The Changing Status of Women in Taiwan: 1945-2010  
 
by 
 
Mei-Lien Lu 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Auburn University 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Auburn, Alabama 
May 7, 2012 
 
 
 
 
Key words: women, status, Taiwan, culture, development, democratization 
 
 
Copyright 2012 by Mei-Lien Lu 
 
 
Approved by 
 
 Cal Clark, Chair, Alumni Professor of Political Science, Director of the MPA Program 
Cynthia J. Bowling, Associate Professor of Political Science and Ph.D. Program Director 
Linda F. Dennard, Professor of Political Science at Auburn University-Montgomery   
Murray Jardine, Jane Dickerson Lanier Professor of Political Science  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the economic, social, and political status of women in 
Taiwan from 1945 to 2010.  This research was guided by a theoretical model of how the 
status of women worldwide is influenced by the extent of patriarchal culture, the level of 
economic development, and the degree of democratization.   
Hypotheses drawn from the theoretical model were tested by using data collected 
from 174 developing and developed nations.  Overall, the statistical analysis found that 
patriarchal culture, economic development, and democratization exert fairly strong 
influences over some dimensions of women?s status but have little association with others.  
This implies that the nature of women?s status is complex and complicated because each 
nation has its own circumstances that are shaped by its historical background, traditional 
culture, geographic location, and so on.  Therefore case studies of individual countries 
should provide valuable insights into the dynamics of women?s changing status in the 
contemporary world. 
This dissertation presents such a case study that analyzes the status of Taiwanese 
women in terms of social conditions, human and social capital, economic activities, and 
political participation and power.  Although women made major progress in all four areas, 
significant problems and barriers remain.  In terms of social conditions, Taiwanese 
women made substantial gains and reached developed world status by the 21st century on 
iii 
 
life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and fertility.  However, Taiwan?s sex birth 
ratios give strong evidence of selective female abortions after the second child, indicating 
the continued existence of patriarchal norms. 
During the postwar era, there have been tremendous increases in women?s 
educational levels and literacy; and the pre-existing gender gap on these dimensions has 
vanished among younger Taiwanese.  In addition, women are now more active than men 
in voluntary organizations.  However, substantial sex segregation in higher education 
majors still remains; and the less educated women from previous generations are at a 
substantial disadvantage in the country?s modernized economy and society. 
Over time women?s participation in the labor force has increased greatly, but it 
still is not high by international standards.  In addition, there was a major jump in 
occupational segregation between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, which probably hurt 
women?s relative status.  In contrast, women?s average wages and salaries have risen to 
approximately 80 per cent of men, far from equal but approximately the level that exists 
in the United States. 
Women and men now vote at equal rates, although women remain substantially 
underrepresented in terms of office-holding.  Over the postwar period, women?s 
representation in legislatures and councils increased gradually to 20 per cent to 30 per 
cent over the last two decades, although their share of the elective chief executives of 
local governments is much lower.  There were few women in the national cabinet before 
2000, but since then they have held 15 per cent to 20 per cent of the ministerial posts; and 
women?s share of the civil service has increased markedly over the last two decades to 
iv 
 
nearly 40 per cent.  By international standards, this is fairly respectable. 
The experience of women in Taiwan since the end of World War II, consequently, 
offers hope to women in other developing nations.  Their living conditions have 
improved greatly; and they are approaching parity with men on many dimensions.  While 
certain types of inequality certainly remain, more progress in the future appears highly 
likely. 
 
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
The author would like to thank Dr. Cal Clark, the committee chair, for his 
invaluable guidance, support, and assistance throughout the production of this 
dissertation.  I would also like to thank Dr. Cynthia J. Bowling, Dr. Linda F. Dennard, and 
Dr. Murray Jardine for their continued encouragement and helpful suggestions, and for 
serving on my dissertation committee.  I am especially grateful to Dr. Janet Clark; her 
expert advice, ongoing support, and careful reading of all of my writing will never be 
forgotten. 
I am greatly indebted to my family for all their help and unconditional love.  I 
sincerely express my appreciation to my friends around the world, especially those in 
Auburn, Alabama; memories of their words of encouragement and many kindnesses to 
me are forever engraved on my mind.  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract ?? ????????????????????????????...... ii  
Acknowledgements ???. ??????????????????????.?.. v  
List of Tables ??. ????????????????????????? ??. x  
List of Figures ??. ?????????????????????????.. ...xiii 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCATION ?????????????????????1  
1. Introduction ??????????????????????????.. .1 
2. Progress and Problems for Women in Taiwan ?????????????.5  
3. Chapter Outline ????????????????????????.. 14  
CHAPTRE 2:  INFLUENCES ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN ????????...  16 
1. Theories about Patriarchal Culture and How It Inhibits the Status of Women?17  
 
The Nature of Patriarchy ??????????????.???? ? ?  19 
Confucian Patriarchal Cultures ?????????????.???..? 26  
2. Major Stages and Dynamics of Economic Development ??????? ?..  33 
3. Contending Theories of How Development Affects the Status of Women ??49  
4. How Does Democratization Affect Status of Women? ?????????..60  
Women?s Movements and Women?s Autonomous Interest Groups ??? ?  62 
Women?s Political Representation ???????????????? ...70 
5. Theoretical Model ???????????????????????.. .81 
vii 
 
CHAPTER 3:  THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN TAIWAN  
                           IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ???????????? .. 86 
1. Defining and Measuring Properties and Data Collection ????????..  86 
2. Testing the Hypotheses ?????????????????????..  90 
Bivariate Correlations for Testing the Theoretical Model ???????. ..91 
Multiple Regressions for Comparing the Impacts of  
    the Three Explanatory Factors ???????????????? ? 94 
3. Comparing Taiwan to Other Nations by a Residuals Analysis ??????.  97 
Residuals Analysis for Women?s Participation in Labor Force  
    by GDP Per Capita ?????????????????????..  99  
Residuals Analysis for Fertility Rate by GDP Per Capita ??????? . 103 
Residuals Analysis for Women?s Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats  
    by GDP Per Capita ?????????????????????  106 
4. Conclusions ????????????????????????? .. 115  
CHAPTER 4:  THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION  
                           OF TAIWAN ?????????????????????? 117 
1. An Introduction to Taiwan ????????????????????117  
2. From 1945 to the 1950s ???????????????????? ? 121 
3. From the early 1960s to the early 1970s ??????????????.. 129  
4. From the mid 1970s to the late 1980s ???????????????...135  
5. From the late 1980s to present ??????????????????. 145  
6. Implications ???????????????????????? .?..155  
CHAPTER 5:  THE CHANGING STATUS OF WOMEN IN TAIWAN ???? .? . 156 
1. Social Conditions ??????????????????????? . 157 
Life Expectancy ??????????????????????? .157 
viii 
 
Infant and Maternal Mortality ????????????????? ? 159 
Fertility Rate ????????????? ..............................................162 
Sex Ratio at Birth ??????????????????????. . 164 
Urbanization ????????????????????????..  166 
2. Human and Social Capital ????????????????????. 168  
Educational Level ??????????????????????..168  
Literacy ??????????????????????????. 170  
Participation in Voluntary Organizations ?????????????..  172 
3. Economic Activities ???????????????????????173  
Labor Force Participation ???????????????????.. 173  
Distribution of Occupations and Occupational Segregation by Sex ???..177  
Entrance into Administrative, Managerial, Professional,  
   and Technical Related Occupations ???????????..???. 183  
 
Gender Pay Gap ??????????????????????? 184  
4. Political Participation and Power ??????????????????187  
Voting Rate ????????????? ????????????  188 
Political Representation ????????????????????.188  
Participation in Women?s Interest Groups ????????????? 203  
5. Conclusion ??????????????????????????. 212  
CHAPTER 6:  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION ?????????????? 214  
1. Introduction ?????????????????????????? 214  
2. Theoretical Model ???????????????????????.. 215  
3. Results ???????????????????????????? 218  
ix 
 
4. Significance of this Study ????????????????????...22 7 
Appendices ..? ????????????????????????????2 30 
     Appendix A.....???..??????????? ????????????. 231 
     Appendix B.????????????????????????????23 3 
     Appendix C ????????????????????????????23 8 
     Appendix D.????????????????????????????24 3 
     Appendix E..????????????????????????????24 8 
     Appendix F..???????????????????????????? 253 
Bibliography....................................................................................................................257 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
 
Table 2.1   Women in Parliament in 1997, by Region of the World ??.????....... .71 
Table 2.2   Women in Parliament in 2005, by Region of the World ???????? .71 
Table 3.1   Economic, Social, and Political Indicators Used in the Analysis,  
                  and Taiwan?s Data Sources ??????????????????? 89 
Table 3.2   Correlations of GDP per Capita, Gender Equality, and Democratization  
                  with Three Indicators of the Status of Women ??????????..? 92  
Table 3.3   Correlations of GDP per Capita with Gender Equality  
                  and Democratization ?????????????????????..  93 
Table 3.4   Multiple Regression Explaining Fertility Rate ???????????.. 95  
Table 3.5   Multiple Regression Explaining Percent of Women in Legislature ???.. 96  
Table 3.6   Multiple Regression Explaining Women?s Labor Force  
                  Participation Rate ??????????????????????.. 97  
Table 3.7   Descriptive Statistics of GDP per capita and the Three Indicators  
                  of Women?s Status ??????????????????????.98  
Table 3.8   Statistics for the Regression of Women?s Labor Force Participation  
                  On GDP per capita ??????????????????????100  
Table 3.9   Greatest ?Overachievers? and ?Underachievers? on Women?s  
                  Participation in Labor Force Rate Given Their GDP?s Per Capita ???.. 102  
Table 3.10   Statistics for the Regression of Fertility Rate on GDP per capita ???..103  
Table 3.11   Greatest ?Overachievers? and ?Underachievers? on Fertility Rate  
                    Given Their GDP?s Per Capita ???????????????.?. 105  
Table 3.12   Statistics for the Regression of Percentage of Women in the Legislature  
                    on GDP per capita ????????????????????...?106  
xi 
 
Table 3.13  Greatest ?Overachievers? and ?Underachievers? on Women?s Per Cent  
                   of Parliamentary Seats Given Their GDP?s Per Capita ???????..  108 
Table 3.14  The Electoral Systems of 15 Greatest Overachievers and 15  
                   Underachievers Countries Based on Female Parliamentary  
                   Representation Given by GDP Per Capita ????????????..  110 
Table 4.1    Production Value and Global Share of Taiwan-made IT Products  
                   and Services in 2007 ?????????????????????150  
Table 5.1    Dimensions of the Status of Women in Taiwan ??????????. 156  
Table 5.2    Infant and Maternal Mortality Rates in Taiwan: 1948-2009 ?????...160  
Table 5.3    Fertility Rates in Taiwan: 1949-2009 ??????????????..162  
Table 5.4    Countries (or Areas) with Fertility Rate below 1.2 per Women: 2009 ??163  
Table 5.5    Sex Ratio at Birth in Taiwan: 1980-2009?????????????.165  
Table 5.6    Sex Ratio at Birth in Taiwan, by Birth Order: 2001-2006 ??????..  165 
Table 5.7    Percentages of Attending School in Taiwan, by  
                   Age Group and Sex: 1976-2009 ????????????????..169  
Table 5.8    Higher Education Enrollment in Taiwan: 2009/2010 ???????.?.170  
Table 5.9    Literacy Rates in Taiwan (% of Aged 15 and Over): 1976-2009 ???....171  
Table 5.10  Literacy in Taiwan, by Age Group and Sex: 2009 ?????????..171  
Table 5.11  Labor Force Participation in Taiwan: 1961-2009 ??????????173  
Table 5.12  Occupational distribution by gender: 1978-2010 ??????????177  
Table 5.13  Distribution of Ratio of Female and Male Workers to Total Employed   
                   in Administrative and Managerial, Professional,  
                   and Technical Occupations ??????????????????.  184 
Table 5.14  Gender Pay Gap in Taiwan: 1981-2009 ?????????????..185  
Table 5.15  Gender Pay Gap by Occupation: 2009 ????? ????????....186  
Table 5.16  Taiwan?s Voting Rates in Elections between 2008 and 2010 ?????.188  
xii 
 
Table 5.17  Women?s Representation in National Legislative Bodies in Taiwan ?.?.192   
Table 5.18  Women?s Representation in Taiwan Provincial Assembly ??????.193  
Table 5.19  Women?s Representation in Municipal City Councils in Taiwan ???...194  
Table 5.20  Women?s Representation in County and Township Councils in Taiwan ?195  
Table 5.21  The Appointment of Women Cabinet Ministers in Taiwan, 1950-2010 ?.198  
Table 5.22  Local Government Chief Executive Officers by Women ???????199  
Table 5.23  Gender Ratio of Public Employees in Taiwan, 1991-2010 ??????.202  
Table 5.24  Government Employees by Grade and Sex, 1991-2010 ???????..202  
Table 5.25  Percentage of Men or Women at High-ranking level of  
                   Public Administration ????????????????????. .203 
Table 5.26  Women?s Movement?s Achievements in Legislation, 1980s-2011 ???.211  
Table 6.1   Variables Used in the Statistical Analysis ?????????????219  
Table 6.2   Summary of Statistical Results ?????????????????.220  
Table 6.3   Taiwan?s Performance Compared to What Would be Predicted for 
                  a Nation With Its GDP per capita ....??????????????? 221  
 
Table 6.4   Summary of Status of Taiwanese Women ?????????????223  
Table 6.5   Summary of the Implications of the Taiwan Case  
                  for the Research Hypotheses ?????????????????? 225  
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1   Forces Promoting the Empowerment of Women ??????????..17  
Figure 2.2   How Democratization Can Promote the Status of Women ??????...61  
Figure 2.3   Social Movements, Women?s Movements, Feminist Movements, and  
                   Women?s in Movements ..????????..???????????62  
Figure 2.4   Model of How Patriarchal Culture, Economic Development,                                  
                   And Democratization Affect the Status of Women ???..??????. 82  
Figure 4.1   Taiwan's Economic Growth: 1952-2008 ????????????.....149  
 
Figure 4.2   Gross Domestic Production by Sector ???????.???????152  
 
Figure 4.3   Employment Structure in Taiwan: 1952-2007. ..????????......... 153  
 
Figure 5.1   Women?s Life Expectancy in Taiwan: 1965-2008 ?????????.. 157  
 
Figure 5.2   Life expectancy in Taiwan, by Sex: 1965-2008 ????????.?? 158  
 
Figure 5.3   Life Expectancy in Taiwan and Selected Countries: 2008 ???..???159  
 
Figure 5.4   World Infant Mortality Rates in Selected Countries: 2008 ?????.....161  
 
Figure 5.5   The Number of Volunteers in Taiwan by sex: 1996-2009 ??????.. 172  
 
Figure 5.6   Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) in Taiwan: 1961-2009 ????..174  
 
Figure 5.7   Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Selected Countries:  
                   1988 and 2008 ???????????????????????. 176  
 
Figure 5.8   The Transformation of Women?s Occupations in Taiwan: 1978-2010 ?.. 179  
Figure 5.9   The Transformation of Men?s Occupations in Taiwan: 1978-2010 ???180  
 
Figure 5.10  Segregation Index by Occupation (SIO) ?????????????181  
xiv 
 
Figure 5.11  The Gender Pay Gap in Taiwan and Selected Countries:  
                     1990 and 2008 ???????????????????????187  
 
Figure 5.12  Number of Public Employees in Taiwan, by Sex: 1991-2010 ????...201  
 
Figure 6.1    Model of How Patriarchal Culture, Economic Development,  
                     and Democratization Affect Status of Women ??????????.. 215  
 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  Introduction 
     After the Second World War, countries all over the world were able to 
reconstruct their war destroyed economies or to start work on economic development.  
Within just a few decades, Taiwan has been transformed from an agricultural society to 
first an industrial and then a high-tech economy as well as from an authoritarian 
government to a liberal democracy.  In fact, Taiwan, one of Asia's Four Little Dragons, is 
praised as an economic miracle in the world (Chow, 2002; Wong, 2003; Vogel, 1991).   
Based on the ?modernization model,? it is assumed that socioeconomic 
development, along with democratization, leads to equality for women who have long 
been suppressed in patriarchal societies.  The logic is that economic development should 
bring wealth.  As a result, mass education is possible and necessary and should, in turn, 
affect production relationships and lifestyles in different ways.  Further, development 
should bring democratic politics.  Therefore, women could push for legal and policy 
reforms through which ?gender inequality? might be reduced.  That is, a compound of 
social, economic, and political changes would create ?modernization?, which could 
undermine traditional patriarchal norms and provide women with a great many resources 
through which they could pursue their own goals autonomously and improve their lives 
2 
 
(Black, 1966; Eisenstadt, 1973; Klein, 1984; Randall, 1987).  
However, in the real world, economic development and its accompanying changes 
might not generate results which would benefit women and improve their situations as 
the modernization model has predicted.  Ester Boserup (1970), in her book Women?s Role 
in Economic Development, points out that many women in developing countries face 
marginalization rather than enhancement.  Generally, they are confined to unstable, low-
paying, unskilled manufacturing jobs.  In addition, women?s traditional roles and statuses 
and support from kinship networks are substantially eroded in the modernization process.  
Women in some social groups and classes might gain from industrialization, but the 
accompanying economic and social transformations have reproduced and reinforced 
patriarchy in many ways.  With regard to political participation, it is expected that 
economic development brings forth democratization.  Democratization thus offers 
opportunities for women to exert political influence resulting in policies and legal 
reforms that can be used to directly change or soften the patriarchal culture of a society 
(Clark and Lee, 2000, p. 1-3; Clark and Clark, 2002, p. 3-5).  Regrettably, according to 
Darcy, Welch, and Clark?s research (1994) and Rule?s studies (1987, 1994a, and 1994b), 
women are underrepresented among political officials in all but a very few countries, 
even in the developed world.   
In sum, the relationship between development and the status of women is not 
absolute and decisive.  Thus, this study attempts to explore the changing status of women 
in Taiwan under the impact of economic development.  Taiwan presents a good case 
study for this purpose for several important reasons.  First, Taiwan has documented 
3 
 
economic achievement during the entire postwar period and has completed the transition 
from an agricultural to an industrial economy and from industrialization to a primarily 
postindustrial society.  This research examines how a successful economic transformation, 
in turn resulting in cultural, social, economic, and political changes, can affect women?s 
status.  Second, in the early 1970s the first wave of the Taiwan women's movement arose 
after Lu Hsiu-lien wrote her New Feminism.  Since then, diverse women's organizations 
or associations have emerged after Martial Law was lifted in 1987.  Most of Taiwan?s 
feminists and members of women?s groups once studied in western countries, especially 
in the United States.  They introduced trends of western thought to men and women in 
Taiwan (Ku, 1988, p. 181; Wang, 1999; Chen 2004; Chang, 2009).  
Moreover, Taiwan is becoming an open society.  Taiwanese do business with 
countries all over the world; and people go abroad for traveling or studying very 
frequently.   Furthermore, by 2005, 364,596 people from foreign countries and China 
(339,752 females and 24,844 males) had married Taiwanese (Foundation of Women 
Rights Promotion and Development, 2007, p. 44-45).  How and in what ways would a 
patriarchal culture be challenged or eroded by these above existing conditions is an open 
question. 
Third, Boserup (1970) points out ?With fewer children and lighter domestic duties, 
the work pattern for married women in developing countries will probably be radically 
different from the one seen during earlier periods of industrialization when most married 
women stayed at home.  It follows that in the future, when a large proportion of women 
may have jobs, it becomes an important task to devise new educational and training 
4 
 
programmes, which can help to reduce the productivity gap between male and female 
labor, thus fitting women to their new way of life? (Boserup, 1970, p. 225).  What 
Boserup had predicated, proposed, and suggested will be examined in this research.  In 
the early 1950s, access to education was extremely limited and showed clearly a very 
noticeable gender imbalance as the average man had attended school for four years and 
the average woman one and a half.  In 1968, the government enacted nine-year 
(elementary and junior-high) compulsory education and paid for it by public expenditures.  
This policy started to expand educational opportunity in general and to narrow the 
different education level afforded to girls and boys.  Moreover, the ?spillover? of 
education policy and fewer children trends, accompanying greater affluence, have 
tremendously narrowed the educational gap between males and females (Hermalin, 
Seltzer, and Lin, 1982; Parish and Willis, 1993; Tsai, Gates, and Chiu, 1994; Hayhoe, 
1995; Yi, 2002, p. 337-340). 
Finally, women in Taiwan have gained very significant representation in many 
areas of the public sphere.  Women?s groups and parties? competition under the impact of 
democracy provide opportunities to improve the status of women.  Diverse women's 
groups and organizations have emerged since Martial Law was lifted in 1987.  Some of 
them focus on gender concerns from different perspectives and provide professional 
services and assistance to women.  Others actively participate in political and social 
movements to urge the modification of laws and to supervise the government's execution 
of public policies to improve women's status in Taiwan's society (Lee, 1988; Ku, 1988 & 
1989; Wang, 1999; Fan, 2000; Chen, 2004; Chang, 2009).  Revising the Civil Code in 
5 
 
order to ensure women?s property rights, quickening the legislative process of the Equal 
Employment Act, and lobbying the passage of the Gender Equity Education Act are 
major achievements during the process of democratization (Chen, 2004; Chang, 2009).  
Also, Taiwan has been democratizing in terms of high competition between parties.  The 
competition has encouraged women to take part in politics.  For example, there were 47 
legislators of the Legislative Yuan, as women held 20.9% of the seats during 2005-2007 
(elected in 2004).  The 2008 legislative elections elected 34 female legislators from a 
total of 113 members, representing 30% of total seats in the Legislative Yuan.  The 1946 
constitution guaranteed women 10 % of the legislative seats at all levels of governments, 
and from the late 1960s women generally won more than the minimum quota (Chou, 
Clark, and Clark, 1990; Chou and Clark, 1994; Lee, 2000).  In 2005, in some local 
elections they even reached above 30 percent (Foundation of Women Rights Promotion 
and Development, 2007, p. 114, Table 5-1-7).  Taiwan?s new democracy with its 
increasing number of female elected officials and legislators, is worthy of being the 
subject of research. 
 
2.  Progress and Problems for Women in Taiwan 
This section presents an overview of the status of women in the economic, social 
and political realms.  
At the end of 2006, Taiwan?s population reached 22.9 million, of which 11.3 
million were female.  Life expectancy for women had increased from 71.45 in 1970 to 
79.4 in 2004 and was nearly 6 years longer than that for males (73.6).  Females had a 
6 
 
lower death rate than males; the female death rate was 458 per 100,000, while the male 
rate was 718 per 100,000, meaning that the male death rate was 1.57 times the female 
rate.  The total fertility rate in Taiwan has experienced an uninterrupted decline since 
1951.  In 2004, the average number of children born to each woman aged 15 to 49 was 
1.2, which was the lowest in historical records.  At the same time, there were 109 boys 
born in Taiwan for every 100 baby girls, this ratio was much higher than the normal 
condition because the global ratio of males to females at birth is about 105:100 (ROC, 
1998, p. 23; Women Web, 2006; ROC, 2007). 
With regard to education, except at the highest level, there was no difference in 
the educational attainment of young men and women at the university level and below for 
the 2004 school year (Women Web, 2006).  But substantial gender segregation by subject 
matter continues to exist at the level of colleges and vocational schools (Liu, 2002, p. 90-
94). 
In 2005, the female labor force participation rate was 48.1%, which reached the 
historically highest point (according to Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan).  In contrast, men?s participation rate has decreased since 1987 
(75.2%).  In 2005, it went down to 67.6%, which was the lowest point on record.  That is, 
the gap between male and female labor force participation has narrowed year by year.  
However, women?s labor force participation in Taiwan was lower than that of 2004?s 
global average at a rate of 53.9%, while around 60 per cent of all workers were women in 
Western countries.  Although the female labor force participation rate has been increasing 
steadily in Taiwan, there are still huge differences in earnings between men and women.  
7 
 
In 2004, females in non-agricultural sectors earned NT$37,104 monthly, on average 
about 78% of what males earned (NT$47, 836) (ROC, 1989a, p. 62; Women Web, 2006; 
ILO, 2004, p. 2; Lien, 2005, p. 294; ROC, 2007, p. 12). 
In regard to social participation, volunteering and citizen involvement have been 
actively promoted by Taiwan?s government in recent years.  In 2004, there were 45,000 
females registered as volunteers, making up 68.8% of all volunteers in Taiwan (Women 
Web, 2006).  The gender ratio of elected officials and legislators in the latest elections for 
all categories of public office and political representation in Taiwan are as follows: 2 
county magistrates (8.7%); 234 councilwomen (26%), 32 Legislators of the Legislative 
Yuan (18.2%); 17 councilwomen in Taipei (32.7%) and 10 councilwomen in Kaohsiung 
(22.7%) in the 2002 election.  At the end of 2006, Chen Chu was elected mayor of 
Kaohsiung.  Before Chen was elected, there weren?t any female mayors in Taipei or 
Kaohsiung; Taipei and Kaohsiung are two special municipalities in Taiwan.  In 2004, the 
number and sex ratio of administrators and government personnel in Taiwan was as 
follows: 7 chiefs of the Executive Yuan (18.9%); 2 commissioners of the Executive Yuan 
(28.6%); 3 justices (20%); 3 commissioners of the Examination Yuan (15.8%); 2 
commissioners of the Control Yuan (9.1%); 47 Legislators of the Legislative Yuan 
(20.9%); and 29 chief administrators (9.5%) (Women Web, 2006). 
In Taiwan, from the1970s until now, the status of women has dramatically 
changed in line with the nation?s cultural, social, economic, and political change.  It is 
necessary to investigate each influence that caused the changing of women?s status; 
otherwise, we cannot see the whole picture of how the status of women arrived at current 
8 
 
conditions in this country. 
As Clark and Clark mentioned in ?Institutions and Gender Empowerment in 
Taiwan,?  ?a nation?s social and cultural institutions are a central determinant of the 
opportunities that women have for empowerment in a particular society.? (Clark and 
Clark, 2008, p. 140).  In early times, under traditional beliefs such as: "treatment of 
females as inferior to males" and "a girl will get married sooner or later and is prone to 
take the side of her husband instead of her own family," most parents supported their sons 
to have further studies using their limited financial resources, but girls had to get jobs or 
stay at home helping with domestic work after they graduated from primary schools.  
This severe barrier to women?s empowerment was overcome in 1968, because the 
government made elementary and junior-high education compulsory and paid for it by 
public expenditures.  Moreover, families now had ample financial resources to support 
both sons and daughters, due to Taiwan?s economic development and fewer children 
trends.  Women?s greater educational opportunities since the end of 1960s are widely 
seen as one of the important contributions to the increased status of women in Taiwan 
(Hermalin, Seltzer, and Lin, 1982; Parish and Willis, 1993; Tsai, Gates, and Chiu, 1994; 
Hayhoe, 1995; Yi, 2002, p. 337-340). 
During the 1960s, the government in Taiwan drew forth its economic 
development policies and started to head towards industrialization.  Abundant cheaper 
workers and inexpensive manufacturing sites were the two major factors attracting many 
foreign companies to set up production branches in Taiwan.  In 1966, the first 
manufacture and export center, Kaohsiung Chienchen Export Processing Zone (EPZ), 
9 
 
joined the industrial line.  Two other export centers, Kaohsiung Nantzu EPZ and 
Taichung Tantzu EPZ, were established by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1971.  
These centers became the main gates to foreign investors, which benefited the most from 
the development of the world economy and usually imported cheap materials and 
exported manufactured goods, including textiles, garments, shoes, toys, leather and 
electronic products.  They combined the advantages of imported materials, the cheap cost 
of the facility and the low wages of domestic female workers.  It was the inexpensive 
young female laborers at great human cost that enabled the economic miracle of Taiwan 
to happen (Ho, 1978; Ranis, 1979; Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981; Gold, 1985). 
While female workers were gradually becoming the main force in the labor 
market, industry in Taiwan was also being transformed.  The labor disputes, wage 
increases, and appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar gradually decreased the competition 
of export products.  On the other hand, a steep hike in land prices further aggravated the 
overall manufacturing environment, forcing many small and medium-sized firms as well 
as labor-intensive enterprises, to scale down, shut down, or move their businesses.  Those 
firms that moved often relocated on the Chinese mainland or elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
leading to a shrinkage in their relevant sectors. 
Upgrading and deskilling resulted from economic restructuring in Taiwan.  For 
further development, most industries eliminated their old machines and invested in new 
equipment for automation of production.  Employers only hired a few skilled workers to 
operate machines in terms of capital-intensive investment; the government permitted 
various sectors to introduce foreign workers; and some industries hired cheaper foreign 
10 
 
female laborers to replace local female workers.  Furthermore, one way that employers 
have deskilled jobs was through new technologies.  Employers needed fewer white-collar 
workers in their offices than before because of computerization.  Deskilling was also 
common at fast-food restaurants and super markets, where many modern cash registers 
now are programmed to take over part of the selling jobs.  The trend of upgrading and 
deskilling resulted in some jobs disappearing and some jobs being created, but most new 
jobs were low-skilled and low-paying jobs.  Moreover, new jobs seemed fewer than the 
jobs that had disappeared, and both men and women were victims, as the unemployment 
rates were 2.6% in 1996, the highest in that decade (Ho, 1997).  This situation was not 
improved as the unemployment rates reached 5% and 4.4% in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively (ROC, 2009b). 
On the other hand, in 1996, Taiwan's hardware information technology industry 
(domestic and overseas combined) yielded a total production value of US$18.2 billion, 
making it Taiwan?s most important foreign exchange earner.  Up 20% from the previous 
year, Taiwan has been the world's third-largest computer hardware supplier since 1995, 
trailing only behind the United States and Japan.  Access to technical and professional 
fields has gradually opened up to women.  The number of female employees working in 
Hsinchu?s Science-based Industrial Park has been increasing year by year, where the 
percentage of female employees was 52% of total employees in 1994 (Taiwan Women 
Web, 1998).  In 2003, the ratio of males to females working in Hsinchu?s Science-based 
Industrial Park was still around half (Song & Huang, 2004). 
Generally speaking, the young generation of female workers has the advantage of 
11 
 
higher education, and they might benefit from economic transformation.  Those low-
educated middle-aged female labors are sacrificed, and some of them are involuntarily 
unemployed. 
Women in Taiwan have gained very significant representation in many areas in 
the public sphere, as the statistical data showed earlier.  Women?s groups and parties? 
competition provide evidence of the impact of democracy upon the status of women.  
First, it wasn't until the early 1970s when the first wave of the Taiwan women's 
movement brought the public's attention to the unequal treatment of women.  The 
Awakening of Women Magazine Agency founded in 1982 by Lee Yuan-chen was the 
only women's organization to focus on gender issues during the enforcement of Martial 
Law.  In turn, diverse women's organizations or associations have emerged since Martial 
Law was lifted in 1987.  The distinguishing feature of these women's groups is that they 
began to focus on gender concerns from different perspectives.  Some of them provide 
professional services and assistance to women.  Others actively participate in political 
and social movements to urge the modification of laws and to supervise the government's 
execution of public policies to improve women's status in Taiwan's society.  They directly 
challenge the thousand-year-old patriarchal culture and provide support for women's 
rights as well as gender equality (Lee, 1988; Ku, 1988 & 1989; Wang, 1999; Fan, 2000; 
Chen, 2004).  Second, Taiwan has been democratizing in terms of high competition 
between parties.  The competition has caught the attention of women.  Therefore, 
women?s policy always is one of their political views because each party only can win the 
election through the support of women?s votes.  Revising the Civil Code in order to 
12 
 
ensure women?s property rights and quickening the legislative process of the Equal 
Employment Act are major legislative achievements during the process of 
democratization (Chen, 2004; Chang, 2009). 
The status of women in Taiwan has been changed step by step along with social, 
economic, and political transformation.  The improvement is associated with the 
transition from agricultural society to industrialization, from an industrial economy to 
high-tech development and from an authoritarian government to liberal democracy.  
Industrialization has brought greater wealth.  As a result, the level of education of 
both sexes has increased.  Thus, highly educated people allowed Taiwan to develop a 
high-tech industry and compete with other countries, such as South Korea.  In this global 
competition, Taiwan?s women were not absent.  Because of the similar education 
opportunities among men and women, they are able to participate in high-tech industry. 
On the one hand, the society has urbanized along with the economic development.  
The kinship system is being diminished in some way.  Social change and economic 
development have granted Taiwanese women more autonomy, resources, and a sense of 
self-efficacy.  In these regards, Taiwanese females are empowered, and the status of 
women is improved.  On the other hand, traditional cultures and patriarchal norms have 
been challenged.  According to the Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Taipei City Government, in 2004, there were five alien bridegrooms among 100 new 
weddings; and, 70% of alien bridegrooms come from European countries, North America, 
and Japan (Shi, 2005).  Also, problems concerning the high divorce rates, single mothers, 
and alien brides all result from social changes, according to many studies (Hsia, 2000; 
13 
 
Liu, 2001; Pong, 2006; Copper, 2009, p. 101). 
On the surface, it seems the status of women has been greatly improved based on 
the statistical data.  But, serious disparities among women themselves might be revealed 
if some conditions are taken into account.  For example, the young generation of female 
workers has the advantage of higher education, and they might benefit from high-tech 
development and earn decent pay.  Those low-educated middle-aged female workers are 
sacrificed, and some of them are involuntarily unemployed owing to economic 
transformation (Ho, 1997).  Also, the status of women might not be improved if we are 
aware of social conditions and violent attacks.  For instance, Peng Wan-ru, a long-time 
activist in Taiwan's feminist movement and the director of the Women's Division of the 
Democratic Progressive Party, was murdered in 1996 (Yang, 2006).  In 2001, among the 
15,681 victims of criminal acts of violence, 69.27% were women (Liu, 2002, p. 100). 
History shows that women?s rights do not improve automatically.  They need to 
be improved through the efforts of government, advocacy groups and women themselves.  
Due to Peng?s sacrifice the Sexual Assault Prevention Act was passed at the end of the 
same year.  The Gender Equity Education Act was announced on the 23rd of June, 2004.  
The General Provisions state the purposes of the act: ?to promote substantive gender 
equality, eliminate gender discrimination, uphold human dignity, and improve and 
establish education resources and environment of gender equality.? The act originated 
from a local feminist movement in the 1980s, began to be drawn up in 2000, and was 
announced in 2004 (Chang, 2009, p. 123-125).  Since the middle of the1980s, Taiwan has 
been democratizing because of high competition between the major parties.  If women 
14 
 
are diligent to use their votes, their voice will be heard.  As the numbers of female 
legislators increase, women?s political representation should enhance their political power 
and have policy consequences for women?s daily lives. 
The next section discusses the chapter outline, which presents the remainder of 
the five chapters for this research. 
 
3.  Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature and, accordingly, develops a path diagram as well 
as hypotheses.  The first section discusses theories about patriarchal culture and how it 
inhibits the status of women.  The second briefly summarizes the central dynamics and 
basic stages of economic development; and the third describes the conflicting theories of 
how development affects the status of women.  The fourth discusses the presumed 
relationship between democratization and the status of women.  Finally, the fifth section 
presents a theoretical model of how three factors (culture, economic development, and 
democratization) influence women?s status in the contemporary world. 
Chapter 3 tests the theoretical model, developed in Chapter 2, of the factors that 
shape the status of women and then uses these data to evaluate the relative status of 
women in Taiwan.  There are three parts in the chapter.  The first one talks about defining 
and measuring properties, as well as data collection.  In the second part, the eight 
research hypotheses are tested for 174 countries.  The third part focuses on comparing 
Taiwan to other nations in the world, both developing and developed, by various 
indicators of women?s status and then uses a ?residuals analysis? from regressions using 
15 
 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) to explain a 
nation?s values on these items to determine whether Taiwan is an ?underachiever? or 
?overachiever.? 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of Taiwan?s socioeconomic and political 
transformation over six decades.  There are five sections in this chapter.  The first one 
briefly introduces Taiwan.  The next four describe the major stages of Taiwan?s 
transformation from a poor agricultural and authoritarian country to an exporter of high-
tech products, post-industrial society, and young democratic nation, as a background for 
analyzing the status of women in Taiwan in chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 presents statistics and analysis on the status of women in Taiwan, 
highlighting changes over time and the current situation as well as the differences 
between men and women in Taiwan and women in other countries.  Analyses are based 
mainly on statistics and resources from Taiwan?s government and international statistical 
agencies.  The study covers four broad dimensions ? social conditions, human and social 
capital, economic activities, and political participation and power.  The end of this 
chapter summarizes the progress that women have and have not made. 
Chapter 6 presents the finding of this study, illustrates the dynamics of women?s 
status of Taiwan, and develops a model to explain both the progress and limitations in 
women?s social, economic, and political status in Taiwan.  The significance of this study 
illustrates at the end of this dissertation. 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
INFLUENCES ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
 
The status of women varies tremendously among contemporary nations and 
societies (Giele and Smock, 1977; Gray, Kittilson and Sandholtz, 2006).  While women 
may not have achieved full equality anywhere, women have far more ability to exercise 
their talents and pursue their own interests and agendas in some societies, such as the 
Scandinavian ones, than in others, such as many Middle Eastern ones (The Global 
Gender Gap Report 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).  As summarized in Figure 2.1, three general 
factors have been suggested as explanations for why this is so.  First, the culture of a 
society certainly shapes the opportunities available to women; and some cultures are 
extremely patriarchal, while others are less so.  Second, industrialization tends to bring 
cultural change favorable to women and to allow women to find employment and escape 
ties to tradition; and post-industrial ?information? economies are particularly favorable 
for women. Finally, women can use political processes in democracies to gain legal 
protections and adopt favorable policies.  Thus, economic development and 
democratization are often seen as empowering women, although these conclusions have 
been strongly challenged as well. 
17 
 
This chapter develops the theoretical foundation for analyzing the status of 
women in Taiwan by examining previous research on the three factors that shape 
women?s roles in a society.  The first section discusses the nature of patriarchal cultures 
and how this concept has been applied to Confucian cultures.  The second briefly 
summarizes the central dynamics and basic stages of economic development; and the 
third describes the conflicting theories of how development affects the status of women.  
The fourth discusses the presumed relationship between democratization and the status of 
women.  Finally, the fifth section presents a summary model of how these three factors 
influence women?s empowerment in the contemporary world. 
 
Figure 2.1  Forces Promoting the Empowerment of Women 
  
LESS PATRIARCHAL 
CULTURES 
 
 
HIGHER STATUS AND 
GREATER EMPOWERMENT 
FOR WOMEN 
DEVELOPMENT TO 
INDUSTRIAL AND 
PARTICULARLY 
POST-INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMIES 
 
 
MORE DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
1.  Theories about Patriarchal Culture and How It Inhibits the Status of Women 
What is culture?  There might not be a single answer to this question.  Redefining 
Culture: Perspectives Across the Disciplines, by Baldwin et al., presents over 300 
18 
 
definitions of culture from across the disciplines (Baldwin, Faulkner, Hecht and Lindsley, 
2006).  In addition, Samuel P. Huntington points out that the term ?culture? has had 
multiple meanings in different disciplines and different contexts.  He suggests that if 
culture includes everything, it explains nothing (Harrison and Huntington, 2000, p. xv).  
On the one hand, this study focuses on how Chinese patriarchal culture influences 
women?s lives.  Thus, ?culture? refers to values, beliefs and attitudes in terms of gender 
relations.  On the other hand, for some sociologists, culture is contrasted with structure. 
They argue that societies consist of a framework of social institutions?the social 
structure?and culture provides a kind of social cement keeping the structure intact.  For 
example, Talcott Parsons distinguished social structure from culture which is responsible 
for integration and goal attainment (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2000, p. 83).  Based on 
this argument and this model, this section investigates  how  the cultural factor influences 
women?s roles and gender relations and shapes women?s status. 
In regards to gender equality, Barbara Crossette, in her article ?Culture, Gender, 
and Human Rights?, argues that ?despite great political and economic gains in many 
places, women around the world still have good reason to be sensitive to how cultures 
affect them? (Crossette, 2000, p. 181).  In addition, some scholars suggest that a society?s 
cultural heritage is one of the factors that shape the status of women (Rives and Yousefi, 
1997).  Furthermore, Clark and Lee indicate that in almost all societies, women as a 
whole are forced into subordinate roles and statuses that are embedded in and reinforced 
by a wide array of patriarchal cultures (Lee and Clark, 2000, p. 1). 
 
19 
 
The Nature of Patriarchy 
Sylvia Walby points out that the concept of patriarchy is an essential tool in the 
analysis of gender relations (Walby, 1989, p. 213).  While the concept of ?patriarchy? has 
been criticized for not being able to deal with historical and cross-cultural variation in the 
forms of women?s subordination, Walby offers a new way of theorizing patriarchy to 
meet these objections.  She defines patriarchy as a system of social structures and 
practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.  In turn, the author 
suggests that patriarchy needs to be conceptualized at different levels of abstraction.  At 
its most abstract, patriarchy comprises a system of social relations.  At the next level, 
patriarchy is composed of six structures: the patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal 
relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal 
relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions, such as religion, 
the media and education.  In each of these structures, it is possible to identify sets of 
patriarchy practices (Walby, 1989, p. 214). 
According to Walby, the patriarchal mode of production is one of two patriarchal 
structures operating at the economic level.  Women?s labor is expropriated by their 
husbands within the marriage and household relations (Walby, 1989, p. 221).  Walby 
asserts, by invoking Christine Delphy?s argument (Delphy, 1984; cited in Walby, 1989, p. 
221), that the defining feature is the relationship of production under which the work is 
performed rather than the tasks which constitute the work.  The work performed by 
women may range from cooking and cleaning for the husband to caring for their children.  
Women?s domestic work is not rewarded with money because it is part of the marriage 
20 
 
relationship between a husband and wife.  That is, the wife works for her husband.  The 
husband is able to expropriate the wife?s labor because he has possession of the labor 
power which she had produced.  He has effective possession of the fruits of her labor. 
Also, he is able to sell this labor power as if it were his own (Walby, 1986).  After 
constructing the structure of housework, Walby presents three stages to her claim.  First, 
the domestic division of labor is a major form of the differentiation of men and women.  
Second, the domestic division of labor has significant effects on other aspects of social 
relations.  Third, the domestic division of labor is a form of gender inequality.  Walby 
points out that time budget studies and the research on the domestic division of labor 
show the unequal amounts of housework and total labor time performed by the spouses 
(Cowan 1983; Gershuny 1983, 1987; Oakley 1974; Vanek 1980; cited from Walby, 1989, 
p. 221).  Also, the results of investigation of the unequal division of household resources 
demonstrate that women have a lesser share in the consumption of household goods than 
do men, ranging from food to leisure time (Deem 1986; Delphy 1984; Pahl 1983; cited 
from Walby, 1989, p. 221). 
Patriarchal relations in paid work shape the second of the patriarchal structures at 
the economic level, according to Walby.  The key feature of patriarchal relations in paid 
work is that of closure of access by men against women.  This involves the exclusion of 
women from paid work or the segregation of women within it (Walby, 1989, p. 222).  As 
an outcome, women?s work is devalued, and they earn lower wages.  In addition, this 
causes a social fact with determinate effects, not only on women?s paid work, but also in 
other areas including the domestic sphere and gender relations.  At the household level, 
21 
 
women depend on their husbands economically.  The gender relations are between the 
excluder and devaluer and the excluded and devalued:  men and women stand on unequal 
platforms. 
Occupational segregation is the key to understanding patriarchal relations in paid 
work, according to Walby.  The practice of paying women less by occupational 
segregation in an open way is out of date because of the passing of equal pay legislation 
in most of the western countries, but an indirect process still works.  Job segregation 
takes place in many ways, vertical and horizontal (Hakim, 1979; cited from Walby, 1989, 
p. 223), and between full-timers and part-timers (Robinson and Wallace, 1984, cited from 
Walby, 1989, p. 223).  Women?s occupations and men?s occupations are segregated at 
different steps by vertical hierarchy; in turn, women?s jobs and men?s jobs are divided in 
the form of horizontal segregation.  Jobs or occupations decide wages; therefore, 
segregation provides the possibility for differential wage rates being paid.  Most often, 
women?s jobs are regarded as less skilled or less important, which results in women?s pay 
being less than men?s.  The differentiation between full- and part-time makes significant 
differences to the amount of legal protection given to employees (Hakim, 1987, cited 
from Walby, 1989, p. 223).  And, most part-time jobs are at the bottom of the jobs 
hierarchy (Dex 1987; Martin and Roberts, 1984; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 223).  
Women are paid less, because part-time jobs are usually taken by women. 
The state is another patriarchal structure.  Walby argues that women are excluded 
from access to state resources and power because of the patriarchal nature of the state 
(Walby, 1989, p. 224).  Women were almost totally invisible in the public sector when 
22 
 
women?s suffrage was denied.  Women exercise the ?right to vote? in most countries 
today, while more indirect forms of exclusion result in women?s political 
underrepresentation.  The limited representation in the public sphere produces an effect 
that women do not have the power to influence public policies which pertain to the 
resolution of issues in their favor. 
Walby argues that the fact that the state is a patriarchal structure does not imply 
that the state is a monolith.  In fact, there are frequently conflicts between the various 
branches of the state over different patriarchal strategies and between the representation 
of patriarchal and capitalist interests (Walby, 1989, p. 224).  For example, there have 
been conflicts over the regulation of women?s paid work (Witz 1986, cited from Walby, 
1989, p. 224) and over whether women should be called into the workforce to make 
munitions in the second World War or left at home in a traditional patriarchal setting 
(Summerfield, 1984; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 224). 
Walby indicates that the patriarchal relations in the state have a series of 
significant effects on gender relations (Walby, 1989, p. 224).  For example, the state 
enacts laws or rules on divorce and marriage, fertility (by legalizing or criminalizing 
abortion), contraception, new reproductive technologies, wage discrimination, sexuality 
(by court rulings on the custody of the children of lesbian mothers), male homosexuality, 
prostitution, pornography, male violence (by court practices in cases of rape and 
battering), housing priorities for battered women, and belief systems (by setting 
parameters within which religions may operate) (Walby, 1989, p. 224). 
23 
 
Walby points out that male violence has a social structural nature. She argues its 
patterning cannot be understood in terms of individual psychologies.  For Walby, men 
use violence as a form of power over women.  ?It (male violence) has a regular social 
form and, as a result of women?s well-founded expectations of its routine nature, has 
consequences for women?s action? (Walby, 1989, p. 224).  In practice, male violence 
takes varied forms, including rape, wife beating, father/daughter incest, flashing, sexual 
harassment, and sexual assault.  Because of fear of male violence, most women alter their 
conduct and patterns of movement.  In other words, women?s daily lives and actions 
might be influenced by the threat of male violence.   
Walby suggests that male violence interacts with other patriarchal structures.  For 
instance, she argues that unless the violence is ?extreme? and in ?inappropriate? 
circumstances, it is tolerated and condoned by the patriarchal state (Walby, 1989, p. 225).  
Also, Brownmiller?s research demonstrates a link between an increase in the 
militarization of society and an increase in the rate of rape (Brownmiller, 1976; cited 
from Walby, 1989, p. 225).  That is, the rate of rape in a given country is historically 
variable, being higher in times of militarization and specially warfare (Walby, 1989, p. 
218). 
Walby mentions that scholars on gender relations have tended either to see 
sexuality as the basis of women?s subordination or have ignored it completely.  She 
suggests that certain forms of sexuality are crucial for patriarchal relations.  In particular, 
the institutionalization of heterosexuality is necessary for patriarchy because without it 
the patriarchal mode of production could not exist (Walby, 1989).  From Walby?s view, 
24 
 
patriarchal relations in sexuality form a structure both in the sense of the primacy given 
to the heterosexual form of sexual practice as distinct from lesbianism and homosexuality, 
and in the sense of the unequal relations within this sexual practice.  This orientates 
women towards marriage as a desirable goal and stigmatizes close female friendships 
(Walby, 1989). 
Patriarchal relations in cultural institutions, such as the media, religions, and 
education, generate a relatively diverse set of patriarchal practices.  With regard to the 
media, Coward?s study on different women?s magazines shows those magazines have in 
common the differentiation of masculinity from femininity (Coward, 1978; cited from 
Walby 1989).  Historically speaking, religions have been very important patriarchal 
institutions which provide correct forms of conduct for men and for women, respectively.  
These defined behaviors have been variable, from burning women who assumed too 
much power as ?witches? to committing adultery.  Education is a site of both 
differentiating men and women and offering men more credentials.  The principle that 
women should be feminine and men ought to be masculine is enhanced through cultural 
institutions.  Under such conditions, certain forms of jobs will be given to men because of 
the reinforcement of their masculinity.  As well, some work is assigned to women due to 
gender roles emphasized by the media, education, and religions. 
Walby argues patriarchy is not an historical constant.  The component structures 
within this system are not only relative over time but also alter in terms of their 
interrelationship with each other.  In addition, Walby suggests that there are two major 
forms of patriarchy: private and public.  Private patriarchy is where women are relatively 
25 
 
excluded from arenas of social life apart from the household.  They provide services 
individually and directly in the home.  Public patriarchy does not exclude women from 
certain sites, but women are subordinated and exploited in this inclusion collectively 
rather than individually.  Walby takes Britain as an example.  She indicates that 
patriarchy had moved towards the private form, and then it shifted to the public form over 
the last two centuries.  Domestic ideology intensified during the eighteenth and most of 
the nineteenth century.  Women, especially married women and middle class women, 
rarely worked in the public sector, only in their own households.  Women were excluded 
from the public realm of the state.  They did not have the right to vote.  And, if married, 
they lacked the ability to own property.  Violence against wives was condoned.  Cultural 
institutions, such as the church, supported the concept that a woman?s best place was in 
her home.  In regard to non-marital sexuality, there were strong sanctions against women 
(Walby, 1989, p 228). 
Today, public patriarchy is widespread in Britain.  Although women have 
participated in the public sector, they are subordinated there.  Most women have paid jobs, 
but wage gaps and occupational segregation are prevalent.  Women now have the same 
citizenship rights as men, but they only share a small proportion of the elected offices and 
only a tiny part of public policies pertain to women?s issues.  There are less severe 
sanctions against non-marital sexuality for women, but these still show a greater degree 
for women than men.  The products of pornographic images, which objectified women, 
have increased.  Marriage may end by divorce, and divorce rates have gone up.  Women 
usually take more responsibilities of childcare after divorce.  As an outcome, female?s 
26 
 
poverty has increased.  Husband?s violence is not quite as legitimate as it once was, but 
few legal penalties have been enacted to protect women.  Women are increasingly 
allowed to participate in cultural institutions, but still in a subordinated way (Walby, 
1989, p 228 - 229). 
Further, Walby suggests that it is necessary to divide the public form of patriarchy 
into two types, based on whether the market or the state brings women into the public 
sphere, in order to present the major differences in the forms of patriarchy between 
different countries of the industrialized world.  On both ends of the continuum are the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the United States, respectively.  In Eastern Europe, once 
the formerly Communist European countries outside the Soviet Union, the state had 
played a major role of dealing with caring for children, the sick, and the old.  Previously, 
those tasks were individually performed by women in their households.  When the state 
stepped in, women were organized and assigned to take part in the workforce.  By and 
large, care jobs were performed by women.  In contrast, the market plays an equivalent 
role in America.  Those states of Western Europe, located in the middle of the continuum, 
are welfare countries.  On the one hand, welfare countries usually make some public 
policies dealing with women?s needs.  On the other hand, women search for jobs 
depending on the market mechanism. 
 
Confucian Patriarchal Cultures 
Catherine S. P. Farris argues that the position of women should be evaluated 
within specific societies and cultural contexts.  She indicates that the Chinese cultural 
27 
 
value of nan zhu wai, nu zhu nei (man rules the outside, woman, the inside) highlights a 
worldview of gender complementary, rather than equivalence, and is one that defines a 
fundamental differences in feminist movements in the United States and in Chinese 
societies.  Farris points out that women?s liberation in Western societies focuses on 
liberation from family, while women?s liberation in Chinese societies is perceived as 
deriving power from social networks and by ending male abuses.  Thus, Farris argues, 
women?s liberation in different societies can be understood only in the cultural context 
(Farris, 2000, p. 144-145). 
Historically speaking, Confucianism has endured as the basic social and political 
value system in Chinese society for over twenty centuries.  The major reason that 
Confucianism has had such a profound impact is that it was adopted as the governmental 
ideology of many dynasties in China; even alien regimes never ignored Confucian 
philosophy and teachings.  Moreover, Confucianism was institutionalized and propagated 
both through the formal curricula of the educational system and through the selection 
process of government officials.  In general, any male adult in imperial China, regardless 
of his wealth or social status, could become a government official by passing the civil 
examination (Dubs, 1938).  Scholars point out that ?the openness of civil exams assured 
the spread and homogenization of Confucian ideology ratifying Chinese family values 
through all levels of society? (Fricke, Chang, and Yang, 1994, p. 25).  Thus,  
Confucianization has had a tremendous influence on values, beliefs, attitude, and the way 
of life of the Chinese people.  Imperial China ended in 1911.  After the loss of hegemony 
as a state orthodoxy, Confucianism did not completely disappear; remnants remain at the 
28 
 
micro-level of family and community, the mid-level of the education system and business 
activities, and the macro-level of the state and its guiding thought (Rozman, 2002, p. 13).   
In general, Sylvia Walby defines patriarchy as a system of social structures, and 
practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.  However, when Walby?s 
patriarchy theory is applied to explore women?s oppression and gender inequality in 
Chinese society, it is necessary to take account of the features of Confucian culture in 
order to present patriarchy in practice in the institutions suggested by Walby.  That is, 
with added culture factors to an examination of general patriarchy, the causes and effects 
of gender inequality in Chinese society could be clearly seen.   
Lu Hsiu-lien (also known as Annette Lu, ??? ), a Taiwanese feminist and 
politician, is a former Vice President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 2000 
through 2008.  In the early 1970s, the first wave of the Taiwan women?s movement arose 
after Lu wrote her ?New Feminism.?  Based on a survey of the history of women in 
Chinese society, Lu indicates that four views from Confucian teachings are the root of 
contemporary women?s low position and lack of self-confidence.  These four views are 
?Continue the Family Line,? ?Three Obediences and Four Virtues,? ?Men 
Outside/Women Inside,? and ?One-sided Chastity? (Lu, 1994, p. 291; Reed, 1994, p. 228). 
The most powerful, and from Lu?s viewpoint,  most destructive, traditional 
Chinese value is the importance of continuing the male family line (Reed, 1994, p. 228).  
In Chinese society, which is based on a patrilineal system and patrilocal marriage, it is 
believed that male heirs are necessary to carry on the family name and the ancestral 
sacrifices.  Male descendants perform the funeral rites, and worship their ancestors to 
29 
 
provide them with a comfortable and peaceful afterlife.  For Chinese, without male heirs 
and ritual offerings, the ancestors? spirits would exist as hungry ghosts.  According to 
Confucian teachings, ?There are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity 
is the greatest of them? (Mencius, 4A:26; cited from Reed, 1994, p. 228).  Lu argues that 
the significance of this aspect of filial piety results in parents and society in general 
considering boys important and girls unimportant.  Moreover, Lu argues that the concept 
of family line continuity causes families to treat their own daughters as commodities and 
women?s marital homes to view them as ?tools? for bearing male heirs.  ?Married 
daughters are spilled water? is a common expression in Chinese society. This phrase tells 
that no matter what happens, a married woman belongs to her husband?s family and can 
never return to her natal family after marriage.  Also, families see little point in providing 
resources for educating their daughters who would benefit their future families.  Families 
might force their daughters to work at a young age or to work as bar girls or prostitutes in 
order to increase family income.  Daughters are expected to pay back their natal families 
for the expense of raising them before they go to their marital families.  Bearing male 
heirs, at least one, is regarded as women?s responsibility for their marital families; 
undoubtedly, women very often face this pressure (Reed, 1994, p. 228-229). 
According to Lu, the second traditional view of women?s destiny sums up 
women?s moral life: the ?three obediences and four virtues? (Reed, 1994, p. 230).  
Addressed in the Confucian classic text, the Book of Rites (Li Chi, ?? ), three 
obediences admonish a woman to obey the father before marriage, obey the husband 
when married, and answer to the son if widowed (Lu, 1994, p. 291).  In the New 
30 
 
Feminism, Lu describes the ?three obediences? as a magical spell being compared to the 
demon-subduing incantation of the legendary Monkey King in the Journey to the West.  It 
makes women take obedience as their guideline for living from birth until death (Reed, 
1994, p. 230).        
Pan Chao, a Han Dynasty poetess and China?s first female historian (White, 2003, 
p. 85), brought the ?three obediences? and the ?four virtues? of womanhood together in 
her Confucian text Instructions for Women (Nu-chieh, ?? ).  Four virtues are four 
criteria that women have to meet in order to be ?virtuous?: morality, skill in handcrafts, 
appearance, and language for women.  According to Lu, the essential meanings of the 
four virtues effectively ties up women?s hands and feet, limiting women?s innate talents 
to merely adorning themselves and limiting their temperament to gentle submission, 
cowardice, and ignorance (Reed, 1994, p. 230).  In addition, Lu indicates that by the end 
of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) the phrase ?the lack of talent is a virtue in a woman? (??
????? ) was applied to express feminine ?virtue? (Reed, 1994, p. 230).  Confucius 
advocated educating everyone without discrimination (???? , Analects 15:39; cited 
from Chan, 2000, p. 120), and Mencius mentioned that one of the three delights of chun-
tzu (gentlemen or superior man, ?? ) is to educate the most talented people in the 
empire (????????? ,??? .  Mencius 7A:20; cited from Chan, 2000, p. 120).  
However, contemporary scholar Sin Yee Chan points out that among the thousands of 
students of Confucius and Mencius, none was a female.  In addition, we realize how 
Confucius educated his son from the Analects (Analects 16:13), but there is no hint that 
he also educated his daughter.  Chan argues these facts point to an acceptance of the 
31 
 
prevailing practice of excluding women from receiving a Confucian education.  This does 
not mean that women received no education at all.  They did learn about subject matters 
like domestic duties, appearance refinement and female crafts.  In particular, they were 
educated in the ?four virtues? of womanhood (Chan, 2000, p. 120-121 & 131).  As the 
civil service examinations were based on the Confucians classics and only men could be 
candidates, women were totally excluded from political participation in traditional society. 
Lu suggests the third traditional view of women?s lot is the division of men?s and 
women?s realms of activity and influence (Reed, 1994, p. 230).  The chapter ?the pattern 
of family? (Nei-Ze, ?? ) in the Book of Rites (Li Chi, ?? ) describes the ideal for the 
separation of men?s and women?s lives as inside and outside the home: ?The men should 
not speak of what belongs to the inside (of the house), nor the women of what belongs to 
the outside ? Things spoken inside should not go ou t, words spoken outside should not 
come in.?  Thus, this concept of men outside/women inside instructs that an ideal woman 
should not speak of outside matters or participate in outside activities, while her husband 
is not necessary to help with household chores because doing housework is considered to 
be the woman?s responsibility.  In her article ?The Domestication of Women,? Barbara 
Rogers argues ?the domestication of women in terms of housework and child care is 
closely linked with various forms of discrimination against them in the non-domestic 
sphere.?  For example, the restriction of education opportunity is rationalized in terms of 
the future domestic career as wives and mothers that await all girls.  In hiring, promotion 
and wage structures, the arguments are all similar, with the additional remark that women 
do not need to work because they are deemed to have husbands supporting them and their 
32 
 
children (Rogers, 1980, p. 24-25). 
Chastity, the primary moral virtue for women in some Confucian texts, is the 
fourth traditional view of women?s destiny addressed by Lu.  According to Lu?s study, 
chastity became an ideal not only for wives but for widows.  Since the old days, 
widowhood had been promoted by the state and endorsed by the Confucianism.  During 
the Sui Dynasty, emperor Wen-ti (??? , 581-604) prohibited the widows of upper-class 
families from remarrying.  By the Song Dynasty (960-1127), widows who did not 
remarry were praised as the highest ideal for women.  During the Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644), the government glorified chaste widows with memorial arches.  Widowhood was 
highlighted under public recognition and social and familial pressure. As a result, even 
engaged girls whose fianc?s died were pushed to remain chaste and not ever marry (Reed, 
1994, p. 231).  In reality, upper-class families could afford to support widows living in 
widowhood, while poor ones might not.   
Margery Wolf did a field study in one Taiwanese village.  She reports in her book 
Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan that a respected widow was one who stayed with 
her deceased husband?s family, but the desire for male descendants allowed the family to 
take no notice of the ideal of chastity if their daughter-in-law became pregnant.  Wolf 
argues ?virtuous widows among poor farm families were filial widows who stayed with 
their parents-in-law.  Their sex life was not relevant? (Wolf, 1972, p. 201).  In contrast, 
men were allowed to have concubines in Chinese society.  Laws governing marriage 
favored men.  For seven reasons, including barrenness, lasciviousness, jealousy, 
talkativeness, thieving, disobedience towards her parents-in-law, and leprosy, wives could 
33 
 
be divorced or resold.  For the sake of keeping a barren wife, the difficulty might be 
obviated by the taking of a secondary wife (White, 2003, p. 177).  In imperial China, the 
fact that men owned concubines did not show as special cases (Mann, 1997).  However, 
the ideology of one-sided chastity might still exist today.  According to a research by 
Kung et al, economic boom and changes in China resulted in most manufacturing 
industries in Hong Kong moving their factories to China where the cost of production is 
much lower.  Thus, large numbers of employers and employees from Hong Kong are 
stationed in China for extended periods of time.  An increased number of Hong Kong 
men had extra-marital affairs in China which led to increased divorce rates in recent years.  
Kung et al argue the trend of a more permissive attitude towards divorce is noted, while 
greater social stigma is attached to divorced women (Kung, Hung, and Chan, 2004). 
 
2.  Major Stages and Dynamics of Economic Development 
Modernization theory is one of several perspectives of development.  At what 
historical moment did modernization theory appear and subsequently revive?  
Modernization theories originated in the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile 
Durkheim.  It came back and was popularized during the late 1950s and early 1960s by 
Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Lerner, Walt Rostow, and Karl Deutsch (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2003).  According to Alvin Y. So?s study, the modernization school was a 
historical product of three crucial events in the post-World War II era.  First, there was the 
rise of the United States as a superpower. While other Western nations, such as Great 
Britain, France, and Germany, were weakened by World War II, the United States 
34 
 
emerged as a world leader due to its robust economy.  As a result, the United States 
instituted the Marshall Plan to help war-torn Western Europe.  Second, there was the 
spread of a united world communist movement. Following the Soviet Union's victory in 
the Second World War in 1945, the Soviet Army occupied nations in both Eastern Europe 
and East Asia.  As a result, communism as a movement spread through many new 
countries.  Third, there was the disintegration of the European colonial empires in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, giving birth to many new nation-states in the Third World.  
These newly established nation-states were seeking a model of development to promote 
their economy and to reinforce their political independence.  Under such circumstances, 
American political elites urged scholars to study the Third World, to promote economic 
development, and to help political stability in the Third World nation-states, for the sake 
of avoiding losing those nascent states to the Soviet communist bloc.  Consequently, a 
great number of studies and discourses relating to modernization and development, 
supported by the U. S. government and private foundations, have been produced since the 
1950s (So, 1990; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978, p. 535).  
From the beginning, the modernization school was in search of a theory.  It 
applied an evolutionary theory and a functionalist theory to explain, predict, and observe 
the process of modernization in the Third World countries.  Evolutionary theory was born 
after the industrial revolution and French revolution.  The industrial revolution applied 
science and technology resulting in establishing the factory production system, rising 
productivity, and selling products to markets in the world.  The French revolution created, 
in terms of equality, liberty, and freedom, a whole new political order and parliamentary 
35 
 
democracy.  By observing this changing social, economic, and political order, 
evolutionary theory asserted that the process of modernization not only shattered the old 
social order but also built the foundation for a new one.  By invoking Auguste Comte?s 
writing (Comte, 1964), So indicates that the classical evolutionary theory has three 
features.  First, it assumes that social change is unidirectional? the fate of human 
evolution is predetermined.  Second, it imposed a value judgment on the evolutionary 
process:  the movement toward the final phase is good because it represents progress, 
humanity, and civilization.  Third, it assumes that the rate of social change is slow, 
gradual, and piecemeal:  the process of modernization is evolutionary, not revolutionary.  
Therefore, to make progress from a simple primitive society to a complex modern one 
will take centuries to complete (So, 1990, p.18-19).   
Another part of the modernization school stemmed from the functionalist theory 
of Talcott Parsons.  Parsons was originally trained as a biologist.  For that reason, the 
organism metaphor is key to understanding Parsons?s theory.  First, just as the parts that 
make up a biological organism are interrelated and interdependent, so the institutions in a 
society are closely related to one another and coordinate harmoniously in a ?system?.  
Second, each institution performs a specific function for the sake of society?s stability and 
growth.  Parsons addressed the concept of ?functional imperatives? to support this 
standpoint, and presented four crucial functions that every society must perform.  These 
four functions are adaptation to the environment, goal attainment, integration, and latency 
(pattern maintenance of values from generation to generation), which are performed by 
the economy, the government, the legal institutions and religion, and the family and 
36 
 
education, respectively.  Third, borrowing from the concept of homeostasis of biological 
organisms, Parsons formulated the notion of ?homeostatic equilibrium? for constant 
interaction among institutions.  When one institution is impacted by social change, it 
produces a chain reaction of changes, or adjustments, in other institution so as to restore 
equilibrium.  That is, the institutions in the system are always changing and adjusting; 
therefore, the social system is not a static entity.  Finally, Parsons developed the concept 
of ?pattern variables? to tell the differences between traditional societies and modern 
societies.  For Parsons, there are five sets of pattern variables: affective versus affective-
neutral relationships, particularistic versus universalistic relationships, collective 
orientation versus self-orientation, ascription versus achievement, and functionally 
diffused versus functionally specific relationship (as cited in So, 1990, p. 20-23).  
Traditional societies display more of the former variables while modern, more of the 
latter.   
The modernization school does not lend itself easily to simple characterization 
under either the influence of evolutionary or functionalist theories because scholars and 
researchers formulate the theories of modernization based on sociological, economic, and 
political approaches.  Different disciplines raise different research questions, and different 
area specialists stress different aspects of the process of modernization (Etzioni and 
Etzioni, 1964; So, 1990).  However, the modernizationists argue that the task before the 
underdeveloped countries is to transform themselves from tradition to modernity 
following the footsteps of the now developed countries (Isbister, 1998, p. 40).  The 
process of modernization, or development, is often seen in terms of stages through which 
37 
 
all countries could pass on their journey to a high standard of living.  Some of these 
stages are simple:  agriculture to industry to services, or rural to urban to suburban.  One 
of the more complex stages of development theories was presented in W.W. Rostow?s 
book The Stages of Economic Growth (1960). 
According to Rostow, in the process of economic development societies pass 
through five distinctive basic stages: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, 
the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption.  A traditional 
society operates within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science 
and technology.  Thus, the great majority of people live in a traditional way at a bare 
subsistence level.  The second stage involves the formation of the preconditions for 
accelerated economic growth, largely as a result of the traditional society?s reaction to the 
external intrusions, actual or threatened, of economically more advanced nations.  This 
reaction weakens the traditional relations of domination and subordination, promotes 
education and introduces new attitudes and ideas regarding economic activities, and 
makes the technological advances available for raising productivity.  Although this period 
of transition between the traditional society and the take-off is regarded as changes in 
both the economy and social values, Rostow indicates that the building of an effective 
centralized national state is a decisive feature of the preconditions period, and it is a 
necessary condition for take-off.  These related conditions are required for take-off to 
occur: when political power regards economic growth as its main business; when the rate 
of productive investment, as a proportion of national income (or net national product), 
doubles or is over 10%; and when technological innovation is applied to a few leading 
38 
 
sectors, both agricultural and industrial.  In turn, the take-off is followed by the drive to 
maturity.  According to Rostow?s study, about sixty years was required to move a society 
from the beginning of take-off to maturity.  During this period, economic growth spreads 
from the initial few leading sectors to a wide range of activities.  The country becomes an 
active participant in international markets, exporting new products and producing for 
domestic use goods that were formerly imported.  As the country reaches maturity, it is 
able to use modern technologies and entrepreneurial skills to make, not everything, but 
any goods it chooses to produce.  Finally, the society goes into the age of high mass-
consumption, and the leading sectors shift towards durable consumers? goods and 
services.  The fruits of growth are transferred to the mass of the population.  Thus their 
standard of living rises steadily and predictably.  Also, an increased number of white-
collar population and skilled factory jobs result in urbanization.  In addition to these 
economic changes, the society has sufficient wealth, through the political process, to 
allocate resources to social welfare and security (Rostow, 1960). 
Rostow?s key contribution to the analysis of economic development is the concept 
of ?take-off.?  The term is borrowed from the field of aeronautics: an airplane must gain a 
certain amount of speed before it has enough momentum to take off and continue to go to 
higher altitudes and greater speeds on its own.  Similarly, in the process of economic 
development, an economy is absorbed by the population growth and by increased 
consumption.  Only after the increase of production rises above that of consumption can a 
flow of investment allow the economy to grow continuously on its own.  That is, the 
decisive transformation of national economic development is the take-off point (Rostow, 
39 
 
1956).  Stage theory accentuates the dynamics of national development, international 
competitiveness in the global market, and the role of government for promoting 
economic upgrading. 
In his book, which is usually referred to simply as The Wealth of Nations (1776), 
Adam Smith illustrates the relationships of the division of labor, productivity, and 
national wealth.  As the book?s title indicates, Smith is primarily concerned with wealth 
creation, which would advance the standard of living in a country.  He argues that 
enlarging national wealth depends on its total production increases, and the division of 
labor is the decisive method of raising productivity.  Smith gives three reasons why a 
division of labor can bring a great increase in the quantity of work.  First, individuals 
become more proficient at their specialized tasks.  Second, the advantage is gained by 
saving time. Workers no longer need to move from one sort of task to another and change 
to different tools.  Third, under the division of labor, the whole attention of workers? 
minds is directed towards a single object.  People are much more likely to discover easier 
methods concerning this object; therefore, the invention of the great number of machines 
facilitate and abridge labor and enable one man to do the work of many (Jardine, 2004).  
However, in Smith?s day of the late 18th century, the industrial revolution just got started, 
and the extensive use of machinery was still in its infancy.  As we look around the world 
today, industries have used the idea of specialization, both of skillful laborers and of 
machinery, to increase production to the point where the market is overflowing with 
goods.   
A second fundamental principle addressed by Adam Smith, in his analysis of the 
40 
 
proper path for a nation to pursue economic prosperity, was the necessity of economic 
liberty (Crobaugh, 1937).  In a free-market economic system, anyone can buy or sell 
whatever goods and service they please at whatever price they bargain.  Therefore, an 
?invisible hand? will promote economic development through market competition.  When 
the supply of a particular commodity is less than its demand, consumers will bid up the 
price, and this provides incentives for suppliers to produce more.  Conversely, prices 
would be driven down under the circumstance of oversupply.  The competition push for 
gaining greater profit stimulates technological and organizational innovations that will 
increase productivity and total production (Clark and Montjoy, 1998).  In addition, Smith 
(1776) argues that capitalism posits a mutual interdependence among firms, societies, and 
nations.  The productivity gains of one can be transferred to others in the form of either 
cheaper goods or technologies that can help others to be more productive (Clark and 
Montjoy, 1998).   
Can competition, as Smith?s ?mutual benefit? model indicates, really bring 
benefits to all nations involved in international economic activity?  It is easily realized 
that productivity gains are much greater in the industrial sector than in agricultural 
production or service occupations (Clark and Montjoy, 1998).  For example, based on the 
principle of ?comparative advantage,? British cloth should be traded for Portuguese wine.  
The result shows Britain becoming rich while Portugal is still staying poor in the twenty-
first century.  This is not a single or an exceptional case.  According to Benjamin J. 
Cohen?s research, the developed countries were about twice as rich as other countries at 
the beginning of the 19th century, while this gap had widened four-fold to eight-to-one in 
41 
 
1950 (Cohen, 1973).  Moreover, at the present time, industrialized countries are rich and 
have higher living standards; whereas, those countries without going through 
industrialization are still suffering from poverty (Clark and Montjoy, 1998).  Obviously, 
industrialization, using energy and machine technology for making goods, performs a 
vital role in the process of economic development, especially when countries face 
growing international economic competition. 
Industrialization seemingly created what Lester Thurow terms a virtuous cycle, 
according to Clark and Montjoy.  In his book Head to Head, Thurow argues that nations 
became rich and industrial during the 19th and 20th centuries by possessing and utilizing 
some combination of four sources of competitive advantage: (1) natural resources, which 
could be sold or used as industrial inputs, (2) new technologies, (3) investment capital to 
put the raw materials and new technologies to work, and (4) human capital in the form of 
skilled labor and entrepreneurs.  Thurow indicates that this process became self-
reinforcing because the productivity growth associated with industrialization produced 
more physical and human capital, as well as bringing new technologies and new 
institutions.  Development meant jumping on the escalator of industrialization (Thurow, 
1992; Clark and Montjoy, 1998). 
The nature of industrialization has evolved dramatically since the 19th century in 
the industrialized countries.  The whole process of development demonstrates structural 
changes in the economy, from agriculture to light industry to heavy and high technology 
industry to services.  Also, the leading sector has shifted?first textiles, next iron and 
steel, then automobiles, and most recently high tech and advanced electronics.  Clark and 
42 
 
Montjoy indicate that, unlike Thurow?s "virtuous cycle," this "industry sequencing" 
model suggests that the advantages of the most advanced industrial nations will at last be 
undercut as they move from high tech industry to the "postindustrial society" whose 
economy is dominated by the service sector where productivity gains come much more 
slowly than in manufacturing production (Clark and Montjoy, 1998). 
Moreover, according to Clark and Montjoy, the ?product life-cycle" theory 
explains why and how each of these industries one after the other spread like a wave 
across the world.  The product life cycle was described in the 1970s by Raymond Vernon.  
Based on the manufacturing experience of US-based multinational corporations (MNCs), 
Vernon argued that some products the most industrial countries once produced and even 
exported were eventually produced abroad and became imported.  In general, an 
innovative product is devised and produced in a highly industrialized country which 
possesses the latest and most expensive technologies.  At the beginning, the new product 
is produced by very capital-intensive processes and highly skilled workers.  After a 
period of time, the production of the item becomes more standardized and labor-intensive.  
As a consequence, production will be moved abroad.  New producers may be process 
innovative firms in Japan or low-cost factories in newly industrialized countries (NICs) 
and less developed countries (LDCs).  In the final stage of the cycle, the country that 
invents a new product very often finds its domestic demand is met by imports from 
countries that have lower labor costs (Vernon 1966; Clark and Montjoy, 1998; Singleton, 
2005, p. 220-221). 
While firms and producers in the most advanced nations find themselves on an 
43 
 
innovation treadmill because of the effect of the product life cycle, governments in 
developing countries and less developed countries confront two dilemmas in the process 
of economic development.  On the one hand, development has an attractive face that 
appeals to leaders and citizens in developing countries with the promise of less poverty, 
longer life, and greater status.  On the other hand, development has a disgusting face of 
exploitation, manipulation, and continued subjugation.  Particularly, most developing 
nations became politically independent after World War II.  It seemed colonial wounds 
were in many ways still fresh and deep in the early post-war period.  However, one 
central question facing developing countries concerned the choice of economic 
strategies?what was the best way successfully to develop and achieve economic growth?  
The two major alternatives that have been promoted for economic development, and that 
form the core of debate among development scholars, are: (1) import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI) frequently employed by Latin America countries; and (2) export-
oriented industrialization (EOI) commonly practiced in Asian countries and suggested by 
international financial organizations.  Each of these strategies stands for a particular 
approach to the two faces of development (Gibson and Ward, 1992; Kukreja, 2005). 
During the 1950s, Latin American scholars were increasingly skeptical of the 
?comparative advantage? path to development that might leave developing countries 
specialized in primary commodity production.  Their new industries could not possibly 
compete with developed countries; thus, the dependency critique became an influential 
framework for development in this region.  As a result, the strategy of ISI was adopted to 
break out of dependency on primary commodity exports.  Also, this strategy fostered 
44 
 
opposition to depending on foreign capital and international trade to promote 
development, which resulted in setting stringent regulations to control foreign investment 
and making restrictive trade policies.   In addition, instead of importing all manufactured 
goods, through the ISI path, Latin American countries started to purse the replacement of 
imports by promoting ?home-grown? industries (Krueger, 1997; Kukreja, 2005; So, 
1990).  However, the result of Martin Landsberg?s research suggests that there were some 
reasons preventing the strategy of ISI from success.  First, they were short of consumer-
goods markets because the majority of the population in Third World countries remained 
poor.  Domestic production thus was geared toward tiny urban markets of luxurious and 
consumer-durables goods.  Second, the domestic bourgeoisie did not have enough capital 
or technology to start domestic industrialization.  Third, instead of importing foreign 
manufactured products, ISI speeded up the import of foreign capital and technology.  This 
was followed by massive profits flowing out to the home countries of the multinational 
corporations (MNCs).  Consequently, the trade deficit in Third World nations continued 
to grow.  In sum, Landsberg argues that the results of the ISI approach were definitely not 
positive: growing income inequalities, limited industrialization, foreign domination, and 
large fiscal deficits and foreign debts (Landsberg, 1979; So, 1990).  Since the late 1980s 
nearly all Latin American countries have adopted market-oriented, neoliberal reforms.  
Economic hardship, caused in part by the previous implementation of ISI policies, 
convinced these governments to reduce the role and size of the state in the economy 
(Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2004).   
In contrast, the performance of economic development in Asian countries 
45 
 
demonstrates the benefits of export-oriented growth (Gereffi and Fonda, 1992; Gibson 
and Ward, 1992; Gilpin, 1987; Krueger, 1997).  The EOI approach tends to maximize the 
benefits of modernization and industrialization by taking advantage of opportunities 
offered by international markets, but governments formulated and implemented policies 
to settle the fears of dependency and exploitation.  It is clear that export-oriented growth 
takes a combination of liberal and mercantilist prescriptions for economic development.  
Instead of relying on non-interventionism and the free market mechanism, the East Asian 
NICs, which are often thought of as glowing examples of practicing EOI method, 
vigorously pursued specific policies for development and increased economic growth 
(Kukreja, 2005).  Although developing policies adopted by these countries are various, 
some specific features, more or less, can be identified among them. 
First, the EOI polices of East Asian NICs continued to promote their industries 
through changing the structure of their productions.  During the 1950s and 1960s, like 
other developing countries, South Korea and Taiwan focused on manufacturing labor-
intensive consumer products.  In order to achieve this goal, both governments set up 
mercantilist-style restrictions to protect ?infant? industries from foreign competition.  
Further, governments provided financial resources and tax incentives to promote 
manufacturing.  As a consequence, this strategy increased the level of employment, 
which practically helped stabilize their political situations (Kukreja, 2005).  By the late 
1960s, South Korea and Taiwan altered their economic development strategies to enter 
the international market for light industry goods.  This outward-looking development was 
followed by industrial deepening in the 1970s, and industrial upgrading and 
46 
 
diversification from the 1980s.  Advanced EOI allowed the East Asian NICs to compete 
more effectively with the low wage neighboring Asian countries, which were engaging 
aggressively in labor-intensive manufactures for global markets (Cheng, 2001, p. 28; 
Gereffi and Fonda, 1992, p. 434; Gilpin, 1987, p. 48-49).  Second, these countries have 
made substantial and continuing investments in education (including job training) and 
human capital, which foster a cohort of knowledgeable and skillful workforce, increase 
productivity, help industrial deepening, and thus enhance international competitiveness 
(Brautigam, 1994, p. 119; Gilpin, 1987, p. 302; Liou, 2002, p. 131-132; Shive and Lee, 
1999, p. 103).  Third, Joseph E. Stiglitz indicates that capital accumulation is often given 
credit for being the engine of growth.  A high level of savings and investment (including 
research and development) in the East Asian countries acts as a motor driving the 
performance of the economy (Brautigam, 1994, p. 123; Dodgson, 2002, p. 244-247; 
Gilpin, 1987, p. 268; James, Naya, and Meier, 1989, p. 63-82; Stiglitz, 1996, p. 153 & 
158).  Fourth, the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) and U. S. aid was another 
major source of the capital formulation in East Asian countries.  Both the Korean War 
and Cold War tensions had a strong influence on the flow of American aid into South 
Korea and Taiwan.  Between 1953 and 1961, U.S. aid financed nearly 75 percent of 
South Korea?s capital formation (Haggard, Kim and Moon, 1991, p. 852).   Also in 
Taiwan, aid in kind was crucial to the extension of the food and textile industries, and aid 
funds were key resources for the emergence of the plastics, synthetic fiber, glass and 
cement industries (Cheng, 2001, p. 27-28).  Taiwan?s domestic capital formation also 
depended heavily on foreign capital inflow during the same period, about 40 percent of 
47 
 
domestic investment was externally financed (Kukreja, 2005).  With FDI and American 
aid flowing in during the 1950s and 1960s, South Korea and Taiwan spurred their initial 
development and established the groundwork for economic growth in the long run.  Last 
but most important, East Asian industrial policies are typically built around a ?pilot 
agency? that shapes development initiatives.  Japan?s Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) is a classic and pioneering example.  Others are the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) in Korea, the Council on Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) in 
Taiwan, and the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in Singapore.  The pilot agency 
performs as a think tank, charts the route for economic development, and decides which 
industries ought to exist or be created and which industries are no longer needed in order 
to adjust the industrial structure and uplift the nation?s international competitiveness 
(Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). 
In summary, modernization theorists suggested that the experiences of the 
industrialized countries offered a useful model for the late developing countries.  The 
factors of a successful Western model include free market economics, social mobility, 
political stability, liberal democracy, and the ?modern? values of the Anglo-Saxon 
cultures (Chan and Clark, 1991, p. 563).  Modernization supporters tend to offer a 
neoliberal view of economic development.  In general, they advocated free markets at 
home and on the international front, and minimal state interference at the marketplace 
except providing a stable business climate, public goods, and infrastructure.  Through the 
motion and force of the ?invisible hand,? the free market stimulates industrialization, 
encourages innovation, and thus creates a ?general benefit? by raising production.  From 
48 
 
the viewpoint of dependency theorists, trade is a tool used by the rich to penetrate and 
make poor countries dependent.  Latin American countries employed ISI strategy because 
of fears of dependence on capitalist core countries.  Although this strategy had led to 
rapid industrialization once in Brazil, its results by and large were disappointing.  
Political economist Robert Gilpin indicated there were some specific reasons for the 
failure of ISI path: the small size of national markets led to uneconomic plants; extreme 
protectionalism weakened incentives to improve quality of production; and the 
necessaries of importing industrial technology and capital goods caused massive trade 
deficits and foreign debts (Gilpin, 1987, 292).  Since the late 1980s, most Latin American 
countries have adopted a market-oriented strategy, neoliberal reforms, and reducing the 
role and size of states.  East Asian NICs? success is due to many factors, but an outward-
looking industrialization strategy and a strong role for the state have been seen as two 
essential components.  On the one hand, those NICs have been fully integrated into world 
economy by pursuing an export-led approach along with the expansion of American and 
Japanese multinationals.  On the other hand, governments conscientiously initiate, 
formulate, and implement policies to promote economic growth, industrial upgrading, 
and diversification in the process of development.  Some scholars, based upon the 
developmental state model, suggest that a strong state is politically autonomous from 
partisan domestic interests; thus, it can provide economic leadership and facilitate 
administrative guidance for the private sector with respect to market decisions and can 
create opportunities for globally economic development (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990).  
However, Chow and Lyter argue that the statist perspective is used to defend 
49 
 
protectionism and interventionism.  They indicate this view is politically driven to 
support authoritative regimes and ignore the negative effects of industrialization and 
economic development, such as labor unions? repression, human rights violations, and 
environmental degradation (Chow and Lyter, 2002). 
 
3.  Contending Theories of How Development Affects the Status of Women 
The effect of socioeconomic development on women is a hotly debated issue 
(Jaquette, 1982; Tiano, 1987).  While much of the relevant literature and research 
involves empirical studies that do not always make a systematic theoretical framework 
(Forsythe et al, 2000), Susan Tiano recommends that competing perspectives in this field 
can be subsumed within three explanations: integration, marginalization, and exploitation 
(Tiano, 1987).  According to Tiano, the integration thesis claims that modernization leads 
to female liberation and gender equality by involving women more centrally in economic 
and political activities.  The marginalization thesis holds that capitalist development 
makes women peripheral to productive roles and resources.  The exploitation thesis 
asserts that development creates a female proletariat supplying low-wage labor for capital 
accumulation (Tiano, 1987).  This study selects four approaches in line with Tiano?s three 
explanatory schemata for analyzing the impact of development on women: the 
modernization theory perspective, the liberal feminist perspective, the dependency theory 
perspective, and socialist feminist perspective.  These four perspectives are examined in 
turn.      
The ?modernization theory? perspective assumes that socioeconomic 
50 
 
development, along with democratization, leads to equality for women who have long 
been suppressed in patriarchal societies.  The logic is that economic development should 
bring wealth.  As a result, mass education is possible and necessary, and should in turn 
affect production relationships and lifestyles in different ways.  Further, development 
should bring democratic politics.  Therefore, women could push for legal and policy 
reforms through which ?gender inequality? might be reduced.  That is, a compound of 
social, economic, and political changes would create ?modernization,? which could 
undermine traditional patriarchal norms and provide women with a great many resources 
through which they could pursue their own goals autonomously and improve their lives 
(Black, 1966; Eisenstadt, 1973; Goode, 1963; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Patai, 1967; 
Rosen and Laraia, 1972, p. 353-354). 
For modernization theory, a society transforming from tradition into modernity is 
associated with improving technology, increases in divisions of labor and literacy, growth 
of commercial activities, urbanization, and the decline in traditional authority.  This 
approach dominated mainstream thinking on the international development during the 
1950s and 1960s (Misra, 2000; Rathgeber, 1990).  During these two decades, it was 
assumed that ?modernization,? which usually equated with industrialization and 
development, would improve the standards of living of the entire population through a 
?trickle down? effect (Rathgeber, 1990, p. 490).   Thus, scholars who paid attention to the 
impact of development on women first found only positive effects (Jaquette, 1982).  
Industrialization and improved technology were said to reduce the impact of biological 
asymmetry between men?s and women?s physical strength.  Birth control was seen to give 
51 
 
women freedom from the endless involuntary reproduction.  Modern values were 
expected to enhance women?s competence and self-respect and increase their autonomy.  
The opportunities for schooling and employment outside the home were anticipated to 
enrich women intellectually as well as financially (Jaquette, 1982, p. 269; Rosen and 
LaRaia, 1972, p. 354-356).  Second, it was believed that any differences between male 
and female absorption into the process of modernization were seen as a failure of 
diffusion, not as a failure of the model.  Women?s relative ?backwardness? was explained 
as the residue of traditional attitudes.  At least in the long run, modern societies would be 
democratic and egalitarian (Jaquette, 1982, p. 269).   Third, on the basic assumption of 
modernization theory, the administration of development policies and programs are 
perceived as sex-neutral or as particularly advantageous to women, who have been more 
fettered and constrained than men by traditional values confining their roles (Jaquette, 
1982, p. 269).  From these views, women were seen as a homogeneous group, and it was 
predicted that gender roles would change as women gained an equal role to men in the 
development of education, employment, and other spheres of society.  Also, the 
modernization theory perspective tends to take for granted that males? experience will be 
generalized to females and that men and women can benefit equally as societies 
increasingly become modernized.  As a result, women were rarely treated as a separate 
unit of analysis in the modernization literature during the 1950s and 1960s (Jaquette, 
1982, p. 268; Rathgeber, 1990, p. 491). 
By the 1970s, many studies in terms of the liberal feminist perspective challenged 
the assumptions of the modernization model, contending that economic development had 
52 
 
not improved women?s status but rather women were marginalized in capitalist societies.  
This view argued that development isolates women from production and political control, 
reinforcing patriarchal culture or the eroding the power and authority they had in 
traditional societies, limiting women?s autonomy and access to cash, property, and other 
resources.  Thus despite the ideology of egalitarianism, development had in general 
increased women?s economic and social marginality, resulting in economic dependence 
on men (Boserup, 1970; Jaquette, 1982; Park, 1993; Tiano, 1987; Tinker, 1976).     
Ester Boserup?s Women?s Role in Economic Development, published in 1970, 
launched the first thorough feminist attack on conventional liberal assumptions (Jaquette, 
1982) and pioneered systematically using gender as a variable in examining the impact of 
economic change on women by analyzing how a gendered hierarchy modifies changes in 
women?s role in different types of societies (Rathgeber, 1990, p. 490).  Most significantly, 
Boserup?s study pointed out that many women in developing countries faced 
marginalization rather than enhancement.  Boserup argued that women?s status in 
agrarian societies was relatively correlated with their role in carrying out subsistence 
tasks.  As technologies advanced that resulted in a shift from subsistence production to 
machine-based agriculture, men monopolized the more advanced technologies while 
women were increasingly marginalized from agriculture.  This in turn reduced women?s 
status, and women were often confined to their homes and under the strict surveillance of 
male kin.  The conversion to the cash economy was introduced by postcolonial 
administrations and development planners which provided men with the training, land, 
inputs, credit, and markets, while women continued to work the least productive land 
53 
 
with the poorest inputs (Boserup, 1970; Jaquette, 1982, 1990).  Boserup contended that 
other aspects of modernization were also detrimental to women.  In cities, women were 
often excluded from formal sector jobs because of their low level of education and sex 
stereotyping.  As a result, they worked as domestic helpers, owners of open-air 
restaurants, petty traders, and often prostitutes (Boserup, 1970, p. 99-103).  Development, 
in line with industrialization, required specialization in a division-of-labor for efficiency 
and increasing productivity.  However, women lacked opportunities for acquisition of 
education, training, and new skills necessary for functional specialization.  Thus they 
were confined to unstable, low-paying, unskilled jobs (Park, 1993).  Urbanization, 
mobility, and conversion to the cash economy as processes cut women off from their 
traditional economic and social roles and pushed them into the modern sector where they 
were discriminated against and exploited.  Consequently, this condition increased female 
dependency (Jaquette, 1982).   
Since the 1970s, inspired by Boserup?s work, a plethora of studies based on the 
liberal feminist perspective have documented empirically how the processes of 
development marginalized women economically and socially and increased their 
dependence on men (Jaquette, 1982; Park, 1993).  Further, regarding the solutions to 
female marginalization and dependency, liberal feminist scholars advocated legal and 
administrative changes to ensure that women would be better integrated into economic 
systems so that women could have equal access to work and its economic rewards 
(Jaquette, 1982; Rathgeber, 1990).  In short, the liberal feminist perspective differed from 
the modernization model which argued that women?s integration into the process of 
54 
 
development automatically improved their status.  Rather, this perspective directed 
attention toward policies based on equal rights that could enhance women?s chances and 
mend their marginalized situation (Jaquette, 1990). 
Just as the modernization theory can be said to examine development from the 
viewpoint of the United States and other Western countries, the dependency theory can be 
said to view development from the Third World perspective (So, 1990).  Theorists in the 
dependency theory tradition argue that economic relationships between the core nations 
and nations at the periphery of the world system are structurally detrimental to the less 
developed countries (LDCs) because of the inherent dynamics of international capitalism 
(Amin, 1976; Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson, 1978; Dos Santos, 1971; Frank, 
1967, 1970).  Most developed countries exploit natural resources, cheap labor, and often 
lax environmental regulations in developing countries.  As a result, developing countries 
have become locations for manufacturing labor-intensive products for export, shifting 
residents in the Third World from agriculture to jobs in factories and the tertiary 
employment sector, where they serve as cheap labor (Chang, 2004; Nash and Fernandez-
Kelly, 1983; Tiano, 1987).  Some typical features of dependency include the growth of 
export-based manufacturing, multinational corporate penetration, investment dependence, 
and export-processing zones (Chang, 2004).  Particularly, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) have played a critical role in recent decades in the Third World (Shen and 
Williamson, 1997; Isbister, 1998).  Through direct investment and subcontracting 
arrangements, the spread of MNCs created the international division of labor, where 
female employment in developing countries was based on wage gaps between developed 
55 
 
and developing countries as well as between men and women (Lim, 1983; Nash, 1983).  
Regarding the impact of economic development on women, the dependency 
perspective assumes that women in the Third World are not integrated into the essentially 
beneficial development process.  Rather, women are involved in an exploitative global 
capitalism which deepens female subordination (Jaquette, 1982, p. 273; Park, 1993, p. 
129-130; Tiano, 1987, p. 217-218).  During the colonial period, the underdeveloped 
countries were integrated into the world economic system.  Agriculture turned from 
subsistence production to a cash-crop economy which was dominated by men because 
Europeans held western belief that farming was a man?s job.  In addition, urbanization cut 
women off from their kinship support networks where they were the main participants in 
the so-called ?informal sector? (Jaquette, 1982, p. 273).   
In spite of technological changes and liberal values that favor women?s 
participation in development, women?s exploitation continues to exist in today?s global 
economy because it serves the needs of capitalism (Jaquette, 1982, p. 274).  That is, 
capital accumulation is made possible by the extreme exploitation of the most vulnerable 
sector of the working population who provides the cheapest labor (Nash, 1983, p. 7).  
Many studies have found that development often makes women in the Third World more 
central to industrial production, but this has resulted in the exploitation of women (Nash 
and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Tinker, 1990).  Women provide cheap and easily expendable 
labor because of discriminatory hiring practices, occupational segregation, and 
inadequate preparation (lack of education and training) which weakens their position 
within the labor markets (Beechey, 1978; McIntosh, 1978; cited from Tiano, 1987, p. 
56 
 
218).  Also, the considerable competition for the jobs available to women maintains low 
wages and docility (Lim, 1981, p. 187).  In addition, the nature of women?s intermittent 
employment in the paid labor force creates a ?reserve army of labor? (Jaquette, 1982, p. 
1982) which can be utilized by the capitalist economy in times of growth when their 
labor is required, and then sent home during lean times (Code, 2000, p. 426).  Especially, 
part-time married female workers can be exploited in this way during economic 
recessions (Code, 2000, p. 426).  Moreover, female workers are often powerless to 
change their working conditions because they rarely organize effective unions (Enloe, 
1983, p. 421; Kung, 1983, p. 174).  In a few words, capitalist industrialization in 
developing countries may provide jobs for women, but while the global capitalist system 
is operated under the extraction of surplus value to accumulate capital, it jeopardizes 
women?s well-being (Fuentes and Ehrenreich, 1983). 
Following the idea of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, classical Marxist 
feminism uses ?class? analysis rather than ?gender? analysis to explain women?s 
oppression (Tong, 2009, p. 106).  In contrast, contemporary socialist feminism, also 
known as dual systems theory, synthesizes the Marxist analysis of capitalism and radical 
feminist theorization of patriarchy to present the importance of both social systems in 
structuring gender relations (Code, 2000, p. 146; Eisenstein, 1979, p. 22; Tong, 2009, p. 
4).  Accordingly, socialist feminists argue that the way to end women?s oppression is to 
kill the two-headed beast of capitalist patriarchy or patriarchal capitalism (Tong, 2009).  
For the sake of this goal, socialist feminist scholars seek to develop theories powerful 
enough to explain the complexity in which capitalism and patriarchy allied to oppress 
57 
 
women (Tong, 2009, p. 111).  Some argue that there has been a fusion of capitalism and 
patriarchy into a single capitalist patriarchy or patriarchal capitalism, while others 
conceptualize these structures as mutually independent, yet interactive, systems of gender 
oppression (Code, 2000, p. 146; Eisenstein, 1979; Sargent, 1981; Tong, 2009, p. 4).  
Among them, Heidi Hartmann, and Sylvia Walby especially stress issues related to 
women and work (Tong, 2009, p. 5). 
In regard to the impact of development on women, the socialist feminist 
perspective develops an explanation of Third World women?s marginalization and 
exploitation.  That is, capitalism employs preexisting patriarchal relations (systems of 
male domination) to accelerate capital accumulation (Tiano, 1987, p. 239).  This analysis 
contends that women?s oppression originates in the household, the primary locus of 
patriarchy that assigns women largely to reproductive roles.  The gender division of labor 
benefits capitalism because women?s unpaid domestic labor and child-rearing activities 
reproduce the labor force at minimal cost.  In turn, women?s reproductive roles condition 
the terms of their participation in paid production.  Women are regarded as subsidiary 
wage earners whose major responsibility is to take care of husbands, children, and 
domestic work.  They are relegated to insecure and low paid positions seen as extensions 
of their reproductive roles.  Also, women?s child-rearing duties and the ambivalent 
attitude towards their roles as wage workers cause them to function as a ?reserve army of 
labor,? to be pulled into or expelled from the work force according to the capital system?s 
needs.  In sum, contrary to classical economic models, which analyze women?s 
productive roles based on labor demand, human capital, and other characters of the labor 
58 
 
market, the socialist feminist perspective attributes women?s vulnerability in production 
to their reproductive roles and the patriarchal dynamics that emanate from the domestic 
sphere (Tiano, 1987, p. 239).  
In her article ?Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex,? Heidi 
Hartmann characterized patriarchy as an independent system of domination anteceding 
capitalism and rooted in the sexual division of labor that is hierarchical, with men on top 
and women on the bottom.  Accordingly, Hartmann reviewed the historical literature on 
the division of labor by sex during the emergence of capitalism and the Industrial 
Revolution in England and the United States and argued that women?s confinement in the 
home was consummated through a historical coalition between working-class and 
capitalist men.  Men?s appropriation of women?s labor, partly achieved through the 
enactment of protective legislation and the family wage, removed women from the sphere 
of paid work, and as a result, from effective access to political power and economic 
resources.  Hartmann suggested that the improvement of women?s social and economic 
condition would depend on eliminating the sexual division of labor and integrating 
women into paid employment (Hartmann, 1976). 
Hartmann?s argument might be supported by Sylvia Walby?s study.  Researching 
on the workplace in the United Kingdom, Walby noted that the British government made 
full employment for both men and women one of its public policies.  As a result, more 
women than before participated in workforce, where they gained not only economic clout 
but also political voices.  According to Walby, conceptualizations of the United Kingdom 
as having a strong male breadwinner logic no longer made much sense.  British 
59 
 
government policy in 2002 has been oriented toward full employment for all.  The British 
government became convinced that in order to compete successfully in the European 
Union and global economic system, the nation needed to provide women workers with 
working hours that were more flexible, ample childcare (The National Childcare 
Strategy), and decent minimum wages.  Walby optimistically claimed that modernization 
of the gender regime is creating a new political constituency of working women who are 
vocalizing their perceived interests in policies to assist combining home and work (Walby, 
2003; Tong, 2009). 
Since the mid-1970, regarding the economic development in the Third World, one 
of the popular studies has been research on the impact of women factory workers in 
export industries in the developing countries, especially those women employed by 
MNCs (Lim, 1983, p. 70; Lim, 1990, 101).  The reason for the widespread interest in this 
topic is the historical coincidence of the women?s increasingly changing roles worldwide 
with the increasing integration of production on a world scale and the expansion of export 
manufacturing in developing countries (Bener?a, 2003, p. 77; Lim, 1990, p. 101; Nash 
and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983).  In addition, the newly popular dependency theory seemed 
to explain the scattered data available, providing a widely accepted stereotyped of 
poverty-stricken Third World women suffering low wages, poor working and living 
conditions, and ruthless exploitation by MNCs located in export-processing free trade 
zones in Asia and Latin America (Lim, 1990).  This trend displayed an evidence of 
female exploitation under capitalist development (Bener?a, 2003, p. 78; Jaquette, 1982; p. 
274).  However, this analysis gradually was seen as simplistic and unable to deal with the 
60 
 
complexity of women?s involvement (Bener?a, 2003, p. 78; Elson and Pearson, 1989; Lim 
1983, 1990).  Thus, many scholars began to point out that women were not passive 
victims of exploitative conditions and demonstrated the multiplicity of factors that 
affected women?s incorporation in paid work and their active involvement in it (Ong, 
1987).  Yet, Linda Y. C. Lim suggested that women?s employment in MNCs might 
actually result in improving certain aspects of women?s status because they benefited 
from formal, well-paid employment.  Particularly, she indicated that MNCs paid higher 
wages than the domestic firms.  Further, she explored the reasons why this issue, which 
in fact involved only a tiny proportion of working women in developing countries, 
became such a sensational case.  She argued that the vision of greedy multinationals and 
exploited young female laborers served ideological stances of Marxists, feminists, and 
trade unionists.  Consequently, facts were overwhelmed by symbolism as these various 
protagonists utilized and interpreted reality to suit their purpose (Lim, 1990). 
 
4.  How Does Democratization Affect Status of Women? 
In his book The Third Wave, Samuel Huntington analyzes the transition of some 
thirty countries, mainly in Europe, Asia (including Taiwan), and Latin America, from 
authoritarian regimes to democratic political systems between 1974 and 1990 
(Huntington, 1991).  It is assumed that democratization might offer prospects for better 
citizen participation and that those previously or traditionally marginalized groups in 
these countries could exert newly acquired political influence to improve their situations 
(Clark and Clark, 2002).  From a gendered perspective, how does democratization affect 
61 
 
the status of women? 
 
Figure 2.2  How Democratization Can Promote the Status of Women 
 WOMEN?S POLITICAL 
  REPRESENTATION 
 
    
 
POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS   
 
 
 
  
POLICIES 
AFFECTING 
WOMEN 
  
 
STATUS OF  
WOMEN 
1. Degree of democracy 
2. Specific electoral  
         arrangements  
         affecting women 
  
WOMEN?S 
AUTONOUMOUS 
  INTEREST GROUPS  
   
 
 
FORM AND EXTENT OF 
PARIARCHAL RELATION 
 
  
    
Source: Clark, Cal and Janet Clark.  2002.  ?The Social and Political Bases for Women?s Growing 
Political Power in Taiwan.?  Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 3 - 2002 (170): p. 
4.   
 
Theoretically, Clark and Clark suggest that democratization should open new 
channels for women to pursue their autonomous objectives.  They argue that 
democratization helps women use political influence through two distinct mechanisms, 
which are shown in Figure 2.2.  First, women could become public officials with the 
political power to enact laws that can benefit their sex.  Second, greater political 
liberalization and civil freedom could furnish a conducive context for the emergence of 
independent women?s groups pushing the government to enact desirable reforms.  The 
end result in either case is that public policies can be used to lessen or remove the 
restrictions on women constructed by the patriarchal cultures that exist in most societies.  
62 
 
Moreover, sketched in Figure 2.2, Clark and Clark contend that the influence of the 
existing patriarchal ideology will almost inevitably affect both the extent of women?s 
autonomous participation in the public domain and the efficiency of government policy 
(Clark and Clark, 2002). 
 
Women?s Movements and Women?s Autonomous Interest Groups 
?Social movement? is defined as ?a set of opinions and beliefs in a population 
which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or 
reward distribution of a society? (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1217; cited in Rosenfeld 
and Ward, 1991, p. 475).  Stated simply, a social movement is a group of people with a 
common interest, who work together to change a policy of government and/or to change  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Social Movements, Women?s Movements, Feminist Movements,  
and Women?s in Movements 
 
 
Social Movements 
Women?s Movements 
Feminist 
Movements 
 
Women in 
movements 
63 
 
how society perceives something (Henderson and Jeydel, 2007).  Women?s participation 
in movement activities is often viewed as a subtype of social movement (Beckwith, 2000; 
Diamond, 1994; Freeman, 1975; Freeman and Johnson, 1999; Gelb and Palley, 1996; 
Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald, 2000; Hsiao, 1990; McBride and Mazur, 2008) and falls into 
three broad categories??women?s movements,? ?feminist movements,? and ?women in 
social movements? (Beckwith, 2000; Krook and Childs, 2010), which are shown in 
Figure 2.3. 
Karen Beckwith suggests a definition of women?s movements as a subset of 
sociopolitical movements that are ?characterized by the primacy of women?s gendered 
experiences, women?s issues, and women?s leadership and decision making.  The 
relationship of women to these movements is direct and immediate.  Movement 
definition, issues articulation, and issues resolution are specific to women, developed and 
organized by them with reference to their gender identity? (Beckwith, 2000, p. 437).   
However, the content of women?s issues and women?s gendered experiences vary across 
national and state structures, cultural contexts, and women?s classes, races, and identities.  
?Women?s movements? can include rightwing or antifeminist women?s movements and 
progressive, leftwing or feminist women?s movements, but exclude women?s activism in 
other social movements, for example, women in nationalist movements that lack gender 
content and where men predominate in leaderships and decision making.  From this 
viewpoint, Beckwith argues ?women?s movements? are distinguished from ?women in 
movements? (Beckwith 2000, p. 437).           
Feminist movements are often seen as a subset of women?s movements (Beckwith, 
64 
 
2000; Martin, 1990), but many scholars have used the terms ?women?s movement? and 
?feminist movement? interchangeably (Goertz and Mazur, 2008, p. 234-235).  Feminist 
movements are distinct because they may include men and share a gender power analysis 
of women?s subordination (Beckwith, 2000; Krook and Childs, 2010).  Moreover, 
feminist movements and organizations may be inspired by different types of feminism 
(Martin, 1990).  Liberal feminism stresses equality between men and women and believes 
that change can be achieved through legal and social reform.  Radical feminism 
emphasizes differences between men and women and regards gender inequality as a basic 
system of power that arranges gender relationships.  Socialist feminism merges 
capitalism from Marxism and patriarchal ideology from radical feminism together to 
form patriarchal capitalism (or capitalist patriarchy) that is the cause of women?s 
oppression.  Postmodern feminism combines ideas about ?sex? and ?gender? with 
postmodern or poststructuralist theory to highlight the multiple and contradictory aspects 
of individual and collective identity, which weaken the possibility of a unitary category of 
?women? or ?men? (Code 2000, p. 397-399; Donovan, 2000; Krook and Childs, 2010; 
Lorber, 2010; Tong, 2009). 
In general, social movements are loosely organized people and groups who act 
over time, outside established institutions, to promote or resist social change (Greenberg 
and Page, 2007).  For what interests, in specific, do women strive by mobilizing 
collective action?  According to Maxine Molyneux?s analysis, the concept of women?s 
interests is highly contentious one.  Because women are positioned within their societies 
through a variety of different means (class, ethnicity, and gender), the interests which 
65 
 
they have as a group are similarly shaped in complex and sometimes conflicting ways.  
Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about the interests of women.  
While ?women?s interests? do not exist in any general sense, Molyneux argues about a 
notion of ?gender interests,? which can be either practical or strategic, each being derived 
in a different way and each embracing implications for women?s subjectivity (Molyneux, 
1985).  
According to Molyneux, practical gender interests arise inductively from the 
concrete conditions of women?s positioning within the gender division of labor, and are 
formulated by the women who are themselves within these positions rather than through 
external interventions.  Practical interests tend to emerge in response to immediate needs 
in women?s daily lives, and they do not entail strategic goals such as women?s 
emancipation or gender equality.  Studies of women?s collective action usually use this 
notion to explain the dynamic and goals of women?s participation in social movements.  
When governments fail to provide basic needs, or the livelihood of their families, 
especially their children, is threatened, women often play a leading role in food riots, 
demonstrations, and petitions.  In addition, Molyneux indicates, based on these examples, 
gender and class are closely intertwined; poor women are often mobilized by economic 
necessary.  Obviously, practical interests cannot be assumed to be innocent of class 
effects (Molyneux, 1985).   
In contrast, strategic gender interests are deductively derived from an analysis of 
women?s subordination and lead to the formulation of an alternative set of arrangements 
to those which exist.  These ethical and theoretical criteria help to formulate strategic 
66 
 
objectives to overcome women?s subordination, such as the abolition of the sexual 
division of labor, the alleviation of the burden of domestic work and childcare, the 
removal of institutionalized forms of discrimination, the attainment of political equality, 
the establishment of reproductive rights, and the adoption of adequate measures against 
male violence and control over women.  Strategic gender interests are often called 
?feminist? or ?women?s real? interests, and, according to Molyneux, require a feminist 
level of consciousness to struggle for them (Molyneux, 1985).   
Molyneux makes an important distinction between practical and strategic gender 
interests.  This distinction is helpful in understanding why women mobilize as women 
and when and where they do.  Practical needs are derived from women?s daily lives and 
experiences, while strategic needs arise from an analysis of women?s subordination to 
men.  Practical gender interests are more immediate and reflect women?s daily 
responsibilities; strategic gender interests are longer term and concern the transformation 
of the relationships between men and women (Jaquette and Staudt, 2006, p. 31; Miraftab, 
2006, p. 182). 
Why do women?s movements occur?  Women?s movements often appear for 
similar reasons or factors as the causes of other social movements (Greenberg and Page, 
2007; Henderson and Jeydel, 2007; Freeman and Johnson, 1999).  The approaches to 
understanding the emergence of social movements could be classified into three general 
theories, which are also broadly applied to interpret women?s movements (Henderson and 
Jeydel, 2007; Costain, 1992; Buechler, 1990).  First, the theory of relative deprivation 
argues that movements form when individuals begin to notice a great gap between what 
67 
 
they believe that they should be able to achieve and what they actually can achieve in 
society.  They then become frustrated and angry.  When this discontent is politicized and 
the power of opposition nearly equals the government, social movements may occur 
(Gurr, 1970, cited from Costain, 1992, p. 3).   In her book The Politics of Women?s 
Liberation, Jo Freeman showed evidence to support her viewpoint that relative 
deprivation among female college graduates in the 1960s contributed to the rise of the 
second women?s movement in America.  She argued that when women compared their 
jobs and social prospects with men of the same age and educational attainment, they felt 
they were unjustly treated.  Males were assigned to management-trainee positions, while 
females with college degrees in the 1960s were put in secretarial or clerical jobs or 
expected to be full-time wives and mothers.  While men advanced quickly in their careers 
and income, women lagged behind their husbands and former male classmates, which 
increased a sense of gender inequality and flaming frustration (Freeman, 1975).  This also 
reveals that women?s and feminist movements were often led by middle-class, college-
educated women because they were subject to the greatest strain (Freeman, 1975; Klein, 
1984).  In general, studies based on relative deprivation theory focused on the psychology 
of movement participation.  They looked for the sources of discontent, analyzed the 
motives of participants, explored their ideologies, and critiqued their leaderships 
(Freeman and Johnson, 1999). 
Second, the resource mobilization theory contends that the development of social 
movements depends mainly on the availability of resources, such as money, facilities, 
communication networks, and committed volunteers (skilled and unskilled) willing to 
68 
 
participate the movement including some elite allies who are interested in associating 
with the movement, such as governments officials, religious leaders, and corporations 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1987; Henderson and Jeydel, 2007; Banszak, 1996).  Policy-
oriented studies found that social movements sometimes led to concessions from 
government (Button, 1978; Piven and Cloward 1977; cited from Meyer, 2004).  From this 
viewpoint, movement strategies could be seen as rational efforts by people poorly 
positioned to make claims on government using conventional means (Meyer, 2004).  For 
those left outside of the pluralist arena, protest was a "political resource" to be used to 
influence policy (Lipsky, 1970; Zald, 1977; cited from Meyer, 2004).  Resource 
mobilization theory stressed movement participation as a rational decision calculated to 
obtain specific goals.  This made the role of ideology and grievances appear less 
important.  That is, studies based on the theory of resource mobilization ask ?who did 
what? rather than ?why? (Freeman and Jonson, 1999, p. 4; Meyer, 2004, p. 127).  In 
addition to relative deprivation, Freeman?s book The Politics of Women?s Liberation 
(1975) also introduced resource mobilization theory by indicating that communication 
networks among college women were already in place through the student and new left 
movements.  These networks were used to organize and disseminate information, helping 
the second wave of women?s movement in the United States to grow fast (Freeman, 
1975).  Moreover, Jo Freeman edited a collection of articles on Social Movements of the 
Sixties and Seventies (1983).  Articles in this book were largely based on the theory of 
resource mobilization.  Furthermore, all of Freeman?s later works emphasized the ability 
of the women?s movement to attract resources and create new organizations.  In contrast, 
69 
 
women?s grievances and isolation at home were seen as less significant (Freeman, 1983; 
Freeman and Johnson, 1999; Costain, 1992).              
Third, political opportunity theory, also known as political process theory or 
political structure theory, argues that social movements are greatly affected by political 
opportunities.  While this perspective acknowledges, in agreement with the resource 
mobilization theory, the critical role of resources, leaders, and elite assistance for 
explaining movement emergence, it places more emphasis on the mobilization of 
resources external to the movement, including political opportunities, political structure 
and political process (Tarrow, 1998; Meyer, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004).  In her 
book Inviting Women?s Rebellion, Costain analyzed the women?s movements in the 
United States by employing political opportunity theory.  She argued that the increased 
presence of women in higher education and workforce participation provided additional 
resources to female constituencies seeking to mobilize in the 1970s.  Given congressional 
attention to discrimination against women, government openness legitimated and 
encouraged collective action as the success of the civil right movement did.  According to 
Costain?s study, opportunities for women?s movements also brought opportunities for 
policy reforms, which inspired each other in a synergistic spiral.  In addition, Costain 
argued that demobilization followed political defeats and government neglect (Costain, 
1992). 
Studies have showed that social movements, or civil society groups, played 
significant roles during the third wave of global democratization (Diamond, 1994; Hsiao, 
1990).  These social mobilizations encompassed a vast number of groups which 
70 
 
collectively challenged authoritarian regimes and strove for democratic changes, 
including students movements, churches, professional associations, women?s groups, 
trade unions, human right organizations, producer groups, the press, civic associations, 
and the like (Diamond, 1994).  Women took the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and 
the subsequent transitions as political opportunities.  They became involved in the 
transformation processes by mobilizing collective actions in the hope that 
democratization could create a ?jump start? for improving their status (Clark and Clark, 
2002).  Although the results might vary (Viterna and Fallon, 2008), most studies conclude 
that women apparently made few gains from the democratic transformations in the 
former Soviet bloc and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s (Waylen, 1994, 
Jaquette, 1994). 
 
Women?s Political Representation 
Democracy is about ?people?s rule.?  In a democratic polity, citizens are presumed 
to have equal rights, opportunities, and a voice in the governance of the public sphere.  In 
modern nation states, citizens per se cannot directly make decisions.  Instead, they need 
to go through representatives, a process that requires interest aggregation through 
political parties and pressure groups.  Therefore, the institution of regular, free, and fair 
elections to determine people?s representatives in governments is the first requirement of 
democracy in its modern form (Razavi, 2000). 
Globally, while in 1997 women accounted for 11.7 percent of members of 
parliament, this figure has increased to 16.2 percent in 2005 (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2).  
71 
 
The election and integration of women into national legislatures leads us to wonder: do 
women legislators pay more attention to women?s issues?  Are female legislators more 
likely to enact laws that can eliminate or lessen discrimination against women?  Answers 
to these questions might depend on how we choose to define representation in general 
and representation of women in particular. 
 
Table 2.1   Women in Parliament in 1997, by Region of the World 
Region Single House 
or Lower House 
Upper House 
Or Senate 
Both Houses 
Combined 
Nordic countries 36.4% - 36.4% 
Americas 12.9% 11.5% 12.7% 
Europe ? OSCE member countries 
including Nordic countries 
 
13.8% 
 
8.5% 
 
12.6% 
Europe ? OSCE member countries 
excluding Nordic countries 
 
12.3% 
 
8.8% 
 
11.5% 
Asia 13.4% 9.9% 13.1% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.1% 13.6% 10.4% 
Pacific 9.8% 21.8% 11.6% 
Arab states 3.3% 2.1% 3.3% 
Global average 12.0% 10.1% 11.7% 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), ?Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of 1 January 1997, 
<http://www.ipu.org>. 
 
Table 2.2   Women in Parliament in 2005, by Region of the World 
Region Single House 
or Lower House 
Upper House 
Or Senate 
Both Houses 
Combined 
Nordic countries 40.0% - 40.0% 
Americas 19.7% 19.9% 19.7% 
Europe ? OSCE member countries 
including Nordic countries 
 
19.0% 
 
16.3% 
 
18.4% 
Europe ? OSCE member countries 
excluding Nordic countries 
 
16.9% 
 
16.3% 
 
16.8% 
Asia 16.1% 14.4% 15.9% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.4% 17.6% 16.5% 
Pacific 12.0% 26.5% 13.9% 
Arab states 7.0% 5.9% 6.8% 
Global average 16.4% 15.0% 16.2% 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), ?Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of 31 December 
2005,? <http://www.ipu.org>.  
72 
 
In her book The Concept of Representation, Hanna Pitkin defines a 
"descriptively" representative body as one that mirrors the characteristics of the 
represented community and a "substantively" representative body as one that reflects the 
interests of the represented community.  Accordingly, descriptive representation means 
"standing for," while substantive representation refers to ?acting for" (Pitkin, 1967).  That 
is, ?standing for? is concerned with who the representatives are (male or female, black or 
white, rich or poor, etc.), and ?acting for? is concerned with what the representatives do.  
A female legislator can represent women by her mere presence in or occupation of that 
office.  In this sense, only women can descriptively represent women.  However, to 
represent women substantively, a female elected official must act for women and their 
interests (Reingold, 1992).  In addition, Pitkin argues that descriptive representation is of 
interest primarily because we "tend to assume that people's characteristics are a guide to 
the actions they will take" (Pitkin, 1967, p. 89).  Put together these concepts address the 
question: Do women in elected positions of power engage in enhancing women?s 
interests and enacting women-friendly policies in order to improve women?s status? 
Scholars have documented that female legislators are more likely to work on 
issues which are important to women.  For example, Saint-Germain?s study found that 
women sponsor more legislation dealing with women's concerns than do their male 
colleagues (Saint-Germain, 1989).  Lijphart found that democracies with higher 
proportions of women in the legislature passed more laws which benefit children 
(Lijphart, 1991).  Thomas? research indicated that legislatures with higher numbers of 
female representatives introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of 
73 
 
women, children, and families (Thomas, 1991).  In her longitudinal study of the Arizona 
state legislature, Saint-Germain found the same pattern evidence as Thomas? findings 
(Saint-Germain, 1989).  Swers stated that women?s representatives express strong support 
for issues of women?s right (Swers, 1998).  While much empirical research indicated that 
female legislators are concerned with women?s issues and social issues, the study (data 
from six Latin American legislatures) by Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Tayor-Robinson 
discovered that women tended to be isolated on committees dedicated to women?s and 
social issues and kept off more powerful economics and foreign affairs committees as the 
percentage of legislators who are women increased, when party leaders or chamber 
presidents controlled committee assignments and when the structure of the committee 
system provided a specific committee to deal with women?s issues (Heath, Schwindt-
Bayer and Tayor-Robinson, 2005).  That is, the traditionally dominant male group 
controlled committee assignments.  As a result, female newcomers were marginalized and 
kept on the sidelines to deal with women?s issues and social issues.           
Greater progress in women?s parliamentary representation has been made in some 
parts of the world, remarkably the Nordic countries, where women?s representation 
averages 40 percent.  Yet, real gains in women?s accessing legislatures have not occurred 
in many regions.  For example, women are still least represented in the Arab states, where 
the regional average in lower houses is 6.7 percent in 2005 (see Table 2.2).  Also, women 
remain regrettably underrepresented in the parliaments of the Pacific Island states, with 
an average of 3.2 percent, excluding Australia and New Zealand, where women?s 
representation stands at 24.7 percent and 28.3 percent, respectively (Ballington, 2005).  
74 
 
Although more female legislators have entered parliaments, women have remained 
underrepresented in national legislatures throughout the world.  It even took 
approximately sixty years for Denmark, Norway and Sweden to cross the 20 per cent 
threshold, and seventy years to reach 30 per cent (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). 
What are the factors that affect women?s parliamentary nomination, and therefore 
recruitment?  In particular, what is the relative significance of political, socioeconomic, 
and cultural factors that boost or hinder women's representation in national politics?  
With regard to political factors, empirical analyses have found that electoral systems, 
party differences, and gender quota systems are crucial variables influencing women?s 
political representation.   
Cross-national studies in terms of women?s share of parliamentary seats have 
focused on the influence of political factors, particularly the structure of the electoral 
system (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999).  Proportional representation (PR) has been 
identified to have strong and significant effects on women?s parliamentary representation 
in comparison to the single-member district system (SMD) (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 
1994; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1998; Norris, 1985; Paxton and Kunovich, 
2003; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1994a, 1994b).  That is, women can make greater progress in 
elected parliaments in nations which use PR systems.  In a SMD system where only one 
person is elected, political parties have a disincentive to risk backing a women candidate 
because of voter prejudice against women's ability to assume legislative duties (Norris 
1996, p. 201; Rule 1994b, p. 690).  In a PR system, however, political parties have an 
incentive to balance tickets by including more women to appeal to different 
75 
 
constituencies (Norris, 1987, p. 129; Matland 1998, p. 112-113; Matland and Studlar 
1996; Rule 1994b).  Also, a PR system can help women because of a contagion effect.  
Under a PR system, once a party starts to nominate women in prominent positions in 
candidates lists, others will be quicker to adopt this policy (Matland and Studlar, 1996; 
Matland, 2005, p. 101-102).   Moreover, parties only nominate a single candidate in SMD 
systems.  Because of the zero-sum feature of nominating decisions, women candidates 
must compete with existing interests within the party which tend to be dominated by men 
(Matland, 1998, p. 112). 
Another factor affecting women?s representation in national politics is party 
differences in terms of political ideology.  Left-oriented parties are more likely to reduce 
gender inequality and tend to nominate women as candidates (Kenworthy and Malami, 
1999).  In contrast, right-wing parties are apt to support traditional values that discourage 
women?s participation in politics (Rule, 1987).  Therefore, the larger the proportion of 
parliamentary seats held by leftist parties, the larger women?s share of those seats tends to 
be.  The presence of leftist parties has been found to increase women?s representation by 
some studies (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1998; Rule, 1987).  However, 
partisan differences may have become less important in recent years, as right-wing parties 
have moved to nominate more women in order to dismiss this as a characteristic 
distinguishing parties of the left (Matland and Studlar, 1996; Rule, 1994a).  Also, Darcy 
et al indicate that in Scandinavia and some other European countries, conservative parties 
have become nearly as likely as leftist parties to nominate women (Darcy, Welch, and 
Clark, 1994, p. 152). 
76 
 
Palema Paxton argues that countries with one-party dominance under ?Marxist-
Leninist? doctrine tend to have more female legislators (Paxton, 1997).  Although the 
legislature in such countries may be elected by popular vote, ruling parties usually 
manipulate election outcomes in many ways.  In this case, because of the equalitarian 
ideology, Marxist-Leninist political regimes select more women in national legislatures to 
present gender equality.  Paxton finds a very strong effect for a ?Marxist-Leninist? 
dummy variable including in her analyses for 1975 and 1988 (Paxton, 1997).  However, 
owing to the dissolution of the Soviet bloc during the third wave of democratization, few 
countries with Marxist-Leninist backgrounds remain (Huntington, 1991).    
Gender quotas have been used as a highly effective way of increasing the number 
of women in public office (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Krook, 2009; Matland, 2008).  
Starting with the adoption of quotas by leftist and Green parties in some European 
countries in the 1970?s, quotas for women in parliaments have quickly spread all over the 
world (Matland, 2008).  Gender quotas vary in type and institutional location (Darcy, 
Welch, and Clark, 1994; Krook, 2009; Randall, 2006).  The two most common types of 
electoral gender quotas are candidate quotas and reserved seats (Dahlerup, 2005, p. 142).  
Candidate quotas set a minimum percentage of candidates for election that must be 
women.  Legal candidate quotas are stipulated in the constitution or in electoral laws or in 
political party law.  Voluntary party quotas are adopted voluntarily by political parties.  
Reserved seats require a certain number of seats for women among representatives in a 
parliament, laid down either in the constitution or by legislature (Dahlerup, 2005; Krook 
2009).  Voluntary gender quotas are adopted by political parties, for example, in 
77 
 
Mozambique and South African.  While political parties are required to adopt gender 
quotas for national legislative candidates in many of Latin America, no country in sub-
Saharan Africa mandates political parties to adopt a gender quota for national legislative 
election.  The reserved-seats system is more common in Asia, but the proportion of 
reserved seats is usually very low.  Alternatively, it can be found in Tanzania and most 
recently Rwanda, where three-eighths of national assembly seats are reserved for women 
(Randall, 2006; Yoon, 2004). 
While quotas for women may help increase women?s political representation in a 
quick way, Chou, Clark, and Clark suggest that there are two problems in this system.  
First, if the quota is fairly low, the implementation of the quota system has the effect of 
turning the floor into a ceiling.  Second, women?s political activists do not favor a quota 
system because it underlines the stereotype of women as a secondary class in politics who 
need protection.  Women are seen as weaker and less competitive in the political arena, 
thus reinforcing gender inequality.  Moreover, women politicians, who are elected by 
quotas system, may have to strive for equal recognition within legislatures (Chou, Clark, 
and Clark, 1990). 
About forty countries had adopted gender quotas for parliamentary recruitment in 
2005, either by constitutional amendment or electoral law.  Also, quotas for women 
candidates have been laid down in major political parties? statutes in more than fifty 
countries (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005).  Dahlerup and Freidenvall suggest that the 
general trends in quota adoption can be identified as the incremental track (Scandinavian 
countries) and the fast track (Latin American and other Third World countries).  From a 
78 
 
liberal viewpoint, quotas for a specific group conflict with the principle of equal 
opportunity for all.  Gender quotas for women, explicitly favoring certain groups of 
citizens, mean that not all citizens (men) are given an equal chance to attain a political 
career.  Therefore, the incremental-track discourse prefers equal opportunity to equal 
results.  In contrast, the fast track discourse rejects the idea of gradual improvement in 
women?s representation.  It argues that an increase in resources might not automatically 
lead to equal representation.  Women?s exclusion and gender discrimination in the public 
sphere only can be solved by engaging in affirmative action.  However, Dahlerup and 
Freidenvall argue that without specifications of quota provisions which match the 
electoral system and rules about the rank order of candidates as well as sanctions for non-
compliance, gender quota provisions may be merely symbolic (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 
2005).   
Referring to gender quotas in terms of women?s political representation, Nordic 
countries are usually seen as fine examples.  In fact, Nordic countries were generally 
world leaders in this area even before introducing any quotas (Matland, 2005).  Moreover, 
Dahlerup and Freidenvall point out that electoral quotas have always been voluntarily 
adopted in Scandinavia, never a legal requirement, and only used by some political 
parties (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005).  Matland contends that causality may run from 
being a world leader to adopting rules, rather than the rules causing one to become a 
world leader (Matland, 2005).  
Women?s progress in attaining political power surely depends, in part, on the 
extent of progress they have made outside political activities (Kenworthy and Malami, 
79 
 
1999; Randall, 1987).  Regarding socioeconomic factors, scholars have identified levels 
of women?s education, levels of women's labor force participation, and women?s share in 
professional occupations as important variables that affect women's access to the 
legislature.  Political participation increases with the level of education.  Also, 
educational status has been identified as a key feature distinguishing political elites from 
ordinary citizens (Putnam, 1976).  For these reasons, increasing levels of college 
graduates among women should enlarge the eligible pool of possible women candidates 
(Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994).  Rule and Norris find that the proportion of women?s 
college graduates has positive effects on women's political representation, but only Rule?s 
research shows the effect to be statistically significant (Rule, 1987; Norris, 1985).   
Women who work in the formal economy develop stronger feelings of confidence 
and independence through their jobs and, therefore, develop a greater sense of political 
efficacy.  Also, work or careers provide the organizational basis for political activities by 
leading women to join trade unions and business groups.  Therefore, more females in the 
labor force might lead to increasing women?s political participation and a larger number 
of motivated and well-connected women candidates who are willing to stand for office 
(Norris, 1987, p. 122).  Studies by Rule and Norris have shown that female labor force 
participation rates have a positive effect on women?s parliamentary representation, but 
only Rule finds this effect to be statistically significant (Norris, 1985; Rule, 1987). 
Scholars argue elected officials at the national level frequently are recruited from 
professional occupations (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, p. 108).  Lawyers, educators, 
journalists, and business professionals tend to be heavily represented in legislatures in 
80 
 
comparison with the general population (Norris, 1996, p. 188-190).  That is, a greater the 
share of women in professional occupations might lead to a larger share of women?s 
legislative representation.  Empirical research by Kenworthy and Malami finds that 
women?s share in the professions is consistently associated with the proportion of 
parliamentary seats they hold (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 257).  
Paxton and Kunovich conclude that ideas about women?s role and position in a 
society can enhance or constrain women?s ability to seek political power (Paxton and 
Kunovich, 2003).  Studies show women may win greater political representation in 
countries where people in general have more liberal attitudes or egalitarian values toward 
the role of women in politics (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; 
Paxton and Kunovich, 2003).  That is, if politics is considered an appropriate vocation for 
women and they are seen as capable of serving in the public sphere efficiently, they will 
be more likely to win office.  Therefore, women are more likely to be nominated by party 
leaders, chosen by voters (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999), and successfully elected to 
office (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 144-145).  Norris created a ?political egalitarianism? 
index from responses to several survey questions in terms of attitudes toward women in 
politics.  She found that countries with more equalitarian scores tended to have larger 
proportions of parliamentary seats held by women (Norris, 1985, 1987).  In addition, 
holding political and socioeconomic factors constant, the research by Kenworthy and 
Malami found countries in which religions emphasize women?s traditional roles tend to 
have fewer women in legislatures (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 257).   
A report by Frederick Nzwili reveals why Kenya?s legislature has one of the worst 
81 
 
record in Africa regarding female representation.  Although violent attacks against 
candidates in Kenya are not limited to women, they are certainly a tactic used to try to 
prevent women in particular from seeking political office.  In the 2002 elections, 130 
women expressed an interest in running for office, but finally only 44 did because some 
of female candidates and their relatives were threatened or assaulted by supporters of 
their male rivals (Nzwili, 2002; cited from Henderson and Jeydel, 2007, p. 5).  According 
to Henderson and Jeydel, in the last Assembly only 9 out of 220 members were women 
and at no point in Kenya?s history has the number of female legislators ever exceeded 10 
(Henderson and Jeydel, 2007, p. 5).  Although women?s political participation in Kenya 
might be an extreme case, it vividly depicts that patriarchal culture stands in the way of 
women?s decision to run for and ultimately win office. 
Studies of the impact of democracy on the status of women demonstrate the 
interrelationship of several factors.  First, women need the psychological will, resources 
and opportunities to engage in movements to improve the status of women.  Second, the 
cultural values and political structures of the society affect how many women 
representatives are elected.  Finally, once elected, women must rise in the legislative 
power structure to be in positions where they can influence the passage of policies 
beneficial to the interest of women. 
 
5.  Theoretical Model 
This section presents a theoretical model of how patriarchal culture, economic 
development, and democratization influence women?s status.  The dissertation uses the 
82 
 
theories regarding these relationships that were discussed in this chapter to examine the 
conditions of women in Taiwan.  A general scholarly consensus exists about some of 
these relationships, but others are quite controversial with different schools of thought 
making opposing presumptions.  The following path diagram in Figure 2.4 models more 
specific hypotheses about these relationships. 
 
Figure 2.4  Model of How Patriarchal Culture, Economic Development, 
and Democratization Affect the Status of Women 
 
 
PATRIARCHAL 
CULTURE 
 
             - / 0                                   -  
                           
ECONOMIC                    + / - 
DEVELOPMENT                                 STATUS OF 
LEVEL                                                   WOMEN 
       
             +                                 + / 0 
 
DEGREE OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
 
 
Patriarchy refers to the prevalence of male dominance in a society.  Women, in 
general, are treated as a secondary and subordinate sex.  It is hypothesized by all the 
major theoretical traditions that a higher degree of patriarchy in traditional cultures 
should produce a debased status for women. 
H1: The degree of patriarchy in traditional culture will have a negative 
relationship with the status of women. 
83 
 
The relationship between development and the status of women is controversial.  
There are two quite different viewpoints.   One, based on the conventional modernization 
model assumes that the impact of development on the status of women is positive.  The 
other associated with the liberal feminist, dependency, and socialist feminist paradigms 
argues that development has a negative impact upon women?s status in traditional 
societies and the developing countries for several reasons.  First, agricultural 
development strategies, such as the introduction of more advanced technology and the 
transformation from subsistence crops to cash-crop production, weaken women?s 
production role by decreasing their participation in agricultural work.  Also, at the onset 
of industrialization, women are marginalized in the ?modern? sectors, where they are 
widely confined to informal, unstable, low-paying, and unskilled manufacturing jobs. 
Meanwhile, women?s traditional roles and support from kinship networks are actually 
eroded.  Since the impact of development upon the status of women is not clear, two 
competing hypotheses will be tested.  The first hypothesizes that higher levels of 
economic development should produce an increasing status for women.  The second 
hypothesizes that higher levels of economic development during agricultural 
modernization and at the earlier stages of industrialization will lead to deterioration in 
women?s status. 
H2: The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon the 
status of women. 
versus 
H3: The level of economic development will have a negative impact upon the 
84 
 
status of women. 
In a democratic country, public officials are selected by the people; and 
fundamental political rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to 
assemble, and the right to petition, are guaranteed for all citizens.  Therefore, there are at 
least three channels through which women can exert political influence to improve their 
status. First, women themselves could become elected officials to enact laws that can 
eliminate or lessen discrimination against women.  Second, women can form advocacy 
groups to press government to make policies and enact legal reforms that help women to 
gain better situations or ensure a more equal status of women.  Finally, under democratic 
systems, it is inevitable that parties must compete for votes, which makes them more 
responsive to important constituencies, such as women.  Thus, it is hypothesized by 
modernization theorists and probably most liberal feminists that democratization should 
improve the status of women.  In contrast, dependency theorists and socialist feminists 
would probably argue that democracy would not help women in most situations because 
of the powerful reinforcing effects of capitalism and patriarchy.  
H4: The degree of democratization will have a positive impact upon the status of 
women. 
versus 
H5: The degree of democratization will not be associated with the status of 
women. 
Likewise, there is strong disagreement over the impact of economic development 
on the degree of patriarchy.  Modernization theorists conclude that greater development 
85 
 
should produce cultural change undercutting patriarchal norms, while dependency 
theorists and socialist feminists are quite skeptical about this line of argument.   
H6: The level of development will have a negative association with patriarchal 
culture. 
versus 
H7: The level of development will have no association with patriarchal culture. 
A higher GDP per capita correlates with democracy.  Moreover, democracy was 
very rare before the industrial revolution. Thus, empirical research leads many to believe 
that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy 
(modernization theory), or helps newly established democracies stabilize (Przeworski et 
al, 2000).  Some campaigners for democracy also suggest that democratization will 
become inevitable if economic development progresses.  Thus, it is hypothesized that 
economic development should promote democratization. 
H8: The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon 
democratization. 
Chapter 3 provides an overall test of these hypotheses and evaluates the status of 
women in Taiwan.  First, correlation and regression analysis of aggregate data for nation-
states are used to show the direction and strength of each of these five relationships, with 
analyses being conducted for both developing and developed countries.  The data for 
Taiwan will then be examined in some detail.  Finally, the indictors of the status of 
women in Taiwan will be used to benchmark the nation?s performance after statistically 
controlling for its economic development level. 
86 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN TAIWAN 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
This chapter tests the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 of the factors that 
shape the status of women and then uses these data to evaluate the relative status of 
women in Taiwan.  There are three parts in the chapter.  The first one talks about defining 
and measuring properties, as well as data collection.  In the second part, the eight 
research hypotheses will be tested for the 174 countries listed in Appendix A.  The third 
part focuses on comparing Taiwan to other nations in the world, both developing and 
developed, by various indicators of women?s status and then uses a ?residuals analysis? 
from regressions using gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) 
to explain a nation?s values on these items to determine whether Taiwan is an 
?underachiever? or ?overachiever.? 
 
1.  Defining and Measuring Properties and Data Collection 
The main independent variables included in this study are the level of economic 
development, the degree of patriarchal culture (as measured by the degree of gender 
equality), and the extent of democracy.  The level of economic development was 
measured by a nation?s GDP (gross domestic product) per capita for 2000, adjusting for 
87 
 
differing national costs-of-living with the purchasing power parity (PPP) index.  GDP per 
capita (PPP US$) for each country was collected from the United Nation?s Human 
Development Report 2002 (2002) except for Taiwan.  
Bernstein and Dyer indicated that beliefs and attitude cannot be directly observed, 
they must be measured indirectly through observation of some behavior?usually the 
response to a questionnaire (Bernstein and Dyer, 1992, p. 64).  Accordingly, a nation?s 
gender equality scale (GES) was applied to measure the degree of patriarchal culture in a 
society.  For each country, the value of GES was calculated by averaging the total score 
of a set of five items (based on 100 points in each one) from the pooled 1995-2001 World 
Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS).  Inglehart and Norris 
pointed out that these five items for WVS and EVS are similar to those contained in the 
more comprehensive psychological scales of gender equality, including attitudes toward 
politics, the workforce, education, and the family (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 31-32).  
Survey questions for these five items were:  D059 MEN MAKE BETTER POLITICAL 
LEADERS: ?On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.? (Agree 
coded low); C001 MEN HAVE MORE RIGHT TO A JOB: ?When jobs are scarce, men 
should have more right to a job than women.? (Agree coded low); D060 UNIVERSITY 
IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A BOY: ?A university education is more important for a 
boy than a girl.?  (Agree coded low); D019 WOMEN NEED CHILDREN: ?Do you think 
that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?? 
(Agree coded low); D023 WOMAN AS A SINGLE PARENT: ?If a woman wants to have 
a child as a single parent but she doesn?t want to have a stable relationship with a man, do 
88 
 
you approve or disapprove?? (Disapprove coded low).  Data on the five items by country 
were collected from Wave 2000 in the book Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural 
Sourcebook based on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys (Inglehart et al, 2004).  
Since 1972, Freedom House, a non-profit organization founded in New York in 
1941 to promote democracy and expand political and economic freedom around the 
world, has annually rated the extent of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) in 
different countries.  According to Freedom House, PR and CL scores, ranking from 1 
(most free) to 7 (least free) respectively, are based on ?a multilayered process of analysis 
and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars.?   Combining these two scores 
produces an index that varies between 2 (most free) to 14 (least free).  Thus, to create a 
scale which goes from the least free to the most free, the original scale is subtracted from 
15 to produce the ?FH score? for each country as the indicator of the extent of 
democratization.  In other words, each country was assigned a score from 1 point to 13 
points, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of democratization. 
With regard to the dependent variables, this research included women?s labor 
force participation rate, total fertility rate (per woman), and the percentage of seats in 
parliament held by women to indicate the economic, social, and political dimensions of 
the status of women, respectively.  Conventionally, participating in the paid workforce 
should give women more resources; therefore, they would become economically 
independent and could autonomously pursue their goals; lower fertility rates would allow 
women to engage in broader economic and political activities; and women?s involvement 
in the political sphere, as measured by seats in the legislature, should make governments 
89 
 
more responsive to women?s rights, concerns, and needs.  Data for each of the three 
indicators of women?s status were collected from the United Nation?s Human 
Development Report 2002 (2002) except for Taiwan. 
 
 
Table 3.1  Economic, Social, and Political Indicators Used in the Analysis,  
and Taiwan?s Data Sources 
 
Variable Indicator 
I. Level of economic development GDP per capita (PPP, US$), 2000 
II. Degree of patriarchal culture Gender equality scale (GES), 2000 
III. Extent of democratization Freedom House score (FH score), 2000 
IV. The status of women Women?s labor force participation rate (%), 
2000 
 Fertility rate (per woman), late 1990s 
 Seats in parliament held by women  
(as % of total), 2002 
 
Indicator Taiwan?s data Year Source 
GDP per capita (PPP, US$) 2000 Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2009, 
published by Council for Economic 
Planning and Development, Executive 
Yuan, ROC (Taiwan) (ROC, 2009b) 
Gender equality scale (GES) 2000 Included in the world dataset 
Freedom House score (FH score) 2000 Included in the world dataset 
Women?s labor force participation 
rate (%) 
2000 Taiwan Women?s Almanac (1st ed.), 
published by Foundation of Women 
Rights Promotion and Development, 
ROC (Taiwan)  
Fertility rate (per woman) 2000 Social Indicators 2009, published by 
Directorate General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, ROC (Taiwan) (ROC, 2009a) 
Seats in parliament held by women 
(as % of total) 
2002 Taiwan Women?s Almanac(1st ed.), 
published by Foundation of Women 
Rights Promotion and Development, 
ROC (Taiwan) 
 
90 
 
Taiwan?s data on GDP per capita (PPP US$) and the three indicators for women?s 
status were taken from different government departments of Taiwan, also known as the 
Republic of China (ROC), because it is not a member of the United Nations.  However, 
both the pooled 1995-2001 World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys 
(EVS) and Freedom House?s survey of Freedom in the World in 2000 included Taiwan.  
Original data were thus available for calculating Taiwan?s GES and FH score.  The data 
sources for all indicators used in analysis are listed in Table 3.1. 
 
2.  Testing the Hypotheses 
 The model is tested with data from 174 developing and developed nations 
(Appendix B reports their values on the six variables included in the analysis).  The data 
for this study are analyzed by using SPSS software.  The binary regressions are 
performed showing the association between 1) the three indicators (GDP per capita, GES, 
and FH score) of the independent variables (economic development, patriarchal culture, 
and democratization) and 2) the three indicators (women in labor force, fertility, and seats 
in the legislature held by women) of the economic, social, and political status of women.  
Only variables measured on either an interval or ratio scales are appropriate for use in the 
calculation of Pearson correlation coefficients; and all the variables examined in this 
research are interval ones. In addition, SPSS calculates the statistical significance of the 
correlation coefficients.   
This section tests the eight hypotheses in my theoretical model that were 
developed in Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2.  First, we will discuss the simple bivariate 
91 
 
correlations between the three explanatory variables and the three indicators of women?s 
status.  Second, multiple regression analysis will be applied to develop more complex 
models of the simultaneous effects of the independent variables. 
 
Bivariate Correlations for Testing the Theoretical Model 
The first hypothesis (H1) is that the status of women will be lower in countries 
with more patriarchal cultures or, using the indicator in this analysis, that the status of 
women will be better in countries that have higher gender equality values.  As the  
correlations in the first column of Table 3.2 show, the nature of this relationship differs 
dramatically among the three dimensions of women?s status.  The hypothesis is strongly 
supported in politics, as gender equality has a high positive correlation of .59 with the 
percentage of women in the national legislature that is statistically significant at the .001 
level.  In other words, women receive much better political representation when norms of 
gender equality are fairly widespread.  In contrast, H1 is only weakly supported in the 
area of social outcomes, as gender equality has a negative correlation of -.20 with the 
fertility rate that is not statistically significant.  The first hypothesis, moreover, is 
disconfirmed in the economic dimension of women?s status because there is no 
association at all between gender equality and the percentage of women in the labor force. 
The second and third hypotheses reflect competing theoretical perspectives on 
how economic development should affect the status of women.  H2 predicts that this will 
be a positive relationship, while H3 posits a negative association.  The middle column in 
Table 3.2 strongly supports the second hypothesis for the political and social outcome  
92 
 
Table 3.2  Correlations of GDP per Capita, Gender Equality, and Democratization 
with Three Indicators of the Status of Women 
 
                                                        Gender Equality      GDP per capita          Democratization 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Economic 
Women in Labor Force                           .07                            -.25**                            -.08 
Social 
Fertility                                                  -.20                            -.59**                           -.52** 
 
Political 
Women % Legislature                            .59**                         .47**                             .38** 
*Statistically significant at .05 level. 
**Statistically significant at .001 level 
 
indicators.  GDP per capita has a fairly strong positive correlation of .47 with the 
percentage of women in parliament and a quite strong negative one of -.59 with the 
fertility rate respectively.  Both these correlations, moreover, are highly statistically 
significant at the .001 level.  However, the second hypothesis is disconfirmed for the 
economy as GDP per capita has a weak-to-moderate correlation of -.25 with women?s 
labor force participation which is statistically significant at the .001 level.  That is, higher 
levels of development bring decreased, not increased, formal economic activities by 
women, lending some support to H3.  
 The forth and the fifth hypotheses, similarly, represent different perspectives on 
how democratization should influence that status of women.  In H4, the degree of 
democratization exerts a positive influence on women?s status, while H5 predicts that 
there will be no association between these two variables.  The results here in the last 
column in Table 3.2 parallel those for the impact of economic development almost 
93 
 
exactly.  H4 is strongly supported for social outcomes, moderately supported for politics, 
and disconfirmed for the economy.  Democratization has a fairly strong negative 
correlation of -.52 with fertility and a moderate positive correlation of .38 with the 
percentage of women in the legislature; and both of these correlations are statistically 
significant at the .001 level.  In contrast, the fifth hypothesis (H5) that the degree of 
democratization will be unrelated to the status of women is supported by the lack of 
correlation (r = -.08) between democratization and the proportion of women in the labor 
force. 
 
Table 3.3  Correlations of GDP per Capita with Gender Equality  
and Democratization 
 
                                                    GDP per capita                      Democratization 
Gender Equality                               .63**                              .48**                           
Democracy                                       .52** 
*Statistically significant at .05 level. 
**Statistically significant at .001 level 
 
The last three hypotheses are tested by the correlations in Table 3.3.  The sixth 
hypothesis (H6) that the level of economic development will have a negative impact on 
the level of patriarchal culture is strongly supported, as GDP per capita has very strong 
correlation .63 with gender equality that is statistically significant at the .001 level.  
Consequently, the seventh hypothesis (H7) that the level of economic development will 
have no association with the level of patriarchal culture is strongly disconfirmed.  Finally, 
the eighth hypothesis (H8) that the level of economic development will have a positive 
impact on the degree of democratization is strongly supported because GDP per capita 
94 
 
has a fairly strong positive correlation of .52 with democratization, which is statistically 
significant at the .001 level. 
 
Multiple Regressions for Comparing the Impacts of the Three Explanatory Factors 
The three factors that are used here to explain the status of women are all strongly 
associated with each other.  Table 3.3 showed that GDP per capita has correlations of .52 
with democratization and .63 with gender equality; and the correlation between gender 
equality and democratization is .48.  All these correlations are highly statistically 
significant at the .001 level.  This section, hence, applies multiple regression analysis to 
provide a more sophisticated model of how GDP per capita, gender equality, and 
democratization influence the three indicators of the status of women. 
Tables 3.4 presents the multiple regression results for how the three explanatory 
variables affect the fertility rate.  In combination, the independent variables exert a strong 
effect as indicated by the Multiple R of .56.  The R2 shows that the three explanatory 
items explain 31% of the variance in fertility rates among these countries.  In terms of the 
independent effects of the explanatory variables, GDP per capita and democratization 
have moderate-to-strong independent effects in the predicted direction.  However, once 
the effects of these other two items are statistically controlled in the multiple regression, 
countries with greater gender equality actually have slightly worse, not better, outcomes 
for women.  In multiple regression, the Beta (or standardized regression) coefficients can 
be used to compare the relative impact of the independent variables.  In Table 3.4 for the 
fertility rate, GDP per capita, has a Beta of -.39 that is statistically significant at the .05  
95 
 
Table 3.4  Multiple Regression Explaining 
Fertility Rate 
 
Overall Equation 
Multiple R        .56 
Multiple R2       .31 
Significance      .000 
Separate Effects of Independent Variables         b              Beta           Sig.    
Gender Equality                                                  .021           .20            .12 
GDP per capita                                                   -.00005     -.39            .013 
Democratization                                                 -.12           -.33            .017    
 
level, thereby giving moderate support to H2; and democratization has a Beta of -.33 
which is statistically significant at the .05 level, moderately supporting the fourth 
hypothesis.  Gender equality, in sharp contrast, has a weak positive effect on the fertility 
rate, with a Beta .20 that is not statistically significant (sig. = .12), which is inconsistent 
with H1. 
The multiple regression explaining the percentage of women in the national 
legislature in Table 3.5 displays a much different causal pattern.  Overall, the Multiple R 
of .63 and R2 of .39 denote a fairly strong combined impact of the three independent 
variables.  Their relative influences, though, are exactly the opposite of the ones that they 
have on the fertility rate.  Gender equality exercises the dominant influence, with a Beta 
of .45 that is statistically significant at the level of .001.  In contrast, the independent 
effects of GDP per capita (Beta = .09, not statistically significant) and of democratization 
(Beta = .18, not statistically significant) are fairly marginal at best, which does not lend  
96 
 
Table 3.5  Multiple Regression Explaining 
        Percent of Women in Legislature 
 
Overall Equation 
Multiple R        .63 
Multiple R2       .39 
Significance      .000 
Separate Effects of Independent Variables             b              Beta           Sig.    
Gender Equality                                                     .38             .45            .000 
GDP per capita                                                      -.00009      .09             .52 
Democratization                                                     .54            .18             .16     
 
much support to H2 or H4.  Thus, once culture is controlled, the influence of the other two 
independent variables vanishes.  In sum, the results of this multiple regression analysis 
strongly support the first hypothesis (H1), which predicted that the degree of patriarchy in 
traditional culture will have a negative relationship with the status of women.  Thus, 
cultural factors appear to be very important in promoting the increased political 
representation of women. 
Finally, the top row in Table 3.2 above showed that women?s participation in the 
labor force has little association with the three independent variables used here.  
Consequently, it should not be surprising that the Multiple R for this multivariate 
relationship in Table 3.6 is fairly weak at .22 (not statistically significant).  Unlike the 
bivariate correlations, though, gender equality does have a weak association with 
women?s increased economic activity as indicated by a Beta of .23 (compared to its r 
of .07 in Table 3.2) once the effects of the other independent variables are controlled.  We 
97 
 
probably should not make too much of this relationship since it is not statistically 
significant.  Still, culture does appear to have a marginal effect upon women?s entry into 
labor markets. 
 
Table 3.6  Multiple Regression 
Explaining Women?s Labor Force Participation Rate 
  
Overall Equation 
Multiple R          .22 
Multiple R2         .05 
Significance        .33 
Separate Effects of Independent Variables         b             Beta          Sig.    
Gender Equality                                                   .23          .23           .12  
GDP per capita                                                   -.000       -.17           .33 
Democratization                                                 -.37         -.11           .50 
 
 
3.  Comparing Taiwan to Other Nations by a Residuals Analysis 
Table 3.7 shows that Taiwan was well above the average for all the 174 nations in 
the analysis in terms of economic development level, as it had a US$15,000 GDP per 
capita in 2000 compared to an international average of US$5,041 (median), or $8,543.30 
(mean).   Taiwan also was an overachiever on two of the three dimensions of women?s 
status but an underachiever on the other one.  Taiwan had a fertility rate of 1.7, which 
was about half of the median (3.000) and mean (3.480) for all countries, suggesting a 
very good performance.  Taiwan also rated highly on the indicator of female political  
98 
 
Table 3.7  Descriptive Statistics of GDP per capita and the  
Three Indicators of Women?s Status 
 
 GDP per 
capita, 
2000 
Women?s 
Participation  
in Labor Force, 
2000 
Fertility Rate 
per Woman, 
late 1990s 
Women?s  
Per Cent of 
Parliamentary 
Seats, 2002 
 
N  Valid 173 163  167  162  
     Missing 1 11  7  12  
Mean $8,543.30 52.876  3.480  13.242  
Median $5,041.00 52.800  3.000  10.950  
Std. Deviation $8,956.857 14.4837  1.8466  8.7934  
Minimum $490 19.2  1.1  .0  
Maximum $50,061 82.8  8.0  42.7  
Taiwan $15,000 46.0  1.7  20.9  
     
Source: 174 countries? statistics of GDP per capita, women?s labor force participation rate, 
fertility rate, and women?s per cent of parliament seats are shown in Appendix B. 
 
 
participation since women held 20.9% of seats in parliament compared to an international 
average of 10.95% (median), or 13.24% (mean).  In contrast, Taiwan was clearly below 
average on women?s participation in the labor force.  Here, Taiwan?s rate of 46.0% was 
significantly below the international average of 52.8% (median), or 52.876% (mean). 
These comparisons use the average for all countries as the standard for 
benchmarking.  Yet, it is reasonable to assume that richer nations will have an advantage 
in many areas.  Thus, a more sophisticated approach to benchmarking is to control a 
nation?s level of affluence in the benchmarking process.  This can be done by using GDP 
per capita to explain national variations in a regression analysis and then measuring how 
99 
 
far a country falls above or below the regression line to indicate how much of an 
underachiever or overachiever it is.  This is called ?residuals analysis? because the 
emphasis is on the difference or residual between a country?s actual score and what the 
regression equation predicts its score should be based on its GDP per capita.  By using 
residual analysis, this section establishes benchmarks for evaluating an individual 
country?s performance on the indicators of women?s status relative to its economic 
resource base.   
Technically speaking, a residual is the difference between the observed value of 
the dependent variable and the value predicted by the regression line.  That is, the 
predicated value is seen as a ?benchmark? of ?normal achievement? when the 
independent or explanatory variable is a measure of resources or wealth, such as GDP per 
capita in this research.  The distance of a country above or below the regression line, 
therefore, indicates how well or poorly it is doing relative to its economic resources.  
Once the statistics pertaining to the linear regression of the two variables are calculated 
by SPSS, the regression equation, in turn, can yield the predicated value and the residual 
of each country.  Therefore, by comparing residuals, countries that have observed values 
better than the predicted ones can be considered ?overachievers.?  Conversely, when the 
actual values are worse than the predicated ones, a nation would be regarded as an 
?underachiever? (Chan and Clark, 1992). 
 
Residuals Analysis for Women?s Participation in Labor Force by GDP Per Capita  
Table 3.8 presents the statistics for the regression of ?Women?s Participation in 
100 
 
Labor Force? on ?GDP Per Capita.?  The correlation (Pearson?s r) is only a weak-to-
moderate -.25, but it is highly significant statistically.  Thus, women?s labor 
participation is slightly lower in richer nations.  The regression equation is: 
Y (women?s labor Force participation rate) = 56.361 ? 0.0003992 ? (GDP per capita) 
Consequently, because the GDP per capita for Taiwan in 2000 was $15,000, this 
regression equation predicts that Taiwan should have had a women?s labor force 
participation rate of 50.373: 
Y = 56.361 ? (0.0003992 ? 15,000) 
    = 50.373 
   
In reality, Taiwan was an underachiever because its actual rate was 46.0 or lower than 
the predicated value.  That is, the predicated women?s labor force participation rate of 
50.373 produces a benchmark of what would normally be expected for a country with 
the same level of economic development in terms of GDP per capita as Taiwan?s. 
 
Table 3.8  Statistics for the Regression of Women?s Labor Force Participation  
on GDP per capita 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
a        56.36 
b        -0.0004 
r           -.25 
Sig        .001 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
101 
 
Table 3.9 presents the 15 countries with the highest and lowest residuals (i.e., the 
differences between their actual and predicted values for women?s labor force 
participation) computed from the regression equation (see Appendix C for a list of the 
residuals for all 174 countries).  In other words, these are the greatest overachievers and 
underachievers.  Ten out of the 15 greatest overachievers in terms of women?s labor 
force participation are countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, Guinea, Kenya, and Eritrea), consistent with Ester 
Boserup?s argument that when agriculture is the dominant form of economic activity at 
low levels of economic development, women participate in the labor force in large 
numbers often as unpaid family workers on the family farm as well as carrying out 
subsistence tasks (Boserup, 1970).  Eleven out of the 15 greatest underachievers are 
countries in which Islam is the majority religion of the people (Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iran, Algeria, Sudan, and Pakistan).  Women 
living in these highly patriarchal societies tend to be excluded from economic activities 
and confined in the private sphere.  The other greatest underachievers, Belize, Malta, 
Ecuador, and Peru, have the majority of their populations practicing the Roman Catholic 
religion.  These societies with more traditional attitudes toward gender roles exhibit 
lower female labor force participation rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
Table 3.9  Greatest ?Overachievers? and ?Underachievers? on Women?s 
Participation in Labor Force Rate Given Their GDP?s Per Capita 
 
 
Country Women?s 
Participation in Labor 
Force Rate (%) 
 
Predicated value Residual 
Overachievers    
Mozambique                                                                                                                         82.8 56.020 26.7801 
Rwanda                                                                                                                               82.6 55.984 26.6156 
Burundi                                                                                                                              82.0 56.125 25.8751 
Tanzania                                                                                                                             81.8 56.152 25.6480 
Solomon Islands                                                                                                                      81.2 55.703 25.4971 
Cambodia                                                                                                                             80.4 55.784 24.6164 
Ghana                                                                                                                                80.1 55.577 24.5232 
Uganda                                                                                                                               79.5 55.879 23.6214 
Iceland                                                                                                                              66.6 44.552 22.0479 
Malawi                                                                                                                               77.9 56.115 21.7847 
Guinea                                                                                                                               77.3 55.570 21.7304 
Thailand                                                                                                                             73.3 53.805 19.4948 
Burkina Faso                                                                                                                         75.0 55.971 19.0288 
Kenya                                                                                                                                74.7 55.953 18.7472 
Eritrea                                                                                                                              74.7 56.027 18.6733 
    
Underachievers    
Oman                                                                    19.2 51.029 -31.8291 
Saudi Arabia                                                                                                                         21.2 51.823 -30.6231 
Libya                                                                                                                                25.0 53.339 -28.3389 
Jordan                                                                                                                               26.6 54.778 -28.1776 
Belize                                                                                                                               27.1 54.123 -27.0229 
Syria                                                                                                                                28.6 54.941 -26.3413 
Yemen                                                                                                                               30.5 56.004 -25.5043 
Lebanon                                                                                                                              29.6 54.641 -25.0411 
Iran                                                                                                                                 29.0 54.012 -25.0119 
Algeria                                                                                                                              29.5 54.242 -24.7419 
Malta                                                                                                                                25.8 49.465 -23.6655 
Ecuador                                                                                                                              32.7 55.082 -22.3822 
Sudan                                                                                                                                34.8 55.643 -20.8435 
Pakistan                                                                                                                             35.3 55.591 -20.2912 
Peru                                                                                                                                 34.5 54.445 -19.9451 
    
 
103 
 
Residuals Analysis for Fertility Rate by GDP Per Capita  
Table 3.10 presents the statistics for the regression of the ?Fertility Rate? on 
?GDP Per Capita.?  For this relationship, the correlation is a quite strong -.59. That is, 
fertility is lower in more developed countries.  The regression equation is 
                            Y = 4.522 ? 0.0001203X       
Y (predicated fertility rate) = 4.522 ? 0.0001203 ? (GDP per capita) 
 
Thus, this regression equation predicts that Taiwan should have had a fertility 
rate of 2.716 based on its GDP per capita of $15,000: 
Y = 4.522 ? (0.0001203 ? 15,000) 
    = 2.716 
 
In comparison to this benchmark, Taiwan?s actual fertility rate 1.7 was much lower than 
the predicated value.  This negative residual demonstrates that Taiwan was a significant 
overachiever on the total fertility rate given by its GDP per capita.      
 
Table 3.10  Statistics for the Regression of Fertility Rate on GDP per capita 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a        4.52 
b      -0.00012 
r         -.59 
Sig      .0004 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
104 
 
Table 3.11 lists the 15 countries with the highest positive residuals and the 15 
nations with the lowest negative residuals (see Appendix D for a list of the residuals for 
all 174 countries).  In general, countries with high negative residuals have created a more 
favorable situation for women than would have been predicated from just their GDP per 
capita, while women apparently would have a low quality of life in those with large 
positive residuals.  In addition to Sri Lanka, the other fourteen greatest overachievers in 
terms of fertility rate are communist and former communist countries, suggesting a 
legacy from these command economies that promoted a very high level of economic 
activity among women.  Although Sri Lanka had a low GDP per capita of $3,530, it rated 
as one of overachievers with a high negative residual due to an actual fertility rate of 2.1 
that equals the conventional replacement rate (United Nations, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2007).  Traditionally, Sri Lanka has attached 
great importance to education.  For example, it has higher literacy rates and high school 
enrollment ratios than other South Asian countries (Clark and Roy, 1997).  According to 
The World?s Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, at higher levels of education, all 
countries show a clear inverse relationship between educational attainment and fertility 
(United Nations, 2000). 
 Among the underachievers with much higher than predicted fertility rates, 
Luxembourg ranked the second with a residual of 3.2.  However, this resulted from its 
having the highest GDP per capita (US$50,061) in the world, which led to a negative 
predicated fertility rate of -1.503.  This is obviously nonsensical.  In contrast, most of the 
other underachievers were fairly poor African nations.  Taken together, these findings 
105 
 
Table 3.11  Greatest ?Overachievers? and ?Underachievers? on Fertility Rate  
Given Their GDP?s Per Capita 
 
Country Fertility Rate per 
Woman, late 1990s 
 
Predicated value Residual 
Overachievers    
Armenia                                                                                                                              1.4 4.214 -2.8136 
Ukraine                                                                                                                              1.3 4.062 -2.7623 
Bulgaria                                                                                                                             1.1 3.834 -2.7343 
Moldova                                                                                                                              1.6 4.268 -2.6677 
Georgia                                                                                                                              1.6 4.201 -2.6009 
Latvia                                                                                                                               1.1 3.674 -2.5737 
Romania                                                                                                                              1.3 3.749 -2.4485 
Belarus                                                                                                                              1.3 3.614 -2.3136 
Russia                                                                                                                               1.2 3.513 -2.3134 
Azerbaijan                                                                                                                           1.9 4.168 -2.2682 
China                                                                                                                                1.8 4.043 -2.2430 
Estonia                                                                                                                              1.2 3.310 -2.1101 
Macedonia                                                                                                                            1.9 3.909 -2.0094 
Sri Lanka                                                                                                                            2.1 4.097 -1.9967 
Poland                                                                                                                               1.5 3.432 -1.9322 
    
Underachievers    
Niger                                                                                                                                8.0 4.432 3.5682 
Luxembourg                                                                                                                           1.7          -1.503 3.2034 
Equatorial Guinea                                                                                                                    5.9 2.707 3.1925 
Yemen                                                                                                                               7.6 4.414 3.1859 
Saudi Arabia                                                                                                                         6.2 3.153 3.0465 
Angola                                                                                                                               7.2 4.258 2.9417 
Oman                                                                                                                                 5.8 2.914 2.8859 
Uganda                                                                                                                               7.1 4.376 2.7238 
Mali                                                                                                                                 7.0 4.426 2.5744 
Burkina Faso                                                                                                                         6.9 4.404 2.4959 
Ethiopia                                                                                                                             6.8 4.441 2.3588 
Malawi                                                                                                                               6.8 4.448 2.3525 
Burundi                                                                                                                              6.8 4.450 2.3496 
Congo Republic                                                                                                                            6.7 4.429 2.2705 
Chad                                                                                                                                 6.6 4.417 2.1833 
    
 
106 
 
imply that the relationship between fertility rate and GDP is significantly curvilinear; so 
that a linear equation somewhat distorts the predicted fertility rates for nations with 
extreme values on GDP per capita.     
 
 
Residuals Analysis for Women?s Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats by GDP Per Capita 
Table 3.12  Statistics for the Regression of Percentage of Women 
in the Legislature on GDP per capita 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
a        9.33 
b        0.00045 
r           .47 
Sig       .0004 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.12 presents the results for the regression of ?Women?s Per Cent of 
Parliamentary Seats? on ?GDP Per Capita.?  For the overall equation, there is a fairly 
strong positive correlation of .47.  That is, women?s parliamentary representation is 
better in more developed countries.  The regression equation is 
Y (women?s per cent of parliamentary seats) = 9.329 + 0.00045267 ? (GDP per capita) 
This regression equation predicts that women in Taiwan should hold 16.12% of 
the legislative seats: 
 
Y = 9.329 + (0.0028511 ? 15,000) 
    = 16.12 
107 
 
However, Taiwan?s actual value 20.9% was higher than the predicated value 16.12%.  
The positive residual of 4.78 shows that Taiwan was an overachiever on the percentage 
of women in the legislature based on its GDP per capita. 
Table 3.13 reports the greatest overachievers and underachievers for women?s 
parliamentary representation (see Appendix E for a list of the residuals for all 174 
countries).  The 15 overachievers include a perhaps surprising variety of nations:  1) five 
Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Iceland) plus New 
Zealand in the developed world; 2) several communist and former communist countries 
(Viet Nam, Turkmenistan, and Bulgaria); and 3) five African nations (Mozambique, 
South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania) plus Argentina in Latin America. 
As Chapter 2 describes in detail, institutional factors have been found to play an 
important role in improving women?s legislative representation.  For example, women 
candidates do considerably better in large multi-member electoral districts; and they 
especially benefit from electoral systems that provide minimum representation or quotas 
for women (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994).  Taiwan, for example, had both these 
conditions which were given credit for women?s strong improvement in winning 
legislative office over the postwar era (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Table 3.13  Greatest ?Overachievers? and ?Underachievers? on 
Women?s Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats Given Their GDP?s Per Capita 
 
 
Country Women's Per Cent of 
Parliamentary Seats, 2002 
Predicated value Residual 
 
Overachievers    
Sweden                                                                                                                               42.7 20.319 22.3809 
Mozambique                                                                                                                           30.0 9.716 20.2844 
Argentina                                                                                                                            31.3 14.932 16.3680 
South Africa                                                                                                                         29.8 13.585 16.2152
Denmark                                                                                                                              38.0 21.836 16.1643 
Rwanda                                                                                                                               25.7 9.756 15.9441 
Finland                                                                                                                              36.5 20.645 15.8554 
Viet Nam                                                                                                                             26.0 10.233 15.7674 
Turkmenistan                                                                                                                         26.0 11.120 14.8801 
Uganda                                                                                                                               24.7 9.876 14.8241 
Bulgaria                                                                                                                             26.2 11.914 14.2861 
Norway                                                                                                                               36.4 22.873 13.5272 
Tanzania                                                                                                                             22.3 9.566 12.7342 
New Zealand                                                                                                                          30.8 18.415 12.3854 
Iceland                                                                                                                              34.9 22.720 12.1798 
    
Underachievers    
United Arab Emirates                                                                                                                 0 17.448 -17.4481 
Kuwait                                                                                                                               0 16.481 -16.4812 
Luxembourg                                                                                                                           16.7 31.991 -15.2914 
Japan                                                                                                                                10.0 21.441 -11.4409 
South Korea                                                                                                                          5.9 17.197 -11.2969 
Equatorial Guinea                                                                                                                    5.0 16.153 -11.1525 
United States                                                                                                                        13.8 24.785 -10.9850
Italy                                                                                                                                9.1 20.024 -10.9244 
Vanuatu                                                                                                                              0 10.597 -10.5975 
Morocco                                                                                                                              0.5 10.934 -10.4343 
Djibouti                                                                                                                             0 10.405 -10.4051 
Solomon Islands                                                                                                                      0 10.075 -10.0751 
France                                                                                                                               10.9 20.295 -9.3947 
Ireland                                                                                                                              13.7 22.849 -9.1492 
Yemen                                                                                                                               0.7 9.733 -9.0333 
 
 
 
109 
 
This institutional explanation appears to be quite applicable to the overachievers 
in Table 3.13.  As shown in Table 3.14, two-thirds of them (10 out of 15) use the party-
list proportional representation system (PR), while only 4 out of the 15 greatest 
underachievers have PR systems.  The comparatively high percentage of women in these 
parliaments (24.7% to 42.7%) supports the argument that an electoral system based on 
the PR has a positive effect on women?s political representation.  Furthermore, the 
application of candidate quotas or reserved seats in Argentina, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Uganda, South Africa, and Tanzania strongly indicates that this ?fast track? is a powerful 
tool for increasing women?s political representation at the national level.  For example, 
women?s representation was as high as 30 percent in Mozambique, up from 16 percent in 
1991, and almost 30 percent in South Africa, up from 3 percent in 1991 (Tripp, 2001).  In 
addition, women?s share of legislative seats in Argentina jumped from 5.9 percent in 
1992 to 31.3 percent after the National Quota Law came into force in 1993 (Carrio, 2005, 
p. 167). 
On the other hand, what factors can explain women?s parliamentary 
underrepresentation in states with the greatest underachievement?  Here, a combination 
of general and specific forces appears to be at work.  First, an ingrained patriarchal 
culture can inhibit women?s participation in politics to a considerable extent.  In 
particular, five Arab states (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Morocco, Djibouti, and 
Yemen) were among the 15 greatest underachievers with zero or a very small percentage 
of women?s seats in parliaments.  Although the Arab world is not a homogeneous region 
and there is no single archetype for Arab women, traditionally the status of women is low  
110 
 
Table 3.14  The Electoral Systems of 15 Greatest Overachievers and  
15 Underachievers Countries Based on Female Parliamentary Representation  
Given by GDP Per Capita 
 
Country Electoral System  for National Legislature1 Electoral family 
Overachievers 
Sweden                                                                                                                               List PR PR 
Mozambique                                                                                                                           List PR PR 
Argentina                                                                                                                            List PR PR 
South Africa                                                                                                                         List PR PR 
Denmark                                                                                                                              List PR PR 
Rwanda                                                                                                                               List PR PR 
Finland                                                                                                                              List PR PR 
Viet Nam                                                                                                                             TRS Plurality/Majority 
Turkmenistan                                                                                                                         TRS Plurality/Majority 
Uganda                                                                                                                               FPTP Plurality/Majority 
Bulgaria                                                                                                                             List PR PR 
Norway                                                                                                                               List PR PR 
Tanzania                                                                                                                             FPTP Plurality/Majority 
New Zealand                                                                                                                          MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 
Iceland                                                                                                                              List PR PR 
Underachievers 
United Arab Emirates                                                                                                                 N2  
Kuwait                                                                                                                               BV Plurality/Majority 
Luxembourg                                                                                                                           List PR PR 
Japan                                                                                                                                Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 
South Korea                                                                                                                          Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 
Equatorial Guinea                                                                                                                    List PR PR 
United States                                                                                                                        FPTP Plurality/Majority 
Italy                                                                                                                                MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 
Vanuatu                                                                                                                              SNTV Other 
Morocco                                                                                                                              List PR PR 
Djibouti                                                                                                                             PBV Plurality/Majority 
Solomon Islands                                                                                                                      FPTP Plurality/Majority 
France                                                                                                                               TRS Plurality/Majority
Ireland                                                                                                                              STV PR 
Yemen                                                                                                                               FPTP Plurality/Majority
1 For countries with bicameral legislatures, system for the lower house. 
2 No provisions for direct elections. 
Key: FPTP-First Past the Post; TRS-Two Round System; BV-Block Vote; PBV-Party Block Vote; 
Parallel-Parallel System; MMP-Mixed Member Proportional; List PR-List Proportional Representation; 
STV-Single Transferable Vote; SNTV-Single Non-Transferable Vote. 
Source: Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis.  2005.  Electoral System Design: The New 
International IDEA Handbook.  Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA). 
 
111 
 
in Arab countries because of the combination of patriarchy, conservative religion, 
tribalism, and the public-private divide.  Female labor force participation in this region is 
generally low; and women?s political office-holding is even lower (Sabbagh, 2005).  For 
example, the Kuwaiti cabinet granted women the right to vote and run for public 
officeonly in 2005 (Palmieri and Jabre, 2005, p. 218).  Not surprisingly, there are no 
women serving in the Kuwait parliament (see Table 3.13).  Similarly, the influence of 
patriarchal culture can be applied to explain women?s gross underrepresentation in 
Equatorial Guinea.  According to the country report by Freedom House, ?Constitutional 
and legal guarantees of equality for women are largely ignored, and violence against 
women is reportedly widespread.  Traditional practices including primogeniture and 
polygamy discriminate against women.  Abortion is permitted to preserve the health of 
the mother, but only with spousal or parental authorization? (Freedom House, 2010). 
Second, according to a worldwide comparative analysis by Kenworthy and 
Malami, ?the timing of women?s suffrage? is persistently related to women?s political 
representation, with earlier suffrage associated with larger women?s shares in parliament 
(Kenworthy and Malami, 1999).  This finding can be utilized for interpreting why there is 
no parliamentary seat held by a woman in Vanuatu or the Solomon Islands.  These are 
new nations that were established between 1977 and 1993; so that women have only 
recently been granted the right to vote (Palmieri and Jabre, 2005, p. 218).   
Third, the atypically low representation of women in Japan and South Korea 
appears to reflect institutional features in addition to their widely cited traditional 
patriarchal cultures.  For example, Ray Christensen argues that campaign activities in 
112 
 
Japan have been severely restricted by laws and regulations, so that candidates rely 
heavily on personal political support groups called koenkai.  However, Japanese women 
have been at a tremendous disadvantage in creating and leading such political machines 
due to social and political reasons.  As a result, in spite of being one of the advanced 
industrial democracies, Japan is notorious for women?s underrepresentation in the lower 
house (Christensen, 2000).  Likewise, Rose J. Lee shows the importance of institutional 
factors by comparing South Korea and Taiwan in terms of women?s political 
representation.  She indicates that these two countries share many characteristics, such as 
patriarchal Confucian cultures, a long postwar period of authoritarianism, rapid economic 
growth and industrialization starting in the 1960s, and the transition and consolidation of 
democracy since the late 1980s.  However, their records of women?s representation in 
politics are sharply different.  Throughout the postwar era, women?s political 
representation in South Korea has been very low, falling in the 1 to 3 percent range at 
both the national and local levels.  By contrast, over the same period, owing to the 
application of a reserved seats system, women?s representation in Taiwan at both the 
national and local levels reached the 15-to-20 percent range.  Accordingly, Lee suggested 
that, in a highly patriarchal society, a legislated minimum level of representation for 
women will encourage women?s political participation and, in turn, promote women?s 
office-holding (Lee, 2000). 
Finally, women?s underrepresentation in Japan is not a unique case among 
advanced countries.  In the residuals analysis, the western societies of Luxembourg, the 
United States, Italy, France, and Ireland are ranked among the greatest underachievers.  
113 
 
Cultural factors appear to provide at least a partial explanation for women?s low levels of 
political representation in the four European countries (the heavily Catholic France, 
Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg).  In a comparative study, Margaret Inglehart found that 
women?s political activism was lower in the Catholic than in the Protestant countries of 
Western Europe and suggested that this was because the Catholic Church was more 
hierarchical and authoritarian in nature than the Protestant churches (Margaret Inglehart, 
1979; cited from Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 134).  In particular, the Catholic Church 
remains quite traditional on women?s roles.           
A more detailed case study of France, furthermore, indicates that the 
underrepresentation of women there results from a combination of cultural and 
institutional factors.  In Europe, French women were among the last to be granted the 
right to vote and to stand for election when they gained these rights under the ordinance 
of 21 April 1944 (Sineau, 2005, p. 122).  According to a case study by French political 
scientist Mariette Sineau, a number of historical factors explain why women in France 
have never held more than a marginal position in national legislature.  The 1789 French 
Revolution legitimized the notion that women were not competent to conduct public 
affairs which hindered their ability to participate in politics for over 150 years.  In 
addition, women are marginalized in the Fifth Republic (1958) because of its single-
member district system for the parliamentary elections.  Sineau argues that this system 
gives a political premium to the notables (usually men) in French society and, thus, 
indirectly discriminates against women.  That is, in selecting their candidates, the parties 
tend to choose the most well-known personality, who already holds a local office in the 
114 
 
district.  Unfortunately, women have been largely excluded from local politics and have 
not been able to make the first step in a standard French political career.  Moreover, most 
of the appointed high-level civil servants are trained in distinguished educational 
institutions, such as the Ecole Nationale d?Administration, all of which are male 
institutions par excellence.  Further, Sineau suggests that the feminist movement of the 
1970s must also bear a share of the responsibility for these institutional constraints.  
French feminists expected change to come from social movements, not political parties.  
As a result, for a long time women in France have been underrepresented in the 
leadership of the parties as well as in government office-holding.  Additionally, Sineau 
contends that a final barrier to the political representation of women in France is judicial.  
In 1982, the country?s highest judicial organ (the Constitutional Council) struck down a 
provision which was meant to institutionalize a maximum of 75 percent representation 
for either sex on the list of candidates contesting municipal elections in cities with a 
population over 3,500.  Sineau argues that by setting this precedent the judicial decision 
clouded the outlook for reforms promoting women?s candidacies (Sineau, 2005, p. 122-
124; Lovenduski, 2010, p. 85).     
The data on the underachievers in Table 13.3 also support the importance of 
institutional factors, such as the nature of the electoral system.  For example, the 
disproportionately low number of women in the U.S. House of Representatives is caused, 
not just by the negative effects of male incumbency and slow turnover, but also by 
America?s single-member district system which is widely regarded as the major factor 
retarding women?s chances to gain office at the national level (Norris, 1993; Darcy, 
115 
 
Welch, and Clark, 1994).  In addition, Richard E. Matland argues that some PR systems 
are preferable to others.  PR systems that guarantee high party magnitudes through a 
combination of high district magnitudes and electoral thresholds are expected to be 
superior for women.  That is to say, just having a PR system is not sufficient.  Ireland, for 
example, which uses the Single Transferable Vote (STV) form of PR, has very small 
district magnitudes (between three and five members) and, therefore, has lower levels of 
female representation than even such plurality/majority systems as Canada, Australia and 
the United Kingdom (Matland, 2005, p. 106-107). 
 
4.  Conclusions 
This chapter tested the theoretical model that was developed in Chapter 2 to 
explain why the status of women is better in some societies than in others.  This statistical 
analysis found that patriarchal culture, economic development level, and the degree of 
democratization exert fairly strong influences over some dimensions of women?s status 
but have little association with others.  In addition, the residuals analysis of the 15 
greatest overachievers and underachievers on women?s labor force participation, fertility 
rate, and legislative representation confirmed the complex effects that cultural, economic, 
and political factors exert on the status of women in national societies.  This implies that 
the nature of women?s status is complicated because each nation has its own 
circumstances that are shaped by its historical background, level of economic 
development, degree of democratization (including regime types), religious affiliation, 
traditional culture, geographical location, and so on.  It could be argued that these factors 
116 
 
influence women?s lives in each country, negatively or positively, in fairly unique 
combinations.  Therefore, case studies of individual countries should provide valuable 
insights into the dynamics of women?s changing status in the contemporary world.  In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I will focus on exploring the social, economic, and political statuses of 
women in Taiwan.  This nation should provide an interesting case study since it is an 
overachiever with respect to fertility rate and legislative representation, but an 
underachiever on women?s participation in labor force.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF TAIWAN 
 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Taiwan was a poor, primarily agricultural 
society that was ruled by an oppressive authoritarian regime.  Over the course of the 
postwar era, the country has experienced very substantial development and 
transformation in both the economic and political realms.  The pattern of economic and 
political change was quite different, though.  Economic development was fairly 
continuous and cumulative; and by the 1980s Taiwan was widely recognized as having 
experienced an ?economic miracle.?  In contrast, there was little political reform until the 
1980s, but Taiwan then experienced a very successful democratic transition in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  There are five sections in this chapter.  The first one briefly 
introduces Taiwan.  The next four describe the major stages of Taiwan?s transformation 
from a poor agricultural and authoritarian country to an exporter of high-tech products, 
post-industrial society, and young democratic nation, as a background for analyzing the 
status of women in Taiwan in chapter 5. 
 
1.  An Introduction to Taiwan 
Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China (ROC), is situated in the 
118 
 
western Pacific between temperate Japan to the north, subtropical Southern China to the 
west, and the tropical Philippines to the south.  It lies on major sea and air transportation 
routes in this region.  This ocean nation comprises the main island of Taiwan, the 
archipelagoes of Penghu (the Pescadores), Quemoy, and Matsue, and a number of small 
islands.  It has a combined area of approximately 36,000 sq. km (13,900 sq. miles).  Only 
about one-fourth of the land is cultivatable because nearly two-thirds of the main island, 
Taiwan, is mountainous.  Thus, the population is concentrated on the west coast where 
the largest wide flatland lies.  Although the land?s natural fertility has been depleted due 
to intensive farming for several centuries, Taiwan?s tropical-to-temperate spectrum of 
climatic zones and generally abundant rainfall provides an excellent agricultural 
environment for producing multiple cropping by using chemical fertilizer (Chiao-min 
Hsieh, 1964, cited from Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 34; ROC, 2005; ROC, 2008a). 
 The population of Taiwan was 22.958 million in 2007, which was one of the most 
densely populated nations in the world (638 persons per sq. km).  Han Chinese make up 
the vast majority of people (about 98 percent); and the remaining minority are composed 
of Austronesia indigenous groups.  The so-called Taiwanese of today are descended from 
successive waves of immigrants belonging to different subgroups that started arriving in 
Taiwan in the 17th century.  The majority of these early immigrants were Holo from 
southern Fujian province and Hakka from eastern Guangdong province.  In addition, after 
50 years of Japanese colonialism ended in 1945, the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist 
government moved to Taiwan and brought about 1.3 million immigrants from all parts of 
the Mainland to the island after its defeat in the civil war in Mainland China in 1949.  
119 
 
They are known as Mainlanders (ROC, 2005; ROC, 2008a). 
Although the official language of Taiwan is Mandarin Chinese, which has been 
the language of instruction in the education system after 1949, most Taiwanese also speak 
Holo Taiwanese (also known as Taiwanese or Minnanese), except for two counties, 
Hsinchu and Miaoli, where the Hakka dialect is spoken.  The Austronesia languages are 
spoken by the indigenous peoples, but are slowly disappearing due to cultural 
assimilation (ROC, 2005). 
In 2007, Taiwan was the world?s 24th-largest economy among 181 economies 
ranked by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook Data 
base, April 2008.  In the same year, the World Trade Organization (WTO) statistics 
indicated that Taiwan was the world?s 16th-largest merchandise exporter and 17th-largest 
merchandise importer, with a trade surplus of US$27.43 billion.  At the end of 2007, 
Taiwan had the world?s fifth-largest foreign exchange reserves, amounting to US$270.31 
billion.  Moreover, Taiwan had a nominal GDP per capita of nearly US$16,800, the 38th-
highest among the 181 ranked economies in the aforementioned IMF database.  In terms 
of purchasing power parity (PPP), this was equivalent to more than US$30,000.  With 
regard to contributions to the GDP (US$383.3 billion) by sector in 2007, services, 
industry, and agriculture were 71.05 per cent, 27.50 per cent, and 1.45 per cent, 
respectively.  In 2007, 10.29 million people participated in the labor force, 57.9 per cent 
of them were employed in the service sector, 36.8 per cent in industry, and 5.3 per cent in 
agriculture (ROC, 2008a, p. 98-100). 
Before the 17th century, Taiwan was an isolated, neglected, and underdeveloped 
120 
 
island.  However, during the age of mercantilism and maritime conquest by Europeans, 
Taiwan attracted world attention because of its geographical location and natural 
resources.  In 1590, Portuguese navigators arrived off the coast of Taiwan.  They were 
impressed by its majestic green mountains rising steeply out of the deep blue waters of 
the Pacific and exclaimed ?Ilha Formosa,? meaning ?beautiful island.?  Thus, the island 
has been known as Formosa in the West for centuries.  Unlike the Portuguese six-week 
stay, the Dutch and the Spanish colonized parts of northern and southern Taiwan.  During 
the thirty-eight-year Dutch rule of Taiwan (1624-1662), the Dutch East India Company 
used the island as a base for its Asian trade, linking this trade with its worldwide 
commercial networks.  Moreover, Dutch Protestant missionaries introduced both 
Christianity and the Latin writing system to the island?s aborigines.  Beginning in 1626, 
the Spanish established small settlements in northern Taiwan to challenge the Dutch 
dominance of the Asian trade.  In September 1642, the Spanish garrison was defeated by 
a Dutch force and expelled from Formosa.  In 1662, Jheng Cheng-gong, a leading Ming 
loyalist, defeated the Dutch and set up a government on Taiwan to defy the Manchurians 
who had established the Qing dynasty on the Chinese mainland.  The Qing dynasty 
conquered Taiwan in 1683 and ruled it until 1895 when Taiwan and the Pescadores were 
ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895).  Taiwan was colonized by Japan for 50 years.  Following Japan?s defeat and 
surrender in August, 1945, at the end of the World War II, the Republic of China assumed 
authority over Taiwan on October 25 (Eto, 1964; Davison, 2003; Tsai, 2009). 
During the postwar era, Taiwan?s economy and politics went through a series of 
121 
 
transformations that resulted in a superior economical performance, and the creation of a 
fledgling democracy, in turn, created opportunities for many women, in general, to have 
better lives.  Chronologically, four periods of major historical, social, economic, and 
political transformations can be discerned: (1) from 1945 to the 1950s when both an 
authoritarian regime and the transformation away from an agricultural economy were 
consolidated; (2) the early 1960s to the early 1970s when the "export boom" advanced 
the economy and set off significant social changes as well; (3) the mid 1970s to the late 
1980s when substantial industrial upgrading occurred that was accompanied by the 
emergence of a middle class society and the launching of political liberalization; (4) the 
late 1980s to present when full democracy was finally achieved but the country was also 
challenged by an ongoing transformation from an industrial to an ?information age? 
economy. 
 
2.  From 1945 to the 1950s 
According to the research by Chen Shao-hsing, a leading sociologist at Taiwan 
National University, statistical data show that Taiwan had economically and socially 
advanced during Japanese colonial rule.  The years from 1926 to 1940 presented a 
tremendous increase in the output of agricultural products which reached its peak on the 
eve of the World War II.  Meanwhile, Taiwan?s social and intellectual development was 
also promoted by economic development.  By 1943, about 70 per cent of children of legal 
school age were officially enrolled in schools.  The literacy rate (about 80 per cent) was 
second only to Japan in Asia.  Medical education, one of the few advanced fields open to 
122 
 
Taiwanese, presented a good example of modernization.  By 1935, 90 per cent of the 
death certificates required by law were issued by doctors of western medicine.  Labor and 
peasant unions, political parties, and literacy movements mushroomed in Taiwan during 
the 1920s under the influence of Japanese liberalism, Wilsonian ideals, and the May 
Fourth Movement on the China mainland, although these civil societies were put down 
after the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s (Chen Shao-hsing, 1955; cited from 
Mancall, 1964, p. 2-4).   
However, despite the fact that economic and social advancement had occurred, 
the Taiwanese resented the political, social, and economic restrictions due to Japanese 
colonial control.  Therefore, initially, Taiwanese welcomed the island?s return to China 
and looked forward to participating as full citizens of the ROC with great enthusiasm 
(Gold, 1985, p. 90; Tien, 1989, p. 36; Metraux, 1991, p 28).  Regretfully, contrary to 
expectations, after eighteen months, Taiwanese openly revolted against the Nationalist 
administration. 
At the end of World War II, mainland China?s economy was in a very bad 
condition because of intermittent warfare for decades.  Worse, the Chinese Nationalist 
army, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was fighting the growing communist revolution which 
revived in 1946.  At this juncture in Taiwan, in addition to approximately US$2 billion 
worth of civilian properties, Japan handed over enormous stockpiles of foodstuffs, 
medicine, and arms and ammunition to the Chinese Nationalists.  Moreover, Governor-
General Chen Yi, who was appointed by Chiang, took over and expanded the Japanese 
system of state monopolies in tobacco, sugar, camphor, tea, paper, chemicals, petroleum 
123 
 
refining, and cement (Tsai, 2009, p. 175-176).  Before long, Taiwan?s resources, raw 
materials and dismantled factories were shipped off to mainland China by opportunists, 
carpetbaggers, and government agencies charged with confiscating assets.  Besides, 
occupying Mainlanders tended to treat the local Taiwanese as collaborators who had 
prospered under Japanese colonial era while the Chinese had a hard time resisting 
Japanese invaders during the eight-year Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).  In the public 
realm, Taiwanese were relegated to the lowest positions, while Chen Yi moved into the 
S?tokufu building (Today?s presidential building of the ROC) and staffed his 
administration with Mainlanders and token Taiwanese, or so called ?half-mountains,?  
who had spent the war years in China (Kerr, 1965; Gold, 1985; Tien, 1989; Tsai, 2009). 
Economic mismanagement and political retrogression, the mix of corruption, 
lawlessness, plundering, high inflation, shortages of daily necessities, high 
unemployment, and disease created a chaotic environment in Taiwan; and the suffering 
and helpless Taiwanese were on the verge of insurrection.  The tension finally exploded 
on the evening of February 27, 1947, following an incident in Taipei where a widow was 
beaten while resisting arrest for selling untaxed cigarettes at the black market, and one 
bystander was killed in the commotion.  Crowds rioted throughout the island, seizing 
police stations, radio stations, arms, and killing a number of post-1945 immigrants from 
the mainland China.  The following week, while reformist protests flared throughout 
Taiwan, some Taiwanese leaders organized the February 28 Incident Settlement 
Committee and tried to negotiate with Chen Yi?s administration in order to end the riot.  
Ostensibly, a compromise between Chen Yi and the ad hoc committee settled the crisis.  
124 
 
In reality, upon arrival on March 8, the KMT troops launched a massacre.  Some of the 
killings were random, while others were systematic.  Particularly, Taiwanese elites and 
professionals were targeted.  Many of the Taiwanese who had formed home rule groups 
during the Japanese colonial period were also victims of the 228 Incident.  The total 
number of Taiwanese killed in 1947 ranged from 10,000 to 20,000, if those who 
disappeared and prisoners presumed dead are included (Kerr, 1965; Gold, 1985; Tien, 
1989; Tsai, 2009). 
Chen Yi was quickly replaced by Wei Tao-ming, a former Chinese ambassador to 
the United States.  In 1950, Chen was executed in Taipei for treason because he attempted 
to join the communists.  While the Taiwanese activists searched for international support, 
the KMT was defeated by Mao Zedong?s liberation army in China.  In 1949, Chiang Kai-
shek and his KMT regime, together with more than a million Nationalist soldiers, 
officials, supporters, and refugees fled to Taiwan.  In addition to the declaration of 
Martial law, which expanded the scope of power of the Taiwan Garrison Command and 
suspended the protection of individual rights guaranteed in the 1946 Constitution, all 
aspects of the public were completely controlled under the party-military organ directed 
by Chiang Kai-shek.  Moreover, the KMT secret police, under the leadership of Chiang 
Ching-Kuo (Chiang Kai-shek?s son) interrogated and terrorized tens of thousands of 
?Taiwanese independents? and Communist elements and those who criticized the KMT 
and the Chiang family.  In this so-called ?white terror,? victims included both Taiwanese 
and Mainlanders (Gold, 1985; Taylor, 2000). 
The United States publicly abandoned Chiang?s regime in Taiwan on January 5, 
125 
 
1950, while it was not yet clear what kind of relationship would be developed with 
Communist China.  On June 25, North Korea?s Kim Il-sung invaded South Korea.  
President Harry Truman was forced to reverse the American hands-off policy toward the 
KMT and sent the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to protect the ROC.  Due to 
the anti-Communist containment policy, the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Security 
Act in the fall of 1951.  Under this policy, economic aid and military support were to be 
resumed (Tsai, 2009, p. 179-186). 
In the political arena, the first phrase of Taiwan?s postwar transformation was 
strongly shaped by the imposition of authoritarian rule over the island with repression 
and terror.  In addition, political power was concentrated in the hands of Mainlanders, 
who were about 15 per cent of the population, whereas Taiwanese were treated as 
?second class citizens? in their own land.  While the one-party dictatorship was strongly 
authoritarian, it imperceptibly did include several situations that helped to promote 
democratization several decades later because of a ?bottom-up? effect.  The ruling KMT 
party incorporated existing social and political groups and factions into the low levels of 
the regime.  It also allowed local elections which the central party-state, acting as a 
mediator, skillfully manipulated to control local political factions or play one off against 
another.  However, contested elections among competing KMT factions were quite 
intense in many localities; consequently, many opponents of the Kuomintang, officially 
classified as independents, ran and were elected.  Gradually, ?Taiwanization? of all level 
of elections occurred in the process of democratization (Chou, Clark and Clark, 1990, p. 
49; Copper, 1997; Clark and Clark, 2002). 
126 
 
In this stage, Taiwan?s economic situation, in contrast, showed a number of 
positive reforms and transformation.  In the early 1950s, the government implemented 
three major policies that helped stimulate the initial steps in development: taming 
inflation, introducing a radical land reform program, and carrying out an import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy. 
Almost certainly, the most damaging economic indicator in the immediate post-
war period was inflation.  The Taipei wholesale price index increased 260 per cent in 
1946, 360 per cent in 1947, 520 per cent in 1948, and 3,500 per cent in 1949 (Ho, 1978).  
The KMT regime realized that the runaway inflation of the late 1940s had been a major 
reason for its defeat in the civil war and moved quickly to stop inflation in Taiwan.  
Monetary and fiscal stabilization measures were imposed to slow the spiraling inflation, 
including a thorough monetary reform, preferential interest rates on deposits, tight control 
on the money supply, and strict government budgets.  These policies successfully tamed 
inflation? consumer price increases dropped to 30 per cent in 1951-1952 and 10 per cent 
or less a year by the mid-1950s, bringing about a stable environment for development 
(Kuo, 1983; Li, 1988). 
During this stage, probably the most important changes came from the radical 
land reform that was implemented in three steps between 1949 and 1953.  Step one, ?rent 
reduction?, was initiated in 1949 and limited farm rents to a maximum of 37.5 per cent of 
the total annual yield of the major crop.  Traditionally, the tenure arrangement was 
sharecropping.  Taiwan?s tenants, about half the farming population, paid 40-60 per cent 
of their output to landlords as rent according to the quality of land.  The ?sales of public 
127 
 
lands to actual tillers? program was implemented as the second step.  Public farmer land, 
which had formerly belonged to the Japanese government and individuals and had been 
transferred to the Nationalist government, was sold to tenant farmers. The price was set at 
2.5 times the annual yield of principal crops and the payment was to be paid in twenty 
installments over a period of ten years.  Totally, more than 71,000 hectares were sold 
between 1948 and 1958.  The third step of the land reform process occurred in 1953, the 
land to the tiller program.  It took from landlords all land in excess of three chias (2.91 
hectares, one chia = .97 hectare), and in turn the government resold these lands at the 
same price described above to the present cultivators.  Landlords were compensated 70 
per cent with land bonds in kind (rice for paddy land, sweet potatoes for dry land) and 30 
per cent with shares of four state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including Taiwan Cement, 
Taiwan Paper and Pulp, Taiwan Agriculture and Forestry, and Taiwan Industry and 
Mining (Ho, 1978; Gold, 1985). 
In 1950, the vast majority of Taiwanese were farmers.  The radical land reform, 
coupled with sizable investments in agriculture supported by US aid and a large-scale 
agricultural extension program conducted by the Sino-American Joint Commission on 
Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), created a productive agricultural sector.  The average 
growth was 5 per cent a year in the 1950s and 4.5 per cent a year in the 1960s.  
Agricultural development created resources to finance the initial industrialization through 
tax payment in kind, the fertilizer-rice barter system (the forced barter of rice for fertilizer 
at state-dictated prices), and the monopoly of sugar refining.  In addition, during the 
1950s, agricultural exports increased rapidly enough to keep the trade deficit acceptable.  
128 
 
Although a part of farmers? yield was squeezed to foster the industrial sector and to 
support the rest of the economy, increased production, products diversity, and innovation 
in farming helped increase farmers? income, which thus improved their living standard, 
greatly reduced the country?s economic and social inequality, and provided resources for 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Lee, 1971; Ho, 1978; Thorbecke, 1979). 
In the industrial sector, the KMT government adopted an import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) path to spur its infant industry, focusing on manufacturing light 
industrial products.  That is, imported manufactures were replaced by domestic 
production.   While high tariffs and quotas were used to discourage imports, ISI 
industries received targeted loans, and the government tightly controlled new entrants.  
Initially, three industries were earmarked for expansion: chemical fertilizer, plastics, and 
textiles.  Later, the synthetic fibers, glass, and food processing industries were added to 
the list.  The ISI policy brought about real industrial growth which averaged over 10 per 
cent a year during the 1950s.  The ratio of imports to total production in manufactured 
goods fell sharply; and total energy consumption (a leading indicator of industrial 
development) more than doubled between 1952 and 1958 (Ho, 1978; Galenson, 1979; 
Cheng, 2001, p. 26; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 38). 
In addition to the three major policies mentioned above, a program of six-year 
compulsory primary education for school-age children 6-12 years old continued and 
universalized the policy existing in the Japanese era and proved to be extremely 
successful in developing the ROC?s human capital (Ho, 1978, p. 99-100; Cheng 2001, p. 
24).  Also, at this stage, the Nationalist government substantially increased its economic 
129 
 
leadership capability by recruiting technocrats, most of them had been educated at 
leading U.S. universities, into the top level of government.  These technocrats played a 
critical role in making public policies that laid the foundation for Taiwan?s continued 
economic development (Gold, 1985; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 49).  
 
3.  From the early 1960s to the early 1970s 
Although the initial effects of the inward-oriented path appeared quite positive, 
this developmental strategy showed its limitations very soon.   As ISI output in non-
durable consumer good sectors exhausted the domestic market demand, economic growth 
slowed down and in turn created an unemployment problem.  In addition, by the late 
1950s, it was clear that the United States would terminate aid to Taiwan in 1965 (in 
reality, the U.S. aid continued until 1968).  To overcome these problems, under the 
persuasion of Chinese-American economists and the aid agency as well as the suggestion 
from technocrats, the ROC government made a major change in development policy, 
shifting from a domestic raw materials or land-based to an imported raw materials and 
labor-intensive pattern of production and exports.  That is, the ISI trajectory was 
gradually replaced by export-oriented industrialization (EOI) track (Ranis, 1979, p. 221; 
Ho, 1978, p. 195-196; Gold, 1985, p.76-78).   
To start this strategy, the Nineteen-Point Program of Economic and Financial 
Reform was promulgated in 1960.  The program included a number of measures designed 
to encourage saving and private investment, to remove subsides, to increase public utility 
rates, to liberalize trade regulation, to unify the multiple exchange rate system, and to 
130 
 
curb military expenditures (Ho, 1978; Gold, 1985, Li, 1988).  Further, the 1961 Statute 
for Encouragement of Investment facilitated the acquisition of plant sites and provided 
production incentives by tax exemptions and deductions.  However, the response of 
industry to export expansion in the early 1960s was slow.  The breakthrough came in 
1964 when General Instruments from the U.S. established a bonded electronics factory 
near Taipei.  Its rapid success demonstrated the potential of offshore assembly in Taiwan 
to other multinational corporations (MNCs).  As a result, seven more were set up in 1964 
and seventeen in 1965.  In 1965, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment was 
revised and its scope extended.  The next year, the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ), which is located beside a modern harbor, was formally opened, although 
exporting from this zone had begun before.  Subsequently, since applications from 
investors flooded in, the government set up two other EPZs in 1969, Nantze in Kaohsiung 
and Taichung in central Taiwan.  Within EPZs, no duties were imposed on imports and 
the administrative procedures were simplified (Ranis, 1979; Gold, 1985; Kuo, Ranis, and 
Fei, 1981).  
The export promotion strategy proved to be very successful.  Real GNP growth 
accelerated to a very high average of 11 per cent annually during 1963-1973.  Moreover, 
this rapid growth produced a fundamental shift in the production structure.  Between 
1958 and 1973, the share of the manufacturing sector in net domestic product (NDP) 
more than doubled from 16 per cent to 36 per cent, while that of the agricultural sector 
declined from 31 per cent to 14 per cent.  Likewise, the share of the total labor force 
participating in agriculture and related industries declined from 49 per cent to 31 per cent, 
131 
 
and that engaged in the industrial sector, including transportation and communication, 
rose from 15 per cent to 35 per cent.  In other words, these shifts meant the extensive 
movement of labor, capital, and enterprises from the more slowly growing sectors to the 
more rapidly growing sectors.  Furthermore, the export-oriented development brought a 
dramatic change in the ROC?s balance of trade.  The large deficits of the late 1950s and 
early 1960 were transformed into surpluses by the early 1970s (Kuznets, 1979; Chou, 
Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 36).   
During this period, some changes and transformations had occurred under the 
influence of export expansion and industrialization.  First, the high growth rates 
generated higher incomes, which helped increase domestic saving and in turn accelerated 
investment.  Saving as a proportion of GNP hovered around 9 per cent from 1952 to 1956, 
and skyrocketed from 12 per cent in 1962 to 22 per cent in 1968 to 33 per cent in 1973.  
This huge jump increased the investment rate from 18 per cent of GNP in the early 1960s 
to 25 per cent over the rest of the decade.  According to W. W. Rostow (Rostow, 1961), a 
country?s development will enter the ?take off? stage when its net investment comprises 
more than 10 per cent of the national income.  Taiwan?s economy began to meet this 
required condition by 1963.  Although multinational corporations (MNCs) were an 
engine to start Taiwan?s export-oriented economic development, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) only accounted for less than 1 per cent of total investment during 1950s, 
about 4 per cent between 1960 and 1967, and 9 per cent at the beginning of the 1970s.  
However, foreign investors, mainly coming from the United States and Japan, were 
significant conduits for technology transfer that helped upgrade Taiwan?s industries.  
132 
 
MNCs also had the effect of fostering small local firms as component suppliers that led to 
supporting the private sector without nurturing big capital as well as proliferating small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Little, 1979, p. 476; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 40; 
Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981, p. 27; Gold, 1985, p. 79-87).   
Second, at first, food processing was the most important leading export.  In the 
1960s, it was overtaken by textiles.  At the same time, the electronics production emerged 
and consequently grew rapidly in the 1970s.  That is, from the 1950s to the early 1970s, 
Taiwan?s export products diversified, and the dominant industries shifted due to the 
influence of a dynamic global market and international product cycle (Gold, 1985).  Third, 
economic development in Taiwan resulted from a pattern of decentralized, labor-intensive 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which were flexible and could quickly respond to 
and adjust to rapid changes in the international market conditions.  Scholars invented the 
term ?guerrilla capitalism? to describe SMEs? aggressive and audacious entrepreneurship 
(Lam and Lee, 1992).  Fourth, both local and foreign firms were involved in labor-
intensive manufacturing during this phrase.  Manufacturing employment could expand 
rapidly in a short period of time because women entered the industrial labor force in large 
numbers.  According to data from the industrial and commercial censuses, the ratio of 
male to female workers in manufacturing in 1954 was 2.49 to 1.  From 1954 to 1961, 38 
per cent of the increase in manufacturing employment was female; from 1961 to 1966, 54 
per cent; and from 1966 to 1971, 57 per cent.  As a result, the ratio of male to female 
working in manufacturing declined to 2.18 to 1 in 1961, 1.69 to 1 in 1966, and 1.13 to 1 
in 1971.  From 1954 to 1966, 82 per cent of increase in female labor force participation in 
133 
 
manufacturing was absorbed by four industries: food processing (26.2 per cent), 
chemicals and chemical products (11.3 per cent), textiles (31.6 per cent), and electrical 
equipment (12.5 per cent).  Textiles had always employed a higher percentage of women, 
while other industries gradually reduced the ratio of male to female workers.  From 1966 
to 1971, 60 per cent of the increase in women?s employment in manufacturing was 
absorbed by two industries: textile and apparel (43 per cent) and electrical equipment (17 
per cent) (Ho, 1978, p. 211).   
Finally, until the lifting of Martial law in 1987, workers in Taiwan could not strike.  
This orderly, disciplined, and docile work force was a major element for the 
industrialization push.  Human capital also qualitatively improved during the EOI period.  
Beginning in 1968, the Executive Yuan extended the numbers of years of compulsory 
schooling from six to nine.  As a result, the enrollment ratio of the twelve to seventeen-
year-old age group dramatically increased: from 49 per cent to 71.5 per cent for males 
and 32 per cent to 60 per cent for females (Shih, 1972; cited from Galenson, 1979, p. 
397).  Moreover, in 1972, the government established the National Vocational Training 
Fund, which was financed by a payroll tax of 1.5 per cent.  Accordingly, a number of 
firms and factories set up on-the-job training or apprenticeship training programs, often 
in cooperation with vocational schools (Galenson, 1979, p. 399-401). 
  While the ?export boom? dramatically improved Taiwan?s economy and set off 
significant social changes as well, there was no comparably simultaneous political 
relaxation.  In 1960, Lei Chen (a mainlander) and others were jailed on the eve of the 
formation of the opposition China Democratic Party.  The next year, the authoritarian 
134 
 
regime sentenced Taiwanese assemblyman Su Tung-chi to life in prison for allegedly 
plotting an armed rebellion.  In 1964, Pen Ming-min, a Taiwan University professor, and 
two of his students were arrested for attempting to distribute anti-KMT materials.  Thus, 
political opposition activists were badly shaken by these events and stopped trying to 
organize or lead political liberalization.  The only challenge to the authoritarian regime 
came from individuals who ran against KMT candidates in provincial and local elections.  
However, these local-level elections still could be manipulated by other means.  For 
example, non-KMT Taiwanese Kao Yu-shu (Henry Kao) was twice elected mayor of 
Taipei (1960 and 1964).  In 1967, for the sake of maintaining party control of Taiwan?s 
most populous city and the site of the largest concentration of mainlanders, the regime 
declared Taipei a ?Special Municipality,? which was under direct control of the Executive 
Yuan with an appointed mayor (Gold, 1985; Tien, 1989). 
By the early 1970s, although the successful implementation of the EOI method 
brought Taiwan an economically prosperous country, the ROC also encountered a series 
of political shocks with respect to international relations.  The setback began with 
Canada?s recognition of the People?s Republic of China (PRC) in 1970.  The next year, 
facing a certain vote by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to seat the PRC 
(China), the ROC (Taiwan) withdrew from the UN.  In 1972, at the end of the landmark 
visit to China, President Richard Nixon and the PRC?s Premier Chou En-lai signed the 
Shanghai Communiqu?, in which the United States acknowledged that ?there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China.?  The same year, Japan switched the diplomatic 
recognition from the ROC to Peking.  In addition, twenty-five other countries followed 
135 
 
the same formula between 1971 and 1972 (Chai, 1981, p. 386-387).  To face these 
dramatic changes and international politics reality, the ROC government immediately 
adopted a number of foreign policies which stressed economic, cultural, technical, and 
educational ties with selected countries.  For example, after the severance of formal 
diplomatic relations with Japan, two nongovernmental agencies, the Association of East 
Asian Relations of the Republic of China and the Interchange Association of Japan, were 
established to continue their relationship (Chai, 1981).  This was just the beginning not 
the end of Taiwan?s diplomatic isolation, however. 
 
4.  From the mid 1970s to the late 1980s 
At the beginning of this stage, in addition to political frustrations in the 
international sphere, the success of Taiwan?s economy was confronted by several serious 
problems.  Its exports began to face clamorous protectionist threatens, especially in the 
United States; wages were rising faster than competitors; other newly industrializing 
countries (NICs) were moving into the same markets; and the physical infrastructure 
began to fall behind demand.  Also, world prices of nonoil goods were going up due to 
bad weather in 1971 and 1972 and the communist bloc import of grain from the U.S.; and 
the Taiwan currency was pegged to the U.S. dollar which was devalued in 1971 and 1973.  
In 1973 and 1974, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
quadrupled the price of oil.  Because imports then were a third of Taiwan?s GDP, these 
import price increases instantly caused negative impacts on the domestic economy.  For 
1974, the real GNP growth dropped to 1 per cent, from 10 per cent per annum during the 
136 
 
1960s and early 1970s; inflation reached 40 per cent, having been less than 2 per cent per 
year between 1961 and 1971; and the trade deficit exceeded US$1 billion.  As a 
consequence, emigration and capital flight to the United States increased, investment and 
foreign trade slowed down, and university students began to voice their dissatisfaction 
(Kuo, 1983; Li, 1988; Wade, 1990, p. 96). 
For solving these problems as well as the oil crisis, the ROC government quickly 
responded with an innovative policy package, including deflationary programs to tame 
inflation and public investment (Ten Major Construction Projects) to pull up the economy.  
As a result, economic conditions improved very soon.  By 1975, inflation was curbed and 
dropped to a negative 5.1 per cent, and the economic growth reached 4.2 per cent.  
Moreover, for the three post-oil crisis years (1976-1978), the average growth rate was 
12.4 per cent, and the inflation was 3 per cent (Kuo, 1983, p. 199-232; Li, 1988, p. 267-
279). 
Again, the second oil price increases in 1979-1980 sunk energy and trade 
dependent Taiwan into inflation and recession.  The impact of this crisis was smaller than 
the first one; and the government implemented the same policies as before but mildly and 
gradually (Kuo, 1983, p. 218).  While inflation was brought down fairly easily, rapid 
growth did not resume until the economic recovery in the United States in 1983 which 
provided an opportunity for another export expansion.  The share of the U.S. market in 
terms of Taiwan?s exports jumped from 34 per cent in 1980 to 48 per cent during the 
period 1984-1986.  Taiwan?s export growths went up to 14.2 per cent in 1983 and 18.9 
per cent in 1984, fell to a 1.3 per cent in 1985 due to a mini recession, and then leaped 
137 
 
again by 15 per cent per year in 1986-1987.  Corresponding to the up-and-down exports, 
GNP growth was 9 per cent per year in 1983-1984, 5 per cent in 1985; near 12 per cent a 
year in 1986-1987 (Kuo, 1983, p. 200; Gold, 1985, p. 98; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 
42). 
During the time when the ROC government dealt with problems caused by the oil 
shocks, it also engaged in promoting industrial upgrading by two very different paths.  
One was based on massive public investment for infrastructure projects together with the 
expansion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in establishing heavy and chemical 
industries, such as steel and petrochemicals.  The other focused on urging and assisting 
the private sector to shift from labor-intensive light industries to high technology 
production, particularly in the electronics and information processing fields (Kuo, 1983; 
Li, 1988; Clark, 1994, p. 18).  It is worth of noting that the industrial structure 
transformation during this stage was accomplished by several significant policies.  First, 
the Ten Major Construction Projects were proposed by Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, 
beginning in 1974 and being completed by 1979.  These projects, pouring US$8 billion 
into the economy, especially included an integrated steel mill (China Steel Corporation) 
and a new Naptha cracking plant for the state-run Chinese Petroleum Company.  China 
Steel Corporation not only provided domestic needs but also exported products abroad; it 
later became one of the world?s most profitable steel companies.  The petrochemical 
industry vertically integrated synthetic textiles and plastics, two of Taiwan?s major 
industries at that time; on the other hand, the production of domestic substitutes for 
imported intermediate materials helped Taiwan to effectively reduce its reliance on 
138 
 
foreign suppliers and to upgrade its industrial structure successfully(Gold, 1985, p. 100-
101).  In turn, even before all of these projects were completed, the ROC government 
upped expenditures another US$23 billion and invested in 14 additional projects 
(Davison, 2003, p.98).  These public investments significantly improved infrastructure 
and enlarged Taiwan?s economic base.   
Second, in 1973, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was 
established to deepen research and development (R&D) capacity for the new growth 
sectors because the government considered that the large number of Taiwan?s SMEs 
could not afford to undertake enough technology investment by themselves.  ITRI 
established laboratories for testing products and brokered the application of R&D.  It also 
identified market opportunities and incubated engineer-turned-entrepreneurs.  By 1987, 
ITRI had a budget of US$215 million and staffed more than 4,500 highly skilled 
employees.  It?s researches targeted six fields, including electronics, machinery, chemical 
engineering, energy and mining, industrial materials, and standards and measurement.  
Furthermore, ITRI?s played a critical role when Taiwan?s local firms entered strategic 
alliances with leading Western firms during the 1980s, especially in the semi-conductor 
and computer industries (Wade, 1990, p. 98; Cheng, 2001, p. 32-33).  Finally, based on 
the concept of export-processing zones, the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park was 
set up in 1980.  The ITRI, next to the Park, provides contract research in many technical 
areas.  The National Tsing Hua University and the National Chiao Tung University, two 
of Taiwan?s leading institutions in science and engineering, are located nearby; they offer 
the science park high-tech engineers and R&D assistances.  The Park creates an 
139 
 
environment conducive to high-tech R&D; and its production, work, life, and 
entertainment attract high-tech professionals and technologies.  The excellent location 
and the rapid growth of its companies and products have made it the ?Silicon Valley of 
Asia? and a base for developing technology-intensive industries (Li, 1988; Cheng, 2003; 
ROC, 2005). 
Along with industrial upgrading, Taiwan?s domestic politics had significant 
transition and changes during this phrase.  Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 
April 1975, Vice President Yen Chia-kan became president according to constitutional 
provisions.  In fact, Chiang?s eldest son Chiang Ching-kuo inherited the mantle of 
supreme power in the country from his position as premier and via his role as the 
chairman of the KMT (Nationalist Party).  That is, the ROC went through a smooth 
political succession after Chiang Kai-shek?s death without problems (Tien, 1989; Copper, 
2000). 
In 1978, Chiang Ching-kuo was officially elected President of the ROC by the 
National Assembly after the term of Yen Chia-kan.  President Yen had earlier declared 
that he would not be a candidate.  As premier (1972-1978) and later as president (1978-
1988), Chiang Ching-kuo presented a ?man of the people? image by going out among the 
people and talking with farmers, workers, and the general public.  He dressed casually 
and often wore a peaked cap to show his affinity and accessibility.  Also, Chiang Ching-
kuo appointed a large number of Taiwanese to government and party positions during his 
administration (Tien, 1989; Copper, 2000). 
Conventionally, Taiwan?s politics had always involved the publication of political 
140 
 
journals to express opposition views because the forming of new political parties was 
forbidden under the ?Temporary Provisions.?  However, until the 1970s, the editors and 
writers of magazines were usually mainlander elites, such as Lei Chen, Po Yang, and Li 
Ao (all had been jailed).  They lacked a potential voter base, so they in general didn?t 
seek elected office or take part in political activities.  In addition, they obsessed about 
issues concerning all of China, not just about Taiwan.  The trend changed in the mid-
1970s.  Taiwanese elites became the primary source of political activists; and they 
engaged in both the literary activities and the electoral politics of the opposition 
movements.  Meanwhile, some second-generation mainlanders also joined the 
opposition?s camps (Tien, 1989, p. 94-95).   
In 1975, Taiwanese politician K?ang Ning-hsiang and his partners published the 
Taiwan Political Review (Tai-wan Cheng-lun).  But after only five issues were distributed, 
government censorship closed down the journal.  K?ang and some of his associates, thus, 
published another journal, The Eighties (Pa-shih nien-tai), which delivered more 
moderate opposition viewpoints toward the ruling regime for the sake of avoiding trouble.  
Very differently, the radical activists began a separate  journal, Formosa (Mei-li-tao), to 
criticize KMT authorities and to press for democratic reform and political liberalization.  
That is, while the former went on cautiously in challenging KMT regime, the later was 
more assertive and progressive.  Although the leading members of the Formosa group 
were brought up and educated under ROC rule, they embraced a strong sense of their 
Taiwanese heritage and resisted identification with the Chinese mainland and a 
government that was structured to rule both the mainland and Taiwan.  Despite their 
141 
 
different approaches for the processes of political reform and democratization, a muted 
opposition group of candidates for political offices began to coalesce in Taiwan.  In the 
mid-1970s, opposition politicians, mostly Taiwanese, worked together and formed an 
informal political group ?dangwai? (literally, outside the party, or outside the KMT party) 
(Tien, 1989; Copper 2000; Rigger, 2001). 
In the 1977 elections, under the umbrella of ?dangwai,? opposition candidates 
won 21 of 77 seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and 4 of the 20 magistrate and 
mayoral elections (Jacobs, 1981, p. 27; cited from Tien, 1989, p. 96).  On the polling day, 
unfortunately, there was a riot in Chungli, a city in Taoyuan County of Taiwan.  A mass 
protest against alleged irregularities in vote counting caused a serious clash between 
angry voters and the police.  Consequently, a police station was burned, and a number of 
causalities were reported (Lin and Chang, 1978, p. 240-79; cited from Tien, 1989, p. 96).  
At last, Hsu Hsin-liang, who left the KMT party and ran as a dangwai candidate for the 
Taoyuan county magistrate's position, won the election.  However, the government-
controlled media used the riot to label the dangwai as a violent and unreasonable group 
(Rigger, 2001, p. 19).  The riot became known as the ?Chungli incident.?  It was the first 
political protest on the streets since the 1940s.  The incident clearly showed that a 
growing population disenchantment with the KMT?s domination and manipulation in 
electoral politics.  Thus, the opposition movement had revived, led by the dangwai 
activists (Tien, 1989). 
Immediately following the Chungli incident, Taiwan experienced two turbulent 
political events in 1978 and 1979.  In December 1978, people in Taiwan were shocked by 
142 
 
the Carter administration?s decision to establish formal ties with the People?s Republic of 
China (PRC).  Only a few days before this announcement, the dangwai leaders, 
encouraged by the results of the 1977 election, got together in Taipei for a well publicized 
political meeting.  They looked forward to making considerable gains in the 1978 
election for seats at the national level.  But the election was cancelled after the US 
decision to terminate diplomatic relations with the ROC government.  On January 1, 
1979, indeed, the US granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC and broke formal ties 
with the ROC.  However, on April 10, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relation Act, 
which in essence gave Taiwan security and trade guarantees and treated Taiwan as a 
sovereign nation-state, though it did not use the term ?Republic of China? (Tien, 1989; 
Copper, 2000). 
Meanwhile, Formosa was more than a magazine.  It established local branches 
throughout the island, promoting prodemocracy activities that challenged to the KMT 
regime.  In December 1979, Formosa supporters organized a rally and parade in 
Kaohsiung to commemorate International Human Rights Day, but also to protest 
government policies which resulted in Taiwan?s diplomatic isolation.  During the march, 
violence erupted between the participants and the police that quickly developed into an 
unexpected riot know as the Kaohsiung Incident.  As a result, on March 18, 1980, eight 
key leaders of the protest, including Lu Hsiu-lien who then was a feminist and later 
became the Vice President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2000-2008), were indicted 
for subversion and sentenced from twelve years to life by the military courts.  Another 
thirty-seven defendants were tried in civil courts.  By and large, the Kaohsiung rally 
143 
 
became a well-remembered event in the history of confrontations between the KMT and 
the dangwai (Tien, 1989; Rigger, 2001). 
   In December 1980, the legislative election originally scheduled in 1978 finally 
took place.  Dangwai candidates included several of the Formosa defendants? attorneys 
and family members (Rigger, 2001).  At the same time, one important role played by 
women in the opposition movement was as Shounan Chiashu, or relatives of political 
prisoners.  Motivated by the  painful experience of KMT?s repression and the 
imprisonment of their husbands, Chiashu, the wives of the arrested dangwai leaders, took 
part in political activities by becoming candidates; they viewed elections as symbolic and 
used campaign platforms as channels to express anger against the authoritarian regime.  
Voters were solicited as an expression of sympathy for the jailed dangwai leaders and of 
solidarity against injustice.  The 1980 election was a turning-point in the history of the 
opposition movement when two wives of Kaohsiung defendants, Chou Ch?ing-yu and 
Hsu Rung-shu, achieved surprisingly successful campaigns.  Particularly, Chou won the 
highest number of votes in her multi-member district for the National Assembly.  
Encouraged by these pioneers, other wives of political prisoners began to run Chiashu 
campaigns, in many cases winning public offices (Clark and Clark, 2002). 
In addition to political opposition activities pushed by the dangwai camp, the 
emergence of social movements was another force driving Taiwan to the path of 
democratization from bottom.  In the past, residents of Taiwan were not permitted to 
organize, assemble or march publicly in support of social causes, since the island was 
under martial law.  Freedoms of speech and expression were severely curtailed, and those 
144 
 
who intended to publicize such causes and urge government policies always suffered 
serious reprisals.  To some extent, political opposition activities might facilitate the 
development of social movements.  The authoritarian government had already 
experienced fiercer and progressive political movements; it thus was not too shocked 
when social movements began to come up.  By the end of 1988, there were 17 major 
social movements, including women?s movements, emerged to make claims on the state, 
calling for the revision of its policies and its relaxation of controls on the society (Hsiao, 
1990). 
At this juncture, President Chiang Ching-kuo realized that substantial changes 
would have to be made because of the sociopolitical climate on Taiwan.  The legitimacy 
of his government was at stake.  Further, he believed that if a democratic country could 
be built in Taiwan, it could eventually be transferred to the mainland.  Therefore, Chiang 
Ching-kuo had conceived a plan for democratization.  First of all, Chiang picked Lee 
Teng-hui, a Taiwanese scholar and technocrat, as his vice-president when he was elected 
to another six-year term in 1984.  In addition, other Taiwanese became the governor of 
Taiwan province and mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung.  But he had to wait two more 
years before he could launch his political reform because various external and internal 
crises intervened (for example, the murder of Henry Liu and the financial scandal of 
Tenth Credit Cooperation).  In the spring of 1986, he announced that martial law would 
be lifted and replaced by a national security law in the fall.  However, on September 28, 
135 members of the dangwai courageously but illegally established a new political party: 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  Now, Chiang became tolerant and wise, for he 
145 
 
took no action toward the formation of the DPP.  In December, the nation held its first 
legal two-party election (for supplementary seats in the Legislative Yuan), with the KMT 
competing with the DPP.  The KMT won, while the DPP nominated 44 candidates for 73 
available seats and 12 were elected.  The election outcome indicated that the people still 
supported  the KMT for the sake of stability, while the DPP demonstrated an impressive 
electoral debut.  More importantly, the electoral competition between the two parties had 
sent Taiwan to the first step of the democratization (Tien, 1989; Clark, 1994; Copper, 
1997 and 2000).   
The next year, in mid-1987, the Emergency Decree, generally called martial law, 
was terminated.  At the same time, the National Security Law went into effect, reducing 
the role of the military in Taiwan?s politics.  In turn, new regulations also enhanced press 
freedom, allowing new newspapers to publish and all papers to increase the number of 
pages printed.  All radical political reform efforts during 1980s, especially ending martial 
law, had significantly pushed Taiwan toward political liberalization and democratization 
(Copper, 2000 and 2009). 
In sum, economic development was fairly continuous and cumulative.  By the 
1980s, Taiwan was widely praised as an economic miracle by the international 
community.  In contrast, there was little political reform until the early 1980s.  However, 
Taiwan finally started a very successful democratic transition at the end of this stage. 
 
5.  From the late 1980s to present 
With political liberalization in process, at this stage, three major changes moved 
146 
 
Taiwan from the transition stage toward the consolidation of democracy.  First, the senior 
representatives of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, who were elected in 
China and had been frozen in office since 1947, were asked to step down in 1991.  
Second, the first direct presidential election for the ROC was held in 1996.  Third,  party 
alternations occurred in 2000 and then in 2008, making Taiwan a full-fledged liberal 
democracy. 
When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui 
succeeded him as president according to the ROC Constitution.  Soon, Lee also became 
the party?s leader of the KMT, though he was briefly challenged by some top officials in 
the party, including Madam Chiang Kai-shek.  Lee?s leadership symbolized an end of the 
Mainland Chinese minority?s hold on political domination in Taiwan.  In March 1990, 
Lee was reelected president for a six-year term by the National Assembly in an 
uncontested vote.  At the same time, the Wild Lily student movement took place in Taipei.  
Over 10,000 pro-democracy students occupied Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square for a 
week and pledged democratic reforms, especially urging direct elections of Taiwan's 
president and vice president and new elections for all representatives.  Lee met student 
representatives and promised, among other things, a National Affairs Conference to 
discuss issues such as the composition of elected bodies of government.  In July, the 
National Affairs Conference ended after suggesting the popular election of the president 
and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, as well as other reforms.  Delegates to the 
Conference included members of the KMT ruling party, the opposition DPP, and 
academics.  However, it was a complex process of forcing senior parliamentarians to 
147 
 
retire.  After months of KMT efforts on the inside and DPP efforts on the outside, the 
senior parliamentarians began to relent.  Finally, following an interpretation of the 
Constitution by the Council of Grand Justices, they retired en mass.  As a result, election 
for all seats in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were first held in 1991 
and 1992 (Copper, 1994 and 2000; ROC, 2005). 
In 1992, the newly elected National Assembly evaluated many proposals for 
Constitution amendments in order to further Taiwan?s political reform.  Among the most 
hotly debated was the proposal to directly elect the president.  In April 1994, the fourth 
meeting of the new National Assembly revised the Constitution of the ROC, and decided 
that the president shall be elected by direct popular vote to a four-year instead of six-year 
term. The first direct popular election of the president would be held on March 23, 1996 
(Copper, 2005, p. 18).   
During the months preceding the election, Taiwan became the target both of 
Beijing's acid tongue and its armed intimidation.  Beijing conducted a series of large-
scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait.  Missiles were fired just 10 miles away from 
Kaohsiung and Keelung, which are Taiwan's two largest seaports.  The PRC repeatedly 
claimed that they would not renounce its military threat to deter Taiwan from 
independence.  As a result, at the time of the presidential election, Taiwan was the center 
of world attention, with more than seven hundred journalists from around the world on 
the island covering the election, and two U.S. aircraft carriers and their battle groups 
standing in the open seas to protect Taiwan from the PRC's heightened military threat.  
Finally, Lee Teng-hui gained a convincing victory over three other teams, winning 54 per 
148 
 
cent of the votes in the election, for which over 76 per cent of eligible voters turned out 
(Shaw, 1996; Copper, 2000 and 2009). 
On March 18, 2000, the second direct presidential election was held.  There were 
five pairs of candidates contending for the positions of president and vice president.  In a 
tight, three-way race, former Taipei City Mayor Chen Shui-bian, representing the DPP, 
narrowly defeated his rivals with 39 per cent of the vote, closely followed by former 
Taiwan provincial Governor James Soong, who ran independently after failing to get on 
the KMT ticket, with 37 percent of the vote.  Then Vice President Lien Chan, 
representing the KMT, received 23 per cent of the vote.  This election not only brought a 
record high of 82 per cent voter turnout, but also ended the KMT?s five-decade holding 
on the presidency .  Moreover, Lu Hsiu-lien, Chen?s running mate, became Taiwan?s first 
female vice president.  In 2004, Chen Shui-bian and Lu Hsiu-lien were reelected.  In 
2008, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou was elected to the presidency, completing the ROC?s 
second party alternation between two major parties (ROC, 2005, p. 51; ROC, 2008a, p. 
45). 
After the late 1980s, economic growth declined quite noticeably, as shown in 
Figure 4.1.  However, despite the impact of the Asian financial storm and the 921 
earthquake (it happened in 1999 in Jiji, Nantou county; 2,415 people were killed, 11,305 
injured, and over US$10 billion worth of damage was reported), Taiwan achieved an 
average economic growth rate of 6.5 per cent during the 1990s.  Although Taiwan had to 
contend successively with the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the SARS epidemic, and 
the late-2000s global financial crisis, it had an average economic growth rate of 3.8 per 
149 
 
cent from 2000 through 2008.  In reality, however, two very different types of structure 
changes brought by globalization impacted Taiwan?s latest economic dynamics. 
 
Figure 4.1  Taiwan's Economic Growth: 1952-2008 
 
   
Source: Economic Development, R.O.C. (Taiwan), 2008 (ROC, 2008b, p. 17). 
 
First, the very successful promotion of high tech industries, such as computers 
and semiconductors, enabled Taiwan to move into a knowledge-based economy at the 
beginning of information age.  By the early 1990s, Taiwan became the third-largest 
producer and exporter of IT and computer-related products in the world market (Chow, 
2002).  In its May 2005 cover story entitled ?Why Taiwan Matters,? BusinessWeek 
magazine highlighted Taiwan?s vital role in the global technological supply chain, with 
the headline pronouncement that ?The global economy couldn?t function without it? 
(BusinessWeek, May 16, 2005).  Further, in 2007, Taiwan remained a key player in the 
global information and communication technology (ICT) industries.  About 60 per cent of 
manufacturing production value was yielded by high- and mid-high-technology 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
1952-60 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-08 
8.4 9.2 
10.3 
8.2 
6.5 
3.8 
Annual rate of increases (%) 
150 
 
manufacturers.  The lion?s share of high-tech revenues was generated by companies 
located in the Hsinchu Science Park, the Southern Taiwan Science Park, and the Central 
Taiwan Science Park; the three parks? combined revenues came to nearly US$60 billion, 
representing a growth of more than 12.5 per cent over the previous year (ROC, 2008a, p. 
101-102).  Moreover, as shown in Table 4.1, Taiwan?s manufacturers continued to rank 
number one and number two globally in terms of production value in several ICT 
industries (ROC, 2008a, p.102). 
 
Table 4.1 Production Value and Global Share of Taiwan-made 
IT Products and Services in 2007 
 
Category Production Value (US$ million) Global Share (%) 
No. 1 in the World 
IC foundry 13,774 68.1 
Mask ROM      353 92.9 
IC packaging   7,450 47.6 
IC testing   3,350 67.7 
Large-size TFT-LCD panels 34,450 48.7 
TN/STN LCD panels   4,850 41.2 
No. 2 in the World 
IC chip design 12,186 26.5 
DRAM chips   7,015 22.4 
OLED flat panels      392 39.0 
Small and medium-size  
TFT-LCD panels   3,670 20.8 
Source: Industrial Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) (cited 
from ROC, 2008a, p. 102). 
 
 
Second, while Taiwan?s ICT industries are continuing to develop and evolve, its 
factories manufacturing labor-intensive, relatively low-skilled products have gradually 
151 
 
moved to areas providing cheaper labor and land, typically to China.  By the middle and 
late 1980s, Taiwan?s labor-intensive manufacturing confronted increasing international 
competition from other NICs and other developing countries.  Meanwhile, the New 
Taiwanese Dollar (Taiwan currency) appreciated sharply due to Taiwan?s huge trade 
surplus and foreign exchange reserves.  Coupled with the increasing wages, Taiwan 
quickly lost its competitive advantage in its traditional fields of production.  Taiwanese 
businesses thus were forced to move their production offshore in order to survive in the 
world market.  The first flows of this investment were concentrated in Southeast Asia.  
However, a considerable number of firms moving to Southeast Asia encountered various 
difficulties caused by cultural differences, the language barrier, labor-management 
disputes, and complex legal problems.  In the meantime, China aimed to attract greatly 
needed capital investment and entrepreneurial know-how through an open door policy; 
and, in late 1987, the ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the 37-year-ban barring 
Taiwan's residents from visiting their relatives on the mainland for humanitarian concerns.  
Consequently, these policies provided Taiwan businesspeople opportunities to survey 
China?s markets and establish direct business negotiations with their Chinese counterparts.  
Obviously, Taiwan's abundant capital and advanced technology matched well with 
China's unlimited supply of cheap labor.  Moreover, China?s pragmatic provincial leaders 
vigorously offered substantial incentives to attract investments for export industries.  
These advantages, taken together with the similarities in culture, tradition, and language 
as well as geographical proximity, are the key factors pushing Taiwan?s trade with and 
investment in China.  Gradually, the Chinese mainland became a prime location for new 
152 
 
factory sites for many Taiwanese firms (Ranis, 1992; Chai, 1994; Soled, 1995; Rapkin 
and Avery, 1995; Wu, 1995; Clark, 1999; Lee 2007). 
 
Figure 4.2  Gross Domestic Production by Sector 
 
 
Source: Data come from Taiwan Statistic Data Book 2009 (ROC, 2009b). 
 
 
Along with the expansion of offshore manufacturing in China, both Taiwan?s 
production and employment structures had dramatically changed, shifting from the 
industry sector to the services sector.  As presented in Figure 4.2, during the 1960s and 
1970s, with the rapid growth of manufacturing, Taiwan?s industry sector almost caught 
up with its services sector in terms of GDP percentage.  Taiwan?s industrial production 
reached a highest point in 1987 (47.4 per cent of GDP).  However, the service sector 
expanded rapidly after that.  By 2007, the services sector accounted for 70.7 per cent of 
Taiwan?s GDP, a percentage very similar to that of many advanced countries.  
27.5 15.5 
5.3 2.4 1.5 
26.6 
36.8 
47.4 
31.9 27.8 
46.0 47.7 47.3 
65.7 
70.7 
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 
60.0 
70.0 
80.0 
1961 1970 1987 1997 2007 
% 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
153 
 
Correspondingly, as shown in Figure 4.3, in the late of 1980s (the early stage of moving 
labor-intensive production ?off shore?), the services sector surpassed the industry sector 
in terms of the share of employment.  By 2007, about 58 per cent of employed persons 
were working in the service sector.  At this stage, most of new jobs were generated from 
the services sector, particularly in the financial and stock market areas (ROC, 2005, p. 
148; Copper, 2009, p. 169). 
 
Figure 4.3  Employment Structure in Taiwan: 1952-2007 
  
Source: Data come from Taiwan Statistic Data Book 2009 (ROC, 2009b). 
 
 
In addition to the major political and economic transformations over the last two 
decades, two public policies implemented during this stage are also worth noting.  First, 
after the liberalization of the university establishment policy starting in 1996, the number 
of colleges and universities in Taiwan increased from 67 to 149 in 2007.  During the 
56.1 
50.2 
36.7 
15.3 
9.6 5.3 16.9 20.5 
27.9 
42.8 
38.2 36.8 
27.0 29.3 35.3 
42.0 
52.3 
57.9 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
1952 1960 1970 1987 1997 2007 
% 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
154 
 
same period of time, the population aged 15 or older with a college or university degree 
rose from 19.3 per cent to 33.9 per cent (ROC, 2008b).  However, the rapid expansion of 
higher education institutions resulted in more slots in colleges and universities than 
applications (Copper, 2009, p. 95).  Second, the National Health Insurance (NHI), a 
universal health care system in Taiwan, was formally instituted in 1995 to provide the 
whole population with medical care.  The NHI incorporated thirteen existing public 
health insurance plans.  At the same time, it extended coverage to the eight million 
citizens who were formerly uninsured, mainly the elderly, children, students, housewives, 
and the disabled.  Participation was mandatory under the Health Insurance Law.  By the 
end of 2007, 99 per cent of Taiwan?s population was enrolled in the NHI program (ROC, 
2005; ROC 2009a; Copper, 2009).   
In addition, starting in the late 1990s, there was a notable increase in marriages 
between Taiwan?s citizens and foreign nationals.  The majority of the foreign spouses 
(about 93 per cent) are the ?Chinese brides? and ?foreign brides? of Taiwanese men.  
Cumulatively, by the end of 2007, 66 per cent of 399,038 foreign spouses came from 
China (including Hong Kong and Macau), while 20 per cent and 7 per cent were from 
Vietnam and Indonesia, respectively.  Consequently, in 2007, marriages of ROC citizens 
to immigrants accounted for one in every six marriages, and children from this type of 
marriage made up 10 per cent of all new births (Foundation of Women Rights Promotion 
and Development, 2007, p. 21 and 44; ROC, 2008a, p. 28).          
 
 
155 
 
6.  Implications 
Over the past six decades, these four transformations have thoroughly reshaped 
Taiwan from a poor agricultural authoritarian regime to a prosperous industrial 
democratic country.  Such essential and far-reaching change certainly offers many 
resources and opportunities that women might potentially use for greater empowerment.  
However, as noted in the literature review chapter, development in many Third World 
nations has not necessarily benefited women because of various barriers that prevent 
them from availing themselves of such theoretically potential resources and opportunities.  
The next chapter, therefore, examines what socioeconomic and political development has 
meant for women in Taiwan by presenting the transformations of women?s status in 
terms of social, economic, and political dimensions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE CHANGING STATUS OF WOMEN IN TAIWAN 
 
This chapter presents statistics and analysis on the status of women in Taiwan, 
highlighting changes over time and the current situation as well as the differences 
between men and women in Taiwan and women in other countries.  Analyses are based 
mainly on statistics and resources from Taiwan?s government and international statistical  
 
 
Table 5.1  Dimensions of the Status of Women in Taiwan 
 
Dimension Indicators 
I. Social Conditions ? Life expectancy 
? Infant and maternal mortality 
? Fertility rate 
? Sex ratio at birth 
? Urbanization  
II. Human and Social Capital ? Educational level 
? Literacy 
? Participation in voluntary organizations 
III. Economic Activities ? Labor force participation 
? Distribution of occupations and 
occupational segregation by sex 
? Entrance into administrative, managerial, 
professional, and technical related 
occupations 
? Gender pay gap 
IV. Political Participation and Power ? Voting rate 
? Political representation 
? Participation in women?s interest groups 
157 
 
agencies.  The study covers four broad dimensions ? social conditions, human and social 
capital, economic activities, and political participation and power.  The main indicators of 
each dimension are showed on Table 5.1. 
 
 
1. Social Conditions 
Life Expectancy 
 
Figure 5.1  Women?s Life Expectancy in Taiwan: 1965-2008 
 
 
Source: 1965?s data from Statistical Yearbook 1971 (p. 78), United Nations; others from Directorate-
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
 
Figure 5.1 clearly indicates a steadily increase in life expectancy for women in 
Taiwan from 1965 to 2008.  On the whole, the life expectancy of the women in Taiwan 
increased by 11.5 years over that time period.  While life expectancy increased for both 
men and women in Taiwan between 1965 and 2008, as shown in Figure 5.2, women had 
consistently higher life expectancy than men with the difference starting at 4.6 years in 
70.4 
74.6 
76.8 77.7 
79.6 
80.8 81.4 81.7 81.9 
64 
66 
68 
70 
72 
74 
76 
78 
80 
82 
84 
1965 1981 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
years 
158 
 
1965 and culminating in a difference of 6.3 years in 2008.  When compared with the life 
expectancies in other selected countries in Figure 5.3, Japan had somewhat higher life 
expectancies than Taiwan whereas China ranked lower than Taiwan.  Taiwan and South 
Korea, two of the Four Asian Little Dragons, performed exactly similarly with respect to 
life expectancy in 2008.  Singapore (one of the Four Asian Little Dragons) and the United 
States had life expectancies similar to Taiwan, but Singapore showed one year more of 
life expectancy in women than Taiwan, and the United States demonstrated one year less 
in women?s life expectancies.   
 
Figure 5.2  Life expectancy in Taiwan, by Sex: 1965-2008 
 
Source: 1965?s data is from Statistical Yearbook 1971 (p. 78), United Nations; 1981-2008 are from 
Directorate- General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
 
 
65.8 
69.7 71.3 71.9 73.8 
74.5 74.9 75.5 75.6 70.4 74.6 
76.8 77.7 79.6 80.8 
81.4 81.7 81.9 
4.6 4.9 5.5 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.5 6.2 6.3 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
1965 1981 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
years 
male 
female 
gap 
159 
 
Figure 5.3  Life Expectancy in Taiwan and Selected Countries: 2008 
 
 
Source: 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau (www.prb.org). 
 
 
Infant and Maternal Mortality 
Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths in a given year of children less than 
one year old, divided by the total proportion of live births in same year, multiplied by 
1,000.  It is an approximation of the proportion of children, per 1,000, who are born alive 
but die within one year of birth (United Nations, 2000, p. 53).  Over the span of time 
displayed in Table 5.2, Taiwan?s infant mortality rates have significantly decreased 
between 1948 and 2009.  However, the decline is most pronounced in earlier years with 
the difference in infant mortality rate leveling off as the data approaches the present.  As 
infant mortality rates decrease over time, women are freed from the necessity of being 
79 78 
76 76 75 
71 
86 
83 82 82 
81 
75 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
Japan Singapore Taiwan South Korea USA China 
male 
female 
160 
 
perpetually pregnant.  Consequently, the currently low infant mortality rate in Taiwan 
indicates that women have a relatively higher quality of life than they did in the past. 
 
Table 5.2  Infant and Maternal Mortality Rates in Taiwan: 1948-2009 
  
year Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births) 
1948 56.6 - 
 1953 33.7 - 
1960 30.5 - 
1965 22.2 - 
1969 19.1 - 
1984   6.9 14.1 
1990   5.3 11.9 
1995   6.4   7.6 
2000   5.9   7.9 
2001   6.0   6.9 
2002   5.4   7.7 
2003   4.9   6.6 
2004   5.3   5.5 
2005   5.0   7.3 
2006   4.6   7.3 
2007   4.7   6.8 
2008   4.5   6.5 
2009   4.1   8.4 
Source: 1. Infant mortality rate: 1948-1969 come from Statistical Yearbook 1957 (p. 42), 1961 (p. 51), and 
1970 (p. 99), United Nations.  1984-2009 are from Bureau of Health Promotion, Department of Health, 
Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).  2. Maternal mortality rate come from Bureau of Health 
Promotion, Department of Health, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
Note: - data are not available. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births in 2008 of the 
world (46), of more developed countries (6), and of Asia (43); accordingly, Taiwan (4.5) 
has a low infant mortality rate.  However, compared to other selected countries, Taiwan in 
2008 had a lower infant mortality rate than both China (21) and the United States (6.4), 
161 
 
while contrasted with Singapore (2.2), Japan (2.6), and South Korea (3.4) Taiwan had a 
higher infant mortality rate.   
 
 
Figure 5.4  World Infant Mortality Rates in Selected Countries: 2008 
 
 
     Source: 2010 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau (www.prb.org).  
 
 
Data shown in Table 5.2 indicate a marked improvement of gynecological 
healthcare standards in Taiwan.  In 1984, for every 100,000 live births, there were 14.1 
birth-related maternal deaths.  By 1990, the maternal mortality rate dropped to 11.9 per 
100,000 live births.  In the 2000s, the maternal mortality rates were between 5.5 and 8.4 
in Taiwan, while the average rate for more developed countries was 9 per 100,000 live 
births (United Nations, 2010, p. 35).  Thus, just as for the infant mortality rate, Taiwan is 
better than the average for the developed world.  
6.4 
21.0 
3.4 
2.6 
2.2 
4.5 
43.0 
6.0 
46.0 
0 20 40 60 
USA 
China 
South Korea 
Japan 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Asia 
More developed countries 
World 
Infant Mortality Rate 
(per 1,000 live births)  
162 
 
Fertility Rate 
Table 5.3  Fertility Rates in Taiwan: 1949-2009 
 
Year Fertility rate (per woman) Year Fertility rate (per woman) 
1949 5.900 1980 2.515 
1950 6.030 1981 2.455 
1951 7.040 1982 2.320 
1952 6.615 1983 2.170 
1953 6.470 1984 2.055 
1954 6.425 1985 1.880 
1955 6.530 1986 1.680 
1956 6.505 1987 1.700 
1957 6.000 1988 1.855 
1958 6.055 1989 1.680 
1959 5.990 1990 1.810 
1960 5.750 1991 1.720 
1961 5.585 1992 1.730 
1962 5.465 1993 1.760 
1963 5.350 1994 1.755 
1964 5.100 1995 1.775 
1965 4.825 1996 1.760 
1966 4.815 1997 1.770 
1967 4.220 1998 1.460 
1968 4.325 1999 1.555 
1969 4.120 2000 1.680 
1970 4.000 2001 1.400 
1971 3.705 2002 1.340 
1972 3.365 2003 1.235 
1973 3.210 2004 1.118 
1974 2.940 2005 1.115 
1975 2.765 2006 1.115 
1976 3.085 2007 1.100 
1977 2.700 2008 1.050 
1978 2.715 2009 1.030 
1979 2.670   
Source: Department of Household Registration Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
Total fertility, or the fertility rate, is the number of children that will be born to 
each woman if all women survive to the end of their reproductive years and bear children 
163 
 
at each age at the same rates as the ones observed in a given period.  Generally, it is 
calculated as the sum of age-specific fertility rates for women aged between 15 and 49 
years (childbearing-age women).  The total fertility rate is said to be below replacement 
level when it is less than 2.1 births per woman (UN, 2000, p. 31). 
As shown in Table 5.3, Taiwan?s fertility levels have decreased sharply in the past 
six decades.  During the years between 1949 and 1959, the total fertility rate for each year 
was around or over 6 births per women; but the fertility rate dropped to around 5 in 1964, 
to around 4 in 1970, to around 3 in 1976.  By 1983 Taiwan? fertility rate was at 
replacement level and fertility continued to decline over the next 25 years.  As of 2009, 
the fertility rate was 1.03 per women. 
 
Table 5.4  Countries (or Areas) with Fertility Rate Below 1.2 per Women: 2009 
 
Countries (or Areas) Total Fertility Rate (per women) 
Hong Kong 1.0 
Macao 1.0 
Taiwan 1.0 
Singapore 1.2 
Andorra 1.2 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.2 
San Marino 1.2 
South Korea 1.2 
Source: Data collected from 2010 World Population Data Sheet, published by Population Reference Bureau 
(www.prb.org). 
   
 
While Taiwan?s Family Planning program of the 1960?s was praised as a success 
story around the world, the government did not notice there was a need to follow up with 
a plan to maintain the fertility rate.  As a result, in the 21th century Taiwan has become 
164 
 
one of the lowest of low fertility countries (or areas) as shown in Table 5.4.  The ROC 
government has begun to worry that the extremely low fertility level will result in rapid 
population aging and bring about other negative socio-economic effects.  Therefore, in its 
Mega Warmth Social Welfare Program (MWSWP) of 2006, the government focused on 
increasing Taiwan?s birthrate.  The relevant policies in dealing with low fertility include 
maternity leave benefits, parental leave benefits, childcare subsidy system, and early 
children education and care (ECEC) (Lin and Yang, 2009).  The result of implementing 
these female-friendly labor policies and childcare policies is worth being observed in the 
future.  Late is better than never, however. 
 
Sex Ratio at Birth 
Sex ratio at birth (SRB) is usually expressed as the number of male newborns per 
100 female newborns.  In addition, SRB is a measure for estimating the number of 
selective abortions, calculated on the basis of the assumed ?normal? SRB of 105 males 
for 100 females.   In general, the accepted ?norm? for SRBs is between 104 and 107 
males per 100 females.  This range is based on worldwide data from the 1950s and 1960s, 
before sex-selective abortion was available.  Data indicating SRBs above the upper limit 
of 107 are interpreted as not ?natural? but achieved primarily through female-selective 
abortion (FSA) (Visaria, 1967; Miller, 2001, p. 1084).  The most recent estimates for 
2005-2010 show that the global ratio of males to females at birth is about 107:100.  
However, regional differences are evident.  In Africa the sex ratio is 103 whereas in Asia 
it increases to 109 (and in Eastern Asia to 117).  In Europe the sex ratio is 106 male 
165 
 
newborns per 100 female newborns, while it is 105 in Latin America, the Caribbean, 
Northern America, and Oceania (United Nations, 2010, p. 6). 
 
 
Table 5.5  Sex Ratio at Birth in Taiwan: 1980-2009 
                                                                                                                          (Female =100) 
Year Sex Ratio at Birth Year Sex Ratio at Birth Year Sex Ratio at Birth 
1980 106.5 1990 110.3 2000 109.4 
1981 107.1 1991 110.4 2001 109.4 
1982 106.9 1992 109.9 2002 108.7 
1983 107.1 1993 108.1 2003 110.3 
1984 107.4 1994 108.9 2004 110.8 
1985 106.7 1995 107.9 2005 109.1 
1986 107.3 1996 108.8 2006 109.6 
1987 108.4 1997 108.9 2007 109.8 
1988 108.2 1998 108.7 2008 109.6 
1989 108.6 1999 109.5 2009 108.5 
Source:  Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
Table 5.6  Sex Ratio at Birth in Taiwan, by Birth Order: 2001-2006 
                                                                                                                          (Female = 100) 
Year Sex Ratio  at Birth Birth Order  and Sex Ratio at Birth 1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth 4th Birth 5th Birth+ 
2001 109.4 106.9 105.8 120.8 135.0 121.2 
2002 108.7 106.9 109.1 121.5 138.7 123.0 
2003 110.3 107.7 108.9 123.6 139.7 122.2 
2004 110.8 108.7 109.4 122.6 134.1 122.8 
2005 109.1 107.7 107.1 122.0 124.3 121.9 
2006 109.6 107.2 108.2 126.7 136.6 113.3 
Source:  Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
Before 1986, the sex ratio at birth in Taiwan was between 105 and 107, but the 
SRBs never dropped below 108 since 1987 (See Table 5.5).  According to Taiwan?s 
Social Indicators 2009, during the last twenty years, 53.7% of newborn babies were the 
first birth in terms of birth order, 36.5% were the second birth, 7.9% were the third birth, 
166 
 
and 1.9% were the remaining births (ROC, 2009a).  As shown in Table 5.6, in the 2001-
2006 period, there was not a huge difference between the first birth and the second one in 
terms of SRB; the ratios stayed between approximately 105 and 109, which were a little 
higher than the generally accepted ?norm? (104 -107).  However, the SRBs of the higher 
parity births reached up to 120 or more, even near 140.   These imbalanced gender ratios 
in Taiwan imply that sex-selective methods are applied by people with son preference.  
Moreover, the higher SRBs among the higher parity births suggest that both the concept 
of ?having a son to carry on the family name? and the ideology of traditional male-
domination are still valued in Taiwan?s society. 
 
Urbanization 
While urbanization goes hand in hand with industrialization, the physical and 
social amenities of cities facilitate gender-equitable change.  That is, the concentration of 
population in urban areas opens many possibilities for women to get educational 
opportunities, reach job markets, access health services, form social support networks, 
exchange information, and organize around the things of greatest importance to them.  
More importantly, cities tend to favor greater cultural diversity and, as a consequence, 
more flexibility in the application of social norms that traditionally impinge on women?s 
freedom of choice (UNFPA, 2007).  According to a study by Inglehart and Norris, the 
levels of urbanization, one of common indicators of social well-being, systematically 
vary across classifications of different types of society.  Based on data from the Human 
Development Report 2000, Inglehart and Norris find that the average percentage of urban 
167 
 
population in postindustrial societies is 79.1, as compared to 67.2 percent and 40.9 
percent in industrial and agricultural societies, respectively (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 
22). 
Taiwan has experienced a rapid urbanization in recent decades as a result of 
industrialization and modernization.  In 1940, about 12 percent of the people in Taiwan 
lived in cities with the population of more than 100,000.  The proportion jumped to 20.7 
percent in 1950 because of the influx of Chinese from the Mainland.  Most of them 
settled down in cities, especially becoming dwellers in Taipei.  By the middle and late 
1950s, as a consequence of land reform and the rising productivity in the agricultural 
sector, a great number of people began moving to cities for nonagricultural activities.  
Meanwhile, the rate of natural increase was the highest in Taiwan?s history.  The process 
of urbanization accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s as factories proliferated in or near 
Taiwan?s large and medium-sized cities.  As a consequence, Taiwan?s proportion of urban 
population rose dramatically from 25.9 percent (2.795 million) in 1960, to 36 percent 
(5.282 million) in 1970, to 47.2 percent (8.396 million) in 1980, to 53.3 (10.61 million) in 
1988 (Ho, 1978; Tien, 1989; Speare, 1992; Copper, 2009).  According to the 2010 World 
Population Data Sheet, in 2008, Taiwan had 78 percent of its total population living in 
urban areas, while more developed nations were about 74 percent urban; and 44 percent 
of residents of less developed countries dwelled in urbanized cities (Haub, 2010). 
 
 
 
168 
 
2.  Human and Social Capital 
Educational Level 
Education has often been seen as one of the keys to women?s empowerment (Roy, 
Blomqvist, and Clark, 2008).  Over the past six decades, Taiwan has significantly 
improved women?s access to education due to two major educational expansions.  At the 
beginning of industrialization, educational opportunities were extremely limited.  In 
addition, very substantial gender inequality exsited in the education system.  In 1951, the 
average man had attended school for four years, while the average woman had only a 
year and a half of education (Chiang and Ku, 1985, p. 5).  From 1953 to 1967, when the 
ROC government made primary schooling compulsory, school attendance of children in 
the six- to twelve-year age group (primary school) increased from 88% to 98% (gender 
disaggregated data are not available).  Further, the ROC extended the number of years of 
compulsory schooling from six to nine in 1968.  The result was a dramatic increase in the 
enrollment rate of the twelve- to seventeen-year age group or junior high from 49% to 
71.5% for males and 32% to 60% for females (Shin, 1972; cited from Galenson, 1979, p. 
397).  
As shown in Table 5.7, by the year 1976, there was nearly universal schooling for 
both boys and girls of age six to eleven.  However, gender inequality still existed for 
other age groups.  For example, 72.82% of girls aged 12-14 were in school compared to 
81.6% of the boys; 40.11% of female students aged 14-16 were in school compared to 
46.08% of the male students; 8.73% of female students aged 17-21 were in school 
compared to 11.15% of the male students.  Obviously, many girls and women still had 
169 
 
limited educational opportunities in 1970s. 
 
Table 5.7  Percentages of Attending School in Taiwan,  
by Age Group and Sex: 1976-2009 
 
Year 
Age 6-11 
(Elementary 
school) 
Age 12-14 
(Junior high 
school) 
Age 15-17 
(Senior high 
school) 
Age 18-21 
(College) 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
1976 97.59 97.49 72.82 81.60 40.11 46.08   8.73 11.15 
1980 97.70 97.43 82.03 84.73 49.06 50.25 10.25 11.86 
1985 96.31 96.29 86.86 87.18 62.86 61.80 13.49 14.24 
1990 97.87 98.21 90.59 90.05 76.85 69.36 20.44 18.33 
1995 99.10 99.01 94.47 93.83 82.65 75.84 29.78 25.88 
2000 98.79 98.77 94.11 93.83 89.39 84.90 42.11 35.47 
2005 98.44 98.49 96.51 96.50 89.85 87.32 61.06 54.00 
2009 97.91 98.09 97.43 97.54 93.15 91.61 68.93 61.34 
Source: Ministry of Education, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
Note: Data based on the net enrollment rate; the net enrollment (NER) represents the number of children in 
the official age group enrolled at a given level of education, divided by the total number of children of that 
age in a given school year, and multiplied by 100 (UN, 2000, p. 88). 
 
 
  
By the late 1980s, Taiwan emerged as an industrialized society and instituted a 
new policy for the expansion of higher education.  As a result, gender inequality in the 
education system was overcome.  As shown in Table 5.7, between 1990 and 2009, all 
levels of school enrollment for both sexes had increased.  Moreover, women had become 
more likely than men to continue their education above 15 years old.  For example, 
during this period of time, more women aged 18 to 21 attended college and university 
than their male counterparts. 
Although these data (in Table 5.7) show aggregate equality of educational 
opportunities for men and women at all levels, substantial gender segregation by subject 
studied exists at the higher levels of education in Taiwan.  For example, as shown in 
170 
 
Table 5.8, college women are concentrated in the fields of health professions, education, 
business and administration, and social science, while they are underrepresented in the 
more technical fields such as computer science, physical sciences, and engineering.  
Those fields dominated by women might not be associated with ?good jobs? in the labor 
market because Taiwan has entered the era of high-tech development beginning in the 
early 1990?s. 
 
Table 5.8  Higher Education Enrollment in Taiwan: 2009/2010 
 
Subjects Women (%) Men (%) 
Health Professions 73 27 
Education 64 36 
Business and Administration 61 39 
Social Science 56 44 
Law 50 50 
Agriculture 50 50 
Computer Science 36 64 
Physical Sciences 25 75 
Engineering 12 88 
Source: Ministry of Education, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
 
Literacy 
Table 5.9 demonstrates that Taiwan?s literacy rate has steadily increased during 
the last few decades; the rate of literacy among people aged 15 and over was 85.04% in 
1976 and it reached 97.91% in 2009.  As shown in Table 5.10, by 2009, almost all 
Taiwanese aged 15-24 were able to read and write, while 13.89% of the population aged 
65 years old and above remained illiterate, accounting for most of the illiterate population 
in this country.  In 2009, the overall literacy rate of Taiwanese women was 3 percent 
171 
 
lower than their male counterparts (see Table 5.9), the gap existed primarily because 
23.60% of Taiwanese women over 65 years old are illiterate compared with only 3.42 
percent of elderly men (see Table 5.10). 
 
Table 5.9  Literacy Rates in Taiwan (% of Aged 15 and Over): 1976-2009 
 
year Literacy rate (%) All Male Female 
1976 85.04 - - 
1992 93.16 96.92 89.15 
2000 95.55 98.51 92.49 
2005 97.33 99.29 95.34 
2009 97.91 99.50 96.33 
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
Table 5.10  Literacy in Taiwan, by Age Group and Sex: 2009 
 
age All Female Male Literacy rate Illiteracy rate Literacy rate Illiteracy rate Literacy rate Illiteracy rate 
15-19       99.99          0.01        99.99          0.01      100.00          0.00  
20-24       99.99          0.01        99.99          0.01        99.99          0.01  
25-29       99.98          0.02        99.97          0.03        99.98          0.02  
30-34       99.95          0.05        99.94          0.06        99.96          0.04  
35-39       99.93          0.07        99.91          0.09        99.94          0.06  
40-44       99.91          0.09        99.89          0.11        99.93          0.07  
45-49       99.83          0.17        99.76          0.24        99.83          0.17  
50-54       99.45          0.55        99.07          0.93        99.83          0.17  
55-59       98.75          1.25        97.76          2.24        99.76          0.24  
60-64       97.16          2.84        94.94          5.06        99.49          0.51  
65+       86.11        13.89        76.40        23.60        96.58          3.42  
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
 
 
 
172 
 
Participation in Voluntary Organizations 
 
Figure 5.5  The Number of Volunteers in Taiwan by sex: 1996-2009 
 
 
Source: Data colected from Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan).  
 
 
A substantial proportion of nonprofit groups rely on volunteers in pursuing their 
objectives.  There are many reasons for participation in voluntary organizations.  In 
addition to altruistic motives (helping people, benefiting children, working for a cause, 
serving the community, and so on), numerous studies have indicated that people get 
involved in volunteer work in order to build or improve their human and social capital, 
such as acquiring new skills and knowledge, gaining career enhancement and 
employment opportunities, increasing self-worth, and expanding social interaction and 
networks (Mueller, 1975; Wiehe and Isenhour, 1977; Gora and Nemerowicz, 1985 & 
1991; Unger, 1991; Riecken, Babakus, and Yavas, 1995; Johnson-Coffey, 1997; Day and 
13 11 12 14 17 17 15 18 
20 25 
31 35 
39 
48 
23 23 26 
32 
40 41 35 41 45 
54 
66 
74 
92 
106 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1,000  
persons 
Male 
Female 
173 
 
Devlin, 1998; Putnam, 2000; OECD, 2001; Bussell and Forbes, 2002). 
In 2009, there were 154,000 persons in Taiwan registered as volunteers, in which 
106,000 were females (68.8%) and 48 thousand were males (31.2%), increasing by 360% 
and 270% from 1996, respectively.  In Taiwan, women are more likely to volunteer than 
men.  As shown in Figure 5.5, the number of females participating in voluntary 
organizations has been more than two times of that of males for past years except 1996.   
 
3.  Economic Activities 
Labor Force Participation 
 
Table 5.11  Labor Force Participation in Taiwan: 1961-2009 
 Labor Force (1,000 Persons) Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 
Year Total Female Male All Female Male 
1961   3,655 - - 61.75 35.81 86.37 
1970   4,654 - - 57.35 35.45 78.87 
1980   6,629 2,223 (33.53%) 4,406 (66.47%) 58.26 39.25 77.11 
1990   8,423 3,160 (37.52%) 5,263 (62.48%) 59.24 44.50 73.96 
1995   9,210 3,551 5,659 58.71 45.34 72.03 
2000   9,784 3,917 (40.03%) 5,867 (59.97%) 57.68 46.02 69.42 
2001   9,832 3,978 5,855 57.23 46.10 68.47 
2002   9,969 4,074 5,896 57.34 46.59 68.22 
2003 10,076 4,172 5,904 57.34 47.14 67.69 
2004 10,240 4,272 5,968 57.66 47.71 67.78 
2005 10,371 4,359 (42.03%) 6,012 (57.97%) 57.78 48.12 67.62 
2006 10,522 4,467 6,056 57.92 48.68 67.35 
2007 10,713 4,597 6,116 58.25 49.44 67.24 
2008 10,853 4,680 6,173 58.28 49.67 67.09 
2009 10,917 4,737 (43.39%) 6,180 (56.61%) 57.90 49.62 66.40 
Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988 (ROC, 1989a); Directorate- 
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 
174 
 
As shown in Table 5.11, women in Taiwan comprised 33.53% of the total labor 
force in 1980 and accounted for 43.40% of it by 2009.  On the one hand, the population 
of women in the labor force in Taiwan was 2.223 million in 1980 but had jumped up to 
4.737 million by 2009.  That is, between 1980 and 2009, the number of females in the 
labor force increased by 113%.  On the other hand, in 1980 the population of men in the 
labor force was 4.406 million but by 2009 there were 6.180 million: over the course of 
thirty years the number of men in the labor force increased by 40%.  In short, during this 
period of time, the number of females participating in the labor force increased much 
more than the number of males, resulting in the gap of women?s access to the labor 
market relative to men?s being substantially narrowed.  However, in terms of gender 
parity, women?s share of total labor force is still far behind that of men?s. 
 
Figure 5.6  Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) in Taiwan: 1961-2009 
 
 
Source: Data collected from Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988 (ROC, 1989a) 
and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan). 
 
86.37 
78.87 77.11 
74.84 
69.42 67.62 67.35 67.24 67.09 66.40 
35.81 35.45 39.25 
45.35 46.02 48.12 48.68 
49.44 49.67 49.62 
61.75 
57.35 58.26 60.12 57.68 57.78 57.92 58.25 58.28 57.90 
30.00 
40.00 
50.00 
60.00 
70.00 
80.00 
90.00 
100.00 
1961 1970 1980 1989 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
% 
Male 
Female 
All 
175 
 
While Figure 5.6 displays an overall decrease in the labor force participation rate 
of men in Taiwan by about 20%, from 86% in 1961 to 66% in 2009, it also demonstrates 
a general increase in the labor force participation rate for women by around 14%, from 
36% to 50%.  The gap between participation rates of women and men has narrowed 
significantly but remains at a considerable 16 percentage points in 2009.  
Along with more education opportunities for women and women?s eagerly 
striving for equal rights, the female labor force participation rate (FLFPR) among the 
countries displayed in Figure 5.7 generally increased between 1988 and 2008 with the 
exception of Japan which showed a decrease in FLFPR by 0.5%.  Of all the countries 
listed, the Netherlands experienced the greatest increase by about 10%.  While Taiwan 
had an overall increase in FLFPR by 4.1% from 45.6% in 1988 to 49.7% in 2008, South 
Korea exhibited a 5% of increase at the same period time, from 45% to 50%.  Globally, 
however, women?s participation in the labor market remained steady in the two decades 
from 1990 to 2010, hovering around 52 per cent (UN, 2010).  Thus, Taiwan is slightly 
below average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 
 
Figure 5.7  Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Selected Countries: 
1988 and 2008 
 
 
Source: Original data collected from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, ROC (Taiwan) and International Labor Organization (ILO), cited from Taiwan?s Social Indicators 
2009, p.76 (ROC, 2009a). 
Note: With respect to 1988?s data, Germany and Netherlands refer to 1991 and 1995, respectively; 
Norway?s 2008 data refers to 2007; Labor force participation rates for USA and Norway are based on the 
civilian population over 16 years of age who are in the labor force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63.7 
56.6 
49.0 47.7 
45.6 45.0 45.6 
48.9 
69.5 
59.5 59.2 
52.5 51.4 
50.0 49.7 
48.4 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
% 
1988 
2008 
177 
 
Distribution of Occupations and Occupational Segregation by Sex 
 
Table 5.12  Occupational distribution by gender: 1978-2010 
                                                                                                                                        (%) 
Year 
Legislators, 
government 
administrators, 
business 
executives and 
managers 
Professionals Technicians 
and  
associate 
professionals 
Clerks Combined 
service, 
shop, 
market, 
sales 
workers 
Agricultural, 
animal 
husbandry, 
forestry and 
fishing 
workers 
Production, 
machine 
operators 
and related 
workers 
Female 
1978 1.12 4.68   6.54   9.86 15.61 22.34 39.85 
1980 1.05 4.79   7.44 11.00 16.70 17.98 41.03 
1990 1.90 6.56 12.96 14.08 19.65 10.10 34.76 
2000 1.54 7.98 16.82 20.64 24.20   5.28 23.54 
2010 1.95 9.67 22.25 20.56 23.89   3.38 18.30 
Male 
1978 4.06 3.25   6.69 4.04 13.20 25.65 43.10 
1980 5.07 3.40   7.69 4.00 13.80 19.79 46.25 
1990 6.41 4.31 10.82 4.33 14.91 14.32 44.90 
2000 6.23 5.38 16.74 4.20 13.88   9.26 44.32 
2010 5.94 8.08 19.78 4.46 14.86   6.43 40.46 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China 
(Taiwan). 
 
 
Men?s and women?s occupations in Taiwan have significantly changed along with 
the transformation of the production structure during the process of industrialization and 
modernization.  Government statistics show that by the late 2000s, industry?s share of 
employment had fallen to less than 37%, while service?s share reached 58% of total 
employment.  In contrast, employment in agriculture had decreased to about 5% (ROC, 
2009b).  As shown in Table 5.12, in 1978, women were concentrated in three 
occupational groups: about 40% were production, machine operators and related workers; 
178 
 
22.34% were agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing workers; and 15.61% 
were combine service, shop, market and sales workers.  By 2010, the majority of women 
were involved in three major occupational categories: 23.89% were engaged as combined 
service, shop, market, and sales workers; 22.25% were technicians and associate 
professionals; 20.56% worked in clerical positions.  With regard to men?s employment, as 
presented in Table 5.12, in 1978, over 80% of male labor force were concentrated in three 
occupational groups: 43.1% were production and related workers; 25.65% involved in 
agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing jobs; and 13.2% employed in the 
field of service and sales .  By 2010, about 75% of men?s labor force concentrated in 
three occupations: 40.46% had production and related jobs; 19.78% were technicians and 
associate professionals; 14.86% devoted themselves to combined service, shop, market, 
and sales jobs. 
 
By translating the statistics displayed in Table 5.12 into graphs, Figure 5.8 and 
Figure 5.9 illustrate changes over time for each occupational category for women and 
men, respectively.  During the past decades, Taiwan has been transformed from an 
agricultural society to an export-led labor-intensive manufacturing country, and then to a 
post-industrial nation.  Particularly, since the late 1980s, Taiwan?s economic activities 
have gradually shifted toward high-skill and knowledge-based production as well as the 
service sector, while low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing moved abroad, typically 
taking place in China.  Figure 5.8 shows that women being engaged in the agricultural 
and related jobs fell about 19 percentage points, from 22.34% in 1978 to only 3.38% in 
2010.  In contrast, women employed in the field of technicians and associate 
179 
 
professionals gradually increased by nearly 16 percentage points, from 6.54% to 22.25%.  
In addition, female production, machine operators and related workers, so-called blue 
collar jobs, in general dropped by 21.55 percentage points from 39.85% to 18.30%.  
Albeit female blue collar jobs once reached the highest point in 1979, sharing 41.67% of 
total female labor force.  The percentages of female clerks, service and sales workers, and 
professionals increased 10, 8, and 5 percentage points, respectively.  In particular, both 
clerks and professionals for women doubled from 9.86% to 20.56% and from 4.68% to 
9.67%, respectively.  Yet, the percentage of women who worked as legislators, 
government administrators, and business executives and managers increased only 
negligibly to 1.95% in 2010 from 1.12% in 1978.  
 
 
Figure 5.8  The Transformation of Women?s Occupations 
in Taiwan: 1978-2010 
 
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
% 
1978 
1980 
1990 
2000 
2010 
180 
 
Figure 5.9  The Transformation of Men?s Occupations in Taiwan: 1978-2010 
 
 
Likewise, men?s labor force distribution across occupations has changed in the 
process of economic structural transformation resulting from industrialization.   As shown 
in Figure 5.9, the number of men who worked at agricultural and related jobs fell about 
19 percentage points, from 25.65% in 1978 to 6.43% in 2010, while between 40% and 
46% of male employees were hired as production, machine operators and related workers.  
Over the same time period, men?s employment in the field of technicians and associate 
professionals increased 13 percentage points in a gradual way, from 6.69% to 19.78%; 
and, the percentage of men who were engaged in professional careers increased 4.83 
percentage points, from 3.25% to 8.08%.  Meanwhile, men?s share of administrative and 
managerial positions, service and sales employment, and clerical jobs increased 1.88, 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
% 
1978 
1980 
1990 
2000 
2010 
181 
 
1.66, and 0.42 percentage points, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.10  Segregation Index by Occupation (SIO) 
 
Source: Annual employment figures for seven broadly defined occupational groups are reported by 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan.  The index of segregation is 
calculated according to the formula: SIOt = ?i | wit ? mit | ? 2, where wit (mit) is the percentage of women 
(men) working in occupation i.    
 
To gauge the extent of the occupational segregation by gender in Taiwan, this 
study uses the well-known segregation measure developed by Duncan and Duncan 
(Duncan and Duncan, 1955; cited from Fuess and Hou, 2009).  For year t, segregation 
index by occupation (SIO) is given by 0 ? SIOt = ?i | wit ? mit | ? 2 ? 100, where wit (mit) is 
the percentage of women (men) working in occupation i.  The index represents the 
percentage of women (or men) that would have to reassign to achieve gender balance 
across occupations.  There is absolute segregation (every occupation employed either 
9.66 
13.70 
22.38 
28.71 
28.48 
30.12 
29.20 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
182 
 
only men or only women) if the SIO is 100; the index would equal 0 if men and women 
were perfectly integrated across all occupations (Reskin and Padavic, 1994; Fuess and 
Hou, 2009).  As shown in Figure 5.10, the degree of sex segregation of occupations has 
dramatically increased, especially since 1986.  However, the years after 1996, the 
segregation indexes have hovered between 28 and 30. 
For 1978, the index of occupational segregation is only 9.66 (see Figure 5.10); 
that is, less than 10% of the female (or male) labor force required relocation to 
accomplish gender balance across occupational groups.  There was nearly equal 
representation in professional and technical jobs with 11.22% of women and 9.94% of 
men working in these fields.  There also was little disparity with respect to service and 
sales occupations, the share for women and men were 15.61% and 13.2%, respectively.  
Among production, machine operators and related workers, male representation 
somewhat exceeded that of females, as comparing 43.1% with 39.85%.  In contrast, men 
were almost four times more likely than women to work in executive or managerial jobs, 
showing 4.06% versus 1.12%.  In addition, women were more than twice as likely to 
work in clerical jobs as men, presenting 9.86% versus 4.04%. (See Table 5.12).  However, 
the average SIO was 12.28 between 1978 and 1986, but by 1986 it had climbed to 13.7.  
This trend is mild, compared to remarkable increase after 1986 (see Figure 5.10).  
Between 1978 and 1991 the SIO measure more than doubled, jumping from 9.66 to 22.38.  
By 2010, 29.2% of working women (or men) would have to have been in different 
occupations to achieve gender balance.  In other words, over the past three decades, sex 
segregation of occupations nearly tripled. 
183 
 
By and large, the segregation index increased so dramatically because of growing 
disparities in three occupational groups.  First, between 1978 and 2010, the gap in clerical 
employment continued to widen, with the female share of this occupation rising from 
9.86% to 20.56% while remaining around 4% for men.  Second, in 1978, services and 
sales jobs were fairly gender-balanced; by 2010 female labor force working in this 
occupation category far exceeded that of male, employing 23.89% of women but only 
14.86% of men.  Third, in 1978 the male share of production and related jobs was slightly 
greater than that of female by 3.25%, 43.1% for men compared to 39.85% for women; by 
2010 male domination in this occupation had grown to 22.16 percentage points, showing 
40.46% for men versus 18.3% for women. 
In addition, along with Taiwan?s industrialization, agricultural employment fell 
from 36.7% of total employment in 1970 to 5.3% in 2007 (ROC, 2009b), by 2010 
respective shares for men?s and women?s labor force in this occupation were 6.43% and 
3.38%.  From the income-earning ability viewpoint, women?s underrepresentation in 
agriculture may be a positive sign for them.  As show in Table 5.15, agricultural and 
related workers make the lowest average monthly earnings among all occupations. 
 
Entrance into Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technical Related 
Occupations 
Over the past three decades, women have reached educational levels comparable 
to men, increased their participation in the labor force, and expanded their economic 
opportunities by limiting childbearing.  As a result, as shown in Table 5.13, women?s  
184 
 
Table 5.13  Distribution of Ratio of Female and Male Workers to Total Employed in 
Administrative and Managerial, Professional, and Technical Occupations 
 
 Share of administrative and 
managerial workers (%) 
Share of professional and  
technical related workers (%) 
 Men Women Men Women 
1980 90.6   9.4 64.3 35.7 
1990 84.9 15.1 56.3 43.7 
2000 85.7 14.3 56.9 43.1 
2010 79.5 20.5 52.7 47.3 
Source: Data calculated by suing statistics from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan). 
 
share of administrative and managerial workers doubled between 1980 and 2010, 
increasing from 9.4% to 20.5%.  However, women are still pretty much underrepresented 
in this top occupation that entails decision-making authority and responsibility as well as 
higher pay.  During the same period of time, women?s share of professional and technical 
related employees also increased 11.6%, from 35.7% in 1980 to 47.3% in 2010.  
Qualified professionals and technicians are required to manage the expansion of a 
country?s science, technology and innovation capacity.  However, in an age where science 
and technology based-knowledge is becoming a determinant of economic 
competitiveness in Taiwan, women are slightly underrepresented among professionals 
and technicians, although the gap has been narrowed in recent years. 
 
Gender Pay Gap 
Table 5.14 shows the average monthly earnings for men and women who were 
employed in the industrial and service sectors (non-agricultural sectors), average 
women?s wage as a percentage of men?s, and the gender pay gap for each year from 1981 
185 
 
to 2009.  In 1981, women in Taiwan earned only 64 per cent of what men earned, 
presenting a gap of 36 per cent.  However, along with the increase of women?s 
educational attainment and the transformation of the production structure, over the course 
of the thirty years the wage gap had narrowed significantly.  By 2009, women?s average 
salary was 80 per cent of men?s.  However, pay differentials between women and men 
vary across occupational groups.  For example, as illustrated in Table 5.15, in 2009, the 
gender pay gap in the field of administrators and managers was smaller, while those of 
services and sales related, agriculture, and machine operators were larger. 
 
 
 
Table 5.14  Gender Pay Gap in Taiwan: 1981-2009 
 
 
Average Monthly Earnings of Employees  
in Industry and Service Sector (NT$) F = % of M* Pay gap (%) 
 All Male Female 
1981 10,677 12,550 8,051 64 36 
1985 13,980 16,580 10,526 63 37 
1990 24,317 28,376 18,923 67 33 
1995 35,389 40,571 28,395 70 30 
2000 41,861 47,253 35,007 74 26 
2005 43,163 47,836 37,480 78 22 
2006 43,493 48,021 38,035 79 21 
2007 44,414 48,903 39,032 80 20 
2008 44,424 49,065 38,870 79 21 
2009 42,176 46,459 37,144 80 20 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan). 
Note: * an expression of female earnings as a percent of male earnings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
Table 5.15  Gender Pay Gap by Occupation: 2009 
 
Occupation Average Monthly Earnings (NT$) Gender  Pay Gap (%) All Male Female 
Legislators, government 
administrators, business 
executives and managers 
 
67,076 
 
 
68,525 
 
 
61,750 
 
10 
Professionals 48,785 54,990 42,544 23 
Technicians and  associate 
professionals 38,485 41,961 34,712 17 
Clerks 28,683 34,250 27,109 21 
Combine service, shop, 
market, sales workers 25,762 31,033 22,194 28 
Agricultural, animal 
husbandry, forestry and 
fishing workers 
20,825 23,070 16,957 26 
Production, machine 
operators and related 
workers 
27,254 29,776 21,004 29 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan). 
 
 
 
 
While countries engage in the promotion of gender equality and even enact laws 
to ensure equal pay, nevertheless the gender pay gap still exists.  As shown in Figure 5.11, 
in 2008, Taiwan?s gender pay gap was 20.8% which was similar to the United States at 
20.1%, while it was much lower than both Japan at 34.1% and South Korea at 33.5%.  
However, by comparing 1990 to 2008, the pay gap narrowed in each selected country 
with Taiwan demonstrating the most significant narrowing of the gap by about 12.5 
percentage points (ROC, 2009a, p. 77). 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
Figure 5.11  The Gender Pay Gap in Taiwan and Selected Countries:  
1990 and 2008 
 
 
Source: Social Indicators 2009 (ROC, 2009a, p. 77). 
 
  
 
4.  Political Participation and Power 
Women can use two distinct ways to improve their status: government and the 
political processes.  First, female officials are usually assumed to be especially responsive 
to women?s concerns and issues.  Thus, having more women officials should result in 
more governmental policies supportive of women (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990; 
Thomas, 1994).  Second, women?s interest groups and individual women can lobby 
public officials to gain favorable policies.  Indeed, the activities of grassroots women?s 
organizations have been quite effective in upgrading the status of women in a wide range 
of contexts in both the developed and developing countries (Costain, 1992; Lee and Clark, 
42.9 45.0 
33.3 
28.2 
34.1 33.5 
20.8 20.1 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
Japan South Korea Taiwan USA 
% 
1990 
2008 
188 
 
2000).  This section, hence, examines women?s political status on Taiwan by presenting 
women?s voting rate, political representation, and women?s movements. 
 
 
Voting Rate 
 
Table 5.16  Taiwan?s Voting Rates in Elections between 2008 and 2010 
 
 Voting rates (%) 
 All Men Women 
2008 Legislative Elections 58.3 58.5 58.1 
2008 Presidential Election 76.3 75.0 77.7 
2009 County/City Mayors Elections 63.3 62.9 63.7 
2010 Metropolitan Elections 71.7 71.1 72.4 
Source: Data collected from Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw). 
 
Taiwan has a long history of elections.  Even during the martial law period, 
elections had been held regularly.  Voting eligibility is defined broadly: the minimum 
voting age is 20, and there are no gender, property, or educational requirements (ROC, 
2005, p.74).  Generally speaking, there is almost no difference in voting rates between 
men and women (Chou and Clark, 1994, p. 163).   However, as demonstrated in Table 
5.16, women?s turnout rates were slightly higher than men?s in three out of the four recent 
elections (except 2008 Legislative elections).  Particularly, in the 2008 presidential 
election, 77.7% of female voters went to the polls, compared to 75 % of male voters. 
 
Political Representation 
This section presents the changing status of women?s political representation in 
Taiwan since 1950s.  Three groups of indicators are selected: women?s representation in 
189 
 
the legislative bodies, in the leadership positions, and in the public administration (civil 
service).      
Since the KMT-led government set up on Taiwan in 1949, albeit with some 
changes, legislative institutions are divided into four categories:  national level (the 
National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan), provincial level (the Taiwan Provincial 
Assembly), Municipal level (five Municipal City Councils ?Taipei, Kaohsiung, New 
Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan), and local level (County/City and Township/Village 
Councils).   
Previously, the Legislative Yuan served as the parliament or congress of the 
Western democracies while the National Assembly had to approve constitutional 
amendments and, before 1996, served as the Electoral College in presidential elections.  
In elections for these two legislative bodies held between 1969 and 1989, only additional 
seats were directly elected, as the majority was held by senior representatives elected 
from constituencies on the Chinese Mainland in 1948.  By the end of 1991, all veteran 
members retired.  Taiwan held its non-supplementary elections for the National Assembly 
in 1991 and the Legislative Yuan in 1992.  However, constitutional amendments 
gradually transferring almost all of the National Assembly's powers to the Legislative 
Yuan in the late 1990s made the National Assembly a dormant body in 2000 and fully 
defunct in 2005.  Thus, currently, the Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative or 
lawmaking body of the state, consisting of popularly elected representatives who serve 
four years and are eligible for reelection (ROC, 1989b; ROC, 2005; Copper, 2000 and 
2009). 
190 
 
The Taiwan provincial government was established in May, 1947, and 
representatives for the Provincial Assembly had been elected by popular vote at four-year 
intervals since 1951.  However, due to government reform, the Provincial Assembly was 
eliminated in December 1998, along with the elected governorship and most other organs 
of the provincial government (ROC, 1989b; Copper, 2000 and 2009).  Taiwan now has 
five special municipalities; they comprise 60 per cent of total population.  Taipei gained 
this status in 1967; and Kaohsiung in 1979 (ROC, 2005; Copper, 2000).  At the end of 
2010, Taipei County (renamed New Taipei City) was upgraded to municipal status along 
with the merged Taichung City (encompassing Taichung City and Taichung County) and 
the merged Tainan City (encompassing Tainan City and Tainan County); also Kaohsiung 
County was merged with the already upgraded Kaohsiung City.  Each municipal city has 
a council, whose main function is to check and balance of its corresponding city 
government.  Taiwan?s local or grassroots legislative bodies are County/City and 
Township/Village Councils.  Elections for these councilors started from the early 1950s 
(Copper and Chen, 1984, p. 44). 
In Taiwan, elections for legislative bodies are based on a single non-transferable 
vote (SNTV) system for multimember districts (MMD), except the Legislative Yuan 
which applied SNTV for both MMD and proportion representation (PR) between 1992 
and 2004 and a mixed parallel electoral system (voters cast separate single member 
districts and PR ballots) since the 2008 election.  Under the SNTV system, voters can 
vote for only one candidate; MMD allows candidates to win with a fairly small number 
of total votes.  While women in Taiwan have had the right to vote and to stand for 
191 
 
election since the 1950s, they also are guaranteed a minimum level of representation in 
legislative bodies according to the 1946 Constitution.  The reserved-seats system was 
included in the ROC?s Constitution during the early stage of the republic, seeing that 
women as a group were severely disadvantaged in their social and economic status under 
the traditional Confucian patriarchal culture and could not compete with men in the 
political arena.  In practice, one or more seats are reserved for women in Taiwan?s 
multimember electoral districts, depending on the size of the district.  When a sufficient 
number of female candidates gain enough votes to be elected, they are considered to have 
met this quota.  When no or not enough women candidates get enough votes to be elected, 
those with the most votes are awarded the seat or seats reserved for them.  On the whole, 
about 10 percent of legislative seats are reserved for women by this system (Chou, Clark, 
and Clark, 1990). 
Table 5.17, Table 5.18, Table 5.19, and Table 5.20 present the situation of 
women?s representation in four levels of Taiwan?s legislative bodies.  The general 
impression from all four tables is that women?s share of representation in legislative 
bodies has steadily and incrementally  increased throughout the postwar era. In latest 
elections, while women appeared to have 30 per cent or more of the total seats in the 
Legislative Yuan and four of five special municipal city councils (except Taichung City 
Council where women gained 27 per cent of total seats), women?s representation in 
County/City and Township/Village Councils also reached 27.4 per cent and 22.7 per cent 
of total seats, respectively.  In addition, the percentage of women being elected into the 
last elections of the National Assembly (1996) and the Provincial Assembly (1994) were 
192 
 
18.3 per cent and 20.3 per cent, respectively (these two assemblies were abolished after 
their 1996 and 1994 terms). 
 
 
Table 5.17  Women?s Representation in National Legislative Bodies in Taiwan 
 
Year 
Candidates Seats 
Total Women % Women Total 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
% 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
Women % Women 
Legislative Yuan 
1969   25     4 16.0   11  0 0   1   9.1 
1972   55     6 10.9   36  3   8.3   4 11.1 
1975   61     4   6.6   37  3 10.8   4 10.8 
1980 218   17   7.8   70  5   7.1   8 11.4 
1983 171   22 12.9   71  5   7.0   8 11.3 
1986 137   12   8.8   73  6   6.0   7   9.6 
1989 302   26   8.6 101  7   6.9 13 12.9 
1992 403   46 11.4 161 10   6.2 17 10.6 
1995 397   50 12.6 164 NA   NA 23 14.0 
1998 498   86 17.3 225 NA   NA 43 19.1 
2001 584 110 18.8 225 NA   NA 50 22.2 
2004 492   95 19.3 225 NA   NA 47 20.9 
2008 423 121 28.6 113   0 0 34 30.1 
National Assembly 
1969   29     2   6.9   15   2 13.3   2 13.3 
1972   78   10 12.8   53   5   9.4   8 15.1 
1980 185   17   9.2   76   7   9.2 12 15.8 
1986 169   25 14.8   84   8   9.5 16 19.0 
1991 627   76 12.1 325 28   8.6 42 12.9 
1996 591 103 17.4 334 29   8.7 61 18.3 
Source: Data collected from various sources: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 
1988 (ROC, 1989a); Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p 90; Lee, 2000, p 53; Sun, 2004, p 174; Legislative 
Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) (www.ly.gov.tw); Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) 
(www.cec.gov.tw).   
 
 
 
 
193 
 
Table 5.18  Women?s Representation in Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
 
Year 
Candidates Seats 
Total Women % Women Total 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
% 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
Women % Women 
1951 140 10   7.1 55   5   9.1   5   9.1 
1954 110 18 16.4 57   6 10.5   6 10.5 
1957 118 22 18.6 66   9 13.6   9 13.6 
1960 126 18 14.3 73   9 12.3 10 13.7 
1963 137 14 10.2 74   9 12.2 10 13.5 
1968 129 19 14.7 71 10 14.1 11 15.5 
1972 121 21 17.4 73 10 13.6 12 16.4 
1977 125 23 18.4 77 10 13.0 13 16.9 
1981 199 34 17.1 77   9 11.7 10 13.0 
1985 158 28 17.7 77   9 11.7 13 16.9 
1989 157 30 19.1 77   9 11.7 14 18.2 
1994 178 32 18.0 79   9 11.4 16 20.3 
Source: Data collected from Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988 (ROC, 1989a); 
Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p 91; Lee, 2000, p 54; Sun, 2004, p 175; Central Election Commission, ROC 
(Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw).  
Note:  The Provincial Assembly was eliminated in December 1998 due to political reforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
Table 5.19  Women?s Representation in Municipal City Councils in Taiwan 
 
Year 
Candidates Seats 
Total Women % Women Total 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
% 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
Women % Women 
Taipei City Council 
1969   77   8 10.4 48 4 8.3   7 14.6 
1973   63   8 12.7 49 4 8.2   7 14.3 
1977   61   8 13.1 51 5 9.8   8 15.7 
1981   83 11 13.3 51 5 9.8   7 13.7 
1985   74 10 13.5 51 5 9.8   9 17.6 
1989 100 24 24.0 51 5 9.8 10 19.6 
1994 145 29 20.0 52 5 9.6 12 23.1 
1998 110 28 25.5 52 5 9.6 17 32.7 
2002 115 30 26.1 52 5 9.6 17 32.7 
2006 103 31 30.1 52 5 9.6 19 36.5 
2010 103 36 35.0 62 NA NA 21 33.9 
Kaohsiung City Council 
1981   81 15 18.5 42 5 11.9   6 14.3 
1985   71 13 18.3 42 5 11.9   6 14.3 
1989   94 14 14.9 43 5 11.6   6 14.0 
1994 129 16 12.4 44 5 11.4   6 13.6 
1998 105 15 14.3 44 5 11.4   5 11.4 
2002 114 19 16.7 44 5 11.4   9 20.5 
2006   77 26 33.8 44 5 11.4 16 36.4 
2010 134 38 28.4 66 NA NA 23 34.8 
New Taipei City Council 
2010 142 42 30.0 66 NA NA 23 34.8 
Taichung City Council 
2010 137 35 25.5 63 NA NA 17 27.0 
Tainan City Council 
2010 130 37 28.5 57 NA NA 23 40.4 
Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988 (ROC, 1989a); Chou, Clark, and 
Clark, 1990, p. 91; Lee, 2000, p 54; Sun, 2004, p. 175-176; Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan). 
Note: The end of 2010, Taipei County (renamed New Taipei City) was upgraded to municipal status along 
with the merged Taichung City (encompassing Taichung City and Taichung County) and the merged Tainan 
City (encompassing Tainan City and Tainan County); also, Kaohsiung County was merged with the already 
upgraded Kaohsiung City. 
  
195 
 
Table 5.20  Women?s Representation in County and Township Councils in Taiwan 
 
Year 
Candidates Seats 
Total Women % Women Total 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
% 
Reserved 
for 
Women 
Women % Women 
County/City Councils 
1950 1827 116   6.3 814   70   8.6   69   8.5 
1952 1844 224 12.1 860   74   8.6   74   8.6 
1954 1579 142   9.0 928   94 10.1   94 10.1 
1958 1621 168 10.4   1025 102 10.0 101   9.9 
1961 1629 162   9.9 929   91   9.8   95 10.2 
1964 1563 230 14.7 907 108 11.9 123 13.6 
1968 1262 208 16.5 847 100 11.8 123 14.5 
1973 1480 206 13.9 850   99 11.6 119 14.0 
1977 1271 190 14.9 857   93 10.9 121 14.1 
1982 1683 226 13.4 799   89 11.1 115 14.4 
1986 1472 209 14.2 837   97 11.6 127 15.2 
1990 1743 265 15.2 842   NA  NA 128 15.2 
1994 1868 275 14.7 883   NA NA 133 15.1 
1998 1952 316 16.2 891   NA  NA 151 16.9 
2002 2057 455 22.1 895   NA  NA 197 22.0 
2005 1689 404 23.9 901   NA  NA 234 26.0 
2009   935 241 25.8 592   NA  NA 162 27.4 
Township/Village Councils 
1952 NA NA NA 5695 0 0   11      0.2 
1954 NA NA NA 6397 NA NA 550      8.6 
1958 NA NA NA 6834 NA NA 629      9.2 
1961 8833 1068 12.0 5260 NA NA 660    12.5 
1964 8510   668 7.8 4776 NA NA 411      8.6 
1968 7769  736 9.5 4709 NA NA 497    10.6 
1973 5575  516 9.3 3757 NA NA 378    10.1 
1977 6460  872 13.5 3793 NA NA 488    12.9 
1982 6717  878 13.1 3700 NA NA 490    13.2 
1986 6066  901 14.9 3754 NA NA 560    14.9 
1994 NA NA NA 6317 NA NA 937    14.8 
1998 NA 1104 NA 3663 NA NA 322      8.8 
2002 NA NA NA 3717 NA NA NA     NA 
2006 6079 1206 19.8 3717 NA NA 759    20.4 
2009 3818  806 21.1 2322 NA NA 527    22.7 
Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988 (ROC, 1989a); Chou, Clark, and 
Clark, 1990, p 92; Lee, 2000, p 55; Sun, 2004, p 176-177; Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) 
(www.ly.gov.tw); Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw). 
196 
 
Three stages of development display the evolution and advancement of women?s 
representation in legislative bodies.  First, initially, women appeared to win many of their 
seats because of their quota.  For example, as shown in Table 5.20, the 1952 elections for 
Township/Village Councils held without implementing the reserved-seats system, women 
won only 11 of 5,685 council seats or 0.2 per cent of the total seats.  Two years later, the 
reserved-seats system was brought into the 1954 elections, women gained 8.6 per cent of 
the Township/Village Councils seats, indicating that the quota for women gave an 
impetus to promote women?s representation.  Thus, throughout the 1950s, women won 
approximately 10 percent of the seats in the elective bodies (Provincial Assembly, 
County/City and Township/Village Councils; see Table 5.18 and Table 5.20).  Similarly, 
this trend emerged when elections began for the Legislative Yuan and the National 
Assembly in the late 1960s.  Second, Taiwan?s elections were highly competitive among 
party factions and individual politicians because the authoritarian regime wanted to 
maintain control by playing local factions off against each other (Copper, 1997; Clark and 
Clark, 2002).  In such conditions, some women needed to be recruited to run; otherwise, 
reserved seats would go by fault to women from opposing factions.  That is, women 
might not totally depend on the reserved-seats system to win elections; rather, they had to 
compete with other female candidates.  Owing to real competition, therefore, women 
gradually built their own political skills and became independent political actors in their 
own right.  By the 1970s or 1980s, depending on the office, women were exceeding their 
reserved quotas by significant margins in all of Taiwan?s legislative elections.  This 
shows that women in Taiwan have been able to win their seats by their own efforts rather 
197 
 
than relying on the ?privileges? prescribed for them by the reserved-seats system.   
Finally, the founding of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 
1986 and the lifting of martial law in 1987 led to Taiwan?s political liberalization; and 
then the growing electoral competition made parties more sensitive to appealing to 
female voters by slating more women candidates than before.  At the same period of time, 
due to social and economic advancement, the rapid growth in the number of women with 
higher education attainment and professional employment greatly expanded the 
?eligibility pool? for women candidates.  More women were nominated and then elected. 
As a result, women?s representation has markedly increased since the mid-1980s: the 
Legislative Yuan, from 12.9 per cent in 1989 to 30.1 per cent in 2008; the Provincial 
Assembly, from 16.9 per cent in 1985 to 20.3 per cent in 1996; Taipei City Council, from 
17.6 per cent in 1985 to 33.9 per cent in 2010; Kaohsiung City Council, from 14.3 
percent in 1985 to 34.8 per cent in 2010; the County/City Councils, from 15.2 per cent in 
1986 to 27.4 per cent in 2009; and, the Township/Village Councils, from 14.9 per cent in 
1986 to 22.7 per cent in 2009.  In sum, although women?s representatives at all levels of 
legislatures still falls far short of providing equal representation for their gender, it cannot 
be denied that they have made more than modest progress. 
There were relatively few women in the top leadership positions of government 
during the authoritarian era.  It was not until 1988 (the beginning of democratization) that 
a woman, Dr. Shirley W. Y. Kuo, gained a cabinet position in the government as minister 
of finance.  Since then, women continue to be appointed cabinet members, and the share 
of cabinet ministerial positions held by women has gradually increased.  Particularly, as 
198 
 
shown in Table 5.21, women held at least 15 per cent of cabinet-level positions between 
2000 and 2010 in both the Chen Shui-bian (DPP) and Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) 
administrations.  Although Taiwan's first popular election for president and vice president 
was not held until 1996, Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lien) ran on the same ticket with President 
Chen Shui-bian and became Vice President in 2000; together with President Chen, she 
was re-elected in 2004. 
 
 
Table 5.21  The Appointment of Women Cabinet Ministers in Taiwan, 1950-2010 
 
Period Premier Cabinet Ministers Total Women % Women 
1950.03.10-1954.05.26 Chen Cheng 19 0 0 
1954.05.26-1958.07.04 Yu Hung-Chun 20 0 0 
1958.07.04-1963.12.10 Chen Cheng 18 0 0 
1963.12.10-1972.05.26 Yen Chia-kan 20 0 0 
1972.05.26-1978.05.09 Chiang Ching-kuo 19 0 0 
1978.05.26-1984.05.25 Sun Yun-suan 23 0 0 
1984.05.25-1898.05.30 Yu Kuo-hwa 20 1   5.0 
1989.05.30-1990.06.01 Lee Huan 20 1   5.0 
1990.06.01-1993.02.27 Hau Pei-tsun 23 2   8.7 
1993.02.27-1997.08.31 Lien Chan 37 5 13.5 
1997.09.01-2000.05.20 Siew Wan-chang 40 4 10.0 
2000.05.20-2000.10.06 Tang Fei 42 9 21.4 
2000.10.06-2002.02.01 Chang Chun-hsiung 41 9 22.0 
2002.02.01-2004.05.20 Yu Shyi-kun 44 8 18.2 
2004.05.20-2005.02.01 Yu Shyi-kun 41 7 17.0 
2005.02.01-2006.01.24 Hsieh Chang-ting 45 7 15.6 
2006.01.25-2007.05.21 Su Tseng-chang 44 7 15.9 
2007.05.14-2008.05.19 Chang Chun-hsiung 46 7 15.2 
2008.05.20-2009.09.10 Liu Chao-shiuan 46 11 24.4 
2009.09.11- present Wu Den-yih 46 9 19.6 
Sources: Data collected from Taiwan Women?s Almanac (Foundation of Women Rights Promotion and 
Development, 2007, p119), Awakening e-news (Awakening Foundation 
http://enews.url.com.tw/enews/46083), and Executive Yuan (www. ey.gov.tw).  
 
 
199 
 
Table 5.22  Local Government Chief Executive Officers by Women 
 
Year Total Women % Women 
Municipal City Mayors 
2006 2* 1 50 
2010  5** 1 20 
County Magistrates/City Mayors*** 
1985 21 2   9.5 
1989 21 3 14.3 
1993 23 1   4.3 
1997 23 3 13.0 
2001 23 2   8.7 
2005 23 2   8.7 
2009 17 3 17.6 
Township Heads/Village Supervisors 
1994 319 6   1.9 
1998 319 18            5.6 
2002 319 20   6.3 
2005 319 25   7.8 
2009 211 25 11.8 
Source: Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988 (ROC, 1989a, p276); Sun, 2004, p. 
177-178, and Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw). 
Notes: * Taipei and Kaohsiung.  ** Taipei, New Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung.  *** There were no 
women candidates between 1950 and 1981, according to data from Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the 
Republic of China 1988 (ROC, 1989a, p 276). 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.22, the situation of women?s representation in the local 
government chief executive positions is less successful than that in the local legislative 
bodies (see Table 5.19 and 5.20).  In fact, women had not won any election as a county 
magistrate or city mayor before 1985; and, there were only three women among the 312 
township heads/village supervisors in the mid 1980s (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p 90).  
However, in the latest elections in 2009, with significant increases, women accounted for 
17.6 per cent and 11.8 per cent of total county magistrates/city mayors and township 
200 
 
heads/village supervisors, respectively.  Significantly, in 2006, Chen Chu, an ex-political 
prisoner from the DPP camp (the political opposition in the past), won the Kaohsiung 
mayoral election and became the first elected female municipal city mayor.  She was re-
elected in 2010 with 52 per cent of the vote in a three-way intense race.  In previous years, 
Chen Chu held senior appointed posts in Taipei City and Kaohsiung City governments 
between 1995 and 2000.   Also, she served as minister of the Council of Labor Affairs 
between 2000 and 2005. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Tsai Ing-wen became the first female 
presidential candidate in the history of the ROC (Taiwan) after defeating two competitors 
in the Democratic Progressive Party?s (DPP) presidential primary held in April 2011.  She 
will run against President Ma Ying-jeou of the ruling KMT in the 5th direct presidential 
election, which is scheduled on January 14, 2012.  Tsai has been the chairwoman of the 
DPP after her party?s heavy loss in the 2008 parliamentary (Legislative Yuan) and 
presidential elections.  Prior to that, she was the chairperson of the Mainland Affairs 
Council (2000-2004), legislator (2005-2006; elected by PR system from DPP list), and 
Vice Premier (2006-2007).  Tsai, born in 1956, is a decade younger than the generation of 
DPP leaders who struggled for democratization in the 1980s.  And, she is quite new to the 
party, becoming a DPP member in 2004.  However, as the DPP?s first chairwoman, Tsai?s 
leadership was solidified because of electoral victories in December 2009 and in by-
elections in early 2010.  Consequently, she was reelected chair in May 2010, gaining 
90.3% of votes cast by party members (Tien and Tung, 2011; Fell, 2010 & 2011). 
 
 
201 
 
Figure 5.12  Number of Public Employees in Taiwan, by Sex: 1991-2010 
 
 
Source:  Data collected from Ministry of Civil Service (www.mocs.gov.tw). 
 
 
Two indicators, women?s share of total government employees and high-ranking 
positions in the public sector, show that women?s representation in public administration 
has quite significantly advanced.  As shown in Figure 5.12, the number of government 
employees steadily increased between 1991 and 1996, and then sharply decreased 
between 1997 and 2007 due to public sector downsizing and privatization of state owned 
enterprises.  However, the size of government slightly increased between 2008 and 2010.  
On the whole, the number of government employees was actually reduced 17 per cent, 
dropping from 410,822 in 1991 to 340,106 in 2010.  At the same period of time, while 
male employees decreased 29 per cent, falling from 295,307 to 208,260, female 
0 
50,000 
100,000 
150,000 
200,000 
250,000 
300,000 
350,000 
400,000 
450,000 
500,000 
1991
 
1992
 
1993
 
1994
 
1995
 
1996
 
1997
 
1998
 
1999
 
2000
 
2001
 
2002
 
2003
 
2004
 
2005
 
2006
 
2007
 
2008
 
2009
 
2010
 
Male 
Female 
Total 
202 
 
employees increased 14 per cent, increasing from 115,515 to 131,846.  Moreover, as 
Table 5.23 shows, in terms of gender ratio, women comprised 39 per cent of total 
government employees in 2010, compared to 28 per cent in 1991. 
 
 
Table 5.23  Gender Ratio of Public Employees in Taiwan, 1991-2010 
 
Year Men (%) Women (%) 
1991 72 28 
1995 69 31 
2000 67 33 
2005 63 37 
2010 61 39 
Source:  Figures calculated by the author based on data collected from Ministry of Civil Service, 
Examination Yuan (www.mocs.gov.tw). 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.24  Government Employees by Grade and Sex, 1991-2010 
 
Year Grades 10-14 Grades 6-9 Grades 1-5 
Women 
1991 0.41 27.58 72.01 
1995 0.73 35.75 63.52 
2000 1.28 48.92 49.80 
2005 1.97 53.53 44.50 
2010 2.58 59.65 37.77 
Men 
1991 3.66 36.34 60.00 
1995 3.63 36.91 59.46 
2000 7.17 56.10 36.73 
2005 8.26 57.55 34.19 
2010 8.20 60.27 31.53 
Source:  Figures calculated by the author based on data collected from Ministry of Civil Service, 
Examination Yuan (www.mocs.gov.tw). 
 
203 
 
Table 5.25  Percentage of Men or Women at High-ranking level of Public 
Administration 
 
Year Men (%) Women (%) 
1991 95.79   4.21 
1995 91.70   8.30 
2000 85.18 14.82 
2005 80.98 19.02 
2010 74.13 25.87 
Source:  Figures calculated by the author based on data collected from Ministry of Civil Service, 
Examination Yuan (www.mocs.gov.tw). 
Note: High-ranking level refers to grades 10-14, see Table 5.23. 
 
 
Likewise, women?s share of high-ranking positions in the public sector has 
improved in a gradual way.  This improvement can be seen from two aspects.  First, as 
presented in Table 5.24, women high-ranking officials (grades 10-14) increased over five 
times, from only 0.41 per cent in 1991 to 2.58 per cent in 2010.  Second, as shown in 
Table 5.25, in terms of the gender ratio, women shared 25.87 per cent of high-ranking 
public administrators in 2010, compared to 4.21 per cent in 1991. 
 
Participation in Women?s Interest Groups 
Since the 1970s, along with Taiwan?s political liberalization and democratization 
came, a wide variety of feminist and women?s groups which strive for gender equality in 
order to better their lives and status.  During the period of ?hard authoritarianism? from 
the late 1940s through the middle of 1970s (Winckler, 1984), two kinds of women?s 
organizations existed in Taiwan.  The first type of women's organization was supported 
by the government and stressed traditional women's roles, duties to their families, and 
dedication to the country.  Madame Chiang (Song Mei-ling), the first lady of President 
204 
 
Chiang Kai-shek, established the Women?s Department within the Central Committee of 
the KMT in 1953 and also led two other large women?s organizations, the Taiwan 
Provincial Women?s Association (set up in 1946) and the Chinese Women?s Anti-
Aggression League (instituted in 1950).  Politically, some members of these government-
affiliated women?s groups occupied the guaranteed quota of women representatives in the 
National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Provincial Councils.  While leaders of those 
organizations were seldom replaced, their primary works were supporting charitable 
causes or the armed forces.  The second type of women's groups included fairly 
conservative social and professional organizations that were closely tied to government-
affiliated women?s organizations, such as the Young Women's Christian Association 
(YWCA), Jaycees Women's Club, Lions Women's Club, Zonta Club, International Career 
Women's League, Women Doctors' Association, and Women Secretaries' Association.  In 
general, during this period of time, women?s organizations and groups were controlled or 
monitored by the KMT regime. They highly supported the status quo and kept themselves 
from challenging Taiwan?s patriarchal culture (Chiang and Ku, 1985; Lee, 1988; Clark 
and Clark, 2002; Chen, 2004, p. 278).  
By the early 1970s, along with economic growth, Taiwan was undergoing the 
transformation from an agricultural society to an industrial one.  Simultaneously, great 
social changes took place due to the emergence of the middle class, nurturing an 
emergent civil society under the KMT regime?s limited tolerance of sociopolitical dissent.  
However, none of these changes brought much influence to the women's organizations 
mentioned above.  On the contrary, a few well-educated women began to review women's 
205 
 
issues in transformation.  Lu Hsiu-lien was a very typical example of that.  In 1971, Lu 
was working at the Executive Yuan after she acquired a master's degree in comparative 
law from the University of Illinois.  While Lu was studying in the United States, she was 
in fact impressed by the heated debate over the emerging women?s movement in that 
country.  There was a noisy patriarchal outcry in Taiwan about guaranteed quotas for 
male students and how to prevent too many female students in the joint college entrance 
examination.  Lu published an article entitled "The Traditional Roles of Men and 
Women" in the United Daily, criticizing the traditional beliefs of continuing the family 
line by producing a male heir, three obediences and four virtues of women, female (one-
sided) chastity or virginity, and the dependent female, male-supported household.  This 
article received wide acceptance and became sensational in Taiwan.  In 1974, her famous 
book New Feminism came out.  This was a pioneer voice of the women's movement in 
Taiwan.  New Feminism brought the public's attention to the unequal treatment of women.  
In addition, Lu initiated the concepts that women should first be people and then women.  
They should walk out of the kitchen.  Sex discrimination against women should be 
removed; and the potential of women should be developed (Chiang and Ku, 1985; Lee, 
1988; Lu, 1994). 
Lu attempted to set up a real organization dealing with women's rights but it was 
not accepted by the government because the Martial Law was still practiced.  Instead, in 
1975, she established the Pioneer Press in Taipei.  Fifteen books and two pamphlets were 
published in one year (1975-1976).  Those books focused on the issues of housewives, 
female workers, farm women, and prostitutes.  On March 8, 1976, Women's Day, with the 
206 
 
help of the Jaycees Club, Pioneer Press held two activities.  One was a men's cooking 
competition; the other was a tea party outside the kitchen.  The former aroused great 
interest in men, while the latter brought many females getting together to exchange their 
view points.  On the one hand, Lu tried to eliminate the traditional bias that a perfect or 
true gentleman never cooks or helps in the kitchen.  On the other hand, she encouraged 
women to walk out of the kitchen, since the world of women should not be restricted to 
the kitchen (Chiang and Ku, 1985; Lee, 1988; Lu, 1994). 
During the 1970s, export processing industries were flourishing and female labor 
problems were very serious, especially in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs).  In view 
of this situation, Lu set up a special telephone line called "Protect you" in Kaohsiung to 
provide consulting and related services to the female laborers.  Later, "Protect you" was 
also established in Taipei, but it was cancelled very soon for political reasons.  Moreover, 
Lu called for meetings of "The proposal for revising the Book of Family under the Civil 
Code" and "The Eugenic Protection Act" to speed up the legislative process of these two 
laws.  She also offered a course in oral skills training for females working with Pioneer 
Press.  At the same time, she tried to popularize the new concept of gender equality by 
organizing a club called Concentric Circles (Lee, 1988).  In 1977, owing to repression 
from the KMT and financial difficulties, Lu closed business in Taiwan.  The next year, 
she returned to the United States to obtain a second Master?s degree from Harvard Law 
School.  Since then, she became increasingly interested in Taiwan?s political status.  
Unfortunately, Lu was jailed for her involvement in the "Kaohsiung Incident" in 1979 
(Ku, 1988; Lu, 1994). 
207 
 
In 1982, while Lu was in prison, a number of her associates during the pioneering 
women?s movement (1972-77), led by Lee Yuan-chen, established the Awakening 
Publishing House in order to raise female consciousness, encourage self-development, 
and voice feminist opinions.  In addition to the publication of a monthly magazine, 
Awakening, and feminist books, the Awakening activists also contributed joint newspaper 
columns and served as advisors on television programs, concerning women?s issues and 
promoting gender equality.  Moreover, the Awakening activists organized annual 
seminars on International Women?s Day (March 8), addressing particular topics regarding 
women?s issues and concerns (Ku, 1988; Ku, 1989). 
Meanwhile, some women?s organizations were formed and devoted themselves to 
improving women's lives.  For example, the Taipei Women Development Center, 
focusing on the topic of the re-employment of minority women and the elderly, was 
founded in January, 1984.  The Warm Life Association for Women branched off from the 
Awakening Magazine in September, 1984 in order to assist divorced women and women 
on the verge of divorce.  The Women's Research Program in the Population Center, 
National Taiwan University was established in September, 1985 to work on gender and 
women's studies.  The Rainbow Project, supported by the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan, 
was set up in June, 1986 to help aboriginal teen girls.  Subsequently, an intricate network 
was created.  Within this network, if any group seized a particularly compelling issue, the 
others immediately stepped up to help win the attention of the public.  Therefore, some 
significant accomplishments for women's rights were fulfilled (Wang, 1999; Chang, 
2009). 
208 
 
Drafted by the KMT government?s Public Health Department in 1971, the 
Eugenic Protection Act was approved by the Executive Yuan in 1982 and sent to the 
Legislative Yuan for further deliberation and legitimization.  In June, 1984, the 
Awakening Magazine convened six other women's groups; therefore, 154 women signed 
a petition for legalizing abortion and sat in the Legislative Yuan to see the legal passage 
of the Eugenic Protection Act.  Under pressure from women?s groups, the Legislative 
Yuan finally passed the bill and legalized abortion in Taiwan on July 9, 1984 (Yu, 1994; 
Wang, 1999, p. 79; Chang, 2009, p. 115).  Now under the protective umbrella of the Law, 
both doctors and pregnant women undergoing abortion operations no longer have to 
worry about the punishment from the Criminal Code.  Before the Eugenic Protection Act 
was implemented, abortion had long existed in the society as a means to avoiding an 
unwanted child; yet, abortion was deemed a violation of the Law.  As a result, many 
pregnant women had to ask quacks to do the crucial operation for them.  Many women 
suffered from the ordeal given by poorly-equipped, poorly-trained, and unlicensed 
doctors to avoid having the offspring they could not afford (Ku, 1988; Yu, 1994). 
As another example, under pressure from women?s groups and organizations, 
revisions of the Book of Family in the Civil Code were enacted into law on June 5, 1985 
and took effect two days thereafter.  Major revisions concerned matrimonial property 
control, grounds for divorce by judicial decree, children's family name, bigamy, and how 
husbands and wives should take their domicile.  Under the old law, all properties of 
husband and wife, whether acquired at the time of marriage or during the continuance of 
the marriage, other than the separate and contributed properties owned by wife, were 
209 
 
owned and managed by the husband (Yu, 1994). 
The Awakening Magazine advanced with startling decisiveness to lay a firm 
foundation for the women's movement after Martial Law was lifted in 1987 and was 
renamed the Awakening Foundation.  With its earlier experiences, the Awakening 
Foundation still undertook awareness-promotion campaigns on a new issue every year on 
Women's Day, thus attracting the media and strengthening their appeals.  In the 
meanwhile, diverse women's organizations or associations also emerged  in the post-
martial law era (a list of women?s organization founded between 1987 and 2004 is shown 
in Appendix F).  One characteristic of these women's associations is that they began to 
focus on gender concerns from different perspectives.  While some of them provided 
women practical services and professional assistance, others actively took part in the 
political and social movements to urge the modification or enactment of laws and to 
supervise the government's execution of public policies to improve women's status in 
Taiwan?s society.  Most significantly, in contrast to feminists? prior need to compromise 
with conservatives, activists threw off their self-censorship after the revocation of martial 
law.  For example, women?s groups based on social feminism and radical feminism began 
to be establish in the1990s and afterward (Ku, 1988; Wang, 1999; Chang, 2009, p. 118-
155; Chen, 2004, p. 55-57).   
In conclusion, it wasn't until the early 1970s that the first wave of the Taiwan 
women's movement arose after Lu Hsiu-lien wrote New Feminism, which brought the 
public's attention to the unequal treatment of women.  The Awakening Publishing House 
founded in 1982 by Lee Yuan-chen was the only women's organization to focus on 
210 
 
gender issues during the enforcement of Martial Law.  In turn, diverse women's 
organizations or associations have emerged since Martial Law was lifted in 1987.  
Moreover, in 2001, the National Alliance of Taiwan Women?s Associations (NATWA), an 
umbrella organization, was established to coordinate the country?s more than 70 gender-
related NGOs (Gao, 2011).  Directly challenging traditional beliefs and patriarchal 
culture, autonomous women?s groups in Taiwan have been working hard to improve 
women?s situations in various fields, including women?s right to reproductive choice, the 
prevention of domestic violence and sexual assault, environmental protection, gender 
equality in employment opportunities, the civil rights of same-sex couples, and the 
advancement of women into leadership roles in the political arena (Chang, 2009, p. 11).  
In particular, the women?s movement had a significant impact on women?s daily lives 
through its success in obtaining legal reforms for gender equality.  The achievements in 
legislative reforms between 1984 and 2011, as presented in Table 5.26, include legalizing 
abortion, revising the Civil Code to protect women?s rights, preventing children and 
teenagers from becoming prostitutes, prohibiting different forms of violence against 
women, eliminating gender biases in the education system, and securing women?s equal 
access to employment opportunities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
211 
 
Table 5.26  Women?s Movement?s Achievements in Legislation, 1980s-2011 
 
Name of Bill Issue and Content Process and Outcome 
Eugenic Protection 
Act 
The act legalized abortion. Women?s groups petitioned for 
?Legalized Abortion? in 1984. 
The act passed in 1984 after 13 
years of conceiving and 
contraction at the Legislative 
Yuan. 
Child and Youth 
Sexual Transaction 
Prevention Act 
Prevents children and teenagers 
from becoming prostitutes.  
First seminar held in 1985. 
First reading in 1993. 
The act passed in 1995 
Revision of Family 
Provision in the Civil 
Code 
Divorce and gender equality 
within marriage and the family: 
expands the definition of 
?acceptable grounds for judicial 
divorce,? making it easier to get 
a divorce; allows wife to keep 
the property registered in her 
name prior to 1985 without 
proving that she previously 
owned it; pays housework or 
professional help to outside 
party. 
First seminar held in 1991. 
Grand Justice determined the 
Article 1089 in the Civil Code 
was unconstitutional in 1994. 
The act sent to Legislative Yuan 
in 1995; final revisions passed 
in 1996.   
Sexual Assault Crime 
Prevention Act 
The act criminalizes all sexual 
violence against women.  
First public hearing held in 
1993; the act submitted in 1994 
and passed in 1996. 
Domestic Violence 
Prevention Act 
The act gives the government 
and police authority to act in 
household affairs, an area that 
formerly had been viewed as an 
exclusively private sphere. 
The act submitted in 1996 and 
passed in 1998. 
Gender Equality in 
Employment Act 
Gender equality in the work 
place; equal employment 
opportunity for women; offers 
maternity and paternity leave; 
prevents sexual harassment. 
Formation of a drafting 
committee in 1987. 
First reading in 1990. 
The act passed in December 
2001.   
Gender Equity 
Education Act 
The law stipulated that a gender-
balanced curriculum should be 
integrated into students? learning 
experiences from kindergarten 
through twelfth grade, and every 
university should offer courses 
in gender studies. 
The act originated from local 
feminism movement in 1980s, 
it passed in 2004.   
In 2011, a revision to the act 
designed to prevent and 
penalize sexual harassment and 
gender-based bullying.   
Sexual Harassment 
Prevention Act 
The importance of this act is that 
sexual harassment is defined as a 
crime. 
The process of legislation lasted 
six years; the act passed in 
2005. 
212 
 
CEDAW* 
Implementation Act  
The act directs government 
agencies to revise all relevant 
laws and administrative 
measures to fall in line with 
CEDAW?s provisions by the end 
of 2014, as well as requires the 
submission of a national report 
on progress toward CEDAW?s 
implementation every four years.  
Although Taiwan?s unique 
political situation has prevented 
the country from rejoining the 
UN, CEDAW was drafted and 
passed in January 2007 under 
the pressure from women?s 
groups.    
The act passed in May 2011, 
and will take effect on January 
1, 2012. 
Source: Fan (2000), p. 141, Table 5.7; Chen, (2004), p. 263, Appendix B; Mo (2005); Gao (2011), p. 30-35. 
Note: * The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Although women made major progress in all four areas, significant problems and 
barriers remain.  In life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and fertility women 
made substantial gains and reached developed world status by the 21st century; and rapid 
urbanization occurred as well.  However, sex birth ratios give strong evidence of selective 
female abortion after the second child, indicating the continued existence of patriarchal 
norms. 
During the postwar era, there have been tremendous increases in women?s 
education levels and literacy; and the pre-existing gender gap on these dimensions has 
vanished among younger Taiwanese.  In addition, women are now much more active than 
men in voluntary organizations.  However, substantial sex segregation in higher 
education majors still remains; and the less educated women from earlier generations are 
at a substantial disadvantage in Taiwan?s modernized economy and society. 
Over time women?s participation rate in the labor force has increased greatly, 
while men?s has dropped, but it still is not high by international standards (see Chapter 3).  
213 
 
In addition, there was a major jump in occupational segregation by gender between the 
mid-1980s and mid 1990s with women becoming more concentrated in clerical, service, 
and sales jobs and men in production, which probably hurts women?s relative status.  
Finally and more positively, women?s average wages and salaries as a proportion of 
men?s have risen to 80 per cent, far from equal but approximately the level that exists in 
the United States. 
Women and men now vote at equal rates.  Over the postwar period, women?s 
representation in legislatures and councils has increased gradually to 20% - 30% over the 
last two decades, although women?s share of the elected chief executives of local 
governments is much lower.  Despite women?s continued gross under representation, this 
is fairly respectable by international standards.  Women?s electoral representation has 
been promoted by 1) the ?reserved-seats system? which guaranteed about a tenth of the 
seats for women; 2) the growing number of women with higher education and 
professional jobs which increases the ?eligibility pool? for women candidates; and 3) 
democratization.  There were few women in the cabinet of the national government 
before 2000, but they have held 15% - 20% of the ministerial posts since then; and 
women?s share of the civil service has increased markedly over the last two decades to 
nearly 40%.  In addition, a woman was Vice President of Taiwan from 2000 to 2008; and 
a woman is now in a close race in the 2012 presidential election.  Finally, 
democratization unleashed a huge expansion of women?s interest groups. 
 
 
214 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation analyzes the economic, social, and political status of women in 
Taiwan from 1945 to 2010.  Taiwan has experienced tremendous changes over the 
postwar era.  First, administration was transferred from the defeated Japanese to 
Mainland China, which established an authoritarian regime; and over time the one-party 
rule was replaced by competitive democracy.  Second, the economy shifted through 
several stages from a poor, primarily agricultural society to a post-industrial, information-
based one.  Martial law controlled citizens? activities during early stages repressing the 
emergence of a civil society.  It was lifted in 1987 giving rise to the establishment of 
interest groups and competing political parties.  All of these changes potentially impacted 
women?s lives. 
This research was guided by a theoretical model (Chapter 2) of how the status of 
women worldwide is influenced by culture, the level economic development, and the 
degree of democratization.  Hypotheses drawn from the theoretical model were tested by 
using data collected from 174 developing and developed nations.  Whether Taiwan was 
an underachiever or an overachiever on selected indicators was also discussed (Chapter 
3).  Taiwan?s economic and political development were traced from the end of World War 
215 
 
II through the present (Chapter 4).  Finally, the changing status of women in Taiwan in 
terms of social conditions, human and social capital, economic activities, and political 
participation and power were analyzed (Chapter 5). 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
Below is the theoretical model of how patriarchal culture, economic development, 
and democratization influence women?s status, used in this dissertation to examine the 
conditions of women in Taiwan.  A general scholarly consensus exists about some of 
these relationships, but others are quite controversial with different schools of thought 
making opposing presumptions.  The following path diagram in Figure 6.1 models more 
specific hypotheses about these relationships. 
 
Figure 6.1 Model of How Patriarchal Culture, Economic Development, 
and Democratization Affect the Status of Women 
 
 
PATRIARCHAL 
CULTURE 
 
             - / 0                                   -  
                           
ECONOMIC                    + / - 
DEVELOPMENT                                 STATUS OF 
LEVEL                                                   WOMEN 
       
             +                                 + / 0 
 
DEGREE OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
 
216 
 
Patriarchy refers to the prevalence of male dominance in a society.  Women, in 
general, are treated as a secondary and subordinate sex.  It is hypothesized by all the 
major theoretical traditions that a higher degree of patriarchy in traditional cultures 
should produce a debased status for women. 
H1: The degree of patriarchy in traditional culture will have a negative 
relationship with the status of women. 
The relationship between development and the status of women is controversial.  
There are two quite different viewpoints.   One, based on the conventional modernization 
model assumes that the impact of development on the status of women is positive.  The 
other associated with the liberal feminist, dependency, and socialist feminist paradigms 
argues that development has a negative impact upon women?s status in traditional 
societies and the developing countries for several reasons.  First, agricultural 
development strategies, such as the introduction of more advanced technology and the 
transformation from subsistence crops to cash-crop production, weaken women?s 
production role by decreasing their participation in agricultural work.  Also, at the onset 
of industrialization, women are marginalized in the ?modern? sectors, where they are 
widely confined to informal, unstable, low-paying, and unskilled manufacturing jobs. 
Meanwhile, women?s traditional roles and support from kinship networks are actually 
eroded.  Since the impact of development upon the status of women is not clear, two 
competing hypotheses will be tested.  The first hypothesizes that higher levels of 
economic development should produce an increasing status for women.  The second 
hypothesizes that higher levels of economic development during agricultural 
217 
 
modernization and at the earlier stages of industrialization will lead to deterioration in 
women?s status. 
H2: The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon the 
status of women. 
H3: The level of economic development will have a negative impact upon the 
status of women. 
In a democratic country, public officials are selected by the people; and 
fundamental political rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to 
assemble, and the right to petition, are guaranteed for all citizens.  Therefore, there are at 
least three channels through which women can exert political influence to improve their 
status.  First, women themselves could become elected officials to enact laws that can 
eliminate or lessen discrimination against women.  Second, women can form advocacy 
groups to press government to make policies and enact legal reforms that help women to 
gain better situations or ensure a more equal status of women.  Finally, under democratic 
systems, it is inevitable that parties must compete for votes, which makes them more 
responsive to important constituencies, such as women.  Thus, it is hypothesized by 
modernization theorists and probably most liberal feminists that democratization should 
improve the status of women.  In contrast, dependency theorists and socialist feminists 
would probably argue that democracy would not help women in most situations because 
of the powerful reinforcing effects of capitalism and patriarchy.  
H4: The degree of democratization will have a positive impact upon the status of 
women. 
218 
 
H5: The degree of democratization will not be associated with the status of 
women. 
Likewise, there is strong disagreement over the impact of economic development 
on the degree of patriarchy.  Modernization theorists conclude that greater development 
should produce cultural change undercutting patriarchal norms, while dependency 
theorists and socialist feminists are quite skeptical about this line of argument   
H6: The level of development will have a negative association with patriarchal 
culture. 
H7: The level of development will have no association with patriarchal culture. 
A higher GDP per capita correlates with democracy.  Moreover, democracy was 
very rare before the industrial revolution. Thus, empirical research leads many to believe 
that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy 
(modernization theory), or helps newly established democracies stabilize .  Some 
campaigners for democracy also suggest that democratization will become inevitable if 
economic development progresses.  Thus, it is hypothesized that economic development 
should promote democratization. 
H8: The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon 
democratization. 
 
3. Results 
This model is tested with data from 174 developing and developed nations.  As 
summarized in Table 6.1, indicators of patriarchal culture, economic development and 
219 
 
democratization were used to explain three separate dimensions of women?s status: 1) 
economic as indicated by women?s labor participation rate, 2) social as indicated by the 
fertility rate, and political as indicated by the percentage of parliamentary seats held by 
women.  Table 6.2 summarizes the results.  One surprising finding is that women?s labor 
force participation is only marginally related to the three independent variables.   This 
strongly implies that this factor does not promote women?s empowerment in the manner 
that is very widely assumed in the literature.  In contrast, fertility rate and women?s 
parliamentary representation have consistent correlations with the three independent 
variables.   
 
Table 6.1  Variables Used in the Statistical Analysis 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: INDICATORS OF WOMEN?S STATUS 
 
Economic:  Women?s Labor Force Participation Rate 
Social:  Fertility Rate 
Political:  Percentage of Parliamentary Seats Held by Women    
INDEPENDENT OR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
 
Patriarchal Culture:  Low Scores on Gender Equality Index 
Economic Development:  High GDP per capita 
Democratization:  Freedom House?s Indices of Political and Economic Freedom 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) is that the status of women will be lower in countries 
with more patriarchal cultures or using the indicator, in this analysis, that the status of 
women will be better in countries that have higher gender equality values.  The 
hypothesis is strongly supported in politics (as indicated by parliamentary representation).  
In contrast, it is only weakly supported in the area of social outcomes (as indicated by the  
220 
 
Table 6.2  Summary of Statistical Results 
Women?s labor force participation is only marginally related to the three independent 
variables, suggesting that this factor does not promote women?s empowerment in the 
manner that is normally assumed. 
H1 that patriarchy undermines the status of women is strongly confirmed for political 
representation but only weakly supported for fertility rate. 
H2 that higher GDP per capita promotes the status of women (as opposed to H3) is 
strongly confirmed for both political representation and fertility rate. 
H4 that greater democratization promotes the status of women (as opposed to H5) is 
supported moderately for political representation and strongly for fertility rate. 
H6 that higher GDP per capita should reduce patriarchy (as opposed to H7) is strongly 
supported. 
H8 that higher GDP per capita should promote democratization is strongly supported. 
 
fertility rate).  The second and third hypotheses reflect competing theoretical perspectives 
on how economic development should affect the status of women.  H2 predicts that this 
will be a positive relationship, while H3 posits a negative association.  The statistical 
analysis in Chapter 3 strongly supports the second hypothesis for both the political and 
social realms.  The fourth and the fifth hypotheses, similarly, represent different 
perspectives on how democratization should influence that status of women.  In H4, the 
degree of democratization exerts a positive influence on women?s status, while H5 
predicts that there will be no association between these two variables.  The results here 
parallel those for the impact of economic development almost exactly.  H4 is strongly 
supported for social outcomes and moderately supported for politics.  The last three 
hypotheses concern the impact of economic development level upon patriarchal culture 
and democratization.  The sixth hypothesis (H6) that the level of economic development 
will have a negative impact on the level of patriarchal culture is strongly supported.  
Consequently, the seventh hypothesis (H7) that the level of economic development will 
221 
 
have no association with the level of patriarchal culture is strongly disconfirmed.  Finally, 
the eighth hypothesis (H8) that the level of economic development will have a positive 
impact on the degree of democratization is strongly supported. 
In addition to testing the hypotheses in the theoretical model with aggregate data 
on a large number of nations, Chapter 3 also evaluates Taiwan?s performance on the three 
central indicators of women?s status (parliamentary representation, fertility rate, and labor 
force participation).  To do this, regression analysis was applied to see whether a 
country?s value or score on each of these indicators was significantly above or below 
what would be predicted given its GDP per capita.  Table 6.3 summarizes these results.  
Applying this residuals analysis showed that Taiwan was an overachiever on the political 
and social indicators.  That is, it has a significantly higher representation of women in the 
national legislature and lower fertility rate than would be predicted by its level of 
economic development.  In contrast it was an underachiever in the economic area with a 
lower than predicted rate of women?s participation in the labor force. 
 
Table 6.3  Taiwan?s Performance Compared to What Would be Predicted for  
a Nation With Its GDP per capita 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION:  Underachiever because it is less than would be 
predicted. 
FERTILITY RATE:  Overachiever because it is less than would be predicted. 
PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION:  Overachiever because it is more than 
would be predicted. 
 
Overall, the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 found that patriarchal culture, 
economic development level, and the degree of democratization exert fairly strong 
influences over some dimensions of women?s status but have little association with others. 
222 
 
This implies that the nature of women?s status is complex and complicated because each 
nation has its own circumstances that are shaped by its historical background, level of 
economic development, degree of democratization (including regime types), religious 
affiliation, traditional culture, geographical location, and so on.  It could be argued that 
these factors influence women?s lives in each country, negatively or positively, in fairly 
unique combinations.  Therefore, case studies of individual countries should provide 
valuable insights into the dynamics of women?s changing status in the contemporary 
world.  This dissertation analyzed the social, economic, and political statuses of women 
in Taiwan. 
Chapter 4 provided an overview of Taiwan?s development during the postwar era.  
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Taiwan was a poor, primarily agricultural society that 
was ruled by an oppressive authoritarian regime.  Over the course of the next half century, 
the country experienced very substantial development and transformation in both the 
economic and political realms.  The pattern of economic and political change was quite 
different, though.  Economic development was fairly continuous and cumulative; and by 
the 1980s Taiwan was widely recognized as having experienced an ?economic miracle.?  
In contrast, there was little political reform until the 1980s, but Taiwan then experienced 
a very successful democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Chapter 5 analyzed the status of women in Taiwan in terms of social conditions, 
human and social capital, economic activities, and political participation and power, as 
indicated in Table 6.4.  Although women made major progress in all four areas, 
significant problems and barriers remain.  In terms of social conditions, women made  
223 
 
Table 6.4  Summary of Status of Taiwanese Women 
SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
Women made substantial gains and reached developed nation status on life expectancy, 
infant and maternal mortality, and fertility. 
In contrast, the ratio of male to female babies indicates selective female abortion after 
the second child, implying the continued existence of patriarchal norms.  
HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Tremendous increases occurred in women?s educational levels and literacy; and the 
gender gap on these has vanished among younger Taiwanese. 
Yet, substantial gender segregation exists in higher education majors. 
Furthermore, older and less educated women are substantially disadvantaged. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
Women?s labor force participation has increased greatly but is not high by international 
standards. 
A major jump occurred in occupational segregation by gender between the 1980s and 
1990s that probably disadvantaged women. 
Women?s wages and salaries are now 80% of men?s, the same as in the U.S.  
POLITICAL AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION 
Women and men have similar voting rates. 
Women participate more than men in voluntary organizations. 
Democratization was followed by a huge expansion of women?s interest groups. 
ELECTIVE OFFICE-HOLDING 
There was a gradual increase over the postwar era; and women now hold 20% to 30% 
of the seats in Taiwan?s legislatures and councils. 
Women remain seriously underrepresented, but this is a good record by international 
standards 
EXECUTIVE SERVICE 
There were few women in the Cabinet before 2000 (none before 1988), but women 
now hold 15% to 20% of the ministerial posts. 
Women?s share of the civil service has increased markedly over the last two decades to 
nearly 40%. 
Women have much lower representation among the elective chief executives of local 
governments. 
 
substantial gains and reached developed world status by the 21st century on life 
expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and fertility; and rapid urbanization occurred 
as well.  However, Taiwan?s sex birth ratios give strong evidence of selective female 
abortion after the second child, indicating the continued existence of patriarchal norms. 
224 
 
During the postwar era, there have been tremendous increases in women?s 
education levels and literacy; and the pre-existing gender gap on these dimensions has 
vanished among younger Taiwanese.  In addition, women are now much more active than 
men in voluntary organizations.  However, substantial sex segregation in higher 
education majors still remains; and the less educated women from earlier generations are 
at a substantial disadvantage in Taiwan?s modernized economy and society.  
Over time women?s participation rate in the labor force has increased greatly, 
while men?s has dropped, but it still is not high by international standards.  In addition, 
there was a major jump in occupational segregation by gender between the mid-1980s 
and mid 1990s with women becoming more concentrated in clerical, service, and sales 
jobs and men in production, which probably hurts women?s relative status.  Finally and 
more positively, women?s average wages and salaries as a proportion of men?s have risen 
to 80 per cent, far from equal but approximately the level that exists in the United States.  
Women and men now vote at equal rates.  Women?s representation in legislatures 
and councils has increased gradually to 20%-30% over the last two decades, although 
women?s share of the elected chief executives of local governments is much lower.  
Despite women?s continued gross under representation, this is fairly respectable by 
international standards.  Women?s electoral representation has been promoted by 1) the 
?reserved-seats system? which guaranteed about a tenth of the seats for women; 2) the 
growing number of women with higher education and professional jobs which increases 
the ?eligibility pool? for women candidates; and 3) democratization.  There were few 
women in the cabinet of the national government before 2000, but they have held 15%-20% 
225 
 
of the ministerial posts since then; and women?s share of the civil service has increased 
markedly over the last two decades to nearly 40%.  In addition, a woman was Vice 
President of Taiwan from 2000 to 2008; and a woman is now in a close race in the 2012 
presidential election.  Finally, democratization unleashed a huge expansion of women?s 
interest groups.  
Because this analysis of Taiwan is a case study, it is hard to evaluate the eight 
hypotheses in the theoretical model on a strictly statistical basis.  Still, as summarized in 
Table 6.5, the results are quite suggestive and parallel those in the aggregate data analysis 
in Chapter 3.  The barriers that patriarchal cultures are posited to raise for the status of 
women (H1), for example, are clearly evident in the gender-specific abortions and would 
almost certainly emerge in a qualitative analysis of declining patriarchy over the postwar 
era.  
 
Table 6.5  Summary of the Implications of the Taiwan Case for  
the Research Hypotheses  
 
H1 that patriarchy undermines the status of women would almost certainly be strongly 
confirmed by qualitative analysis. 
H2 that higher GDP per capita promotes the status of women is supported by the major 
progress that women made in many areas.  Yet, there is significant support for the 
contradictory H3 as well.  Women?s labor force participation has lagged; women with 
low education are increasingly marginalized; and the big jump in occupational 
segregation by gender in the late 1980s and early 1990s probably hurt women.   
H4 (as opposed to H5) that greater democratization promotes the status of women is 
supported in one area by the explosion of women?s groups that occurred after 
democratization.  Yet, democratization seemingly had little effect on the other 
indicators of women?s status. 
H6 that higher GDP per capita should reduce patriarchy (as opposed to H7) is, at least 
impressionistically, supported. 
H8 that higher GDP per capita should promote democratization is supported, although 
democratization in Taiwan considerably lagged its rapid industrialization. 
 
226 
 
H2 and H3 provide contrasting predictions about the impact of economic 
development on the status of women with the first hypothesizing that development should 
promote women?s status and the second that development should undercut it.  As just 
noted, rapid development on Taiwan over the past 60 years has been associated with 
considerable progress for women on many indicators of social conditions and human 
capital, consistent with the second hypothesis.  Yet, there is significant support for the 
third hypothesis as well.  Women?s labor force participation has lagged; many women 
with low education were marginalized from the benefits of industrialization; and the jump 
in occupational segregation by gender between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s suggests 
the potential for similar problems as Taiwan enters the post-industrial age.  
The fourth and fifth hypotheses predicted, respectively, that democratization 
should augment or have no effect upon the status of women.  Unlike the aggregate data 
analysis which generally supported H4 (except for labor force participation), the only 
clearly discernible impact of democratization in Taiwan was to stimulate an explosion of 
independent feminist and women?s groups.  Otherwise, long-term trends in women?s 
social and economic conditions and political office-holding appeared to continue from 
the authoritarian to the democratic eras, consistent with H5.  
H6 and H7 predicted that increasing development levels would either reduce 
patriarchal norms or have no impact on them.  Because time series data on the gender 
equality index are not available, it is not possible to test these competing theoretical 
perspectives formally.  Impressionistically, though, Taiwan?s huge economic 
transformations during the second half of the 20th century were accompanied by a 
227 
 
significant decrease in the prevalence of many patriarchal norms.  Finally, Taiwan?s 
democratization after four decades of rapid development is consistent with H8 that 
economic development should promote democratization.  However, it could also well be 
argued that democratization in Taiwan was delayed considerably beyond what might have 
been expected given its level of development. 
 
4. Significance of this Study 
The reason that I decided to embark on this research derives from my experience 
as a tour manager for a travel agency in Taiwan.  This career took me to visit different 
countries throughout the world.  Although Taiwan was still considered to be a developing 
country, I observed that the conditions of women in my country were relatively high as 
compared to those in most of countries I visited whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa.  I 
noticed wide variances between these countries ranging from Scandinavia where women 
enjoy relatively high gender equality to India where they have a distinctly inferior 
position.  Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations; therefore, the progress made by 
women there has been virtually ignored in the international community.  Consequently, I 
believe it is beneficial to women everywhere to have a case study of the progress made 
by women in Taiwan to demonstrate what conditions promote greater gender equity. 
The descriptive analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 show how important economic 
development and institutional frameworks have been in providing opportunities for at 
least some women in Taiwan to improve their status.  First, although the Confucian 
culture always valued education and knowledge for men, the need for human capital and 
228 
 
trained workers for the developing economy has led to the expansion of public education 
to include both men and women.  Their rising level of education has given women greater 
self-confidence and also caused a massive reduction in the birth rate.  Thus, women now 
have greater controlled over their lives.  Second, the expansion of the job markets 
provided more employment opportunities and economic independence for women.  In 
many cases, a substantial number of women moved to the cities where the urban 
environment offered them more freedom than living in the country side.  Third, although 
democracy came late in the period of this study, women were well placed to organize 
feminist interest groups and to enter elective offices.  The institution of ?reserved seats? 
gave them a start to enter politics.  This jump start was later augmented by their increased 
levels of education and by legitimate party competition. 
However, this case study provides additional evidence of the impact of cultural 
lag.  As indicated by the findings in Chapter 3, the dynamics of patriarchal environment 
have retarded women?s entrance into the paid labor market.  Moreover, it has influenced 
the types of the education and jobs that women hold.  Furthermore, the cultural 
imperative that each family have at least one son to carry on the family line has not 
completely disappeared despite extremely low birth rates. 
The experiences of women in Taiwan since the end of World War II offer hope to 
women in other developing societies.  The living conditions of women in Taiwan have 
greatly improved since 1945.  In many ways, they enjoy parity with men.  For example, 
they vote equally in most elections; they have a high level of education; and they have 
longer life expectancy.  While certain types of inequality still exist, it is likely that with 
229 
 
continuing economic and democratic advancement, women?s lower status in terms of 
occupational level, job segregation, and salaries will gradually disappear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
231 
 
Appendix A 
Nations Included in Study 
Albania              Dominica             Lebanon              Saudi Arabia         
Algeria              Dominican Republic   Lesotho              Senegal              
Angola               Ecuador              Libya                Seychelles           
Antigua & Barbuda    Egypt                Lithuania            Sierra Leone         
Argentina            El Salvador          Luxembourg           Singapore            
Armenia              Equatorial Guinea    Macedonia            Slovakia             
Australia            Eritrea              Madagascar           Slovenia             
Austria              Estonia              Malawi               Solomon Islands      
Azerbaijan           Ethiopia             Malaysia             South Africa         
Bahamas              Fiji                 Maldives             South Korea          
Bahrain              Finland              Mali                 Spain                
Bangladesh           France               Malta                Sri Lanka            
Barbados             Gabon                Mauritania           St. Kitts & Nevis    
Belarus              Gambia               Mauritius            St. Vincent & Grenadines 
Belgium              Georgia              Mexico               Sudan                
Belize               Germany              Moldova              Suriname             
Benin                Ghana                Mongolia             Swaziland            
Bhutan               Greece               Morocco              Sweden               
Bolivia              Grenada              Mozambique           Switzerland          
Botswana             Guatemala            Myanmar              Syria                
Brazil               Guinea               Namibia              Taiwan               
Brunei               Guinea-Bissau        Nepal                Tajikistan           
Bulgaria             Guyana               Netherlands          Tanzania             
Burkina Faso         Haiti                New Zealand          Thailand             
Burundi              Honduras             Nicaragua            Togo                 
Cambodia             Hong Kong            Niger                Trinidad & Tobago    
Cameroon             Hungary              Nigeria              Tunisia              
Canada               Iceland              Norway               Turkey               
Cape Verde           India                Oman                 Turkmenistan         
Central African Republic  Indonesia            Pakistan             Uganda               
Chad                 Iran                 Panama               Ukraine              
Chile                Ireland              Papua New Guinea     United Arab Emirates 
China                Israel               Paraguay             United Kingdom       
Colombia             Italy                Peru                 United States        
Comoros              Ivory Coast          Philippines          Uruguay              
Congo                Jamaica              Poland               Uzbekistan           
Congo Rep            Japan                Portugal             Vanuatu              
Costa Rica           Jordan               Qatar                Venezuela            
Croatia              Kazakhstan           Romania              Viet Nam             
Cuba                 Kenya                Russia               Yemen               
232 
 
Cyprus               Kuwait               Rwanda               Zambia               
Czech Rep            Kyrgyzstan           Saint Lucia          Zimbabwe             
Denmark              Laos                 Samoa                 
Djibouti             Latvia               Sao Tome & Principe   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
Appendix B 
Statistics of GDP Per Capita, Women?s Labor Force Participation Rate, 
Fertility Rate, Women?s Per Cent of Parliament Seats, FHscore, 
and GEscale by country order 
       
Country gdppc work fertilty womenleg FHscore GES 
       
Albania              $3,506  59.7 2.6 5.7 6 56 
Algeria              $5,308  29.5 3.2 4.0 4 49 
Angola               $2,187  72.8 7.2 15.5 3  
Antigua & Barbuda    $10,541    8.3 9  
Argentina            $12,377  35.6 2.6 31.3 12 62 
Armenia              $2,559  62.4 1.4 3.1 7 39 
Australia            $25,693  55.8 1.8 26.5 13 77 
Austria              $26,765  43.9 1.4 25.1 13 67 
Azerbaijan           $2,936  54.6 1.9 10.5 4 48 
Bahamas              $17,012  66.6 2.4 19.6 13  
Bahrain              $15,084  33.5 2.6  2  
Bangladesh           $1,602  66.3 3.8 2.0 8 40 
Barbados             $15,494  61.7 1.5 20.4 13  
Belarus              $7,544  59.3 1.3 18.4 3 46 
Belgium              $27,178  39.7 1.5 24.9 12 63 
Belize               $5,606  27.1 3.4 13.5 13  
Benin                $990  73.6 6.1 6.0 11  
Bhutan               $1,412  57.1 5.5 9.3 2  
Bolivia              $2,424  48.0 4.4 10.2 11  
Botswana             $7,184  63.0 4.4 17.0 11  
Brazil               $7,625  43.8 2.3 6.7 9 58 
Brunei               $16,779  50.0 2.8  3  
Bulgaria             $5,710  56.8 1.1 26.2 10 46 
Burkina Faso         $976  75.0 6.9 11.0 7  
Burundi              $591  82.0 6.8 14.4 3  
Cambodia             $1,446  80.4 5.2 9.3 3  
Cameroon             $1,703  49.3 5.1 5.6 2  
Canada               $27,840  60.1 1.6 23.6 13 79 
Cape Verde           $4,863  46.1 3.6 11.1 12  
Central African Rep  $1,172  67.6 5.3 7.3 8  
Chad                 $871  67.2 6.6 2.4 4  
Chile                $9,417  37.6 2.4 10.1 11 54 
China                $3,976  72.7 1.8 21.8 2 71 
Colombia             $6,248  48.1 2.8 12.2 7 59 
Comoros              $1,588  62.5 5.4  5  
Congo                $825  58.4 6.3 12.0 5  
234 
 
Congo Rep            $765  60.6 6.7  2  
Costa Rica           $8,650  37.1 2.8 19.3 12  
Croatia              $8,091  48.7 1.7 16.2 10 49 
Cuba                  49.5 1.6 27.6 1  
Cyprus               $20,824  49.0 2.0 10.7 13  
Czech Rep            $13,991  61.2 1.2 14.2 12 66 
Denmark              $27,627  61.7 1.7 38.0 13 54 
Djibouti             $2,377   6.1 0.0 6  
Dominica             $5,880    18.8 13  
Dominican Republic   $6,033  40.0 2.9 14.5 11 62 
Ecuador              $3,203  32.7 3.1 14.6 9  
Egypt                $3,635  35.0 3.4 2.4 4 40 
El Salvador          $4,497  45.8 3.2 9.5 10 65 
Equatorial Guinea    $15,073  45.7 5.9 5.0 1  
Eritrea              $837  74.7 5.7 14.7 3  
Estonia              $10,066  61.0 1.2 17.8 12 61 
Ethiopia             $668  57.3 6.8 7.8 5  
Fiji                 $4,668  37.0 3.2  6  
Finland              $24,996  57.0 1.7 36.5 13 75 
France               $24,223  48.5 1.7 10.9 12 54 
Gabon                $6,237  63.2 5.4 11.0 6  
Gambia               $1,649  69.7 5.2 2.0 3  
Georgia              $2,664  55.7 1.6 7.2 7 40 
Germany              $25,103  47.9 1.3 31.0 12 63 
Ghana                $1,964  80.1 4.6 9.0 10  
Greece               $16,501  38.0 1.3 8.7 11 58 
Grenada              $7,580    17.9 12  
Guatemala            $3,821  36.0 4.9 8.8 8  
Guinea               $1,982  77.3 6.3 8.8 4  
Guinea-Bissau        $755  57.0 6.0 7.8 6  
Guyana               $3,963  40.7 2.4 20.0 11  
Haiti                $1,467  56.0 4.4 9.1 4  
Honduras             $2,453  40.3 4.3 5.5 9  
Hong Kong            $25,153  50.7 1.2    
Hungary              $12,416  48.5 1.4 8.3 12 48 
Iceland              $29,581  66.6 2.0 34.9 13 60 
India                $2,358  42.1 3.3 8.9 10 50 
Indonesia            $3,043  55.2 2.6 8.0 8 55 
Iran                 $5,884  29.0 3.2 3.4 3 54 
Ireland              $29,866  37.1 1.9 13.7 13 79 
Israel               $20,131  48.4 2.9 13.3 11  
Italy                $23,626  38.3 1.2 9.1 12 63 
Ivory Coast          $1,630  43.9 5.1 8.5   
Jamaica              $3,639  67.1 2.5 16.0 11  
235 
 
Japan                $26,755  50.8 1.4 10.0 12 63 
Jordan               $3,966  26.6 4.7 3.3 7 40 
Kazakhstan           $5,871  61.1 2.1 11.2 4  
Kenya                $1,022  74.7 4.6 3.6 4  
Kuwait               $15,799  36.6 2.9 0.0 6  
Kyrgyzstan           $2,711  60.8 2.9 6.7 4  
Laos                 $1,575  74.4 5.3 21.2 2  
Latvia               $7,045  60.0 1.1 17.0 12 45 
Lebanon              $4,308  29.6 2.3 2.3 4  
Lesotho              $2,031  47.4 4.8 10.7 7  
Libya                $7,570  25.0 3.8  1  
Lithuania            $7,106  57.8 1.4 10.6 12 49 
Luxembourg           $50,061  37.9 1.7 16.7 13 63 
Macedonia            $5,086  49.7 1.9 6.7 8 56 
Madagascar           $840  69.1 6.1 8.0 9  
Malawi               $615  77.9 6.8 9.3 9  
Malaysia             $9,068  48.4 3.3 14.5 5  
Maldives             $4,485  65.4 5.8 6.0 4  
Mali                 $797  70.1 7.0 12.2 10  
Malta                $17,273  25.8 1.9 9.2 13 64 
Mauritania           $1,677  63.4 6.0 3.0 4  
Mauritius            $10,017  37.9 2.0 5.7 12  
Mexico               $9,023  39.4 2.8 15.9 10 60 
Moldova              $2,109  60.4 1.6 12.9 9 51 
Mongolia             $1,783  73.5 2.7 10.5 10  
Morocco              $3,546  41.4 3.4 0.5 6 42 
Mozambique           $854  82.8 6.3 30.0 8  
Myanmar              $1,027  65.8 3.3    
Namibia              $6,431  53.7 5.3 20.4 10  
Nepal                $1,327  56.7 4.8 7.9 8  
Netherlands          $25,657  45.4 1.5 32.9 13 77 
New Zealand          $20,070  57.2 2.0 30.8 13 86 
Nicaragua            $2,366  47.2 4.3 20.7 9  
Niger                $746  69.4 8.0 1.2 7  
Nigeria              $896  47.6 5.9 3.3 7 41 
Norway               $29,918  59.1 1.8 36.4 13 83 
Oman                 $13,356  19.2 5.8  4  
Pakistan             $1,928  35.3 5.5  4 53 
Panama               $6,000  43.3 2.6 9.9 12  
Papua New Guinea     $2,280  67.6 4.6 1.8 10  
Paraguay             $4,426  36.8 4.2 8.0 8  
Peru                 $4,799  34.5 3.0 18.3 9 70 
Philippines          $3,971  49.5 3.6 17.2 10 46 
Poland               $9,051  57.1 1.5 20.7 12 51 
236 
 
Portugal             $17,290  51.2 1.5 18.7 13 45 
Qatar                $18,789  41.0 3.7  3  
Romania              $6,423  50.7 1.3 9.3 11 43 
Russia               $8,377  59.3 1.2 6.4 5 42 
Rwanda               $943  82.6 6.2 25.7 2  
Saint Lucia          $5,703   2.7 13.8 12  
Samoa                $5,041   4.5 6.1 11  
Sao Tome & Principe  $1,792    9.1 12  
Saudi Arabia         $11,367  21.2 6.2  1  
Senegal              $1,510  61.6 5.6 19.2 8  
Seychelles           $12,508    23.5 9  
Sierra Leone         $490  44.6 6.5 8.8 6  
Singapore            $23,356  50.1 1.6 11.8 5 66 
Slovakia             $11,243  62.7 1.4 14.0 12 69 
Slovenia             $17,367  54.6 1.2 12.2 12 63 
Solomon Islands      $1,648  81.2 5.6 0.0 7  
South Africa         $9,401  47.2 3.1 29.8 12 65 
South Korea          $17,380  53.2 1.5 5.9 11 55 
Spain                $19,472  37.5 1.2 26.6 12 66 
Sri Lanka            $3,530  42.9 2.1 4.4 8  
St. Kitts & Nevis    $12,510    13.3 12  
St. Vincent & Grenadines $5,555    22.7 12  
Sudan                $1,797  34.8 4.9 9.7 1  
Suriname             $3,799  36.0 2.2 17.6 12  
Swaziland            $4,492  41.5 4.8 6.3 4  
Sweden               $24,277  62.5 1.5 42.7 13 83 
Switzerland          $28,769  50.7 1.5 22.4 13 67 
Syria                $3,556  28.6 4.0 10.4 1  
Taiwan               $15,000  46.0 1.7 20.9 12 61 
Tajikistan           $1,152  57.6 3.7 12.4 3  
Tanzania             $523  81.8 5.5 22.3 7 63 
Thailand             $6,402  73.3 2.1 9.6 10  
Togo                 $1,442  53.4 5.8 4.9 5  
Trinidad & Tobago    $8,964  44.1 1.6 20.9 11  
Tunisia              $6,363  36.9 2.3 11.5 4  
Turkey               $6,974  49.9 2.7 4.2 6 54 
Turkmenistan         $3,956  62.1 3.6 26.0 1  
Uganda               $1,208  79.5 7.1 24.7 4 57 
Ukraine              $3,816  55.6 1.3 7.8 7 48 
United Arab Emirates $17,935  31.7 3.2 0.0 4  
United Kingdom       $23,509  52.8 1.7 17.1 12 75 
United States        $34,142  58.8 2.0 13.8 13 81 
Uruguay              $9,035  48.0 2.4 11.5 13 59 
Uzbekistan           $2,441  62.3 2.8 7.2 2  
237 
 
Vanuatu              $2,802   4.6 0.0 11  
Venezuela            $5,794  43.1 3.0 9.7 7 59 
Viet Nam             $1,996  73.8 2.5 26.0 2 54 
Yemen                $893  30.5 7.6 0.7 4  
Zambia               $780  64.2 6.0 12.0 6  
Zimbabwe             $2,635  65.3 5.0 10.0 4 61 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 
 
Appendix C  
Residuals for Women?s Participation in Labor Force 
Given by GDP Per Capita 
 
Country Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate 
Predicated 
value 
Residual 
    
Albania                                                                                                                              59.7 54.961 4.7388 
Algeria                                                                                                                              29.5 54.242 -24.7419 
Angola                                                                                                                               72.8 55.488 17.3122 
Antigua & Barbuda                                                                                                                    . 52.153 . 
Argentina                                                                                                                            35.6 51.420 -15.8199 
Armenia                                                                                                                              62.4 55.339 7.0607 
Australia                                                                                                                            55.8 46.104 9.6958 
Austria                                                                                                                              43.9 45.676 -1.7763 
Azerbaijan                                                                                                                           54.6 55.189 -0.5888 
Bahamas                                                                                                                              66.6 49.570 17.0303 
Bahrain                                                                                                                              33.5 50.339 -16.8393 
Bangladesh                                                                                                                           66.3 55.721 10.5787
Barbados                                                                                                                             61.7 50.176 11.5244 
Belarus                                                                                                                              59.3 53.349 5.9507 
Belgium                                                                                                                              39.7 45.511 -5.8114 
Belize                                                                                                                               27.1 54.123 -27.0229 
Benin                                                                                                                                73.6 55.966 17.6344 
Bhutan                                                                                                                               57.1 55.797 1.3028 
Bolivia                                                                                                                              48.0 55.393 -7.3932 
Botswana                                                                                                                             63.0 53.493 9.5070 
Brazil                                                                                                                               43.8 53.317 -9.5169 
Brunei                                                                                                                               50.0 49.663 0.3373 
Bulgaria                                                                                                                             56.8 54.081 2.7186 
Burkina Faso                                                                                                                         75.0 55.971 19.0288 
Burundi                                                                                                                              82.0 56.125 25.8751 
Cambodia                                                                                                                             80.4 55.784 24.6164
Cameroon                                                                                                                             49.3 55.681 -6.3810
Canada                                                                                                                               60.1 45.247 14.8528 
Cape Verde                                                                                                                           46.1 54.420 -8.3195
Central African Rep                                                                                                                  67.6 55.893 11.7070 
Chad                                                                                                                                 67.2 56.013 11.1869 
Chile                                                                                                                                37.6 52.602 -15.0016 
China                                                                                                                                72.7 54.774 17.9264 
Colombia                                                                                                                             48.1 53.867 -5.7666 
Comoros                                                                                                                              62.5 55.727 6.7731 
Congo                                                                                                                                58.4 56.031 2.3685 
239 
 
Congo Rep                                                                                                                            60.6 56.055 4.5446 
Costa Rica                                                                                                                           37.1 52.908 -15.8078 
Croatia                                                                                                                              48.7 53.131 -4.4309 
Cuba                                                                                                                                 49.5 . . 
Cyprus                                                                                                                               49.0 48.048 0.9521 
Czech Rep                                                                                                                            61.2 50.776 10.4244
Denmark                                                                                                                              61.7 45.332 16.3678 
Djibouti                                                                                                                             . 55.412 . 
Dominica                                                                                                                             . 54.014 . 
Dominican Republic                                                                                                                   40.0 53.952 -13.9525 
Ecuador                                                                                                                              32.7 55.082 -22.3822 
Egypt                                                                                                                                35.0 54.910 -19.9097 
El Salvador                                                                                                                          45.8 54.566 -8.7656 
Equatorial Guinea                                                                                                                    45.7 50.344 -4.6437 
Eritrea                                                                                                                              74.7 56.027 18.6733 
Estonia                                                                                                                              61.0 52.342 8.6575 
Ethiopia                                                                                                                             57.3 56.094 1.2058 
Fiji                                                                                                                                 37.0 54.497 -17.4974 
Finland                                                                                                                              57.0 46.382 10.6175 
France                                                                                                                               48.5 46.691 1.8090 
Gabon                                                                                                                                63.2 53.871 9.3290 
Gambia                                                                                                                               69.7 55.703 13.9975 
Georgia                                                                                                                              55.7 55.297 0.4026 
Germany                                                                                                                              47.9 46.340 1.5602 
Ghana                                                                                                                                80.1 55.577 24.5232 
Greece                                                                                                                               38.0 49.774 -11.7737 
Grenada                                                                                                                              . 53.335 . 
Guatemala                                                                                                                            36.0 54.835 -18.8355
Guinea                                                                                                                               77.3 55.570 21.7304 
Guinea-Bissau                                                                                                                        57.0 56.059 0.9406 
Guyana                                                                                                                               40.7 54.779 -14.0788 
Haiti                                                                                                                                56.0 55.775 0.2248 
Honduras                                                                                                                             40.3 55.382 -15.0816 
Hong Kong                                                                                                                            50.7 46.320 4.3802 
Hungary                                                                                                                              48.5 51.404 -2.9044 
Iceland                                                                                                                              66.6 44.552 22.0479 
India                                                                                                                                42.1 55.420 -13.3195 
Indonesia                                                                                                                            55.2 55.146 0.0539 
Iran                                                                                                                                 29.0 54.012 -25.0119 
Ireland                                                                                                                              37.1 44.438 -7.3384 
Israel                                                                                                                               48.4 48.325 0.0754 
Italy                                                                                                                                38.3 46.929 -8.6294 
Ivory Coast                                                                                                                          43.9 55.710 -11.8101 
Jamaica                                                                                                                              67.1 54.908 12.1919 
240 
 
Japan                                                                                                                                50.8 45.680 5.1197 
Jordan                                                                                                                               26.6 54.778 -28.1776 
Kazakhstan                                                                                                                           61.1 54.017 7.0829
Kenya                                                                                                                                74.7 55.953 18.7472 
Kuwait                                                                                                                               36.6 50.054 -13.4539 
Kyrgyzstan                                                                                                                           60.8 55.279 5.5214
Laos                                                                                                                                 74.4 55.732 18.6679 
Latvia                                                                                                                               60.0 53.548 6.4515 
Lebanon                                                                                                                              29.6 54.641 -25.0411 
Lesotho                                                                                                                              47.4 55.550 -8.1501 
Libya                                                                                                                                25.0 53.339 -28.3389 
Lithuania                                                                                                                            57.8 53.524 4.2759 
Luxembourg                                                                                                                           37.9 36.377 1.5234 
Macedonia                                                                                                                            49.7 54.331 -4.6305 
Madagascar                                                                                                                           69.1 56.025 13.0745 
Malawi                                                                                                                               77.9 56.115 21.7847 
Malaysia                                                                                                                             48.4 52.741 -4.3409 
Maldives                                                                                                                             65.4 54.570 10.8296 
Mali                                                                                                                                 70.1 56.043 14.0573 
Malta                                                                                                                                25.8 49.465 -23.6655 
Mauritania                                                                                                                           63.4 55.691 7.7086 
Mauritius                                                                                                                            37.9 52.362 -14.4621 
Mexico                                                                                                                               39.4 52.759 -13.3589 
Moldova                                                                                                                              60.4 55.519 4.8811 
Mongolia                                                                                                                             73.5 55.649 17.8509 
Morocco                                                                                                                              41.4 54.945 -13.5453 
Mozambique                                                                                                                           82.8 56.020 26.7801 
Myanmar                                                                                                                              65.8 55.951 9.8492
Namibia                                                                                                                              53.7 53.794 -0.0936 
Nepal                                                                                                                                56.7 55.831 0.8689 
Netherlands                                                                                                                          45.4 46.119 -0.7186
New Zealand                                                                                                                          57.2 48.349 8.8511 
Nicaragua                                                                                                                            47.2 55.416 -8.2163 
Niger                                                                                                                                69.4 56.063 13.3370 
Nigeria                                                                                                                              47.6 56.003 -8.4031 
Norway                                                                                                                               59.1 44.418 14.6824 
Oman                                                                                                                                 19.2 51.029 -31.8291 
Pakistan                                                                                                                             35.3 55.591 -20.2912 
Panama                                                                                                                               43.3 53.966 -10.6656 
Papua New Guinea                                                                                                                     67.6 55.451 12.1493 
Paraguay                                                                                                                             36.8 54.594 -17.7940 
Peru                                                                                                                                 34.5 54.445 -19.9451 
Philippines                                                                                                                          49.5 54.776 -5.2756 
Poland                                                                                                                               57.1 52.748 4.3523 
241 
 
Portugal                                                                                                                             51.2 49.459 1.7413 
Qatar                                                                                                                                41.0 48.860 -7.8603 
Romania                                                                                                                              50.7 53.797 -3.0968 
Russia                                                                                                                               59.3 53.017 6.2833 
Rwanda                                                                                                                               82.6 55.984 26.6156 
Saint Lucia                                                                                                                          . 54.084 . 
Samoa                                                                                                                                . 54.348 . 
Sao Tome & Principe                                                                                                                  . 55.645 . 
Saudi Arabia                                                                                                                         21.2 51.823 -30.6231 
Senegal                                                                                                                              61.6 55.758 5.8420 
Seychelles                                                                                                                           . 51.368 . 
Sierra Leone                                                                                                                         44.6 56.165 -11.5652
Singapore                                                                                                                            50.1 47.037 3.0628 
Slovakia                                                                                                                             62.7 51.873 10.8274 
Slovenia                                                                                                                             54.6 49.428 5.1720 
Solomon Islands                                                                                                                      81.2 55.703 25.4971 
South Africa                                                                                                                         47.2 52.608 -5.4080
South Korea                                                                                                                          53.2 49.423 3.7772 
Spain                                                                                                                                37.5 48.588 -11.0876 
Sri Lanka                                                                                                                            42.9 54.952 -12.0517 
St. Kitts & Nevis                                                                                                                    . 51.367 . 
St. Vincent & the  
Grenadines                                                                                                                 
. 54.143 . 
Sudan                                                                                                                                34.8 55.643 -20.8435 
Suriname                                                                                                                             36.0 54.844 -18.8443 
Swaziland                                                                                                                            41.5 54.568 -13.0676 
Sweden                                                                                                                               62.5 46.669 15.8305 
Switzerland                                                                                                                          50.7 44.876 5.8237
Syria                                                                                                                                28.6 54.941 -26.3413 
Taiwan                                                                                                                               46.0 50.373 -4.3729 
Tajikistan                                                                                                                           57.6 55.901 1.6991 
Tanzania                                                                                                                             81.8 56.152 25.6480 
Thailand                                                                                                                             73.3 53.805 19.4948 
Togo                                                                                                                                 53.4 55.785 -2.3852 
Trinidad & Tobago                                                                                                                    44.1 52.782 -8.6824 
Tunisia                                                                                                                              36.9 53.821 -16.9207 
Turkey                                                                                                                               49.9 53.577 -3.6768 
Turkmenistan                                                                                                                         62.1 54.782 7.3184 
Uganda                                                                                                                               79.5 55.879 23.6214 
Ukraine                                                                                                                              55.6 54.837 0.7625 
United Arab Emirates                                                                                                                 31.7 49.201 -17.5012 
United Kingdom                                                                                                                       52.8 46.976 5.8239 
United States                                                                                                                        58.8 42.731 16.0686
Uruguay                                                                                                                              48.0 52.754 -4.7541 
242 
 
Uzbekistan                                                                                                                           62.3 55.386 6.9136 
Vanuatu                                                                                                                              . 55.242 . 
Venezuela                                                                                                                            43.1 54.048 -10.9479 
Viet Nam                                                                                                                             73.8 55.564 18.2360 
Yemen                                                                                                                               30.5 56.004 -25.5043 
Zambia                                                                                                                               64.2 56.049 8.1506 
Zimbabwe                                                                                                                             65.3 55.309 9.9911 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
Appendix D 
 Residuals for Fertility Rate Given by GDP Per Capita 
 
Country Fertility rate Predicated value Residual 
    
Albania                                                                                                                              2.6 4.100 -1.4996 
Algeria                                                                                                                              3.2 3.883 -0.6827 
Angola                                                                                                                               7.2 4.258 2.9417 
Antigua & Barbuda                                                                                                                    . 3.253 . 
Argentina                                                                                                                            2.6 3.032 -0.4319 
Armenia                                                                                                                              1.4 4.214 -2.8136 
Australia                                                                                                                            1.8 1.429 0.3707 
Austria                                                                                                                              1.4 1.300 0.0997 
Azerbaijan                                                                                                                           1.9 4.168 -2.2682 
Bahamas                                                                                                                              2.4 2.474 -0.0741 
Bahrain                                                                                                                              2.6 2.706 -0.1061 
Bangladesh                                                                                                                           3.8 4.329 -0.5287
Barbados                                                                                                                             1.5 2.657 -1.1568 
Belarus                                                                                                                              1.3 3.614 -2.3136 
Belgium                                                                                                                              1.5 1.251 0.2494 
Belize                                                                                                                               3.4 3.847 -0.4468 
Benin                                                                                                                                6.1 4.402 1.6976 
Bhutan                                                                                                                               5.5 4.352 1.1484 
Bolivia                                                                                                                              4.4 4.230 0.1702 
Botswana                                                                                                                             4.4 3.657 0.7431 
Brazil                                                                                                                               2.3 3.604 -1.3039 
Brunei                                                                                                                               2.8 2.502 0.2979 
Bulgaria                                                                                                                             1.1 3.834 -2.7343 
Burkina Faso                                                                                                                         6.9 4.404 2.4959 
Burundi                                                                                                                              6.8 4.450 2.3496 
Cambodia                                                                                                                             5.2 4.348 0.8525
Cameroon                                                                                                                             5.1 4.317 0.7834
Canada                                                                                                                               1.6 1.171 0.4291 
Cape Verde                                                                                                                           3.6 3.936 -0.3363
Central African Rep                                                                                                                  5.3 4.380 0.9195 
Chad                                                                                                                                 6.6 4.417 2.1833 
Chile                                                                                                                                2.4 3.388 -0.9882 
China                                                                                                                                1.8 4.043 -2.2430 
Colombia                                                                                                                             2.8 3.770 -0.9696 
Comoros                                                                                                                              5.4 4.330 1.0696 
Congo                                                                                                                                6.3 4.422 1.8777 
Congo Rep                                                                                                                            6.7 4.429 2.2705 
244 
 
Costa Rica                                                                                                                           2.8 3.480 -0.6805 
Croatia                                                                                                                              1.7 3.548 -1.8478 
Cuba                                                                                                                                 1.6 . . 
Cyprus                                                                                                                               2.0 2.015 -0.0153 
Czech Rep                                                                                                                            1.2 2.838 -1.6377
Denmark                                                                                                                              1.7 1.197 0.5034 
Djibouti                                                                                                                             6.1 4.235 1.8645 
Dominica                                                                                                                             . 3.814 . 
Dominican Republic                                                                                                                   2.9 3.795 -0.8955 
Ecuador                                                                                                                              3.1 4.136 -1.0361 
Egypt                                                                                                                                3.4 4.084 -0.6841 
El Salvador                                                                                                                          3.2 3.980 -0.7803 
Equatorial Guinea                                                                                                                    5.9 2.707 3.1925 
Eritrea                                                                                                                              5.7 4.421 1.2792 
Estonia                                                                                                                              1.2 3.310 -2.1101 
Ethiopia                                                                                                                             6.8 4.441 2.3588 
Fiji                                                                                                                                 3.2 3.960 -0.7597 
Finland                                                                                                                              1.7 1.513 0.1868 
France                                                                                                                               1.7 1.606 0.0938 
Gabon                                                                                                                                5.4 3.771 1.6291 
Gambia                                                                                                                               5.2 4.323 0.8769 
Georgia                                                                                                                              1.6 4.201 -2.6009 
Germany                                                                                                                              1.3 1.500 -0.2003 
Ghana                                                                                                                                4.6 4.285 0.3148 
Greece                                                                                                                               1.3 2.536 -1.2356 
Grenada                                                                                                                              . 3.609 . 
Guatemala                                                                                                                            4.9 4.062 0.8383
Guinea                                                                                                                               6.3 4.283 2.0170 
Guinea-Bissau                                                                                                                        6.0 4.431 1.5693 
Guyana                                                                                                                               2.4 4.045 -1.6446 
Haiti                                                                                                                                4.4 4.345 0.0550 
Honduras                                                                                                                             4.3 4.226 0.0737 
Hong Kong                                                                                                                            1.2 1.494 -0.2943 
Hungary                                                                                                                              1.4 3.027 -1.6272 
Iceland                                                                                                                              2.0 0.961 1.0386 
India                                                                                                                                3.3 4.238 -0.9378 
Indonesia                                                                                                                            2.6 4.155 -1.5553 
Iran                                                                                                                                 3.2 3.813 -0.6134 
Ireland                                                                                                                              1.9 0.927 0.9729 
Israel                                                                                                                               2.9 2.099 0.8013 
Italy                                                                                                                                1.2 1.678 -0.4781 
Ivory Coast                                                                                                                          5.1 4.325 0.7746 
Jamaica                                                                                                                              2.5 4.084 -1.5836 
Japan                                                                                                                                1.4 1.302 0.0985 
245 
 
Jordan                                                                                                                               4.7 4.044 0.6558 
Kazakhstan                                                                                                                           2.1 3.815 -1.7150
Kenya                                                                                                                                4.6 4.399 0.2015 
Kuwait                                                                                                                               2.9 2.620 0.2799 
Kyrgyzstan                                                                                                                           2.9 4.195 -1.2953
Laos                                                                                                                                 5.3 4.332 0.9680 
Latvia                                                                                                                               1.1 3.674 -2.5737 
Lebanon                                                                                                                              2.3 4.003 -1.7031 
Lesotho                                                                                                                              4.8 4.277 0.5229 
Libya                                                                                                                                3.8 3.610 0.1895 
Lithuania                                                                                                                            1.4 3.666 -2.2663 
Luxembourg                                                                                                                           1.7 -1.503 3.2034 
Macedonia                                                                                                                            1.9 3.909 -2.0094 
Madagascar                                                                                                                           6.1 4.420 1.6795 
Malawi                                                                                                                               6.8 4.448 2.3525 
Malaysia                                                                                                                             3.3 3.430 -0.1302 
Maldives                                                                                                                             5.8 3.982 1.8182 
Mali                                                                                                                                 7.0 4.426 2.5744 
Malta                                                                                                                                1.9 2.443 -0.5427 
Mauritania                                                                                                                           6.0 4.320 1.6803 
Mauritius                                                                                                                            2.0 3.316 -1.3160 
Mexico                                                                                                                               2.8 3.436 -0.6356 
Moldova                                                                                                                              1.6 4.268 -2.6677 
Mongolia                                                                                                                             2.7 4.307 -1.6070 
Morocco                                                                                                                              3.4 4.095 -0.6948 
Mozambique                                                                                                                           6.3 4.419 1.8812 
Myanmar                                                                                                                              3.3 4.398 -1.0979
Namibia                                                                                                                              5.3 3.748 1.5524 
Nepal                                                                                                                                4.8 4.362 0.4382 
Netherlands                                                                                                                          1.5 1.434 0.0664
New Zealand                                                                                                                          2.0 2.106 -0.1061 
Nicaragua                                                                                                                            4.3 4.237 0.0632 
Niger                                                                                                                                8.0 4.432 3.5682 
Nigeria                                                                                                                              5.9 4.414 1.4863 
Norway                                                                                                                               1.8 0.921 0.8792 
Oman                                                                                                                                 5.8 2.914 2.8859 
Pakistan                                                                                                                             5.5 4.290 1.2105 
Panama                                                                                                                               2.6 3.799 -1.1994 
Papua New Guinea                                                                                                                     4.6 4.247 0.3529 
Paraguay                                                                                                                             4.2 3.989 0.2111 
Peru                                                                                                                                 3.0 3.944 -0.9440 
Philippines                                                                                                                          3.6 4.044 -0.4436 
Poland                                                                                                                               1.5 3.432 -1.9322 
Portugal                                                                                                                             1.5 2.441 -0.9406 
246 
 
Qatar                                                                                                                                3.7 2.260 1.4398 
Romania                                                                                                                              1.3 3.749 -2.4485 
Russia                                                                                                                               1.2 3.513 -2.3134 
Rwanda                                                                                                                               6.2 4.408 1.7919 
Saint Lucia                                                                                                                          2.7 3.835 -1.1352 
Samoa                                                                                                                                4.5 3.915 0.5852 
Sao Tome & Principe                                                                                                                  . 4.306 . 
Saudi Arabia                                                                                                                         6.2 3.153 3.0465 
Senegal                                                                                                                              5.6 4.340 1.2602 
Seychelles                                                                                                                           . 3.016 . 
Sierra Leone                                                                                                                         6.5 4.463 2.0374
Singapore                                                                                                                            1.6 1.711 -0.1106 
Slovakia                                                                                                                             1.4 3.168 -1.7684 
Slovenia                                                                                                                             1.2 2.431 -1.2314 
Solomon Islands                                                                                                                      5.6 4.323 1.2768 
South Africa                                                                                                                         3.1 3.390 -0.2901
South Korea                                                                                                                          1.5 2.430 -0.9298 
Spain                                                                                                                                1.2 2.178 -0.9780 
Sri Lanka                                                                                                                            2.1 4.097 -1.9967 
St. Kitts & Nevis                                                                                                                    . 3.016 . 
St. Vincent & Grenadines                                                                                                                 . 3.853 . 
Sudan                                                                                                                                4.9 4.305 0.5947 
Suriname                                                                                                                             2.2 4.064 -1.8643 
Swaziland                                                                                                                            4.8 3.981 0.8191 
Sweden                                                                                                                               1.5 1.600 -0.0997 
Switzerland                                                                                                                          1.5 1.059 0.4409
Syria                                                                                                                                4.0 4.094 -0.0936 
Taiwan                                                                                                                               1.7 2.716 -1.0363 
Tajikistan                                                                                                                           3.7 4.383 -0.6829 
Tanzania                                                                                                                             5.5 4.459 1.0414 
Thailand                                                                                                                             2.1 3.751 -1.6510 
Togo                                                                                                                                 5.8 4.348 1.4520 
Trinidad & Tobago                                                                                                                    1.6 3.443 -1.8427 
Tunisia                                                                                                                              2.3 3.756 -1.4557 
Turkey                                                                                                                               2.7 3.682 -0.9822 
Turkmenistan                                                                                                                         3.6 4.045 -0.4454 
Uganda                                                                                                                               7.1 4.376 2.7238 
Ukraine                                                                                                                              1.3 4.062 -2.7623 
United Arab Emirates                                                                                                                 3.2 2.363 0.8370 
United Kingdom                                                                                                                       1.7 1.692 0.0078 
United States                                                                                                                        2.0 0.412 1.5875
Uruguay                                                                                                                              2.4 3.434 -1.0342 
Uzbekistan                                                                                                                           2.8 4.228 -1.4278 
Vanuatu                                                                                                                              4.6 4.184 0.4157 
247 
 
Venezuela                                                                                                                            3.0 3.824 -0.8242 
Viet Nam                                                                                                                             2.5 4.281 -1.7813 
Yemen                                                                                                                               7.6 4.414 3.1859 
Zambia                                                                                                                               6.0 4.428 1.5723 
Zimbabwe                                                                                                                             5.0 4.204 0.7956 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248 
 
Appendix E  
Residuals for Women?s Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats 
Given by GDP Per Capita 
 
Country Women?s Per Cent of 
Parliamentary Seats 
Predicated value Residual 
    
Albania                                                                                                                              5.7  10.916  -5.2162 
Algeria                                                                                                                              4.0  11.732  -7.7319 
Angola                                                                                                                               15.5  10.319  5.1809 
Antigua & Barbuda                                                                                                                    8.3  14.101  -5.8009 
Argentina                                                                                                                            31.3  14.932  16.3680 
Armenia                                                                                                                              3.1  10.487  -7.3875 
Australia                                                                                                                            26.5  20.960  5.5399 
Austria                                                                                                                              25.1  21.445  3.6546 
Azerbaijan                                                                                                                           10.5  10.658  -0.1581 
Bahamas                                                                                                                              19.6  17.030  2.5697 
Bahrain                                                                                                                              .  16.157  . 
Bangladesh                                                                                                                           2.0  10.054  -8.0542
Barbados                                                                                                                             20.4  16.343  4.0569 
Belarus                                                                                                                              18.4  12.744  5.6558 
Belgium                                                                                                                              24.9  21.632  3.2676 
Belize                                                                                                                               13.5  11.867  1.6332 
Benin                                                                                                                                6.0  9.777  -3.7772 
Bhutan                                                                                                                               9.3  9.968  -0.6682 
Bolivia                                                                                                                              10.2  10.426  -0.2263 
Botswana                                                                                                                             17.0  12.581  4.4188 
Brazil                                                                                                                               6.7  12.781  -6.0808 
Brunei                                                                                                                               .  16.925  . 
Bulgaria                                                                                                                             26.2  11.914  14.2861 
Burkina Faso                                                                                                                         11.0  9.771  1.2292 
Burundi                                                                                                                              14.4  9.597  4.8034 
Cambodia                                                                                                                             9.3  9.984  -0.6836
Cameroon                                                                                                                             5.6  10.100  -4.5000
Canada                                                                                                                               23.6  21.932  1.6679 
Cape Verde                                                                                                                           11.1  11.530  -0.4305
Central African Rep                                                                                                                  7.3  9.860  -2.5596 
Chad                                                                                                                                 2.4  9.723  -7.3233 
Chile                                                                                                                                10.1  13.592  -3.4921 
China                                                                                                                                21.8  11.129  10.6711 
Colombia                                                                                                                             12.2  12.157  0.0425 
Comoros                                                                                                                              .  10.048  . 
Congo                                                                                                                                12.0  9.702  2.2975 
249 
 
Congo Rep                                                                                                                            .  9.675  . 
Costa Rica                                                                                                                           19.3  13.245  6.0552 
Croatia                                                                                                                              16.2  12.992  3.2082 
Cuba                                                                                                                                 27.6  .  . 
Cyprus                                                                                                                               10.7  18.756  -8.0560 
Czech Rep                                                                                                                            14.2  15.663  -1.4627
Denmark                                                                                                                              38.0  21.836  16.1643 
Djibouti                                                                                                                             0.0  10.405  -10.4051 
Dominica                                                                                                                             18.8  11.991  6.8091 
Dominican Republic                                                                                                                   14.5  12.060  2.4399 
Ecuador                                                                                                                              14.6  10.779  3.8210 
Egypt                                                                                                                                2.4  10.975  -8.5746 
El Salvador                                                                                                                          9.5  11.365  -1.8648 
Equatorial Guinea                                                                                                                    5.0  16.153  -11.1525 
Eritrea                                                                                                                              14.7  9.708  4.9921 
Estonia                                                                                                                              17.8  13.886  3.9141 
Ethiopia                                                                                                                             7.8  9.631  -1.8314 
Fiji                                                                                                                                 .  11.442  . 
Finland                                                                                                                              36.5  20.645  15.8554 
France                                                                                                                               10.9  20.295  -9.3947 
Gabon                                                                                                                                11.0  12.152  -1.1525 
Gambia                                                                                                                               2.0  10.076  -8.0755 
Georgia                                                                                                                              7.2  10.535  -3.3350 
Germany                                                                                                                              31.0  20.693  10.3070 
Ghana                                                                                                                                9.0  10.218  -1.2181 
Greece                                                                                                                               8.7  16.799  -8.0990 
Grenada                                                                                                                              17.9  12.760  5.1396 
Guatemala                                                                                                                            8.8  11.059  -2.2588
Guinea                                                                                                                               8.8  10.226  -1.4263 
Guinea-Bissau                                                                                                                        7.8  9.671  -1.8708 
Guyana                                                                                                                               20.0  11.123  8.8770 
Haiti                                                                                                                                9.1  9.993  -0.8931 
Honduras                                                                                                                             5.5  10.439  -4.9395 
Hong Kong                                                                                                                            .  20.716  . 
Hungary                                                                                                                              8.3  14.950  -6.6497 
Iceland                                                                                                                              34.9  22.720  12.1798 
India                                                                                                                                8.9  10.396  -1.4965 
Indonesia                                                                                                                            8.0  10.707  -2.7066 
Iran                                                                                                                                 3.4  11.993  -8.5927 
Ireland                                                                                                                              13.7  22.849  -9.1492 
Israel                                                                                                                               13.3  18.442  -5.1422 
Italy                                                                                                                                9.1  20.024  -10.9244 
Ivory Coast                                                                                                                          8.5  10.067  -1.5669 
Jamaica                                                                                                                              16.0  10.976  5.0236 
250 
 
Japan                                                                                                                                10.0  21.441  -11.4409 
Jordan                                                                                                                               3.3  11.124  -7.8244 
Kazakhstan                                                                                                                           11.2  11.987  -0.7868
Kenya                                                                                                                                3.6  9.792  -6.1917 
Kuwait                                                                                                                               0.0  16.481  -16.4812 
Kyrgyzstan                                                                                                                           6.7  10.556  -3.8563
Laos                                                                                                                                 21.2  10.042  11.1580 
Latvia                                                                                                                               17.0  12.518  4.4817 
Lebanon                                                                                                                              2.3  11.279  -8.9792 
Lesotho                                                                                                                              10.7  10.248  0.4516 
Libya                                                                                                                                .  12.756  . 
Lithuania                                                                                                                            10.6  12.546  -1.9459 
Luxembourg                                                                                                                           16.7  31.991  -15.2914 
Macedonia                                                                                                                            6.7  11.631  -4.9314 
Madagascar                                                                                                                           8.0  9.709  -1.7093 
Malawi                                                                                                                               9.3  9.607  -0.3074 
Malaysia                                                                                                                             14.5  13.434  1.0659 
Maldives                                                                                                                             6.0  11.359  -5.3594 
Mali                                                                                                                                 12.2  9.690  2.5102 
Malta                                                                                                                                9.2  17.148  -7.9484 
Mauritania                                                                                                                           3.0  10.088  -7.0882 
Mauritius                                                                                                                            5.7  13.864  -8.1637 
Mexico                                                                                                                               15.9  13.414  2.4863 
Moldova                                                                                                                              12.9  10.284  2.6163 
Mongolia                                                                                                                             10.5  10.136  0.3638 
Morocco                                                                                                                              0.5  10.934  -10.4343 
Mozambique                                                                                                                           30.0  9.716  20.2844 
Myanmar                                                                                                                              .  9.794  .
Namibia                                                                                                                              20.4  12.240  8.1597 
Nepal                                                                                                                                7.9  9.930  -2.0297 
Netherlands                                                                                                                          32.9  20.944  11.9562
New Zealand                                                                                                                          30.8  18.415  12.3854 
Nicaragua                                                                                                                            20.7  10.400  10.2999 
Niger                                                                                                                                1.2  9.667  -8.4667 
Nigeria                                                                                                                              3.3  9.735  -6.4346 
Norway                                                                                                                               36.4  22.873  13.5272 
Oman                                                                                                                                 .  15.375  . 
Pakistan                                                                                                                             .  10.202  . 
Panama                                                                                                                               9.9  12.045  -2.1452 
Papua New Guinea                                                                                                                     1.8  10.361  -8.5612 
Paraguay                                                                                                                             8.0  11.333  -3.3326 
Peru                                                                                                                                 18.3  11.501  6.7985 
Philippines                                                                                                                          17.2  11.127  6.0733 
Poland                                                                                                                               20.7  13.426  7.2736 
251 
 
Portugal                                                                                                                             18.7  17.156  1.5439 
Qatar                                                                                                                                .  17.835  . 
Romania                                                                                                                              9.3  12.237  -2.9367 
Russia                                                                                                                               6.4  13.121  -6.7212 
Rwanda                                                                                                                               25.7  9.756  15.9441 
Saint Lucia                                                                                                                          13.8  11.911  1.8893 
Samoa                                                                                                                                6.1  11.611  -5.5111 
Sao Tome & Principe                                                                                                                  9.1  10.140  -1.0402 
Saudi Arabia                                                                                                                         .  14.475  . 
Senegal                                                                                                                              19.2  10.013  9.1874 
Seychelles                                                                                                                           23.5  14.991  8.5087 
Sierra Leone                                                                                                                         8.8  9.551  -0.7508
Singapore                                                                                                                            11.8  19.902  -8.1022 
Slovakia                                                                                                                             14.0  14.419  -0.4187 
Slovenia                                                                                                                             12.2  17.191  -4.9910 
Solomon Islands                                                                                                                      0.0  10.075  -10.0751 
South Africa                                                                                                                         29.8  13.585  16.2152
South Korea                                                                                                                          5.9  17.197  -11.2969 
Spain                                                                                                                                26.6  18.144  8.4561 
Sri Lanka                                                                                                                            4.4  10.927  -6.5270 
St. Kitts & Nevis                                                                                                                    13.3  14.992  -1.6922 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines                                                                                                                 
22.7  11.844  10.8563 
Sudan                                                                                                                                9.7  10.143  -0.4425 
Suriname                                                                                                                             17.6  11.049  6.5512 
Swaziland                                                                                                                            6.3  11.363  -5.0625 
Sweden                                                                                                                               42.7  20.319  22.3809 
Switzerland                                                                                                                          22.4  22.353  0.0474
Syria                                                                                                                                10.4  10.939  -0.5388 
Taiwan                                                                                                                               20.9  16.119  4.7805 
Tajikistan                                                                                                                           12.4  9.851  2.5495 
Tanzania                                                                                                                             22.3  9.566  12.7342 
Thailand                                                                                                                             9.6  12.227  -2.6272 
Togo                                                                                                                                 4.9  9.982  -5.0818 
Trinidad & Tobago                                                                                                                    20.9  13.387  7.5130 
Tunisia                                                                                                                              11.5  12.210  -0.7095 
Turkey                                                                                                                               4.2  12.486  -8.2861 
Turkmenistan                                                                                                                         26.0  11.120  14.8801 
Uganda                                                                                                                               24.7  9.876  14.8241 
Ukraine                                                                                                                              7.8  11.056  -3.2565 
United Arab Emirates                                                                                                                 0.0  17.448  -17.4481 
United Kingdom                                                                                                                       17.1  19.971  -2.8714 
United States                                                                                                                        13.8  24.785  -10.9850
Uruguay                                                                                                                              11.5  13.419  -1.9191 
252 
 
Uzbekistan                                                                                                                           7.2  10.434  -3.2340 
Vanuatu                                                                                                                              0.0  10.597  -10.5975 
Venezuela                                                                                                                            9.7  11.952  -2.2519 
Viet Nam                                                                                                                             26.0  10.233  15.7674 
Yemen                                                                                                                               0.7  9.733  -9.0333 
Zambia                                                                                                                               12.0  9.682  2.3179 
Zimbabwe                                                                                                                             10.0  10.522  -0.5219 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
253 
 
Appendix F 
A list of women's organizations founded between 1987 and 2004 in Taiwan 
- Homemaker's Union and Foundation 
Focus: Environmental preservation, green consumption. 
Publication: The Correspondence of Homemaker's Union and Foundation. 
Founded in: March 1987 
 
- Union of Progressive Women  
Focus: Political reform movement.  
Publication: Progressive Women 
Founded in: May 1987 
 
- Taipei Women Rescue Foundation 
Focus: The rights of abused teen girls.  
Publication: The Correspondence of Women Rescue Foundation  
Founded in: August 1987 
 
- The Garden of Hope Foundation 
Focus: Child prostitution and sexual abuse. 
Publication: Magazine of the Garden of Hope  
Founded in: May 1987 
 
- Modern Women's Foundation  
Focus: The rights of sexually abused women.  
Founded in: 1987 
 
- Taiwan Grassroots Women Worker's Center 
Focus: Female workers' working rights and health problem. 
Publication: Asia Women Workers, Female Workers in Taiwan 
Founded in: July 1988 
 
- Christian Foundation of Women's Welfare 
Focus: Women's mental development and employment. 
Founded in: 1989 
 
- End Child Prostitution Association, Taiwan (ECPAT) 
Focus: International trafficking and prostitution of teen girls. 
Founded in: 1989 
 
- Research Program on Gender and Society, National Tsing Hua University  
Focus: Gender studies and education.  
Founded in: 1989 
254 
 
- The Warm Life Association for Women (Taichung)  
Focus: To assist divorced women and women on the verge of divorce.  
Publication: Wan-Qin  
Founded in: 1990 
 
- National Organization for Women 
Focus: Women's rights. 
Founded in: 1991 
 
- Solidarity Front of Women Workers  
Focus: Assist the establishment of women workers' organizations, the movement of the 
opposite, and the education of women workers. 
Founded in: June 1991 
 
- The Warm Life Association for Women (Kaohsiung) 
Focus: To assist divorced women and women on the verge of divorce.  
Publication: Wan-Qin  
Founded in: August 3, 1991 
 
- Kaohsiung Awakening Association  
Focus: Women's mental development; promoting and supervising the practice of public 
policy concerns with women's rights. 
Founded in: July 1992 
 
- Center of Research on Gender, Kaohsiung Medical College 
Focus: Research and consultancy on gender issues.  
Founded in: 1992 
 
- Taipei Women's Development Association 
Focus: The employment of women, and women in disturbed families. 
Founded in: May 1993 
 
- Department of Women's Development, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)  
Focus: Women's mental development and grassroots movement. 
Founded in: 1993 
 
- Taipei Community Women Association 
Focus: Women's rights, and women's organization in community.  
Founded in: 1993 
 
- Taiwanese Feminist Scholars Association (TFSA) 
Focus: Anti-sexism, women?s security, women?s rights in education, workplace, family 
and health care, and women?s representation in politics. 
Founded in: September 1993 
255 
 
- Taipei Association for Promotion of Women's Rights (TAPWR) 
Focus: Women's rights, and sexual education.  
Publication: The Purple Sisters 
Founded in: February, 1994 
 
- Fembooks 
Focus: A bookstore focuses on female related books and female writers. 
Founded in: April 1994 
 
- Taipei Awakening Association 
Focus: Developing women's awareness of their status in the society, and promoting 
women's status. 
Founded in: 1994 
 
- The Taiwanese Developmental Resource Center for Women 
Focus: Legal advice. 
Founded in: 1994 
 
- Pink Collar Solidarity 
Focus: Women's status in service industry, and the elimination of obstacle against 
women's employment. 
Founded in: 1994 
 
- Taipei One Leaf Orchid Growth Association for Widowed Family 
Focus: Mutual help between widowers or widows and their families. 
Founded in: 1995 
 
- Kaohsiung Monocotylydonous Orchid Association 
Focus: Mutual help between widowers or widows and their families.  
Founded in: 1995 
 
- Women Association of Taiwan 
Focus: The development of women's mentality, and the promotion of local culture. 
Founded in: September 1995 
 
- Center for the Study of Sexualities, National Central University 
Focus: Sexualities research, and sexual education training provider. 
Founded in: 1995 
 
- Research Center for Gender and Space, Institute of Building and Planning, National 
Taiwan University 
Focus: Gender and space. 
Founded in: 1995 
 
256 
 
- Kaohsiung Women's Action Association 
Focus: Women and gender issues.  
Founded in: 1996 
 
- Peng Wan-Ru Foundation 
Focus: Personal safety of women, and the promotion of women's studies and practical 
services. 
Founded in: 1997 
 
- Collective of Sex Workers and Supporters (COSWAS) 
Focus: Sex workers? rights 
Founded in: 1999 
 
- Gender/Sexuality Rights Association, Taiwan (GSRAT) 
Focus: Concerning with and working for gender issues and sexual rights.  
Founded in: 1999 
 
- Taiwan Women?s Link 
Focus: Women's rights, especially in the area of women's health and politics. 
Founded in: 2000 
 
- National Alliance of Taiwan Women?s Associations 
Focus: Flourishing developments within women?s groups and participating international 
women?s meets and forums. 
Founded in: 2001 
 
- Taiwan Gender Equity Education Association (TGEEA) 
Focus: Promoting gender equity education. 
Founded in: 2002 
 
- TransAsia Sisters Association, Taiwan (TASAT)  
Focus: Supporting the foreign spouses from Southeast Asia countries married in Taiwan.   
Founded in: 2003 
 
- LesHand Association 
Focus: Concerning and promoting lesbians? rights. 
Founded in: 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257 
 
 
 
 
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