should point out that Smuts does emphasize the role that long-term economic changes, such as the incredible decline in the value of specie, played in the decisions monarch’s made about public displays; Smuts, 90.
Charles was forced to make a number of alterations to traditional forms of public display because of overpowering political and economic circumstances that demanded some alterations regardless of the king’s personal preference. By 1633, however, most of these crises were long passed, leaving Charles free to perform his monarchial duties in Scotland according to his own judgment. The Scottish coronation is therefore a better representation or gauge of the king’s policy toward public ceremony, display, and interaction. Its features, along with Charles’s alterations to other public ceremonial roles, spectacles, and spaces, reveal a king who did not simply withdraw from his subjects out of personal preference. Instead, he responded to the language and events described in the previous chapters, as well as the arenas and institutions that encouraged them, by reinforcing the sacred nature of both his position and his person in the spaces, rituals, and exhibitions that visually represented society to its members. Among the results were Laudian religious services that emphasized the mysterious nature of God and the divine jurisdiction of the clergy as blessed intercessors who held mysterious knowledge, church interiors that created a sacred space where laymen came at the designated time to receive the gifts of the universal, unquestionable power embodied in these spaces, and highly ordered civil and religious processions that presented the divine social hierarchy and the king’s place at the center of it through a number of spatial and symbolic physical representations.314

314 “Laudian,” as Peter Lake has suggested, is used here simply to refer to the ceremonial forms of worship and other high-church religious practices that characterized the reformed services of the Church of England during the Personal Rule. It should not be taken as a suggestion of Laud’s, rather than Charles’s or anyone else’s, responsibility for the ultimate shape and application of these forms. Peter Lake, “The Laudian Style: Order, Uniformity, and the Pursuit of Holiness in 1630s,” in Kenneth Fincham, ed., The Early Stuart Church, 1603-1642 (Stanford: University Press, 1993), 161-185.
II. London, 1626

Though Charles’s coronation was first scheduled for September or October 1625, it eventually took place on February 2, 1626. Both contemporary observers and modern scholars have described the 1626 ceremony as a “private” ceremony. Charles travelled to Westminster from Whitehall by boat rather than in the traditional public processions, avoiding an important opportunity to display himself to his people. Ideally, the new monarch would make a solemn procession through the city on the day before the coronation ceremony. Leaving the Tower of London, the procession was essentially one elaborate ceremony of welcome and reception, with each of the municipal and corporate dignitaries performing a specific, inherited role and function. At the same time, specific corporations and guilds had assigned roles and duties that each saw as part of their traditional rights and privileges. While travelling through the city, the new monarch would pass by a number of elaborate celebratory arches constructed specifically for the occasion. Each arch was an allegorical image accompanied by a dramatic performance elaborating the message of the arch. The journey from arch to arch was carried out amid a variety of planned and impromptu music and dancing, both partly fuelled by the wine that flowed freely from the city’s major public fountains.

The following morning, the uncrowned monarch met the high nobility in Westminster Hall. After placing the king on the throne, each noble took responsibility for whatever right or duty their office claimed, whether bearing a part of the regalia or assisting the monarch. Formed

315 Birch, Court and Times, 72.

316 Richards, 82; United Kingdom, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I, 1625-1649, 23 vols. (1858-1897; repr.,London : Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1964), I: 271. Hereafter referred to as CSPD with the corresponding years italicized in lieu of the volume number. Richards dismisses the suggestion that this was to reduce the cost of the ceremony, despite contemporary reports from those within the government suggesting such.
into a specific order by rank and office, these nobles were joined by several members of the high clergy on a short procession from Westminster Hall to the Abbey with the king following near the rear under a fine silk canopy. Walking on a lavish cloth laid beforehand, the procession entered the Abbey. They returned to Westminster Hall in the same order after the ceremony ended. That evening, the newly crowned monarch feasted with the nobles and court inside the hall. During the celebration, various personal ceremonies and rituals were also carried out by the decedents of ancient families who had inherited the right to assist or honor the king in a multitude of ways. From holding the king’s napkin to riding into the Hall on horseback to defend his honor, these personal and symbolic duties carried a great amount of meaning. They were an inherited right of service that needed to be recognized to confirm the new king’s understanding of the nobles’ traditionally guaranteed rights and privileges.317

In February of 1626, the ceremonial procession from Westminster Hall into the Abbey and the rites that followed were mostly in keeping with the traditional ceremony used for the coronation, but there were a small number of interesting modifications. Charles, according to Peter Heylyn, chose to wear white rather than the traditional purple. Heylyn pointed out that this was Charles’s own decision, and had nothing to do with any shortage of purple fabric.318 Charles, like his father, also chose not to wear the traditional red shirt for the anointing, though Simon D’Ewes assumed it was put on behind the specially drawn traverse, out of the audience’s sight.319 Red was the color of nobility and peerage, while white was associated with men of God and virtue. Virtue personified wore white robes in Thomas Dekker’s pageant for James’s


318 Peter Hylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus* quoted in Wordsworth, 6.

entrance, so it is fitting that Heylyn claimed that Charles wore white to “declare that Virgin Purity with which he came to be espoused unto his Kingdom.”

Charles’s choice to wear white to represent his purity was especially significant given the date of his coronation. Charles was crowned on February 2nd, the traditional date of the religious festival celebrating Christ’s presentation in the temple and the symbolic purification of his virgin mother Mary. Though most coronations took place on holy days, Charles, whether out of necessity or preference, chose the traditional date of Christ’s presentation in the temple to be presented to his subjects as king. No matter what circumstances may have led to Charles coronation taking place on February 2, the significance of that date and his decision to wear white emphasized the connection between God in his earthly form and the king. It also represented the unquestionable character of Charles’s heritage and claim to the throne, as well the professed clarity of his conscious and ambitions in claiming the throne.

This symbolism combined with the traditional language of the ceremony of the coronation to reinforce the connection of the between the king and Christ on Earth, as well as the spiritual purity of the king himself. After the anointing, the Archbishop of Canterbury prayed:

God, the Son of God Christ Jesus, who is anointed by his father above his fellows, he by his anointing [pour] down upon thy head the blessing of the Holy Ghost and make it enter into the bowels of thy heart, so by this visible gift thou may receive invisible grace, having justly executed the government of this temporal Kingdom, thou may reign with him eternally, who only being without sin doth live in glory with God…Amen.

This prayer explained the symbolism of the anointing, not in the more typical example of Samuel anointing David to signify God’s chosen king, but by unpacking the connection between Christ and God. It seemed to link Jesus’s earthly divinity to a symbolic anointing that placed him above his peers, just as Christ anointed his chosen representative on Earth, Charles. Asking that this  

320 Heylyn quoted in Wordsworth, 6.  
321 Wordsworth, 34.
physical anointing be symbolic of the invisible pouring of God’s grace onto Charles’s immortal soul, the prayer closed by explaining that just rule on Earth was proof of this spiritual anointing, an outward sign of the righteous and unblemished soul that was required if the king was to rule beside God in heaven for eternity.

Aside from the symbolic shift in the royal wardrobe, ceremonial roles dedicated to the sovereign’s interaction with the masses were also altered. Traditionally, when the king’s procession moved from Westminster Hall to the church, they traditionally walked on a specially arranged cloth. This cloth, similar to cloth present at a monarch’s funeral, was to be divided among the subjects gathered outside the church, serving as both a religious relic and a gift of substantial material value. This duty was the responsibility of the Royal Almoner for the coronation, who at the time of Charles’s coronation was the Earl of Exeter.\textsuperscript{322} It was also his duty to distribute specially minted coins to the crowd during the king’s procession back to Westminster Hall. Unfortunately, as he wrote to Secretary Conway on January 22, Exeter was suffering from such a severe bout of gout that he was unable to meet his duties, though he insisted that his absence was in no way related to the financial costs of his position. There is no record of Exeter’s replacement, or if the cloth was properly distributed.\textsuperscript{323} It is doubtful that the distribution took place given that king also requested 100 pieces of silver to distribute to the crowd, but was unable to obtain the coins in time.\textsuperscript{324} It seems entirely possible that any spectators that gathered to see Charles’s processions to and from Westminster Abbey may have received no relics or rewards at all.

\textsuperscript{322} Wordsworth, 11. This post is not the same as the traditional Royal Almoner, which was held by a clergymen and not hereditary.

\textsuperscript{323} CSPD, 1625-1626, 230.

\textsuperscript{324} Wordsworth, 11.
The public processions therefore offered less access to the king and probably did not involve the traditional custom of distributing relics or souvenirs to the throngs gathered outside the church. What is also striking is the complete absence of published reports or pamphlets describing the coronation ceremony. Official or unofficial printed accounts of contemporary coronation ceremonies were usually part of a larger description of all of the public ceremonies and displays that surrounded the event. More detailed accounts circulated in manuscript letters. Mede passed a description of the ceremony written by Simon D’Ewes onto others, suggesting that some knowledge of what occurred certainly circulated in the public domain. D’Ewes described the ceremony in detail, specifically noting that when the curtain was drawn during the anointing to hide the king’s exposed body parts, those “being arcana,” it was “drawn, I dare say boldly, few more single persons then there were thousand within the church saw it.”

Mede added that a prayer was included in the service that had been left out since Henry VII’s coronation, describing the king as “not merely being lay, but a mixed person.”

How Mede knew of these supposed innovations remains a mystery, but the absence of published descriptions left no way of combating such rumors. It was easy for writers like Mede, then, to portray the new king as an innovator. These portrayals, however, along with the real or imagined innovations they described were the product of a number of outside influences. The first, and most obvious, of these was the tangled web of extraordinary political and social contingencies that greeted Charles’s ascension. These produced the second and less direct of the two main influences on contemporary portrayals: a somewhat widespread perception of Charles as a reformer or innovator expressed as part of the often outspoken concern over the new king’s

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326 Ibid., 220.
foreign policies and his dedication to upholding the true faith both at home and abroad long before the ceremony at Westminster.

Unfortunately for Charles, his reign in both of his kingdoms began with doubts already swirling around him. James died near the end of March, 1625 when Charles was anxiously awaiting the arrival of his new bride from Paris. Charles faced the difficult and expensive tasks of organizing his father’s funeral and welcoming his new bride before Parliament could be convened. Charles set the official mourning period at a full year. The funeral itself is reported to have cost the crown upwards of £50,000, part of which was invested in over 9,000 “blacks,” pieces of black cloth for proper mourning attire, distributed to mourners.327 In May, he planned to meet his bride at Dover and accompany her into the city of London. In preparation for his journey to the southeast, he published the Proclamation of May 17. The proclamation explained that Charles attempted to limit his peoples’ access to his royal presence during the spring and summer of 1625 in part because of a massive outbreak of plague that killed 41,313 Londoners before the end of December.328 Added to the costs of his father’s funeral, the moderately elaborate procession of the wedding party from Dover to London, and the need to convene Parliament as quickly as possible, the threat of plague was one among a number of practical reasons for putting the king’s coronation off until a more convenient date. It is also worth mentioning that Charles was preparing a massive fleet at Dover during this same period, which certainly would have increased traffic travelling the notoriously questionable roads between the

327 CSPD, 1625-1626, 22.
328 Larkin, 71, n. 2.
capital and the ports. The addition of throngs of beggars and onlookers to this traffic would have contributed to an already difficult logistical situation.329

These circumstances reasonably excuse Charles’s decision to delay his coronation until the following year, but they do not necessarily explain why his coronation was not accompanied by the traditional entry and procession through London, or the other public displays normally associated with coronations. Though many historians give the impression Charles never intended to hold the entry and procession, the available evidence suggest otherwise. It seems more accurate to suggest Charles may not have been overly attached to the ceremonies in the first place, and when circumstances made them difficult or inconvenient, or they could not be carried out in the manner Charles desired, he simply abandoned them. In December of 1625, Charles certainly planned on the entry as part of his coronation; this is clear from Arundel’s letter to the City of London concerning the celebratory arches.330 By the following January, however, Mede wrote that the procession had been postponed until May.331 On May 25, a letter from Pembroke ordered the City to have the unused arches taken down.332

In addition to the recent plague, the ongoing war, the Montagu controversy, and the financial crisis Charles’s government faced, one reason for the delays was Charles’s difficult relationship with his new queen. The Venetian ambassador explained that Charles hoped to have his queen crowned at the time of his entry, but the geopolitical circumstances described in the previous chapter and related disagreements over Henrietta Maria’s personal household frustrated

329 For the state of the roads between London and Dover, see 1630 Proclamation concerning the King’s Highways in Larkin, 248.
331 Birch, *Court and Times*, 77.
the king’s plans from the beginning. Charles’s new wife was proving difficult to live with, thanks to her continuing connections to her homeland and the French Church. Though initially Charles anticipated being crowned with his queen, she eventually refused to take part in the February ceremony after drawn-out negotiations between Charles’s representatives, the French, and even papal envoys failed to produce a resolution. The ambassador explained that the queen’s coronation would hopefully be settled by May, when the king hoped to make his royal entry into London. By May 1626, however, the international dispute surrounding the queen’s coronation was far from settled, and the entry procession was cancelled. Neither of the two events ever actually happened.

The officers of the City of London may have also played an important part in the crown’s decision to cancel the entry and procession. Charles, like his predecessors, used the city like a modern bank. The city provided immediate cash loans to the crown against collateral such as expected subsidies or royal jewels. Charles received several large loans from the city almost immediately after his father’s death. When the king dismissed Parliament in the summer of 1626, he immediately turned to the city for another loan. The city leaders, though, were reluctant to grant it. Any loan would eventually have to be collected from the people of the corporation who already had a number of grievances with the crown. After some negotiating and maneuvering, the city agreed to the king’s request. According to Mede, however, they did not agree to a loan. The officers gave the king £15,000 not as a loan or a free gift, but as “that which was to be granted to his majesty on his riding through the city.” This allowed the city to meet the king’s

333 United Kingdom. Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in other Libraries of Northern Italy (1864-1947; repr., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1970), XXII:51, 294. Hereafter referred to as CSPV, 1625-1626.

334 Ibid., 311, 466.
request without setting a precedent that might be used against them in the future. It also removed one of the major motivations Charles may have had to hold the ceremony. This was not the reason that the procession was cancelled in May of 1626, but it may say a great deal as to why the procession was never rescheduled.

As for the possible May entry, the ongoing and chaotic Parliamentary sessions in early 1626 combined with the desperate attempts to supply the English fleet and growing fears about the possibility of a Spanish invasion of England to demand all of the crown’s attention in late May. The social disorder that would have accompanied Charles’s procession through London in the late spring or early summer of 1626 was exactly what the overburdened royal government and treasury did not want. Charles almost certainly did not want his most reliable source of cash, the London merchants, spending staggering amounts of money on celebrations that would take away men and materials that were needed for the desperately struggling war effort. Given the political, social, and fiscal upheaval that gripped London for the rest of the decade, it can hardly be surprising that Charles’s entry and procession never took place in the 1620s.

In the end, Charles’s ascension was totally stripped of many of the public processional traditions of previous ceremonies. While it is convenient in hindsight to blame these innovations on Charles’s disregard for his subjects’ expectations, the previous pages explain that most were the cumulative result of a number of unfortunate challenges the king faced during his first two years on the throne. Charles’s unfortunate inheritance left him in a position which forced him to adapt to difficult circumstances in order to protect the legitimacy of his reign. The new king’s subjects, however, were not privy to the sort of detailed explanation provided here.

335 Birch, *Court and Times*, 126.
Understandably, many men publically questioned the delayed timing and strange nature of Charles’s coronation. It is telling, however, that many of the questions began almost as soon as the new king assumed the throne, well before any expected forms were altered or any public ceremonies should traditionally have taken place.

In May of 1625, less than two months after James’s death, Mede wrote: “Why the coronation is deferred so long, we know not; but some imagine some mystery in it, besides the present business and danger of infection.” This must have been fairly common conversation because in the same month, the Venetian ambassador noted that “men talk of the possibility of [the king] not being crowned in order to remain more absolute” by avoiding the coronation oath requiring him to uphold the laws. These concerns seem odd since coronations, entries, and processions were often delayed. James’s coronation ceremony was held four months after Elizabeth’s death, but the plague caused James and his advisors to cancel all public aspects of the ceremony, specifically requesting subjects not come to Westminster. He also postponed his entry and progression through London until March 1604, nine months after his coronation the previous July, because of a pestilence very similar to the plague that greeted Charles’s ascension in 1625. James was never actually placed upon his throne in Westminster Hall; instead, he proceeded directly to the Abbey after the royal barge had docked near the bridge. After the ceremony, he came back to the boat and left, forgoing the traditional feast in the Hall. In May 1625, when Mede and the Venetian Ambassador reported the popular suspicion that Charles would alter or forego the traditional coronation celebration, the new king was still two months short of the four

336 Ellis, Letters, 193.

337 CSPV, 1625-1626, 51.

months between his father’s ascension and coronation. The men Mede described expected
innovations, and saw novelty where none existed.

The remarkable comments relayed by the Venetian ambassador captured this climate
perfectly. In May 1625, Charles had given his subjects no reason to suspect their new king of
absolutist ambitions, nor had he presented any evidence that could possibly lead his subjects to
question his intent to take the coronation oath. So where did this distrust originate? Charles’s
marriage to a Catholic was the most glaring source. Cogswell’s discussion of widespread,
popular resistance to the Spanish Match and the reservations of men like Chamberlain, discussed
in Chapter II, suggest that, even if Charles’s subjects found Henrietta Marie’s French blood less
offensive than the Spanish alternative, a Catholic queen and a king willing to marry her
undoubtedly caused concern. Charles’s suspension of the laws against Catholics on his wedding
day presumably gave truth to these concerns. The comments recorded by Mede and others in
May 1625 make much more sense when viewed as a product of Charles’s suspension of the laws
against recusants on May 1.

Contemporary English thought linked absolutism and tyranny to Catholic ideas of papal
or concilar infallibility and the constant danger Catholic ambitions posed to every facet of
English life. Rumors about Charles’s desire to be “more absolute” likely expressed his subjects’
fears for the future of the religious foundations of the English church rather than any threats to
constitutional rights. The “mystery” Mede’s men suspected, whether real or imagined, was of
course a private motivation, almost certainly dangerous to the status quo and the commonweal.
Considered as part of a greater, predominantly religiously motivated distrust of the king’s actions
in May 1625, then these men’s expectation of some private motives provides a valuable lesson
for historians. The breakdown of trust between the king and his subjects may not necessarily
have been the product of a disconnect created by what contemporaries described as the “private nature” of Charles’s court. It is equally possible that contemporary descriptions of the king’s “private” nature were actually the product of an existing unhappiness or distrust. Even so, if the public concern over the nature of Charles’s London coronation was created by an already inflamed religious distrust for which it was partially blamed, the distrust surrounding his Scottish coronation in 1633 proved quite the opposite. It saw a recognized, underlying religious distrust stoked to an inferno by the nature of the ceremony itself. Where religious issues created the strained relationship between Charles and the English that was largely responsible for the innovations many men unjustly expected and imagined in the 1626 ceremony, real innovations during the Edinburgh ceremony and celebrations radically altered the relationship between Charles and the Scots, creating a dangerous distrust similar to the one that greeted Charles in 1625.

III. Scotland, 1633

In late June, 1633, Charles’s assembled court finally began their procession to his long overdue coronation as King of Scotland. Charles inherited the Scottish crown from his father over eight years earlier, but his journey was delayed by a seemingly endless succession of crises and contingencies. By the time Charles could slowly make his way to Edinburgh, it had been fifteen years since a Scottish king had set foot on his nation’s soil. The journey north took a little over a month, as the king stopped to be entertained by important English nobles, to pursue the hunt in the parks and forests along the way, and to make official state entries in several northern cities. In all, the trip consumed most of the summer of 1633, drawing almost all of the court and council
away from London. The journey was Charles’s first trip to his birth-country since he left it at the age of three, his first official royal entry into one of his capitals, and, according to some historians, a rare example of Charles undertaking a traditional form of public display that was important to his subjects’ perception of both his reign and his authority. In the Scottish coronation we find how Charles chose to publically represent himself and his authority when relatively unrestrained by overwhelming circumstances.

Recently, historians have highlighted the ways that Charles’s Scottish coronation proved the king to be totally oblivious to the Scots’ religious and national sensibilities.339 This point is incontrovertible. His use of bishops for the ceremony itself, particularly for the already controversial anointing, undoubtedly upset the already frustrated Scots. His father ordered his mother be anointed when she was crowned Queen in 1590, but the reaction of the Scottish ministers was so strong that James threatened to install a bishop to carry out the ceremony.340 While Anne was eventually anointed by Robert Bruce, Charles was anointed by the Archbishop of St. Andrews, which can only have added to the religious tension of the time.341

Other alterations, however, have been unfairly pointed to as evidence of an equal amount of disregard. Charles’s choice to hold the ceremony at Holyrood Abbey instead of the abbey at Scone provides one example. Some scholars point to it to indicate Charles’s shortcomings, but no one alive during Charles’s reign had ever witnessed a coronation at the ruined abbey.342


340 Schramm, 99.

341 Wordsworth, 101; General Reference Office of Scotland. *Papers Relative to the Marriage of James the Sixth of Scotland with the Princess Anna of Denmark, 1590* (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1828), 53. Hereafter referred to as *Marriage of James*.

342 Kishlansky, 70.
James’s coronation was a rushed ceremony at the Church of the Holy Rood outside Sterling Castle when he was an infant, and Charles’s mother Anne was crowned Queen at Holyrood Abbey in 1590. The Scots initially suggested St. Giles as the site ceremony, but Holyrood Abbey was a more traditional choice. The move from Scone can hardly have upset too many of Charles’s Scottish subjects, although the rejection of St. Giles, a strict Presbyterian congregation within Edinburgh, may suggest some underlying meanings in the location apart from tradition.

Charles’s Scottish coronation and the public ceremonies that surrounded it reveal the logistical challenges such ceremonies presented to a weak royal administration, and the king’s attitude toward such presentations, whether in 1626 or 1633. Charles’s letters to the Privy Council of Scotland and the Council’s directions to royal agents show the king’s determination to limit the possibilities of common access to the king’s person, and the need to take precautions to reduce the numbers of vagabonds and beggars in the crowd. In February 1633 the council reported:

Great numbers of vagabond beggars repair from all parts of the country toward Canongate and Edinburgh where…their shameful exclamations and crying so troubles and wearies the noblemen and other subjects walking the street as they cannot conveniently attend their lawful affairs and business at the Council and Session.

It is obvious that word of the king’s arrival in the city attracted an unusual number of beggars to places the king was expected to pass. The council gave the responsibility of clearing these

343 Marriage of James, 50.

344 [Patrick Walker ?], ed., Documents Relative to the Reception at Edinburgh of the Kings and Queens of Scotland (Edinburgh: 1822), 70.

unwanted beggars to the burghs themselves, approving the collection of taxes in each borough to place these vagabonds in poor houses to keep them from harassing the king and his entourage.346 Limiting the number of beggars that the king’s party passed en route to each city, however, would have proven much more difficult.347

Specific directions to each of the nobles who were supposed to greet the king’s train on its progression to the capital were added to provisions regarding Charles’s baser subjects. They reinforced the need to meticulously control the specific subjects within the king’s immediate surroundings. For instance, the Earl of Dunfermline was commanded to “have special care that no rascals, commons, or others be suffered to be in your lordship’s company, but gentlemen well horsed and in good equipage.”348 These directions and others like them, however, should not be taken to suggest that Charles dismissed the importance of the proper role of his common subjects in these ceremonies. The next sentence of the same directions made it clear that “the commons are not to be hindered to stand along the gate sides to get a sight of his Majesty.”349 This statement very clearly shows that the crown understood how important it was for common subjects to be able to see the monarch, and went out of its way to ensure they would be able to do so. These points were reinforced by the conclusion of the orders explaining that these requirements were “a point of service highly concerning his majesty’s contentment.”350

346 Ibid.
347 Similar orders and accompanying descriptions were issued before James’s 1617 visit to Scotland, so these efforts were by no means unprecedented. See Documents Relative to the Reception at Edinburgh, 61.
348 Privy Council of Scotland, 100-101.
349 Ibid., 101.
350 Ibid.
Still, Charles wanted to reinforce the separation between his person and his subjects. In his orders to the city of Edinburgh, he gave the city authority to organize the traditional standing guard to line the streets that he would pass through, but he also took the precaution of having the city organize a “moving” guard to surround the king on the day of his entry into the city.\footnote{Ibid., 117.} Charles took similar precautions when he finally made an Elizabethan style entry into London in 1641, when he had a mounted guard posted along the city’s streets. Smuts presents this alteration as a specific response to the popular political protests that preceded the 1641 entry, but Charles’s actions in Edinburgh reveal Charles took similar steps long before the unruly crowds of the 1640s.\footnote{Smuts, 92.}

Charles entered Edinburgh on June 15, 1633 to all the pomp and ceremony the city could devise. He was greeted by five formal arches and accompanying pageants with classical and historical themes, which he surveyed on his journey through the city to Holyrood House. It was the first time the city had welcomed a reigning monarch in sixteen years and the first time it had presented pageants to welcome a visit in over forty years. Surprisingly, there was little printed accompaniment surrounding the entry. The texts of the pageants were printed in Edinburgh along with a handful of welcoming verses, but no accounts of the actual progress were printed. Even more surprising is the fact that the coronation and entry pageants received no attention from London printers. One poem describing the king’s journey north still exists, but there were no London editions of the pageants or coronation printed.\footnote{The Entertainment of the High and Mighty Monarch King Charles… (Edinburgh: 1633); Scotland’s Welcome… (Edinburgh: 1633); Grampius Gravitation… (Edinburgh: 1633); King Charles His Birthright… (Edinburgh: 1633); Poem on the King’s Most Excellent Majesties Happy Progress into Scotland (London: 1633).}
It is possible that the nature of Charles’s Edinburgh festivities may have upset his English subjects, not because they would have offended their cultural sensibilities, but because they would have met London’s expectations perfectly. All of the aspects of Charles’s Edinburgh coronation combined to produce an almost perfect English coronation celebration. The state entry accompanied by pageants may have been rare in Edinburgh, but they were expected as standard procedure in London. The crimson robed Charles’s entry into Edinburgh on June 15, his solemn procession from Edinburgh Castle to Holyrood before the coronation ceremony on June 18, and the coronation ceremony itself were all in the traditional English fashion. Though the ceremonial anointing and white clad bishops may have upset the Scots’ Calvinist sensibilities, they would have been expected in London. The railing that surrounded the elevated stage set up in Holyrood may have been a point of conversation in London, but it was one among several points of outrage in Edinburgh. 354

The robed bishops, who supposedly knelt on their entrance to the church, the crosses displayed near the “altar” on the stage, and kneeling king who received communion “with great reverence” left the Scots with little doubt of the dark, papist innovations that their English guests planned to introduce in Scotland. 355 The long opening sermon, a Calvinist favorite, did little to soothe inflamed passions. The 200 gold and 1000 silver coins the almoner distributed to the gathered masses on the procession out of the church may have had some effect on the souls fortunate enough to receive them, but few were likely to forget that the hand that cast them to the crowd belonged to the Bishop of Murray. 356

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354 Wordsworth, 94.
355 Ibid., 94-106.
356 Wordsworth, xxv-xxx; xxvi.
Heylyn explained that Charles had little to do in Edinburgh but “see and be seen.” He travelled in state to touch one hundred souls, both young and old, for the “king’s evil” on June 24th in celebration of the nativity of St. John the Baptist. He personally attended what he considered an almost perfect Parliament in a hall he had newly built for that purpose. And he travelled to a number of cities and burghs north of Edinburgh to see his kingdom and for his subjects there to see him. As Maurice Lee points out, Charles 1633 visit to Edinburgh was a logistical success. It was a success in the mind of Charles and his ministers as well. The king had travelled his country, been lavishly welcomed by his loving subjects, and achieved all of the financial and administrative goals he hoped to reach with the Scottish Parliament. As he left Edinburgh after spending a little over a month in Scotland, Charles had little reason to question his relationship with his Scottish subjects. They had proven their love time and time again. His subjects, however, were left holding the bill for a distant king who appeared to have little regard for their gifts or their religion. Charles proved himself willing to meet his subjects in person and display himself before them in all the state and ceremony possible. Unfortunately for Charles, the image he displayed was a foreign and alienated monarch intent on reaching into Scotland only to force his will on the kingdom’s pulpits and purses.

III. Ceremonies, Spaces, and the Sacred

357 Quoted in Wordsworth, xxix.
358 Marriage of James, 117.
360 Ibid., 133.
361 CSPD, 1633-1634, 126, 128.
Both of Charles’s coronations left his subjects feeling alienated, unsure of the king’s intentions, and uncertain of his commitment to the traditional norms they held dear. In the London ceremony, the lack of tokens, printed descriptions of the festivities, and the procession through the city were most damaging to the ceremony’s potential to manifest and renew the personal bonds between subject and ruler because they limited real and symbolic access to the royal body. “One of the most important favors a monarch could bestow,” according to Sharpe, “was admission into the royal presence: a sight of divine monarchy.” The royal body was sacred. Sacred was public in the most traditional sense: undeniable, universal, bonding, and legitimate. While ceremonies and rituals were opportunities to approach the sacred, physical places, printed accounts, relics, and images provided secular individuals with a real material connection to it. This contact created a sense of intimacy and knowledge because these objects were representative of actual physical contact with the revered. For many subjects, particularly the uneducated poor, the sacred was physically present in the symbol. This meant religious ideas and social concepts often had material manifestations within the personal world of each individual. The ladies who drove the recorder of St. Edmond’s to smash the church’s stained glass window after he discovered them making “low curtsies…to God the Father in the [stained-glass] window” exemplify this point in their belief that God was actually in their parish window. Charles’s failure to provide those relics meant individuals could not create personal connections to the king anointed. The monarch’s connection with the poor was special, just as grace was a divine gift to the depraved. The king healed their sickness; the king’s almoner traditionally handed out alms to the poor he encountered in his travels; and seeing the royal body would have


at least raised their spirits. The king’s presence was his gift to his subjects, both noble and common. By gracing his subjects with his presence, Charles showed his pleasure with them. He was also sharing his majesty and his Arcana, or the sacred nature that gave him mysterious knowledge, with them in some way. In the royal touch, he was sharing his sacred mystery with his subjects in the most intimate, physical way. The receiving of petitions and council, on the other hand, allowed them to share in the king’s most precious secular prerogative: the ruling of his kingdoms. During his London coronation in 1626, as Richards rightly suggests, Charles failed to do any of these things.

According to Richards’s account, similar failures characterized Charles’s public ceremonial forms until just prior to the Civil War. He was rarely seen, refused to allow all but a few of his subjects into his presence, and travelled as privately as possible. Charles, this line of argument clearly suggests, refused to play the public part of a king. The forms and displays of the 1633 coronation in Edinburgh, however, challenge such a view on several levels. First, Charles did not become “increasingly withdrawn” from his subjects’ view as his reign progressed. In fact, it would be safer to suggest the opposite. The 1633 celebration proves he was willing to present himself to his subjects, and, as Sharpe and Kishlansky have shown, he did so more frequently during the 1630s than in the first five years of his reign. The ceremonial reforms during Charles’s London coronation in 1626 show Charles’s penchant for ceremony and sacred symbolism, but the public forms of the celebration cannot be taken as any type of precursor to the king’s public policy during the personal rule. Those policies were actually much more consistent with the nature of the king’s Scottish coronation. Any search for the possible connection between Charles’s reformations of public rituals or the king’s role in ceremonial

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364 Richards, 77, 113.
365 Ibid., 113.
functions and his ultimate failure to ensure the personal loyalty of his subjects is therefore better understood if viewed in relation to public forms and reception of the festivities in Edinburgh in 1633 rather than the London ceremony in 1626.

The ceremonial nature of Charles’s court and the public ceremonies that publically displayed it have received a great deal of recent attention from both political and cultural historians.366 Simultaneously, the prevailing consensus that Charles’s religious policies and reforms throughout the 1630s were uniquely responsible for the unrest that allowed the crises of his later reign to take the shape the did has also led historians to dissect the public nature of the religious ceremonies and services of the Laudian church.367 In both instances, historians see Charles’s public spectacles and religious reforms as having been more controlled, orderly ceremonies than those of his predecessors. Sharpe’s describes the court reforms of the late 1620s and 1630s as having placed an emphasis on the physical separation of the royal body, and the reduction of access to the space around it. Charles used his Gentlemen Ushers to control access to his person, making his every interaction into a ritual of kingship. Rituals, according to Sharpe, that “publically emphasized the reverence due to the king’s body and the mystical majesty of monarchy.”368

366 The terrific work of Richards, Smuts, and many other cultural historians and literary scholars helped expand the discussion of politics beyond those few individuals recognized as “politicians,” forcing many former “revisionists” to move beyond high-politics to defend their positions. The result has been something that appears very similar to what Sharpe hopefully described as a “cultural turn” in the study of Stuart politics; Sharpe, Remapping, 19.

367 Altar railing has become the primary focus of these studies. For a brief historiography, see Kenneth Fincham, “The Restoration of the Altars in the 1630s,” The Historical Journal, 44, 4 (Cambridge, University Press, 2001), 919-920. For the local impact of these reforms, see David Cressy, Travesties and Transgressions in Tudor and Stuart England (Oxford: University Press, 2000), 186-211.

368 Sharpe, Personal Rule, 218.
This was not limited to the confined spaces of the royal court or the king’s presence chamber. The “concern with reverence and ritual became an obsession on public occasions.”\(^{369}\) Such public occasions “expressed the royal mind,” communicating an “image of royalty,” even a “monarchical ideology.”\(^{370}\) Charles’s reforms to the festivities of the Order of the Garter on St. George’s day highlighted these ideas. Charles reinstated the tradition that the king publically proceed to Windsor the day before St. George’s day when the Order’s traditional celebration was held. He also modified the “George,” the medallion bearing the image of St. George that each knight was required to wear at all times, to make the badge more religious in its imagery.\(^{371}\) All of these reforms were meant to communicate the virtues of manliness, order, chivalry, hierarchy, and chastity that were emphasized in Charles’s personal life to the public realm.\(^{372}\)

The religious forms of the Caroline Church continued the process, emphasizing the sacredness of specific spaces, and publically reinforcing the importance of divine order and proper reverence. Peter Lake’s seminal discussion of the “Laudian style” describes the physical forms of the Church in the 1630s as focused on the “divine presence in the world and more particularly within the church.”\(^{373}\) “The typical Laudian interior,” according to Lake, “with the altar railed at the east end of the chancel, perhaps a screen erected between the nave and the chancel,… did indeed present a picture, delineated in architectural or spatial terms, of the

\(^{369}\) Ibid.

\(^{370}\) Ibid., 219.

\(^{371}\) Ibid., 219-220.

\(^{372}\) Ibid., 220.

\(^{373}\) Lake, “The Laudian Style,” 164.
Laudian view of the Christian community.”\textsuperscript{374} It was a reaction against an idealized puritanical enemy who “allowed the church to be used for all manner of secular purposes,” seeing the sacred church manifest, not in the spaces of houses of worship, but in the physical bodies of the individuals who made up the church.\textsuperscript{375} To Laudians, Lake explains, the godly saw themselves as the holy objects, rather than the physical spaces of the nation’s cathedrals. In making all parishioners come to the newly placed altar to kneel at the railed off spaces demarking the sacred presence of the holy and divine on earth, the Laudian emphasis on sacred spaces aligned neatly with the renewed emphasis on ceremony and ritual both inside the court and in its public displays. Each of the elements, as seen in the previous pages, was present in the ceremonies and celebrations in Edinburgh, making the 1633 coronation a unique example of what Lake and Pincus describe as the “unique cultural politics” of the 1630s. Cultural politics, they seem to suggest, that were uniquely responsible for the distrust and unrest that ultimately allowed all of Charles’s kingdoms to take arms against him during the Civil Wars.

\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., 177-178.

\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., 179.
Conclusions

The preceding pages describe aspects of the public debates that surrounded Charles in the early years of his reign and attempt to explain how his reaction to them shaped the policies and performances of his later years. They describe an erosion of traditional, personalized authority in the mid-1620s that forced the individual persons in public positions (i.e. “the authorities”) to justify their statements without relying on the authority inherent in offices they held. Critics initially questioned the king’s policies and decisions indirectly, but publically, by critiquing his closest temporal ministers and his spiritual advisors. The king’s exclusive power to judge these two groups lay at the very heart of his control over the systems of governance. Bishops and clergy officially interpreted the public doctrines of the Church of England and its positions on scripture. The king mediated their disagreements and judged their debates in conference; his approval basically determining the winner of a particular debate. The same was true of his temporal councilors who developed and debated government policy in his councils. The king judged the performance and worthiness of the men within all of these councils.

The king’s ability to protect these ministers from public and parliamentary criticism was absolutely necessary in order to preserve his power, but rarely, prior to the 1620s, was the monarch forced to demonstrate this power. Instead, these men and the crown protected their position by directly and indirectly refuting criticisms in the same manner that they were presented: they simply countered the argument against them by deploying commonly accepted sources of truth to refute their critics’ claims. Clerics used the same scripture to defend themselves that their critics deployed to attack them. The king’s secular councilors responded
with the legal and historical sources that their critics’ used to legitimize their public critiques. These methods required the existence of both a universally accepted source of truth and a commonly-held conception of the ideal forms of governance. The growing belief that what benefited the universal community of the “state” was not necessarily the same as what benefited the individuals in public positions that traditionally represented or made up the state eventually destroyed myths of mutual interests.

Members of the regime itself instigated the earliest public debates hoping to persuade the monarch to some particular policy or action, but the possibility of separating the traditional positions of public authority from the public good allowed other members of society outside the court to make public statements under the guise of protecting the “state” or church from the corrupt individuals that claimed to represent it in public positions. Still, the monarch was seen as the arbiter and judge of these debates as well as those within his traditional religious and temporal councils. Since his decisions were reflected in the actions and statements of the government, it was rare for the king to publically express specific judgments on these debates. On the few occasions in which he did, James’s decisions at the Hampden Court Conference in 1604 for instance, the king publically heard all the information and his decisions carried his personal authority as delivered from his own mouth. Such an explicit approach removed the possible threats of corrupt ministers or bad councils and made clear the legitimate, definitive judgment of the king. In these cases, it was impossible to question the king’s actions and statements without attacking the king himself. Though the clear enunciation of the king’s personal word and authority protected such specific statements, it also made them undeniably dangerous, a desperate tactic of last resort that potentially put the foundations of monarchy itself into play.
In 1625 and 1626, however, Charles was forced to increasingly wager his own personal authority to protect secular and spiritual authorities from public and parliamentary criticism by over-extending and over-clarifying royal positions that were normally much more withdrawn and generally stated. Parliament avoided directly confronting the king by justifying Montagu’s prosecution on procedural grounds in 1625. The 1626 impeachment of Buckingham, however, carried a more obvious assault on Charles’s judgment. Charles and his ministers’ failure to win enough support in parliament through traditional arguments left them with few options other than the personal intervention of the king. After Charles dismissed parliament, he attempted to persuade his subjects with the same ineffectual justifications he gave to the MPs. They explained the immediate situations that made unusual procedures and policies necessary, and the king promised that he would reward their loyalty with a new parliament as soon as possible. Charles’s requests failed, however, because his subjects simply responded by restating the need for parliamentary approval. The basic question, then, seems to be why Charles and his ministers’ efforts in the 1625 and 1626 Parliaments failed to win support?

Charles’s failure in parliament cannot be separated from the contexts and events that made the meeting necessary. The religious wars, debates, and unrest that welcomed Charles to the throne in 1625 presented him with an unprecedented combination of political and cultural challenges to his authority and to his kingship. Many of these difficulties were the result of long-term processes or inherited circumstances that had affected Elizabeth and James, but James never faced the type of broad crisis that occurred in his son’s early reign. At the center of it all was a widespread perception of change and innovation that was both a product of and contributor to the culture of distrust that accompanied the crises and challenges of the 1620s. These perceptions
shaped both the language of public religious and political debates, as well as the nature of state ceremonies and performances.

Many Englishmen, as Chapter I reveals, believed Charles’s lax policies regarding his wife’s Catholic co-religionists and his protection of Montagu confirmed their long-held fears that Charles’s marriage would lead to the destruction of the fundamental Protestant character of the Church of England. Parliamentarians and pastors railed against “Arminian” writers and the clerics who defended them, accusing both groups of secretly supporting the Roman Church and betraying the one True Church. In Chapter III the distrust between the king and his public generated controversy over Charles’s coronation. In May 1625, many subjects saw “some mystery” behind Charles’s decision to delay his coronation apart from the risks and demands of the war and the plague. In the same month others suggested that the new king delayed his coronation because he wanted to gain more absolute power by not swearing to uphold the laws as required in the coronation oath. The controversies over the forced loan discussed in Chapter II seemed to confirm many Englishmen’s suspicions about the king’s disregard for the ancient laws. Distrust and a fear of disorder and instability permeated the language and displays of political culture and cultural politics in Charles’s first five years as king.

The “mystery” some men saw in the timing of Charles’s coronation portrayed secret motivations and causes, but carried larger theological baggage as well. “Mystery” could describe the mystical, symbolic presence of God as well as an aspect of faith beyond the reach of human logic. Both theological definitions implied the presence or influence of a higher power, along with secret knowledge or justification of specific actions that mediated between that power and lesser subjects. This special knowledge was not part of the publically available explanations, however, much like the pejorative “private” signified a singular, uncommon belief or behavior.
Those men who shared Prynne and Burton’s belief that God’s grace allowed every member of “the elect” to understand and interpret God’s word rejected the mysterious knowledge priest and clergy formerly claimed. Applied to political actions, this mode of thought asked “why could any of the reasons behind government actions not be publically explained unless if they were illegitimate?” Such motivations, beliefs, or other “mysteries” were secretly hidden from open sight because they were extraordinary suspensions of the ordinary, natural order.

Chapters I and II are studies of specific public attempts to remove the “mystery” from the doctrines of the Church and the policies of the government of England. The Calvinist position in the debates over predestination claimed God, through singular, absolute power, decided who to save and damn, but it also suggested that men could understand the specifics of God’s actions and the nature of salvation. The political and legal debates in Chapter II arose as subjects demanded these same specifics from their king and his ministers. In both examples, individuals claimed that ordinary men outside traditional positions of authority had the same inherent ability to judge as those who held public positions, whether in the interpretation of scripture and law or judging the fitness of government ministers. Chapter III shows Charles’s public ceremonies attempted to re-establish that “mystery” after 1629 by tightly ordering public spectacles and limiting access to the royal body itself. Close control of access to the king forced appeals through traditional channels that were part of the hierarchical structure of society, while also making the area around his sacred body more awe-inspiring. Mystifying the king and the Church through ceremonies and spaces that reflected hierarchical order reaffirmed the role of councilors and clergy as intermediaries between the sacred and the subject. At the center of both stood an uncontestable sacred space and body, claiming unquestionable power over interpretation and judgment.
II. Writing, Rhetoric, and the Public Sphere

England saw much change and disorder in Charles’s first five years on the throne. A new king married to a Roman Catholic queen led the country into war after a generation of peace. The Protestant forces on the continent, the defenders of True Faith whose very survival seemed connected to their own, appeared to be in danger of total defeat at the hands of the Habsburg armies. Plague tore through London and the suburbs, and the economy stagnated under pressure from pirates off the coast and the war’s obvious impact on trade. Soldiers were billeted in private homes, and towns were forced to meet their demands when the government who called them could not. In the following years, unruly bands of unpaid soldiers criss-crossed the countryside while the crown attempted to pay them through unprecedented means of taxation. Even in the house of God, listeners heard about the secret danger posed by the Papists and the Arminians as wells as from the Puritans. Everywhere Englishmen turned in the first five years of Charles’s reign, they were alerted to imminent dangers and persistent crises. Such anomalies and threats justified typically unheard of public action by common individuals, acting to protect their society and their faith.

Still, how real was the crisis of 1625-30? Were these circumstances actually threatening the stability of the realm, or was the perception of crisis the salient feature of Charles’s early reign? In published works, discussions of crisis and disorder in turn served as a rhetorical device to justify public appeals by those outside traditional public positions. Writers and speakers publically referenced unprecedented dangers and actions to legitimate breaches of social norms unthinkable under typical circumstances. In times of peace, royally approved events such as
entries, coronations, or parliaments temporarily suspended normal order, and granted subjects freedom to act outside the everyday rules of society. The presence of the king was an integral part of these suspensions; the men in parliament or the audience for an entry technically became part of his court and council, and were therefore extraordinary. During periods of crisis and disorder, however, the crises and events themselves suspended the traditional norms regulating public speech and many other public behaviors. This led to the rhetoric of eminent threat and crises, which permeated publications in the 1620s, as a means of justifying public criticism. It also makes discussions of change, disorder, or innovation in published works unreliable as a gauge of true public perception because the change was presented as a justification for the work itself.

In the case of private letters, even those intended for semi-public circulation such as Joseph Mede’s newsletters, one need not rely on accusations of change, disorder, and innovations to justify writing. By its very nature, epistolary writing focuses on the unusual and on change. It is, after all, a medium for relaying “news,” events that are unique and singular. Since singular and unusual events and behaviors were commonly interpreted as ominous portents of divine dissatisfaction dangerous to the natural order, “news” was by its very nature negative. Mede’s letters are almost hysterical as they report change, threat, and innovation. In this way, they can mislead modern readers into assuming a more widely held perception of crisis because, in reality, relaying the news meant that the author focused on change and disorder.

Mede’s information either came from men who frequented “Paul’s walk,” the long nave aisle of St. Paul’s where fashionable and educated men discussed the news they received from the most recently delivered merchants’ correspondence, or from his fellow divines who received and transmitted information through their own correspondence networks. Merchant packets
naturally described recent events and new conditions affecting trade, almost always negative changes that threatened investments during years of war and instability. Mede’s clerical source likely shared the beliefs that led the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography to call him the “father of English millenarianism.” The basic foundation of millenarianism, the belief that Christ will physically return to Earth to personally reign over one thousand years of peace (the millennium), required necessarily unique, singular, and extraordinary events as proof of Christ’s imminent return because the scripture claimed wars, plagues, and famines would mark the days leading up his arrival. Both Mede’s sources focused on the negative and unusual.

Just as it was necessary to argue against some imagined change in order to affect any actual change, some expectation of news was necessary to initiate the discussions through which news was transmitted outside of traditional sites of conversation and correspondence. Though printed and written communication receives most scholarly attention, long-established social institutions were at the center of communication even in periods that involved such “novel techniques” in written and printed exchanges. The public statements during the opposition to the marriage were obviously political, but they were presented in churches and during religious meetings, which were the centers of social interaction from the smallest parish church in the country to St. Paul’s in London. In these spaces, the community, as a united congregation of worshipers, came together as an embodiment of the commonweal. These were open spaces with largely unrestricted access where information was exchanged, and the individual physically took his or her position within a visual representation of society as a whole.

Such a view allows for the contextualization of the theological motivations for Charles’s religious reforms, which were predominantly focused on the “holiness” of physical spaces, and the prescribed ordering of the services held in those spaces. When viewed as information centers
rather than simple houses of worship, the spaces and functions of churches and their reformation
take on new importance. Rather than the product of high-theology, Charles’s reforms can be seen
as an attempt to control social interaction by controlling the physical spaces of social arenas,
thereby indirectly controlling the conduct of individuals within those arenas. These reforms, like
all of Charles’s policies, were an attempt to refocus and reconstruct a hierarchical view of society
that operated through a clearly defined, visibly manifest network of rank, emanating from one
central and universal authority. Though, in theory, God was that power, its earthly distribution
was channeled through the king. Just as God was the source of all grace, the king controlled the
marks of privilege and honor on Earth: the renewed reverence of the Order of the Garter, for
example.

Lake and Pincus point out, as I have above, that the crises Mede and others reported,
whether real or imagined, justified public appeals. Men claimed emergencies to defend
themselves of accusations of “popularity.” Crises and threats were reported in the same public
arena whose very existence they justified. Lake and Pincus suggest such appeals called into
being, or implied the existence of, a public capable of rational judgment based on the
information it was given. The question, however, is to what extent this rhetorical strategy and the
language of crisis made Lake and Pincus’s public sphere necessarily self-perpetuating, constantly
expanding from the point of initiation with each supposed crisis? In this process of expansion,
once the rhetorical strategies of justification reached certain polarized positions, no reasonable
room for reconciliation remained. As Cust argues, the ground for negotiation eroded in the
1620s. Polarization was the natural end of the temporary public spheres Lake and Pincus
describe. Cust sees this erosion as the result of changes in the regime’s ideological position and
the rhetoric that accompanied it. The radical evolution of the rhetoric and change to the
ceremony of kingship, however, may belie to some extent the importance of ideological change. In a political culture whose forms were based on an ingrained distrust of the unknown individual actor, reasoned negotiation was circumscribed by the radical rhetoric of crisis necessary to legitimate public expressions of dissatisfaction.

This rhetoric of crisis paralleled the actual parliamentary strategies of self-preservation. By the public identification of new problems, parliamentary men could claim the need to remain in session. Such comparisons led to the even larger question of the exact relationship between Lake and Pincus’s public spheres and the existence and nature of parliament. If both acted and questioned in this way, taking similar forms, then they certainly interacted in a complex, multifaceted manner, with each somehow dependent on and reacting to the nature, even the existence, of the other. Though the questions of how the politics of the public sphere directly influenced the manner of the parliamentary proceedings or what role a sitting parliament played in the creation of a public sphere are important, it is more reasonable to conclude that the shared forms were indicative of a key feature of the political culture of the period: a depersonalized conception of true, public authority free from the corruption inherent in associating the authority of public positions with the unquestionable judgment of the individuals who filled them. It was the product of the internalized distrust of the individual, the stranger, or the always deceptive actor that characterized so much of early Stuart popular and political culture. The rhetoric of crisis drew upon the community’s general suspicion of individuals and outsiders and its growing fear of private motives and disingenuous persons in order to justify public speech. Such rhetoric inflamed and created distrust far beyond the social and demographic shifts it responded to, changing a climate of circumstantial misgivings and doubts into a popular culture of constant uncertainty, hyper-sensitive to the slightest perception of innovation or change.
The institutional conflicts of the late 1620s were part of the same process. The contemporary understanding of “public” as an institutionalized common good and its personalized evil counterpart shaped the perception of personalized authority’s danger to the integrity of the innately “good” institutional systems and procedures. It was never the monarchy or parliament that was the problem, but the individual men misleading it. Simultaneously, the Church of England had an established orthodoxy as close as possible to the ancient church, but it was being perverted by disingenuous individuals. The popular faith in the legitimacy of the institutions of power was undermined by the persons within those institutions perceived to be acting in private, diabolical interests. With all other institutions motivated by the private desires of dangerous individuals, the legitimacy of a totally impersonalized institution such as parliament could only increase.

The growth of depersonalized institutions and authorities corresponded with the rise of the intellectual movements centered on the belief in universally available, legitimizing truths independent of personalized, definite sources of “right” and “wrong.” History, Common Law, and religious texts created dangerous avenues of authority outside of the traditional, personalized systems of authorization and legitimization. Charles was able to remove parliament as an institutional avenue for dissent, but the shroud of institutional balance was destroyed. Parliament had previously been merely another institution of control that provided an illusion of council and popular participation, but it slowly assumed the role of judging the personal authorities of other institutions. After the end of parliament, Charles was able to control the other institutions of power, but this could only reinforce the power of parliament in its position as the institutional avenue of legitimization.
The crown was not losing specifically its ability to govern or systematically control subjects. It was losing its ability to protect the institutions of control themselves from allegations of diabolical personal interest. The loss of control stemmed from institutional conflict between legislative, judicial, academic and religious powers generated by the ever-increasing, constantly widening public and parliamentary discourse on the origin and nature of authority. This struggle ultimately forced the monarchy into closing the institutions of control that it previously relied on. The monarchy responded by attempting to reinforce the central authority of the king himself to compensate for the lack of institutional mechanisms of power. Withdrawing from possible avenues of council allowed the monarchy to centralize the perceived source of authority in the person or choice of the monarch by reducing the possibilities of alternative authorities. It also meant focusing all distrust and blame on a single source: a tyrannical, crypto-Catholic king bent on eliminating the proper institutions of public authority. Ultimately, the violence of the civil wars would destroy the myths of institutional purity and thereby allow the dissolution of the monarchy. By the time of the wars, however, those myths were all that remained of the divine kingship whose final embodiment the anarchy and violence of the 1640s eventually destroyed.
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