South Korean Perceptions of Soft Power: How te Hanguk-in S Themselvs in th Wold by Unji Baek A thesi submited to the Graduate Faculty of Auburn University in partial fulfilment of the requiremnts for the Degr of Master of Arts Auburn, Alabama ugust 2, 2014 Keywords: Soft Power, Hard Power, South Korea, National Brand Copyright 2014 by Unji Baek Approved by Joseph Molnar, Profesor of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology Alen Furr, Profsor and Chair of the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work Raj Mohan, Profsor of Siol i Abstract Soft Power is an important way for countries to wield national power in the international world, especialy for mid and smal size countries like South Korea. This study focuses on self-evaluation and how this evaluation is afectd by demographics and social staus. Also, in order to avoid focusing solely on popular culture, this resarch used Nye?s clasifcation of thre types of Soft Power: culture, politcs, and diplomacy. To sum up the results, South Koreans are more consentient that South Korea has strong politcal and diplomatic Soft Power when they are older or have a lower ducational level. The results also imply that the government ought to make polices that can increase people?s trust in it and enhance South Korea?s Soft Power. Possible solutions might include polices to break the chain of collusive ties betwen politcians and businesmen, and polices to take aggresive action for foreign aid and overseas dispatches. i Acknowledgemnt First, I want to thank my nation that gave me an opportunity to study in Auburn while serving in the miltary. To my mother Michung Shin and my father Junggi Baek who gave me love and taught me the reality of life that family should be the most important part of your life, and how to care about people that have ls than we have. To my thesi advisor Joseph Molnar for his unstintig support during this resarch. He pasionately instructed and motivated me to finish this study. To my acdemic advisor and comite member Alen Furr for his meticulous and kind guidance for two years? tudy in Auburn and for his help with this study. To commite meber Raj Mohan for supporting the theoretical background of this study and sharing his time to help with this study. To my friends Gayeon Won, Seulgi Park, Youngseon Kho, and Haejung Chung for being there for me and helping with this study. To my neighbor Dr. Hyejin Park for her warm-heartednes that gave me a sense of balance while living in Auburn. To my profesors and friends at Auburn, Conner Bailey, Nicholas Pagnucco, Madison Hinton, Trevor McEuen, Scott Miler, and Chen Songquan, for being there for me. To al of you: thanks. iv Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgemnts ............................................................................................................ i List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures .................................................................................................................. vii Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 Soft Power ................................................................................................................1 Movements to Improve Soft Power .........................................................................3 South Korea?s Efforts to Enhance Soft Power ........................................................5 Problem Definition...................................................................................................9 Purpose of the Study ..............................................................................................10 Significance of the Study .......................................................................................10 Specifc Study Objectives ......................................................................................11 I. Conceptual Framework .................................................................................................13 Theories of Power ..................................................................................................13 Theories of Soft Power ..........................................................................................17 Percived Soft Power .............................................................................................20 Limitaions of Soft Power Theory .........................................................................20 Dependent Varibles ..............................................................................................21 Independent Varibles ...........................................................................................22 Cumulative and Independent Effects .....................................................................27 v I. Resarch Methods ........................................................................................................28 Sample and Dat Collection...................................................................................28 Measures ................................................................................................................32 Dependent Varibles ..................................................................................32 Independent Varibles ...............................................................................3 Analysi..................................................................................................................34 IV. Results..........................................................................................................................36 Varibles Characteristics .......................................................................................36 Hypothesi Testing.................................................................................................38 Cumulative and Independent Effects ................................................................... 45f V. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................49 Summary ................................................................................................................49 Implications............................................................................................................49 Limitaions .............................................................................................................51 Refrences ..........................................................................................................................54 vi List of Tables Table 1 ................................................................................................................................ 9Table 2 .............................................................................................................................. 23 Table 3 .............................................................................................................................. 23 Table 4 .............................................................................................................................. 29 Table 5 .............................................................................................................................. 36 Table 6 .............................................................................................................................. 38 Table 7 .............................................................................................................................. 39 Table 8 .............................................................................................................................. 40 Table 9 .............................................................................................................................. 42 Table 10 ............................................................................................................................ 43 Table 11 ............................................................................................................................ 4 Table 12 ............................................................................................................................ 46 Table 13 ............................................................................................................................ 54 vii List of Figures Figure 1 ............................................................................................................................. 28 Figure 2 ............................................................................................................................. 29 1 I. Introduction Soft Power Max Weber defined power as ?the chance that an individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own wil even against the resitance of others? (Webr, 1957). As Webr said, power gives a ntion leverage to achieve its goals, o nations atempt to maximize their power in order to influence other countries. The source for obtaining power is a question of perennial concern. While the sources of power are constantly evolving and changi, a nation?s economic strength has been a constant source of power, and miltary strength became asignificant source of power after World War I. Moreover, these two sources timulate and compensate for each other to enhance power. Hence, before the 21st century, nations mostly focused on miltary and economic power, known as Hard Power, and used the power to cerc relatively weak countries (Cho, 2003). Howevr, the trend changed in the 21st century with the appearnce of the concept of Soft Power. In 1990, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of Soft Power in the book Soft Power, emphasizng the importance of nonmiltary influence in international relations. He defined Soft Power as the ability to make others wants what you want. In contrast to the coercive nature of Hard Power, Soft Power includes cultural, politcal and diplomatic sources (Nye, 2004) It is obvious that the concept becomes a major isue of international politcs. The changi cirumstances of society have acelrated the importance of the concept. In current times, nations hardly ever enforce their demands on weak nations through the relative strength of Hard Power, because using Hard Power equires much efort to faciltae change. An example that depended on Hard Power was the Iraq War. The U.S. invaded Iraq s a punitive measure after 9/11, despite international oppositon. The war lasted from 2003 to 2 2011, and insurgency is ongoing. The U.S. spent $1.9 trilion for this war, and the war caused many casualties in U.S. forces: 4,487 dead; eight mising or captured; 32,226 wounded; and 47,541 injured, diseased, or with other medical problems ("Iraq War," 2014). The U.S. has paid heavily for the war by relying on Hard Power. On the other hand, Soft Power can creat much more lverage with les efort, because nations wil follow another country?s culture and polices when it demonstrates strong Soft Power. Represntative examples are the European Union (EU) and the cultural embasy of the United Staes. The EU is a politcal and economic aliance of 28 European countries. Although European countries are miltarily inferior to the United Staes, they have held the U.S. in check since the organization of the European Union in 1994 (Ferguson, 2003). Anthony King, who wrote Towards a Europe Miltary Culture?, argued the EU is aglobal security actor in post-cold war (King, 2006). The case of the EU demonstrates how Soft Power compensates for inferior Hard Power. Another example is the cultural embasy of the United Staes (Schneider, 2003). From 1950 to 1954, the U.S. dispatched the cultural embasy, made up of actors, musican, artist, writers, and dancers, to 89 countries. The cultural embasy was intended to show the values of a democratic society in contradistinction to a totalitarin system. Through cultural embasy activities, the U.S. interacted with people from countries having ideals opposed to those of the United Staes and demonstrated American values. Although Russia critcized the activity as clever propaganda scheme, the U.S. continued it for four years. J. Wiliam Fulbright, an American scholar who studied cultural diplomacy, admited that it was a type of propaganda scheme, but argued that these activities wer the only way to break the Iron Curtain (Fulbright, 1951). 3 As shown by thes case, nations have gradualy come to recognize the importance of Soft Power, and understand how Soft Power wields its influence in international relationships, and Soft Power has emrged as an alternative to Hard Power. Therfore, the changi cirumstances of current society lend weight to Soft Power, and the concept of Soft Power has become acritcal subject in politcal sociology. Movements to Improve Soft Power When Joseph Nye initiated the theory of Soft Power, he esntialy aimed to explain U.S. power. Thus, his work concentrated on the U.S. (Gomichon, 2013). The terorist atacks on the United Staes on Septmber 11, 2001, led to a turning point in the theory. The Septmber 11 atck was commited by the Islamic terorist group, Al-Qaeda. They atcked the World Trade Centr and the Pentagon with hijacked airplanes, resulting in the deaths of 2,996 people. Victims of the teror wer mostly civilians, and the tror raised public resntment of American civilians. Thus, 9/11 had a great efct on the foreign policy of the United Staes ("Septmber 11 atcks," 2014). Conservatives and liberals within the U.S. government had distinct alternative views of foreign policy after 9/11. Conservatives who supported the miltarism of the Bush administration argued for more vigorous miltary action against erorism and totaly rejcted Nye?s concept of Soft Power. They belived that Soft Power as meaningles for a country without miltary rivals. Meanwhile, some liberals argued that the unparleld strength of the U.S. was a reason for the tragic terorist atacks. They asumed that because the U.S. held an unrivaled staus in the world, nations in conflict with the U.S. wer in fear nd such countries wer more likely to 4 commit a terorist act. They held sceptical atitudes toward the miltarism of the Bush administration and emphasized the necesity of Soft Power (Bohorquez, 2005). With such disputes about Hard Power and Soft Power, the concept of Smart Power was proposed as an alternative for foreign policy. Smart Power suggest equilibrium betwen Hard and Soft Power. Scholars who support Smart Power argue that the U.S. ought to use alternative tools to achieve its goals instead of relying solely on its miltary strength. Alternatives might be aliances, international instiutions, legitmate diplomacy, and the power of ideals. They argue that a foreign policy that focuses on Smart Power ould be les prone to war (Nossel, 2004). Even though some cast doubt upon the efectivenes of Soft Power, it is obvious that Soft Power is an important isue in current international relations. Al countries of the world have tried various atempts to enhance their Soft Power. U.S. obviously has both very strong Hard Power and very strong Soft Power, but its Soft Power has hown a downard tendency in recnt years. When Joseph Nye introduced the concept of Soft Power, he asertd that he U.S. had not only the strongest Hard Power in the world, but also the most Soft Power. He rgarde the source of American Soft Power as cultural popularity and the image of the nation as a land of opportunity for migrants (Bohorquez, 2005). Howevr, the strength of American Soft Power has declined, and many U.S. disputes reflct he problem of equilibrium betwen Soft Power and Hard Power (Nye, 2011). The Soft Power survey b Monocle verifes the fact. Monocle is a magzine that has collaborated with the Instiute for Government (IfG) to rank the Soft Power of 26 countries annualy since 2010. The survey evaluates the Soft Power through a panel score and staistical metrics that include five indices (culture, diplomacy, education, busines/innovation, and government). In the 2013 survey, the U.S was ranked third 5 in 2013, behind Germany and England. The U.S. has dropped one step since 2012, when it was ranked second. In the Monocle?s survey, Germany was ranked first and England was second in 2013. Monocle rgarded Germany?s politcal history and efctive diplomacy as source of its Soft Power. The root of England?s Soft Power was considered to be its trong and widespread diplomatic relations with many nations (Albert & Mota, 2013). Although China was not ranked in the Top 10, its movement to enhance Soft Power is outstanding. China has been described as a super power that wil replace the U.S., and the country has tried to reinforce Soft Power as much as its economic growth. As part of an efort to improve Soft Power, China hosted the Beijng Olympics in 2008 and wil hold the Shanghai EXPO in 2014 (Fan, 2008). Besides, China has led the civilization of surrounding countries ince the fiftenth century, so China has kept the staus as Asia?s traditional centr power. Therefore, China?s staus and latent cultural power are significant sources of its Soft Power. Meanwhile, smal countries such as Switzerland make a good fight by keping a neutral positon in international society. Although Switzerland ranks 128th in area (41,210 sq km), and 98 th in population (8,112,200 in 2013) (CIA, 2013), its Soft Power was ranked 8th in Monocle?s Soft Power ankig ("The World Factbook," 2013). Furthermore, Canda and the Netherlands are rpresntative countries that wield larger politcal clout than their miltary and economic weight would indicate because of their economic aid or peacekeping activities (Nye, 2002). South Korea?s Eforts to Enhance Soft Power As shown by these examples, international comunities have made comon eforts to improve Soft Power. In addition, Soft Power is the largest source of international power for smal and mid-sized countries like South Korea. As Nye outlined in Soft Power and the Korean 6 Wave, it is hard for smal and mid-sized countries to become super powers, but it is possible to wield outsized influence through Soft Power as Switzerland and the Netherlands have done (Nye & Kim, 2013). This fact is important for South Korea because of its size of teritory and population. In 2013, South Korea rnked 109 th in area (99,720 sq kilometr, CIA 2013) and 27th in population (49 milion) in the world (CIA 2013). Thus, improving Soft Power is epecialy significant for this country to wield influence. Nonetheles, South Korea could not focus on improving Soft Power for decades because of the stae of the country. Directly after gaining independence from Japn, South Korea was involved in the Korean War fom 1950 to 1953. The war destroyed the majority of industry in the nation. Thus, for sevral years after the war, the South Korean government focused on developing the nation?s infrastructure and its economic growth. In addition, South Korea has been in a stae of armistice with North Korea for 60 years, yet North Korea has continued miltary provocations. Acording to the Ministry of National Defnse of South Korea, North Korea hs comited 1,959 infiltrations and 994 local provocations against South Korea since the truce began. Furthermore, North Korea consistently threatns South Korea through the possesion of nuclear weapons and long-distance misiles (Ministry of National Defnse, 2012). Miltary confrontation with North Korea imperils national security and impedes stable development of South Korea. Thus, these circumstances are an obstacle to focusing on Soft Power instead of improving Hard Power. Meanwhile, as the nation has stabilized in recnt decades, the administration of South Korea made sveral atempts to enhance the Soft Power of this nation. President Kim Young-sam, who governed over South Korea from 1993 to 1998, stresd transparency of the nation. His eforts enhanced politcal integrity, and became a driving force of politcal Soft Power. 7 Also, Kim Young-sam?s government gained a foothold for globalization and drew national interst in international events. Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung?s government (1998-2003) initiated the first atempt to make a national brand. The government co-hosted the 2002 World Cup with Japan under the slogan ?Dynamic Korea? creating an image of South Korea as pasionate and dynamic. Also, President Kim Dae-jung devoted his whole life to seking human rights in Korea and around the world in nations such as Burma nd Timor. These forts by the government creatd an international image of South Korea s a nation that developed human rights and respected the human rights of other nations. Roh Moo-Hyun governed South Korea from 2003 to 2008, and he emphasized the role of South Korea as a busines hub and a balancer in Northeast Asia. The government atempted to introduce South Korea s a leader in Northeast Asia. Besides, through establishing the Knowledge Sharing Program, this government showed other developing countries how South Korea chievd economic development after the Korean War. Thes movemnts enhanced South Korea?s international image. Le Myung-bak?s government (2008-2013) promted rather visible polices to improve Soft Power. This government hosted an international confernce and dispatched the Korean Peace Corps abroad. Also, Le?s government established the National Brand Commite and practied systematic procedures to strengthen the nation?s global identity (Le, 2010). In spite of multilateral eforts to strengthen South Korea?s Soft Power, the results have been disappointing. Ther are thre instiutions that survey the country?s brand annualy: Anholt-Gfk Roper, Bloom Consulting, and FutureBrand. Each organization uses difernt methodologies to evaluate a nation?s brand, but South Korea consistently shows low rankig in 8 every result. Anhol-Gfk Roper?s rankig considers five variables: experts, governance, culture and heritage, people, and tourism. South Korea rnked 33th among 50 target countries in 2009. Bloom Consulting evaluates thre aspects: atraction of trade, atraction of tourism, and atraction of talent. Among 193 countries evaluated in 2012, South Korea was ranked 79 th in atraction of trade, 36th in atraction of tourism, and 18th in atraction of talent. Meanwhile, FutureBrand measures sevn factors by using quantitaive resarch, experts? opinions and co-creative insights: 1) awrenes, 2) familarity, 3) asociations, 4) prefrence, 5) consideration, 6) decison/visitaion, and 7) advocacy. Acording to the result of this survey, South Korea rnked 49th among 118 countries in 2012, a drop of sevn steps from 42th in 2011 ("Rankings-Country by Country," 2013). Visble achievements of national eforts to enhance Soft Power have ben shown mostly through the boom of Korean popular culture in foreign countries, a phenomenon known as the ?Korean Wave? (Cho, 2005). One example of how Korean popular culture was introduced in foreign countries was when overseas troops broadcasted Korean soap drams in order to increase these countries? familarity with South Korea. The drams wer sensationaly popular. After the succes, many Korean drams have ben exported to foreign countries, and the succes led to the boom in Korean pop music. Korean pop music ranked high in many foreign music charts. To cite an example, ?Gangam Style," a song performed by aKorean musican, has had twenty bilion hits on You-tube, and it is listed in the Guinnes Book of World Records as the most ?liked? video in YouTube history. In addition, a variety of Korean entrtainers have performed al over the world. The succes of soap drams and entertainers have helped improve apositve image of the nation and led to international interst in the country (Cabalza, 2011). 9 Problem Definiton Because of its relatively smal size, South Korea needs Soft Power to wield international influence, but the majority of studies about South Korean Soft Power are focused on the ?Korean Wave.? A search for studies with the key words ?Soft Power? and ?Korea? in the database of the Korean National Asembly Library and the Korea Education and Resarch Information Service rvealed that he majority of articles wer about the ?Korean Wave. Specifcaly, of 69 studies with the key words, 26 articles wer about cultural Soft Power. Of these articles, 70% wer about the ?Korean Wave? (Table 1). Table 1 Resarch Statistics about South Korean Soft Power, Korean National Assembly Library and Korea Education and Research Infmation Servic Database, 2014 Format Overal Soft Power Culture (Korean Wave) Diplomacy (PKO) Domestic Governmnt Published Article 7 12(7) 13(3) 5 Disertaion/Thesi 6 11(9) 6(2) 2 Book/Pmphlet - 3(2) 1(0) 3 Total 13 26(18) 20(5) 10 PKO: Peace Keping Operation This focus may cause a problem because popularity of popular culture is unlikely to lead to an improvement of Soft Power. Although popular culture is a part of Soft Power, Soft Power is a much wider concept that includes politcal and diplomatic ares a wel. Movements to enhance Soft Power that depend mostly on popular culture risk creating a very partial nd distorted image of a nation. For example, the majority of soap drams show characters with a wealthy and modern lifestyle, so foreigners who encounter South Korea through soap drams expect it to be a modern and developed country. Although Korean pop music has become a huge succes in Europe, Europeans stil view South Korea mostly as an industrial powerhouse (Nye & Kim, 2013). Thes tudies produce a slanted view of South Korea nd make it hard to provide a 10 rounded view of the nation?s Soft Power. There is a need to consider al thre aspects of Soft Power: culture, politcs, and diplomacy. In addition, there are fw studies of national self-evaluation, that is, how South Koreans evaluate their own Soft Power. It is natural that resarchers of Soft Power depend on external evaluation, because the focus of the studies i on how other countries are influenced by anation?s Soft Power. However, it is also necesary to approach the problem fro a difernt view by considering that social perception is influenced by self-evaluation. Self-evaluation can help clarify an uncertain self-concept, and a wel-defined self-concept provides a framework to understand related paterns of national afilation. Self-concept is defined as a set of cognitive structures that provide for individual expertise in particular social domains (Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985). A wel-defined self-concept enables an individual to improve self-control, provides self-continuity, and advances the procesing of self-relvant information. Also, through creating a positve image of the self, enhanced self-concept is a key to goal seting (Sedikides, 1993). Therefore, this study is valuable bcause it measures Korean citzens? perceived Soft Power to enhance an objective view of South Korean Soft Power. Purpose of Study The purpose of this study is to gain theoretical and politcal implications to improve the Soft Power of South Korea. Thus, this study follows Nye?s clasifcation of types of Soft Power to retain objectivity and adds South Koreans? internal evaluation as wel. Respondents are divided by demographic factors and social staus, and each group?s percption of Soft Power is analyzed. Also, this resarch follows Nye?s clasifcation of Soft Power: cultural, politcal, and diplomatic Soft Power. To consider thre parts wil resolve the slanted view of Soft Power which leans too heavily on popular culture. Furthermore, this resarch examines the antecdents 11 and characteristics that shape South Koreans? perception of their nation?s Soft Power. The results wil sugest ways to formulate polices asociated with Soft Power. Two main resarch questions are discussed: 1) how demographic factors and social staus afect South Koreans? evaluation of the nation?s Soft Power and 2) what factors shape perceptions of Korean Soft Power. Signifcance of Study South Korea needs Soft Power to wield international influence, but it has weaker Soft Power than Hard Power. Acording to the report hat was represnted in the World Economic Forum, aong the 20 countries of G20, South Korea?s rankig in national power is 13th and its miltary economic apbility is 9th, but its Soft Power is 12th (Gang, 2009). South Korea has relatively stronger conomic and miltary power than its teritory and population might lead one to expect. However, the fact that its Soft Power is weaker than its Hard Power alows the asumption that South Korea cn strengthen its national power by seking abalanced development of Soft Power and Hard Power. Specifc Study Objectives This study measures South Korean citzens? perceptions of their nation?s Soft Power. The introduction defines Soft Power and helps to establish the concept of Soft Power. To measure prceptions of Soft Power, particpants wer divided into groups acording to demographic factors and social staus. South Korean citzens? percption of their Soft Power was analyzed by examining eight hypothese. The hypothese used demographic variables and determinants of social staus as independent variables to verify how difernt groups perceiv their Soft Power. A wel-defined concept of Soft Power wil provide a theoretical background for alowing South Korea to wield 12 more power in the international world. Thus, this resarch devlops the concept of Soft Power as a dimension of national identity and global particpation. Meanwhile, this resarch sugest implications for policy making, future rsearch, and theories. South Korea hs focused on vitalizng popular culture to enhance Soft Power, and most of the existing studies pertaining to Soft Power are about popular culture. However, this resarch aims at improving the Soft Power of South Korea through difusion of culture, diplomatic ativities, and transparent domestic governance, not through popular culture alone. 13 I. Conceptual Framwork Theories of Power As noted above, power has been a key subject of politcal sociology. Thus, writers from many perspectives have writen about power and defined it in difernt ways, resulting in many acdemic theories about power. Robert A. Dahl, a politcal scholar who wrote The Concept of Power, defines power as ?a succesful atempt of A that has power over B to the extent that he can get from B would not otherwise do? (Dahl, 1957). Dahl?s key concept is imposing on B to act against B?s desire. Leslie H. Gelb, who wrote Power Rules: How Comon Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy, regards power as coming from psychological and politcal leverage by employing resources and positons (Gelb, 2009). As power has relational and situational features, it changes depending on encounterd situations and relations. Steven Lukes, a politcal and social theorist, defined five aspects of power (Lukes, 2005). First, power is dispositonal, meaning that power depends on capability that may or may not be exertd. Second, power focuse on superiority. Relative superiority that surpases others? power is more important than absolute magnitude of power. Third, power is dependency-inducing. This type of power acompanies domination. Fourthly, power does not consider difernces in actors? interst. Finaly, power is an endles exchange rlationship betwen engaing entites. French and Raven (1968) presnted five Base of Social Power: Reward Power, Coercive Power, Legitmate Power, Refrent Power, and Expert Power. Reward Power is based on the ability to reward, and Coercive Power is based on the ability to punish. Legitmate Power comes from internalized values in a recipient who acepts that the giver has a legitmate right to influence the rcipient and that he recipient ought to 14 acept the influence. Refrent Power is a power that stems from the giver?s atractivenes. The recipient wil follow the giver and desire to be a meber of the giver?s group when the giver is atractive. Expert Power is determined by the extent of the knowledge that he giver has. J. David Singer verifes why power play n important role within national relationships (Singer, 1963). In order to ?live and let live,? without relationships with other nations, a nation must met two requiremnts: 1) it must be absolutely isolated from others and 2) it must be self-sufficent so that it can survive without any asitance from others. However, because it is impossible to met these conditions, countries need to depend on each other. Besides, every country has the capability to cause srious damge to other countries, even though there is a relative difernce of power. Thus, it is hard for a strong nation to unilateraly influence aweaker nation. Based on these rasons, Singer insisted that nations are closely related to each other and that they tr to strengthen power so that they can expand their fedom to behave the way they want. Thus, Singer verifes that the interlationship among nations makes the concept of power acritcal subject of sociology. Even though scholars have long theories about power until the ninetenth century, most scholars focused on the coercive aspect of power. They asumed that complex societis need a governing mechanism, and that power and authority are need to control the society. Power was explained as a coercive and conflict-based concept, while authority was defined as concept similar to the modern concept of Soft Power. Power was regarded as an ilegitmate easure to control a society, and authority as a legitmate one (Boskoff, 1972). The tendency to focus on the coercive charcter of power can be traced to Karl Marx and subsequent Marxist heorist. Marx was much concerned with the conflict betwen clases and said that ?the history of al hitherto existing society is the history of clas trugles?(Marx & 15 Engels, 1959). The conflict relationship betwen capitalist and proletarin is at the centr of clas theory. Marx presumed that capitalist and proletarins are always in conflict, and that power is based on the control of means of production. Thus, he believed that capitalist controlled proletarins by using their power over the means of production (Marx, 1904). Dahrendorf explained how the diferntial distribution of authority creats power to dominate others (Dahrendorf, 1959). Dahrendorf asertd that diferntial distribution of authority forms a?conflict group,? and each group has a specifc role and occupation. A group?s specifc role and occupation entail rights, and the rights give the group power to control others. For example, a teacher has a right to control students in clas, so a teacher can instruct students to stay in the clasroom during school hours. Therefore, social roles are acompanied by ?expectaions of domination or subjection,? and the distribution of authority is a source for the formation of a?conflict group.? It is obvious that the definition of power by Marx and Dahrendorf is far fom Nye?s concept of Soft Power. Their asertions about power are both based on the compulsory character of power, which coerces others. Thus, early scholars and Marxist theorist clearly both focused on coercion and presure. Another Marxist theoretican, Antonio Gramsci, s notable for his theory of ?hegemony? to depict the ideological nd politcal dominance of a governing clas. He advanced the Marxist view of power by adding the need of public approval (Gramsci, 1995). Gramsci dentifed the same proces of clas conflict as Marx, but premised that social order is built on public support for existing arngemnts. In other words, a group needs public support to seiz the miltary and manufacturing system, so a dictaor cannot rule the system without public approval. Although Gramsci focused on domestic power, his theory can be extended to show the significance of requiring legitmate support from other countries in international afirs. 16 Meanwhile, Max Weber defined thre types of authority: legal, traditional, and charismatic authority (eber, 1957). Although Weber did not specifcaly refr to power, his explanation of authority expanded earlier definitions of power by adding the concept of legitmacy. In other words, he included cooperation and legitmacy as charcteristics of power along with coercion. Acording to Weber, legal authority is a power that depends on a belif that established rules are rliable. The traditional authority arise from people?s conviction that imeorial tradition is justifed and from exercise of existing authority. On the other hand, charismatic authority arise from an alegiance to the exceptional character of a person. Weber thought that society consistently faces cris due to defiance of existing authority. Thus, society depends on personal and charismatic authority to defeat the chalenge. However, charismatic authority is unstable and temporary, so the governing clas creats rules and offical duties, replacing charismatic authority with legal authority. In this explanation, Webr showed that coordination and leadership process in a society emrge from shared confidence about the legitmacy of command, so that power develops into authority. He argued that force does not make pople obey, and that heir motivation for obedience omes from their recognition of the legitmacy of control (Webr, 1957). His theory of thre types of authority stimulated acdemic interst about another aspect of power. Foucault explained the character of power in the same vein as Max Webr, adding an explanation of how one exerts power without coercive measures (Foucault, 1977). Foucault showed the proces by which people adapt to a social system by using the example of the ?panopticon.? He defined the panopticon as circular prison in which prisoners can be observed from al directions. Philosopher Jermy Bentham initialy refred to the panopticon in 17 1791, and Foucault used the concept to explain how observation induces an efct of power without coercive power. The structure of the panopticon provides aview in al directions, so that the behavior of the prisoners i constantly oversen. Thus, they are conscious of the guard?s observation and obey the rgulations of the prison. Foucault presumed that current society is similar to the panopticon because people live under the domination of observation. Thus, they self-consciously obey the regulations, but they are deluded into believing that hey internalize the rules without external control. Self-conscious obedience is not same as the voluntary behavior that rise as legitmate and cooperative feature of Soft Power. However, the example of the panopticon shows how power levrages people without physical force and coercion. While the above theorist mostly give a theoretical basi for governing power, Pier Bourdieu shows how culture operates a means of domination. Pier Bourdieu xamines the relationship betwen social clas and cultural prefrence, and outlines how social structure afects the cultural prefrences of individuals (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu argued that social clas determine cultural prefrences. Furthermore, people with a limited experience of culture share analogous experience with other people in the same clas, leading to reproduction of the clas tructure. Therefore, people may be unconsciously dominated by culture simply b sharing the same culture. His perspective shows how people are influenced by culture, and how a nation applies leverage to other countries by having an influential culture. Theories of Soft Power Theory of Soft Power by Joseph Nye is not a new theory but a synthesi of theories that focus on legitmate fatures of power. This perspective became away to stres legitmate and cooperative features of power in international relations. As sources of legitmate and cooperative 18 power, Nye sugestd thre sources, culture, politcs, and diplomacy. Nye said, ?Culture is a set of values and practies that creat meaning for a society.? (Nye, 2004). Therfore, the culture of a nation can enhance the atractivenes of arelationship when it includes universal values and shared values with other countries. Other sources of Soft Power are polices at home and abroad. Politcs that are hypocritcal or haughty or that disregard other nations? opinion weaken the Soft Power of a nation, so Nye rgards domestic and foreign politcs a sources of Soft Power. Based on these facts, Nye identifed thre determinants of a nation?s Soft Power: 1) the atractivenes of its culture, 2) its politcal values when it lives up to them at home and abroad, and 3) its foreign polices when they are sen as legitmate and having moral authority (Nye, 2004). Nevertheles, Nye did not ignore the influence of miltary and economic power. He argued that nations need to concede the limits of Hard Power, then try to compensate for these restrictions by considering interdependence among countries. A good example of the practie of Soft Power is the Peace Corps, apreminent international service organization of the United Staes. The organization sends Americans abroad to give aid to people around the world, and aims at giving help and promoting a beter understanding with each other ("Peace Corps," 2013). In the same vein as Nye?s theory, Stevn Lukes identifed thre dimensions of power and explained features of power. A one-dimensional view concentrates on visible power. A one-dimensional power controls the proces of making and implenting decisons about key isues. A two-dimensional view of power includes not only observable conflicts but also covert conflicts. A two-dimensional power sets agendas and restricts what is being discussed. Thus, the power works to control the opinions of disadvantaged groups through invisible tools of social structure. A thre-dimensional power is concerned not only with decison making and control over politcal agendas, but also with presnt isues and potential isues, including observable and 19 latent conflicts. A thre-dimensional power controls information and is concerned with molding public opinion by controlling information. That is, a thre-dimensional power manipulates what others think they want. The concept of two-dimensional and thre-dimensional power, in which a powerful entity set agendas to shape desires, is similar to Nye?s concept of Soft Power. Kenneth Boulding, who wrote Thre Faces of Power, sugestd a difernt clasifcation of power: 1) destructive power, or the power to destroy, 2) productive power, or the power to pay, and 3) integrative power, or the power to congreate pople by respect and consideration for each other (Boulding, 1990). Destructive power means that A has a power that can threatn B. A threatns to do what B does not want if B does not do what A wants. Boulding regarded destructive power as including politcal and miltary power. Another type of power is productive power. Productive power is used when A and B agre to an exchange and both A and B have something that the other desires. Economic power is a subcategory of productive power. The last type of power is integrative power. Boulding categorized it as the power of love or respect. In this case, A does something for B because A loves B. A subcategory of integrative power is ocial power. Social power comes from intimacy with or love for people who are in the same group. Integrative power is similar to Soft Power. However, Boulding?s clasifcation of power difers from Nye?s in that Boulding?s i limited to people in the same culture. Nye asumed that if people share the same culture or values, integrative and social power exist even when the people come from difernt backgrounds. Tania Domet, who wrote Soft Power in Global Politcs? Diplomatic Partners as Transversal Actors, interpretd the function of Soft Power fom a diplomatic view. Domet stresd the role of diplomatic partnerships that oil diplomatic relations. She argues that 20 diplomatic partnerships represnt Soft Power (Domet, 2005). Perceived Soft Power This study analyzes Soft Power fom a difernt view, in respect that measures how South Koreans evaluate their Soft Power. Self-evaluation helps clarify an uncertain self-concept, and a wel-defined self-concept provides a framework to understand social domain. Hazel Markus et al, the authors of Role of the Self-Concept in the Perception of Others, defined Self-concept as set of cognitive structures that provide for individual expertise in particular social domains. Also, they indicated that self-concept afects a person?s perception proces that perceivs, memorizes, infer and evaluates other?s behavior (Markus et al., 1985). Constantine Sedikides, who wrote Assesment, Enhancemnt, and Verifcation Detrminants of the Self-Evaluation Proces, summarized sevn functions of self- concept 1) gives a power that regulates self, 2) provides a consitent sense of self, 3) acelrates procesing of information related to self, 4) acts a a key factor in goal-seting, 5) has impacts on social perception, 6) detrmines a person?s behavior and choice of partners in personal relationships, and 7) projects a coherent and advisable image of a person to others. Therfore, this study takes note that self-evaluation has an impact on social percption, and analyzes percived Soft Power by South Koreans. Limitation of Soft Power Theory Although it is genraly concurred that Soft Power has a significant meaning in today?s society, various resarchers have complented Nye?s theory or disputed aspects of it. Guen Le, who wrote A Theory of Soft Power and Korea?s Soft Power Strategy, admited that Nye?s definition of Soft Power launched atempts to understand hidden parts of international relationships (Le, 2009). At the same tie, he pointed out that Nye?s theory lacks atheoretical 21 framework and mainly focuses on explaining the abnormal power of the United Staes. In addition, Nye?s clasifcation is ambiguous when the outcome of power does not coincide with the source of the power. If a coercive form of power brings about acooperative and atractive result like Soft Power does, Nye?s clasifcation is unclear bout whetr to categorize the power as Soft Power or Hard Power. Therefore, he suggestd a new definition of Soft Power based on its results: 1) Soft Power nhances xternal security b showing an tractive image of a nation, 2) Soft Power motivates other countries to support a nation?s polices, 3) Soft Power shapes other nations? views and prefrences, 4) Soft Power helps maintain unity in a country, and 5) Soft Power increase public support for a leader and a government (Le, 2009). Steven Lukes critcized Nye?s theory because it fails to explain distinctions betwen difernt means that shape prefrences and difernt ways of persuasion (Lukes, 2005). As noted above, Lukes? theory of thre-dimensional power is similar to Nye?s. However, Lukes argues that Nye?s theory does not adequately explain which means and ways of persuasion make pople want to follow a country?s culture and polices (Vuving, 2009). Nye?s theory has been critcized because of thre main reasons: 1) focusing too much on explaining U.S. power, 2) basing clasifcations on the source of power, and 3) failng to explain causes of shaping prefrences and ways of persuasion. Depndet Variable Although Nye?s theory has been critcized, this study follows his clasifcation. The purpose of this study is analyzing percptions of Soft Power, not analyzing Soft Power. Nye?s theory has problems with ambiguous clasifcation and does not adequately explain the cause of Soft Power. Thes problems afect eforts to analyze the causes of Soft Power. However, they do not greatly afect eforts to analyze prception of Soft Power, so they do not cloud the isue. 22 Therefore, this study follows Nye? clasifcation because it has abundant theoretical background, and clasifes Soft Power into thre types: cultural, politcal, and diplomatic fields. Cultural Soft Power refrs to power that comes from universal values and values shared with others. Politcal Soft Power efrs to power which stems from domestic values and polices. Diplomatic Soft Power refrs to the power esults from the values that anation express through the style of its foreign policy. This resarch anlyze how South Koreans percive the thre types of Soft Power, so perceivd Soft Power used as dependent variables. Citzen perceptions of the relative standings of South Korea on these thre dimensions are the focus of this study. Indepndet Variables This resarch examines ix demographic factors and aspects of social staus as independent variables that are hypothesized to afect perceptions of Soft Power. These are: region, age, gender, educational level, occupation, and income Region Region was chosen for an independent variable bcause of the historical background of South Korea. The eastern and westrn parts of South Korea wer separated into independent countries for 600 years. Besides, the South Korean government adopted a local self-government sytem in 2006, so presnt administrative districts are also divided into westrn and eastern regions. Jeollado, the westrn part of the country, is divided into the two provinces of Chonbuk and Chonnam. Gyeongsangdo, the eastern part, is divided into the two provinces of Kyongbuk and Kyongnam (se fig. 2). The local self-government system acentuates distinctions betwen Jeollado and Gyeongsando, and the two regions have shown significantly distinctive politcal and cultural tendencies. This tendency is demonstrated by much Korean resarch. 23 Table 2 Polling Rate of Presidential Elections according to Administrative Region Region 15th elction (1998~)(%) 16th elction (2003~)(%) 17th elction (2008~)(%) 18th elction (2013~)(%) Metropolitan Ae Grand Nationl Party 38.3 Grand Nationl Party 44.4 Grand Ntionl Party 52.5 Saenuri Prty 49.4 Democratic Paty 42.0 Uri Party 50.6 Democratic paty 24.0 Democratic Paty 49.8 Chung cheongdo Grand National Prty 27.4 Grand Nationl Party 41.3 Grand Ntionl Party 37.1 Saenuri Prty 54.3 Democratic paty 43.9 Uri Party 52.5 Democratic paty 22.6 Democratic Paty 44.8 Gyeong sangdo Grand National Prty 59.1 Grand Nationl Party 69.4 Grand Ntionl Party 62.4 Saenuri Prty 68.6 Democratic Paty 13.5 Uri Party 25.8 Democratic paty 10.3 Democratic Paty 30.5 Jeolado Grand National Prty 3.3 Grand Nationl Party 4.9 Grand Ntionl Party 9.0 Saenuri Prty 10.5 Democratic Paty 94.4 Uri party 93.2 Democratic paty 80.0 Democratic Paty 88.5 Note. Adapted from Regional Conflicts of South Korea: Aspects and Measures, p. 109, by Hong-Seog Choe, 2013, Soul: The Korean Asociation for Plicy Studies onservative parties: Grand Ntional nd Saenuri; rogresiv parties: Democratic and Uri Table 3 Parliamentary Seat Share of Parties according to Administrative Region Region 16 th council (2000~)(%) 17th council (2004~)(%) 18th council (2008~)(%) 19th council (2012~)(%) Metropolitan Ae Grand Nationl Party 41.2 Grand Nationl Party 30.3 Grand Ntionl Party 73.9 Saenuri Prty 38.7 Democrtic paty 57.7 Uri Party 69.7 Democatic party 23.4 Democratic Paty 57.7 Chung cheongdo Grand Nationl Party 16.7 Grand Nationl Party 4.2 Grand Ntionl Party 4.2 Senuri Party 56.5 Democrtic paty 33.3 Uri Party 79.2 Democatic party 33.3 Democratic Paty 39.1 Jeollado Grand Nationl Party 98.5 Grand Nationl Party 88.2 Grand Ntionl Party 67.6 Senuri Party 92.4 Democrtic Paty Uri Party 5.9 Democatic art 2.9 Democratic Paty 4.5 Gyeong sangdo Grnd National Party - Grand Nationl Party - Grnd National Prty - Senuri Party - Democrtic paty 86.2 Uri Party 80.6 Democatic arty 80.6 Democratic Paty 86.7 Note. Adapted from Regional Conflicts of South Korea: Aspects and Measures, p. 109, by Hong-Seog. Choe, 2013, Soul: The Korean Asociation for Plicy Studies onservative parties: Grand Ntional nd Saenuri; rogresiv parties: Democratic and Uri 24 For example, Choe Hong-Seog?s paper ?Regional Conflicts of South Korea: Aspects and Measures,? demonstrates that the two areas have distinguishing opinions and characters (Choe, 2013). Acording to him, inhabitants in same are share similar interst that oppose other regions? interst. People who live in same rgion are likely to have similar politcal tendencies. As shown in Table 2 and 3, this asertion is supported by the results of presidential elections and each party?s share of parliamentary seats (Table 2 and 3). People who live in Jeollado have consistently supported progresive parties and showed up to 30 times a much approval for a progresive party as for a conservative party. On the other hand, inhabitants of Gyeongsangdo have mostly supported conservative parties. It is possible that he politcal tendencies of the regions may afect their evaluation of government polices. When the data was collectd, a progresive party, Democratic Party, was the ruling party, so the people of Jeollado wer likely to be in favor of this government. Based on these facts, it is hypothesized that region predicts people?s evaluation of politcal and diplomatic Soft Power. Hypothesi 1: Citzens? percptions of Soft Power difer across regions of Korea. Gender Gender was chosen as an independent variable because South Korea has had a draft sytem for 60 years. That does not include women (Jeong & Hah, 2014). Since the division of the Korean peninsula, South Korea has required two years of mandatory miltary service for the male population. Thus, the draft system is likely to creat a difernce of politcal, diplomatic, and miltary atitudes betwen males and females. Eunkyoung Jeong and Yangsoo Hah, who wrote The Effect of Ego-Resilency, Social Support, Miltary Life Satisfaction Growth Related Miltary Service in Korean Veterans, verifed that individuals? growth on psychological factors changed after being discharged from miltary service. It is possible to asume that mandatory 25 miltary service deepens males? understanding of government domestic and foreign polices, and that males ases government polices more gnerously than females. Hypothesi 2: Males are more consentient that South Korea has strong Soft Power than do females. Age Meanwhile, age was used for an independent variable because the rapid change of South Korea during the last 60 years afectd the percptions of South Koreans and creatd a genration gap betwen older and younger people (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture [EKC], 2013). The industrialization of South Korea started in 1953, and the society has changed dramticaly during the last 60 years. The rapid growth of industrialization after the Korean War was caled ?the Miracle of Han River? by South Korea, because the country achieved outstanding economic development in a short period of time. However, the rushed development of the society did not alow enough time for people to adapt to changes within the society and has led to conflicts among enrations and difering perceptions of social problems (Ham, 2013). Popular culture, which is refred as the driving force of South Korean Soft Power in studies about Soft Power, is upported by the younger generation. Thus, there is a chance that young people are more consentient that South Korea has strong cultural Soft Power than do older people. People in their 50s and 60s endured the Korean War, the Japanes colonial period, and miltary dictaorship. It is obvious that the presnt South Korea is amuch more dmocratic society than it was in the 1950s. As older people ndured the hard times, they are likely to agre that politcal and diplomatic Soft Power is strong than do young people. Hypothesi 3: Younger people are more consentient that cultural Soft Power of South Korea is strong than do older people. 26 Hypothesi 4: Younger people are more consentient that politcal and diplomatic Soft Power of South Korea is weak than do older people. Ocupation Social staus refrs to the positon that someone occupies in a society, and it is categorized as cribed or achievd staus (Henslin, 2011). Ascribed staus is involuntary because it is determined by birth, but achievd staus is determined by one?s efort. People having difernt social stauses show distinct cultural inclinations and politcal tendencies. Social standing determines a person?s social group, and social group afects a person?s perception (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1957). This resarch focused on achieved staus that is determined by one?s wil, and verifed how social group can afect perceptions of Soft Power. Among determinants of social staus, occupation is a represntative example of achieved staus (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1957). Thus, occupation was used as independent variable in this resarch. Howevr, it is hard to clasify whetr a particular ocupation has higher or lower social staus, so this resarch focused on detrming whether occupation is relvant to a person?s perception of Soft Power. Hypothesi 5: Ocupation is related to perceptions of Soft Power. Level of Education Completd education levl is closely connected to occupation. When companies selct people for a specifc positon, they consider several characteristics, including completd level of education. Thus, level of education is the best single predictor of ocupation (Kahl & Davis, 1955). Level of education is strongly linked with occupation and ocupation is strongly linked with social staus. It is asumed in this paper that people with higher social staus are more likely to agre with the politcs of their government, because they are more likely to be satisfied with 27 the presnt social system. Therefore, this resarch hypothesized that highly educated people are more likely to agre that South Korea has strong Soft Power. Hypothesi 6: People with more ducation are more likely to agre that South Korea has strong Soft Power. Income As mentioned above, occupation is asociated with social staus, and income is determined by one?s occupation. In addition, highly educated people are apt to earn higher incomes than people with les education (Grilches, 1970). It is possible to asume that income afects social staus, so this resarch uses income as an independent variable. Based on the asumption that people with higher social stauses are more likely to be satisfied with the presnt social system, this resarch hypothesized that people with higher incomes are more likely to perceiv strong Soft Power. Hypothesi 7: People with higher incomes are more likely to believ that South Korea has strong Soft Power. Cumlative and Indepndet Efects Six independent variables wer chosen by considering historical background, the mandatory miltary sstem of South Korea, and detrminants of social staus. Last concern is whetr each varibles xplain perceived Soft Power when control other varibles. The analysi wil prove which variable has an efect to explain Soft Power, and which one is not. Thus, the last hypothesi proposes that these independent varibles are useful to explain perceived Soft Power of South Korea s controlling other varibles. Hypothesi 8: Each independent variable useful to predict perceived Soft Power as control other variables. 28 I. Resarch Methods Sample and Data Collection This study uses data collectd in 2008 by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), which examined the relationships betwen the U.S. and Asian countries. CFR surveyed the five Asian countries which have the most important relationships with the U.S.: South Korea, China, Japan, Indonesia, nd Vietnam (se fig. 1). While the larger project included six countries, this study focused on the sample of South Korean citzens. Figure. 1. Map of East Asia 29 Figure 2. Provincial Map of South Korea Table 4 Classifcation of Region of South Korea Province and major cites Subunit of Province Si Gun Gu Metropolitan Areas Gyeonggido 28 3 20 Soul* Incheon Chungcheongdo Chunghegnamdo 8 7 2 conbuk 3 8 Daejon* Jeollado Jeolnamdo 5 17 Jlabuk 6 8 2 Gwngju* Gyeongsangdo yeongsanamdo 8 10 5 Gsnbuk 10 13 2 Daegu* Busn Ulsa* Gangwondo 7 1 Note: Si, Gun, and Gu are subunits of province and major city *Soul, Incheon, Dejon, Gwangju, Daegu, Busn, Ulsan are singular major cites, o do not have subunit(Si, Gun, and Gu) 30 Han-kook Resarch Company (HKRC) conducted the survey in South Korea. Face-to-face interviews conducted betwen January 22 and February 5, 2008, produced 1,029 response. The sample was selcted in a five-step proces by using a multi-stage quota smple based on the administrative districts of South Korea. First, he agency used data from fiften of the sixten administrative districts, excluding Je-ju Island. The fiten administrative districts include the following (se fig. 2): Seoul Metropolitan Area, Busan City, Daegu City, Incheon City, Gwangju City, Daejun City, Ulsan City, Gyeonggi Province, Gangwon Province, Chungbuk Province, Chungnam Province, Junbuk Province, Junnam Province, Gyeongbuk Province, and Gyeongnam Province. Je-ju Island acounts for only 1.1% the population of South Korea and is separated from the mainland. Thus, to increase the cost-efctivenes of the study, this ample xcluded Je-ju Island. The number of surveys conducted in each administrative district was based on its population size. Second, the fiten administrative divisions wer separted into smaler units: Si, Gun, or Gu. As third step, Si, Gun or Gu wer subdivided in smaler units, Eup, Myeun, or Dong, and samples wer randomly taken (Table 4). Fourth, particpants wer collectd using sample quotas represntative of the age and gender distribution of the whole nation based on the Korean Resident Registration Census on Dec. 31 in 2005. When compared with the results of the census, the samples? demographic characteristics deviated from the known demographic characteristics of South Korea. Therfore, case wer weighted to enhance rpresntativenes of the data. The results from weighted sampling, howevr, wer not appreciably difernt from those not weighted. In the fith step, the agency recruited interviewrs among ordinary Korean citzens 19 years of age or older to conduct the face-to-face interviews. 31 Resarchers used two types of questionnaires, and they randomly alocated one of two difernt questionnaire forms to each respondents. Questionnaire A had 512 particpants and Questionnaire B had 517 particpants. While the two questionnaires had some common questions, each form also had questions unique to that version. Each questionnaire has eighty- one questions. Nine questions ask demographic factors and forty-two questions are comon questions which are asked in both types of questionnaires. The A questionnaire had fiten questions that wer not on the B questionnaire, and the B questionnaire had fiten questions that wer not on the A questionnaire. The questions that wer included in only Questionnaire A wer mostly about diplomatic problems. Among fiten questions, eleven questions wer asociated with diplomatic problems. While most questions which wer in only Questionnaire B wer mostly about cultural problems, and nine questions asked cultural problem. As each questionnaire had difernt fiften questions, not al questions had an equal number of responses. Among twelv questions used in this resarch, six questions wer taken from the A questionnaire, and five from the B questionnaire. Just one question was included on both questionnaires. The Korean survey consisted of one-on-e interviews, and al particpants completd the interview. Thus, the sampling is represntative of the survey results. Also, the study used a cross-ectional method that imed at evaluating South Korean perceptions in a single point of time. 32 Measures Depndet Variables Out of the eighty-one questions in the CCFR study, the eighten which oncerned cultural, politcal, and diplomatic Soft Power wer used for this study. However, six of the eighten wer excluded due to failure to demonstrate the minium factor reliability test. The twelve questions used for this study included thre questions for cultural Soft Power, thre questions for politcal Soft Power, and six questions for diplomatic Soft Power. Respondents indicated the degre to which they agred with these questions on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating ?strongly disagre? and 10 indicating ?strongly agre.? The results for each type of Soft Power wer measured by adding the responses, with the sum indicating the amount of Soft Power perceived by the respondents. Cultral Soft Power First of al, perceived cultural Soft Power was measured using responses to thre questions. These wer ?South Korea posses advanced science and technology,? ?South Korea has an appealing popular culture,? and ?South Korea has a rich cultural heritage.? The alpha reliability of the thre questions was .769, reflcting sufficent internal consitency reliability. The sum of cultural Soft power ranges from seven to thirty. Politcal Soft Power Percived politcal Soft Power was measured by responses to thre questions. These wer ?South Korea hs a politcal system that serves the needs of its people,? ?South Korea provides many economic opportunities for its workforce,? and ?The government of South Korea 33 has been efective in promoting its polices to people in Asia.? Cronbach?s alpha was .793, indicating strong reliability. The sum of politcal Soft power anges from zero to thirty. Diplomatic Soft Power Lastly, perceivd diplomatic Soft Power was measured by six questions. These wer ?South Korea respects the sovereignty of other Asian countries,? ?South Korea uses diplomacy to resolve key problems in Asia,? ?South Korea helps other Asian countries develop their economies,? ?South Korea builds trust and cooperation among Asian countries,? ?South Korea provides asitance in the event of humanitarin crise in Asia,? and ?South Korea xercise leadership in international instiutions like the UN and the World Trade Organization.? Cronbach?s Alpha was .855 for diplomatic questions, showing strong reliabilty. The sum of diplomatic Soft power anges from six to sixty. Indepndet Variables Region refrs to the major politcal administrative divisions of the Korean nation. In the orignal study conducted by HKRC, the agency divided South Korea into fiften administrative districts and coded respondents? place of residence into fiten categories. However, this tudy combined neighboring administrative districts based on evidence that adjacent districts show similar politcal tendencies. Combining relatively similar clusters of adminstrative districts provides sufficent data for analysi. Thus, administrative districts wer reclasifed into five clusters: Metropolitan Area, Chungcheongdo, Jeollado, Gyeongsando, and Gangwondo. As adjcent regions, Seoul, Incheon, and Gyenggido Provinces wer combined as Metropolitan Area nd coded 1. Daejon, Chungcheongnamdo, and Chungcheongbukdo wer united as Chungcheongdo Province, and coded 2. Gwangju, Jeollanamdo, and Jeollabukdo wer combined as Jeollado Province, and coded 3. Daegu, Ulsan, Busan, Gyeongsanamdo, and 34 Gyeongsanbukdo wer combined as Gyeongsando Province, and coded 4. Gangwondo Province was coded 5. In addition, region varibles wer recoded using dummy variables for corelation and regresion analyse, because the variables wer collectd by nominal level. Gender was categorized as male or female. Male was coded as 1 and female as 2. Ocupation was clasifed into nine categories: agriculture, forestry, or fishery was 1, self- employed was 2, sales or service was 3, blue-collar was 4, white-collar was 5, housewife or homemaker was 6, student was 7, no occupation, retired or other was 8, and non-respondent was 9. Dummy variables wer creatd for correlation and regresion analysi. Level of education was measured by the acdemic level completd and was orted into seven categories: middle school graduate and under was 1, high school graduate was 2, colleg student was 3, two-year technical (profesional) colleg raduate was 4, four-year colleg graduate was 5, postgraduate degre was 6, and non-respondent was 7. Income was measured in terms of monthly income including al wages and pensions. Thus, the interviewr asked, ?What is the average monthly income of your household for 2005, including al wages, salries, pensions and other income?? and gave twelve options for the interviewe. Income categories wer in incremnts of 990,000 KRW (approximately 990 USD). Therefore, ls than 1,000,000 KRW (approximately 1,000 USD) was coded 1; 9,000,000-9,990,000 KRW was 9; 10,000,000 KR or more (over 10,000 USD) was 11, etc. Non-respondents wer coded 12 and these data wer treatd as mising. Analysis The results of the survey wer coded by SPS and analyzed using thre methods: one-way nalysi of varince (ANOVA), correlation, and regresion analysi. 35 First of al, ANOVA treats cultural, politcal and diplomatic Soft Power as dependent variables. Independent varibles wer region, gender, age, ocupation, income, and level of education. As a post-hoc test, the Bonferoni test, which used 0.05 alpha value, examined wher the mean difernces of groups came from when ANOVA test showed signifcant results. The Bonferoni test was pplied to the thre ANOVA analyse that used region, age, or income as an independent variable. Just one ANOVA used gender as an independent varible, and therefore the post-hoc test could not be used because the gender variable had only two levels. In addition, analysi of occupation and level of education included non-respondents, so these two analyse wer excluded from the post-hoc test. Thes anlyse wil provide an explanation of how South Koreans percive their Soft Power acording to demographic factors and social staus. Correlation analysi was used to examine relationships betwen dependent variables and independent variables. This analysi verifes that a variable is not related to other variables, causing multicollinearity due to being too closely related to other variables. Lastly, regresion analysi verifed whether the clusters of independent variables wer useful to predict perceivd Soft Power. This analysi was conducted thre times for each type of Soft Power. 36 IV. Results Variable Characteristics Table 5 Dscription of Dependent and Independent Variables, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 N Range Minimu Maximu Mean Std. Deviation 1. Region 1029 4 1 5 2.26 1.37 2. Gender 1029 1 1 2 1.50 .50 3. Categorical Age 1029 4 1 5 2.89 1.39 4. Scale Age 1029 67 19 86 43.20 14.67 5. Ocupation 1029 8 1 9 4.88 1.78 6. Education Level 1029 8 1 9 3.36 1.63 7. Average Income 1012 10 1 1 4.07 2.07 8.CulturalSoftPower 512 23 7 30 23.26 4.01 9.PolitcalSoftPer 508 30 0 30 16.72 4.76 10.DiplomaticSoftPower 500 54 6 60 37.77 8.76 Table 5 shows descriptive staistics for the seven independent variables and thre dependent variables. Regional identifcation was used as an independent varible and was clasifed into five categories. The initial region data was divided into 15 categories, but the dat was recategorized by combining adjcent regions, creating five nw categories: Metropolitan Area, Chungcheongdo, Jeollado, Gyeongsando, and Gangwondo. The distribution of respondents by region was follows: Metropolitan Area, 48.6% (500); Chungcheongdo, 10.3% (106); Jeollado, 11.3% (116); Gyeongsando, 26.7% (275); and Gangwondo, 3.1% (32). Nearly half of the respondents resided in Metropolitan Area, represnting the highest percentage for a single rgion. The smalest percentage of respondents resided in Gangwondo. 37 The second independent variable was gender. Females acounted for 50.4%, or 519, of al respondents, while male rspondents numbered 510 (49.6%). Age distribution was evenly distributed also. Age included these five groups: 19-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 or over. The number of particpants acording to age roup was follows: 19-29, 20.5% (211); 30-39, 22.9% (236); 40-49, 22.4% (230); 50-59, 15.9% (164); and 60 or over, 18.3% (188). While ach group was fairly similar in size, the 30-39 age roup was the largest and the 50-59 age roup was the smalest. In contrast, he categories for occupation, educational level, and income wer not evenly distributed. The occupation distribution of respondents was a follows: agriculture, forestry, or fishery, 1.7% (17); self-employed, 12.7% (131); sales or service, 10.5% (108); blue-collar, 6.5% (67); white-collar, 33.4% (344); housewife/homeaker, 17.9% (184); student, 9.4% (97); no occupation/retired/others, 7.7% (79) and non-respondents 2% (2). White-collar workers wer the largest category. Also, educational level was concentrated into two main groups, high school graduates and colleg raduates. Specifcaly, middle school graduates and under epresnted 13.6% (140); high school graduates, 29% (298); colleg students, 9.4% (97); two-year technical (profesional) colleg raduates, 11.6% (119); four-year colleg raduates, 29.4% (303); post graduates, 6.9% (71); and non-respondents, 1% (1). In total, 58.04% of respondents wer either high school or colleg raduates, represnting the largest part of the educational level distribution. Monthly income was divided into 11 categories: Les than 1,000,000 KRW, 7.5% (77); 1,000,000-1,999,000 KRW, 14.2% (146); 2,000,000-2,990,000 KRW, 19.8% (204); 3,000,000-3,990,000 KRW, 22.5% (232); 4,000,000-4,990,000 KRW, 16% (165); 5,000,000-5,990,000 38 KRW, 8.7% (90); 6,000,000-6,990,000 KRW 3.3% (34); 7,000,000-7,990,000 KRW 1.8% (19); 8,000,000-8,990,000 KRW, 1.4% (14); 9,000,000-9,990,000 KRW, 1.0% (10) and 10,000,00 KRW or more, 2.0% (21). Respondents who earned 3,000,000-3,990,000 KRW wer the largest group. Hypothesi Testing Region A one-way nalysi of varince (ANOVA) was used to determine whether perceptions of Soft Power diferd by region. To get a more distinctive difernce, this analysi combined adjcent regions that have similar cultural and politcal tendencies into five clusters. Using the five regions as independent variables, ANOVA was used to compare mean values of perceived Soft Power betwen the five regions. Table 6 shows standard deviation, degre of fredom, and F-values of perceived Soft Power by region. Overal, perceivd cultural and politcal Soft Power did not significantly difer by region, but perceived diplomatic Soft Power was significantly difernt. Table 6 ANOVA of Soft Power by Region, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 Region F-ratio df Soft Power Metropolitan Chung cheongdo Jeollado Gyeong sando Gang wondo Cultral Men (S.D) 21.35 (4.41) 22.37 (3.90) 21.22 (4.36) 21.85 (4.08) 19.80 (5.10) 1.48 4 Politcal Men (S.D) 16.38 (4.99) 17.00 (4.81) 16.76 (3.76) 17.38 (4.47) 15.44 (6.25) 1.32 4 Diplomatic Men (S.D) 36.47 (8.50) 40.79 (9.81) 40.47 (9.65) 38.03 (8.12) 35.44 (6.31) 4.69** 4 ** p=0.001 levl * p=0.05 levl, N=1029 39 The result of ANOVA for perceived diplomatic Soft Power showed significant difernces. The smalest mean value was Gangwondo, and the largest value was Jeollado. The F-value of perceived diplomatic Soft Power as 4.69, and it diferd significantly b region [F(4,1028)=4.69, p=.001]. During the follow-up procedure, the ANOVA of regions was staisticaly significant. The Bonferoni test with conventional p<.05 level indicated that the mean of Metropolitan Area was significantly lower than the means of Jeonllado and Chungchungdo in diplomatic Soft Power. That is, inhabitants of Jeonllado and Chungchungdo wer significantly more likely to believ that South Korea hs strong diplomatic Soft Power than wer the people of Metropolitan Area. Gender Table 7 ANOVA of Soft Power by Gender, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey,2008 Gender F-ratio df Soft Power Male Female Cultral Men (S.D) 21.17 (4.52) 21.90 (4.03) 3.61 1 Politcal Men (S.D) 16.88 (4.71) 16.56 (4.81) .59 1 Diplomatic Men (S.D) 38.25 (9.16) 37.29 (8.32) 1.50 1 ** p=0.001 levl * p=0.05 levl,N=1029 The Second ANOVA examined the hypothesi that males and females perceive Soft Power diferntly as a result of mandatory miltary service for males. Gender was used as an independent variable and the thre types of Soft Power wer used for dependent variables. However, the results of ANOVA showed that gender did not significantly afect perception of any of the thre types of Soft Power. The rsults indicate that gender was not a significant 40 variable for perceived Soft Power. Age Another ANOVA examined whetr ther was difernce in perceived Soft Power by age roup. Five age roups wer used as independent variables, and the thre types of Soft Power wer dependent varibles. Table 8 shows mean value, standard deviation, and F-value of perceivd Soft Power by age. Overal, perceptions of politcal and diplomatic Soft Power er significantly difernt by age, but cultural Soft Power was not. Table 8 ANOVA of Soft Power by Age, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 Region F-ratio df Soft Power 19-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 Over 60 Cultral Men (S.D) 21.46 (4.41) 21.16 (4.23) 21.51 (4.50) 22.44 (3.58) 21.28 (4.56) 1.2 4 Politcal Men (S.D) 16.02 (4.59) 15.76 (4.36) 15.64 (5.46) 18.57 (3.88) 18.62 (4.21) 10.53** 4 Diplomatic Men (S.D) 35.96 (8.29) 35.59 (9.54) 36.88 (8.98) 41.44 (7.43) 40.85 (7.12) 9.95** 4 ** p=0.001 levl * p=0.05 levl, N=1029 Percptions of politcal Soft Power showed significant difernces. People in the 60 and over group showed the highest mean perceived politcal Soft Power, and people in their 40s showed the lowest mean. F-value was lso large enough to be significant [F(4,1028)=10.53, p<.001]. Post hoc comparison using the Bonferoni test indicated that the mean of the 60 and over group was significantly difernt from al other groups except the 50s group. The 50s group also significantly diferd from al other groups except for the 60s group. Thus, this result shows that age is a meaningful factor to explain perceivd politcal Soft Power. The f-value of 41 perceivd diplomatic Soft Power was smaler than for politcal Soft Power, but it was significant, [Mean50s=41.44 versus Mean30s=35.59, [F(4,1028)=9.95, p<.001]. Furthermore, the Bonferoni post hoc criterion for significance indicated that he 50s group (M = 18.57, SD = 3.88) and the 60 and over group (M=18.62, SD=4.21) showed signifcantly higher mean values than other age groups in politcal Soft Power. Along with politcal Soft Power, the 50s group and the 60 and over group displayed higher means in diplomatic Soft Power. The above rsults indicate that perceivd politcal and diplomatic Soft Power is significantly difernt by age. Although F-value of percived cultural Soft Power was not significant, it is meaningful that the means of each question which asked about cultural Soft Power wer larger than those of questions which asked about politcal and diplomatic Soft Power. The mean of thre cultural questions was 7.76 out of ten. The mean of politcal questions was 5.73, and the mean of diplomatic questions was 6.30. These rsults indicate that South Koreans perceiv their cultural Soft Power to be higher than politcal and diplomatic Soft Power. Ocupation When eight occupation clusters wer used as independent variables, ANOVA confirmed the hypothesi that people who have difernt occupation have difernt perceptions of Soft Power. Across the board, means of occupation groups wer significantly difernt for perceivd cultural and politcal Soft Power. Howevr, diplomatic Soft Power as not significantly difernt by ocupational cluster. Students rated cultural Soft Power lowest and people employed in sales or service rated it highest. F-value of perceived cultural Soft Power by occupation group was significant [F(7,1028)=2.02, p<.04]. Percived politcal Soft Power was also significant by ocupational clusters. The student group had the lowest mean nd the blue-collar group had the highest mean, and F-value was significant [F(7,1028)=1.97, p<.05]. On the 42 other hand, there was no significant difernce in perceivd diplomatic Soft Power by ocupation. F-value was not reach significant value .05 [F(7,1028)=1.44, p=.18]. These data indicate that occupation afects perception of cultural and politcal Soft Power. Level of Education A fifth ANOVA was used to examine the hypothesi that people?s level of education afects their perception of Soft Power. Acordingly, six educational levels wer used as independent variables. Table 10 shows mean values, standard deviations, degres of fredom, and f-values of Soft Power by level of education. Overal, the results of ANOVA wer not Table 9 ANOVA of Soft Power by Ocupation, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 Ocupation Cultral Soft Powr Mean (S.D) Politcal Soft Powr Mean (S.D) Diplomatic Soft Power Mean (S.D) Agriculture/forestry/ Fishery 21.46 (4.61) 17.85 (4.36) 38.00 (10.) Self-employed 21.38 (4.14) 17.12 (4.80) 38.67 (8.50) Sales/ervice 23.15 (4.49) 18.10 (5.05) 38.16 (9.56) Blue-collar 22.32 (4.10) 18.23 (4.99) 39.14 (7.62) White-collar 21.43 (4.26) 16.26 (4.63) 36.66 (8.75) Housewife/ om makr 21.97 (3.85) 16.61 (4.87) 39.63 (8.93) Student 20.15 (4.20) 15.31 (4.40) 36.24 (8.74) No cupation/ Retired/others 20.75 (5.06) 17.03 (4.54) 37.33 (7.89) F-ratio 2.02* 1.97* 1.4 df 7 7 7 ** p=0.001 levl * p=0.05 levl, N=1029 43 significant for perceived cultural Soft Power, but politcal and diplomatic Soft Power showed significant difernce by level of education. Politcal Soft Power was significantly difernt by group. People who completd postgraduate dgres rated politcal Soft Power lowest, and people who wer middle school graduates or lower ated it highest. The result of ANOVA was also significant [F(5,1028)=4.19, p<.001]. Although perceptions of politcal Soft Power and diplomatic Soft Power wer similar, diplomatic Soft Power showed the most significant difernces. In comon with percived politcal Soft Power, the lowest ratings wer from people with post-graduate degres, and the highest wer from people who wer middle school graduates or lower. The higher the educational level showed the lower the perception of diplomatic Soft Power. Thus, the results of ANOVA verifed that level of education is an indicator of perceived politcal and diplomatic Soft Power. Table 10 ANOVA of Soft Power by Educational Levl, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 Education Cultural Soft Power Mean (S.D) Politcal Soft Power Mean (S.D) Diplomatic Soft Power Mean (S.D) Middle school graduat and under 21.36 (4.47) 18.29 (4.51) 40.82 (6.73) High school graduate 22.36 (4.05) 17.63 (4.18) 39.75 (8.64) Colleg student 20.59 (4.58) 15.43 (4.99) 36.05 (9.55) Two-year technical (profsional) colleg raduate 20.68 (4.09) 16.09 (4.18) 36.30 (8.86) Four-year Colleg graduat 21.46 (4.39) 16.19 (4.84) 36.41 (8.78) Postgraduate 21.40 (4.20) 15.08 (6.21) 35.67 (8.61) F-ratio 1.85 4.19** 4.91** 44 df 5 5 5 ** p=0.001 levl * p=0.05 levl, N=1029 Income Table 1 ANOVA of Soft Power by Income, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 Income (KRW 1,000) Cultural Soft Power Mean (S.D) Politcal Soft Power Mean (S.D) Diplomatic Soft Power Mean (S.D) Les than 1,000 19.49 (5.11) 17.15 (4.36) 42.15 (8.29) 1,000 - 1,990 21.93 (4.04) 16.95 (4.34) 36.53 (8.31) 2,000 -2,990 21.27 (4.21) 16.61 (4.44) 36.09 (9.05) 3,000 - 3,990 21.36 (4.19) 16.78 (4.77) 37.13 (8.54) 4,000 - 4,990 22.11 (4.32) 16.18 (5.43) 39.91 (8.57) 5,000 - 5,990 22.00 (3.58) 17.12 (4.10) 36.46 (8.43) 6,000 - 6,990 21.86 (4.66) 17.64 (5.84) 37.32 (7.28) 7,000 - 7,990 20.18 (4.29) 14.55 (6.51) 36.13 (6.24) 8,000 - 8,990 23.33 (3.45) 15.17 (2.86) 36.63 (8.96) 9,000 - 9,990 24.80 (5.72) 20.20 (4.44) 44.00 (12.98) 10,000 or more 21.90 (4.86) 17.30 (5.89) 35.64 (6.22) F-ratio 1.07 .82 2.48* 45 df 10 10 10 ** p=0.001 levl * p=0.05 levl, N=1029 Lastly, was used to examine the hypothesi that people with difernt income lvels have difernt percptions of the Soft Power of South Korea. Income lvel was clasifed in thousands of KRW, where 1,000 KRW was pproximately equal to one U.S. dollar (USD). Across the board, the results of ANOVA indicated that percived cultural and politcal Soft Power was not significantly difernt by income. Howevr, F-value of diplomatic Soft Power was significantly difernt. The 9,000-9,990 group evaluated al thre types of Soft Power generously, and the group showed the highest mean value. F-values of cultural and politcal Soft Power wer not significant; only diplomatic Soft Power as significantly difernt by income [Fpolitcal(10,1028)=2.48, p=.01]. In addition, Bonferoni test showed that he mean of the 1,000,000 or les group was significantly difernt from the 2,000,000-2,990,000 group. The 1,000,000 or les group showed mean difernces with thre other groups, 1,000,00-1,990,000 KRW, 3,000,000-3,990,000 KRW, and 5,000,000-5,990,000 KRW. Thes difernces approached staistical significance, but did not reach the conventional p<.05 level. To sum it up, income is a significant factor of perceivd diplomatic Soft Power. Cumlative and Indepndet Efects Multiple rgresion analyse wer conducted to examine whetr the cluster of independent variables was useful to explain perceived Soft Power. Table 12 summarizes the result of regresion analysi. Overal, the result of multiple rgresion showed that the cluster of independent variables was useful to explain perceptions of the thre types of Soft Power. The first multiple rgresion model showed that he cluster of independent variables was a 46 meaningful predictor of cultural Soft Power, R? = .08, F(14, 489) = 2.89, p < .001. As can be sen in Table 12, analysi with age had significant negative regresion weights, indicating that young people wer more likely to agre that cultural Soft Power was weak. The analysi with level of education had significantly negative regresion weights, meanig that people who had higher educational evels wer more likely to agre that South Korea has trong cultural Soft Power. Table 12 OLS Regresion of Soft Power, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 Cultral Soft Power Politcal Soft Power Diplomatic Soft Power B b s.e t-value B b s.e t-value B b s.e t-value (Constant) 22.46 1.85 12.15 12.23 2.16 5.67 33.93 4.04 8.39 Metropolitan Ara 1.49 .19 1.08 1.38 1.51 .16 1.23 1.23 1.21 .07 2.14 .57 Chungcheongdo 3.09 .23* 1.18 2.62 1.90 .12 1.34 1.41 5.69 .20* 2.39 2.38 Jeollado 1.09 .09 1.15 .95 1.56 .11 1.31 1.20 5.37 .20* 2.36 2.28 Gyeongsando 2.30 .26* 1.10 2.10 2.16 .20 1.25 1.73 2.67 .14 2.20 1.2 ender .64 .08 .40 1.57 -.19 -.02 .48 -.40 -2.17 -.13* .87 -2.49 Age -.04 -.16* .02 -2.29 .08 .24* .02 3.60 .11 .18* .04 2.84 griculture/Forestry/ Fishery -.22 -.01 1.35 -.16 .05 .00 1.59 .03 -2.74 -.03 4.42 -.62 Self/managemnt -.26 -.02 .79 -.33 .05 .00 .96 .05 .42 .02 1.79 .23 Sales/Service .33 .02 .90 .36 2.21 .14 1.07 2.07 2.02 .07 1.86 1.09 Blue-collar .97 .06 .97 1.0 1.07 .06 1.16 .93 .13 .00 2.04 .07 White-collar .19 .02 .79 .24 1.23 .12 .95 1.30 1.47 .08 1.73 .85 Housewife .03 .00 .79 .04 -.05 -.00 .96 -.05 3.40 .15 1.78 1.91 Student -1.95 -.16 1.01 -1.93 1.05 .07 1.20 .87 1.21 .04 2.32 .52 Education -.33 -.13* .15 -2.30 -.42 -.14* .17 -2.49 -.85 -.16* .31 -2.74 Income .27 .14* .09 2.93 .10 .04 .11 .88 .32 .08 .20 1.61 R2 .08 .10 .12 Adjusted R2 .05 .07 .09 F-ratio 2.89** 3.39** 4.24** 47 ** p=0.001 levl * p= 0.05 levl, N=1029 In addition, regresion using income as an independent variable showed significantly positve regresion weights, indicating that people who had higher income lvels rated cultural Soft Power higher. The inhabitants of Chungchungdo and Gangwondo showed significantly difernt evaluations of cultural Soft Power than did other regions. The gender and occupation variables did not contribute to the multiple rgresion model of cultural Soft Power. Secondly, the multiple rgresion model of politcal Soft Power with al predictors produced R? = .10, F(14, 485) = 3.39, p < .001 The analysi using ae as an independent variable had signifcant positve regresion weights, indicating that after controlling for other variables in the model, older people wer more likely to agre that politcal Soft Power of South Korea is strong. The analysi with level of education displayed significantly negative regresion weights, meaning that people with higher educational levels wer more likely to percive politcal Soft Power as low. Regresion analysi with income showed significantly positve regresion weights, indicating that people who had higer income lvels rated cultural Soft Power high. Region, gender, occupation, and income did not contribute to the multiple rgresion model of cultural Soft Power. The multiple rgresion model of diplomatic Soft Power with 15 variables produced R? = .12, F(14, 476) = 4.24, p<.001. The analysi using ender showed negative regresion weights, meaning that females wer more likely to agre that diplomatic Soft Power was weak. Howevr, diplomatic Soft Power had significant positve regresion weights by age varible, indicating that after controlling for other variables in the model, older people wer more likely to agre that South Korea had high diplomatic Soft Power. Analysi with level of education displayed significantly negative regresion weights, meaning that people with higher educational levels 48 perceivd that South Korea had low diplomatic Soft Power. Analysi with region showed that inhabitants of Chungcheongdo and Jeollado showed difernt perceptions of diplomatic Soft Power. Inhabitants of Chungcheongdo wer more consentient that diplomatic Soft Power was strong, but inhabitants of Jeollado wer revrse. The ocupation and income varibles did not contribute to the multiple rgresion model of diplomatic Soft Power. 49 V. Conclusions Sumary The purpose of this study was to verify how difernt demographic groups and social clases perceive the Soft Power of South Korea diferntly, and to find implications for enhancing Soft Power. Although there have ben many previous studies of Soft Power, the previous studies focused on external evaluation, that is, how other countries evaluate the Soft Power of South Korea. However, this study dealt with Soft Power in a difernt way b analyzing how South Koreans evaluate their own Soft Power. Acording to the results of analyse, percived Soft Power can be meaningfully explained by the cluster of demographic factors and determinants of social staus that wer used as independent variables. In detail, 1) thre independent variables, age, occupation, and level of education, afectd South Koreans? perception of politcal Soft Power, 2) four variables, region, age, lvel of education, and income, influenced percption of diplomatic Soft Power, and 3) ocupation was the only factor which afectd cultural Soft Power. Implications One especialy significant finding was that percived politcal and diplomatic Soft Power was distinctively difernt by age roup. Younger South Koreans rated politcal and diplomatic Soft Power low. This findig may be due to the fact that age roups within Korea hve significantly difernt levls of education. Acording to the report of educational atainment by the National Staistical Ofice, among mebers of the Organization for Economy Cooperation and Development (OECD), South Korea hs the largest disparity of educational level among genrations. People under 40, who wer born after the mid-70s, have amuch higher average educational level than people over 50 ("The World Factbook," 2013). Therfore, the findings of 50 this study suggest that the wel-educated younger genration tended to suspect he politcal and diplomatic legitmacy of South Korea. The presnt government has not gained people?s trust, especialy among people in their 30s and 40s who are the main agents of economic ativity ("The World Factbook," 2013). This tendency is likely to continue as time pases because younger genrations wil distrust the government?s polices and diplomacy. One reason that people do not admit he legitmacy of politcs may be the unhealthy link betwen politcs and the economy. Distrust of the politcal justifcation of South Korea is raised consistently at home and abroad. Weak politcal Soft Power not only disturbs economic development, but also damages the national brand. Acording to the report of the World Economic Forum (WEF), among 148 countries surveyed, South Korea rnked low in public trust in politcians (112th), transparency of government policymaking (137th), and protection of minority shareholders' interst (124 th) (Schwab & Sal-iMart?n, 2013). Unhealthy links betwen politcs and the economy creat asocial structure which is advantageous for the wealthy. The structure lads to an abnormal economic structure, conglomerate. Considering people?s distrust of the government, the government needs polices that break the chain of collusive ties betwen politcians and businespeople. Improving politcal transparency wil be a starting point for enhancig politcal Soft Power. Another reason for people?s distrust of the government is connected with diplomatic polices. South Korea?s Ofical Development Asitance (ODA) is 0.12 percnt of gross national income. Among members of the OECD, it ranked 22nd in 2011. Although this rankig moved up one lvel from 2009, the rank is second to last ("The World Factbook," 2013). In addition, while the South Korean miltary has particpated in Peace Keping Operations (PKO) since 1993, it is limited to dispatching nonbatle branches to restricted ares (Defnse, 2012). 51 This pasive atitude towards ODA and PKO negatively afects evaluation of diplomatic Soft Power not only b foreign countries but also by South Korean citzens. Thes facts imply that South Korea ought to formulate more active diplomatic polices to increase foreign aid and overseas dispatch of armed forces. Such polices wil enhance South Korea?s positon in the international world and improve other nations? atitudes towards South Korea. In addition, it is meaningful that the mean value of perceive cultural Soft Power was larger than for the other types of Soft Power. South Koreans commonly agre that South Korea has compartively stronger cultural Soft Power than politcal and diplomatic Soft Power. However, as mentioned above, the eforts to enhance Soft Power of South Korea lean towards popular culture. The government should extend eforts to enhance cultural Soft Power in diverse fields. Some possible ways to improve cultural Soft Power might include establishing Korean language instiutions and giving traditional Korean performances in foreign countries. Nevertheles, eforts to enhance Soft Power should be balanced with development of Hard Power. It is inevitable for South Korea to be concerned with Hard Power, especialy miltary power, because South Korea has continued miltary confrontations with North Korea. But if this country concentrates too heavily on Hard Power, it wil creat an air of anxiety for surrounding countries who have conflictive relationships with South Korea. On the other hand, South Korea wil lose deternt force if the country just focuses on enhancig Soft Power. Therefore, the theory of Smart Power, which stress balance betwen Soft Power and Hard Power, is important for the policy making of South Korea. Smart Power faciltaes reducing the budget for miltary power through alternatives such as aliances and international instiutions. Limitations This resarch was based on Joseph Nye?s clasifcation of thre types of Soft Power: 52 cultural, politcal, nd diplomatic. However, some say that his clasifcation is ambiguous and sugest a new clasifcation based on sources of power. This resarch is limited because it did not specify which fields of Soft Power wer measured. Thus, alternate clasifcation is need to measure Soft Power. For instance, Monocle?s measuremnt used five categories of culture, diplomacy, education, busines/innovation, and government. Including segmentalized categories may lead to a more complet explanation of Soft Power. In addition, this data was collectd in 2008, six years ago. During this period, South Korea ndured many social changes. The first female president was elcted in 2012, and South Korea hosted the Yeosu Expo in 2012 and the Group of 20 (G20) in 2010. The sinking of Sewol fery in 2014, which caused many casualties, shocked the entire nation, and raised questions about South Koreans? ignorance of safety procedures. These social events are likely to have afectd the percived Soft Power of South Korea. Therefore, additional resarch is needed to analyze South Koreans? presnt perceptions of Soft Power. Furthermore, most of the independent variables used in this study did not have a significant efct on perceived cultural Soft Power. Only the ocupational cluster had any significant efct. Thus, this result found meaningful implications for improving politcal and diplomatic Soft Power, but not cultural Soft Power. In addition, the result of regresion shows that the selcted independent variables have only a limited ability to predict perceptions of Soft Power. The cluster of independent variables explained eight percent of percptions of cultural Soft Power, ten percnt of perceptions of politcal Soft Power, and twelve percnt of perceptions of diplomatic Soft Power. Even though the result of regresion was significant, a large proportion of perceptions of Soft Power wer not predicted by the independent variables. Further esarch is neded to identify independent variables which an more succesfully predict 53 perception of Soft Power. 54 Table 13 Corrlation of Matrix of Study, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 1.Cultral Soft Power - 2.Politcal Soft Power .37 - 3.Diplomatic Soft Poer a a - 4.Metroplitan -.07 -.07 -.14* - 5.Chungcheongdo .1* .02 .12* -.3* - 6.Jeolado -.06 .0 .1* -.35* -.12* - 7.Gyeongsando .08 .08 .02 -.59* -.21* -.2* - 8.Gender .08 -.03 -.06 .0 .0 .01 -.0 - 9.Age -.05 .2* .24* -.03 -.01 .01 .03 .02 - 10.gricultre/Forestry/Fishery -.01 .04 .0 -.13* -.02 .20* -.01 -.02 .12* - 1.Self/mangemnt -.04 .03 .04 .0 -.02 .0 .01 -.08* .23* -.05 - 12.Sales/Service .07 .10* .02 -.02 .04 -.05 .03 -.07* -.05 -.04 -.13* - 13.Blue-colar .02 .08 .04 -.1* .04 .01 .06* -.19* .18* -.03 -.10* -.09* - 14.White-colar .05 -.07 -.10* .03 -.03 .03 -.03 -.12* -.32* -.09* -.27* -.24* -.19* - 15.Housewife .04 -.01 .10* .04 .02 -.05 -.01 .46* .24* -.06 -.18* -.16* -.12* -.3* - 16.Student -.10* -.1* -.05 -.03 .03 .03 -.02 -.03 -.46* -.04 -.12* -.1* -.09* -.23* -.15* - 17.Education .0 -.18* -.20* .08* .01 .0 -.07* -.16* -.49* -.1* -.17* -.04 -.19* .50* -.18* -.02 - 18.Income .12* -.01 -.02 .14* -.05 -.06* -.06* -.05 -.17* -.05 -.03 .03 -.10* .27* -.09* -.07* .35* ** Corelation is significant at the 0.01 levl (2-tailed) and * Correlation is ignifcant at the 0.05 levl (2-tailed), N=1029 Nte: Qustis asking diplomatic Soft Power ar difrent with cultral and polital questions, o correlation btwen diplomatic Soft power with cultural and politcal Soft Power is not computed. 55 Refrences Albert, Henry, & Mota, Rogerio (Producer). 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