Moral Disengagement from an Organizational Justice Perspective:  
An Exploratory Study 
 
by 
 
Gregory W. Stevens 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Auburn University 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Science 
 
Auburn, Alabama 
August 9, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: moral disengagement, organizational justice, individual differences 
unethical decision-making, business ethics 
 
 
Copyright 2010 by Gregory W. Stevens 
 
 
Approved by 
Jacqueline K. Mitchelson, Chair, Assistant Professor of Psychology 
Daniel J. Svyantek, Professor of Psychology 
Achilles A. Armenakis, James T. Pursell Eminent Scholar in Management Ethics  
 
 ii 
Abstract 
 
The current study contributes to a growing understanding of the construct of 
moral disengagement, in particular the role of organizational justice and individual 
differences as antecedents.  In a study of 272 undergraduate students, no significant 
relationship was found between organizational justice and a tendency to morally 
disengage, as assessed through responses to ethical business scenarios.  However, several 
important relationships were uncovered between individual differences and moral 
disengagement.  Among them, aggression, cynical views of humankind, and being 
reserved (or ?aloof?) positively related to moral disengagement, while conscientiousness 
and empathy exhibited negative relationships.  Interestingly, the callous affect subscale of 
psychopathy also negatively related to moral disengagement.  Furthermore, an 
exploratory analysis was conducted to assess differential relationships for each of the 
eight moral disengagement techniques.  The implications of these results for future 
research on situational and individual antecedents of moral disengagement are discussed. 
 
 iii 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... v 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Moral Disengagement Theory ................................................................................ 2 
Integration of Organizational Justice ...................................................................... 5 
Method .............................................................................................................................. 12 
Participants and Procedure .................................................................................... 12 
Measures ............................................................................................................... 13 
Results ............................................................................................................................... 18 
Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 22 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research ................................................... 29 
Practical and Theoretical Implications.................................................................. 31 
References ......................................................................................................................... 33 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 56 
 
 
 iv 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Basic descriptive statistics and correlations for personality variables  ................39 
Table 2: Basic descriptive statistics and correlations for Dark Triad, empathy and 
aggression variables ...............................................................................................40 
Table 3: Basic descriptive statistics and correlations for Hogan Development Survey  
variables .................................................................................................................41 
Table 4: Basic descriptive statistics and correlations for the moral disengagement 
mechanisms  ...........................................................................................................42 
Table 5: Marginal means of moral disengagement by organizational justice  ..................43 
Table 6: Results of regression analysis for overall moral disengagement   .......................44 
Tables 7a-i: Results of regression analysis for moral disengagement techniques  ............45 
 
 v 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of hypothesized relationships between variables of interest   ..........54 
Figure 2: Mean moral disengagement by mechanism and organizational justice   ...........55 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 One of the most enduring questions of the human condition revolves around the 
explanation of why people engage in unethical behavior.  This question is particularly 
relevant for organizations, as the effects of such behavior can be far-reaching and often 
financially and emotionally disastrous for many (Bajaj, 2008; Gimein, 2008).  
Unsurprisingly, many empirical studies have focused on unethical decision making in 
organizations.  A recent review of the literature found that a bulk of unethical decision-
making studies focused on individual factors and differences (e.g., age, moral 
philosophy), while only about half of that amount focused on organizational factors (e.g. 
ethics codes, rewards and sanctions; Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000).  Loe and 
colleagues argue that an integration of the organizational context and individual factors is 
a necessary future step in ultimately determining the ?why? behind peoples? unethical 
decisions at work (see also Funder, 2001).  In response, the current study attempts to 
predict unethical decision-making by examining the effects of organizational justice and 
individual factors on the propensity to morally disengage. 
 Moral disengagement offers a mechanism by which otherwise moral individuals 
can engage in unethical decisions or behaviors.  Briefly, moral disengagement allows 
individuals to selectively and temporarily disengage internal moral standards that would 
typically inhibit unethical decisions (Bandura, 1999).  Recent research has focused on the 
antecedents that lead to moral disengagement, with the goal of uncovering important 
individual differences (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008).  However, from the 
 
 
2 
interactionist perspective proposed by Trevino (1986), individual differences and the 
social environment are theorized to combine to explain and predict ethical decision-
making.  As such, if we are to explain workers? unethical decisions and behavior, we 
must consider the effects of the individual and the environment.  To the best of the 
author?s knowledge, no study to date has offered such a comprehensive examination of 
moral disengagement.  As a result, the current study will focus on the unique effects of 
organizational justice and relevant individual differences, as well as the potential for 
interactive effects between them.  By filling this gap in the literature, the current study 
will contribute to a better understanding of moral disengagement, and the ways in which 
individuals can be dissuaded from deactivating moral standards in response to unjust 
conditions and personality tendencies. 
Moral Disengagement Theory 
 Before introducing the construct of moral disengagement, it is important to 
outline the relevant aspects of the theory from which it arose: Bandura?s (1986) social 
cognitive theory (SCT).  In SCT, human actions are conceptualized as the result of 
interactions between behavior, cognitive and other personal factors, and the environment.  
This perspective is congruent with Trevino?s (1986) interactionist approach to ethical 
decision-making introduced above.  SCT proposes that individuals employ a self-
regulatory mechanism that allows them  to anticipate, reflect on, and judge their actions 
in comparison to a set of internal moral standards.  Moreover, Bandura (1986) argues that 
these internal standards are the result of social learning and repeated exposure of the self-
regulatory mechanism, as opposed to being genetically determined.  This mechanism 
underscores the importance of considering both the social environment and the 
 
 
3 
individual?s personality in moral self-regulation.  Furthermore, Bandura proposed that 
such regulatory mechanisms could be selectively activated or deactivated.  Moral 
disengagement extends from the interactionist perspective of SCT and refers to the ability 
of individuals to selectively disengage internal moral standards via eight interrelated 
mechanisms, discussed in detail below (Bandura, 1999).  In other words, moral 
disengagement is the ability of individuals to engage in unethical decision-making or 
behavior without experiencing distress by cognitively reframing their  perceptions.   
 The mechanisms of moral disengagement can be logically separated into three 
groups, all of which involve some form of cognitive restructuring.  The first group 
comprises mechanisms that rely on cognitive restructuring of the act or behavior: moral 
justification, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparison.  Each of these 
mechanisms is intended to portray unethical behavior as less harmful or even necessary 
in certain contexts.  As a result, such actions should be easier for the individual to carry 
out.  For example, moral justification may involve rationalizing unethical behavior as 
critical in serving the greater good of the organization.  Employing euphemistic language 
sanitizes behavior by replacing negative wording with more positive images (e.g., 
?massaging? the books instead of falsifying them).  Finally, advantageous comparison 
allows individuals to consider current unethical behavior as less aversive or damaging as 
compared to other possibilities that are seen as being more harmful. 
The second group of moral disengagement mechanisms center on the cognitive 
restructuring of the role of the actor: displacement of responsibility, diffusion of 
responsibility, and disregard/distortion of consequences.  In these three cases, the 
unethical behavior is made more palatable due to perceived lack of control over the 
 
 
4 
situation.  Relevant to organizations, displacement of responsibility allows an employee 
to blame an authority, be it a boss or supervisor.  Diffusion of responsibility, on the other 
hand, allows an individual to attribute responsibility to the group of which the individual 
is a part.  In both cases, the perceived role of the employee in the behavior is diminished.  
Disregard/distortion of the consequences will allow an individual to disconnect the 
results of the behavior from the act itself, reducing the role the employee has in the harm 
resulting from the behavior. 
The final group of mechanisms involves cognitive restructuring of the victims of 
unethical behavior: dehumanization and attribution of blame.  In both cases, the 
mechanism does not dispute or redefine the consequences of unethical behavior.  Rather, 
the victims are conceptualized as somehow having deserved such treatment.  
Dehumanization, in an organizational context, may be an executive?s dismissal of his 
employees simply as a means to generate profits instead of seeing them as individuals.  In 
this sense, unethical behavior may then be perceived as justified, as when an executive 
pays himself bonuses while cutting pension funds.  Attribution of blame involves placing 
blame on the victim of unethical acts, such that the consequences of the behavior are 
somehow deserved.  In all, the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement, when 
selectively engaged, allow individuals to participate in unethical behavior without the 
guidance of internal moral standards.    
Although moral disengagement has traditionally been studied in the domains of 
military or political violence (Bandura, 1999), delinquent youths (Barnes, Welte, 
Hoffman, & Dintcheff, 2005), or death-related professions (Osofsky, Bandura, & 
Zimbardo, 2005), recent efforts have begun to focus on the nuanced role in organizational 
 
 
5 
contexts (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008; Moore, 2007).  Indeed, based on several of 
the above examples, it is not difficult to see how individuals in organizations are able, 
possibly even encouraged, to morally disengage by virtue of organizational hierarchies 
and bureaucracies.  Critical to the consideration of moral disengagement in organizations, 
following from a SCT perspective, is whether or not these mechanisms are being 
selectively engaged.  Previous research (Detert et al., 2008) has focused almost 
exclusively on individual differences as antecedents of moral disengagement.  However, 
we argue that for a more complete understanding of moral disengagement, the main 
effects and interactions of social triggers and individual differences must be considered.  
It follows from SCT that cues from the environment and the interpretation of those cues 
based on personality differences will combine to influence the ways in which one 
ultimately creates internal moral standards and then chooses to activate or deactivate 
those standards.  Because this is a critical aspect of SCT, and consequently of moral 
disengagement, we argue that the environment will have a large impact on the tendency 
to morally disengage.  It is with this idea that we now turn to the construct of 
organizational justice as a potential organizationally based trigger. 
Integration of Organizational Justice 
Broadly, organizational justice is conceptualized as the perception of fairness in 
the workplace.  Where fairness has been found to relate to motivation, satisfaction and 
citizenship behaviors, the perception of unfairness relates to negative changes that are 
both affective (e.g., low commitment) and behavioral in nature (e.g., withdrawal; Latham 
& Pinder, 2005).  Studies of organizational fairness originated from Adams? (1963) 
equity theory, which rests on the premise that members of an organization will 
 
 
6 
simultaneously judge their inputs (e.g., time, effort) against their outputs (e.g., pay, 
benefits).  The degree to which an employee?s inputs are perceived to be commensurate 
with outputs leads to perceptions of fairness, which provided early conceptualizations of 
distributive justice.  Later research expanded the organizational justice construct to 
include procedural justice.  Procedural justice refers to the extent that individuals 
perceive workplace procedures, especially those that determine outputs, to be fair, 
consistent, accurate and free of bias (Leventhal, 1980).  Another important aspect of 
procedural justice specifies the role that having a ?voice? or other form of control in a 
process leads to perceptions of procedural fairness (Folger, 1977).  The most recent 
component of organizational justice, introduced by Bies and Moag (1986), focuses on the 
interactions within the organization from a justice perspective, known as interactional 
justice.  Subsequently, these interactions have been divided further into two distinct 
justice components.  Interpersonal justice refers to the degree that people perceive they 
are being treated respectfully and politely by the authority of the organization.  
Informational justice, on the other hand, refers to the degree that information and/or 
explanations have been given in a timely manner and appear reasonable.  Although the 
distinctiveness of each of these forms of justice has been called into question, research 
has generally supported the four-factor structure presented above (Colquitt, 2001).  Given 
the range of negative outcomes (e.g., turnover intentions, counterproductive work 
behaviors) that previously have been related to perceptions of injustice (cf. Cohen-
Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001), we propose that organizational justice is 
a salient construct that may lead individuals to morally disengage. 
 
 
7 
Thus far, we have proposed that organizational justice may play a role in 
increasing one?s tendency to morally disengage.  From an interactionist perspective, 
however, we should also expect individual differences to play a moderating role in 
organizational justice-moral disengagement relationships.  Returning briefly to equity 
theory, an individual will react to perceptions of injustice in order to resolve perceived 
inequities (Adams, 1963).  Research to date has primarily focused on the manner in 
which personality differences affect the tendency of certain responses to organizational 
justice over others. For instance, Henle (2005) reported that individuals who exhibit low 
socialization or high impulsivity are more likely to see organizational deviance as an 
acceptable response to interactional injustice, than do individuals who exhibit high 
socialization or low impulsivity.  Similarly, van Olffen and de Cremer (2007) found that 
individuals with low personal control respond differently, in terms of organizational 
attachment, to low levels of procedural justice than do individuals with high levels of 
personal control. Both cases indicate the importance of simultaneously considering 
situational and personality factors when examining justice-outcome relationships. 
Moreover, Detert and colleagues (2008) note that some personality traits may 
make individuals more prone to moral disengagement.  For example, they argue that 
empathy lessens the tendency to morally disengage because individuals are more likely to 
identify with the circumstances of others.  Conversely, trait cynicism facilitates moral 
disengagement by virtue of distancing individuals from the victims, actions, or 
consequences of unethical or immoral behavior.  In line with these findings and those 
from the organizational justice literature, the current study will consider several 
individual differences that may affect the way in which organizational justice perceptions 
 
 
8 
relate to a tendency to morally disengage.  Namely, we sought personality types that lead 
to either a distancing effect, such as that shown by cynicism, or an increased likelihood of 
unethical or dysfunctional behavior, as was shown for deviance.  In this manner, we will 
be able to more accurately capture moral disengagement as a response to perceptions of 
injustice. 
Specifically, a number of frequently researched dysfunctional personalities are 
considered in the current study, including trait aggression, Machiavellianism, subclinical 
psychopathy, and subclinical narcissism.  We opted to consider aggression due to its role 
in a large range of workplace deviant behaviors, including retribution, obstructions, 
displaced aggression, and counterproductive performance (James, McIntyre, Glisson, 
Bowler, & Mitchell, 2004).  Aggressive individuals have been shown to be more inclined 
to perceive injustice (Kennedy, Homant, & Homant, 2004), and as a result, may be more 
likely to respond to such injustices with one of the moral disengagement mechanisms.  
We also will consider dysfunctional dispositions outside of aggressive tendencies, which 
have been shown to relate to higher potential for work-related problems (Hogan & 
Hogan, 2001).  Several examples of these dispositions include being excitable- defined as 
?moody and hard to please? with ?intense but short-lived enthusiasm?- and leisurely- 
defined as ?ignoring other people?s requests and becoming irritated or argumentative if 
they persist? (Hogan & Hogan, 2001, p. 42).  Given the higher incidence of 
organizational issues among these individuals, it is of empirical interest to determine the 
extent that these personality types and perceptions of injustice lead to a tendency to 
morally disengage.  
 
 
9 
Finally, we will consider three common undesirable personality traits, referred to 
in the literature as the ?dark triad? of personality (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).  The dark 
triad includes some of the more researched traits, including Machiavellianism, 
narcissism, and subclinical psychopathy.  Christie and Geis (1970) originally introduced 
the concept of a Machiavellian personality construct, when they created a measure 
derived from statements found in Machiavelli?s original books.  They found that 
individuals who agreed with such statements were more likely to behave coldly and 
manipulatively.  In the case of both subclinical narcissism and psychopathy, researchers 
translated clinical criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) into a form more applicable for nonclinical samples.  For example, Raskin and 
Hall (1979) outlined the criteria for the narcissistic personality as one involving high 
levels of self-importance, responses to criticism that are either indifferent or full of rage, 
and a lack of empathy, among others.  Psychopathy, on the other hand, long having been 
defined solely from prison sample data, began to accumulate interest, especially those 
individuals that are ?successful? psychopaths (Babiak, 2000; Widom, 1977).  This shift in 
focus was aided by numerous efforts to create self-report measures (e.g., Hare, 1985; 
Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) to be used in place of impractical clinical 
interviews.  Again, low empathy was defined as a hallmark, but this time, it was 
combined with a high degree of impulsivity or thrill seeking and selfishness. 
Although it can be seen that all three of the dark triad share certain features (i.e., 
social malevolence, self-promoting tendencies, emotional coldness, duplicity, and 
aggressiveness; Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 557), the authors also found the three 
personality constructs of the dark triad to be distinct from each other.  The question then 
 
 
10 
becomes one of determining which combinations relate to higher tendencies of moral 
disengagement and why.  In fact, prior research has hinted that perhaps the combination 
of these traits may lead to different perceptions of justice, as well as differences in the 
selection of responses to injustice.  For example, a study that focused on the effect of 
such personalities in organizations found a positive relationship between 
Machiavellianism and increased job strain and decreased satisfaction (Gemmell & 
Heisler, 1972).  In explaining such results, the authors hypothesized that the cynical and 
untrusting nature of such individuals might lead them to perceive more unfairness than 
others (e.g., being passed over for a promotion they deserved).  Some support for this 
proposition has been offered.  Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, and Arbach (2005) found that 
self-concern constructs correlated highly with a measure of victim sensitivity, or 
tendency to perceive victimization.  These results suggest that individuals having these 
traits may be more likely to perceive and respond to organizational injustice than others 
without such traits.  Combine this finding with the tendency for emotional coldness, such 
individuals might show decreased empathy and, as Detert et al. (2008) found, be more 
likely to select moral disengagement as a response. In summary, we believe that these 
dispositional traits may have unique main effects, as well as interact with the perception 
of organizational justice and result in specific patterns of moral disengagement.   
In the current study, we broadly hypothesize unique main effects of organizational 
injustice and individual differences, as well as interactive effects of these two factors on 
moral disengagement.  Of particular interest to the current study, specific patterns of 
moral disengagement may emerge in response to the experience of organizational justice; 
theoretically, we may trace the similarities between the experience of certain injustices 
 
 
11 
and the justifications underlying disengagement mechanisms.  For example, interpersonal 
injustice relates to treating people with disrespect, where the mechanisms of 
dehumanization and attribution of blame relate to reconceptualizing the victim as 
subhuman or somehow blameworthy.  In organizational cultures where workers are seen 
only as generating profits or are otherwise treated poorly, unethical behaviors may be 
rationalized by similarly ignoring the human qualities of the workers.  In another 
instance, procedural injustice refers to processes that are unfair or in which individuals 
have no voice, which may encourage people to be more likely to morally disengage by 
using the following mechanisms: diffusion of responsibility or displacement of 
responsibility.  If an individual has no say in a given process, it is likely that they may 
rationalize unethical behavior along similar lines, by blaming the boss or the group. 
Furthermore, the tendency of individuals to morally disengage may also be a function of 
the individual differences presented earlier.  As one illustrative example, aggressive 
individuals who must balance the maintenance of a positive self-concept and aggressive 
tendencies may rely more on moral disengagement mechanisms than non-aggressive 
individuals.  Finally, individual differences and the perception of organizational justice 
may also interact to uniquely predict moral disengagement.  Using the same example as 
above, aggressive individuals may be more sensitive to certain types of organizational 
injustice (e.g. interpersonal as opposed to informational), and as a result, more likely to 
resort to moral disengagement than in response to other forms of disengagement.  A 
summary of the major relationships between the constructs is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
12 
 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The current study consists of two waves of online data collection at a large, public 
university in the Southeast.  Participants were undergraduates who received course credit 
in exchange for completion of the surveys.  The first wave of data collection consisted of 
a number of demographic variables and the individual difference measures, presented in 
randomized order.  Upon completion of the first wave, participants were then eligible to 
complete the second wave of data collection, which involved responding to several 
scenarios depicting ethical dilemmas.  Each scenario depicted a different aspect of 
organizational justice and presented the participant with an issue requiring resolution.  
Participants responded to each scenario by rating their approval of a rationale for the 
solution of the ethical dilemma.  Each participant completed a different scenario for each 
organizational justice condition, resulting in a within-subjects design.  These two waves 
were disguised as unrelated studies to prevent participants from ascertaining our 
hypotheses.  The final sample for the current study consisted of 272 students who 
completed both waves.  The average age of participants was 20.18 years old (SD = 2.13 
years), 68.8% female, and consisted of the following ethnic backgrounds: 92% 
Caucasian/White, 5% African American/Black, 2% Asian American/Pacific Islander, and 
1% Hispanic.  Because data collection took place over the Fall and Spring semesters, we 
also ran independent groups t-tests to verify that the samples from each semester were 
 
 
13 
equivalent on these demographic variables.  None of the results of these tests were 
significant, so all of the analyses will be conducted on the combined sample. 
Measures 
 Scenario Development.  Although the use of scenarios in ethical decision making 
studies is debated, the benefits of such an approach often outweigh the disadvantages 
(Loviscky, Trevino, & Jacobs, 2007).  Along with Loviscky and his colleagues, we argue 
that scenarios present standardized stimuli for participants to respond to, allowing us to 
manipulate the organizational justice component, as well as possible solutions reflecting 
strategies of moral disengagement.  The four scenarios used in the current study (see 
Appendix A) were modified from scenarios originally presented in Loviscky et al. 
(2007), in which managerial moral judgment was assessed.  For each scenario, several 
phrases were added in order to manipulate the organizational justice condition (e.g., for 
Informational Justice: ?Ray blames the situation on his boss not communicating 
important details about the project in a timely manner?).  The phrasing for each 
organizational justice manipulation reflects commonly accepted dimensions provided by 
Colquitt (2001; see Table 1).  For the informational justice example provided above, the 
defining measurement item derived from Colquitt was as follows: ?communicated details 
in a timely manner? (p. 389).  Each one of the four base scenarios was modified to depict 
the four forms of organizational justice.  This approach resulted in 16 unique scenarios 
and allowed for them to be counterbalanced across participants. 
Following each scenario, participants were asked to respond to statements 
according to their level of approval for justifying an unethical solution.  Participants rated 
each justification on a 7-point Likert response format ranging from 1 (?I strongly 
 
 
14 
disapprove?) to 7 (?I strongly approve?).  Rationales for the solution to each scenario were 
written to represent a moral disengagement technique, with each statement representing a 
single technique.  The basis for each statement was derived from a moral disengagement 
scale presented by Detert et al. (2008; see appendix A).  For example, ?It?s ok to steal to 
take care of your family?s needs,? measuring moral justification, was modified for an 
organizational setting to read, ?He needs to take care of his own company first and 
foremost.?  These statements were designed to provide the participant with possible 
rationales for following an unethical path (e.g., ?It?s okay for Ray to focus on deadlines at 
the expense of quality because??).  The responses to the scenario also included an 
option to capture ethical decision-making (i.e., ?It?s never okay to focus on deadlines at 
the expense of quality.?).   
 Once the scenarios were constructed, they were subjected to a pilot study, in 
which graduate students in the Management and Industrial/Organizational Psychology 
programs performed a Q-Sort.  In this process, participants were asked to read each 
scenario and then categorize it according to the form of organizational justice they 
believed it represented.  Descriptions of each form of organizational justice were also 
provided to assist individuals in making their decisions.  In the first round of pilot testing, 
25 participants rated the scenarios.  Six scenarios that did not have greater than 75% 
agreement were revised and subjected to further pilot testing.  In the second round, 16 
participants rated the revised scenarios.  All scenarios achieved greater than 75% 
agreement with the exception of a single scenario that achieved 67% agreement. 
 Individual Differences.  A number of relevant individual difference variables 
were assessed during the first wave of data collection.  Among them, participants 
 
 
15 
completed the Hogan Development Survey (HDS; Hogan & Hogan, 2009), which is 
designed to assess 11 common dysfunctional work behaviors.  Responses consist of 
?True? or ?False? answers to a total of 168 items.  Given the exploratory nature of the 
current study, we want to capture potential individual differences in workplace behavior, 
especially those factors that would lead an individual to be more likely to respond 
unethically to a given situation.  Although this measure is typically geared towards the 
assessment of employees, an independent samples t-test was used to verify that responses 
did not significantly differ between individuals with work experience and those without 
work experience. 
Participants also completed the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-
A; James & MacIntyre, 2000).  The CRT-A is based on inductive reasoning problems, to 
which the participants are asked to respond, as opposed to traditional self-report methods 
of aggressive behaviors.  The rationale behind the CRT-A is that aggressive individuals 
employ different justification mechanisms (e.g., hostile attribution bias, derogation of 
target bias) about the world than do prosocial individuals, and these mechanisms inform 
an individual?s reasoning.  The overall reliability estimate in the current study is .59, 
although typical estimates range from .74 to .87 (James, McIntyre, Glisson, Bowler, & 
Mitchell, 2004).  A summary of 10 empirical validation studies indicate that the mean 
uncorrected validity coefficient of the CRT-A is .44, which is above the typical .40 value 
for single predictors measuring aptitudes and .30 for personality (James et al., 2004). 
The International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999) measured 
participant?s personality along the common five-factor model, which includes scales to 
assess openness to experience, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and 
 
 
16 
emotional stability (previously neuroticism).  Scales for each factor will be used, 
consisting of 10 items each.  Participants will be asked to respond to each item on the 
basis of how well it describes themselves on a 5-point response format (1 = ?Very 
inaccurate,? 5 = ?Very accurate?).  The alpha reliability estimates for each of the five 
factors are .85 (neuroticism), .77 (openness), .83 (conscientiousness), .81 (agreeableness), 
and .87 (extraversion).   
The scale for Empathy was also sourced from the IPIP.  Although it is labeled 
sympathy on that site, Detert et al. (2008) note that differences between sympathy and 
empathy are largely semantic in nature, sympathy simply being the more outdated term.  
This scale consists of ten items, rated on a 5-point response format (1 = ?Very 
inaccurate,? 5 = ?Very accurate?).  A sample item is ?I suffer from others? sorrows.?  The 
reliability estimate for empathy is .73. 
Machiavellianism, often defined as having a manipulative personality, was 
measured using the MACH-IV inventory (Christie & Geis, 1970). The inventory consists 
of 20 5-point Likert items, 10 of which indicate high Machiavellianism and 10 indicate 
low Machiavellianism.  Participants are asked to respond to items based on the extent to 
which they agree or disagree with the items, phrased either in Machiavellianism terms or 
not.  Reported alpha coefficients have consistently been found to be around .79 (e.g., 
Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).  The overall reliability estimate for 
the current study is .76. 
Narcissism was measured using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-16; 
Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006), which is a short form of the NPI-40 developed by 
Raskin and Hall (1979). This measure is a 16-item forced-choice questionnaire. 
 
 
17 
Participants responded to each set of items, selecting the option that most closely 
matched their own feelings.  Statements are constructed such that one option is in 
opposition with its pair (e.g., ?I am more capable than other people? and ?I like having 
authority over other people?).  The reliability estimate for the current study is .70.  
Reported reliability for the short measure have traditionally ranged from .68 to .78 (Ames 
et al., 2006), while the reported reliability for the 40-item scale is .83 (Raskin & Terry, 
1988).  Ames et al. (2006) also reported a correlation of .90 between the 16-item and the 
40-item scales. 
Subclinical psychopathy was measured using the Self Report Psychopathy Scale 
(SRP III; Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, in press).  The SRP-III is a 64-item measure, 
representing a four-factor structure of psychopathy: interpersonal manipulation, criminal 
tendencies, erratic lifestyle, and callous affect.  The measure is an improvement over 
previous 2-factor versions of the SRP and is an attempt to more closely align with four-
factor structures represented in clinical psychopathy instruments (Williams, Paulhus, & 
Hare, 2007).  Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which each statement describes 
them on a Likert-type response format, ranging from 1 (?Strongly Disagree?) to 5 
(?Strongly Agree?).  Sample items include ?I am a rebellious person? and ?I never feel 
guilty over hurting others.?  The overall alpha reliability estimate is .79.  
 
 
18 
 
 
Results 
 Basic descriptive statistics, scale reliability estimates and bivariate correlations 
are presented in Tables 1-3.  Additionally, the correlations between the individual moral 
disengagement mechanisms are provided in Table 4.  To assess the potential for a direct 
relationship between organizational justice and moral disengagement, a repeated 
measures analysis was conducted using a linear mixed model approach. For this analysis, 
the dependent variable was participants? moral disengagement scores, which were 
calculated as the mean rating across the moral disengagement mechanisms for each 
scenario.  The within-subject, fixed factor comprised the four forms of organizational 
justice that were depicted by the scenarios: distributive, procedural, informational, and 
interpersonal.  The results from the final model, assuming an unstructured covariance 
structure and after controlling for age, grade point average, and previous employment, 
indicate that organizational justice likely does not significantly affect one?s tendency to 
morally disengage, F(3,217) = .223, p = .880; a summary of the estimated marginal 
means is provided in Table 5. Pairwise inspection of these means, using a Bonferroni 
correction, suggests there are no significant differences in moral disengagement score 
between any of the conditions of organizational justice, all p?s = 1.  In the event that the 
mean moral disengagement score masks some of the variability among individual 
mechanisms, disengagement mechanisms, grouped by organizational justice type, were 
plotted against participants? moral disengagement score (see Figure 2).  Visual inspection 
of the means corroborates the results from the overall analysis, showing scant differences 
 
 
19 
between the forms of organizational justice for each type of moral disengagement 
mechanism.  Taken together, these results suggest that organizational justice has no 
significant effect on moral disengagement, either measured at the overall level or at the 
level of the individual mechanisms. 
Although the primary research questions in the current study pertained to the 
potential interactive effects of situational and individual factors in predicting moral 
disengagement, the previous results suggest that it may be more worthwhile to turn 
attention to individual difference antecedents instead.  For the subsequent analyses, moral 
disengagement scores were averaged across the conditions of organizational justice, 
resulting in a between-subjects design.  At this stage, a multiple hierarchical regression 
was conducted to determine which of the individual difference variables predict moral 
disengagement.  The dependent variable of moral disengagement was calculated as the 
overall mean score across both mechanisms and justice conditions.  In the first step, the 
control variables of age, grade point average, and previous employment were entered.  In 
the subsequent step, scores representing the individual difference variables were entered 
in a stepwise fashion.  The full results from the models are provided in Table 6.  The final 
model predicted 32% of the variance in moral disengagement, with significant predictors 
of the Cynical Views subscale of Machiavellianism (B = .193, t = 2.124, p = .035), 
aggression (B = .434, t = 2.682, p = .008), conscientiousness (B = -.207, t = -2.867, p = 
.005), the Reserved dimension of the HDS (B = .049, t = 2.758, p = .006), the Callous 
Affect dimension of psychopathy (B = -.288, t = -3.127, p = .002), and empathy (B = -
.239, t = -2.442, p = .016). 
 
 
20 
In addition to the primary analysis of overall moral disengagement, an exploratory 
regression analysis was conducted at the level of individual mechanisms.  The overall 
score for each mechanism was computed as the mean score across the four scenarios.  A 
mean score was also computed for overall unethical decision-making based on the final 
response to each scenario, in which participants rated their disapproval of the action 
presented in the scenario, which was reverse-coded to maintain consistency with the 
other moral disengagement items.  Similar to the overall analysis, the first step in the 
regression contained the control variables of age, GPA, and previous employment.  The 
second step involved the stepwise inclusion of the individual difference variables to 
determine which have the best predictive ability.  The results from these analyses are 
presented in Tables 7a through 7i. 
Although the values in the tables represent the standard significance levels, it is 
also worth noting the predictors remain significant after controlling for Type I error rate 
using the conservative Bonferroni correction, p < .00625.  For the moral justification, 
displacement of responsibility, and distortion of consequences mechanisms, no predictors 
satisfied this stringent criterion. The Cynical View subscale of Machiavellianism 
emerged as significant for the euphemistic language mechanism (B = .346, t = 2.951, p = 
.004), the dehumanization mechanism (B = .402, t = 3.357, p = .001), and the attribution 
of blame mechanism (B = .347, t = 3.012, p = .003).  Aggression emerged as a significant 
predictor for the diffusion of responsibility mechanism (B = .847, t = 3.257, p = .001), the 
attribution of blame mechanism (B = .659, t = 2.823, p = .005), and the measure of 
unethical decision-making (B = .677, t = 2.755, p = .006).  Conscientiousness emerged as 
significant for the advantageous comparison mechanism (B = -.425, t = -4.318, p < .001), 
 
 
21 
and the dehumanization mechanism (B = -.323, t = -3.265, p = .001).  Openness to 
experience was also a significant predictor for the dehumanization mechanism (B = -.381, 
t = -4.560, p < .001), as well as the measure of unethical decision-making (B = -.311, t = -
3.329, p = .001).  Finally, the Reserved subscale (B = .073, t = 2.977, p = .003) and the 
Diligent subscale (B = -.072, t = -3.453, p = .001) of the Hogan Development Survey 
significantly predicted the attribution of blame mechanism.  In general, the individual 
results tend to corroborate the results from the analysis of overall moral disengagement. 
 
 
22 
 
 
Discussion 
 The current study initially set out in an effort to determine the situational and 
individual antecedents of the moral disengagement construct.  Whereas previous studies 
have focused primarily on individual differences (e.g., Detert et al., 2008), this study 
attempted to uncover some of the more interesting reactions that individuals have to 
situational factors that might encourage either more or less moral disengagement.  
Therefore, the primary interest was on the relationship between perceptions of 
organizational justice and the resultant propensity to morally disengage.  Of secondary 
interest were the personality factors that might interact with or influence perceptions of 
organizational justice.  Although the possibility exists to study this same model with the 
situational factors moderating the relationship between personality and moral 
disengagement, the model in the current study was intended merely to reflect the 
respective strength of situational versus individual factors, particularly in response to the 
strong situations generated by the manipulated scenarios.  Unfortunately, the differences 
between these two perspectives became moot as the situational factors emerged as 
nonsignificant. 
 Despite the best efforts to validate and emphasize the manipulations in the 
scenarios, there was no significant relationship between organizational justice and moral 
disengagement, either at the overall level or at the level of the individual mechanisms.  At 
this point, the focus of the study shifted from one following a situation-person 
interactionist perspective to one focused on the individual differences that predict moral 
 
 
23 
disengagement.  Collapsing moral disengagement across the conditions of organizational 
justice, several individual differences emerged to predict one?s propensity to morally 
disengage.  Specifically, aggression, cynical views of human kind, and what Hogan and 
Hogan (2009) refer to as being reserved all positively predicted one?s tendency to 
morally disengage.  On the other hand, conscientiousness, empathy, and the Callous 
Affect subscale of psychopathy all negatively relate to the tendency to morally disengage 
(a more detailed treatment of the callous affect relationship will be provided below).  All 
of these individual differences, with the exception of empathy, also emerged as 
significant predictors of at least half of exploratory analyses of the individual moral 
disengagement mechanisms.   
 The presence of relationships between cynical views of humankind, empathy, and 
moral disengagement reinforces previous findings by Detert et al. (2008).  It appears that 
individuals with high levels of empathy are more likely to take the perspective of others, 
and are therefore less likely to utilize moral disengagement tactics.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, those individuals who have an inherent distrust of people will be more 
likely to distance themselves from others, in turn facilitating the use of moral 
disengagement tactics.  These findings are in line with previous research that has focused 
on the relationship between perspective-taking and moral behavior (Eisenberg, 2000).  
Beyond the extant literature, this study also offers a preliminary examination of the 
specific mechanisms that these traits predict.  For example, the current findings suggest 
that cynicism may predict a higher likelihood of the use of the euphemistic language, 
dehumanization, and attribution of blame mechanisms.  Understanding which 
mechanisms certain individuals tend to employ is potentially important in generating 
 
 
24 
interventions to prevent moral disengagement.  For example, interventions aimed to limit 
the possibility of diffusion of responsibility may have little effect on individuals who rate 
highly on measures of cynicism.  Without analyses geared towards the level of specific 
mechanisms, our understanding of the construct of moral disengagement will be 
inherently limited. 
Turning to the other main findings, the current study is among the first to 
demonstrate relationships between being reserved, trait aggression, and conscientiousness 
with moral disengagement.  Hogan and Hogan (2009) define the trait of reserved as 
?seeming socially withdrawn and lacking interest in or awareness of the feelings of 
others? (p. 13).  In many ways, this description contains some conceptual overlap with 
the previous discussions of empathy and cynicism, although it remains distinct.  In 
general, this relationship further supports a trend where the inability to connect with 
others is at the root of increased tendencies to morally disengage, whether that inability is 
defined in terms of low empathy, high distrust, or merely a disinterest in others.  The 
current study has therefore contributed to the growing nomological network of 
antecedents that rely on one?s relationships to other people.  Interestingly, based on the 
analyses of individual mechanisms, being reserved predicts one?s likelihood to utilize 
attribution of blame.  One possible mechanism connecting the trait to the mechanism may 
lie in the distance that one feels towards others, and as a result, more of a reliance on the 
fundamental attribution error that those others have somehow deserved their fate instead 
of a consideration of situational forces.  Certainly, future research would benefit from 
probing this relationship further. 
 
 
25 
Although some previous studies have examined the relationship between moral 
disengagement and aggression, the latter is most commonly defined in terms of behavior 
(e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Pornai & Wood, 2010).  The 
current study is the first, to the author?s knowledge, to investigate the role of trait 
aggression as an antecedent to moral disengagement.  Furthermore, this study is the first 
to explore the mechanisms that are predicted by trait aggression: diffusion of 
responsibility, attribution of blame, and the overall assessment of unethical decision-
making.  One conceptualization of trait aggression has posited the presence of conflicting 
forces: the motivation to be aggressive and the simultaneous motivation to hold a positive 
view of the self (James et al., 2005).  The results here suggest that one way in which 
individuals navigate this conflict may be through the use of moral disengagement.  
Indeed, there is some conceptual overlap between the rationalizations that James et al. 
(2005) proposed (e.g., derogation of target) and the mechanisms included under the 
concept of moral disengagement (e.g., attribution of blame).  Generally speaking, moral 
disengagement tactics may allow one to reconceptualize or minimize the consequences of 
aggressive tendencies or behaviors, while allowing the maintenance of a positive self-
concept.  Although moral disengagement has typically been used to explain how 
otherwise ?typical? individuals engage in unethical decisions or behavior (Bandura, 
1999; Detert et al., 2008), the current study offers some initial insight into the use of 
moral disengagement tactics by individuals who may already be predisposed to 
aggressive and/or unethical behaviors. 
Although there was no a priori hypothesis for a negative relationship between 
conscientiousness and moral disengagement, there is some conceptual basis for expecting 
 
 
26 
such a link.  Becker (1998) notes the disagreement among definitions of the concept of 
conscientiousness, especially across the five-factor model of personality and the more 
morally-laden view from research on integrity.  For the purposes of the current study, the 
moral aspects of conscientiousness (i.e., integrity-based approach) are of primary interest, 
as they directly relate to whether or not one will be more likely to engage in moral 
disengagement tactics.  From this view, conscientiousness is defined as having 
responsibility, dependability, and carefulness.  There are several potential mechanisms 
through which these characteristics might negatively relate to moral disengagement, 
although at this point, they would primarily be conjecture.  For example, a conscientious 
individual, through careful thought and anticipation of responsibility, may be more likely 
to avoid situations in which moral disengagement is necessary.  On the other hand, such 
individuals may simply be more comfortable in taking responsibility for their actions and 
may not need to find ways to justify such actions.  From the exploratory analysis, the 
findings suggest the conscientious individuals are less likely to engage in advantageous 
comparison and dehumanization.  Future research should examine the potential 
mechanisms, especially in light of these findings, and also focus on the facets of 
conscientiousness to further elucidate these relationships. 
Perhaps most surprisingly, however, was the negative relationship between 
dimensions of psychopathy and moral disengagement.  At the overall level, callous affect 
was negatively related to moral disengagement, while at the individual mechanism level, 
overall psychopathy was negatively related to one?s use of euphemistic language, and 
criminal tendencies were negatively related to one?s use of advantageous comparison.  
Although these relationships are in the opposite direction as originally hypothesized, 
 
 
27 
there may yet be reason to expect these findings.  Returning to the original conception of 
moral disengagement, Bandura (1996; 1999) argued that the justification mechanisms 
allowed one to disengage from one?s internal moral standards.  It may very well be the 
case that individuals who score highly on measures of psychopathy either lack the ability 
to consider the moral consequences of their actions (Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & 
Haidt, 2009) or are simply more comfortable in violating them (Cima, Tonnaer, & 
Hauser, 2010).  Although an in-depth discussion of specific mechanisms is outside the 
scope of the current study, it may generally be posited that psychopaths simply do not 
require disengagement mechanisms to facilitate unethical decision making as they are 
already ?well-equipped? to do so.  Future research should examine the boundary 
conditions of moral disengagement. 
Using the Bonferroni-corrected analysis of the individual mechanisms, the 
predictors of aggression and the Cynical View subscale of Machiavellianism 
demonstrated negative relationships with at least two or more of the specific moral 
disengagement mechanisms, while the predictors of conscientiousness and openness to 
experience positively related to at least two or more of the mechanisms.  For the most 
part, these predictors also emerged as significant as the primary analysis on moral 
disengagement.  As the one exception, openness to experience predicted the individual 
mechanisms, but did not emerge in the overall analysis.  Although this relationship was 
not explicitly hypothesized, there is some empirical evidence to support the current 
findings.  For example, Dollinger and LaMartina (1998) found a positive relationship 
between openness to experience, defined as the extent to which individuals are receptive 
to and tend to seek out inner experiences, and moral reasoning.  The authors argue that 
 
 
28 
the underlying mechanisms may be explained by the tendency of open individuals to 
avoid conventional thinking and to seek out answers for themselves.  Extended to the 
construct of moral disengagement, these observations may suggest that open individuals 
are more likely to possess higher levels of moral reasoning, and may thus be less likely to 
encounter situations where moral disengagement would be required.  However, future 
research would benefit from examining this potential relationship and its mechanisms 
further. 
It is also potentially informative to note the individual differences that were 
hypothesized to relate to moral disengagement, but emerged as nonsignificant throughout 
the current study.  Specifically, although narcissism was thought to relate to an increased 
tendency towards moral disengagement, it failed to emerge as a significant predictor for 
the overall construct as well as the individual mechanisms.  One potential explanation for 
this result is that the aspects of narcissism that should contribute to moral disengagement 
(i.e., low empathy, aggressive responses to criticisms) were already captured by other 
predictors in the model, while the core characteristic of narcissism, namely self-interest, 
may not be expected to contribute to one?s moral reasoning or justifications.  These 
results further support findings that the three constructs of the Dark Triad (Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002), are indeed distinct from one another despite some degree of overlap, as 
evidenced by their differential patterns of prediction in the current study. 
Finally, it is important to note that this model, after controlling for GPA, previous 
employment, and age, only explained a limited amount of the variability in moral 
disengagement.  This result indicates the potential for other individual differences, as 
 
 
29 
well as potential situational factors that can further contribute to predicting moral 
disengagement. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 In an attempt to determine the source of the nonsignificant relationship between 
organizational justice and moral disengagement, several possible explanations emerge.  
The first could be that participants simply did not read the scenarios closely enough to 
pick up on the manipulation.  Unfortunately, the lack of a manipulation check in the 
current study precludes any definitive answer.  However, as a proxy, subsequent analyses 
were run selecting only those cases that were deemed to have taken potentially sufficient 
time to read and process the scenarios.  In two separate analyses mirroring the repeated 
measures analysis, participants that took under five minutes and under ten minutes were 
screened from the data.  The results from both were substantively equivalent to the 
original analysis, resulting in a nonsignificant relationship between organizational justice 
and moral disengagement. Therefore, one may likely posit that the explanation that they 
were not carefully reading the scenarios is not the sole culprit. 
 A second explanation is simply that the manipulations in the scenarios were not 
strong enough to elicit perceptions of organization justice in the participants.  Here too, a 
manipulation check would provide definitive evidence had it been included in the study.  
Unfortunately, one may only speculate that this is perhaps a possible explanation and 
cannot rule out that organizational justice truly has no effect on one?s tendency to morally 
disengage.  Future research should include a manipulation check as well as perhaps make 
such manipulations stronger and more easily perceptible.  
 
 
30 
 An additional limitation is related to the low estimated reliability of the Cynical 
Views subscale of the measure of Machiavellianism and the lack of a reliability estimate 
for the 2-item Generalized Morals subscale.  Despite widespread use in the literature, 
some authors have noted that reliability estimates of this measure have typically been 
inconsistent (Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009).  As such, the conclusions related to 
these scales should be interpreted with caution; however, it is also important to note that 
the results obtained in the current study support previous research and theory (Detert et 
al., 2008).  Future research should therefore examine more recent alternative measures of 
Machiavelliansim (e.g., Dahling et al., 2009) to support such findings. 
Another limitation of the current study is that the measures were all web-based, 
allowing participants to complete them in a variety of environments and conditions.  In 
an attempt to avoid confounds, participants were asked about the location in which they 
were taking the survey.  When this indicator was included as a control in the prior 
analysis, it emerged as nonsignificant, suggesting that an individual participant?s location 
did not affect their responses.  Other limitations related to the use of online measures 
include the potential for common method bias (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). The 
current study attempted to avoid this issue by separating the measures across two waves 
of data collection and by alternating the response modalities (i.e., forced choice, 
frequency measures, agreement measures).  Consistent with these limitations and with the 
recommendations of Kish-Gephart, Harris, and Trevino (2010), future research on ethical 
decision-making should move away from scenario-based designs and move towards more 
elegant laboratory-based studies.  Laboratory-based studies will also provide the 
researcher with the ability to generate stronger manipulations, controlling the experience 
 
 
31 
of injustice, and allowing the participants to engage in certain strategies more 
behaviorally as opposed to merely hypothetically. 
Finally, as with all undergraduate samples, care must be taken with regard to 
generalizability.  This issue is especially pertinent given the nature of the constructs being 
assessed.  For example, it is questionable whether college-aged students have had 
sufficient life experience to encounter many ethical dilemmas such as those that occur in 
the workplace.  Additionally, one must also consider the degree of range restriction that 
may impact the relationships between measures, especially with regard to the constructs 
of psychopathy, for example, which includes measures of criminality and antisocial 
behavior.  Future research should examine these phenomena in real-world samples of 
working adults.   
Practical and Theoretical Implications 
 Although the current study does not offer much in the way of explicit implications 
for situational factors that contribute to moral disengagement, it is far too soon to 
disregard such factors all together.  Indeed, with individual differences explaining only 
32% of the variability in moral disengagement, it is certainly worthwhile to continue the 
search for stronger situational factors.  Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) provide some insight 
here with a recent meta-analysis on the situational antecedents of unethical decision-
making.  Based on their results, future research should examine those factors that 
displayed stronger relationships to unethical decisions and actions, such as organizational 
ethical climate and culture, as well as the role of explicit ethical codes of conduct.  Moral 
disengagement is a prime construct for these types of interactionist studies, because it 
offers an explanation as to why typically ethical individuals can make unethical 
 
 
32 
decisions.  To fully understand how this process unfolds, it is necessary to simultaneously 
consider individual differences and the environmental or organizational cues that 
influence this form of disengagement. 
 Practically speaking, if we can assume that moral disengagement is a function of 
the environment and the individual within that environment then organizations would be 
well served to understand the factors that contribute to such moral disengagement.  This 
implication may be approached in the context of the opportunity-pressure-predisposition 
model of organizational misconduct (Baucus, 1994), in which wrongdoing is more likely 
to the extent that organizational factors encourage the action in question (pressures), limit 
the probability of detection (opportunity), all the while taking into account the specific 
traits of the individuals that simultaneously predispose them to wrongdoing.  Considering 
these three factors  together  should allow organizations to acknowledge individual 
predispositions that lead to higher tendencies towards moral disengagement, and focus on 
appropriate interventions that either prevent pressures from occurring or increase the 
chances of detection of such behavior.  Such efforts may be in the form of job redesign or 
the implementation and enforcement of ethics codes (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). 
 In sum, the current study offers another piece of the puzzle in explaining the 
process of moral disengagement.  The findings suggest that individuals who are typically 
aggressive, or have a cynical view of humankind are more likely to morally disengage.  
Furthermore, individuals who are highly conscientious or empathic are less likely to 
morally disengage.  Although the findings for organizational justice were nonsignificant, 
it may still be important to consider how such individuals interact with their environment 
to either lessen or exacerbate the potential for moral disengagement.
 
 
33 
 
 
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personality moderates the effects of perceived fairness on organizational 
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Widom, C. S. (1977). A methodology for studying noninstitutionalized psychopaths. 
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Assessment, 88, 205-219. 
 
 
 
39 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, reliability estimates, and bivariate correlations of covariates and personality variables with moral 
disengagement. 
Variable M SD Rel. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Grade Point Average 3.17 0.53 ~ --         
2. Previous Employment 0.33 0.47 ~ -.09 --        
3. Gender 0.69 0.46 ~ .09 -.08 --       
4. Neuroticism 2.50 0.68  .85 -.20** -.02 .10 --      
5. Openness to Experience 3.49 0.62  .77  .04 .08 .02 .00 --     
6. Conscientiousness 3.62 0.62  .83 .29** .08 .16** -.39** .08 --    
7. Agreeableness 3.78 0.56  .81 .20** -.04 .31** -.45** .11 .50** --   
8. Extraversion 3.54 0.67  .87 .12 -.09 .12* -.30** .03 .08 .18** --  
9. Moral Disengagement 3.42 0.64  .87 -.12* -.16** -.06 .16** -.17** -.35** -.24** -.09 -- 
Note. * signifies correlations are significant at the .05 level, ** signifies correlations are significant at the .01 level.  Gender is coded 
as: 0 = Male, 1 = Female.  Previous employment is coded as: 0 = No previous work experience, 1=Previously employed. 
 
 
 
40 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, reliability estimates, and bivariate correlations for the Dark Triad variables, aggression, empathy 
and moral disengagement. 
Variable M SD Rel. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Empathy 3.58 0.53 .73 --           
2. Narcissism 0.31 0.19 .70 -.34** --          
3. M - Interpersonal Tactics 2.59 0.54 .65 -.44** .27** --         
4. M - Cynical Views 2.69 0.49 .57 -.45** .19** .47** --        
5. M - Generalized Morals 2.42 0.79 ~ -.24** .24** .41** .32** --       
6. Aggression -0.47 0.26 .60 -.26** .09 .14* .28** .07 --      
7. P - Interpersonal 
Manipulation 
2.46 0.62 .87 -.48** .47** .60** .54** .40** .18** --     
8. P - Callous Affect 2.20 0.58 .83 -.67** .38** .45** .45** .32** .25** .65** --    
9. P - Erratic Lifestyle 2.57 0.62 .83 -.37** .37** .38** .34** .30** .11 .60** .56** --   
10. P - Criminal Tendency 1.52 0.53 .81 -.36** .18** .30** .31** .30** .32** .46** .51** .49** --  
11. Moral Disengagement 3.42 0.64 .87 -.25** .06 .25** .32** .05 .25** .20** .14* .20** .16** -- 
Note. M = Machiavellianism subscale, P = Psychopathy subscale; * signifies correlations are significant at the .05 level, ** signifies 
correlations are significant at the .01 level. The Generalized Morals subscale of Machiavellianism comprises only two items; 
therefore, a reliability estimate is not provided. 
 
 
41 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for the Hogan Development Survey variables and moral 
disengagement. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
12 
1. Excitable 5.74 3.34 --             
2. Skeptical 6.97 2.62 .42** --            
3. Cautious 6.04 2.96 .41** .17** --           
4. Reserved 5.21 2.45 .36** .32** .23** --          
5. Leisurely 6.94 2.73 .22** .36** .24** .35** --         
6. Bold 6.98 3.04 .09 .38** -.29** .14* .33** --        
7. Mischievous 6.47 2.73 .20** .34** -.25** .21** .13* .45** --       
8. Colorful 7.10 2.81 .02 .19** -.44** -.10 .16* .56** .46** --      
9. Imaginative 6.05 2.76 .22** .32** -.15* .30** .25** .46** .52** .36** --     
10. Diligent 9.14 2.74 -.04 .13* .13* -.01 .12 .07 -.17** -.10 -.06 --    
11. Dutiful 9.13 2.39 -.09 -.05 .25** -.22** .10 -.14* -.09 -.07 -.20** .22** --   
12. Moral Disengagement 3.42 0.64 .18** .23** .14* .28** .14* .08 .23** .04 .12 -.24** .09 -- 
Note. * signifies correlations are significant at the .05 level, ** signifies correlations are significant at the .01 level.  Please reference 
Hogan and Hogan (2009) for a complete description of these variables. 
 
 
42 
Table 4. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between the mechanisms of moral disengagement. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Moral Justification 4.06 0.96 --                   
2. Euphemistic Language 3.38 0.83 .47** --                 
3. Advantageous Comparison 4.00 0.83 .40** .50** --               
4. Displacement of Responsibility 3.66 0.87 .45** .54** .46** --             
5. Diffusion of Responsibility 3.50 0.94 .38** .52** .36** .61** --           
6. Distortion of Consequences 3.20 0.84 .26** .48** .42** .44** .51** --         
7. Dehumanization 2.85 0.89 .26** .57** .31** .49** .54** .64** --       
8. Attribution of Blame 2.70 0.92 .23** .52** .29** .45** .53** .57** .75** --     
9. Unethical Decision-making 2.96 0.93 .13* .41** .32** .30** .32** .47** .48** .50** --   
10. Moral Disengagement 3.42 0.64 .60** .79** .64** .76** .77** .74** .78** .75** .50** -- 
Note. * signifies correlations are significant at the .05 level, ** signifies correlations are significant at the .01 level. 
 
 
 
43 
Table 5. Estimated marginal means of moral disengagement predicted by organizational 
justice, controlling for age, GPA, and previous employment. 
Variable Mean Std. Error 
95 % Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Distributive Justice 3.385 .059 3.268 3.501 
Procedural Justice 3.370 .059 3.254 3.485 
Interpersonal Justice 3.357 .063 3.233 3.481 
Informational Justice 3.333 .062 3.211 3.454 
Note. Means are evaluated at the following covariate values: age = 20.23, GPA = 3.1761, 
and previous employment = .34386. 
 
 
 
44 
Table 6. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting overall moral disengagement.   
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.111) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.324) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.266** .079  -.137 .077 
Age  -.061** .019  -.033 .018 
Previously Employed  -.186* .090  -.156 .081 
Machiavellianism - Cynical Views      .193* .091 
Aggression      .434** .162 
Conscientiousness     -.207** .072 
Hogan - Reserved      .049** .018 
Psychopathy - Callous Affect     -.288** .092 
Empathy     -.239* .098 
Note. Model 1 represents the first step in which only control variables were entered.  
Model 2 represents the second step, in which variables were entered in a stepwise 
fashion. N=201 for all analyses. B = unstandardized regression coefficient, and  
B
SE
 = standard error for the unstandardized regression coefficient. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
 
 
45 
Tables 7a-i. Hierarchical regression analysis predicting individual mechanisms of moral 
disengagement.   
 
Table 7a. Moral Justification. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.057) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.082) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.048 .124  -.050 .123 
Age  -.070* .030  -.064* .030 
Previously Employed  -.298* .141  -.272 .140 
Hogan - Dutiful      .063* .027 
Note. For all subsequent tables, Model 1 represents the first step in which only control 
variables were entered.  Model 2 represents the second step in which individual 
difference variables were entered in a stepwise fashion.  N=201 for all analyses. B = 
unstandardized regression coefficient, and B
SE
 = standard error for the unstandardized 
regression coefficient. * p<.05; ** p<.01. ? denotes variables that are significant using 
the Bonferroni correction of p<.00625. 
 
 
46 
Table 7b. Euphemistic language.   
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.098) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.243) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.277** .099  -.178 .100 
Age  -.082** .024  -.059* .023 
Previously Employed  -.178 .113  -.117 .106 
Machiavellianism - Cynical Views
?
      .346** .117 
Aggression      .419* .211 
Conscientiousness     -.236* .094 
Hogan - Leisurely      .046* .019 
Psychopathy - Callous Affect     -.227* .103 
 
 
 
47 
Table 7c. Advantageous comparison. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.041) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.157) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.144 .102   .014 .104 
Age  -.041 .025  -.019 .024 
Previously Employed  -.214 .116  -.139 .110 
Conscientiousness
?
     -.425** .099 
Hogan - Skeptical      .048* .020 
Psychopathy - Criminal Tendencies     -.242* .116 
 
 
 
 
48 
Table 7d. Displacement of responsibility. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.074) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.146) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.329** .114  -.268* .112 
Age  -.070* .028  -.052 .027 
Previously Employed  -.172 .129  -.190 .125 
Hogan - Reserved      .067** .025 
Aggression      .542* .248 
 
 
 
 
49 
Table 7e. Diffusion of responsibility. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.052) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.200) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.319* .123  -.199 .117 
Age  -.055 .030  -.022 .028 
Previously Employed  -.164 .140  -.190 .130 
Aggression
?
      .847** .260 
Empathy     -.315* .125 
Hogan - Reserved      .057* .027 
 
 
 
 
50 
Table 7f. Distortion of consequences. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.084) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.218) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.398** .108  -.223* .108 
Age  -.056* .026  -.021 .025 
Previously Employed  -.138 .122  -.123 .115 
Empathy     -.293** .111 
Aggression      .594** .224 
Conscientiousness     -.266** .101 
 
 
 
 
51 
Table 7g. Dehumanization. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.072) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.331) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.297* .114  -.096 .106 
Age  -.075** .028  -.032 .025 
Previously Employed  -.169 .129  -.157 .112 
Openness to Experience
?
     -.381** .083 
Machiavellianism - Cynical Views
?
      .402** .120 
Conscientiousness
?
     -.323** .099 
Hogan - Reserved      .059* .023 
Machiavellianism - Generalized Morals     -.170* .074 
 
 
 
 
52 
Table 7h. Attribution of blame. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.048) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.270) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.314** .115  -.124 .106 
Age  -.037 .028   .001 .025 
Previously Employed  -.158 .131  -.142 .116 
Machiavellianism - Cynical Views
?
      .347** .115 
Hogan - Reserved
?
      .073** .025 
Hogan - Diligent
?
     -.072** .021 
Aggression
?
      .659** .234 
 
 
 
53 
Table 7i. Unethical decision-making. 
  Model 1 
(R
2
=.011) 
 Model 2 
(R
2
=.220) 
Variables      B B
SE
      B B
SE
 
GPA  -.178 .122   .012 .115 
Age  -.001 .030   .020 .027 
Previously Employed  -.003 .139   .043 .126 
Aggression
?
      .722** .246 
Hogan - Diligent     -.074** .023 
Openness to Experience
?
     -.312** .094 
Psychopathy - Criminal Tendencies      .396** .126 
 
 
54 
Figure 1. Summary of theoretical relationships between organizational justice, individual 
difference variables, and moral disengagement mechanisms. 
 
Note. HDS = Hogan Development Survey, Five Factor = Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Openness, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness.
 
 
55 
Figure 2. Mean moral disengagement scores by moral disengagement mechanisms, 
grouped by form of organizational justice. 
 
 
Note. MJU = moral justification, ELA = euphemistic language, ACO = advantageous 
comparison, DIS = displacement of responsibility, DIF = diffusion of responsibility, 
CON = distortion of consequences, DEH = dehumanization, ABL = attribution of blame. 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Note. Ethical business scenarios are illustrated, along with their respective response 
options.  Sentences in bold indicate organizational justice manipulations to the base 
scenarios.  Response options are presented here in order of: moral justification, 
euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, 
diffusion of responsibility, distortion of consequences, dehumanization, and attribution of 
blame; the final option for each scenario assesses ethical decision-making.  In the actual 
survey administration, the scenarios did not display the text as bold and the scenarios and 
their response options were both randomly presented. 
.
 
 
57 
Scenario 1 Versions 
Procedural Justice 
Ray manages a unit in a company that calls itself a ?total quality? organization.  Part of the organization?s 
mission statement says that employees should strive to continually improve their performance.  Lately, 
Ray?s unit has been extremely busy trying to get its work done on several important projects.  Ray blames 
the situation on the fact that he has no say in the decision-making process about how much work gets 
assigned.  Ray asked his boss for advice about how to meet all of the deadlines, and the boss basically told 
him that his unit would have to cut corners on quality in order to get everything done on time.  The boss 
also told Ray that meeting deadlines is the best way to keep clients off their backs, and that the clients 
rarely complain about substandard work because its effects show up much later.  However, Ray knows that 
doing substandard work for clients will only hurt the company?s reputation in the long run.  Ray knows he 
wouldn?t be in this situation if he were able to have input regarding the amount of work being 
assigned. 
 
Distributive Justice 
Ray manages a unit in a company that calls itself a ?total quality? organization.  Part of the organization?s 
mission statement says that employees should strive to continually improve their performance.  Lately, 
Ray?s unit has been extremely busy trying to get its work done on several important projects.  Ray blames 
the situation on the fact that his boss asks his subordinates to work extra hours without providing 
any overtime pay.  Ray asked his boss for advice about how to meet all of the deadlines, and the boss 
basically told him that his unit would have to cut corners on quality in order to get everything done on time.  
The boss also told Ray that meeting deadlines is the best way to keep clients off their backs, and that the 
clients rarely complain about substandard work because its effects show up much later.  However, Ray 
knows that doing substandard work for clients will only hurt the company?s reputation in the long run.  Ray 
knows he wouldn?t be in this situation if his boss would pay for the overtime required to do quality 
work. 
 
Informational Justice 
Ray manages a unit in a company that calls itself a ?total quality? organization.  Part of the organization?s 
mission statement says that employees should strive to continually improve their performance.  Lately, 
Ray?s unit has been extremely busy trying to get its work done on several important projects. Ray blames 
the situation on the fact that his boss failed to communicate important details of one of the projects in 
a timely manner and forced Ray?s unit to redo much of their previous work.  Ray asked his boss for 
advice about how to meet all of the deadlines, and the boss basically told him that his unit would have to 
cut corners on quality in order to get everything done on time.  The boss also told Ray that meeting 
deadlines is the best way to keep clients off their backs, and that the clients rarely complain about 
substandard work because its effects show up much later.  However, Ray knows that doing substandard 
work for clients will only hurt the company?s reputation in the long run.  Ray knows he wouldn?t be in 
this situation if his boss would have just shared important project information. 
 
Interpersonal Justice 
Ray manages a unit in a company that calls itself a ?total quality? organization.  Part of the organization?s 
mission statement says that employees should strive to continually improve their performance.  Lately, 
Ray?s unit has been extremely busy trying to get its work done on several important projects.  Ray blames 
the situation on the fact that his boss frequently yells at and demeans his subordinates, resulting in 
unmotivated and stressed out employees.  Ray asked his boss for advice about how to meet all of the 
deadlines, and the boss basically told him that his unit would have to cut corners on quality in order to get 
everything done on time.  The boss also told Ray that meeting deadlines is the best way to keep clients off 
their backs, and that the clients rarely complain about substandard work because its effects show up much 
later.  However, Ray knows that doing substandard work for clients will only hurt the company?s reputation 
in the long run.  Ray knows he wouldn?t be in this situation if his boss would just treat his 
subordinates with a little respect and dignity so that they were motivated to do quality work. 
 
 
58 
Scenario 1 Responses 
 
It?s okay for Ray to tell his unit to focus on meeting deadlines at the expense of doing quality work because 
(1 = ?Strongly Disapprove? and 7 = ?Strongly Approve?) 
 
1. He needs to take care of his own company first and foremost. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. This is just the way that the game is played. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Cutting corners is better than losing a client because of a missed deadline. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Ray?s boss gave the go-ahead to do it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. All the managers of the other units will be doing the same thing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. The clients won?t even notice the decline in quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. If the clients want their deadlines to be met, then they don?t deserve quality work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The clients have brought this on themselves by being too demanding. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. It?s never okay to focus on deadlines at the expense of quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Which options presented above would you consider to be the: 
___ best option  ____ 2
nd
 best option  ____3
rd
 best option 
 
 
 
59 
Scenario 2 Versions 
Procedural Justice 
Pat is responsible for providing estimates of business expenses for his unit to his boss, who then determines 
the budget for all units in the company.  Upper management has always emphasized the importance of 
providing timely and accurate financial estimates, and they have backed up this policy by disciplining 
managers for inaccurate or late estimates. Pat recently realized that the figures he supplied contained a 
mistake.  If Pat had the chance to voice his opinion about needing more time to get accurate 
estimates, the mistake probably would not have happened.  The mistake was that an expense was 
projected to be larger than it should have been. It will not affect the ability of the company to stay within 
the budget.  However, the money could be used to cover other company expenditures.  Up to this point, no 
one else has identified the mistake and it is unlikely that they will.  Pat believes this wouldn?t even be an 
issue if he was able to have input on the actual process of providing financial estimates. 
 
Distributive Justice 
Pat is responsible for providing estimates of business expenses for his unit to his boss, who then determines 
the budget for all units in the company.  Upper management has always emphasized the importance of 
providing timely and accurate financial estimates, and they have backed up this policy by disciplining 
managers for inaccurate or late estimates. Pat recently realized that the figures he supplied contained a 
mistake.  Pat believes that the mistake would probably not have occurred if his amount of pay 
reflected the amount of effort actually needed to do the estimates.  The mistake was that an expense 
was projected to be larger than it should have been. It will not affect the ability of the company to stay 
within the budget.  However, the money could be used to cover other company expenditures.  Up to this 
point, no one else has identified the mistake and it is unlikely that they will.  Pat believes this wouldn?t 
even be an issue if his pay matched the effort that was required. 
 
Informational Justice 
Pat is responsible for providing estimates of business expenses for his unit to his boss, who then determines 
the budget for all units in the company.  Upper management has always emphasized the importance of 
providing timely and accurate financial estimates, and they have backed up this policy by disciplining 
managers for inaccurate or late estimates. Pat recently realized that the figures he supplied contained a 
mistake.  If Pat?s boss had provided accurate information about when the estimates were due, Pat 
would have had more time and the mistake probably would not have happened.  The mistake was that 
an expense was projected to be larger than it should have been. It will not affect the ability of the company 
to stay within the budget.  However, the money could be used to cover other company expenditures.  Up to 
this point, no one else has identified the mistake and it is unlikely that they will.  Pat believes this 
wouldn?t even be an issue if his boss had given him accurate information about deadlines for the 
estimates. 
 
Interpersonal Justice 
Pat is responsible for providing estimates of business expenses for his unit to his boss, who then determines 
the budget for all units in the company.  Upper management has always emphasized the importance of 
providing timely and accurate financial estimates, and they have backed up this policy by disciplining 
managers for inaccurate or late estimates. Pat recently realized that the figures he supplied contained a 
mistake.  If Pat?s boss had not yelled at Pat about the estimates the first time around, the mistake 
would probably not have happened.  The mistake was that an expense was projected to be larger than it 
should have been. It will not affect the ability of the company to stay within the budget.  However, the 
money could be used to cover other company expenditures.  Up to this point, no one else has identified the 
mistake and it is unlikely that they will.  Pat believes this wouldn?t even be an issue if his boss just 
treated him with a little respect when asking for the estimates. 
 
 
 
60 
Scenario 2 Responses 
 
It?s okay for Pat to NOT report the mistake because? 
(1 = ?Strongly Disapprove? and 7 = ?Strongly Approve?) 
 
1. He needs to protect the reputation of his unit above all else. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The mistake is really just a ?drop in the bucket? in the overall budget. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Compared to other possible mistakes, this one isn?t hurting the company any. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Managers shouldn?t be doing the accountants? jobs anyway. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. The entire team helped with the estimates, so any one person should not be blamed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. The estimates are just for the accountants.  They don?t really affect anyone. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. If the estimate process weren?t so complicated, mistakes like this wouldn?t be made. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. His boss doesn?t even deserve accurate estimates. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Mistakes, once they?ve been identified, should never go unreported. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Which options presented above would you consider to be the: 
___ best option  ____ 2
nd
 best option  ____3
rd
 best option 
 
 
 
61 
 Scenario 3 Versions 
Procedural Justice 
Kris decided that her subordinates would benefit greatly from a particular training program.  In fact, Kris as 
much as promised these employees that they would receive the training in the near future.  The employees 
were excited and looked forward to developing their skills.  At the time that Kris made that statement she 
felt that her budget would easily cover the training. However, upper management recently sent Kris and the 
other managers at her level a memo about new financial policies. The memo demanded increased 
efficiency over the next quarter, and outlined new rules saying funds could only be spent on essential 
functions. Kris is upset that her input was not considered in the process of making changes to current 
policies.  Kris believes that this focus on short-term goals would be detrimental to the long-term 
functioning of the unit that she manages. Kris would not even be in this situation if she had had a voice 
in the changes that were made. 
 
Distributive Justice 
Kris decided that her subordinates would benefit greatly from a particular training program.  In fact, Kris as 
much as promised these employees that they would receive the training in the near future.  The employees 
were excited and looked forward to developing their skills.  At the time that Kris made that statement she 
felt that her budget would easily cover the training. However, upper management recently sent Kris and the 
other managers at her level a memo about new financial policies. The memo demanded increased 
efficiency over the next quarter, and outlined new rules saying funds could only be spent on essential 
functions. Kris is upset that upper management frequently demands more and more from workers 
without providing adequate training or development opportunities.  Kris believes that this focus on 
short-term goals would be detrimental to the long-term functioning of the unit that she manages. Kris 
would not even be in this situation if upper management fairly compensated her unit?s efforts. 
 
Informational Justice 
Kris decided that her subordinates would benefit greatly from a particular training program.  In fact, Kris as 
much as promised these employees that they would receive the training in the near future.  The employees 
were excited and looked forward to developing their skills.  At the time that Kris made that statement she 
felt that her budget would easily cover the training. However, upper management recently sent Kris and the 
other managers at her level a memo about new financial policies. The memo demanded increased 
efficiency over the next quarter, and outlined new rules saying funds could only be spent on essential 
functions. Kris is upset that upper management produced this memo without first sharing the details 
of the new policy with the managers.  Kris believes that this focus on short-term goals would be 
detrimental to the long-term functioning of the unit that she manages. Kris would not even be in this 
situation if upper management had been candid in the changes that were being considered. 
 
Interpersonal Justice 
Kris decided that her subordinates would benefit greatly from a particular training program.  In fact, Kris as 
much as promised these employees that they would receive the training in the near future.  The employees 
were excited and looked forward to developing their skills.  At the time that Kris made that statement she 
felt that her budget would easily cover the training. However, upper management recently sent Kris and the 
other managers at her level a memo about new financial policies. The memo demanded increased 
efficiency over the next quarter, and outlined new rules saying funds could only be spent on essential 
functions. Kris is upset that upper management simply reprimands the managers for promises made 
to subordinates, rather than working cooperatively towards a solution.  Kris believes that this focus on 
short-term goals would be detrimental to the long-term functioning of the unit that she manages. Kris 
would not even be in this situation if upper management treated the managers in a fair and 
respectful manner. 
 
  
 
 
 
62 
Scenario 3 Responses 
 
Kris should schedule the training for her subordinates because? 
(1 = ?Strongly Disapprove? and 7 = ?Strongly Approve?) 
 
1. She has an obligation to look out for her own subordinates first and foremost. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The new rules on expenses are basically guidelines anyway. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Using the money for training is not as bad as using it for some other purpose. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The new memo is forcing her into this situation, so she can?t be blamed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. All of the other managers are probably doing the same things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Using the money on training won?t really hurt the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. The new rules are really just more mistreatment by upper management. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Upper management only thinks about money instead of people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. It?s not okay to schedule training if it breaks company rules. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Which options presented above would you consider to be the: 
___ best option  ____ 2
nd
 best option  ____3
rd
 best option 
 
 
 
 
63 
Scenario 4 Versions 
Procedural Justice 
Leigh has been looking forward to the day that a certain subordinate is rotated out of her unit.  This 
subordinate usually works up to performance standards, but is very abrasive, mean-spirited, and hardly 
anyone can stand interacting with him.  The subordinate is due to be rotated out of the work unit in two 
days.  But today, Leigh has learned that the subordinate made a serious mistake. When others made the 
same mistake, Leigh has followed company policy by providing negative feedback and constructive 
criticism after writing a formal letter of discipline for the employee?s personnel file. However, Leigh and 
the other managers have had no say in the way that the disciplinary procedures have been created 
and must be carried out.  In this situation, Leigh has written up the employee, but does not know if it is 
worth the time and effort to engage in what will probably be a very unpleasant interaction with the 
subordinate.  After all, the subordinate will be rotated out of the unit very soon.  This would not be an 
issue if Leigh had a say in the way she disciplined her own subordinates. 
 
Distributive Justice 
Leigh has been looking forward to the day that a certain subordinate is rotated out of her unit.  This 
subordinate usually works up to performance standards, but is very abrasive, mean-spirited, and hardly 
anyone can stand interacting with him.  The subordinate is due to be rotated out of the work unit in two 
days.  But today, Leigh has learned that the subordinate made a serious mistake. When others made the 
same mistake, Leigh has followed company policy by providing negative feedback and constructive 
criticism after writing a formal letter of discipline for the employee?s personnel file. However, Leigh and 
the other managers feel they are not being paid at the same level as the amount of effort required to 
discipline subordinates.  In this situation, Leigh has written up the employee, but does not know if it is 
worth the time and effort to engage in what will probably be a very unpleasant interaction with the 
subordinate.  After all, the subordinate will be rotated out of the unit very soon.  This would not be an 
issue if Leigh felt her pay matched the effort required to perform this part of her job. 
 
Informational Justice 
Leigh has been looking forward to the day that a certain subordinate is rotated out of her unit.  This 
subordinate usually works up to performance standards, but is very abrasive, mean-spirited, and hardly 
anyone can stand interacting with him.  The subordinate is due to be rotated out of the work unit in two 
days.  But today, Leigh has learned that the subordinate made a serious mistake. When others made the 
same mistake, Leigh has followed company policy by providing negative feedback and constructive 
criticism after writing a formal letter of discipline for the employee?s personnel file. However, Leigh and 
the other managers feel that the executives rarely provide clear details about the company policy.  In 
this situation, Leigh has written up the employee, but does not know if it is worth the time and effort to 
engage in what will probably be a very unpleasant interaction with the subordinate.  After all, the 
subordinate will be rotated out of the unit very soon.  This would not be an issue if the executives 
provided clear and accurate information to their managers. 
 
Interpersonal Justice 
Leigh has been looking forward to the day that a certain subordinate is rotated out of her unit.  This 
subordinate usually works up to performance standards, but is very abrasive, mean-spirited, and hardly 
anyone can stand interacting with him.  The subordinate is due to be rotated out of the work unit in two 
days.  But today, Leigh has learned that the subordinate made a serious mistake. When others made the 
same mistake, Leigh has followed company policy by providing negative feedback and constructive 
criticism after writing a formal letter of discipline for the employee?s personnel file. However, Leigh and 
the other managers are frequently chastised by upper management for the way in which they provide 
the feedback.  In this situation, Leigh has written up the employee, but does not know if it is worth the 
time and effort to engage in what will probably be a very unpleasant interaction with the subordinate.  After 
all, the subordinate will be rotated out of the unit very soon.  This would not be an issue if Leigh was 
treated in a respectful manner by upper management in the process of disciplining her subordinates. 
 
 
 
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Scenario 4 Responses 
 
It would be okay for Leigh to NOT have the interaction with the subordinate because? 
(1 = ?Strongly Disapprove? and 7 = ?Strongly Approve?) 
 
1. She should be spending time and effort on stable members of her unit. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Policies like this are meant to be ?flexible? in these situations anyway. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Skipping this interaction isn?t as serious as skipping one with someone staying in the unit. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. It?s really the subordinate?s next manager who should be taking care of feedback. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Other managers certainly don?t follow the procedures all the time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Having the meeting or not won?t have an effect on the employee?s future behavior. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. It?s the subordinate?s fault for being abrasive, so the effort of feedback isn?t worth it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Someone that abrasive and mean doesn?t deserve to be treated like other humans. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. It?s never okay to ignore disciplinary policy; Leigh needs to meet with the subordinate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Which options presented above would you consider to be the: 
___ best option  ____ 2
nd
 best option  ____3
rd
 best option