

**South Korean Perceptions of Soft Power:  
How the Hanguk-in See Themselves in the World**

by

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## Abstract

Soft Power is an important way for countries to wield national power in the international world, especially for mid and small size countries like South Korea. This study focuses on self-evaluation and how this evaluation is affected by demographics and social status. Also, in order to avoid focusing solely on popular culture, this research used Nye's classification of three types of Soft Power: culture, politics, and diplomacy.

To sum up the results, South Koreans are more consentient that South Korea has strong political and diplomatic Soft Power when they are older or have a lower educational level. The results also imply that the government ought to make policies that can increase people's trust in it and enhance South Korea's Soft Power. Possible solutions might include policies to break the chain of collusive ties between politicians and businessmen, and policies to take aggressive action for foreign aid and overseas dispatches.

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## I. Introduction

### Soft Power

Max Weber defined power as “the chance that an individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own will even against the resistance of others” (Weber, 1957). As Weber said, power gives a nation leverage to achieve its goals, so nations attempt to maximize their power in order to influence other countries. The source for obtaining power is a question of perennial concern. While the sources of power are constantly evolving and changing, a nation’s economic strength has been a constant source of power, and military strength became a significant source of power after World War I. Moreover, these two sources stimulate and compensate for each other to enhance power. Hence, before the 21<sup>st</sup> century, nations mostly focused on military and economic power, known as Hard Power, and used the power to coerce relatively weak countries (Cho, 2003). However, the trend changed in the 21<sup>st</sup> century with the appearance of the concept of Soft Power.

In 1990, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of Soft Power in the book *Soft Power*, emphasizing the importance of nonmilitary influence in international relations. He defined Soft Power as the ability to make others want what you want. In contrast to the coercive nature of Hard Power, Soft Power includes cultural, political and diplomatic sources (Nye, 2004) It is obvious that the concept becomes a major issue of international politics. The changing circumstances of society have accelerated the importance of the concept.

In current times, nations hardly ever enforce their demands on weak nations through the relative strength of Hard Power, because using Hard Power requires much effort to facilitate change. An example that depended on Hard Power was the Iraq War. The U.S. invaded Iraq as a punitive measure after 9/11, despite international opposition. The war lasted from 2003 to



2011, and insurgency is ongoing. The U.S. spent \$1.9 trillion for this war, and the war caused many casualties in U.S. forces: 4,487 dead; eight missing or captured; 32,226 wounded; and 47,541 injured, diseased, or with other medical problems ("Iraq War," 2014). The U.S. has paid heavily for the war by relying on Hard Power.

On the other hand, Soft Power can create much more leverage with less effort, because nations will follow another country's culture and policies when it demonstrates strong Soft Power. Representative examples are the European Union (EU) and the cultural embassy of the United States. The EU is a political and economic alliance of 28 European countries. Although European countries are militarily inferior to the United States, they have held the U.S. in check since the organization of the European Union in 1994 (Ferguson, 2003). Anthony King, who wrote *Towards a Europe Military Culture?*, argued the EU is a global security actor in post-cold war (King, 2006). The case of the EU demonstrates how Soft Power compensates for inferior Hard Power.

Another example is the cultural embassy of the United States (Schneider, 2003). From 1950 to 1954, the U.S. dispatched the cultural embassy, made up of actors, musician, artists, writers, and dancers, to 89 countries. The cultural embassy was intended to show the values of a democratic society in contradistinction to a totalitarian system. Through cultural embassy activities, the U.S. interacted with people from countries having ideals opposed to those of the United States and demonstrated American values. Although Russia criticized the activity as a clever propaganda scheme, the U.S. continued it for four years. J. William Fulbright, an American scholar who studied cultural diplomacy, admitted that it was a type of propaganda scheme, but argued that these activities were the only way to break the Iron Curtain (Fulbright, 1951).

As shown by these cases, nations have gradually come to recognize the importance of Soft Power, and understand how Soft Power wields its influence in international relationships, and Soft Power has emerged as an alternative to Hard Power. Therefore, the changing circumstances of current society lend weight to Soft Power, and the concept of Soft Power has become a critical subject in political sociology.

### **Movements to Improve Soft Power**

When Joseph Nye initiated the theory of Soft Power, he essentially aimed to explain U.S. power. Thus, his work concentrated on the U.S. (Gomichon, 2013). The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, led to a turning point in the theory. The September 11 attack was committed by the Islamic terrorist group, Al-Qaeda. They attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with hijacked airplanes, resulting in the deaths of 2,996 people. Victims of the terror were mostly civilians, and the terror raised public resentment of American civilians. Thus, 9/11 had a great effect on the foreign policy of the United States ("September 11 attacks," 2014).

Conservatives and liberals within the U.S. government had distinct alternative views of foreign policy after 9/11. Conservatives who supported the militarism of the Bush administration argued for more vigorous military action against terrorism and totally rejected Nye's concept of Soft Power. They believed that Soft Power was meaningless for a country without military rivals.

Meanwhile, some liberals argued that the unparalleled strength of the U.S. was a reason for the tragic terrorist attacks. They assumed that because the U.S. held an unrivaled status in the world, nations in conflict with the U.S. were in fear and such countries were more likely to

commit a terrorist act. They held sceptical attitudes toward the militarism of the Bush administration and emphasized the necessity of Soft Power (Bohorquez, 2005).

With such disputes about Hard Power and Soft Power, the concept of Smart Power was proposed as an alternative for foreign policy. Smart Power suggests equilibrium between Hard and Soft Power. Scholars who support Smart Power argue that the U.S. ought to use alternative tools to achieve its goals instead of relying solely on its military strength. Alternatives might be alliances, international institutions, legitimate diplomacy, and the power of ideals. They argue that a foreign policy that focuses on Smart Power would be less prone to war (Nossel, 2004).

Even though some cast doubt upon the effectiveness of Soft Power, it is obvious that Soft Power is an important issue in current international relations. All countries of the world have tried various attempts to enhance their Soft Power.

U.S. obviously has both very strong Hard Power and very strong Soft Power, but its Soft Power has shown a downward tendency in recent years. When Joseph Nye introduced the concept of Soft Power, he asserted that the U.S. had not only the strongest Hard Power in the world, but also the most Soft Power. He regarded the source of American Soft Power as cultural popularity and the image of the nation as a land of opportunity for migrants (Bohorquez, 2005). However, the strength of American Soft Power has declined, and many U.S. disputes reflect the problem of equilibrium between Soft Power and Hard Power (Nye, 2011). The Soft Power survey by *Monocle* verifies the fact.

*Monocle* is a magazine that has collaborated with the Institute for Government (IfG) to rank the Soft Power of 26 countries annually since 2010. The survey evaluates the Soft Power through a panel score and statistical metrics that include five indices (culture, diplomacy, education, business/innovation, and government). In the 2013 survey, the U.S. was ranked third

in 2013, behind Germany and England. The U.S. has dropped one step since 2012, when it was ranked second.

In the *Monocle*'s survey, Germany was ranked first and England was second in 2013. *Monocle* regarded Germany's political history and effective diplomacy as a source of its Soft Power. The root of England's Soft Power was considered to be its strong and widespread diplomatic relations with many nations (Albert & Mota, 2013). Although China was not ranked in the Top 10, its movement to enhance Soft Power is outstanding. China has been described as a super power that will replace the U.S., and the country has tried to reinforce Soft Power as much as its economic growth. As part of an effort to improve Soft Power, China hosted the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and will hold the Shanghai EXPO in 2014 (Fan, 2008). Besides, China has led the civilization of surrounding countries since the fifteenth century, so China has kept the status as Asia's traditional center power. Therefore, China's status and latent cultural power are significant sources of its Soft Power.

Meanwhile, small countries such as Switzerland make a good fight by keeping a neutral position in international society. Although Switzerland ranks 128<sup>th</sup> in area (41,210 sq km), and 98<sup>th</sup> in population (8,112,200 in 2013) (CIA, 2013), its Soft Power was ranked 8<sup>th</sup> in *Monocle*'s Soft Power ranking ("The World Factbook," 2013). Furthermore, Canada and the Netherlands are representative countries that wield larger political clout than their military and economic weight would indicate because of their economic aid or peacekeeping activities (Nye, 2002).

### **South Korea's Efforts to Enhance Soft Power**

As shown by these examples, international communities have made common efforts to improve Soft Power. In addition, Soft Power is the largest source of international power for small and mid-sized countries like South Korea. As Nye outlined in *Soft Power and the Korean*

*Wave*, it is hard for small and mid-sized countries to become super powers, but it is possible to wield outsized influence through Soft Power as Switzerland and the Netherlands have done (Nye & Kim, 2013). This fact is important for South Korea because of its size of territory and population. In 2013, South Korea ranked 109<sup>th</sup> in area (99,720 sq kilometer, CIA 2013) and 27<sup>th</sup> in population (49 million) in the world (CIA 2013). Thus, improving Soft Power is especially significant for this country to wield influence.

Nonetheless, South Korea could not focus on improving Soft Power for decades because of the state of the country. Directly after gaining independence from Japan, South Korea was involved in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. The war destroyed the majority of industry in the nation. Thus, for several years after the war, the South Korean government focused on developing the nation's infrastructure and its economic growth. In addition, South Korea has been in a state of armistice with North Korea for 60 years, yet North Korea has continued military provocations. According to the Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, North Korea has committed 1,959 infiltrations and 994 local provocations against South Korea since the truce began. Furthermore, North Korea consistently threatens South Korea through the possession of nuclear weapons and long-distance missiles (Ministry of National Defense, 2012). Military confrontation with North Korea imperils national security and impedes stable development of South Korea. Thus, these circumstances are an obstacle to focusing on Soft Power instead of improving Hard Power.

Meanwhile, as the nation has stabilized in recent decades, the administration of South Korea made several attempts to enhance the Soft Power of this nation. President Kim Young-sam, who governed over South Korea from 1993 to 1998, stressed transparency of the nation. His efforts enhanced political integrity, and became a driving force of political Soft Power.

Also, Kim Young-sam's government gained a foothold for globalization and drew national interest in international events.

Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung's government (1998-2003) initiated the first attempt to make a national brand. The government co-hosted the 2002 World Cup with Japan under the slogan "Dynamic Korea" creating an image of South Korea as passionate and dynamic. Also, President Kim Dae-jung devoted his whole life to seeking human rights in Korea and around the world in nations such as Burma and Timor. These efforts by the government created an international image of South Korea as a nation that developed human rights and respected the human rights of other nations.

Roh Moo-Hyun governed South Korea from 2003 to 2008, and he emphasized the role of South Korea as a business hub and a balancer in Northeast Asia. The government attempted to introduce South Korea as a leader in Northeast Asia. Besides, through establishing the Knowledge Sharing Program, this government showed other developing countries how South Korea achieved economic development after the Korean War. These movements enhanced South Korea's international image.

Lee Myung-bak's government (2008-2013) promoted rather visible policies to improve Soft Power. This government hosted an international conference and dispatched the Korean Peace Corps abroad. Also, Lee's government established the National Brand Committee and practiced systematic procedures to strengthen the nation's global identity (Lee, 2010).

In spite of multilateral efforts to strengthen South Korea's Soft Power, the results have been disappointing. There are three institutions that survey the country's brand annually: Anholt-GfK Roper, Bloom Consulting, and FutureBrand. Each organization uses different methodologies to evaluate a nation's brand, but South Korea consistently shows low ranking in

every result. Anhol-Gfk Roper's ranking considers five variables: experts, governance, culture and heritage, people, and tourism. South Korea ranked 33<sup>th</sup> among 50 target countries in 2009. Bloom Consulting evaluates three aspects: attraction of trade, attraction of tourism, and attraction of talent. Among 193 countries evaluated in 2012, South Korea was ranked 79<sup>th</sup> in attraction of trade, 36<sup>th</sup> in attraction of tourism, and 18<sup>th</sup> in attraction of talent. Meanwhile, FutureBrand measures seven factors by using quantitative research, experts' opinions and co-creative insights: 1) awareness, 2) familiarity, 3) associations, 4) preference, 5) consideration, 6) decision/visitation, and 7) advocacy. According to the result of this survey, South Korea ranked 49<sup>th</sup> among 118 countries in 2012, a drop of seven steps from 42<sup>th</sup> in 2011 ("Rankings-Country by Country," 2013).

Visible achievements of national efforts to enhance Soft Power have been shown mostly through the boom of Korean popular culture in foreign countries, a phenomenon known as the "Korean Wave" (Cho, 2005). One example of how Korean popular culture was introduced in foreign countries was when overseas troops broadcasted Korean soap dramas in order to increase these countries' familiarity with South Korea. The dramas were sensationally popular. After the success, many Korean dramas have been exported to foreign countries, and the success led to the boom in Korean pop music. Korean pop music ranked high in many foreign music charts. To cite an example, "Gangnam Style," a song performed by a Korean musician, has had twenty billion hits on You-tube, and it is listed in the Guinness Book of World Records as the most "liked" video in YouTube history. In addition, a variety of Korean entertainers have performed all over the world. The success of soap dramas and entertainers have helped improve a positive image of the nation and led to international interest in the country (Cabalza, 2011).

## Problem Definition

Because of its relatively small size, South Korea needs Soft Power to wield international influence, but the majority of studies about South Korean Soft Power are focused on the “Korean Wave.” A search for studies with the key words “Soft Power” and “Korea” in the databases of the Korean National Assembly Library and the Korea Education and Research Information Service revealed that the majority of articles were about the “Korean Wave. Specifically, of 69 studies with the key words, 26 articles were about cultural Soft Power. Of these articles, 70% were about the “Korean Wave” (Table 1).

**Table 1**

*Research Statistics about South Korean Soft Power, Korean National Assembly Library and Korea Education and Research Information Service Database, 2014*

Format	Overall Soft Power	Culture (Korean Wave)	Diplomacy (PKO)	Domestic Government
Published Article	7	12(7)	13(3)	5
Dissertation/Thesis	6	11(9)	6(2)	2
Book/Pamphlet	-	3(2)	1(0)	3
Total	13	26(18)	20(5)	10

PKO: Peace Keeping Operation

This focus may cause a problem because popularity of popular culture is unlikely to lead to an improvement of Soft Power. Although popular culture is a part of Soft Power, Soft Power is a much wider concept that includes political and diplomatic areas as well. Movements to enhance Soft Power that depend mostly on popular culture risk creating a very partial and distorted image of a nation. For example, the majority of soap dramas show characters with a wealthy and modern lifestyle, so foreigners who encounter South Korea through soap dramas expect it to be a modern and developed country. Although Korean pop music has become a huge success in Europe, Europeans still view South Korea mostly as an industrial powerhouse (Nye & Kim, 2013). These studies produce a slanted view of South Korea and make it hard to provide a



rounded view of the nation's Soft Power. There is a need to consider all three aspects of Soft Power: culture, politics, and diplomacy.

In addition, there are few studies of national self-evaluation, that is, how South Koreans evaluate their own Soft Power. It is natural that researchers of Soft Power depend on external evaluation, because the focus of the studies is on how other countries are influenced by a nation's Soft Power. However, it is also necessary to approach the problem from a different view by considering that social perception is influenced by self-evaluation. Self-evaluation can help clarify an uncertain self-concept, and a well-defined self-concept provides a framework to understand related patterns of national affiliation. Self-concept is defined as a set of cognitive structures that provide for individual expertise in particular social domains (Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985). A well-defined self-concept enables an individual to improve self-control, provides self-continuity, and advances the processing of self-relevant information. Also, through creating a positive image of the self, enhanced self-concept is a key to goal setting (Sedikides, 1993). Therefore, this study is valuable because it measures Korean citizens' perceived Soft Power to enhance an objective view of South Korean Soft Power.

### **Purpose of Study**

The purpose of this study is to gain theoretical and political implications to improve the Soft Power of South Korea. Thus, this study follows Nye's classification of types of Soft Power to retain objectivity and adds South Koreans' internal evaluation as well. Respondents are divided by demographic factors and social status, and each group's perception of Soft Power is analyzed. Also, this research follows Nye's classification of Soft Power: cultural, political, and diplomatic Soft Power. To consider three parts will resolve the slanted view of Soft Power which leans too heavily on popular culture. Furthermore, this research examines the antecedents

and characteristics that shape South Koreans' perception of their nation's Soft Power. The results will suggest ways to formulate policies associated with Soft Power.

Two main research questions are discussed: 1) how demographic factors and social status affect South Koreans' evaluation of the nation's Soft Power and 2) what factors shape perceptions of Korean Soft Power.

### **Significance of Study**

South Korea needs Soft Power to wield international influence, but it has weaker Soft Power than Hard Power. According to the report that was represented in the World Economic Forum, among the 20 countries of G20, South Korea's ranking in national power is 13<sup>th</sup> and its military economic capability is 9<sup>th</sup>, but its Soft Power is 12<sup>th</sup> (Gang, 2009). South Korea has relatively stronger economic and military power than its territory and population might lead one to expect. However, the fact that its Soft Power is weaker than its Hard Power allows the assumption that South Korea can strengthen its national power by seeking a balanced development of Soft Power and Hard Power.

### **Specific Study Objectives**

This study measures South Korean citizens' perceptions of their nation's Soft Power. The introduction defines Soft Power and helps to establish the concept of Soft Power. To measure perceptions of Soft Power, participants were divided into groups according to demographic factors and social status.

South Korean citizens' perception of their Soft Power was analyzed by examining eight hypotheses. The hypotheses used demographic variables and determinants of social status as independent variables to verify how different groups perceive their Soft Power. A well-defined concept of Soft Power will provide a theoretical background for allowing South Korea to wield

more power in the international world. Thus, this research develops the concept of Soft Power as a dimension of national identity and global participation.

Meanwhile, this research suggests implications for policy making, future research, and theories. South Korea has focused on vitalizing popular culture to enhance Soft Power, and most of the existing studies pertaining to Soft Power are about popular culture. However, this research aims at improving the Soft Power of South Korea through diffusion of culture, diplomatic activities, and transparent domestic governance, not through popular culture alone.

## II. Conceptual Framework

### Theories of Power

As noted above, power has been a key subject of political sociology. Thus, writers from many perspectives have written about power and defined it in different ways, resulting in many academic theories about power.

Robert A. Dahl, a political scholar who wrote *The Concept of Power*, defines power as “a successful attempt of A that has power over B to the extent that he can get from B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957). Dahl’s key concept is imposing on B to act against B’s desire. Leslie H. Gelb, who wrote *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy*, regards power as coming from psychological and political leverage by employing resources and positions (Gelb, 2009). As power has relational and situational features, it changes depending on encountered situations and relations. Steven Lukes, a political and social theorist, defined five aspects of power (Lukes, 2005). First, power is dispositional, meaning that power depends on capability that may or may not be exerted. Second, power focuses on superiority. Relative superiority that surpasses others’ power is more important than absolute magnitude of power. Third, power is dependency-inducing. This type of power accompanies domination. Fourthly, power does not consider differences in actors’ interests. Finally, power is an endless exchange relationship between engaging entities. French and Raven (1968) presented five Bases of Social Power: Reward Power, Coercive Power, Legitimate Power, Referent Power, and Expert Power. Reward Power is based on the ability to reward, and Coercive Power is based on the ability to punish. Legitimate Power comes from internalized values in a recipient who accepts that the giver has a legitimate right to influence the recipient and that the recipient ought to

accept the influence. Referent Power is a power that stems from the giver's attractiveness. The recipient will follow the giver and desire to be a member of the giver's group when the giver is attractive. Expert Power is determined by the extent of the knowledge that the giver has.

J. David Singer verifies why power play an important role within national relationships (Singer, 1963). In order to "live and let live," without relationships with other nations, a nation must meet two requirements: 1) it must be absolutely isolated from others and 2) it must be self-sufficient so that it can survive without any assistance from others. However, because it is impossible to meet these conditions, countries need to depend on each other. Besides, every country has the capability to cause serious damage to other countries, even though there is a relative difference of power. Thus, it is hard for a strong nation to unilaterally influence a weaker nation. Based on these reasons, Singer insisted that nations are closely related to each other and that they try to strengthen power so that they can expand their freedom to behave the way they want. Thus, Singer verifies that the interrelationship among nations makes the concept of power a critical subject of sociology.

Even though scholars have long theories about power until the nineteenth century, most scholars focused on the coercive aspect of power. They assumed that complex societies need a governing mechanism, and that power and authority are needed to control the society. Power was explained as a coercive and conflict-based concept, while authority was defined as a concept similar to the modern concept of Soft Power. Power was regarded as an illegitimate measure to control a society, and authority as a legitimate one (Boskoff, 1972).

The tendency to focus on the coercive character of power can be traced to Karl Marx and subsequent Marxist theorists. Marx was much concerned with the conflict between classes and said that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles"(Marx &

Engels, 1959). The conflict relationship between capitalist and proletarian is at the center of class theory. Marx presumed that capitalists and proletarians are always in conflict, and that power is based on the control of means of production. Thus, he believed that capitalists controlled proletarians by using their power over the means of production (Marx, 1904).

Dahrendorf explained how the differential distribution of authority creates power to dominate others (Dahrendorf, 1959). Dahrendorf asserted that differential distribution of authority forms a “conflict group,” and each group has a specific role and occupation. A group’s specific role and occupation entail rights, and the rights give the group power to control others. For example, a teacher has a right to control students in class, so a teacher can instruct students to stay in the classroom during school hours. Therefore, social roles are accompanied by “expectations of domination or subjection,” and the distribution of authority is a source for the formation of a “conflict group.” It is obvious that the definition of power by Marx and Dahrendorf is far from Nye’s concept of Soft Power. Their assertions about power are both based on the compulsory character of power, which coerces others. Thus, early scholars and Marxist theorists clearly both focused on coercion and pressure.

Another Marxist theoretician, Antonio Gramsci, is notable for his theory of “hegemony” to depict the ideological and political dominance of a governing class. He advanced the Marxist view of power by adding the need of public approval (Gramsci, 1995). Gramsci identified the same process of class conflict as Marx, but premised that social order is built on public support for existing arrangements. In other words, a group needs public support to seize the military and manufacturing system, so a dictator cannot rule the system without public approval. Although Gramsci focused on domestic power, his theory can be extended to show the significance of requiring legitimate support from other countries in international affairs.

Meanwhile, Max Weber defined three types of authority: legal, traditional, and charismatic authority (Weber, 1957). Although Weber did not specifically refer to power, his explanation of authority expanded earlier definitions of power by adding the concept of legitimacy. In other words, he included cooperation and legitimacy as characteristics of power along with coercion.

According to Weber, legal authority is a power that depends on a belief that established rules are reliable. The traditional authority arises from people's conviction that immemorial tradition is justified and from exercise of existing authority. On the other hand, charismatic authority arises from an allegiance to the exceptional character of a person. Weber thought that society consistently faces crisis due to defiance of existing authority. Thus, society depends on personal and charismatic authority to defeat the challenge. However, charismatic authority is unstable and temporary, so the governing class creates rules and official duties, replacing charismatic authority with legal authority. In this explanation, Weber showed that coordination and leadership processes in a society emerge from shared confidence about the legitimacy of command, so that power develops into authority. He argued that force does not make people obey, and that their motivation for obedience comes from their recognition of the legitimacy of control (Weber, 1957). His theory of three types of authority stimulated academic interest about another aspect of power.

Foucault explained the character of power in the same vein as Max Weber, adding an explanation of how one exerts power without coercive measures (Foucault, 1977). Foucault showed the process by which people adapt to a social system by using the example of the "panopticon." He defined the panopticon as a circular prison in which prisoners can be observed from all directions. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham initially referred to the panopticon in

1791, and Foucault used the concept to explain how observation induces an effect of power without coercive power. The structure of the panopticon provides a view in all directions, so that the behavior of the prisoners is constantly overseen. Thus, they are conscious of the guard's observation and obey the regulations of the prison.

Foucault presumed that current society is similar to the panopticon because people live under the domination of observation. Thus, they self-consciously obey the regulations, but they are deluded into believing that they internalize the rules without external control. Self-conscious obedience is not same as the voluntary behavior that arises as a legitimate and cooperative feature of Soft Power. However, the example of the panopticon shows how power leverages people without physical force and coercion.

While the above theorists mostly give a theoretical basis for governing power, Pierre Bourdieu shows how culture operates as means of domination. Pierre Bourdieu examines the relationship between social class and cultural preference, and outlines how social structure affects the cultural preferences of individuals (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu argued that social class determine cultural preferences. Furthermore, people with a limited experience of culture share analogous experience with other people in the same class, leading to reproduction of the class structure. Therefore, people may be unconsciously dominated by culture simply by sharing the same culture. His perspective shows how people are influenced by culture, and how a nation applies leverage to other countries by having an influential culture.

### **Theories of Soft Power**

*Theory of Soft Power* by Joseph Nye is not a new theory but a synthesis of theories that focus on legitimate features of power. This perspective became a way to stress legitimate and cooperative features of power in international relations. As sources of legitimate and cooperative



power, Nye suggested three sources, culture, politics, and diplomacy. Nye said, "Culture is a set of values and practices that create meaning for a society." (Nye, 2004). Therefore, the culture of a nation can enhance the attractiveness of a relationship when it includes universal values and shared values with other countries. Other sources of Soft Power are policies at home and abroad.

Politics that are hypocritical or haughty or that disregard other nations' opinion weaken the Soft Power of a nation, so Nye regards domestic and foreign politics as sources of Soft Power. Based on these facts, Nye identified three determinants of a nation's Soft Power: 1) the attractiveness of its culture, 2) its political values when it lives up to them at home and abroad, and 3) its foreign policies when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority (Nye, 2004). Nevertheless, Nye did not ignore the influence of military and economic power. He argued that nations need to concede the limits of Hard Power, then try to compensate for these restrictions by considering interdependence among countries. A good example of the practice of Soft Power is the Peace Corps, a preeminent international service organization of the United States. The organization sends Americans abroad to give aid to people around the world, and aims at giving help and promoting a better understanding with each other ("Peace Corps," 2013).

In the same vein as Nye's theory, Steven Lukes identified three dimensions of power and explained features of power. A one-dimensional view concentrates on visible power. A one-dimensional power controls the process of making and implementing decisions about key issues. A two-dimensional view of power includes not only observable conflicts but also covert conflicts. A two-dimensional power sets agendas and restricts what is being discussed. Thus, the power works to control the opinions of disadvantaged groups through invisible tools of social structure. A three-dimensional power is concerned not only with decision making and control over political agendas, but also with present issues and potential issues, including observable and

latent conflicts. A three-dimensional power controls information and is concerned with molding public opinion by controlling information. That is, a three-dimensional power manipulates what others think they want. The concept of two-dimensional and three-dimensional power, in which a powerful entity sets agendas to shape desires, is similar to Nye's concept of Soft Power.

Kenneth Boulding, who wrote *Three Faces of Power*, suggested a different classification of power: 1) destructive power, or the power to destroy, 2) productive power, or the power to pay, and 3) integrative power, or the power to congregate people by respect and consideration for each other (Boulding, 1990).

Destructive power means that A has a power that can threaten B. A threatens to do what B does not want if B does not do what A wants. Boulding regarded destructive power as including political and military power. Another type of power is productive power. Productive power is used when A and B agree to an exchange and both A and B have something that the other desires. Economic power is a subcategory of productive power. The last type of power is integrative power. Boulding categorized it as the power of love or respect. In this case, A does something for B because A loves B. A subcategory of integrative power is social power. Social power comes from intimacy with or love for people who are in the same group. Integrative power is similar to Soft Power. However, Boulding's classification of power differs from Nye's in that Boulding's is limited to people in the same culture. Nye assumed that if people share the same culture or values, integrative and social power exist even when the people come from different backgrounds.

Tania Domett, who wrote *Soft Power in Global Politics? Diplomatic Partners as Transversal Actors*, interpreted the function of Soft Power from a diplomatic view. Domett stressed the role of diplomatic partnerships that oil diplomatic relations. She argues that

diplomatic partnerships represent Soft Power (Domett, 2005).

### **Perceived Soft Power**

This study analyzes Soft Power from a different view, in respect that measures how South Koreans evaluate their Soft Power. Self-evaluation helps clarify an uncertain self-concept, and a well-defined self-concept provides a framework to understand social domain. Hazel Markus et al, the authors of *Role of the Self-Concept in the Perception of Others*, defined Self-concept as a set of cognitive structures that provide for individual expertise in particular social domains. Also, they indicated that self-concept affects a person's perception process that perceives, memorizes, infer and evaluates other's behavior (Markus et al., 1985).

Constantine Sedikides, who wrote *Assessment, Enhancement, and Verification Determinants of the Self-Evaluation Process*, summarized seven functions of self- concept 1) gives a power that regulates self, 2) provides a consistent sense of self, 3) accelerates processing of information related to self, 4) acts as a key factor in goal-setting, 5) has impacts on social perception, 6) determines a person's behavior and choice of partners in personal relationships, and 7) projects a coherent and advisable image of a person to others. Therefore, this study takes note that self-evaluation has an impact on social perception, and analyzes perceived Soft Power by South Koreans.

### **Limitation of Soft Power Theory**

Although it is generally concurred that Soft Power has a significant meaning in today's society, various researchers have complemented Nye's theory or disputed aspects of it. Guen Lee, who wrote *A Theory of Soft Power and Korea's Soft Power Strategy*, admitted that Nye's definition of Soft Power launched attempts to understand hidden parts of international relationships (Lee, 2009). At the same time, he pointed out that Nye's theory lacks a theoretical

framework and mainly focuses on explaining the abnormal power of the United States. In addition, Nye's classification is ambiguous when the outcome of power does not coincide with the source of the power. If a coercive form of power brings about a cooperative and attractive result like Soft Power does, Nye's classification is unclear about whether to categorize the power as Soft Power or Hard Power. Therefore, he suggested a new definition of Soft Power based on its results: 1) Soft Power enhances external security by showing an attractive image of a nation, 2) Soft Power motivates other countries to support a nation's policies, 3) Soft Power shapes other nations' views and preferences, 4) Soft Power helps maintain unity in a country, and 5) Soft Power increases public support for a leader and a government (Lee, 2009).

Steven Lukes criticized Nye's theory because it fails to explain distinctions between different means that shape preferences and different ways of persuasion (Lukes, 2005). As noted above, Lukes's theory of three-dimensional power is similar to Nye's. However, Lukes argues that Nye's theory does not adequately explain which means and ways of persuasion make people want to follow a country's culture and policies (Vuving, 2009).

Nye's theory has been criticized because of three main reasons: 1) focusing too much on explaining U.S. power, 2) basing classifications on the source of power, and 3) failing to explain causes of shaping preferences and ways of persuasion.

### **Dependent Variable**

Although Nye's theory has been criticized, this study follows his classification. The purpose of this study is analyzing perceptions of Soft Power, not analyzing Soft Power. Nye's theory has problems with ambiguous classification and does not adequately explain the cause of Soft Power. These problems affect efforts to analyze the causes of Soft Power. However, they do not greatly affect efforts to analyze perception of Soft Power, so they do not cloud the issue.

Therefore, this study follows Nye' classification because it has abundant theoretical background, and classifies Soft Power into three types: cultural, political, and diplomatic fields. Cultural Soft Power refers to power that comes from universal values and values shared with others. Political Soft Power refers to power which stems from domestic values and policies. Diplomatic Soft Power refers to the power results from the values that a nation expresses through the style of its foreign policy. This research analyze how South Koreans perceive the three types of Soft Power, so perceived Soft Power used as dependent variables. Citizen perceptions of the relative standings of South Korea on these three dimensions are the focus of this study.

### **Independent Variables**

This research examines six demographic factors and aspects of social status as independent variables that are hypothesized to affect perceptions of Soft Power. These are: region, age, gender, educational level, occupation, and income

#### **Region**

Region was chosen for an independent variable because of the historical background of South Korea. The eastern and western parts of South Korea were separated into independent countries for 600 years. Besides, the South Korean government adopted a local self-government system in 2006, so present administrative districts are also divided into western and eastern regions. Jeollado, the western part of the country, is divided into the two provinces of Chonbuk and Chonnam. Gyeongsangdo, the eastern part, is divided into the two provinces of Kyongbuk and Kyongnam (see fig. 2). The local self-government system accentuates distinctions between Jeollado and Gyeongsando, and the two regions have shown significantly distinctive political and cultural tendencies. This tendency is demonstrated by much Korean research.

**Table 2***Polling Rate of Presidential Elections according to Administrative Region*

Region	15 <sup>th</sup> election (1998~)(%)		16 <sup>th</sup> election (2003~)(%)		17 <sup>th</sup> election (2008~)(%)		18 <sup>th</sup> election (2013~)(%)	
Metropolitan Area	Grand National Party	38.3	Grand National Party	44.4	Grand National Party	52.5	Saenuri Party	49.4
	Democratic Party	42.0	Uri Party	50.6	Democratic party	24.0	Democratic Party	49.8
Chung cheongdo	Grand National Party	27.4	Grand National Party	41.3	Grand National Party	37.1	Saenuri Party	54.3
	Democratic party	43.9	Uri Party	52.5	Democratic party	22.6	Democratic Party	44.8
Gyeong sangdo	Grand National Party	59.1	Grand National Party	69.4	Grand National Party	62.4	Saenuri Party	68.6
	Democratic Party	13.5	Uri Party	25.8	Democratic party	10.3	Democratic Party	30.5
Jeollado	Grand National Party	3.3	Grand National Party	4.9	Grand National Party	9.0	Saenuri Party	10.5
	Democratic Party	94.4	Uri party	93.2	Democratic party	80.0	Democratic Party	88.5

*Note.* Adapted from *Regional Conflicts of South Korea: Aspects and Measures*, p. 109, by Hong-Seog Choe, 2013, Seoul: The Korean Association for Policy Studies

Conservative parties: Grand National and Saenuri; Progressive parties: Democratic and Uri

**Table 3***Parliamentary Seat Share of Parties according to Administrative Region*

Region	16 <sup>th</sup> council (2000~)(%)		17 <sup>th</sup> council (2004~)(%)		18 <sup>th</sup> council (2008~)(%)		19 <sup>th</sup> council (2012~)(%)	
Metropolitan Area	Grand National Party	41.2	Grand National Party	30.3	Grand National Party	73.9	Saenuri Party	38.7
	Democratic party	57.7	Uri Party	69.7	Democratic party	23.4	Democratic Party	57.7
Chung cheongdo	Grand National Party	16.7	Grand National Party	4.2	Grand National Party	4.2	Saenuri Party	56.5
	Democratic party	33.3	Uri Party	79.2	Democratic party	33.3	Democratic Party	39.1
Jeollado	Grand National Party	98.5	Grand National Party	88.2	Grand National Party	67.6	Saenuri Party	92.4
	Democratic Party		Uri Party	5.9	Democratic Party	2.9	Democratic Party	4.5
Gyeong sangdo	Grand National Party	-	Grand National Party	-	Grand National Party	-	Saenuri Party	-
	Democratic party	86.2	Uri Party	80.6	Democratic Party	80.6	Democratic Party	86.7

*Note.* Adapted from *Regional Conflicts of South Korea: Aspects and Measures*, p. 109, by Hong-Seog Choe, 2013, Seoul: The Korean Association for Policy Studies

Conservative parties: Grand National and Saenuri; Progressive parties: Democratic and Uri

For example, Choe Hong-Seog's paper "Regional Conflicts of South Korea: Aspects and Measures," demonstrates that the two areas have distinguishing opinions and characters (Choe, 2013). According to him, inhabitants in same area share similar interests that oppose other regions' interests. People who live in same region are likely to have similar political tendencies. As shown in Table 2 and 3, this assertion is supported by the results of presidential elections and each party's share of parliamentary seats (Table 2 and 3). People who live in Jeollado have consistently supported progressive parties and showed up to 30 times as much approval for a progressive party as for a conservative party. On the other hand, inhabitants of Gyeongsangdo have mostly supported conservative parties. It is possible that the political tendencies of the regions may affect their evaluation of government policies. When the data was collected, a progressive party, Democratic Party, was the ruling party, so the people of Jeollado were likely to be in favor of this government. Based on these facts, it is hypothesized that region predicts people's evaluation of political and diplomatic Soft Power.

Hypothesis 1: Citizens' perceptions of Soft Power differ across regions of Korea.

### **Gender**

Gender was chosen as an independent variable because South Korea has had a draft system for 60 years. That does not include women (Jeong & Hah, 2014). Since the division of the Korean peninsula, South Korea has required two years of mandatory military service for the male population. Thus, the draft system is likely to create a difference of political, diplomatic, and military attitudes between males and females. Eunkyong Jeong and Yangsoo Hah, who wrote *The Effect of Ego-Resiliency, Social Support, Military Life Satisfaction on Growth Related Military Service in Korean Veterans*, verified that individuals' growth on psychological factors changed after being discharged from military service. It is possible to assume that mandatory

military service deepens males' understanding of government domestic and foreign policies, and that males assess government policies more generously than females.

Hypothesis 2: Males are more consentient that South Korea has strong Soft Power than do females.

### **Age**

Meanwhile, age was used for an independent variable because the rapid change of South Korea during the last 60 years affected the perceptions of South Koreans and created a generation gap between older and younger people (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture [EKC], 2013). The industrialization of South Korea started in 1953, and the society has changed dramatically during the last 60 years. The rapid growth of industrialization after the Korean War was called "the Miracle of Han River" by South Korea, because the country achieved outstanding economic development in a short period of time. However, the rushed development of the society did not allow enough time for people to adapt to changes within the society and has led to conflicts among generations and differing perceptions of social problems (Ham, 2013).

Popular culture, which is referred as the driving force of South Korean Soft Power in studies about Soft Power, is supported by the younger generation. Thus, there is a chance that young people are more consentient that South Korea has strong cultural Soft Power than do older people. People in their 50s and 60s endured the Korean War, the Japanese colonial period, and military dictatorship. It is obvious that the present South Korea is a much more democratic society than it was in the 1950s. As older people endured the hard times, they are likely to agree that political and diplomatic Soft Power is strong than do young people.

Hypothesis 3: Younger people are more consentient that cultural Soft Power of South Korea is strong than do older people.



Hypothesis 4: Younger people are more consentient that political and diplomatic Soft Power of South Korea is weak than do older people.

### **Occupation**

Social status refers to the position that someone occupies in a society, and it is categorized as ascribed or achieved status (Henslin, 2011). Ascribed status is involuntary because it is determined by birth, but achieved status is determined by one's effort. People having different social statuses show distinct cultural inclinations and political tendencies. Social standing determines a person's social group, and social group affects a person's perception (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1957). This research focused on achieved status that is determined by one's will, and verified how social group can affect perceptions of Soft Power.

Among determinants of social status, occupation is a representative example of achieved status (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1957). Thus, occupation was used as independent variable in this research. However, it is hard to classify whether a particular occupation has higher or lower social status, so this research focused on determining whether occupation is relevant to a person's perception of Soft Power.

Hypothesis 5: Occupation is related to perceptions of Soft Power.

### **Level of Education**

Completed education level is closely connected to occupation. When companies select people for a specific position, they consider several characteristics, including completed level of education. Thus, level of education is the best single predictor of occupation (Kahl & Davis, 1955). Level of education is strongly linked with occupation and occupation is strongly linked with social status. It is assumed in this paper that people with higher social status are more likely to agree with the politics of their government, because they are more likely to be satisfied with

the present social system. Therefore, this research hypothesized that highly educated people are more likely to agree that South Korea has strong Soft Power.

Hypothesis 6: People with more education are more likely to agree that South Korea has strong Soft Power.

### **Income**

As mentioned above, occupation is associated with social status, and income is determined by one's occupation. In addition, highly educated people are apt to earn higher incomes than people with less education (Griliches, 1970). It is possible to assume that income affects social status, so this research uses income as an independent variable. Based on the assumption that people with higher social statuses are more likely to be satisfied with the present social system, this research hypothesized that people with higher incomes are more likely to perceive strong Soft Power.

Hypothesis 7: People with higher incomes are more likely to believe that South Korea has strong Soft Power.

### **Cumulative and Independent Effects**

Six independent variables were chosen by considering historical background, the mandatory military system of South Korea, and determinants of social status. Last concern is whether each variables explain perceived Soft Power when control other variables. The analysis will prove which variable has an effect to explain Soft Power, and which one is not. Thus, the last hypothesis proposes that these independent variables are useful to explain perceived Soft Power of South Korea as controlling other variables.

Hypothesis 8: Each independent variable useful to predict perceived Soft Power as control other variables.

### III. Research Methods

#### Sample and Data Collection

This study uses data collected in 2008 by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (CCFR), which examined the relationships between the U.S. and Asian countries. CCFR surveyed the five Asian countries which have the most important relationships with the U.S.: South Korea, China, Japan, Indonesia, and Vietnam (see fig. 1). While the larger project included six countries, this study focused on the sample of South Korean citizens.



Figure 1. Map of East Asia



**Figure 2.** Provincial Map of South Korea

**Table 4**  
*Classification of Region of South Korea*

	Province and major cities	Subunit of Province		
		Si	Gun	Gu
	Gyeonggido	28	3	20
Metropolitan Areas	Seoul*			
	Incheon*			
Chungcheongdo	Chungcheongnamdo	8	7	2
	Chungcheonbukdo	3	8	2
	Daejeon*			
Jeollado	Jeollanamdo	5	17	
	Jeollabukdo	6	8	2
	Gwangju*			
Gyeongsangdo	Gyeongsangnamdo	8	10	5
	Gyongsanbukdo	10	13	2
	Daegu*			
	Busan*			
Gangwondo	Ulsan*			
		7	11	

*Note:* Si, Gun, and Gu are subunits of province and major city

\*Seoul, Incheon, Daejeon, Gwangju, Daegu, Busan, Ulsan are singular major cities, so do not have subunit(Si, Gun, and Gu)

Han-kook Research Company (HKRC) conducted the survey in South Korea. Face-to-face interviews conducted between January 22 and February 5, 2008, produced 1,029 responses. The sample was selected in a five-step process by using a multi-stage quota sample based on the administrative districts of South Korea.

First, the agency used data from fifteen of the sixteen administrative districts, excluding Je-ju Island. The fifteen administrative districts include the following (see fig. 2): Seoul Metropolitan Area, Busan City, Daegu City, Incheon City, Gwangju City, Daejeon City, Ulsan City, Gyeonggi Province, Gangwon Province, Chungbuk Province, Chungnam Province, Junbuk Province, Jeonnam Province, Gyeongbuk Province, and Gyeongnam Province. Je-ju Island accounts for only 1.1% the population of South Korea and is separated from the mainland. Thus, to increase the cost-effectiveness of the study, this sample excluded Je-ju Island.

The number of surveys conducted in each administrative district was based on its population size. Second, the fifteen administrative divisions were separated into smaller units: Si, Gun, or Gu. As third step, Si, Gun or Gu were subdivided in smaller units, Eup, Myeun, or Dong, and samples were randomly taken (Table 4).

Fourth, participants were collected using sample quotas representative of the age and gender distribution of the whole nation based on the Korean Resident Registration Census on Dec. 31 in 2005. When compared with the results of the census, the samples' demographic characteristics deviated from the known demographic characteristics of South Korea. Therefore, cases were weighted to enhance representativeness of the data. The results from weighted sampling, however, were not appreciably different from those not weighted. In the fifth step, the agency recruited interviewers among ordinary Korean citizens 19 years of age or older to conduct the face-to-face interviews.

Researchers used two types of questionnaires, and they randomly allocated one of two different questionnaire forms to each respondents. Questionnaire A had 512 participants and Questionnaire B had 517 participants. While the two questionnaires had some common questions, each form also had questions unique to that version. Each questionnaire has eighty-one questions. Nine questions ask demographic factors and forty-two questions are common questions which are asked in both types of questionnaires. The A questionnaire had fifteen questions that were not on the B questionnaire, and the B questionnaire had fifteen questions that were not on the A questionnaire.

The questions that were included in only Questionnaire A were mostly about diplomatic problems. Among fifteen questions, eleven questions were associated with diplomatic problems. While most questions which were in only Questionnaire B were mostly about cultural problems, and nine questions asked cultural problem. As each questionnaire had different fifteen questions, not all questions had an equal number of responses. Among twelve questions used in this research, six questions were taken from the A questionnaire, and five from the B questionnaire. Just one question was included on both questionnaires.

The Korean survey consisted of one-on-one interviews, and all participants completed the interview. Thus, the sampling is representative of the survey results. Also, the study used a cross-sectional method that aimed at evaluating South Korean perceptions in a single point of time.

## **Measures**

### **Dependent Variables**

Out of the eighty-one questions in the CCFR study, the eighteen which concerned cultural, political, and diplomatic Soft Power were used for this study. However, six of the eighteen were excluded due to failure to demonstrate the minimum factor reliability test. The twelve questions used for this study included three questions for cultural Soft Power, three questions for political Soft Power, and six questions for diplomatic Soft Power. Respondents indicated the degree to which they agreed with these questions on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree” and 10 indicating “strongly agree.” The results for each type of Soft Power were measured by adding the responses, with the sum indicating the amount of Soft Power perceived by the respondents.

#### **Cultural Soft Power**

First of all, perceived cultural Soft Power was measured using responses to three questions. These were “South Korea possesses advanced science and technology,” “South Korea has an appealing popular culture,” and “South Korea has a rich cultural heritage.” The alpha reliability of the three questions was .769, reflecting sufficient internal consistency reliability. The sum of cultural Soft power ranges from seven to thirty.

#### **Political Soft Power**

Perceived political Soft Power was measured by responses to three questions. These were “South Korea has a political system that serves the needs of its people,” “South Korea provides many economic opportunities for its workforce,” and “The government of South Korea

has been effective in promoting its policies to people in Asia.” Cronbach’s alpha was .793, indicating strong reliability. The sum of political Soft power ranges from zero to thirty.

### **Diplomatic Soft Power**

Lastly, perceived diplomatic Soft Power was measured by six questions. These were “South Korea respects the sovereignty of other Asian countries,” “South Korea uses diplomacy to resolve key problems in Asia,” “South Korea helps other Asian countries develop their economies,” “South Korea builds trust and cooperation among Asian countries,” “South Korea provides assistance in the event of humanitarian crises in Asia,” and “South Korea exercises leadership in international institutions like the UN and the World Trade Organization.” Cronbach’s Alpha was .855 for diplomatic questions, showing strong reliability. The sum of diplomatic Soft power ranges from six to sixty.

### **Independent Variables**

**Region** refers to the major political administrative divisions of the Korean nation. In the original study conducted by HKRC, the agency divided South Korea into fifteen administrative districts and coded respondents’ place of residence into fifteen categories. However, this study combined neighboring administrative districts based on evidence that adjacent districts show similar political tendencies. Combining relatively similar clusters of administrative districts provides sufficient data for analysis. Thus, administrative districts were reclassified into five clusters: Metropolitan Area, Chungcheongdo, Jeollado, Gyeongsando, and Gangwondo.

As adjacent regions, Seoul, Incheon, and Gyenggido Provinces were combined as Metropolitan Area and coded 1. Daejoen, Chungcheongnamdo, and Chungcheongbukdo were united as Chungcheongdo Province, and coded 2. Gwangju, Jeollanamdo, and Jeollabukdo were combined as Jeollado Province, and coded 3. Daegu, Ulsan, Busan, Gyeongsannamdo, and



Gyeongsanbukdo were combined as Gyeongsando Province, and coded 4. Gangwondo Province was coded 5. In addition, region variables were recoded using dummy variables for correlation and regression analyses, because the variables were collected by nominal level.

**Gender** was categorized as male or female. Male was coded as 1 and female as 2.

**Occupation** was classified into nine categories: agriculture, forestry, or fishery was 1, self-employed was 2, sales or service was 3, blue-collar was 4, white-collar was 5, housewife or homemaker was 6, student was 7, no occupation, retired or other was 8, and non-respondent was 9. Dummy variables were created for correlation and regression analysis.

**Level of education** was measured by the academic level completed and was sorted into seven categories: middle school graduate and under was 1, high school graduate was 2, college student was 3, two-year technical (professional) college graduate was 4, four-year college graduate was 5, postgraduate degree was 6, and non-respondent was 7.

**Income** was measured in terms of monthly income including all wages and pensions. Thus, the interviewer asked, “What is the average monthly income of your household for 2005, including all wages, salaries, pensions and other income?” and gave twelve options for the interviewee. Income categories were in increments of 990,000 KRW (approximately 990 USD). Therefore, less than 1,000,000 KRW (approximately 1,000 USD) was coded 1; 9,000,000-9,990,000 KRW was 9; 10,000,000 KRW or more (over 10,000 USD) was 11, etc. Non-respondents were coded 12 and these data were treated as missing.

## **Analysis**

The results of the survey were coded by SPSS and analyzed using three methods: one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlation, and regression analysis.

First of all, ANOVA treats cultural, political and diplomatic Soft Power as dependent variables. Independent variables were region, gender, age, occupation, income, and level of education. As a post-hoc test, the Bonferroni test, which used 0.05 alpha value, examined where the mean differences of groups came from when ANOVA tests showed significant results. The Bonferroni test was applied to the three ANOVA analyses that used region, age, or income as an independent variable. Just one ANOVA used gender as an independent variable, and therefore the post-hoc test could not be used because the gender variable had only two levels. In addition, analysis of occupation and level of education included non-respondents, so these two analyses were excluded from the post-hoc test. These analyses will provide an explanation of how South Koreans perceive their Soft Power according to demographic factors and social status.

Correlation analysis was used to examine relationships between dependent variables and independent variables. This analysis verifies that a variable is not related to other variables, causing multicollinearity due to being too closely related to other variables.

Lastly, regression analysis verified whether the clusters of independent variables were useful to predict perceived Soft Power. This analysis was conducted three times for each type of Soft Power.

## IV. Results

### Variable Characteristics

**Table 5**

*Description of Dependent and Independent Variables, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
1. Region	1029	4	1	5	2.26	1.37
2. Gender	1029	1	1	2	1.50	.50
3. Categorical Age	1029	4	1	5	2.89	1.39
4. Scale Age	1029	67	19	86	43.20	14.67
5. Occupation	1029	8	1	9	4.88	1.78
6. Education Level	1029	8	1	9	3.36	1.63
7. Average Income	1012	10	1	11	4.07	2.07
8.CulturalSoftPower	512	23	7	30	23.26	4.01
9.PoliticalSoftPower	508	30	0	30	16.72	4.76
10.DiplomaticSoftPower	500	54	6	60	37.77	8.76

Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the seven independent variables and three dependent variables. Regional identification was used as an independent variable and was classified into five categories. The initial region data was divided into 15 categories, but the data was recategorized by combining adjacent regions, creating five new categories: Metropolitan Area, Chungcheongdo, Jeollado, Gyeongsando, and Gangwondo. The distribution of respondents by region was as follows: Metropolitan Area, 48.6% (500); Chungcheongdo, 10.3% (106); Jeollado, 11.3% (116); Gyeongsando, 26.7% (275); and Gangwondo, 3.1% (32). Nearly half of the respondents resided in Metropolitan Area, representing the highest percentage for a single region. The smallest percentage of respondents resided in Gangwondo.

The second independent variable was gender. Females accounted for 50.4%, or 519, of all respondents, while male respondents numbered 510 (49.6%).

Age distribution was evenly distributed also. Age included these five groups: 19-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 or over. The number of participants according to age group was as follows: 19-29, 20.5% (211); 30-39, 22.9% (236); 40-49, 22.4% (230); 50-59, 15.9% (164); and 60 or over, 18.3% (188). While each group was fairly similar in size, the 30-39 age group was the largest and the 50-59 age group was the smallest.

In contrast, the categories for occupation, educational level, and income were not evenly distributed. The occupation distribution of respondents was as follows: agriculture, forestry, or fishery, 1.7% (17); self-employed, 12.7% (131); sales or service, 10.5% (108); blue-collar, 6.5% (67); white-collar, 33.4% (344); housewife/homemaker, 17.9% (184); student, 9.4% (97); no occupation/retired/others, 7.7% (79) and non-respondents 2% (2). White-collar workers were the largest category.

Also, educational level was concentrated into two main groups, high school graduates and college graduates. Specifically, middle school graduates and under represented 13.6% (140); high school graduates, 29% (298); college students, 9.4% (97); two-year technical (professional) college graduates, 11.6% (119); four-year college graduates, 29.4% (303); post graduates, 6.9% (71); and non-respondents, 1% (1). In total, 58.04% of respondents were either high school or college graduates, representing the largest part of the educational level distribution.

Monthly income was divided into 11 categories: Less than 1,000,000 KRW, 7.5% (77); 1,000,000-1,999,000 KRW, 14.2% (146); 2,000,000-2,990,000 KRW, 19.8% (204); 3,000,000-3,990,000 KRW, 22.5% (232); 4,000,000-4,990,000 KRW, 16% (165); 5,000,000-5,990,000

KRW, 8.7% (90); 6,000,000-6,990,000 KRW 3.3% (34); 7,000,000-7,990,000 KRW 1.8% (19); 8,000,000-8,990,000 KRW, 1.4% (14); 9,000,000-9,990,000 KRW, 1.0% (10) and 10,000,000 KRW or more, 2.0% (21). Respondents who earned 3,000,000-3,990,000 KRW were the largest group.

## Hypothesis Testing

### Region

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether perceptions of Soft Power differed by region. To get a more distinctive difference, this analysis combined adjacent regions that have similar cultural and political tendencies into five clusters. Using the five regions as independent variables, ANOVA was used to compare mean values of perceived Soft Power between the five regions. Table 6 shows standard deviation, degree of freedom, and F-values of perceived Soft Power by region. Overall, perceived cultural and political Soft Power did not significantly differ by region, but perceived diplomatic Soft Power was significantly different.

**Table 6**

*ANOVA of Soft Power by Region, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

Soft Power	Region					F-ratio	df
	Metropolitan	Chung cheongdo	Jeollado	Gyeong sando	Gang wondo		
Cultural							
Mean	21.35	22.37	21.22	21.85	19.80	1.48	4
(S.D)	(4.41)	(3.90)	(4.36)	(4.08)	(5.10)		
Political							
Mean	16.38	17.00	16.76	17.38	15.44	1.32	4
(S.D)	(4.99)	(4.81)	(3.76)	(4.47)	(6.25)		
Diplomatic							
Mean	36.47	40.79	40.47	38.03	35.44	4.69**	4
(S.D)	(8.50)	(9.81)	(9.65)	(8.12)	(6.31)		

\*\*  $p=0.001$  level \*  $p=0.05$  level,  $N=1029$

The result of ANOVA for perceived diplomatic Soft Power showed significant differences. The smallest mean value was Gangwondo, and the largest value was Jeollado. The F-value of perceived diplomatic Soft Power was 4.69, and it differed significantly by region [F(4,1028)=4.69, p=.001]. During the follow-up procedure, the ANOVA of regions was statistically significant. The Bonferroni test with conventional  $p < .05$  level indicated that the mean of Metropolitan Area was significantly lower than the means of Jeonllado and Chungchungdo in diplomatic Soft Power. That is, inhabitants of Jeonllado and Chungchungdo were significantly more likely to believe that South Korea has strong diplomatic Soft Power than were the people of Metropolitan Area.

## Gender

**Table 7**  
*ANOVA of Soft Power by Gender, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

Soft Power	Gender		F-ratio	df
	Male	Female		
Cultural Mean (S.D)	21.17 (4.52)	21.90 (4.03)	3.61	1
Political Mean (S.D)	16.88 (4.71)	16.56 (4.81)	.59	1
Diplomatic Mean (S.D)	38.25 (9.16)	37.29 (8.32)	1.50	1

\*\*  $p=0.001$  level \*  $p=0.05$  level,  $N=1029$

The Second ANOVA examined the hypothesis that males and females perceive Soft Power differently as a result of mandatory military service for males. Gender was used as an independent variable and the three types of Soft Power were used for dependent variables. However, the results of ANOVA showed that gender did not significantly affect perception of any of the three types of Soft Power. The results indicate that gender was not a significant

variable for perceived Soft Power.

### Age

Another ANOVA examined whether there was a difference in perceived Soft Power by age group. Five age groups were used as independent variables, and the three types of Soft Power were dependent variables. Table 8 shows mean value, standard deviation, and F-value of perceived Soft Power by age. Overall, perceptions of political and diplomatic Soft Power were significantly different by age, but cultural Soft Power was not.

**Table 8**  
*ANOVA of Soft Power by Age, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

Soft Power	Region					F-ratio	df
	19-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	Over 60		
Cultural Mean (S.D)	21.46 (4.41)	21.16 (4.23)	21.51 (4.50)	22.44 (3.58)	21.28 (4.56)	1.22	4
Political Mean (S.D)	16.02 (4.59)	15.76 (4.36)	15.64 (5.46)	18.57 (3.88)	18.62 (4.21)	10.53**	4
Diplomatic Mean (S.D)	35.96 (8.29)	35.59 (9.54)	36.88 (8.98)	41.44 (7.43)	40.85 (7.12)	9.95**	4

\*\*  $p=0.001$  level \*  $p=0.05$  level,  $N=1029$

Perceptions of political Soft Power showed significant differences. People in the 60 and over group showed the highest mean perceived political Soft Power, and people in their 40s showed the lowest mean. F-value was also large enough to be significant [ $F(4,1028)=10.53$ ,  $p<.001$ ]. Post hoc comparison using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean of the 60 and over group was significantly different from all other groups except the 50s group. The 50s group also significantly differed from all other groups except for the 60s group. Thus, this result shows that age is a meaningful factor to explain perceived political Soft Power. The f-value of

perceived diplomatic Soft Power was smaller than for political Soft Power, but it was significant, [Mean<sub>50s</sub>=41.44 versus Mean<sub>30s</sub>=35.59, [F(4,1028)=9.95, p<.001]]. Furthermore, the Bonferroni post hoc criterion for significance indicated that the 50s group (M = 18.57, SD = 3.88) and the 60 and over group (M=18.62, SD=4.21) showed significantly higher mean values than other age groups in political Soft Power. Along with political Soft Power, the 50s group and the 60 and over group displayed higher means in diplomatic Soft Power. The above results indicate that perceived political and diplomatic Soft Power is significantly different by age.

Although F-value of perceived cultural Soft Power was not significant, it is meaningful that the means of each question which asked about cultural Soft Power were larger than those of questions which asked about political and diplomatic Soft Power. The mean of three cultural questions was 7.76 out of ten. The mean of political questions was 5.73, and the mean of diplomatic questions was 6.30. These results indicate that South Koreans perceive their cultural Soft Power to be higher than political and diplomatic Soft Power.

## **Occupation**

When eight occupation clusters were used as independent variables, ANOVA confirmed the hypothesis that people who have different occupation have different perceptions of Soft Power. Across the board, means of occupation groups were significantly different for perceived cultural and political Soft Power. However, diplomatic Soft Power was not significantly different by occupational cluster. Students rated cultural Soft Power lowest and people employed in sales or service rated it highest. F-value of perceived cultural Soft Power by occupation group was significant [F(7,1028)=2.02, p<.04]. Perceived political Soft Power was also significant by occupational clusters. The student group had the lowest mean and the blue-collar group had the highest mean, and F-value was significant [F(7,1028)=1.97, p<.05]. On the



other hand, there was no significant difference in perceived diplomatic Soft Power by occupation. F-value was not reach significant value .05 [F(7,1028)=1.44, p=.18]. These data indicate that occupation affects perception of cultural and political Soft Power.

**Table 9**  
*ANOVA of Soft Power by Occupation, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

Occupation	Cultural Soft Power	Political Soft Power	Diplomatic Soft Power
	Mean (S.D)	Mean (S.D)	Mean (S.D)
Agriculture/forestry/ Fishery	21.46 (4.61)	17.85 (4.36)	38.00 (10.10)
Self-employed	21.38 (4.14)	17.12 (4.80)	38.67 (8.50)
Sales/service	23.15 (4.49)	18.10 (5.05)	38.16 (9.56)
Blue-collar	22.32 (4.10)	18.23 (4.99)	39.14 (7.62)
White-collar	21.43 (4.26)	16.26 (4.63)	36.66 (8.75)
Housewife/ Home maker	21.97 (3.85)	16.61 (4.87)	39.63 (8.93)
Student	20.15 (4.20)	15.31 (4.40)	36.24 (8.74)
No occupation/ Retired/others	20.75 (5.06)	17.03 (4.54)	37.33 (7.89)
F-ratio	2.02*	1.97*	1.44
df	7	7	7

\*\*  $p=0.001$  level \*  $p=0.05$  level,  $N=1029$

### Level of Education

A fifth ANOVA was used to examine the hypothesis that people's level of education affects their perception of Soft Power. Accordingly, six educational levels were used as independent variables. Table 10 shows mean values, standard deviations, degrees of freedom, and f-values of Soft Power by level of education. Overall, the results of ANOVA were not

significant for perceived cultural Soft Power, but political and diplomatic Soft Power showed significant difference by level of education. Political Soft Power was significantly different by group. People who completed postgraduate degrees rated political Soft Power lowest, and people who were middle school graduates or lower rated it highest. The result of ANOVA was also significant [ $F(5,1028)=4.19, p<.001$ ]. Although perceptions of political Soft Power and diplomatic Soft Power were similar, diplomatic Soft Power showed the most significant differences. In common with perceived political Soft Power, the lowest ratings were from people with post-graduate degrees, and the highest were from people who were middle school graduates or lower. The higher the educational level showed the lower the perception of diplomatic Soft Power. Thus, the results of ANOVA verified that level of education is an indicator of perceived political and diplomatic Soft Power.

**Table 10**  
*ANOVA of Soft Power by Educational Level, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

Education	Cultural Soft Power	Political Soft Power	Diplomatic Soft Power
	Mean (S.D)	Mean (S.D)	Mean (S.D)
Middle school graduate and under	21.36 (4.47)	18.29 (4.51)	40.82 (6.73)
High school graduate	22.36 (4.05)	17.63 (4.18)	39.75 (8.64)
College student	20.59 (4.58)	15.43 (4.99)	36.05 (9.55)
Two-year technical (professional) college graduate	20.68 (4.09)	16.09 (4.18)	36.30 (8.86)
Four-year College graduate	21.46 (4.39)	16.19 (4.84)	36.41 (8.78)
Postgraduate	21.40 (4.20)	15.08 (6.21)	35.67 (8.61)
F-ratio	1.85	4.19**	4.91**

df	5	5	5
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\*\*  $p=0.001$  level \*  $p=0.05$  level,  $N=1029$

**Income**

**Table 11**  
*ANOVA of Soft Power by Income, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

Income (KRW 1,000)	Cultural Soft Power	Political Soft Power	Diplomatic Soft Power
	Mean (S.D)	Mean (S.D)	Mean (S.D)
Less than 1,000	19.49 (5.11)	17.15 (4.36)	42.15 (8.29)
1,000 - 1,990	21.93 (4.04)	16.95 (4.34)	36.53 (8.31)
2,000 - 2,990	21.27 (4.21)	16.61 (4.44)	36.09 (9.05)
3,000 - 3,990	21.36 (4.19)	16.78 (4.77)	37.13 (8.54)
4,000 - 4,990	22.11 (4.32)	16.18 (5.43)	39.91 (8.57)
5,000 - 5,990	22.00 (3.58)	17.12 (4.10)	36.46 (8.43)
6,000 - 6,990	21.86 (4.66)	17.64 (5.84)	37.32 (7.28)
7,000 - 7,990	20.18 (4.29)	14.55 (6.51)	36.13 (6.24)
8,000 - 8,990	23.33 (3.45)	15.17 (2.86)	36.63 (8.96)
9,000 - 9,990	24.80 (5.72)	20.20 (4.44)	44.00 (12.98)
10,000 or more	21.90 (4.86)	17.30 (5.89)	35.64 (6.22)
F-ratio	1.07	.82	2.48*

df	10	10	10
** $p=0.001$ level * $p=0.05$ level, $N=1029$			

Lastly, was used to examine the hypothesis that people with different income levels have different perceptions of the Soft Power of South Korea. Income level was classified in thousands of KRW, where 1,000 KRW was approximately equal to one U.S. dollar (USD). Across the board, the results of ANOVA indicated that perceived cultural and political Soft Power was not significantly different by income. However, F-value of diplomatic Soft Power was significantly different. The 9,000-9,990 group evaluated all three types of Soft Power generously, and the group showed the highest mean value. F-values of cultural and political Soft Power were not significant; only diplomatic Soft Power was significantly different by income [ $F_{\text{political}}(10,1028)=2.48, p=.01$ ].

In addition, Bonferroni tests showed that the mean of the 1,000,000 or less group was significantly different from the 2,000,000-2,990,000 group. The 1,000,000 or less group showed mean differences with three other groups, 1,000,000-1,990,000 KRW, 3,000,000-3,990,000 KRW, and 5,000,000-5,990,000 KRW. These differences approached statistical significance, but did not reach the conventional  $p<.05$  level. To sum it up, income is a significant factor of perceived diplomatic Soft Power.

### **Cumulative and Independent Effects**

Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine whether the cluster of independent variables was useful to explain perceived Soft Power. Table 12 summarizes the result of regression analysis. Overall, the result of multiple regression showed that the cluster of independent variables was useful to explain perceptions of the three types of Soft Power. The first multiple regression model showed that the cluster of independent variables was a

meaningful predictor of cultural Soft Power,  $R^2 = .08$ ,  $F(14, 489) = 2.89$ ,  $p < .001$ . As can be seen in Table 12, analysis with age had significant negative regression weights, indicating that young people were more likely to agree that cultural Soft Power was weak. The analysis with level of education had significantly negative regression weights, meaning that people who had higher educational levels were more likely to agree that South Korea has strong cultural Soft Power.

**Table 12**  
*OLS Regression of Soft Power, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

	Cultural Soft Power				Political Soft Power				Diplomatic Soft Power			
	B	b	s.e	t-value	B	b	s.e	t-value	B	b	s.e	t-value
(Constant)	22.46		1.85	12.15	12.23		2.16	5.67	33.93		4.04	8.39
Metropolitan Area	1.49	.19	1.08	1.38	1.51	.16	1.23	1.23	1.21	.07	2.14	.57
Chungcheongdo	3.09	.23**	1.18	2.62	1.90	.12	1.34	1.41	5.69	.20*	2.39	2.38
Jeollado	1.09	.09	1.15	.95	1.56	.11	1.31	1.20	5.37	.20*	2.36	2.28
Gyeongsando	2.30	.26*	1.10	2.10	2.16	.20	1.25	1.73	2.67	.14	2.20	1.22
Gender	.64	.08	.40	1.57	-.19	-.02	.48	-.40	-2.17	-.13*	.87	-2.49
Age	-.04	-.16*	.02	-2.29	.08	.24**	.02	3.60	.11	.18**	.04	2.84
Agriculture/Forestry/ Fishery	-.22	-.01	1.35	-.16	.05	.00	1.59	.03	-2.74	-.03	4.42	-.62
Self/management	-.26	-.02	.79	-.33	.05	.00	.96	.05	.42	.02	1.79	.23
Sales/Service	.33	.02	.90	.36	2.21	.14	1.07	2.07	2.02	.07	1.86	1.09
Blue-collar	.97	.06	.97	1.00	1.07	.06	1.16	.93	.13	.00	2.04	.07
White-collar	.19	.02	.79	.24	1.23	.12	.95	1.30	1.47	.08	1.73	.85
Housewife	.03	.00	.79	.04	-.05	-.00	.96	-.05	3.40	.15	1.78	1.91
Student	-1.95	-.16	1.01	-1.93	1.05	.07	1.20	.87	1.21	.04	2.32	.52
Education	-.33	-.13*	.15	-2.30	-.42	-.14*	.17	-2.49	-.85	-.16*	.31	-2.74
Income	.27	.14**	.09	2.93	.10	.04	.11	.88	.32	.08	.20	1.61
R <sup>2</sup>		.08				.10				.12		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		.05				.07				.09		
F-ratio		2.89**				3.39**				4.24**		

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*\*\* p=0.001 level \* p= 0.05 level, N=1029*

In addition, regression using income as an independent variable showed significantly positive regression weights, indicating that people who had higher income levels rated cultural Soft Power higher. The inhabitants of Chungchungdo and Gangwondo showed significantly different evaluations of cultural Soft Power than did other regions. The gender and occupation variables did not contribute to the multiple regression model of cultural Soft Power.

Secondly, the multiple regression model of political Soft Power with all predictors produced  $R^2 = .10$ ,  $F(14, 485) = 3.39$ ,  $p < .001$ . The analysis using age as an independent variable had significant positive regression weights, indicating that after controlling for other variables in the model, older people were more likely to agree that political Soft Power of South Korea is strong.

The analysis with level of education displayed significantly negative regression weights, meaning that people with higher educational levels were more likely to perceive political Soft Power as low. Regression analysis with income showed significantly positive regression weights, indicating that people who had higher income levels rated cultural Soft Power high. Region, gender, occupation, and income did not contribute to the multiple regression model of cultural Soft Power.

The multiple regression model of diplomatic Soft Power with 15 variables produced  $R^2 = .12$ ,  $F(14, 476) = 4.24$ ,  $p < .001$ . The analysis using gender showed negative regression weights, meaning that females were more likely to agree that diplomatic Soft Power was weak. However, diplomatic Soft Power had significant positive regression weights by age variable, indicating that after controlling for other variables in the model, older people were more likely to agree that South Korea had high diplomatic Soft Power. Analysis with level of education displayed significantly negative regression weights, meaning that people with higher educational levels

perceived that South Korea had low diplomatic Soft Power. Analysis with region showed that inhabitants of Chungcheongdo and Jeollado showed different perceptions of diplomatic Soft Power. Inhabitants of Chungcheongdo were more consentient that diplomatic Soft Power was strong, but inhabitants of Jeollado were reverse. The occupation and income variables did not contribute to the multiple regression model of diplomatic Soft Power.

## **V. Conclusions**

### **Summary**

The purpose of this study was to verify how different demographic groups and social classes perceive the Soft Power of South Korea differently, and to find implications for enhancing Soft Power. Although there have been many previous studies of Soft Power, the previous studies focused on external evaluation, that is, how other countries evaluate the Soft Power of South Korea. However, this study dealt with Soft Power in a different way by analyzing how South Koreans evaluate their own Soft Power.

According to the results of analyses, perceived Soft Power can be meaningfully explained by the cluster of demographic factors and determinants of social status that were used as independent variables. In detail, 1) three independent variables, age, occupation, and level of education, affected South Koreans' perception of political Soft Power, 2) four variables, region, age, level of education, and income, influenced perception of diplomatic Soft Power, and 3) occupation was the only factor which affected cultural Soft Power.

### **Implications**

One especially significant finding was that perceived political and diplomatic Soft Power was distinctively different by age group. Younger South Koreans rated political and diplomatic Soft Power low. This finding may be due to the fact that age groups within Korea have significantly different levels of education. According to the report of educational attainment by the National Statistical Office, among members of the Organization for Economy Cooperation and Development (OECD), South Korea has the largest disparity of educational level among generations. People under 40, who were born after the mid-70s, have a much higher average educational level than people over 50 ("The World Factbook," 2013). Therefore, the findings of



this study suggest that the well-educated younger generation tended to suspect the political and diplomatic legitimacy of South Korea. The present government has not gained people's trust, especially among people in their 30s and 40s who are the main agents of economic activity ("The World Factbook," 2013). This tendency is likely to continue as time passes because younger generations will distrust the government's policies and diplomacy.

One reason that people do not admit the legitimacy of politics may be the unhealthy link between politics and the economy. Distrust of the political justification of South Korea is raised consistently at home and abroad. Weak political Soft Power not only disturbs economic development, but also damages the national brand. According to the report of the World Economic Forum (WEF), among 148 countries surveyed, South Korea ranked low in public trust in politicians (112<sup>th</sup>), transparency of government policymaking (137<sup>th</sup>), and protection of minority shareholders' interests (124<sup>th</sup>) (Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2013). Unhealthy links between politics and the economy create a social structure which is advantageous for the wealthy. The structure leads to an abnormal economic structure, conglomerate. Considering people's distrust of the government, the government needs policies that break the chain of collusive ties between politicians and businesspeople. Improving political transparency will be a starting point for enhancing political Soft Power.

Another reason for people's distrust of the government is connected with diplomatic policies. South Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA) is 0.12 percent of gross national income. Among members of the OECD, it ranked 22<sup>nd</sup> in 2011. Although this ranking moved up one level from 2009, the rank is second to last ("The World Factbook," 2013). In addition, while the South Korean military has participated in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) since 1993, it is limited to dispatching nonbattle branches to restricted areas (Defense, 2012).

This passive attitude towards ODA and PKO negatively affects evaluation of diplomatic Soft Power not only by foreign countries but also by South Korean citizens. These facts imply that South Korea ought to formulate more active diplomatic policies to increase foreign aid and overseas dispatch of armed forces. Such policies will enhance South Korea's position in the international world and improve other nations' attitudes towards South Korea.

In addition, it is meaningful that the mean value of perceive cultural Soft Power was larger than for the other types of Soft Power. South Koreans commonly agree that South Korea has comparatively stronger cultural Soft Power than political and diplomatic Soft Power. However, as mentioned above, the efforts to enhance Soft Power of South Korea lean towards popular culture. The government should extend efforts to enhance cultural Soft Power in diverse fields. Some possible ways to improve cultural Soft Power might include establishing Korean language institutions and giving traditional Korean performances in foreign countries.

Nevertheless, efforts to enhance Soft Power should be balanced with development of Hard Power. It is inevitable for South Korea to be concerned with Hard Power, especially military power, because South Korea has continued military confrontations with North Korea. But if this country concentrates too heavily on Hard Power, it will create an air of anxiety for surrounding countries who have conflictive relationships with South Korea. On the other hand, South Korea will lose deterrent force if the country just focuses on enhancing Soft Power. Therefore, the theory of Smart Power, which stresses balance between Soft Power and Hard Power, is important for the policy making of South Korea. Smart Power facilitates reducing the budget for military power through alternatives such as alliances and international institutions.

### **Limitations**

This research was based on Joseph Nye's classification of three types of Soft Power:

cultural, political, and diplomatic. However, some say that his classification is ambiguous and suggest a new classification based on sources of power. This research is limited because it did not specify which fields of Soft Power were measured. Thus, alternate classification is need to measure Soft Power. For instance, *Monocle*'s measurement used five categories of culture, diplomacy, education, business/innovation, and government. Including segmentalized categories may lead to a more complete explanation of Soft Power.

In addition, this data was collected in 2008, six years ago. During this period, South Korea endured many social changes. The first female president was elected in 2012, and South Korea hosted the Yeosu Expo in 2012 and the Group of 20 (G20) in 2010. The sinking of Sewol ferry in 2014, which caused many casualties, shocked the entire nation, and raised questions about South Koreans' ignorance of safety procedures. These social events are likely to have affected the perceived Soft Power of South Korea. Therefore, additional research is needed to analyze South Koreans' present perceptions of Soft Power.

Furthermore, most of the independent variables used in this study did not have a significant effect on perceived cultural Soft Power. Only the occupational cluster had any significant effect. Thus, this result found meaningful implications for improving political and diplomatic Soft Power, but not cultural Soft Power. In addition, the result of regression shows that the selected independent variables have only a limited ability to predict perceptions of Soft Power. The cluster of independent variables explained eight percent of perceptions of cultural Soft Power, ten percent of perceptions of political Soft Power, and twelve percent of perceptions of diplomatic Soft Power. Even though the result of regression was significant, a large proportion of perceptions of Soft Power were not predicted by the independent variables. Further research is needed to identify independent variables which can more successfully predict

perception of Soft Power.

**Table 13***Correlation of Matrix of Study, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey, 2008*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1.Cultural Soft Power	--																
2.Political Soft Power	.37	--															
3.Diplomatic Soft Power	a	a	--														
4.Metropolitan	-.07	-.07	-.14**	--													
5.Chungcheongdo	.11*	.02	.12**	-.33**	--												
6.Jeollado	-.06	.00	.11*	-.35**	-.12**	--											
7.Gyeongsando	.08	.08	.02	-.59**	-.21**	-.22**	--										
8.Gender	.08	-.03	-.06	.00	.00	.01	-.00	--									
9.Age	-.05	.22**	.24**	-.03	-.01	.01	.03	.02	--								
10.Agriculture/Forestry/Fishery	-.01	.04	.00	-.13**	-.02	.20**	-.01	-.02	.12**	--							
11.Self/management	-.04	.03	.04	.00	-.02	.00	.01	-.08*	.23**	-.05	--						
12.Sales/Service	.07	.10*	.02	-.02	.04	-.05	.03	-.07*	-.05	-.04	-.13**	--					
13.Blue-collar	.02	.08	.04	-.11**	.04	.01	.06*	-.19**	.18**	-.03	-.10**	-.09**	--				
14.White-collar	.05	-.07	-.10*	.03	-.03	.03	-.03	-.12**	-.32**	-.09**	-.27**	-.24**	-.19**	--			
15.Housewife	.04	-.01	.10*	.04	.02	-.05	-.01	.46**	.24**	-.06	-.18**	-.16**	-.12**	-.33**	--		
16.Student	-.10*	-.11*	-.05	-.03	.03	.03	-.02	-.03	-.46**	-.04	-.12**	-.11**	-.09**	-.23**	-.15**	--	
17.Education	.00	-.18**	-.20**	.08*	.01	.00	-.07*	-.16**	-.49**	-.11**	-.17**	-.04	-.19**	.50**	-.18**	-.02	--
18.Income	.12**	-.01	-.02	.14**	-.05	-.06*	-.06*	-.05	-.17**	-.05	-.03	.03	-.10**	.27**	-.09**	-.07*	.35**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and \* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), N=1029

Note: Questions asking diplomatic Soft Power are different with cultural and political questions, so correlation between diplomatic Soft power with cultural and political Soft Power is not computed.

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