Redefining US Security Missions: 
The Effectiveness of Security Forces during Military Operations

by

Basma S. Abdul-Hamid

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Auburn University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Auburn, Alabama
December 13, 2014

Key words: armed civil conflict, authoritarianism, security forces, military operations, policing

Copyright 2014 by Basma S. Abdul-Hamid

Approved by

Jill A. Crystal, Chair, Professor of Political Science
James A. Nathan, Professor/Eminent Scholar of Political Science
Linda F. Dennard, Professor of Political Science
William T. Dean III, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies
Abstract

This study examines how an Arab state’s use of force influences responses based on popular perception of institutional legitimacy. The study argues the duration of armed civil conflict within Arab states signals rejection of a dysfunctional authoritarian government. In essence, regardless of the cause of onset, the duration of armed civil conflict is linked to perceptions of the state’s internal legitimacy. Therefore, the aim of this study is to understand how an Arab state’s or intervening force’s exercise of authority to attain people’s compliance affects the population’s political behavior. The first underlying assumption is contextual interpretations by the belligerents engaged in armed civil conflict are just as influential as structural and functional factors in driving political behavior. The second assumption is when intrastate conflict erupts between the state and its people institutional functionality is linked to the state’s authority. The final assumption is a policing approach to security influences political behavior differently than a military approach.

Historical records show the British in Iraq restored order in a shorter period of time and with fewer casualties, so this study investigates how the British achieved such outcome. The study compares the British (1919-1921) and French (1925-1927) responses to an outbreak of armed civil conflict within their protectorates, to ascertain how the British policing approach was more authoritative than the French approach. Results of these comparisons are then used to assess the security approach applied in the initial years of the US military campaign in Iraq, between 2003 and 2005.
The case-studies are compared using Mill’s most similar and most different analytical frameworks. The qualitative method of process-tracing links possible causal pathways with observed outcomes. Findings show a professionalized policing approach increases non-combatants’ cooperation with authority, reduces the duration of intrastate conflict, and reduces the number of casualties from armed civil conflict. The caveat is police professionalism must reflect structural, functional and symbolic legitimacy.
Acknowledgments

While I lived a truly charmed life, I certainly did not anticipate attaining an advanced degree in tow. Thus, I attribute this favorable outcome to the generosity of those I encountered along the way. I wish to begin by thanking the members of my committee. I am most grateful to my chair, Dr. Jill Crystal, for skillfully guiding me through this academic endeavor and not losing faith in me. I am equally grateful to Dr. Linda Dennard, for championing human sense of decency and compassion. My deep appreciation goes out to Dr. James Nathan, for graciously lending me his time and attention. Likewise for Dr. Bill Dean, whose mentorship has been pivotal to my development. I am eternally indebted to Dr. Greg Weaver, for entering my life just in the nick of time and guiding me through the finish line. Furthermore, I wish to recognize the great help I received from Drs. Steven Brown, Gryski, Kalu and Mss. France and Bullen.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the immense support I received from my Air Force family, especially from Generals Shaud, Regni, and Fadok; Mr. Jones; Drs. Hayden, Costanzo, Spivey, Griffith, Kessler, Grummelli, Dains, Ouellette, Ware, Yeisely, and Berg.

My parents and brothers have long been my sources of inspiration and subjects of my admiration. They modeled the virtues of intellect, nurtured my sense of curiosity, and instilled in me an appreciation for perseverance. However, it is the love of my family is which made this journey meaningful and achieving this milestone possible. Therefore, I dedicate this work to my soul-mate, Anthony, and our precious daughters, Gabby and Alexa. They are my raison d’être, sources of pride, and boundless wellsprings of joy.
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... iv
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 1
  The Road Between Tyranny and Anarchy ................................................................. 14
  The Roadmap ............................................................................................................. 22
  Political Mirages ........................................................................................................ 24
  Proverbial Quicksand ................................................................................................. 28
  The Purpose of the Study .......................................................................................... 44
  The Study Outline ..................................................................................................... 45
Chapter 2: The Frameworks ......................................................................................... 47
  Contextual Background ............................................................................................ 48
    The Big Picture ...................................................................................................... 49
    Much Ado About Nothing ....................................................................................... 52
  The Conceptual Framework ....................................................................................... 57
    Political Violence ................................................................................................... 59
    Military Operations ................................................................................................. 60
    Security .................................................................................................................. 66
    Policing ................................................................................................................... 72
The Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................... 79
  Structural Legitimacy .................................................................................................................. 82
  Rational Choice Theory ............................................................................................................... 95
  Conflict Theories ....................................................................................................................... 99
  Collective Action ......................................................................................................................... 105
  Constructivism ........................................................................................................................ 108

Chapter 3: Methodology ............................................................................................................... 114
  Case Study ................................................................................................................................ 119
  Within-Case Study ...................................................................................................................... 121
  Cross-Case Study ....................................................................................................................... 121
  Case Selection ............................................................................................................................ 122
  Research Design ......................................................................................................................... 123

Chapter 4: The British and French Case Studies ......................................................................... 129
  The Pre-WWI Years .................................................................................................................... 131
  Post-WWI Regional Profile ......................................................................................................... 144
  The British in Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 152
  The French in Syria ..................................................................................................................... 158

Chapter 5: The US Case Study .................................................................................................... 165

Chapter 6: The Comparative Analysis ......................................................................................... 184
  Discussion.................................................................................................................................. 192
  Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 212
  Policy Implications ..................................................................................................................... 223

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 229
List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Army Corrections Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Airborne Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSF</td>
<td>Air Force Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AoR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Bureau of Diplomatic Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Community-oriented Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Core Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA-IG</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>Development Fund for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Diplomatic Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC</td>
<td>Iraqi Body Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>Internal Defense and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Interim Governing Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRMO</td>
<td>Iraq Reconstruction Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF</td>
<td>Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Navy Master-at-arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-Iraq</td>
<td>Multi-National Force-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Army Military Police Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NIE  National Intelligence Estimate
NSAM  National Security Action Memorandum
NSC  National Security Council
NSPD  National Security Presidential Directive
OCONUS  Overseas
ODNI  Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND  Operation New Dawn
ORHA  Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP  Office of Special Plans
PCO  Project and Contracting Office
PMG  Provost Marshal General
PTSD  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RAF  British Royal Air Force
S/CRS  Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at DoS
SA  Security Assistance
SC  Security Cooperation
SecDef  Secretary of Defense
SIGIR  Special Inspector General for Reconstruction in Iraq
SOF  Special Operations Forces
SSCI  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SWAT  Special Weapons and Tactics
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>Unified Combatant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>US Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

This study compares the different approaches to establishing security, in terms of restoring public order in the aftermath of intrastate conflict and by the use of lethal force. More specifically, the study explores how exogenous and endogenous factors yield different responses to a state’s use of force based upon the population’s interpretation of the context. The aim is to understand how, within the context of the Middle East\(^1\) region, an Arab state’s exercise of authority yields responses based upon the population’s perception of its legitimacy. Thus, the study inquires how the interpretation of structural, functional and symbolic characteristics of a particular context influences the population’s behavioral response to authority, by either inducing compliance or inciting rebellion. The study argues the duration of armed civil conflict\(^2\) within Arab states\(^3\) signals popular rejection of dysfunctional authoritarian\(^4\) governance (Neep 2012, 10; Blanchard et. al. 2012, 2). In essence, regardless of the conflict’s cause of onset its duration is linked to people’s perception of the Arab state’s authority to use force and, more abstractly, the state’s internal legitimacy (Neep 2012, 9).

This study assumes belligerents engaged in armed civil conflict in the Middle East are equally influenced by symbolic drivers of action as structural and functional drivers based upon their interpreted meaning (Neep 2012, 9). The second assumption is the influence of using force,

---

\(^1\) The Middle East region includes the following states: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

\(^2\) Sørli, Gleditsch, and Strand (2005) coined this term to denote both internal and internationalized internal conflicts.

\(^3\) According to Donno and Russett (2004), democratic deficit is characteristic of Arab states more than Islamic.

\(^4\) Totalitarian regimes deliberately use terror and the security apparatus to control the population. Meanwhile authoritarian governments allow some level of independent action (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 107).
by an Arab state against its people in response to an outbreak of intrastate conflict, is linked to people’s perceptions of the state’s authority. The final assumption is people’s behavioral responses differ according to the types of approaches to establishing security. This study finds the policing approach elicits compliance by being perceived as more authoritative than the military approach. The authoritative quality of the policing approach lies in its interpreted symbolic meaning within a particular context. The symbolic influence of the policing approach induces cooperation with authority and restores order by reducing the duration of conflict.

In its broadest sense, the study explores the security dimension of Arab states and its impact on US operations. The process of this investigation takes on three general themes: theoretical, historical and analytical. The study begins by deconstructing the relevant context into its constitutional components, then analyzing the selected case studies to better understand the security dimension of Arab states. Based upon this understanding of the particular context, its constitutional components, and the impact of their application on establishing security during military missions, the study contemplates their implications to US military policies.

While the potential for broader applicability is possible, the focus of this inquiry is limited to the exercise of authority within the Middle East region. As a geo-strategically significant location to the United States (US) and the most militarized region in the world, the capacity of Arab states to maintain stability and order, domestically and regionally, is of unique interest. The structure and function of the international system and its affiliated institutions constitute the exogenous factors influencing people’s perceptions and behaviors. By the same token, endogenous factors refer to people’s socially constructed interpretations of their environment and which elicit behavioral responses. Since historical records show the British in Iraq restored order in a shorter period of time and with fewer casualties, this study is curious as
to how this was achieved. Therefore, it compares the British policing approach to restoring order and in response to an outbreak of armed civil conflict within Iraq (1919-1921) with the French approach within Syria (1925-1927). The goal of this comparison is to ascertain how the British policing approach differed from the French; thereby, reduced the duration of the armed civil conflict and, in turn, the number of casualties. Results of this comparison are then used to assess the security approach applied in the initial years of the US military campaign in Iraq (2003-2005).

Scholarly literature points to enduring structural and functional causes for Arab states’ lag in all modes of development, which is why this study aims to understand the message conveyed by the differing responses to exercise of authority. Authoritarian Arab states remain in power by keeping institutions weak, holding the population captive, and maintaining a robust coercive apparatus. In essence, authoritarian governments sow the seeds of internal conflict with their chosen policies (Hashim 2006, 80; Blanchard et. al. 2012, 2). Consequently, a display of incompetence by the state or intervening force will only reaffirm people’s perception of the state’s illegitimacy (Connable and Libicki 2010, 153). So regardless of the conflict’s cause of onset, the duration of the conflict reflects the Arab state’s inability to restore order, because the achievement of this desired outcome is linked to domestic perceptions of the state’s legitimacy (Johnson 1982, 32). Thus, it would behoove US policy-makers and military planners to appreciate the role cultural and contextual factors play in driving people’s interpretations of state’s use of force (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 683; Blanchard et. al. 2012, 2-4). This is particularly imperative in the conduct of US military missions aiming to restore order and establish security (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 1).
Arguably, Arab states’ views on power relations and force applications have been largely shaped by the region’s imposing attributes. However, as of late, these justifications seem either out of step or perhaps have lost their explanatory potency (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 3). The incontrovertible underlying premise is authoritarian Arab governments remain in power through coercion and tacit support of sponsors (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 3). However, the cost of maintaining a favorable status quo to these authoritarian government rises as popular perceptions of the state’s legitimacy cedes (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 3). Essentially, the more aggrieved people feel about the state’s dysfunction, the more oppressive the state has to be to maintain a favorable status quo. Perhaps inevitably, the authoritarian Arab state will find itself turning to the international community for help and to bargain for its survival. Worse yet, the embattled state would adopt US’ method of hiring paid mercenaries (Seahill 2007, 347-359).

In general, incompetent governments “defeat themselves more often than...by a dominant insurgency” (Connable and Libicki 2010, 152). Self-defeat is largely caused by the state or its intelligence agencies ignoring early signs of discontent or waiting for conditions to deteriorate beyond a certain point (Connable and Libicki 2010, 152). It can also be precipitated by the state’s failure to address the root causes of discontent or by not addressing them adequately (Connable and Libicki 2010, 152). Similarly, it can be caused by lack of situational awareness, whether as failure to identify major shifts in strategic momentum or by not extending credible control into rural areas (Connable and Libicki 2010, 152). Such states tend to also rely on some form or another of fickle sponsorship. External sponsors are often “burdened with the need to sustain domestic support over an extended period of time” (Connable and Libicki 2010, 153).

The latest wave of political volatility sweeping through the Middle East, illustrate the limitations and implications of an incompetent state asserting its coercive control in lieu of
perception of legitimacy (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 2-4). An outbreak of intrastate conflict within an Arab state particularly requires a rapid response, to prevent the situation from devolving into a protracted struggle (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 1).

Military interventions are often launched in response to urgent negative circumstances. In common parlance, the process of restoring order in the aftermath of armed civil conflict is referred to as “nation-building”. However, within colloquial discourse the term nation-building is often used interchangeably with state-building. This tendency conflates the process of nurturing sense of national identity within a group with creating or resurrecting a functional state capacity. Arguably, this is attributed to the US often involving “the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors” (Dobbins et al. 2007, xvii). It is therefore imperative to distinguish and differentiate missions involving external military intervention from other forms of indigenous political reform. It could perhaps serve as a first step in preserving the authenticity of both processes.

By the same token, conventional and irregular wars differ in their strategic purposes and operational approaches (Dempsey 2013, I-5). Irregular warfare is characterized by “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)” (Dempsey 2013, I-6). By exploiting local bureaucratic incompetence, eliciting foreign support; leveraging popular support and fighting with a dispersed, decentralized force, insurgents are positioned to challenge the state’s authority (Galula 2006, 8 and 19; Connable and Libicki 2010, 182; Nagl 2005, 22). Therefore, popular support of an insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying external force (Connable and Libicki 2010, 176). Consequently, irregular wars are rarely resolved by military operations alone (Dempsey 2013, I-5; Connable
and Libicki 2010, 154; Hashim 2006, 272). Counterinsurgency (COIN) differs from conventional combat operations in its strategy for achieving desired effects and requiring a holistic civil-military approach (Goldfein 2013, I-2).

Traditionally, COIN refers exclusively to hostility against combatants. However, the distinctions between “combatant” and “civilian” are often beyond the means of military intelligence to discern. Furthermore, the term “insurgent” is sometimes based on a subjective view of the government’s legitimate authority. As such, the term “counterinsurgency” is somewhat cognate with “suppression” of rebellion. Military guidance on COIN often advises “to incorporate some form of interdiction operations into a comprehensive campaign plan when sanctuary is present” (Connable and Libicki 2010, 151). The key to remember here is often the “use of precision decapitation strikes came at a cost,” whether in “civilian casualties or some form of civilian back-lash” (Connable and Libicki 2010, 191).

COIN often also requires targeting the insurgency’s leadership structure. The ongoing wisdom is “the ability to take out (kill or capture) a dominant charismatic military leader may also be helpful to governments” (emphasis in original) (Connable and Libicki 2010, 191). Notwithstanding, “the same is not true for taking out the dominant political leader, as many colonial or white-majority regimes did, with little success” (Connable and Libicki 2010, 192). Essentially, targeting a political leader may help “subdue violence to manageable levels for a few years,” but the “government’s failure to address root causes allowed the insurgency to reignite” (Connable and Libicki 2010, 192).

Perhaps, fundamentally, this explains why COIN efforts conducted in the last century have been challenging, but especially to Western democracies (Galula 2006, 44). Insurgent-
centric COIN may be successful when the insurgents are unpopular. However, so long as the insurgency maintains popular support it will retain its strategic and tactical advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and those of the population (Galula 2006, 49). For this reason some argue “the different political situations in Iraq and Vietnam negate the relevance of any Vietnam COIN strategy for Iraq” (Hastedt 2011, 99; Hashim 2006, 30). The recent conflict in Iraq was not initially a struggle between the people against a government, rather “a security problem driven by mutual fear of all people about what will happen if the opposing group(s) seize control of the government” (Hastedt 2011, 99; Hashim 2006, 385-389).

To US policy-makers, the interagency efforts undertaken to build or re-build another state’s institutions reside within the realm of Security Cooperation (SC) missions. SC refers to Department of Defense (DoD) “interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.” While the authorization and appropriation statutes differ, both SC and SA programs provide “defense articles, military training, and other defense services” to a partner host nation (HN) missions. Notwithstanding, because SC activities are tools of national security and foreign policy, the Department of State (DoS) is normally the lead agency responsible for managing and coordinating SC processes. Within DoD, the Under

---

5 In developing the National Security policy, the president consults with the National Security Advisor and National Security Council then relies on the National Security Staff to develop the policy and make recommendations. The National Security policy process begins with the president’s decision being transmitted to all the relevant cabinet secretaries for implementation (Whittaker et. al. 2011, 24-30).

Secretary of Defense for Policy is the “principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on SC matters.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing these various SC activities.

A US COIN strategy “is designed to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence; strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of the HN government; and isolate the insurgents physically, psychologically, politically, socially, and economically” (Goldfein 2013, I-3). A population-centric COIN strategy “starts with the acceptance of the people as important to COIN operations” (Goldfein 2013, I-3). Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is one way in which one government could provide the HN with means for protection against threats to its security (Austin 2010, i). After all, COIN is “a complex protracted effort,” which often requires the integration of capabilities typically associated with peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, stability operations, FID, and counter-terrorism (Goldfein 2013, III-1).

A successful COIN strategy would “reduce the credibility of the insurgency while strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government” (Goldfein 2013, III-2). Security assistance (SA) activities may also take place within the context of SC missions. SA includes the implementation of the military component of policies established by the DoS (Austin 2010, I-11). Hence, SA is “the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of US national policies and objectives” (Austin 2010, I-10).

---

7 Ibid.
8 Other offices include: the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness; and the Military Departments.
The concept of FID originated during the Kennedy administration via the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 182. The document offered the first COIN guidance from the executive level. During the Johnson administration, NSAM 341 reemphasized the strategic imperative of supporting the HN government by aligning the structural nature of agency responses with the aims of this executive policy (Austin 2010, I-3). Guidance for the military aspect of FID assistance is contained in the 2010 Joint Publication (JP) 3-22 – *Foreign Internal Defense*. In broad terms, FID includes support by both civilian and military agencies, and focuses on aiding HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD). An IDAD plan must ultimately accomplish four interdependent objectives – balanced development of HN’s political, social, and economic programs; ensuring security and protection of the populace; neutralization of threats; and mobilization of manpower and materiel resources (Austin 2010, II-3).

IDAD activities take place within the area where SA and FID missions intersect. An IDAD program must adhere to the principles of unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, maximum use of civ-mil and psychological operations, minimum use of force, government responsiveness, and use of strategic communication (Austin 2010, II-5). Also taking place within this intersected area are security force assistance activities, in which the DoD augments and supports the development of HN security forces’ capacity and capabilities (Austin 2010, I-16).

An indirect form of support meanwhile focuses on building the infrastructure and capabilities conducive to self-sufficiency. Indirect support activities include: security assistance, military exchange programs and exercises (Austin 2010, x). A direct form of support excludes combat operations and focuses instead on civil-military relations, provision of services to the local populace, psychological operations, mobility, logistics, communications and intelligence cooperation (Austin 2010, x). The Director of National Intelligence (which replaced the Director
of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support FID either directly or through an advisory capacity.

When planning for such assistance missions “a large portion of the force needed to conduct FID is in the Reserve Component,” which in the absence of a Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority are a scarce resource let alone available for long-term operations (Austin 2010, IV-12; Dempsey 2013, V-13). Hence, deployment of Special Operation Forces (SOF) has been the traditional method for conducting FID (Austin 2010, IV-15; Alexander 2010, 45). While SOF members are uniquely qualified for such missions, given their extensive operational skills and cultural training (Alexander 2010, 46-50), they are limited by their units’ size and specialized expertise (Austin 2010, IV-15; Alexander 2010, 51). Therefore, the required additional support is supplemented by private contractors to enable “commanders to use joint forces more efficiently” (Austin 2010, IV-20).

As witnessed in the latest US military operations, rather than US strategic planners turn to private contractors as means of last resort, they became the default option for providing support (Hastedt 2011, 138; Scahill 2007, xvii). The cost in contractor fees, between 2002 and 2010, was $154 billion to the DoD, $11 billion to the DoS, and $7 billion to the USAID (Hastedt 2011, 138). Between 2009 and 2011, the Commission on Wartime Contracting investigated the combined impact of “over-reliance on contractors and an inadequate supervision and accounting of how funds were spent” (Hastedt 2011, 138). In its final report to Congress, the Commission blamed the “lack of coordination among State, Defense, and USAID planning and implementation projects, a lack of sufficient staff to oversee these efforts, and a ‘gotta have it

---

9 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence was established in December 2004. (Whittaker et. al. 2011, 58).
now’s mentality that valued meeting immediate targets over producing long-term successes” (Hastedt 2011, 138).

Similarly, it faulted contractors for “inadequate financial controls” and found contract personnel “guilty of money laundering, bribery, kickback schemes, and false invoicing” (Hastedt 2011, 139). Unless oversight and accountability improve, the Commission considers the future plan of DoS to hire 5,100 private security contractors “a looming disaster” (Hastedt 2011, 138). By the end of 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) had found the lack of effective management of contractors “negatively affecting unit morale or military operations” (GAO 2006, 31). Moreover, it had hindered DoD’s “ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are effectively meeting their contract requirements in the most cost-efficient manner” (GAO 2006, 35).

Fundamentally, much of the publicly available literature on establishing security is preoccupied with issues of inadequate strategy, lack of coordination, staffing weaknesses, and insufficient funding that is poorly timed (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 25-29; Scahill 2007, xiv). Moreover, considering the complexity of tasks, there was little clarity on how to best proceed (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 84; Hashim 2006, 350). Most notably was the lack of preparation for the Golden Hour, “in which it is necessary to establish public safety and security after a conflict” (Phelps 2010, 5). It is during the Golden Hour the police “as the most visible aspect of government interaction with a population, must act in a transparent and humanitarian manner to promote the rule of law” (Phelps 2010, 7). The literature on democratic policing emphasizes the importance of establishing a police force during this period “as part of a legitimate and representative government of the people” (Phelps 2010, 7).
In the period leading up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, policy-makers seemed more concerned with guarding against appearing imperialist than actually preparing to behave as liberators (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 10 and 29; Gordon and Trainor 2006, 18). In spite of all the discouraging evidence and cautionary advice (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 6 and 7; Hashim 2006, 357), US policy-makers nonetheless promised a speedy and efficient military campaign to topple the existing Iraqi government, contain the security threat it posed, and hand-over sovereignty back to the Iraqis (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 10). While the campaign did topple the despotic regime and handed over sovereignty to the Iraqis, however, the protracted war left behind an unstable country and region (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 683).

Prior to the 2003 Iraqi invasion, numerous policy gaps and contradictions seem to have been ignored without account (Craner 2003). US policy-makers seemed more focused on ensuring a strong political foothold in the region with a minimal military footprint (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 29 and 80; Scahill 2007, xv). Details of the events leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlight the extent to which the US decision-makers were either poorly informed (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 9; Hastedt 2011, 187; Hashim 2006, 21 and 59), or at odds with each other (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 27-30; Hastedt 2011, 199).

Without a doubt, it was imperative for the Coalition military forces to depart the country as soon as the conventional war campaign achieved its goal of toppling the Iraqi regime. The US had hoped to form a friendly Iraqi government and swiftly hand back Iraq’s sovereignty. SecDef Rumsfeld was intent on not engaging in state-building; the failure to “organize a civilian constabulary for immediate duty in Iraq was not an oversight” (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 503). However, unanticipated delays associated with decapitating the former Iraqi regime and with replacing it with a new more malleable Iraqi government led to several complications. By then,
Iraq was beginning to descend into sectarian civil war. Departure of Coalition forces during that critical time would have expedited the complete collapse of the state. Any chance of exit, henceforth, meant supporting a flawed political process and manufacturing an illusion of pluralism (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 229). This is hardly an insignificant point, since states and institutions require perception of their legitimacy to function and endure (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 82). When lacking such legitimacy, resort to coercion and use of force become necessary to compel obedience to authority. As with any political arrangement, sustainment of a repressive state grows increasingly costly and untenable.

This study, therefore, investigates the connection between the perception of legitimate authority and establishing security. The inquiry is driven by assertions about the effectiveness of the British policing approach to maintaining order. A previous study had argued the British were more effective in establishing order within their Iraq mandate than the French within Syria during the interwar period, between 1919 and 1939. The reason was attributed to Britain’s less conspicuous mechanism of maintaining order (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 22). This study therefore compares the two security approaches within the Fertile Crescent region. Comparisons in this study aim to explore how these historical approaches differed in restoring order. As US military planners reorient their gaze toward future conventional or unconventional wars, findings of this study point to an alternative method for attaining compliance. Given the evolving geo-strategic context and potential global challenges, US policy-makers must consider a more pragmatic and sustainable approach to establishing order during the conduct of military operations (Nagl 2005, 105).
The Road Between Tyranny and Anarchy

While the Middle East has experienced constant volatility since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the latest tumult spreading through the region could nonetheless carry new implications. The complexity of globalism, exponential growth in numbers of non-state actors, and the rapid proliferation of technology are promising less manageable global consequences. Although globalization is not a new phenomenon, the concept of the state in comparison is.

Since time immemorial, populations indigenous to the Middle East had to overcome challenges, internal and external as well as natural and man-made. As such, life in the Middle East, whether in times of war or the peaceful lulls in between, continues to be seen as Hobbesian.\textsuperscript{10} After all, the people of this region still struggle with territorial disputes, water scarcity, external conflict zones,\textsuperscript{11} and relentless militarization (Sørli, et al. 2005, 141; Crystal 2001, 470). According to neo-realists, the potential for engaging in conflict is a consequence of anarchy in the international system and due to the powerful incentives for aggression (Measrsheimer 1990; Bull 1977). Could this explain why the Middle East is the most militarized region in the world and, therefore, home to a revolving cast of power peddlers?

As power competitors continue to ruthlessly vie for prestige they, in the manner of their course, systematically erode the credibility of political incumbents and the authority of existing institutions (Sørli, et al. 2005, 142). Eventually, this cyclical pattern of targeted contestation renders political and economic institutions weak and rudderless (Sørli, et al. 2005, 142; Bellin 2004, 139). As a result, formal institutions cannot be relied upon to lift these states from a general sense of insecurity and inertial malaise (Bellin 2004, 139; Lust-Okar 2004, 166).

---

\textsuperscript{10} Refers to a range of strategic interactions, between tyranny and anarchy.

\textsuperscript{11} Afghanistan, the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, and Sudan.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) argued what distinguishes a government from the state is the ability of the population to affect its behavior (Book III). Joel Migdal (1988) succinctly explained how a legitimate state’s main function is to govern. Otherwise, the state is an institution among others seeking to establish control over society; hence, it must compete with other strong leaders. The political system is legitimate by its capacity to achieve changes and perform functions effectively through institutions. Seymour Lipset (1959) defined legitimacy in both instrumental and affective terms (86). The instrumental dimension of legitimacy is the political system’s capacity to meet society’s expectations, and the affective is maintaining consensus over its efficacy (Van Evera 1994, 31). Therefore, the state must effectively penetrate society to identify collective ends, to regulate interactions, and to extract resources (Kilcullen 2010, 150).

Lipset argued a crisis of legitimacy may occur during periods of transition in which power is redistributed due to structural change (1959, 87). The outbreak of political violence hence creates instability and points to a lapse in effective governance. According to historical experiences, a strong and centralized authority is essential to remedy this vulnerability. But what if the strong centralized authority is the source of armed civil conflict?

Ideally, the role of the state is to shield citizens from predatory threats normally posed by a larger and anarchic international system (Rousseau 1762, Book II). Regrettably, most Arab states have yet to meet this notional obligation. To the people of these countries, the state merely represents another hurdle for them to overcome. Middle Easterners are rational and utility-maximizers; they had learned from anecdotal history there are hurdles worth overcoming, while there are others too intractable to confront, at least not head on. Due to this dubious legacy, the region appears as if it is particularly wired for opportunism and conflict (Sørli, et al. 2005, 141).
Case in point, even interstate\textsuperscript{12} wars which erupted in the Middle East after World War II are still considered one of the most enduring,\textsuperscript{13} or the bloodiest,\textsuperscript{14} or involving the most international participants\textsuperscript{15} (Sørli, et al. 2005, 141). Naturally, facts like these lead one to wonder if indeed the region is more prone to conflict. If the claim is true, what drives such proclivity? Is conflict inherent to the region or simply pathology in need of cure?

Broadly speaking, this study is interested in understanding the complex relationship between the authoritarian Arab state and its population, especially in their roles as antagonists midst armed civil conflict. The literature contains competing arguments on what the purpose of the state is, what it represents, or how much authority it should have. However, this study is more concerned with how these issues are deliberated in the Middle East. More precisely, how the duration of armed civil conflict is in fact evidence of government’s incompetence. In this context, armed civil conflict represents how the antagonists’ interpretations of their reality (Levy 1989, 282), in terms of threat perception and use of retaliatory force, affect the eventual outcome of the conflict. Therefore, the study intends to examine how revolutionaries’ response to state’s authority affects the conflict’s duration and casualty numbers.

To achieve this goal of discovering a common cause for armed civil conflict within the Middle East, the study begins by describing the volatile context within which antagonists come to a head. It begins by considering worldviews are equal to structural and functional factors in determining political behaviors and outcomes (Van Evera 1994; Holsti 1968; Hastedt 2011, 45). After all, individuals create organizations, cultures, and societies (Pfaff 2008, 2). What all

\textsuperscript{12} Between sovereign states.
\textsuperscript{13} Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ongoing since 1948.
\textsuperscript{14} Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988.
\textsuperscript{15} Iraq, 1991 and 2003.
individuals have in common is the capacity to make assumptions about one’s own self and others (Pfaff 2008, 3). Based on the premise that a person’s deeply held beliefs, norms, and values could be inferred from membership in a larger social construct, then stereotypes are cognitive shortcuts. They are resistant to change and tend to outlive their original purpose.

Within diverse cultures, in which “cross-cutting ties are strongest,” conflicts are harder to sustain due to the equally valued interests (Pfaff 2008, 5). By joining the police, one must surrender all other organizational biases and, instead, accept the cross-cutting ties which come with it. Otherwise police forces become a battleground for sects rather than “a means to unify them” (Pfaff 2008, 5). Because the police were not considered “essential to the regime’s survival,” they were always under resourced and poorly paid” (Pfaff 2008, 7). While they were “capable of maintaining order and preventing crime,” their primary purpose was to “monitor the population for political activism”; suppression of dissent “was left to the regime’s security services” (Pfaff 2008, 7). Therefore, the Iraqi police “were perceived more as a corrupt force than an instrument of oppression” (Pfaff 2008, 7). More significantly, “Iraqis did not trust the police enough to tip them off to insurgent activity” (Pfaff 2008, 8). The number of police killed between May 2003 and December 2006 was 12,000. Between 2005 and 2006, “a total of 2,842 police” were killed and “5,792 wounded” (Pfaff 2008, 8). These numbers do not include the number of potential recruits targeted by suicide bombers while waiting in line (Pfaff 2008, 8).

The outbreak of conflict could potentially represent a clash of competing interests, conflicting ideals, or contradictory views of reality (Van Evera 1994, 26). The approach for this study assumes the deconstruction of the context would yield a nuanced and insightful understanding of the conflict’s internal dynamics. This is accomplished by unpacking the context into structural and functional components, while affording each its tangible value and symbolic
meaning (Johnson 1982, 22). Herein, structural components refer to systemic features such as sovereignty, authority, order, etc. Meanwhile, functional components refer to institutional mechanisms like coercion, compliance, perception, interpretation, etc. (Johnson 1982, 32). In this study, attaining Pareto equilibrium is synonymous with restoring order by regaining the balance undergirding the social contract. Therefore, if attaining Pareto equilibrium represents the desired end state and constitutes the aim of both antagonists, then the onset of armed civil conflict represents a structural or procedural dysfunction. After all, effective governance offers, in theory, less costly alternatives to violence for resolving grievances.

Generally speaking, the outbreak of armed civil conflict has been attributed by some to external pressures (Skocpol 1979), or opportunistic exploitation of weaknesses within the state structure (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2007, 56; Lust-Okar 2004, 164). Meanwhile, others argued structural factors alone cannot explain the dynamic nature of this type of conflict. Modernization theorists, such as Rostow, Organski, and Huntington, frame revolutions as the outcome of a series of political processes. Particularly, when the state cannot adapt to rapid changes wrought by the process of industrialization. Structural functionalists assert armed civil conflict erupts under power deflating conditions, which combine a perceived social dysfunction and an accelerating catalyst (Johnson 1982, 38; Lieden and Schmitt 1968, 38). Thereby, revolutionaries use force intentionally to correct a perceived disequilibrium in the social system. The object of contention is the social contract, and the armed conflict represents revolutionaries’ reaction to the state’s breach of the contract (Rousseau 1762, Book IV; Van Evera 1994, 31). The social contract enumerates “natural” human rights as the basis for society (Rousseau 1762, Book II). Barbara Geddes (1999) linked variations in authoritarianism to the different roles of institutions.
In any of these cases the ultimate outcome of the armed civil conflict is expressed as a trajectory. After antagonists initially clash, the momentum could either move in reverse toward decreased armed conflict or, conversely, toward continued or heightened violence. Thus, once armed civil conflict erupts the viability of available options for restoring order should be assessed within this dynamic context. Strategic culture often involves mythmaking, whether in the form of self-glorifying, self-whitewashing, or other-maligning (Van Evera 1994, 27-28). The point being emphasized here is the importance of recognizing the dynamic nature of meanings, in addition to the components’ tangible values (Holsti 1968; Morgenthau 1973). Given the stakes and finite resources available during the conduct of such operations, the importance of this requirement cannot be overstated. Understanding how armed civil conflict in Arab states reflects antagonists wielding resources vis-à-vis their perceptions of an evolving context would certainly contribute to better management of conflicts.

Traditionally, the transitional period following conventional or irregular warfare is known as Phase IV. During this phase, stability missions take place in a context in which there “is no functioning legitimate government or there is only a minimally functioning one” (Hastedt 2011, 94). Such missions are prioritized and pushed to the forefront, thereby dominating the nature of operations. Events transpiring during this period tend to be protean, as attempts are made in earnest to mend frayed bonds, reconcile competing perspectives, and refashion a new way for moving forward. Therefore, the military is tasked with reducing “the level of threat to manageable levels that can be controlled by civilian authorities (Hastedt 2011, 94). Due to the inherently political nature of this phase, expending valuable time, blood, and treasure although requisite hardly guarantees yield, let alone return on investment. After all, chance and uncertainty are war’s faithful companions; they are adept at reversing outcomes. Nevertheless,
stemming violence need not be reduced to a gamble. Throughout human history, lengthy periods of peace have been possible. So, how can Pyrrhic victory be avoided and the seeds of enduring peace sown during this phase of warfare?

In a classical sense, conventional war is waged among sovereign states. It represents a national policy and must account to a complex set of actors. Additionally, war can vary in scope and scale depending on the associated stakes and interests. At one extreme, war may involve the whole national triad– the population, government, and military. Components of this triad are by no means characteristically homogeneous, neither within the state nor among states. Political culture certainly determines the extent of heterogeneity. Normally, however, each component tends to be distinct, both functionally and structurally. Each component can be identified by its unique worldview and interests. Furthermore, war is multi-dimensional. In addition to employing military power, waging war may also require the exercise of other national instruments of power, such as application of diplomatic, informational, and economic levers. Conventional warfare, characteristically, is a violent duel between sovereign antagonists. A struggle between military forces, each a representative of their nation and an extension of its political interests. The struggle commences by militaries clashing into each other, and ends when one side can declare victory over the other.

Hence why, re-establishing order during Phase IV is a primary task and exceptionally difficult. The interdependence of military missions dictates the need to establish security first and foremost and in phases. Therefore, proper planning is imperative for overall operational success. Policy-makers and military commanders, lest they wish to gamble away a favorable outcome, must prioritize explicitly the objective of gaining and retaining control. Maintenance of order requires vigilance and agility in responding to changeable realities. Spoilers and opportunists are
often abound (Lust-Okar 2004, 166; Dobbins et. al. 2003, 199), especially during lulls in conflict, eager to tip the scales in their favor (Nye and Welch 2013, 208).

With interstate wars on the decline and, conversely, intrastate violence on the rise (Nye and Welch 2013, 218), a deeper look into the implications of intrastate conflict is apropos. Political violence includes a range of sub-national conflicts, such as revolutions, coups, insurgencies, and civil wars. Its virulence is correlated to its ambiguity, and the means for resolving it are incorrigibly elusive, largely due to the conflict’s inherent nature. The causes of political violence are considered wicked problems. Most likely, they will require external intervention to finally resolve. Which is why, missions associated with irregular forms of warfare must prioritize the task of establishing security.

Military interventions inherently take place in non-permissive environments and under dangerous conditions (Bayley and Perito 2010, 150). The military, however, “is a poor tool for winning hearts and minds because it is more destructive and less discriminating than police action” (Bayley and Perito 2010, 152). Notwithstanding, an intervening force must “serve the security needs of individual citizens,” by simultaneously being available to respond to their security needs effectively and exhibiting fairness in their actions (Bayley and Perito 2010, 153).

The national and regional implications of armed conflict make this type of conflict particularly detrimental to the non-combatant population. An outbreak of armed civil conflict represents the state’s quintessential policy failure, for its insatiable capacity to complicate, if not reverse, progress and civility (Kilcullen 2010, 30). Bernard Fall elaborated, “a government that is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed” (Kilcullen 2010, 149).
The Roadmap

The broader premise of this study is the perception of legitimacy at the micro-level is becoming increasingly critical to the viability of the international system at the macro-level. Essentially, an authoritative top-down approach to maintaining order may only endure if the collective perceives it as beneficial. The theoretical framework for this study, at the macro-level, is founded on three international relations models – neorealism, liberal idealism, and social constructivism. Hence, the study begins with a broad survey of the literature, to explain the structural and functional elements of the current international system, particularly vis-à-vis the conception of state security. Next, a discussion of the rational choice model, at the micro-level, helps explain how access to information influences individual sense of security and motivates collective action and counter responses. At the boundary where the two levels meet, an examination of the literature on intrastate conflict would help distinguish the various forms of political conflict. Patterns of armed civil conflict are inextricably linked to the socio-political and economic profiles of authoritarian governments, but even more so in the Middle East.

A discussion of the security approaches in response to armed civil conflict takes place in the second half of this study. The study’s analytical framework is shaped by the two historical cases from the interwar period: the British administration in Iraq (1919-1921) and the French in Syria (1925-1927). This framework is then applied to the recent US operations in Iraq for comparison. Since establishing security early is imperative for restoring order, the study focuses on the conduct of OIF during the initial years, from 2003 to 2005. Therefore, comparison of the three case studies is limited to the conduct of operations within the year following the outbreak of armed civil conflict. The comparative analysis uses qualitative process-tracing to assess the following hypothesized claims.
The objective of the analysis is to assess the study’s three hypothesized claims. The first claim asserts the state’s exercise of lawful authority would reduce the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. Theoretically, the legitimate exercise of authority induces cooperative compliance with minimal need for deadly force and span of time. The rationale lies in the ability of the state to attain conferred consensus regarding its competency in the form of international and national legitimacies. Combined, these legitimacies privilege the state with the authority to use force in order to restore order, to protect collective interests, and to ensure access to public commons (Rousseau 1762, Book III). Therefore, when the outcome of using force is continued armed civil conflict or escalation the state’s authority is in question.

The second claim asserts the military approach increases the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. The underlying assumption is military missions are inherently deadly. States’ right to sovereignty was established by the Peace of Westphalia and reaffirmed by the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Nevertheless, according to Just War principles, a state in breach of its obligations to its people could potentially forfeit its immunity from external intervention. Theoretically, the state is legally authorized to use force to defend its sovereignty and autonomy against aggression. However, barring such threat to a state’s survival, subjecting citizens to brutal force or the inability to protect them from such harm constitutes a breach of the state’s legal obligation.

Finally, the third claim asserts the policing approach reduces the number of casualties killed in an armed civil conflict. As a representative of the state, the security apparatus is considered an extension of the state and its authority. Thereby, the perception of state’s legitimacy would induce compliance with police authority without the need to resort to coercive
force. In sum, the evaluation of these three claims is fundamental to identifying the common root of armed civil conflict in the Middle East.

If the first claim is true, then worldviews are equal to structural and functional factors in determining political behaviors and outcomes. And, if the second claim is also true, components of armed civil conflict hold tangible value and symbolic meaning. And, if the third claim is also true, effective governance is able to offer less costly alternatives than resort to coercive force to resolve grievances. The truth of these three claims would establish the link between onset of political violence within the Middle East and responses to ineffective authoritarian governance. Therefore, once the armed civil conflict erupts the duration of this conflict is linked to continued perceptions of state’s illegitimacy. The implications of such findings could be far reaching, since authoritarian states are likely to turn to the international system to bargain for its survival.

**Political Mirages**

By the end of WWII, the majority of independent Arab states were ruled by authoritarian oligarchs (Sørli, et al. 2005, 146; Lust-Okar 2004, 159; Lowenstein 1957). Historical legacies had taught the political elite the folly of ignoring subtle security challenges, whether in the form of internal agitation or external interferences. As such, governments in the region were primarily focused on consolidating their grip on power and maintaining a favorable status quo (Crystal 2001, 472; Lust-Okar 2004, 159). During this process, notions of establishing political legitimacy and institutional efficacy were summarily sacrificed in favor of coercive control and ideological mythology (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 11 and 16).

---

16 With the exception of Israel and Turkey; they are considered electoral democracies.
The Cold War era, in particular, proved a boon for authoritarian governments in the Middle East. It provided them with the time, logistical support, and political cover needed effectively neutralize any opposition (Crystal 2001, 473). Lessons learned during these states’ formative years continue to this day, informing the decisions and relations of these states. They also explain why the authoritarian Arab states chose to retain long defunct colonial-era coercive instruments and control mechanisms (Sørli, et al. 2005, 146; Bellin 2004, 141; Crystal 2001, 472). In other words, the policies of Arab states are mere replications of a larger extractive system. Predictably, not even economic institutions are spared the predatory practices of an authoritarian system. The economies of Arab states are largely maintained by either rent-seeking\(^\text{17}\) or state subsidy of services (Sørli, et al. 2005, 147; Bellin 2004, 139; Khan and Jomo 2000). In any case, the fate of the population is held captive and at the mercy of the state’s beneficence (Sørli, et al. 2005, 147; Lust-Okar 2004).

Given the fiercely competitive nature of power-politics in the Middle East, autocratic rulers find they must distinguish themselves from others. Most often, they do so by being politically shrewd and sufficiently adept at managing political capital and instruments of power\(^\text{18}\) at their disposal. Studies on proto-insurgency show political role in the government “before [the] conflict started – turns out to be neither a variant nor particularly salient to the win-lose percentage” Connable and Libicki 2010, 174). To ensure the survival of their authoritarian regime, autocrats judiciously balance the need to occasionally dole-out finite resources with the potential implications of appearing to cede power, albeit symbolically (Lust-Okar 2004, 164).

\(^{17}\) Relationships based on illegitimate transactional exchanges include corruption, rent-seeking, and patron-client. Rent-seeking is the control and manipulation of rights or access to institutional functions by demanding payment (Khan and Jomo 2000, 5).

\(^{18}\) For example, control over political access, distribution of resources, policy-making, force deployment, etc.
These are few of the reason why Arab states continue to lag in all forms of development, whether economic, social, or political (Sørli, et al. 2005, 143).

In 2004, a study by Eva Bellin aimed to understand what makes the Middle East so resistant to democratization. She began by noting the common absence of key prerequisites of democratization, such as “a strong civil society, a market-driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture” (Bellin 2004, 141). Nonetheless, she acknowledged the absence of these conditions often explains the failure to consolidate democracy once initiated, but not necessarily the failure to initiate a transition to begin with (Bellin 2004, 142). Eventually, the study linked the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East to prevalence of authoritarian-fostering conditions, rather than absence of democratic prerequisites (Bellin 2004, 152). The study concluded access to a coherent and effective coercive apparatus, in particular, empowers the state to “face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy, ‘value incoherence,’ and even a pervasive sense of relative deprivation among its subjects” (Bellin 2004, 143). Hence, the state’s ability to resist political reform, override popular mobilization, and, ultimately, maintain its grip on power is demonstrated in its will and capacity to crush the opposition with its armed security apparatus (Bellin 2004, 143; Skocpol 1979, 32).

Authoritarian Arab states perceive dissent as a threat and refuse to afford it avenues of expression (Lust-Okar 2004, 160). Political elites’ decisions, whether to engage in reform or unleash coercive terror in response to popular calls for reform, is rationally calculated and aims to balance perceived costs and rewards for each option (Bellin 2004, 146). Until then, authoritarian Arab states are exceptionally keen on maintaining access to a robust coercive apparatus as a viable option (Bellin 2004, 144). The robustness of this coercive apparatus is
directly linked to the authoritarian state’s sense of insecurity, patrimonial practices, as well as its capacity to maintain fiscal health and networks of international support (Bellin 2004, 144). Conversely, the state’s access to the coercive apparatus is tempered by high levels of popular mobilization and levels of Weberian institutionalization (Bellin 2004, 146).

In 2005, a study by Mirjam E. Sørli, Nils P. Gleditsch, and Havard Strand examined the trends in global and regional armed conflicts which emerged since the 1950s. The study found civil wars to be the dominant form of conflict globally (Sørli, et al. 2005, 142). In building upon the Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war and modifying it to distinguish between the causes of outbreak and the duration of armed civil conflicts, the study did not find anything exceptional about the outbreak of this type of conflict in the Middle East (Sørli, et al. 2005, 144). While the study confirms the region is one of the most prone to conflict outbreaks, these outbreaks are neither to the extent seen in Asia and Africa nor experienced as often since the end of the Cold War (Sørli, et al. 2005, 143). Similarly, the study found fatalities associated with intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War were lower in the Middle East than those in Asian and African regions (Sørli, et al. 2005, 143). Nonetheless, the study emphasized that once armed civil conflict erupts in the Middle East it tends to last for a long time (Sørli, et al. 2005, 144). Therefore, while the Middle East region resembles a metaphoric tinderbox, there is nothing exceptional about the causes of outbreak in this region. Hence why the authors concluded armed civil conflicts in the Middle East can be explained by a general theory of civil war (Sørli, et al. 2005, 160).
Proverbial Quicksand

Any future US military interventions in the Middle East are likely to include stabilization missions to check regional tensions precipitated by the conflict. The mere decision to become militarily involved automatically implies a strategic national interest. Therefore, the policies and plans pertaining to US security missions should reflect in their analytical rigor the imperatives driving them. A comprehensive SC or SA plan would consider the full range of implications – strategic, operational, and tactical, at all relevant levels of analysis.

At present, stabilization efforts are being frustrated by the growing demand and difficulty of such missions. Of the many controllable factors determining the ease or difficulty of these missions, “the level of effort – measured in time, manpower, and money” is the most important (Dobbins 2003, xxv). A pre-requisite of stability operations is fulfilled by ensuring security at the micro-level. The cumulative effect of positive outcomes could, potentially, transform a military campaign at the macro-level.

Instilling sense of security within humans entails more than parading uniformed personnel while carrying guns and badges (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 62; Baker and Hamilton 2006, 13). Constructivists argue human conception of reality is endogenous (Wendt 1992, 394). Identities and worldviews are not conceived objectively, rather formulated inter-subjectively. Perspectives are constructed through social interactions and conveyed symbolically (Lust-Okar 2004, 160). By extension, if individuals assign reality its subjective meaning then, accordingly, their sense of security is also socially constructed (Kegley and Raymond 2002, 270). Thus, exogenous controls are insufficient for compelling action. They must be laden with subjective meaning in order to motivate.
Herbert Simon argued problem-solving requires motivation because motivation precedes action; ergo, facilitation is the key operative (Simon 1962, 473). Similarly, if sense of security is enabled by perceptions of threat or absence of, then compliance can be actively facilitated through contextual inducement. Unfortunately, this same rationale applies to instigating armed conflict. Therefore, to comprehend a population’s compliant or rebellious reaction to state authority, examination of the cognitive processes and catalytic agents is necessary. Stakeholders’ rationality is certainly integral to understanding behavior, but so is the role of context in shaping their interpretation of the experience (Simon 1962, 401). As the following paragraphs demonstrate, the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was keen on driving this point across.

On September 10th, 2001, SecDef, Donald Rumsfeld, was delivering a speech to “Pentagon officials in charge of the high-stakes business of defense contracting” and “former corporate executives from Enron, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Aerospace Corporation” (Scahill 2007, xiv). He announced to his audience the Pentagon’s bureaucracy posed “a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America” (Rumsfeld 2001). Further elaborating, “despite this era of scarce resources taxed by mounting threats, money disappears into duplicative duties and bloated bureaucracy – not because of greed, but gridlock. Innovation is stifled – not by ill intent but by institutional inertia” (Rumsfeld 2001). He added, there is a need to dispel the myth, “that money enters this building and disappears…In truth, there is a real person at the other end of every dollar…that means that there will be real consequences from, and resistance to, fundamental change” (Rumsfeld 2001).

By his own account on that day, “it takes today twice as long as it did in 1975 to produce a new weapon system, at a time when new generations of technology are churned out every 18 to
24 months” (Rumsfeld 2001). He argued, by saving 5 percent of the DoD’s yearly budget, “we
would free up some $15 billion to $18 billion, to be transferred from bureaucracy to the
battlefield” (Rumsfeld 2001). He then confirmed he had already eliminated “some 31 of the 72
acquisition-related advisory boards” (Rumsfeld 2001). Back then, there were “2.7 million people
who wear our country’s uniform – active, Guard and Reserve” and approximately 700,000
civilian DoD personnel (Rumsfeld 2001). He concluded by disclosing his plans to “reduce
headquarter staffs by 15 percent by fiscal year 2003,” as mandated by Congress, and outsource
military housing, healthcare, and services (Rumsfeld 2001). He then challenged his audience, “to
wage an all-out campaign to shift Pentagon’s resources from bureaucracy to the battlefield”
(Rumsfeld 2001). He predicted “a major initiative to streamline the use of the private sector in
the waging of America’s wars” would “meet fierce resistance” (Scahill 2007, xiv), but reassured
his audience, “I have no desire to attack the Pentagon; I want to liberate it. We need to save it
from itself” (Rumsfeld 2001; Gordon and Trainor 2006, 9).

Oddly enough, this drive to outsource military capacities began in the 1990s, with former
President Clinton and SecDef Cheney before him. The Clinton administration had established the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to examine the impact of “reforming
and reinventing government so that it is smaller, smarter and more responsive (Krahmann 2010,
122). The report identified “increased competition and efficiency as core elements for improving
government’s and the armed forces’ provision of national security” (Krahmann 2010, 123). The
report “advocated the elimination of restrictive legislation in the United States Code, Title 10 –
Armed Forces which prohibited the contracting-out of key military occupations” (Krahmann
2010, 123).
Against this background of attempting to experiment with an unwieldy Leviathan, the occupation phase of OIF was planned and executed. The attempt subsequently came under bipartisan fire (Bowen 2013; Scahill 2007, 342). This study certainly acknowledges the role individual political actors played and the larger institutional dysfunction which hamstrung the reconstruction efforts after the invasion (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 13; Hastedt 2011, 184; Hashim 2006, 298). However, the study is far more concerned with the military’s lack of readiness for such missions and the policy-makers’ apathy toward the fact (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 11; Hastedt 2011, 94; GAO 2006, 35). These realities are unfolding within the context of amassing “the largest army of private contractors ever deployed in war” (Scahill 2007, xvii and 365).\textsuperscript{19} By evaluating DoD’s policy of invading Iraq, the aim is to prevent future attempts at senseless re-education (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 689; Hastedt 2011, 83; Hashim 2006, 323).

Within a year of the 9/11 attacks on US soil, SecDef Rumsfeld had established the Office of Special Plans (OSP) (Hastedt 2011, 208). Its stated mission, as a challenge to the CIA’s, was to provide “an independent review” of the raw intelligence and “dispute the mainstream interpretations given to it by the intelligence community” (Hastedt 2011, 208). Ultimately, the manifold publicly stated reasons for invading Iraq can be distilled to removal of the Iraqi regime and elimination of the threat he posed, by potential access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and links to terrorist groups.

In time it became irrefutably clear, by favoring US military intervention, OSP had selectively pushed through “intelligence that suited the pro-war case” (Hastedt 2011, 208). It was advanced by SecDef Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney through “‘stovepiping’ it forward out of normal channels into the intelligence estimating process” (Hastedt 2011, 208). Apparently, the

Vice President had made a concerted effort behind the scenes “to root out intelligence supporting this position” and “his preoccupation with discrediting opponents of the war are among the most controversial aspects of the Bush administration’s handling of prewar intelligence” (Hastedt 2011, 185). Nonetheless, OSP, in the end, was equally criticized by members of Congress for its role in handling the intelligence as was the CIA “for its failure to express its doubts over the quality of intelligence behind the decision to go to war” (Hastedt 2011, 208).

Prior to the invasion, the Bush administration had threatened Iraq with military action for resisting compliance with the UN Resolution 1441, mandating complete disarmament (Dobbins et. al. 2003, 167). However, reports by the UN weapon inspectors, the CIA, and the US Department of Energy dispelled the security threats posed by Iraq’s WMD program. Much later, in May 2005, the *Sunday Times of London* published the content of top-secret British meeting minutes, commonly referred to as the “Downing Street Memo”. The meeting was held on July 23rd, 2002, by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and his war cabinet. The memo suggested “the Bush administration ‘fixed’ intelligence about Iraq and that actions at the United Nations were designed to give legal cover to British Prime Minister Tony Blair before an invasion to oust Saddam Hussein.” The extent of the “fix” was exaggerating the threat posed by the Iraqi WMD program and the regime’s link to al Qaeda (Ricketts 2002). What was perhaps more troubling was witnessing the yarn of myth-making being spun, unencumbered and without account.

---

20 France, Germany, Russia, and Turkey opposed the invasion, while China abstained. Turkey denied the US and UK permission “to use its territory to invade Iraq” (Dobbins et. al. 2003, 167).
22 Ibid.
23 Rowan Mason, “Chilcot inquiry accused of whitewash over letters between Blair and Bush,” *The Guardian*, 29 May, 2014. Results of the Chilcot Inquiry are pending release. The inquiry was launched in 2009 to examine the role of the British government in the lead-up to invading Iraq. Due to US’ request, the British government agreed to only publish the general “gist” of the exchanges between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, rather than the full correspondence.
On March 9th, 2003, the first OIF air operation was conducted, by dropping leaflets on Baghdad stressing the Coalition’s support of Iraqis and urging non-interference (Moseley 2003, 15). On March 17th, a 48-hour ultimatum was issued for the ruling regime to leave Iraq. In not heeding the Coalition’s warning, OIF was launched on March 19th as a military action. On March 20th, the US ground forces began their push into Iraq, and by April 5th they entered Baghdad. On April 6th, the Coalition forces had achieved air supremacy and, on the 9th, the Iraqi ruling government fell. By April 14th major military operations had ended and on the 16th the first humanitarian relief mission was conducted (Moseley 2003, 15; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 12). Thus, the conventional combat phase of OIF was completed within 21 days and without requiring a declaration of war. Nonetheless, the most damage in terms of casualties and destruction of infrastructure took place during the subsequent occupation phase.

The total number of US casualties associated with OIF was approximately 4,489 fatalities; the number of wounded in action was approximately 32,237 (DoD 2014). As of 7 December, 2012, the number of US service members diagnosed with OIF-deployment related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was approximately 103,792 cases (Fischer 2013, 6). According to data collected by the Iraqi Body Count (IBC), the number of civilian fatalities from violence during OIF was 118,661 deaths.

The total number of civilians killed by Coalition forces was 14,985. Hence, of the total fatalities, combatant and non-combatant combined, it is estimated 79% were civilian; 13% by Coalition forces. By the time former President Bush declared “Mission Accomplished”, on May 1st, 2003, there had been a total of 7,424 Iraqi casualties. The deadliest period for civilians was

---

24 The number of PTSD cases by the end of 2002 was 133 (Fischer 2013, 6).
25 IBC indicates it extracted the data from approximately 6,828 distinct reports and collected them from 90 incident sources. Sources of the data can be verified directly by accessing the IBC website.
between mid-2006 and mid-2008. By 2009, 90% of civilian fatalities had taken place. The total number of civilians killed by small arms gunfire was 63,746. Finally, the most targeted group was police forces, totaling 9,433 deaths – the largest number of profession-related killings.

The deposed Iraqi president was apprehended by the end of 2003, yet the Coalition forces continued their presence in Iraq. In a 20/20 television interview, in January, 2005, then re-elected President George W. Bush attributed the disparity between the stated justification for the intervention and the substantive evidence to reliance on a faulty intelligence gathering process. An identical reason for the inability to prevent the attacks on US soil two years earlier. The tendency was to attribute flawed policies “to leadership deficiencies or breakdown in organizational behavior and not to the values that guided that action” (Hastedt 2011, 62). By then the US policy in Iraq had dramatically shifted, from “liberating and leaving Iraq by September of 2003” to “occupying and rebuilding”, with limited pre-war planning (Bowen 2013, 37; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 14).

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimated the “government spent $388 billion on contracts” in 2006, and “much of that money is exposed to ‘potential waste and misuse’ because of the way the government buys goods and services.” There were “about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors, a total that is approaching the size of the U.S. military force there.” Three years into the war and guided by few industry standards, “the military and contractors have sometimes lacked coordination,

26 By then, the violent campaign for ethnically segregating neighborhoods was complete.
resulting in friendly fire incidents.” By the time the Coalition forces withdrew from Iraq in December, 2011, they left behind a politically unstable state and a more volatile region (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 690; Hashim 2006, 350). Concomitantly, the “aggressive policies and unpopular occupations” led to “the ‘bleeding’ of the U.S. military (Seahill 2007, 342).

Notwithstanding, in its report on the handling of prewar intelligence on Iraq by the US Intelligence Community (IC), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) criticized the IC’s lack of “consistent post-September approach to analyzing and reporting on terrorist threats,” HUMINT shortcomings, and particularly the CIA’s highly compartmentalized intelligence sharing mindset, inaccurate or inadequate analysis of uncertainties, rampant “group think” and “layering effect” organizational dynamics, and “manner in which both its top leadership and professionals approached their job” (Hastedt 2011, 210; SSCI 2004, 14-).

The SSCI report concluded the IC and the October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s WMD program “either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting” (SSCI 2004, 14). Second, “the intelligence reporting did show that Iraq was procuring dual-use equipment that had potential nuclear applications, but all of the equipment had conventional military or industrial applications. In addition, none of the intelligence reporting indicated that the equipment was being procured for suspect nuclear facilities" (SSCI 2004, 14). Third, while “the conclusion that chemical and biological weapons were within Iraq’s technological capability” and “Iraq’s efforts to deceive and evade…and its inability or unwillingness to fully account for pre-Gulf” weapons precursors “could have led analysts” to their reasonable conclusions (SSCI 2004, 15); however, claiming “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons” had “overstated both what was known and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq’s chemical and biological

---

29 Ibid.
weapons holdings” (SSCI 2004, 14). Fourth, the claims “all key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active…are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War” and the intent behind developing a small UAV program to deliver BW agents” were “not supported by the underlying intelligence provided” (SSCI 2004, 15).

In terms of other operational aspects, some policy analysts argue, although political milestones were being realized in Iraq, “the creation of a functioning government supported by the [sic] all sectors of the Iraqi population was not achieved” (Hastedt 2011, 96; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 66; Hashim 2006, 360). The political realities in Iraq, between 2004 and 2006, made achieving stability “much less creating a democratic government,” elusive (Hastedt 2011, 96; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 198; Hashim 2006, 81 and 365). The following discussion sets the context within which the Iraqi Army was disbanded and Iraqi unemployment skyrocketed.

The efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq, between 2003 and 2011, were directed by three successive organizations (Bowen 2013, 38). The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA); the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); and the US Mission-Iraq. Both ORHA and CPA fell under the aegis of the DoD; the US Mission-Iraq under the DoS. From January to April 2003, ORHA constituted the initial US implementation effort in Iraq. In light of ORHA’s insufficient acquisition capacity to respond to Iraq’s immediate needs, the CPA was established to take over operations (Bowen 2013, 39; Hashim 2006, 295). The CPA’s task, from late-April 2003 to June of 2004, was to temporarily exercise powers of government and, as necessary, provide security for the delivery of humanitarian aid and elimination of WMDs (Bowen 2013, 39).
On that same day, the US Congress had approved establishment of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The White House had allocated $2.475 billion for the post-conflict missions under the assumption Iraq would support its own reconstruction efforts shortly after (Bowen 2013, 39). The US Agency for International Aid controlled 74% of the appropriated funds (Bowen 2013, 39). Thus, the CPA had to rely on Iraqi resources to fund any reconstruction programs. The account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, previously established to manage the United Nation’s Oil for Food Program, was thereby converted to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and placed temporarily under the CPA’s authority. The account was to be used to pay Iraqi salaries and fund expenditure. The original purpose of the account was to manage $23.4 billion of seized and generated Iraqi funds (Bowen 2013, 9). Of note, the Paris Club had, posthumously, erased 80% of Iraq’s estimated $120 billion foreign debt (Bowen 2013, 10).

In a DoS memo, dated February 7th, 2003, senior DoS and DoD staff members were notified of the Coalition forces’ reluctance to take on a “policing” role during the reconstruction phase of OIF (Craner 2003). Remarkably, soon after the conventional combat phase of OIF ended on May 1st, 2003, rampant lawlessness and criminality spilled over into the streets of the newly liberated Iraq (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 19; Hashim 2006, 17). The effect of the power vacuum in the aftermath of conventional combat was akin to a sucking chest wound. Meanwhile the damage caused by L. Paul Bremer’s tenure compounded friction; it was seen by some as a self-inflicted wound. Bremer was “a highly confrontational viceroy” and ideologue (Scahill 2007, 64). Upon his arrival to Baghdad, some Iraqis immediately “viewed him as another Saddam” (Scahill 2007, 64 and 75). As a polarizing figure, every single one of his moves “sent a

---

30 Membership in the Paris Club includes 19 of the world’s largest economies.
firm message to many Iraqis that they would have little say in their future, a future that increasingly looked bleak and familiar” (Scahill 2007, 65). Thus, the decision to appoint Bremer as “both Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq was met with immediate controversy, even among those who had worked with him” (Scahill 2007, 64).

The chaos was further compounded by the CPA ordering the de-Ba’athification and disbanding of the Iraqi Army simultaneously (Bowen 2013, 40; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 14; Scahill 2007, 65). This decision led to “four hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers” being forced out of work and left without a pension (Scahill 2007, 65). Even the shallowest review of Iraq’s history would have highlighted the enduring link “between militarism and nationalism” in response to foreign intervention (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 203). Bremer explained, his decision was “meant to appease the Kurds and the Shia,” as “a concession to their parties so that they would not secede from Iraq” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 202). In 2006, Bremer defended his decision by claiming “the Army disbanded itself during the 2003 Iraq war” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 204). This argument flies in the face of logic and historical records. Prior to the launch of OIF, the Coalition had dropped leaflets which offered the Iraqi Army an “implicit bargain – they stopped fighting and we would treat them fairly” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 205). In essence, the decision to dismantle the Iraqi Army was an act of deception, to dismantle the army without a shot being fired. Even if at best the intention was to re-employ the same Army, it was the patronizing and deceptive nature of the act which inflamed their ire. To the cooperative Iraqis, it was seen as “a betrayal” (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 26); this single act “sent the wrong message at the wrong time” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 205). Furthermore, the

---

31 In April, 2004, a proposal to change the Iraqi flag as a break from its pan-Arab history managed to provoke the majority Arab population.
army as an institution does not simply dissolve itself when everyone goes home (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 205).

Noteworthy, Bremer “relied heavily on the disgraced Iraqi exile, Ahmad Chalabi, for advice on internal politics in Iraq” (Scahill 2007, 64). After a month of Bremer’s arrival he enacted a series of radical laws, some “unprecedented in their generosity to multinational corporations” (Scahill 2007, 66). To remedy the consequent Iraqi outrage, an ambitious reconstruction plan was devised by the CPA to spur Iraq’s recovery, which further prompted the president to ask Congress for an additional $20.3 billion. At this point in time, it is highly likely the CPA was oblivious to how he now reminded Iraqis of how they were treated during the Mandate years.

In November 2003, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Defense to further fund the reconstruction plan but, more importantly, to close “the oversight gap” by establishing the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA-IG) (Bowen 2013, x). On November 15th, 2003, the White House announced sovereignty would return to Iraq at the end of June 2004. Indeed, on June 28th, 2004, the CPA ceremonially handed over Iraq’s sovereignty to the Interim Governing Council (IGC). Additionally, the Coalition forces were reorganized as the new Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-Iraq). The US Mission-Iraq (June 2005-August 2010), which fell under the purview of DoS, was now, per National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, in charge of reconstructing Iraq (Bowen 2013, 41). Moreover, two ad hoc reconstruction offices were created, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and Project and Contracting Office (PCO). IRMO reported to DoS and PCO to DoD (Bowen 2013, 41). By mid-2005, while the US Mission-Iraq was attempting to contract Iraqi firms directly, PCO “cautioned against shifting large amounts of funding away from contracts that had been
awarded under full and open competition” (Bowen 2013, 41). By the time the insurgency in Iraq was in full swing, by the beginning of 2006 (Bowen 2013, 43), an estimated 180,000 Iraqis were contracted by such firms (Bowen 2013, 41).

Additionally, a total of five funds had been created to assist in Iraqi efforts. The amount of funds allocated to each as follows: IRRF ($20.86 billion); Iraq Security Forces Fund ($20.19 billion); Economic Support Fund ($5.13 billion); Commander’s Emergency Response Program ($4.12 billion); and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account ($1.31 billion) (Bowen 2013, 9). Of the $52 billion allocated to these funds, DoD was in control of 87% ($45 billion) of them (Bowen 2013, 38). At some point during the occupation, the number of Americans in Iraq, not including the number of supporting contracted personnel, peaked at 170,000 personnel (Bowen 2013, 38). Average programs’ sheer size meant “oversight of a contractor’s work” had to be conducted by drone aircraft (Bowen 2013, 31).

In 2011, the number of contractors dropped precipitously, into a half, as US troops began withdrawing from Iraq. By the end of 2011, $146 billion of DFI was spent on reconstruction. In spite of the funds and effort spent on rebuilding Iraq, only limited positive progress was witnessed. The explanatory consensus blamed the poor showing on the lack of sufficient US consultation with Iraqi authorities, corruption, inefficiency, and poor security (Bowen 2013, 11).

In March, 2013, the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction in Iraq (SIGIR), Stuart Bowen, issued his final assessment on US expenditures in Iraq, between 2003 and 2012. The report concluded, in addition to the $20 billion in Iraqi funds controlled by the US, $60 billion in US tax-payer funds were spent on Iraqi stability and reconstruction projects (Bowen 2013, 55). A
comparison of costs, efforts, and outcome between the Marshall Plan and reconstruction of Iraq clearly demonstrated the Plan’s superiority over the performance in Iraq (Lewarne 2007, 27). 32

Some have attributed the success of the Marshall Plan in Germany and Japan to the American policy of “creating domestic and regional security” (Hastedt 2011, 100). In essence, it “had little to do with American policy or the presumed natural inclination of people liberated from tyranny for democracy” (Hastedt 2011, 100). Thus, one should not assume the source of contention in Iraq was the form of occupation. The structural factor responsible for reducing the Marshall Plan’s costs was US’ ability to understand the context and willingness to self-correct (Lewarne 2007, 2). The Truman Administration “was willing to consider debate and criticism from several quarters, review its original objectives and quickly organize around a solution” (Lewarne 2007, 3); it was adept at resolving controversies to quickly restore “the advantage of a single donor decision-making process” (Lewarne 2007, 2). Unlike OIF, the effort behind implementing the Plan was relatively more focused, and the process leading up to it was “well thought out and planned” (Lewarne 2007, 2).

Paul Hoffman, the first administrator of the Marshall Plan, described efforts in Iraq as the “political dumping ground of unqualified politicians,” and criticized the Bush administration for basing appointments on “loyalty first and expertise second.” 33 Success is measured by the extent of recovered initial expense. The cost of the Marshall Plan in today’s currency value would have been $81.3 billion (Lewarne 2007, 12). More significantly, the Plan was accomplished in the span of 18 months; Iraq remains in political, social, and economic shambles (Lewarne 2007, 16).

32 The Marshall Plan is considered an example of successful post-war reconstruction. The US government was the sole donor in this effort. In addition to the US, efforts to reconstruct Iraq were also provided by Britain and Australia and administered via CPA (Lewarne 2007, 3).
SIGIR began its investigations briefly before the official transfer of control from CPA to the interim Iraqi government in June, 2003. Noting the sheer absurdity and corrupting influence of flooding a conflict zone with unaccountable funds, the report documented the practice of delivering pallets of untraceable cash to infuse the five funds responsible for conducting stability and reconstruction missions in Iraq. Incidentally, the total expenditure in Iraq merely reflects half of what has been spent in Afghanistan thus far. The report exposes the lack of policy coherence, poor institutional memory, and negligible accountability, which led to loss of $8 billion in waste and $1.6 billion in fraud. The report nonetheless assures 390 audits have led to more than 100 convictions and recovery of $2 billion (Bowen May 2013, 6).

David Alpher of the Middle East Institute pointed to the report’s preoccupation with “chronicling funding failures rather than with focusing on what would constitute better policy in situations of conflict and instability in the (sadly inevitable) next case” (Alpher 2013). Alpher believed the report yielded a more invaluable insight by suggesting what the largest lesson learned should be. Iraqi respondents, in interviews inquiring about possible explanations for the dismal return, pointed to lack of interaction between Iraqis and Americans. They asserted, a stronger relationship based on interaction and consultation “would have given the Iraqis the opportunity to tell the Americans how to target efforts better, how to align those efforts with Iraqi needs and desires, and how to root out poor choices in local contractors” (Alpher 2013). Meanwhile, American respondents attributed it to “lack of communication and coordination between civilian and military entities and to poor execution of strategic planning and oversight mechanisms; the interaction and relationship with the host country did not come across as salient” (Alpher 2013). The disconnect, between American and Iraqi points of view, is glaringly obvious and consistent across the board, regardless of respondent’s status, stake in the outcome.
or proximity to the battlespace. This finding confirms unity of effort and legitimacy were sorely lacking during this costly endeavor (Bowen May 2013, 121).

What the US strategy in Iraq clearly failed to accomplish was to motivate Iraqis to take charge of their liberated, albeit now fragmented, country (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 24). Perhaps it was the drastic US shift in policy midstream, or the missed opportunity to self-correct, or the tendency to implement a one-size-fits-all strategy (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 27). Could this war have been altered favorably had these issues been addressed?

An emerging trend in security discourse is advocating use of law enforcement during stabilization missions, as a more effective mean for garnering public support. It is assumed, “[i]f citizens have confidence that the police will protect them and provide emergency services, they are likely to be loyal to the state” (Bayley and Perito 2010, 150). Legitimacy is integral to inducing cooperative compliance to authority and, thereby, reducing the need to resort to oppressive violence. Citizens who perceive their government as legitimate “are more likely to cooperate with the police; public input that results in improving public safety increases the legitimacy of government” (Bayley and Perito 2010, 152).

So, in essence, not only does perception of legitimacy go hand-in-hand with good governance, but legitimacy and political stability are also mutually reinforcing. International organizations, such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc., have long championed this perspective. However, their capabilities and capacities to generate the needed resources have been taxed to their maximum. Any additional requirements will have to be met by other means.
The Purpose of the Study

This study compares different approaches to establishing security, in terms of use of force needed to restore order. The underlying assumption is contextual interpretations are as influential as structural and functional factors in driving political behaviors (Van Evera 1994, 26). More precisely, it compares the British policing approach in Iraq with that of the French in Syria between the two world wars. This comparison aims to distinguish between the two security approaches in restoring order. A previous study by Tony Smith (1978) compared the British and French decolonization policies. Smith claimed “the British proved to be ideologically, and especially institutionally, more fit than the French to cope with overseas challenges to their rule” (1978, 71). He noted the effectiveness of Britain’s domestic political institutions and the pragmatic preference for ruling an “informal empire” (Omissi 1990, 25), which afforded them a closer bond with the US (Smith 1978, 100). Of relevance is the adaptability of British policies; the pragmatism in transferring power to local elites; and restricting their use of force “to situations where it could be realistically expected to achieve reasonable ends” (Smith 1978, 100; Nagl 2005, 50-51).

Perception of legitimacy is conceptualized as inducement of compliance, rather than further incitement of rebellion. The rationale underlying the perception of institutional legitimacy is as follows. If an institution reflects desired values or shared interests, and if the durability of this institution hinges on its effective delivery of these values/interests, then internalization of these values/interests, in time and by affected stakeholders, leads to institutional support and
durability. By extension, if the state is considered an institution, and the governance is the function of the state, then the durability of the state hinges on the effectiveness of its governance.

Hence, the state and particularly its policing institutions require popular perception of their legitimacy to endure. This point is especially critical when the revolt is “motivated by secession or autonomy” (Connable and Libicki 2010, 185). When lacking such legitimacy, the state’s resort to coercion becomes necessary to maintain orderly obedience to illegitimate authority. Inevitably, the impulse of the oppressed to restore natural equilibrium will overwhelm the resources available to subvert it. In the long-run, sustenance of a repressive state grows increasingly costly and untenable, because the effectiveness of this approach has a relatively short shelf-life. Findings of this study could suggest an alternative method for establishing security during the implementation phase of operations. Given the geo-strategic environment and global challenges, a bottom-up approach to establishing security could prove most pragmatic.

In the next chapter, the literature review aims to achieve three results. First, explain the link between exercise of authority and the management of intrastate conflict. Second, describe the requirements for establishing security during phase IV. Lastly, describe how the policing approach differs from military tactics.

The Study Outline

The fundamental argument of this study is institutions, whether at the macro- or micro-levels, reflect collective beliefs, values, and shared interests. Thus, the durability of policing institutions depends on subjective judgments of their effectiveness in delivering security. In time, the rewards of institutional efficacy are internalized by the affected stakeholders and lead to

\[34\] Cautionary note, institutional durability does not necessarily imply enduring legitimacy.
reciprocal support. The second chapter describes the context within which future US military missions are likely to unfold. A historiographical overview of the Fertile Crescent sets the stage for the three case-studies. A review of the theoretical literature follows to explain the rationale weaving through the analytical framework. The third chapter describes the research design and the comparative method of process-tracing. The fourth chapter introduces the two historical case studies serving as the basis for the analytical framework. The fifth chapter reviews the security operations conducted in the initial years of OIF. In the sixth chapter, the analytical framework is applied to evaluate the three hypothesized claims within the context of the US experience in Iraq. The study then ends with its final conclusion and consideration of potential policy implications.
“On whatever terms peace is made, it must be absolutely kept. From the sacredness of the faith pledged in the engagement, and every thing must be cautiously avoided, not only savouring of treachery, but that may tend to awaken and inflame animosity.”
- Hugo Grotius

Chapter 2: The Frameworks

As described in the previous chapter, this study aims to understand the link between perception of authority and the duration of armed civil conflict. Therefore, this chapter focuses on exploring the potential security challenges associated with authoritarian Arab states, and the implications of an outbreak in armed civil conflict. The chapter begins with a description of the methods used in studying political behavior. This description is then followed by a historiographical overview of the context within which future US military missions are likely to take place. The second half of this chapter explores the theoretical models underlying the structural, functional, and symbolic drivers of political action in Arab states. This would also include a discussion of the security approaches appropriate for restoring order in non-permissive environments. The premise of this study links the structural and functional durability of the international system with individuals’ perceptions of its legitimacy. Essentially, the authoritative top-down approach to order may only survive if the collective perceives it as beneficial.

International Relations (IR) and Comparative Studies are both interested in assessing decisions made by states. The difference lies in the object of their focus. Comparative cross-cultural studies are interested in understanding variations in political behavior within states. They tend to describe the organization of power, levels of authority, quality of cross-cutting ties, and types of violence. Meanwhile, IR studies are interested in understanding states’ interactions with each other. So, while an IR analyst may attribute the nature of states’ interactions to a systemic
constraint, like polarity, the comparative analyst attributes a state’s decision to internal influences, such as political culture\textsuperscript{35} or public opinion (Kegley and Raymond 2002, 31-40; Wiarda 2007, 3-4). Thus, for simplification purposes, the two perspectives differ in the level at which analysis takes place.

**Contextual Background**

In the current post-Cold War international system, an outbreak of intrastate conflict at the micro-level may usher in macro-level implications. Within this evolving context, if a state defaults on its constitutional obligations or loses authority, it is potentially forfeiting its right to sovereignty (Rousseau 1762; Chomsky 2006, 7). The dangers posed by political violence, whether in the form of threats to human security, regional instability, or internationalization of the conflict, warrant heightened concern. If policy-makers find the need to launch such operations unavoidable, their foreign policy and military plans must reflect an appreciation for the political nature of irregular warfare. Such missions entail an intricate web of complex operations and formidable strategic implications. Political violence due to its nature and implications can be especially threatening to human security and disruptive to military operations. To wrest this type of violence and to restore some semblance of order, exercise of authority must be effective and judicious. After all, the inherently political nature of these missions can be seriously undermined by mismanaged armed civil conflict.

\textsuperscript{35}Political culture encompasses the historically and ideologically influenced shared beliefs and values on politics, choices of leaders, and forms of governance (Wiarda 2007, 9).
The Big Picture

Establishing order has been a perennial problem for the international system (Ikenberry 2001, 17). During the Cold War era, a surreal sense of stability dominated the globe, due to a strategic and ideological security framework imposed by the two superpowers (Snow 2008, 23; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011, 41). At the core of this bipolar stand-off was the belief superpowers can shape regional security orders (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 2). Some argued, due to the Cold War, the influence of regional powers was overshadowed until the USSR had finally collapsed. Detractors, conversely, asserted that regional powers played a role all along, even during the Cold War era (Holsti 1970, 253). This point has now become utterly moot.

Regional sub-systems are now gaining prominence and increasingly shaping securitization patterns (Stein and Lobell 1997; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011). Additionally, many of the constraints imposed upon the US military by its competition with the Soviets have dissolved (Gray 2005, 20; Snow 2008, 38). As a result, US military missions have gradually become more adventurous and ambitious -- seeking to reunite divided countries and installing democratic governments. As regional sub-systems continue to exert their influence in tandem, simply by asserting their geographical proximity, they are also beginning to chafe at continued encroachments into their spheres of influence by global powers (Ikenberry 2011, 57). In reciprocation, these global powers continue to flaunt their gravitas, either by assuaging their allies’ regional trepidations or infusing individual states with economic and military support (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 224). Of specific relevance are two concerns – a multipolar
world less accommodating of the Roosevelt Corollary\textsuperscript{36} and unmanaged armed civil conflicts which could have deleterious effects upon regional stability.

The US, by virtue of being a founding member of the UN, architect of its charter, and a permanent member on the Security Council (UNSC) had committed to respecting state sovereignty, eradicating war, eliminating human suffering, promoting progress and justice, and securing individual rights for all (UN 1945, 3; Mingst and Karns 2007, 56). Skeptics argue the US’ foreign policy record since WWI raises doubts about the sincerity of the US’ commitment to peace and stability (Amnesty 2011; Mingst and Karns 2007, 57). The diverse range of opinions, between war advocates at one extreme and proponents of peace at the other, revolve around the proper role of the US and how to create a favorable political order (Shadlow 2003, 85; Mingst and Karns 2007, 57).

Amplifying regional jitters is US’ growing aversion to entanglement by institutional constraints (Chomsky 2006, 38).\textsuperscript{37} This trend became apparent in 1994, when the Presidential directive no. 25 was issued, stating the US “is prepared to participate in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations only to the extent that this participation is warranted by national US interest” (Cassese 2005, 44; Mingst and Karns 2007, 13). The trend became undeniable when the Clinton Administration agreed to sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) but refused to join.\textsuperscript{38} This decision was largely driven by constitutional restraints and domestic resistance to allowing an international body jurisdiction over US citizens or territory. In the landmark case of \textit{Reid v. Covert}, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the US Supreme Court declared the

\textsuperscript{36} In reference to the interventionist foreign policy of President Theodore Roosevelt. While the Monroe Doctrine advocated isolationism, the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary asserted the role of the US as a regional hegemon/policeman (Mitchener and Weidenmeir 2005, 658; Hastedt 2011, 12).


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
authority of the Constitution over US citizens supersedes any international executive agreement
or treaty signed by the US Senate. Notwithstanding, this declaration amounted to “a death
sentence for collective security” (Bertrand 1995, 352).

The Bush Administration was perhaps more defiant with the ICC (Schaefer 2005, 2), and
the Obama Administration had attempted to re-vector US-ICC relations through positive
engagement and supportive gestures (Obama 2010, 48); nonetheless, both refused to ratify the
Rome statute (Koh 2010). Positive efforts therefore were insufficient to change ingrained views
of American unilateralism and impunity, especially with allegations of usurping international
laws and the UN Conventions39 continuing to emerge,40 eroding international faith in US’
intentions (Hastings 2012, 42; Ball 2007, 34); proof the US never abandoned its non-
interventionist foreign policy.

The emerging geo-strategic environment is drastically different from the one which
dominated the 20th century (Obama 2010, 17). Some argue “the world will not just look less
American – it will also look less liberal” (Ikenberry 2011, 56). Not that the fundamental
principles underlying international order will be contested, but rather the distribution of authority
and capacity to lead within it (Ikenberry 2011, 57). With the rise of non-western regional powers
and growth in transnational threats the world will be divided, between state actors who want to
expand the rule-based, multilateral international order and those who want “a less cooperative
order built on spheres of influence” (Ikenberry 2011, 68).

39 A pattern of unlawful activities have been conducted as anti-terrorism measures. These include creation of secret
prisons abroad to torture detainees, preventing oversight and due process, etc. (Ball 2007).
40 Patrick Wintour, “Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq war could report this year, says David Cameron,” The Guardian,
16 May 2014.
Indeed, some have argued the integrity of the Westphalian system itself is at stake (Herbst 2004, 305). The end of the Cold War ushered in “increasingly diverse, differentiated and fragmented” security challenges conducive to state failure and internal conflict (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011, 39; Herbst 2004, 304). Although there’s nothing new about nation-states being consumed by internal conflict; however, it now appears as if governments’ loss of legitimacy has become more intolerable and harder to reverse (Clapham 2004, 89).

**Much Ado About Nothing**

The 2012 Global Peace Index reports four of five of the failing states were located in the Middle East. Globally, there’s a growing trend of violent criminality, violent demonstrations, homicides, and organized internal conflict (GPI 2012). The sharper increase in number of weak and failing states is one of the established ramifications of globalization (Rotberg 2004, 305). The networked connectivity, porous borders, looser institutional controls, and easier access to sophisticated technologies and lethal weapons erode a weak state’s support and sovereignty. Such trends would likely lead to future upticks in armed civil conflict (Snow 2008, 31).

The anticipated consequences include a rise in dispersed and regionalized threats taking on localized dimensions and, conversely, internal conflicts increasingly spilling over regionally (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008, 502; Blanchard et. al. 2012, 10). Moreover, in addition to threats by traditional interstate wars, human security will be further threatened by large-scale environmental degradation and predation by armed criminals exploiting a power vacuum (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011, 39; Rotberg 2004, 311).

---

41 This index uses 23 indicators to evaluate the peacefulness of 158 countries. The four most deteriorating Middle Eastern states are: Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Oman.
Of the many functions performed by the state, the primary is to provide security as a “political good”. Without a sustained and reasonable measure of security the delivery of other desirable goods is outright impossible (Rotberg 2004, 3). States, therefore, must ensure law, order, economic infrastructure, development, and human security (Gortney 2011, I-11). These expectations are at the core of state stability and the social contract, in which citizens relinquish their right to use force for protection by the state (Fixdal and Smith 1998). Rotberg (2004) asserts, “agency,\textsuperscript{42} rather than structural flaws or institutional insufficiencies” is at the root of slides toward state failure (Rotberg 2004, 10). When the state uses excessive force against its people it “creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency” (Kilcullen 2010, 30).

The principle of ensuring human security encompasses the human right to freedom from fear and freedom to attain needs (Annan 2000). Threats to human security once conventional warfare had ceased can significantly impede the establishment of relative stability required for advancing other dimensions of recovery (Kilcullen 2010, 216). The inability to return to relative normalcy can further threaten the likelihood of the US attaining its larger strategic objectives (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 24-26). The possibility of armed civil conflict spilling over\textsuperscript{43} into neighboring territory and the region can alter domestic and regional power dynamics (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008, 486; Blanchard et. al. 2012, 10).

Warfare, as a subset of the state’s larger war, is waged alongside the state’s other instruments of power such as economic, diplomatic, and intelligence tools (Moseley 2007, 15). A state’s power cache could be described as either hard power or soft power (Nye 2002, 8). Soft

\textsuperscript{42} Agency “allowed the state to act upon bodies from which it stood apart, of which the most important was the body of population which had come to be called ‘society’” (Neep 2012, 30).

\textsuperscript{43} As currently witnessed in the Ukraine, Nigeria, Iraq, and Syria.
power describes the preference to use diplomacy and economics in an enticing manner, to persuade and attract the cooperation of international actors (Nye 2002, 9). Conversely, hard power is punitive and relies on deployment of sanctions and military force to deter or coerce compliance (Moseley 2007, 23). Hence, war is the ultimate embodiment of hard power. Nonetheless, it is only a tool midst others to attain political objectives (Clausewitz 1989, 87).

Conventional warfare takes place on a defined battlefield, between regular state forces, and by using legally sanctioned tactics and weapons other than biological, chemical, or nuclear. In contrast, unconventional warfare is “conducted by, through, and with surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed by external forces” (Alexander 2010, 45-47). The purpose of these operations is to affect a psychological impact. The covert nature of the operations and potent tactics is to produce exaggerated and dramatic effects, make this type of warfare exceptionally intimidating.

In irregular warfare, a superior force such as the state’s security apparatus confronts an inferior force such as insurgents (Galula 2006, 3). Insurgents, due to the weakness of their position and dearth of their resources must rely on evasive and exhaustive strategies, while the superior force on restraint (Gortney 2011, I-14). An insurgency is “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority” (Austin 2009, I-1). It is, therefore, a struggle for political ends. The state and insurgents compete to win the support and acquiescence of the larger population (Galula 2006, 5). For this end, the insurgent employ tactics specifically to undermine the legitimacy and competence of the government (Galula 2006, 6).
The inferior tactics and non-state actor status of the insurgents force the state to engage in low-intensity warfare. This type of warfare is the selective and restrained application of force to coerce compliance of the rogue faction. The ambiguous nature and low tempo of such operations exclude effective means normally employed during conventional warfare. The costs of conventional air power and artillery can be politically prohibitive when used in urbanized environments (Austin 2009, II-4; Connable and Libicki 2010, 191). Insurgents pose a unique threat by being indistinguishable from non-combatants and exploiting a legally protected status (Galula 2006, 50). Regardless of all attempts to argue legal minutiae, the onus will always be on the state to ascertain targets’ identity. Until insurgents gain enough support and strength to engage in civil war, they will ensure their survival within an “ecosystem”, in which inputs and outputs are constantly exchanged and lead to systematic behavior (Kilcullen 2010, 196).

Defusing tensions, therefore, involves “local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors” (Kilcullen 2010, 30). An effective military campaign recognizes the link and difference between intervention and post-conflict development (Bell 2011, 324). Counterinsurgents, unlike their opponents, share the population’s aim -- the return to homeostasis. A unified aim affords the state an edge over the insurgency, if translated into unity of effort. This can be achieved by engaging in mutually reinforcing exchanges and introducing incremental changes within the interrelated sub-systems, with each working toward the same goal (Kilcullen 2010, 216). The efficient integration of feedback will have a synergistic, real-time effect on the overall system (Austin 2009, VII-6).

A state unwilling or unable to uphold its responsibility will exacerbate the population’s sense of vulnerability and fear of violence (Cassese 2005, 62). This condition is compounded by the fact other avenues for help or protection are scarce and hard to come by. It would be naive to
expect a quick or effective response when time is of the utmost essence from an elephantine bureaucracy like the UN (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011, 44). The UN is founded on the principles of acknowledging state sovereignty, equality, and freedom from intervention. Such convictions are antithetical to resolving internal conflicts; let alone urgently (Mingst and Karns 2007, 23; Evans 1994, 3; Dobbins et al. 2007, 1). Article (2) 7 states, “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but the principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” (UN 1945, 3). In any case, the UNSC must determine if there is in fact a threat to peace or an act of aggression; only after complete or partial economic or diplomatic sanctions prove inadequate can the UNSC consider use of armed force, albeit limited (UN 1945, 10). The scope of intervention by other states is limited by the Charter. States that have been attacked, however, do retain, per Article 51, the right of self-defense, pending UNSC action (UN 1945, 10). The caveat is “armed action in self defense is permitted only against armed attack” (O’Connell 2002, 7).

Another significant obstacle to planning and implementing emergency responses is the growing philosophical gap between international actors over how to regulate armed civil conflict, whether by management or prevention. This schism reflects a deeper and more fundamental disagreement on how armed civil conflict originates and whether institutional checks or enfranchisement are better predictors of strategic culture (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2008, 5; Evans 1994, 20). Needless to mention, impartiality in intervention, in which “outsiders take complete command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and impose a peace settlement,” is illusory (Betts 1994, 21). Realistically, this only happens after “wars have played
themselves out and the fighting factions need only the good offices of mediators to lay down their arms” (Betts 1994, 28).

Certainly this discourse would be remiss if it did not acknowledge the critical role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross. This private association, established in 1863, is one of few which enjoy a legal *sui generis* status in the international community (Cassese 2005, 133). Its sole purpose is to respond to humanitarian missions related to armed civil conflict. Additionally, it promotes drafting of treaties and compliance with international conventions, and ensures the rights of belligerents and victims of war are respected (Cassese 2005, 133). However, when legitimate humanitarian interventions take place, most are launched for immediate and reactionary purposes (Dobbins et al. 2007, 2). As a consequence, intervening forces face the difficult, lengthy, and expensive task of refashioning a society (Kegley and Raymond 2002, 234; Dobbins et al. 2007, xix).

**The Conceptual Framework**

Since this study compares different approaches to restoring order after the outbreak of armed civil conflict, this section discusses the structural, functional, and socially constructed concepts relevant to this process. Armed civil conflict is a sub-category of intrastate conflict which includes both internal and internationalized conflicts. This theoretical framework explains the rationale weaving through the analytical framework used to compare the three case-studies.

The outbreak of armed civil conflict not only creates the volatile context within which antagonists come to a head, but is also a product of that context. To better understand what causes the onset of armed civil conflict, one must begin by recognizing the role people’s perceptions play in determining social interactions. This study argues worldviews are equal to
structural and functional factors in influencing political behaviors and outcomes. Ostensibly, what all humans have in common is their capacity to make assumptions about one’s own self and others. Moreover, individuals choose their affiliations based on these assumptions. Nonetheless, while it is possible to infer individuals’ values and interests from the company they keep; however, the benefits associated with stereotyping are hardly ever worth it. Stereotypes are considered cognitive shortcuts, and can potentially mislead. More significantly, because of their tendency to outlive their original purpose they are likely to serve as a source of conflict.

Conflict is much harder to sustain within a diverse culture rich with cross-cutting ties. Such culture requires one to transcend primeval biases and to surrender instead to a more expansive sense of communion. Alternatively, exclusive worldviews are primed to cause conflict. They guarantee a clash, whether in competing interests, conflicting ideals, or contradictory views of reality. The approach for this study assumes the deconstruction of the context would yield a nuanced understanding of the conflict’s internal machinations. This is accomplished by deconstructing the context into its structural and functional components, while affording each its tangible value and symbolic meaning. Herein, structural components refer to systemic features such as sovereignty, authority, order, etc. Meanwhile, functional components refer to institutional mechanisms like coercion, compliance, perception, interpretation, etc. In this study, attaining Pareto equilibrium is synonymous with restoring order by regaining the balance undergirding the social contract. Therefore, if attaining Pareto equilibrium represents the desired end state and constitutes the aim of both antagonists, then the onset of armed civil conflict represents a structural or procedural dysfunction (Lieden and Schmitt 1968, 37). After all, effective governance offers, in theory, less costly alternatives to violence for resolving grievances.
Political Violence

In its broader sense, political violence encompasses a range of sub-national armed conflicts, including insurgency and civil war. Categorical distinctions among intrastate conflicts are largely based on the nature of belligerents, targets, levels and types of support and force, and the intended outcome. Due to the complexity of causes leading to its outbreak, intrastate conflict is considered a wicked problem, and will most likely require external intervention to resolve.

Governments devoid of internal legitimacy often resort to using means of coercion and intimidation to impose order and compel obedience (Lust-Okar 2004, 160). Because sustained repression has a relatively short shelf-life, it is only a matter of time before the impulse of the oppressed to restore natural equilibrium overwhelms any contrived constraints (Lust-Okar 2004, 161). Failed states, typically, experience armed civil conflict that is “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions” however, the intensity of the violence is not what defines a failed state; it is the enduring and all-consuming nature of armed insurgencies (Rotberg 2004, 5).

When a central government loses its internal legitimacy, it also loses its authority over the use of force and vice-versa. Fragile states’ spiral descent into failure and decay begins with the ineffective centralized government having to compete with other power centers for control over society. Such control includes authority over its geographical boundaries, security apparatus, and population (Posner 2004, 237). States could also plunge into intrastate conflict when “ruler-led oppression provokes a countervailing reaction on the part of resentful groups or
newly emerged rebels” (Rotberg 2004, 6). Rudolph J. Rummel (1997) estimated 262 million victims were killed by democide, a term he coined for violence perpetrated by authoritarian or totalitarian governments upon their own citizens. He concluded the best gauge of a regime’s propensity to commit democide is its degree of totalitarianism and drive for power.

Authoritarian Arab governments systematically manipulate civil action to manufacture an image of internal legitimacy (Blanchard et al. 2012, 17). Some leverage access to power toward sustaining their own monopoly on power (Bellin 2004, 148; Salamey and Pearson 2012, 933). The Middle East is “distinguished by the comparatively high proportion of government expenditures devoted to security forces” (Posusney 2004, 131). The strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the coercive apparatus have fostered robust authoritarianism (Bellin 2004, 143). Compelling evidence exists linking the region’s lack of political pluralization with reduced reliance on extractive means for funding (Bellin 2004, 148). Some argue, states freed from having to extract taxes are less compelled to bargain with citizens, thereby are less accountable and more likely to behave in a predatory manner (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 622). An alternative interpretation of the predatory behavior of rich states offers, in the absence of bargaining these states are less fearful of citizens’ reactions and citizens less committed to the state (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 622). This corroborates research findings on the “resource curse”, which associates resource endowment with the likelihood of experiencing civil war.

**Military Operations**

After the end of the Cold War, international norms had acknowledged but now also qualified states’ right to sovereignty. Immunity from international intervention became

---

44 The term “irregular” refers to the type of behavior, the rebellion and disobedience of rules set by the military establishment, not to the frequency of onset (Kilcullen 2010, x).
contingent upon the state’s ability to gain and maintain authority over its domain. According to Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008), in addition to prioritizing economic recovery once armed civil conflict ends, the emerging state will attempt to prevent the armed civil conflict from reigniting (Collier et al. 2008, 462). Studies on civil war link collapse of an authoritarian state to internal conflict. The subsequent institutional vacuum and the internationalization of the conflict is a remnant of the authoritarian past (Collier et al. 2008, 463). Therefore, discernment of the context within which military operations take place is imperative for effective planning and implementation. Based on growing international concern and the numerous variations in approaches to peace-building and/or peacekeeping, the UN was propelled, in 2005, to standardize responses to these various post-conflict circumstances. The UN-proposed model for intervention involves six stages: conflict resolution, peace-keeping, democratization, reform, acceptance of settlement, and withdrawal of intervening forces (Collier et al. 2008, 464).

According to the US military, a military campaign consists of several linked engagements to achieve a unified objective. Campaigns and operations often proceed in phases: I-Preparation; II-Shape the Battlespace, III-Decisive Operations; IV-Stability Operations (Mullen 2011, III-38). Military responses fall along a continuum and distinguished by their objectives, of engagement, security cooperation, or deterrence (Gortney 2011, I-4). In terms of operational types, the two ends of the warfighting continuum are conventional and irregular warfare. The US military, in aggregate, has been more successful in conducting conventional warfare. As a result, its strategic culture reflects such fact. Therefore, a potential adversary is more likely to challenge the US to an irregular stand-off.

With a few exceptions, traditionally, DoD plays a supportive role to DoS in most matters of foreign policy (Whittaker et. al. 2011, 52). DoD takes the lead in discussions pertaining to
“coalition military considerations and political-military and security issues (e.g., civil-military, nation-building and/or stability operations) (Whittaker et. al. 2011, 52). DoD established the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), a “multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community” (Whittaker et. al. 2011, 54). Members of JIACGs are the link to their parent agencies and help synchronize joint task force (JTF) operations (Whittaker et. al. 2011, 54).

Military interventions are often launched in response to an immediate negative purpose and could potentially lack all the necessary intelligence. Consequently, the intervening force may face the more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive task of having to refashion the affected state. The intervention itself will change power relationships within that society and among its neighbors. Those whom may benefit from the intervention may abuse their positions, and those disadvantaged may move to frustrate the purposes of the intervening authorities (Dobbins et al. 2007, 3; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 30).

The establishment and sustainment of security is critical to the process of rebuilding a state, so “plans must feature an appropriate balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations in all phases” (Gortney 2011, II-12). Stability operations are the “missions, tasks, and activities that…fall into three broad categories of activity: initial response, transformational, and/or sustainment (Gortney 2011, I-3). Because security never exists in vacuum, assessment of the context in which it will be implemented is critical. According to joint military doctrine, JP 3-07 – Stability Operations, “the nature of the security environment may require US military forces to engage in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military
operations” (Gortney 2011, I-4). The range of possible military operations varies by size, purpose, and intensity.

By the time US troops entered Iraq in 2003, the US had been engaged in the most nation-building missions in the world. Unfortunately, in the pre-OIF planning period, civilian and military’s serious attempts to reflect upon previous lessons were sorely absent. During OIF the US had opted for the “deconstruction” approach. This approach required the Coalition forces to first dismantle the existing state apparatus then build a new one (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 14). In earnest, the Coalition forces began carrying out their assigned missions, methodically and systematically disempowering some elements of society and empowering others instead. Shortly after, the Coalition forces noticed a growing trend – the more sweeping the operational objectives were, the more resistance they encountered (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 16; Hashim 2006, 28).

Ahmed Hashim (2006) offered an overview of Iraq’s insurgency since its inception. He detailed the Sunni insurgents’ means, motives, and opportunities and offered a shorter analysis of the Shi’ite and Kurdish insurgencies. He argued the Iraqi Sunni insurgency, initially, was not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision (Hashim 2006, 18). The outbreak of violence began on April 28th, 2003, when “US soldiers shot and killed fifteen people at an anti-US rally” in Fallujah and wounded sixty-five (Hashim 2006, 23). While the insurgency began by a smorgasbord of former regime loyalists and resentful Iraqis, the two groups were distinct nonetheless (Hashim 2006, 24). The dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces a month later fuelled the tempers of the resentful Sunnis (Hashim 2006, 28 and 29). He observed the “security situation deteriorated over the course of 2004 and worsened dramatically during the first eight months of 2005” (349). Cooperation and operational coordination characterized the
relationship between former regime loyalists and resentful Iraqis. He asserted the US policy in Iraq and, in turn, the conduct of military operations played a pivotal role in inciting and perpetuating the insurgency (Hashim 2006, 275). At fault, he reasoned, was the US’ rigid and inflexible ideological approach, the failure to implement the basic tenets of nation-building; and the “failure to have an effectively prepared counter-insurgency strategy,” going into the war (Hashim 2006, 275). He rebuked the US military’s blatant inability to fight irregular warfare.

B.H. Liddell Hart once noted, “[t]he only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out” (Liddell Hart 1944, v). John Nagl (2005) examined the US Army’s organizational pitfalls and bureaucratic inefficiencies made blatantly clear during the Vietnam War (205). He compared the British and American militaries’ development of COIN doctrine and capacities to adapt to changing circumstances, especially when entering into an armed conflict initially unprepared for (xxii and 198). He emphasized the importance of learning from unanticipated circumstances (206). He concluded the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and its organizational characteristics created by its history, was better able to quickly learn and apply COIN lessons during the course of the Malayan Emergency (216).

Dobbins, et al. (2007) argued the US military strategy focused on ridding Iraq of an insurgency rather than on liberating it. The strategy had stressed selective engagement; formation of coalition support when possible; keeping the US presence to a minimum level; augmenting the state’s instruments of power; and, shaping reform designed to address shortcomings and the root causes of the insurgency. Instead, they argued, once a minimal level of security is established the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants should have been the next priority. However, within heavily armed societies with a long tradition of gun ownership, depriving individuals of their small arms may prove impractical. Therefore, at a minimum, heavy
arms should have been gathered, stored, or destroyed, and the display of small arms by any except state security forces should have been banned. Armed units should have been broken up, and individuals afforded alternative livelihoods. For agreements among contending parties to take place, deployment of an international force is often a prerequisite. Dobbins, et al. posited the key to success is not for the US military to become better at COIN, but to improve FID capabilities. The authors believe security tasks are best undertaken by international civilian police; nevertheless, the treacherous conditions pervasive during this phase of military operations pose a significant challenge to such initiatives. If civilian police pool of resources are lacking, they recommended including a large number of military police in the initial peacekeeping force.

Generically speaking, once military operations are launched Army soldiers and Marines are the first to arrive and make contact with the affected population. However, not until the affected population learns to trust the external military presence can one expect their collaboration or cooperation in reporting criminal or subversive activities to come forth. In the absence of guarantees to personal safety, the flow of goods, services, and general public will not circulate normally; thus, political and economic reforms cannot take hold. Intervening forces will require help from the local police and, at least, the passive cooperation of the local military in establishing a secure environment. Even when available, however, indigenous security services will usually prove incompetent, corrupt, or opportunistic, requiring close oversight, mentoring, and institutional change.

It is critical that the forces arrive with a coherent plan and adequate resources and funding to perform these tasks. The military component should establish extensive links with the civilian population. One avenue is through active intelligence collection, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. More importantly, the civilian and military leadership must devise a coherent chain of command and comprehensive system of accountability.

Meanwhile, within most post-conflict environments there will be more soldiers than needed and fewer police officers than required. Ideally, as armies are scaled back and reformed, police forces are bolstered and reformed. Training functions, when and where feasible, must be administered by professionally trained law enforcement personnel. Stabilizing an internally divided society without significant indigenous capacity for security can require an external military force of 10 to 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. The cost for fielding a US or NATO force is about $200,000 per soldier per year. The cost of fielding the typical UN peacekeeping force is about $45,000 per soldier per year (Dobbins, et al. 2007).

Walter Ladwig (2007) opined effective police forces are a key component of COIN efforts. Thus, the lack of institutional capacity or legal authority to train foreign police forces undercuts US security assistance in the war on terror. He explored the history of US police assistance during the Cold War, and proposed a means by which, for a fraction of what it spends annually on military assistance programs, the US can leverage domestic police academies to provide high-quality support and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies.

Security

Authoritarian states endure by presenting themselves, simultaneously, as a source of conflict and protection. As a result, formal institutions are corrupted by the state’s discordant policies. In Iraq, not even the security sector is immune from the corrosiveness of acrimony. The security environment consists of the following instruments of control: Special Republican Guard and Republican Guard; regular army, air force, and navy; security and intelligence services;
police forces; judiciary and criminal justice; and various paramilitary groups (Dobbins et. al. 2003, 179). When the Coalition forces took control of Iraq in 2003, there were a total of 4,000 “poorly trained Iraqi police” which reported for duty throughout the country (Phelps 2010, 139). In 2004, Iraq faced a growing challenge from insurgents and militia groups as the country drifted toward civil war (Perito 2011, 1). Iraq’s “fledgling police units mutinied under fire and resigned en masse”; violence continued to escalate till 2005 (Perito 2011, 1; Phelps 2010, 139). By September 2005, 85% of the insurgent attacks were concentrated in four provinces: Baghdad, Al Anbar, Salah Ad Din, and Ninawa (MSSI 2005, 21). While 80% of the attacks were directed against the Coalition forces, 80% of the casualties were civilians (MSSI 2005, 23). By then the Coalition had trained and equipped 68,800 police members. The absence of law and order during the initial stages of the occupation unhinged the state of Iraq. Therefore, conditions conducive to withdrawal of the Coalition forces became conditions-based - the key indicator was fielding of capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

The report by the Iraq Study Group, issued in December 2006, warned the “security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of national reconciliation” (Baker and Hamilton 2006, 19). Sectarian militias had refused to demobilize and opted to exact revenge instead (Baker and Hamilton 2006, 20; Dobbins et. al. 2003, 173). As late as July 2007, the Coalition forces’ opinion of the Iraqi police they were in charge of training was uncomplimentary (Pfaff 2008, 1). The reasons behind this disappointing outcome, failure to develop functional “local police forces to provide a permanent security presence” (Pfaff 2008, 1), were predictable: corruption, sectarianism, and intimidation by militias and criminal

---

45 Iraq is divided into 18 provinces.
46 Includes Ministry of Interior Forces: Police, Highway Patrol, and other MOI forces. The total trained and Equipped was 104,300. The Ministry of Defense Forces include: Army, Air Force, Navy. The total number recruited was 87,800 (MSSI 2005, 27).
organizations (Pfaff 2008, 1). By all accounts, this was the “biggest obstacle to stability in Iraq” and the most surprising to the Coalition forces (Pfaff 2008, 1). Unlike the army, “the police were never attacked or disbanded “(Pfaff 2008, 1; Perito 2011, 1).

State rebuilding in the aftermath of conventional combat require an environment conducive to peaceful development. If military operations are deemed necessary to achieve such outcome, then the size, scope, and intensity of operations will vary according to the nature of the crisis (Gortney 2011, I-4). The growing number of failing states and their susceptibility to intrastate conflict will likely complicate the US’ ability to access or secure national interests, due to the ensuing heightened instability. Such conditions increase the likelihood of the US military intervening to ameliorate crises. If the US intends to engage in missions requiring protection of vulnerable populations, not just highly visible political actors, it must fully prepare to deal with the arduous realities. Prewar preparations must anticipate rapid deterioration of security conditions and the unwillingness or inability of international actors to intervene. The goal of such missions must be to improve conditions on the ground, not exacerbate them (Bell 2011, 310). However, the US, for manifold reasons, including Congress’ aversion to peacekeeping missions, remains ill-prepared for such operations (Phelps 2010, 150; Dobbins et al. 2007, 65).

The 2006 GAO report found the increase in number of contractors was attributed to reductions in the size of the military and increase in the number of operations and missions (7). During OIF, various support requirements were provided by a broad array of contracting companies and subcontractors. For example, DynCorp International provided police force training;47 Blackwater USA provided private security;48 Northrop Grumman provided force

48 Ibid.
protection support; Kellog, Brown and Root provided base operation support; ManTech provided mine-clearing support; CACI provided network engineering support; General Dynamics provided Stryker vehicle support; MPRI, a unit of L-3 Communications, provided strategic planning mentors to the Iraqi Defense Ministry;\(^{49}\) Titan, also a unit of L-3 Communications, provided linguist support;\(^{50}\) and Boeing provided unmanned aerial vehicle support (GAO, 2006, 8). Guidance on DoD’s policy on contracting support is found in DoD Instruction 3020.41 – Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces. While “the instruction addresses the need for visibility over contractors however, “it does not address the need to provide adequate contract oversight personnel, to collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at deployed locations, or to provide pre-deployment training on the use of contract support” (GAO 2006, 12).

During a hearing by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, on October 2\(^{nd}\), 2007, the Chairman of the House Committee, Representative Henry A. Waxman, estimated for “every taxpayer dollar spent on Federal programs, over 40 cents now goes to private contractors” (2). The cost of providing security by a private military or security contractor is six times higher than by an active duty military member. Effectively, charging the government such high rates in sole-sourced/no-bid contracts allows private security contractors to lure highly trained soldiers out of the military service to work for them (Scahill 2007, 372).

In hindsight, the absence of checks on contractors’ conduct perhaps carried the most significant impact. After all, if Saddam left Iraqis with any legacy it is the memory of all paying dearly for his praetorian state (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 208). This, apparently, was not

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.
enough to give Bremer pause. Remarkably, private contractors did not fall under the authority of the Uniform Code of Military Justice until it was amended in 2007 (Scahill 2007, 360).

The ability to establish security in a non-permissive environment is in essence a reflection of strategic culture (Nagl 2005, 4). Strategic culture models can be powerful prediction tools. However, their misapplication could easily lead to intellectual rigidity and inflexibility. This result is caused by a tendency to habitually rely on “preferred means and traditional methods even when they are ill-suited for a new or changing context” (Shultz 2012, 5).

The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction is a manual created by the US Institute of Peace (USIP). It was created, primarily, to guide the decisions and actions of civilian agencies working with the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State (S/CRS). Although this guide disclaims, it “bears no government stamp, nor has the U.S. government adopted it officially,” its comprehensiveness is unmatched by any other roadmap (USIP 2009, 1-3). The extent of research and consultation that went into creating it encompasses the major policy documents and relevant considerations, making it relatively exhaustive. In addition to reviewing US policy documents, the manual reflects input “from state ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and development, along with major intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations” (USIP 2009, 1-4). Unlike doctrine and manuals prescribing input and proscribing outputs, this guide describes HNs’ desired outcomes. In other words, the guide not only considers what needs to be accomplished but also how it can be accomplished effectively.

51 S/CRS was established on August 5th, 2004, and authorized by the National Security Presidential Directive-44 (Whittaker et. al. 2011, 47).
In the Middle East, historical and cultural narratives direct relational choices. So, to understand the link between factors driving onset of armed civil conflict and those leading to effective resolution, cultural views on notions of legitimacy, communal solidarity, and sense of security are critical (Thomas 2008, 15). The historical cases described in this study illustrate how responses to political mobilization and population control are also contextually driven. The commonalities discovered between the study-cases suggest a combination of structural conditions and policies converge at a critical juncture to yield specific outcomes (Slater and Simmons 2010, 887).

The USIP guide outlines the primary outcomes and corresponding tasks necessary for planning and executing stabilization missions. Desired end states constitute the broader and overarching system of categorization. Listed next and in proper order, the desired end states are: safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy, and social well-being. These desired outcomes represent an aggregate of sub-sets of accomplishments. The prospect of reaching a desired end state depends upon achieving a particular set of objectives. The holistic ethos integral to the success of the model is depicted by a concentric representation of end states and their tasks. The cross-cutting principles at the core of these missions are: HN ownership and capacity, political primacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, and regional engagement. They are located at the center of the model, where all end states intersect with each other. This serves as a reminder of the interdependent nature of its components.

According to the USIP guide, establishing security requires five sub-tasks: cessation of large-scale violence; establishing territorial and physical security; maintaining public order and state’s legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Each sub-task consists of first creating the
necessary conditions. **Cessation of large-scale violence** requires: separation of warring parties; sustainment of cease fire and peace agreement; management of spoilers; and collection of intelligence. Establishing **territorial security** requires ensuring freedom of movement and border security. **Physical security** requires protection of vulnerable populations; protection of infrastructure; and preserving evidence of committed war crimes. Maintaining **public order** requires a comprehensive system of law enforcement, interim judiciary, and humane detention. Finally, maintaining **state’s legitimate monopoly on force** requires disarming and demobilizing armed combatants, reintegrating them back into society, and reforming the security sector.

**Policing**

The primary organization for local civilian policing in Iraq is the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Their mission is “to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level” (MSSI 2005, 37). They are “organized into patrol, station, and traffic sections in all major cities and provinces” (MSSI 2005, 37). New recruits must complete the eight-week basic police training. Recruits with previous police or military experience must attend a three-week Transition Integration Program. The responsibility of the Ministry of Interior Qualifying Committee is to properly vet the recruits. More than 17,000 police members received additional specialized training in various areas, such as interrogation procedures, counter-terrorism, investigations, and election security (MSSI 2005, 38). The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team is a “multi-disciplinary coalition team” to help build policy and procedures to enable the Ministry of Interior to function more effectively (MSSI 2005, 38).

As urged by the USIP guide, achieving stabilization objectives concomitantly is of the essence, especially while building the HN’s security capacity, ownership, and legitimacy. Hence,
the obvious parallels between principles of criminology and political stabilization are hard to miss. In the realm of conflict theory, the state mediates between two contrasting interests or conflicting values (Vold et al. 1998, 235). The process by which power is redistributed can be influenced, similarly, by organized groups formed to pursue and defend shared values and interests. Furthermore, in criminology, power and crime rates are inversely related because “people with absolute power are never officially defined as criminals” (Vold et al. 1998, 259).

As a case in point, in recent years, rapid changes in US domestic threats and law enforcement capabilities have resulted in closer cooperation among SOF and civilian law enforcement agencies (LEA) units (Alexander 2010, 1). Thus, there has been “an apparent convergence of the operations conducted…especially Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units, in what were formerly separate and distinct missions” (Alexander 2010, 1). Often, “criminals are equipped with fully automatic weapons and in some areas conducting small-unit operations” which require SOF-like capabilities to respond to effectively (Alexander 2010, 1). Ostensibly, the requirements “to obtain warrants prior to execution of raids for high-value targets, collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecution, and on occasion present testimony in courts of law are new missions for SOF” (Alexander 2010, 1).

The most obvious implication of employing such hybrid units pertains to the Posse Comitatus Act restriction, which limits the ability of the federal government to enforce state laws by employing federal military members. Other significant consequences include: competition over a limited resource pool; acquisition of new operational and training skills; and increased personal liability (Alexander 2010, 77).

52 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Act was modified in 1981 to exclude the National Guard. The US Coast Guard now operates under the Department of Homeland Security; therefore, also not covered by the Act.
Bayley and Perito claim Core Policing (CP) would allow a nascent government to establish security by proactively stemming the outbreak of armed conflict. CP claims to leverage community inputs and feedback to combat predatory behaviors known to instigate intrastate conflict. Sir Robert Peel, dubbed the father of modern policing, in 1829, pioneered the concept of preventative policing. He developed nine principles which defined the ethical police creed: the basic mission of the police is to prevent crime and disorder; job performance depends on public’s approval of police actions; voluntary and cooperative public assistance is necessary and linked to gaining public’s respect; degree of public cooperation is inversely related to use of force; gaining the public’s favor is through impartial service, not catering to its opinion; use of force must be of last resort and to the extent order is restored and law is observed; community outreach is essential to sustain relevance; police must respect jurisdictional boundaries and not usurp the powers of the judiciary; and finally, evidence of efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not proof of police action (Lentz and Chaires 2007). Proactive policing is a concept which closely resembles CP but instead advocates reducing crime by encouraging community involvement. It is also based on Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Windows theory of informal social control.

Alternatively, evidence does confirm COP reduces fear of crime and enhances overall relations between police and citizens. However, research findings on the effectiveness of community-oriented policing (COP) are mixed. Proof COP reduces crime rates or changes individual behavior has not been too convincing. The latest resurgence in community-oriented policing came at the heels of the civil rights movement. It aimed to redress the dysfunctional relations between urban police and minorities, akin to a public relations campaign. Theoretically,

---

CP encourages cooperation and informative exchanges by emphasizing the street-level contact between the police and citizens. In turn, this orientation also prioritizes the concept of space over time in order to effectively prevent crime and respond to citizens’ needs.

Bayley and Perito found the role of police resembles closely “what has been recommended for police in coping with counterterrorism and prevention of violent crime” (Bayley and Perito 2010, 2). They emphasized the necessity of specifying the functions to be performed because training will reflect the degree of specificity, “roles determine training, not the other way around” (Bayley and Perito 2010, 3). They claim CP is “necessary for the development of self-government”; it “ensures that the police are more effective in containing violence that arises variously from insurgency, terrorism, and violent crime.” They found it easier to train local police on CP than “to train them to become so-called little soldiers who support or supplement military forces in offensive counter insurgency operations” (Bayley and Perito 2010, 3).

In societies “governed through systems of uneasy clientage and elite cooption,” colonial powers resorted to using political policing and intelligence gathering (Thomas 2008, 294). The four obstacles “to the effective exploitation of intelligence” they had to contend with were: “time and space, organization, politicization, and cognition” (Thomas 2008, 296). Colonial intelligence was “based on the steady accumulation of information about an identified constituency – the internal population – whose underlying hostility to foreign rule was taken for granted” (Thomas 2008, 300). In other words, they measured colonial success by “popular acquiescence in European rule rather than willing acceptance of it” (Thomas 2008, 300). As a result, colonial administrators “meshed local opposition with external dangers because state repression presented opportunities for foreign opponents to exploit the inevitable discontent” (Thomas 2008, 301). To
this day, states struggle with how to “reconcile their requirements for social control with limited coercive means at their disposal” (Thomas 2008, 302). Thereby, they continue to their search for ways to “reduce this deficit of repressive power” (Thomas 2008, 302).

Air policing is simply airpower replacing artillery (Mackey 2007, 32). Nonetheless, aviation drastically transformed the physical dimension of the battlefield (Omissi 1990, 90). It allowed the state to expand its reach. Air policing allowed the government to penetrate previously closed and geographically isolated communities (Omissi 1990, 91). Thereby, “emergence of the aeroplane as a weapon to enforce government demands irreversibly altered the balance of power between the central state and the societies on its geographical margins” (Omissi 1990, 211).

The role of police in irregular warfare is primarily to transform the legitimate local government into an effective one. To achieve this goal, political and diplomatic personnel must be involved. Mission success requires commanders to understand the human terrain of their environment and emphasize intelligence collection. Security of the population is paramount, to prevent spoilers from preying on the general population (Wiarda 2007, 198; Bayley and Perito 2010, 77; Dobbins et. al. 2003, 199). Effective policing would require taking the lead on military missions; possessing diversified skills; and focusing on keeping the population safe.

One of the most frustrating aspects of training Iraqi police is learning to distinguish between cultural practices “which reflect basic assumptions and espouses values” and “those which are merely tolerated” (Pfaff 2008, 37). Practices during the Saddam era encouraged a “poor ethical climate in the Iraqi police forces,” which in turn created “confusion between authority and responsibility. It is not that the Iraqi police do not “understand what appropriate
professional and ethical standards are,” but given the difficult operating environment they are “either not able or not interested in upholding them” (Pfaff 2008, 30). For this reason, some US advisors “have held back developing the necessary relationships required to build an effective and democratic police force” (Pfaff 2008, 31). Others “have limited their interaction to making demands on Iraqi officials and police to conform to internationally recognized standards regarding human rights and corruption and then monitoring compliance” (Pfaff 2008, 31).

In light of the information presented in this chapter, to assume the security situation is hopeless would be understandable, but also inaccurate. As in all things bureaucratic or complex, the problem does not lie in the absence of solutions, but rather unawareness of their existence. In spite of the great strides made, during the 1980s, in bridging the communication divide between the US armed forces nonetheless, power struggles and fierce competition over resources remains a barrier hindering full cooperation. The point being made here, by including the following section is to draw attention to the unharnessed capability which currently exists within the military matrix but is poorly utilized.

When not deployed on joint missions abroad, each branch of the armed forces has its own apparatus for maintaining order and security within their respective jurisdictions in the continental US (CONUS). However, when military personnel are deployed on joint missions overseas (OCONUS) the Unified Combatant Commander directs responsibilities and assigns missions according to the Unified Command Plan. In turn, each Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) is assigned a force and an Area of Responsibility (AOR) to execute missions. The organization and reporting chain of command for military personnel is outlined in Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, March 2013.
While in CONUS, the Army Military Police Corps (MP) maintains law and order within garrison, the Criminal Investigations Command (CID) investigates crimes, and the Corrections Command (ACC) maintains the Army’s disciplinary and correctional systems. Both MPs and CID report to the Provost Marshal General; while ACC to the Secretary of the Army. For 29 years the office of the Provost Marshall General (PMG) of the US Marine Corps was abolished, but was reinstated in 2003. Marines responsible for law enforcement, criminal investigations, and corrections report to the PMG.

Master-at-arms (MA) is a naval rating for personnel responsible for discipline and order on ships or in installations. Like all sailors, MA’s chain of command is through an Executive Officer or Operations Officer up to the Commanding Officer. The training and specialization MAs undergo is identical to the Air Force’s Security Forces (AFSF). Members of AFSF are exclusively trained to execute law enforcement, security, investigations, interrogations, and combat missions. They are also responsible for confinement and corrective measures. They provide security in the form of community patrolling, guarding of entry points, and population and resource protection. Moreover, they are simultaneously capable of engaging in ground combat, base defense, and convoy escort. Once significant experience is gained in a basic specialty, AFSF may opt to further specialize or serve jointly. Phoenix Raven is a program dedicated to force and resources protection, which operate in high threat level environments. After completing Close Precision Engagement, they can deploy with Army teams.

As discussed earlier, the force needed to conduct FID missions requires a Presidential Call-up of Reserve units, which are a scarce resource and hardly available for long-term operations. Therefore, rather than over-burden SOF units with FID missions or rely on “hired
guns” to supplement operations, why not consolidate the law enforcement capacities of the armed services to train and to deploy jointly?

**The Theoretical Framework**

The bulk of the literature on causes of conflict focuses on systemic-level theories, therefore, biased toward great power interstate wars (Levy 1989, 215). Systemic-level theories attribute interstate conflict to structural characteristics of the international system, “the external environment common to all states” (Levy 1989, 222). These theories could fall within the realist or idealist paradigms, although differ in what they see precipitated the armed conflict (Levy 1989, 223). Realist theories, in particular, downplay the role of domestic institutions and minimize the effect of internal state processes. Instead, theories at the systemic-level focus on the role of anarchy, power distribution, and alliances in determining interactions among great powers including the outbreak of war. Of relevance, realist view small states as “acting in the shadows of the great powers” and, therefore, the variables aforementioned affect them differently (Levy 1989, 216). Notably, this perspective presents a clear contrast to national-level theories and decision-making theories. National-level theories attribute the causes of war to societal forces and the political structure of the state. In the meantime, decision-making theories point the cause to the role of bureaucratic processes (Levy 1989, 225).

Security concerns represent a common interest shared by these different perspectives. While the realist view of anarchy predisposes theories to negative predictions and aggressive state behavior, liberals assert the system allows for the creation of cooperative regimes and norms. Hence, rationality is a central presumption in the utility-maximization hypothesis (Keohane 1968, 181). According to Organski (1968) the age of industrialization affected power
distribution calculations by changing power differentials. While liberal economic theorists predict the spread of prosperity and free-trade would outmode military might, realists, conversely, see interdependence as a source of state weakness (Levy 1989, 261).

The classical Marxist and Leninist theories are examples of a national-level theory. Historical materialist Marxism focuses on the roles of class struggle and uneven development as the causes of conflict. Meanwhile, Lenin attributed the cause of conflict to divisions in spheres of interest and the hegemonic exercise of power (Keohane 1968, 181; Wallerstein 1947). Wallerstein’s modern world system and the Marxist-Leninist theories argue a link between the growth of capitalism among imperial powers and their drive for expansionism and militarization (Levy 1989, 266). Waltz, Snyder, and Van Evera are defensive realists; therefore, believe the structural constraints of the international system would discourage great powers from engaging in reckless behaviors (Mearsheimer 2011, 425). Waltz refuted the Marxist-Leninist causal chain by arguing “[c]apitalism is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for imperialism, although it can play a contributory role along with other variables” (Levy 1989, 266). Nevertheless, Schumpeter argued capitalist imperial expansion was driven by a group of atavist military elite (Levy 1989, 266). Snyder’s (1988) imperial overextension theory, in turn, notes the danger of over expanding due to coalitional politics and ideological commitments.

While Arab states are far from monolithic, but to “reject class analysis out of hand, merely on account of contingent ideological associations, is, from a scholarly point of view, inadmissible” (Batatu 1978, 5). In the pre-WWI era, Iraq was “a plural, relatively isolated, and often virtually autonomous city-states and tribal confederations, urban ‘class’ ties tended to be in essence local ties rather than ties on the scale of the whole country” (Batatu 1978, 8). Social structures “differed according to differences in their historical functions or in their natural
circumstances” (Batatu 1978, 9). In addition to hierarchies of wealth, there were hierarchies of religion, sects, and status (Batatu 1978, 9). A noteworthy point here “at the top in the scale of power tended also to stand at the top with respect to wealth or in terms of religious, sectarian, ethnic, or status affiliation” (Batatu 1978, 9).

When the plurality of state forms and the diversity in state-society relations were left unexplained, renewed interest in Marxism, especially in terms of the conception of the state, attempted to fill the gap (Keohane 1968, 205). Industrialization had mobilized workers and, in step, new social and economic forces began impacting the structure of the state (Keohane 1968, 226). Notwithstanding, as Habermas argued, this required shifting attention “away from the state and class conflict toward a motivational crisis in culture and ideology (Keohane 1968, 206).

During the nineteenth century, the concept of social Darwinism by Herbert Spencer swept across the industrialized world. In time this alternative to evolutionary theory took on racial and imperialist tones. Some political elites opportunistically framed the nation’s strategic culture to suit their various expansionist agendas. They achieved so by creating the perception war was necessary, to confront a threat posed by an external group (Levy 1989, 273). Although Rosecrance (1963) linked political elite’s attempt to solve internal problems with domestic instability, historical evidence of elites invoking nationalist sentiments to “rally around the flag” and preserve the state was documented by Bodin, back in 1593 (Levy 1989, 272).

Finally, decision-making theories have produced policy analysis models focused on state behaviors and civ-mil relations. They offer guidance on offensive, defensive, and deterrence decision-making based on theoretical generalizations and historical examples (Levy 1989, 276). For example, Jack S. Levy (1986) a link between the inflexibility caused by mobilizations
requirements and the outbreak of war (218). He pointed to complex interactions within the causal chain (1986, 219). Most Decision-making theories pertain to military spending or proliferation of weapons (Levy 1989, 275). Most decision-making models attribute crisis instability to military rigidity and military plans lacking consideration of political objectives (Levy 1989, 278).

As this brief primer on theories noted, regardless of the level at which armed conflict is instigated or the justification for its onset, concerns for security exist at every level and only differ in their scale. At its core, this study argues the importance of building a security policy on a solid foundation. If security is the foundational bedrock of state formation, then its effectiveness may be inferred from its foundation. This, in a nutshell, is the rationale weaving through this study. However, to trace repercussions of security approaches to their origins, this study must first describe the theoretical logic underlying the analytical framework. Whilst the underlying premise, security is fundamental, perhaps seems intuitive, its realization is often harder than appears. The difficulty lies in attaining the pre-requisite notion of legitimacy, the mutually reinforcing agreement between the state and the population to comply with rules set in the social contract.

**Structural Legitimacy**

Due to anarchy, the notion of legitimacy at the international level is implicit in the nature of the structure of the system. Therefore, compliance is synonymous with obedience; achieved either by coercion or inducements (Wendt 1995, 77). This fact has been “uncontroversial,” as established by the various Positivist models (Hurd 1999, 380). Hence, acts of defiance or disobedience are antagonistic and antithetical to maintaining order. The state therefore views
exploitation of cross-border ethnic or religious ties for support as defiance of its right to sovereignty and exercise of authority.

The discourse on collective sovereignty and political authority was dominated for millennia by two paradigms -- the cooperative Grotian/universalist Kantian and the adversarial Hobbesian traditions. The international system, in aggregate, had to contend with a state-centric model and three forms of interaction: power struggle between states, regulated interactions among them, and transitional conflict within them (Bull 1977, 24).

Machiavelli, famous/infamous for his realist perspective, was a keen observer of power politics. In *The Prince* (1532), he described modes of gaining power and administering assets. His advice to a mentally trained ruler, determined to survive at all cost, is to “ruthlessly” administer a principality - a forerunner to a state (Machiavelli 1532, 1). His amoral directions extend to how new territory is conquered by various “virtues”, how a colony can be established or run, and how to become a hegemon in purely realist terms.

In terms of establishing security and military relations with the larger society, he noted the influence of revolutionary social and political developments and the rapid expansion of local agricultural economies. During the Middle Ages, commercial and financial strengths had drastically transformed state structure and military organization and, in a way, became essential for compensating for state’s shortfalls. Machiavelli’s writings on requisites for military victory strongly emphasize the primacy of recruiting native inhabitants for defense of their land (Machiavelli 1532, 63). To him, mercenaries embodied the antonyms of all human virtues and he cautioned against using them (Machiavelli 1532, 55; Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2008, 10).
Ever since then, state power has been intimately linked to economic and military strengths. Even within democratic regimes, characterized by the principle of subordinating the military to civilian control. In fact, democratic republics tend to be quite successful at war, because their citizen-soldiers are politically rational and enfranchised. They also tend to be expansionist, because they would not fight a war unless to win (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2008, 10). This is certainly consistent with US’ early history of expansion, whether in the name of self-determination, freeing of slaves, or extension of voting rights during the Civil War (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2008, 19).

Since military force helps attain political ends, it is the responsibility of the state to invoke its political authority over the use of force. Military leaders are tasked to ensure proper form and obedience, in order to sustain legitimacy and garner confidence (Rothenberg 1986, 34). Justification for resorting to war must align with the principles of Jus ad Bellum; the mandate to protect non-combatants during conflict a steeple of Jus in Bello.

The moral principles of Jus in Bello guide legitimate conduct in war, by prioritizing distinction, proportionality, and necessity in military actions (Walzer 1977, 41). Once combat has been initiated, combatants must distinguish between legitimate targets and legally protected non-combatants (Walzer 1977, 30). In addition to fair treatment and prohibition of malum in se in handling prisoners of war, violence must be in proportion to the damage suffered (Walzer 1977, 209). These principles are enumerated in the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The liberal principles undergirding international law originated in the West (Mingst and Karns 2007, 18). The seeds of state sovereignty were sown when St. Augustine, in the 4th century, opined killing another to defend one’s state does not “necessarily violate the
commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’” (Kegley and Raymond 2002, 262). His rationale was later extended by Pope Nicholas I to include justification for “any defensive war” (Kegley and Raymond 2002, 262).

Hugo Grotius penned, *Laws of War and Peace*, the most comprehensive essay on enduring peace. He was known for his ‘statist’ view of the international community, in which “co-operation and regulated intercourse among sovereign states, each pursuing its own interests” (Grotius 1901, 55-57; Cassese 2005, 21). His legal justification became the foundation for international and humanitarian law, as administered by the International Court of Justice (Cassese 2005, 24).

Immanuel Kant’s view of the international community, on the other hand, was Universalist (Cassese 2005, 21). He argued, in *Perpetual Peace* (1795), the citizenry will bear the brunt of warfare calamities and therefore will be more conservative than the head of state in waging it. For this reason, their consent is required before declaring war (Cassese 2005, 275). It is at this juncture differences between government types become a crucial consideration, in which powers of the state are separated and the degree of citizen representation (Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2008, 7). Nevertheless, in terms of explaining decision-making mechanisms, the realist and liberalist perspectives have been limited by their assumptions, about the nature of primary actors and drivers of behavior.

Military theories play a pivotal role in shaping military thought and defining institutional organization. Some theories focus on explaining the phenomenon of war, some on describing its evolution, and others on exploring the relationships between its components. As military theorists continue to churn out explanations and predictions, debates rage in-tow over the true
role of the military commander and how effectiveness is achieved. Military theories can only
offer guidance, not rules or dictates, they shape how, not what, one thinks about war (Vego 2011,
60). Although theory informs doctrine, military behavior is ultimately a product of many
influences, including lessons learned and organizational structure (Gray 2005, 25).

Military strategy is defined as “the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war”
(Clausewitz 1989, 177). Clausewitz, like Machiavelli, based his theory on the immutable nature
of war (Gray 2005, 17). From grand strategy to tactics, he viewed major victory as primary, more
important than smaller successes (Clausewitz 1989, 79). He linked victory to codes of conduct,
designed to save humans from their own passions and cruelty (Clausewitz 1989, 76). Thus,
leaders are morally obligated to plan for an expedited end to the conflict, to inflict minimal
suffering, even if relatively; and to attain a better and more enduring peace (Hawley and Skoz
2005, 40). The longer a war drags on, the more vicious fighting becomes, the stronger bitterness
gets, and the possibility of life returning to a previous normalcy less likely (Weigley 1973, 132).

War is an extension of policy; therefore, politics by other means (Clausewitz 1989, 605).
Clausewitz is most famous for his Paradoxical Trinity of violence, chance, and rationality. In his
model, violence, chance, and rational policy are interlinked (Clausewitz 1989, 89). Harry
Summers, in On Strategy (1982), simplified these abstract and complex dynamics, by presenting
the elements of the Trinity as the social aspects of population, military, and government. When
the government disrupts the delicate balance between these actors, the immediate impulse is to
counter this imbalance, to expect the population and/or the military to restore the balance.
Revolutionary warfare is an example of such tendency (Nagl 2005, 24). The population support
and enthusiasm hinge upon the degree of confidence they have for in the fighting force and
leaders’ competence. Populations support reflects a reciprocal commitment to the collective well-being.

Martin van Creveld (1991) criticized Clausewitz’ Trinity, as too statist and deterministic. His approach addressed the role of non-state actors and focused on analyzing the relationships that result from answering the “what, why, how, and whom” of warfare. Rather than view these two theories as dichotomous, it would be more accurate to interpret them as two different perspectives, as realist and constructivist.

Regardless of what drives the onset of war, the consensus from Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, to Walzer -- war must never be an end of itself; waging it must be of last resort (Moten 2011, ix). In spite of all the emphasis on their importance, yet “the manner and results of war’s end have seldom been addressed in a rigorous and systematic fashion (Moten 2011, ix). It is the duty of military leaders to identify and communicate, unambiguously, campaign ends, ways, and means. Military doctrine dictates they must secure the means and training necessary before subjecting humans and infrastructure to ruin. Hubris, nonetheless, “invariably leads to death on the battlefield, and often leads to failure to accomplish the goals initially articulated” (Phelps 2010, 3).

Notwithstanding the great accomplishment of the Congress of Vienna, it nevertheless failed to prevent another outbreak of war. Even though for thirty years the peace settlement stemmed hegemonic expansionism it ultimately failed, because it did not contemplate other threats to enduring peace. The lesson from this example and subsequent wars is peace only endures if the normative consensus underlying it remains viable.
This conclusion highlights the profound influence of anarchy on state behavior and the fragility of maintaining peace through collective security. Napoleon Bonaparte acknowledged this fact at the zenith of his hegemonic power. He acknowledged, peace could only endure to the extent nations are willing and able to “avoid the pin pricks that precede canon shots.” Hence, the fate of peace is determined by societies’ commitment to its viability. Strategic culture emphasizes the ideational (contextual) and normative (behavioral) boundaries of how threats are perceived and addressed. In other words, strategic culture helps predict cooperative and adversarial interactions (Shultz 2012, 4).

The political price associated with deployment of the A and H-bombs meant politicians and scientists could no longer “go on blithely letting one group of specialists decide how to wage war and another decide when and to what purpose” (Brodie 1959, 7). Since then, military generals could rarely contemplate military operations “without bothering themselves about the complex and, to them, questionable motives of their government” (Brodie 1959, 7). Congress could not resist “intervention in military affairs through the machinery of appropriation” and “investigations of alleged wrongdoing or errors of judgment” (Brodie 1959, 8).

Ultimately, the military like any other organization has “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of human relationships within an organization” (Wilson 1989, 91). Changing these patterns - how the military learns and evolves - is accomplished through change in doctrine and operational procedures. The process “begins with the recognition of shortcomings in organizational knowledge or performance, it is then “followed by search for the right solution and achieving consensus, to finally adopt and disseminate (Nagl 2005, 6). The military’s organizational resilience has been attributed to its capacity to adapt.
Doctrine is often seen as an accurate gauge of the military’s mindset (Nagl 2005, 8). It constitutes “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application” (Gortney 2011, i; Nagl 2005, 7). Doctrines contain strategic and operational guidance on how to avoid past mistakes and leverage successes, but lack a connection with a strategic vision. The missing connection can only be provided by the Commander-in-chief. This vision is dependent upon the political priorities of an elected official and reflects the personalized approach to a geopolitical climate.

This chapter thus began by dissecting the structural coherence of the current system, both at the national and international levels. The theoretical framework argues the Westphalian model is in fact a perfect fit for the Middle East. In essence, ongoing turmoil in the region can be traced back to misapplication of the model and continued re-enforcement of an irrational status quo.

Stephen Krasner (1995) explained the significance of the Westphalian model, as the “basic concept for some of the major theoretical approaches to international relations”; thereby, the foundation for “analytical assumption, as well as international society perspectives, for which it is an empirical regularity” (121). According to this model, the state is a political entity imbued with the right to autonomy and territorial authority (115). He nonetheless argued “the Westphalian model has never been an accurate description of many of the entities that have been called states” (115). Adding, “every major peace settlement from Westphalia to Helsinki has involved violations of the Westphalian model” (144).

He further explained, by using coercion as an example, when applied against an established state it would be in violation of its sovereignty, and against a would-be state it is in
violation of its autonomy (Krasner 1995, 136). Coercion involves power asymmetry and leaves “at least one actor worse off” (Krasner 1995, 136). He described imposition as “the logical extreme of coercion,” in which “the target is so weak that it has no choice but to accept the demands of the more powerful state” (Krasner 1995, 137). The Treaty of Versailles, at the end of WWI, “was explicitly designed to alter the domestic political arrangements of the new states” (Krasner 1995, 143).

So what could explain this enduring Westphalian lure? Constructivism would argue “the Westphalian state is a manifestation of a larger international society in which the intersubjective shared understanding of statesmen reinforces authority structure” (Krasner 1995, 146). Andreas Osiander (2001) argued the Westphalian myth is actually a product of modern day fixation with sovereignty (251). The modern re-conception of the model has more to do with protecting an “imagined” ideal, than its original intent (Blaney and Inayatullah 2000, 54), thereby corroborating Holsti’s assertion.

In its historical context, the peace settlement was to sustain the fragmentation of Europe (261). It was more about power usurping legitimacy, than about defending autonomy (263). Not unlike exporting the French Revolution, or the belief “power could, in itself, be the ordering and taming principle of a disorderly and dangerous world” (Talbott 2003, 1040).

In order for anyone to conclude Western principles are incompatible with Middle Eastern political culture, then to prove their foundational premises of these principles must be applied universally. An objective assessment would apply the “imagined” Euro-centric conception of the nation-state evenly (Neep 2012, 12 and 28). Doing so would highlight the tragic irony – the Westphalian concept emerged from a historical circumstance identical to that currently prevalent,
especially in the Middle East. So, to conflate persistence of Middle Eastern instability with rejection of western principles is an exercise in circular logic.

The Westphalian concept of nation-state is a Euro-centric representation of an imagined ideal-type (Mukherji 2010, 2; 12). If a nation, by definition, is ethnically bound, and the state exerts authority over sovereign territory, then a nation-state constitutes a sovereign collective, ethnically and territorially bound (Mukherji 2010, 2). According to this conceptualization, the legitimacy of this collective is inextricably linked to functional territorial controls. It also implies a mono-cultural bloc, a homogenized entity identified by its territorial sovereignty. Empirical evidence, however, has demonstrated such ideal only exists in the realm of imagination or, more ominously, by inflicting mass slaughter. The construct then is about managing the “other”, which exists “outside the state, beyond the boundaries of political community” (Blaney and Inayatullah 2000, 44). Hence, the Westphalian model is more about the “deep anxieties and sense of opportunities that informed social theory,” which shaped and legitimated the nascent international system (Blaney and Inayatullah 2000, 54). Therefore, ethnicity and the state are, in reality, subjective claims about identity.

Moreover, if multi-culturalism is characterized by ethnic plurality, each equally sovereign, then the colonial model was in fact designed to serve its imperial ends, not to democratize its subjects (Mukherji 2010, 12; Blaney and Inayatullah 2000, 30). Power asymmetries, inherent in colonial relations, are what endowed the notion of equality its value. After all, power asymmetries are why the American republic was founded on equality in the eyes of the law. Again, a subjective notion.
Only by the advent of humanitarianism during the post-WWII era was the obdurate Western perspective of state sovereignty finally challenged. Until then, the discourse on collective civil society was dominated by the traditional notion of sovereignty “as the right to non-intervention enjoyed solely by the state” (Crain and Stivachtis 2009, 228). Only by reconsidering the assumption, “the state exists as the sole guarantor of sovereignty on the international stage,” was civil society finally emancipated, as a counterbalance to the state (Crain and Stivachtis 2009, 228; Fowler and Biekart 2013, 464).

Colonialist authoritarian governments “systematically repressed any political expression or semblance of civic organization for fear of their potential role in opposition” (Crain and Stivachtis 2009, 232). This is why the new sovereignty consists of the three dimensions: legitimacy, capacity, and responsibility, both internal and external (Crain and Stivachtis 2009, 236). If sovereignty is contingent upon internal and external legitimacy, then the authority to rule requires acceptance of representation (Crain and Stivachtis 2009, 236).

Accounts of experiences exposed the extent to which colonialism had warped natural social dynamics to sustain their advantage. Sadly, even though politics is central to the discourse on developing civil-society, the narratives remain donor-centric (Fowler and Biekart 2013, 463). The current discourse remains normative, “unresolvably too ‘plural’ and its context-specific expressions too diverse to offer the prospect of making an unambiguous contribution to political theory and action” (Fowler and Biekart 2013, 465).

What the above discussion suggests is lack of perceived legitimacy plays a role in rendering exercise of authority ineffective and even counterproductive. Hence, the fragmented
state of affairs in the Middle Eastern is merely a reflection of international experimentation. The following discussion traces the roots of the system’s behavior.

In the modern context, the notion of victory and distribution of war spoils has taken on a more normative value. Modern victory comes in the form of “reconstruction as the outcome of a rational process through which the dominant powers consciously develop principles and institutions that reflect their values and preferences” (Cronin 2010, 792). Both Gilpin (1981) and Ikenberry (2001) argued, in the chaotic aftermath of war, victorious states are presented with an opportunity to “define the terms of the postwar settlement and character of the new order” (Cronin 2010, 792). Therefore, according to the neo-realist interpretation of power and authority, legitimacy implies “cohesive and stable political system” (Cronin 2010, 792). So, while the post-WWII norms attempted to constrain predatory behavior, it could not sanction powerful states from snubbing convention or victors from reconfiguring war aims.

Relational Control is a theoretical perspective on how power in structured relationships is used to alter interactions (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 418). It encompasses the transformative process by which new dynamics replace the historical. The main premise is relationships can be redefined and restructured through application of power. The utility of the process lies in its ability to induce dynamic responses (Salamey and Pearson 2012, 932). Whether in the form of cooperation, competition, or coercion, these dynamic responses are determined by the nature and potency of its three interrelated components: context, structure of the outcome, and attitude of actors’ toward each other (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 419). The outcome of the overall process would either lead to systemic integration or fragmentation of social relationships (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 418).
According to Charles Tilly (1990), the process of state-building includes four mechanisms: war-making, state-making, protection of supporters, and extraction of resources. The use of war-making is geared toward eliminating competitors and extracting resources. It is often associated with taxation hikes and rise in debt. Common tactics for justifying increased taxation include linking causes to national security, revision of tax codes, and costs of expensive technology or bureaucratic expansion. Barnett (1995) asserted external threats and warfare can build a sense of national identity. While Anthony Smith (1996) agreed, he qualified the outcome based upon ethnic composition. War will likely strengthen the national consciousness of ethnically homogenous societies, but will fragment heterogeneous ones. Theda Skocpol (1979) and Adelman (1985) added, combining war and revolution can be a potent mix, by mobilizing “previously excluded groups for participating in war” (Taylor and Botea 2008, 34).

According to the predatory theory, the state is “an agent of some group or class that exists to extract revenue from a broader group of constituents under its control” (Thies 2004, 54). Cohen, Brown and Organski (1981, 902) explained how tax hikes are needed to centralize power, and how centralized control instigates conflict by intruding upon pre-existing local polities. Taxes affecting property rights are an example of such intrusion. In such cases, war-making is the preferred approach. On the other hand, Dan Reiter (1995) noted the rarity of conditions warranting preemptive attacks (33). Moreover, in the few cases in which preemption was launched analysis found the justification was exaggerated (Reiter 1995, 33).

When raising taxes is unfeasible, the state has to resort to incurring debt. Meanwhile, in the Middle East either pan-Arabism is stoked by emphasizing external threats or inter-Arab rivalry by manipulation of specific national identities. Rent-seeking states use oil wealth to substitute kinship loyalties with ties of patronage (Thies 2004, 56). What they discover, in time
or during economic downturns, power and top-down authority, in the absence of genuine legitimacy, are extremely expensive to maintain.

The state mechanisms for compelling cooperation or coercion will be discussed later in this chapter. The following section describes the mechanisms for social control at the national level. Although these mechanisms of control rarely manifest in their pure form, they are broadly categorized as coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy (Hurd 1999, 383). Political theories on what constitutes legitimacy at the national level are relatively scant. This study has based its definition of legitimacy on that provided by Max Weber.

Weber conceived social life as composed of three interdependent concepts: authority, material interests, and value orientation (Bendix 1977, 286). He believed explanation of people’s behavior, in terms of why and how, can be gleaned from “why and how they believe in the existence of a moral order that imposes obligations upon them” (Bendix 1977, 287). Because establishing order requires authority to dominate, it also requires power and that capacity to exercise it (Bendix 1977, 290). He defined the state as a legitimate order of authority. His philosophical basis for state legitimacy represents a complex system of interdependent relationships – compliance entails domination and power; power entails authority and obedience (Bendix 1977, 292). In addition to establishing legitimacy, compliance or defiance of state authority is founded on rationality.

Rational Choice Theory

Herbert Simon argued facilitation is the key to problem-solving, because motivation precedes action (Simon 1962, 473). Since the Weberian state represents dominance based on constellation of interests, it implies subsidiarity or obedience to legal authority. State function,
therefore, is “dependent on the perception of legitimacy” (Fry and Raadschelders 2008, 30). Because Weberian perception of legitimacy hinges upon reason and objectivity, provision of public goods must be through impersonal institutional structures and bureaucratic administration.

Therefore, trust and civic responsibility are foundational to good Weberian governance (Wiarda 2007, 80). Robert Putnam (2000) argued an undeniable connection between social cohesion and good governance. In his treatment of civic community, he addressed the direct link between civic culture and democratic governance. He highlighted the role of informal networks and social dynamics in building bonds of trust (2007, 138). Francis Fukuyama (1992) also argued the link between democratic principles and good governance.

Hence, a pre-requisite of successful state formation is the attainment of a minimal degree of trust among involved actors, “to take one another’s interest into account, and to cooperate” (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 420). With the state’s main utility being the effective management of power distribution, proven impartiality is pivotal for maximum participation of stakeholders. The US Constitutional system of checks and balances has demonstrated strategies of structural control can be effective in safeguarding against agential abuses of meta-power (Hurd 1999, 404). The use of coercion can in fact “be rendered socially productive and a source of increased welfare” if properly sanctioned and organized (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 625; Wiarda 2007, 42).

Conversely, ideological barriers and strategies of polarization are symptoms of relational controls run amok. They result in adverse behavioral outcomes, such as distrust and resistance (Van Evera 1994). Historically, structured strategies of segregation or divide-and-rule were

---

54 Discussed in a later section.
implemented to prevent actors from organizing to resolve problems or conflicts of interests (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 421; Batatu 1978, 24). Oppressive authoritarian governments characteristically prohibit freedom of association and/or exchange of information to prevent uncontrollable political action from emerging. In a system of divide-and-rule characteristic of colonial administration, interactions are controlled through institutionalized and bureaucratic patterns of organization (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 422; Lust-Okar 2004, 160).

Types of social control are reflected in the strength of state capacities. Three indicators help measure such strength – the scales of compliance, participation, and legitimation (Migdal 1988, 32; Thomas 2008, 18). Bates, Greif and Singh (2002) held “order is not a property of the state; rather, it is a characteristic of an equilibrium” (600). It is, in fact, the citizens who “retain control over the means of coercion” and are able to restore the equilibrium by threatening violence against defectors (600). In stateless societies, poverty is traded for peace; violence for prosperity.

The state is therefore the means for transcending these trade-offs (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 600). Because citizens control the modes of action, power resides in allocation of resources for activities. Hence, the role of the state is endogenous, so its impulses can become predatory or developmental. Thus, in stateless societies, this power is concentrated in the hands of those who simultaneously “can allocate their resources among economic activities, military activities, and leisure” (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 603). The ongoing competition over means of protection and production makes armed civil conflict appear as “almost a permanent feature of many such communities; disputes and potential skirmishes lie under the surface, ready to emerge” (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 603).
When monarchs in late medieval England discovered they could gain new sources of revenue by establishing order; hence, private warfare and lawlessness were quickly banned (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 612; Migdal 1988, 23). When states and citizens freely exercised their bargaining powers, equilibrium was sustained (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 622; Easton 1990, 57). These were the necessary initial steps to creating the English state. Political order was achieved within the framework of the Magna Carta, wherein property rights and civic society are protected, and powers for extracting taxes limited (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 613).

Since then, effective governance became closely linked to state capacity, thereby the notions of adherence to the rule of law and accountability. However, the link between good governance and democratization remains tenuous (Carothers 2007, 12; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 301). Realities challenge a direct link, especially within newly transformed countries (Rothstein and Teorell 2012, 14; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 298). The evidence shows a stronger link between good governance and absence of interstate violence, than with democratization (Rothstein and Teorell 2012, 6).

Suffice it to say, contrary to the Washington Consensus, establishing state capacity first and foremost is fundamental to achieving effective governance (Rothstein and Teorell 2012, 4; Wiarda 2007, 52). Moreover, although prioritizing the impartiality of implementing policies and executing procedures is a steeple for institutionalizing formal authority, nevertheless, insisting upon it can be counterproductive, especially at a sub-state level or during the formative stages. Establishing a grass-roots capacity to govern could prove more critical than impartiality (Carothers 2007, 13; Wiarda 2007, 11; Neep 2012, 14).
Conflict Theories

The State-Society approach explores the “interrelations between the central state and the various units (classes, interest groups) that make up a society” (Wiarda 2007, 142). This approach corrects a tendency by both Marxian and non-Marxian models to treat the state as a neutral or dependent variable, influenced by class struggles or interest groups. The State-Society approach, on the other hand, views the state as a regulator of behavior and processes, an independent variable. At the domestic level, this approach views state autonomy and sovereignty as potential grounds for contestation. So, to understand the political behavior of an authoritarian government, an analytical framework capable of considering the role of state is essential. (Wiarda 2007, 183).

Marc Howard Ross (1986) put forth a general theory of political violence. He confirmed the existence of durable political-cultural attributes, and offered structural explanations for “with whom one cooperates and with whom one fights” (428). Experiences in the early stages of state development also determine conflict levels and type of targeted victims. Internal conflicts are linked to weak cross-cutting ties, strong localized machismo culture (uncentralized societies), and polygyny. Meanwhile, external warfare was associated with high socioeconomic complexity where polygyny absent, and martial endogamy and weak cross-cutting ties.

Sørli et al. (2005) enquired if the Middle East’s proclivity to armed civil conflict was exceptional. They analyzed the causes by modifying the Collier & Hoeffler model. The Collier & Hoeffler model had used econometrics to build their greed/predation model for explaining the onset of intrastate conflicts. Traditionally, grievance models used rational-choice theory to explain armed civil conflict. In turn, Sørli et al. chose to analyze intrastate conflict by combining
those two approaches and assessing the influence of frustration, opportunity, and common identity. Because the causes of conflict onset (outbreak) and incidence (prevalence) differ, a conscious distinction was made in variable identification. The findings indicate conflict onset in the Middle East did not stand-out. However, armed civil conflict duration registered almost as high as Asia and higher than any other region.

While a significant body of historical and comparative research has helped explains how wars defined the current international system, few have studied them as recurring phenomena. For example, studies have shown how wars, in general, shaped the modern nation-state (Tilly 1975; Skocpol 1979; Mansfield and Snyder 1995); how armed civil conflict can be exacerbated by political instability (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or access to natural resources (Ross 2004); how the onsets of different types of wars differ (Raleigh and Hegre 2005; Kalyvas 2005); and why autocracies are more prone to engaging in wars (Levy 1998). Unfortunately, few advanced long-wave macro-historical theories which study wars as recurring cycles. Goldstein (1991) studied wars as a product of economic cycles, and Modelski and Morgan (1985) as a byproduct of hegemonic competition.

A study by Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min (2006) is of unique relevance to this discussion. They investigated the outbreak of war, between 1816 and 2001, as a social phenomenon in its own right. In their study, they distinguished between the process leading to empire building and the formation of a nation-state. Rather than applying the conventional definition of state, they linked the outbreak to a fixed geographical territory. They justified this corrective measure by demonstrating how the conventional conception of the modern state excludes relevant ethnic and nationalist aspects (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Additionally, they did not treat the international system as a single unit, nor as an integrated bloc;
rather, as “an arena for the discontinuous diffusion of institutional forms” (Wimmer and Min 2006, 868).

Their findings yielded a link between time-dependent transformations of institutional form, from colonial to nation-state. Furthermore, it helped explain spill-over effect, as a connection between intra- and interstate wars. Intrastate conflict spills over territorial boundaries when political elites, in the course of competing over contested institutional structure, mobilize one ethnic group at the expense of another. A major implication of their study is framing intrastate conflict in terms of nationalist resistance to empire expansion, rather than opportunism or state fragility (893).

The governments in the Middle East have long been “beset by a profound crisis of legitimacy” (Hudson, 1999, 92; Kelidar 1993, 315). The capacity of the ruling oligarchs to use coercive violence has been proven entrepreneurial. The region is indeed exceptional but strictly in the chronic nature of its pathology (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 622). Corrupt formal institutions and dysfunctional power-sharing schema have forced dissatisfied citizens to withhold cooperation and seek political remedies elsewhere (Wiarda 2007, 9; Kelidar 1993, 315; Migdal 1988, 30).

Lately, however, it appears as if the locus of power has permanently shifted toward either informal institutions or external international actors. Implicit in this shift is the presumption appropriate external intervention could facilitate “communication, collective decision-making and binding agreements among the actors” (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 426). After all, in the absence of external mediation, the burden falls upon the affected actors to rationalize
embracing a cooperative posture. Ideologies, meanwhile, control the behavior of groups by reorienting their perceptions and cognitive models of analysis.

Hence, the main difficulty in establishing control over fragmented and heterogeneous Middle Eastern societies is the decentralized nature of value allocation, in which “[n]umerous systems of justice operate simultaneously” (Migdal 1988, 39; Kelidar 1993, 315). The two primary drivers of welfare loss in the region are taxation and violence (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 624). Therefore, a policy for reducing casualties from armed civil conflict and enhancing cooperation must devise effective strategies of relational control. The state or authoritative power must allocate the essential resources to control “possibilities for contact and social organization; control of differential payoffs; and control of cultural orientations and ideology” (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 429). These criteria are foundational to evaluating the British and French approaches to stabilizing their Middle Eastern protectorates.

The apparent link between perception of legitimacy and state behavior lies in governments’ irresponsiveness to citizen grievances or resistance to allowing discursive space for opposition (Bellin 2004, 152; Salamey and Pearson 2012, 942). Arab governments typically respond to dissent with use of “torture, chemical weapons (Saddam Hussein in Kurdistan) and mass murder (Bashar al-Assad’s father in Hama)”55 (Salamey and Pearson 2012, 934). The ethnic diversity of the region makes this approach cost-prohibitive. So unless the aim is to further intimidate or incite armed civil conflict, the governing authority must go to great lengths to refrain from committing such atrocities.

55 Anne Applebaum, “Middle East violence ‘the result of generations of tyranny’,” The Telegraph, 17 August 2013.
If and when exposed, despotic governments tend to justify their actions by invoking historical rationales. Their actions, regardless of attempted justifications, were intended to deprive citizens their freedoms and are to squelch dissent by employing (Salamey and Pearson 2012, 935). The state’s continued disregard of its constitutional obligations will inevitably leads to “an increase in protest and rebellion regionwide” (Hudson, 1999, 93). The Arab Spring, for example, was the “result of generations of tyranny: decades of suppression and distortion of political discussion, of deliberately weakened civil society, of shallow economic debate and profoundly venal corruption” (Salamey and Pearson 2012, 934). The failure of Arab states to integrate communities into a political system is characteristic of their divisive policies and symptomatic of the chronic low capacity of their political institutions (Kelidar 1993, 315; Bellin 2004, 152; Carothers 2007, 18; Smith 1978, 92).

These governments represent the tyranny of a minority (Chomsky 2006, 162). They are keenly aware the process of overcoming authoritarian counter-measures requires a strong and cohesive civic society (Salamey and Pearson 2012, 932; Chomsky 2006, 170). From the state’s perspective, it would be irrational to allow citizens the opportunity to overcome these constraints (Chomsky 2006, 160). To overcome contradictory interests, civic society needs to create opportunities to interact, persuade, coordinate, and apply selective sanctions if necessary. Aside from religious or ethnic venues, political discourse is strongly regulated and censored. At its core, the legitimacy of the political process requires rationality. Hence, acute dysfunction is symptomatic of structurally reinforced irrationality.

The concept of meta-power emerged, in the late 1970s, from the realm of game theory. Meta-power essentially entails the application or mobilization of resources to shape political

---

56 Ibid.
outcomes. This strategy must consider stakes, in which the size and scope play a significant role, and must result in domination by one agent (Olson 2000, 6). Hence, dysfunctional states would rather maintain a static disequilibrium than attain optimality (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 39). Actors exercising meta-power rely on the intrinsic mechanism of manipulation or re-shaping of organizational norms and values to attain structural control of individual and group behaviors. This conceptual construct is at the core of how a state mobilizes its resources to establish social order and control of political actions. It can also apply to sub-state actors aiming to reshape institutional norms and procedures.

Since WWII, Arab authoritarian governments have resembled praetorian regimes from Roman past. Such regimes systematically manipulate civil action to manufacture an image of internal legitimacy (Huntington 1968, 237; Lust-Okar 2004, 159; Blanchard et. al. 2012, 17). Many of these governments in the Middle East have leveraged their access to “strategic rents” toward sustaining their monopoly on power (Bellin 2004, 148; Salamey and Pearson 2012, 933). How else could have these despotic governments sustained their death-grip on power? Thomas Carothers (2007) affirmed the role of political structures in helping or hindering growth of civil society, pluralist politics, and civ-mil relations (Krahmann 2010, 104). Perhaps this is why defense of the Posse Comitatus Act is so critical.

The main takeaway from the discussion is the rational link between a state’s authority and capacity to establish social order (Migdal 1988, 16). They both require credible legitimacy (Migdal 1988, 21), especially where the government functions as both an agent and an institution. Perception of illegitimacy and lack of authority drive affected citizens to reconfigure political order. If rehabilitating a dysfunctional system is not feasible, a more localized alternative is considered. The task of establishing security, whether in the form of a gated
community or a garrison state, therefore requires a clear understanding of how the use of force can ameliorate or exacerbate civil tensions.

Collective Action

According to Mancur Olson, the need to compel is inextricably linked to the state’s capacity to function (Olson 1971, 13; Hurd 1999, 383). Regardless if responses were compelled by inducement or threat, they will reflect individuals’ assessment of the contextual components. Of relevance, how agents’ view of state’s authority influences form and direction of the outcome (Neep 2012, 14). Compliance with state rules, rather than mere obedience or outright rebellion, is mutually preferred for its underlying efficiency and effectiveness (Hurd 1999, 388).

Community security is a social structure built on common knowledge conducive to sustaining trustful interactions (Wendt 1995, 73; Rousseau 1762). Strategic culture determines how actions by “others” are perceived and interpreted. To be able to convert community security into collective security, perception of institutional legitimacy is a fundamental pre-requisite. Under such circumstances, compliance is further re-enforced in time. Thus, the feedback loop is essential to institutional credibility, structurally and functionally.

Olson explored the influence of structural controls on group behavior (1971, 21; Migdal 1988, 25). The concepts of rationality and utility of common goods are at the core of his theory on collective action (Olson 1971, 7). He asserted “no major state in modern history has been able to support itself through voluntary dues or contributions” (Olson 1971, 13). The state, unlike private organizations, may not be able to achieve Pareto-optimality, because it is responsible for providing both collective and non-collective goods to its citizens (Olson 1971, 26). He argued, the absence of non-collective costs in small groups and markets, causes the use of incentives to
be more effective in stimulating individual cooperation. More importantly, the nature of diminished returns inherent in large organizations compromises a member’s commitment to shared objectives. The use of compulsory mechanisms is intended to trump personal calculus of gains and costs (Olson 1971, 14).

The state cannot rely on an individuals’ rationality to induce cooperation, because the Pareto-principle constitutes the rational obstacle to overcome. The Marxist view posits members of a small exclusive group often employ compulsory means to make the larger group bear the disproportionate share of costs (Olson 1971, 102). By narrowly focusing on class oppression for wealth-maximization, the Marxist perspective can neglect evidence of contrary dynamics, as seen within smaller groups and provision of non-collective goods (Olson 1971, 16 and 109; Olson 2000, 3). Non-collective goods offered by the state, to include protection and defense, require the deployment of a unique type of rational agents, as described by Neumann and Mongerstern (1953, 32). The delivery of such goods depends on these members’ capacity to overcome rational barriers, by conceptualizing gains in non-zero sum terms.

The initial game theory model put forth overly simplified propositions. The model’s underlying assumptions were the sum outcome is zero; achieving absolute equilibrium is possible; and the solution requires a single imputation (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 34). The Utility theory, on the other hand, presented a more complex and realistic model. It considers the possibility of incomplete information and the need to attain solutions through formation of alliances (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 34). Furthermore, rather than limiting the outcome to a zero-sum, the model can conceive an outcome in variable or relative terms (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 35). In such cases, the zone of uncertainty is expressed in terms of imputation difficulty (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 35). This difficulty is a product of methodically
assessing all probabilities involved in divvying spoils among partners (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 36). Whichever alliance emerges will invariably influence the remaining set of probabilities and the overall system (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 36). So in sum, the nature of the stability which emerges “will be property of the system as a whole and not of the single imputations of which it is composed” (Neumann and Mongerstern 1953, 36).

Citizens capable of rationalizing in non-zero sum terms would be better served by an organizational structure other than a Hobbesian one. Societies in which the majority’s interest encompasses all, “they will, out of pure self-interest, forgo redistribution to themselves and treat the minority as well as they treat themselves” (Olson 2000, 20). Such societies achieve the paradoxical Pareto efficiency by changing their incentives, in valuing the output rather than the cost of the input. This process begins by conceiving gains and losses in non-zero sum terms. More specifically, it begins with identifying the desired alternative outcome, then reverse engineering the structural and functional construct. Once the necessary conditions are incorporated into the construct, its credibility can be evaluated.

Civic-driven change is a perspective which acknowledges the pervasiveness of power politics within the process of civic development. It is focused on defining the “political contours and dynamics involved”; at its core is the notion of civic agency (Fowler and Biekart 2013, 477). Civic agency is primal, both for challenging illegitimate authority effectively and for reclaiming authority back. The following discussion explains why civic agency is so imperative for establishing stability, especially in the Middle East.
Constructivism

Constructivists assert ideas matter; they are foundational to identity formation and navigation of social interactions (Wendt 1995, 71; Hurd 1999, 392). Hence, to conceive conflict in terms of distinct worldviews the nature of ethnic ties is central to understanding the motives driving interactions. According to constructivists, ethnic identity is manufactured and “cannot be invented ex nihilo and strategically manipulated without regard for historical experience and the distribution of beliefs and interests among target populations” (Binder 1999, 7; Wendt 1995, 77).

Stefano Guzzini argued the neorealist analysis of structural power has its limitation. The limitation originates from the actual conceptualization of power. Neorealist presuppositions about actor preferences and their sole focus on Waltzian bargaining detract from the approach’s ability to fully explain power (Guzzini 1993, 444). The analytical lens primarily ignores the view of power as a relational concept and it does not account for the static constraints on localized strategic behavior (Guzzini 1993, 445).

Krasner, meanwhile, focused on the process by which power and norms influenced each other, i.e. the “lags and feedbacks between power base and regime” (Guzzini 1993, 451). He distinguished between relational power behavior, which “refers to efforts to maximize values within a given set of institutional structures” and exercise of meta-power, which refers to “efforts to change the institutions themselves (Guzzini 1993, 451). He explained power could reside in the capability to alter the context. After a time lag, the agent could be considered an independent source of influence (Guzzini 1993, 451). Effective relational power hinges upon actors’ awareness of intended interactional aspects and, thereby, requires a policy-contingency framework at the appropriate analytical level (Guzzini 1993, 454). The poststructuralist
perspective further draws attention to the intersubjective power of symbols, “the power of the rite is based in good part on the potency of its symbols and its social context” (Guzzini 1993, 465).

Pierre Bourdieu (1984) explored the link between social stratification, cultural capital, and structural reproduction (Bourdieu 1984, 24). He explained how perception of legitimacy could be structurally and functionally manufactured (Bourdieu 1984, 21). Hence, impartiality exists in Bourdieu’s domain of doxa, “the self-evident background of the established order on which the contest between orthodoxy and heterodoxy is articulated” (Guzzini 1993, 466). It represents the characteristic arbitrariness of the status quo, a potentially double-edged proposition (Bourdieu 1984, 4). He advanced reflexivity and Multiple Correspondence, as tools to reconcile the habitus-field, or objective-subjective, antinomy (Bourdieu 1984, 15). Therefore, change is ultimately in the purview of the observer (Bourdieu 1984, 22).

Compliance with authority, not just mere obedience, entails internalization of interests based on trust in state policies and procedures (Migdal 1988, 22). In fact, the extent of integration could potentially reach subconscious depths. The power of legitimacy is therefore evident in an actor feeling compelled to oblige in spite of inconsistency or contradiction with own definition of interests (Hurd 1999, 388). Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom (1992) argued the advantages of legitimate authority and the costs of its absence. Legitimacy is a powerful ordering mechanism (Neep 2012, 9) because “internalization of external standards can also defuse Olsonian problems of collective action”; it sets the strategic goals and means for achieving common good (Hurd 1999, 389).
Order is traditionally maintained at the local level, wherein disorder is most disruptive to a community. Use of force in the Middle East is viewed in terms of its capacity to consolidate communal ties or fragment them (Neep 2012, 9). While public protest or acts of defiance are especially threatening to the state, since they signal loss of legitimacy and control, asserting dominance through the use of force further erodes the public’s confidence in the state’s commitment to cohesion (Neep 2012, 9). Due to the historical legacies of the Middle East, the population is exceptionally leery of divisive attempts to leverage one community over another. For this reason, “it has long been a practice of Iraqi leadership to bring family members and close relations into the organization which they manage” (Pfaff 2008, 17). This practice helps consolidate and align the group’s interests, protect against betrayal, and “enhances one’s status within the group one most closely identifies with” (Pfaff 2008, 17). Another unique organizational characteristic of the Iraqi police is the notion of a “responsibility vacuum,” in which “those at the top have all the authority, but only consider themselves responsible for what they order others to do” (Pfaff 2008, 26).

Vold’s Group Conflict theory is based on sociological explanations of group behavior, particularly in terms of conflict being “one of the principal and essential social processes” and how conflict between groups “tend to develop and intensify the loyalty of group members to their respective groups” (Vold et al. 1998, 236). Congressional interactions in the US are testimonial. Hagan’s Structural Criminology asserts crime is perpetrated to “impose one’s power on others” (Vold et al. 1998, 246).

Policing theories are mostly comparative, to explain why policing systems vary in organization, power structure, effectiveness, cultures, etc. Moreover, implicit in the nature of policing is the hegemonic notion of maintaining social order (Thomas 2008, 18). The systemic
nature of police organizations also implies an organizational culture, thereby policing is political and contentious. Furthermore, policing systems develop, modernize, and decay.

The body of empirical literature discussed here was to explain how wars shaped the international system, and also to demonstrate the parallels between principles of criminology and politics. In the realm of conflict criminology two views exist – consensus and conflict of values (Vold et al. 1998, 235). The process by which power is redistributed can be influenced by organized groups formed to pursue and defend shared values and interests. Furthermore, in conflict criminology, power and crime rates are inversely related, because “people with absolute power are never officially defined as criminals” (Vold et al. 1998, 259).

Theories on political behavior and intrastate conflict established the knowledgebase needed to conduct this inquiry. The purpose of theory is heuristic; to guide predictions based on established facts. It is, by definition, a generalized simplification (Lim 2006, 66). It provides “the tools to frame and explain empirical puzzles” (Lim 2006, 65). For example, the rational choice theory helps explain and predict decisions and actions, at the individual level of analysis, because it is founded on the principle of human rationality. This theory asserts individuals will consistently act according to their self-interests and maximization of their own benefits (Lim 2006, 76). The process involves detailed strategic calculations, which weigh the costs against the benefits from a particular decision.

Agency is defined as “the capacity of actors to operate independently of externally imposed constraints and to impose those choices on the world” (Lim 2006, 73). On the other hand, some structuralists have implied “significant social change is not likely to come about purely through individual action or agency” (emphasis in original) (Lim 2006, 82). It is not that
they discount agency, but rather believe “historical structures necessarily shape the possibilities for change” (Lim 2006, 82). Institutions represent the environment within which individual choices and decisions are structured. Institutions produce outcomes that, once equilibrium has been achieved, “no one has an incentive to alter” (Lim 2006, 78). Normative institutionalists contend “institutions directly influence the behavior of actors by shaping their values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs” (Lim 2006, 85). To reiterate, rationalists view individuals’ decision-making as independent and only limited by availability of information; while normatives assert institutions influence actors by affecting their strategic interactions (Lim 2006, 86). Cultural knowledge, as a normative example, helps explain observed behavior by linking it to the underlying cognitive and affective schema (Ross 1997, 45). It is a worldview, but “also a political resource that can be used to achieve political, social, or economic goals” (Lim 2006, 88). Thus, culture “has a way of being constantly reinvented” (Lim 2006, 221).

The robustness of theories hinges upon their proven resilience. In time, theories may grow more credible, or may be falsified by the emergence of new facts or techniques. Hence, the theoretical process is integral to distinguishing the relevant facts from those irrelevant (Lim 2006, 67). Therefore, it is equally critical to develop new theories and to test the durability of existing ones. This requirement relies heavily on the application of the comparative approach.

This chapter contained a discussion of the likely context within which US military missions may take place. It was followed by an overview of the relevant theoretical models and main concepts. The intent of this chapter was to broadly survey the potential challenges and implications posed by an outbreak of intrastate conflict. The following section outlines the design of this inquiry. The methodology utilizes case-study comparisons and examination of patterns to trace possible causal pathways linking use of force with duration of armed civilian
conflict. The research design combines case-study, cross-case and within-case analyses. The qualitative method of process tracing is particularly helpful in identifying causal pathways (Nagl 2005, xxii). In the following chapters claims are hypothesized, case-studies are described, and hypothesized claims are assessed by applying John Stuart Mill’s Method of Agreement and Method of Difference.
Chapter 3: Methodology

This section outlines how this inquiry is conducted. The chosen methodology allows the examination of patterns and tracing of causal pathways. The research design combines the case-study approach with cross-case and within-case analyses. The method of process tracing in particular helps identify these causal pathways. The case is made in this section for this chosen methodology and claims are hypothesized for assessment. Therefore, the main goal of this section is to ascertain how the link between the security approach and restoring order can be identified.

Scholarly literature points to the enduring structural and functional causes driving Arab states to lag in all modes of development. Moreover, this dysfunction manifests even though the minimal requisites for mobilization have been readily available in this region (Lust-Okar 2004, 160). High-stakes security threats have been often cited by the state as justification for the irrational imperatives. Arguably SecDef Rumsfeld would agree; if politics is the “struggle for power over the creation and distribution of resources, life chances, and well-being” (Lim 2006, 17), then its deadly nature certainly has not helped lower these stakes. The question then becomes, why must politics be so deadly?

Aside from the Middle East region being the most militarized and one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world (Sørli, et al. 2005, 141) studies have established there is nothing exceptional about the outbreak of civil war in this region (Sørli, Gleditsch, and Strand 2005, 142). While the duration of armed civil conflict certainly tends to be long, the onset of
intrastate conflict, nonetheless, fits the general model of civil war (Sørli, et al. 2005, 142). As such, the outbreak of armed civil conflict in Arab states is linked to frustration (repression, suffering), opportunity (freedom to organize, access to finance, weapons, soldiers), and common identity (cohesion) (Sørli, et al. 2005, 145).

Arab states, including rent-seekers, tend to lag in all forms of development (Sørli, et al. 2005, 142; Bellin 2004, 139). The pattern of interaction between states and citizens demonstrates an obvious attempt to maintain a state of static suspension. While the vast majority of armed conflict incidents pit the state against militant Islamists (Sørli, et al. 2005, 144), there are no visible attempts to curb this growing militancy (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). After all, resistance to democratization was not attributed to “absent prerequisites,” but rather “present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism” and a tenacious coercive apparatus (Bellin 2004, 152). Thus, the prevalence of instability is mostly due to structural factors and institutional weakness (Bellin 2004, 152) Hence, what distinguishes the region is the persistence of post-colonial divisive policies, willingness to use rents to subsidize coercive means, continued foreign influence, ethnic dominance, and resource mismanagement.

Perceptions of threat-ubiquity have made provision of security the fulcrum of political power in the region. If legitimate authority is derived from voluntary consent to being dominated by the state, then the lack of representation has eroded the voluntary nature of this consent (Rousseau 1762; Neep 2012, 9; Thomas 2008, 18). Endurance of authority, in spite of its lack of legitimacy, therefore can only be explained by neutralization of political opposition, either through cooption or coercion. The degree of social exclusion creates “impetus, at least on the

---

57 The Sørli, Gleditsch, and Strand (2005) study examined the region’s conflicts between 1960 and 2003. The findings therefore must be analyzed within their proper context, which excludes the consequences of OIF and the Arab Spring. The inclusion of these conflicts may very well exacerbate the original findings.
part of the excluded population, to overthrow the government”; however, a successful outcome depended on the exclusion being real and not perceived (Connable and Libicki 2010, 189). This may explain the noticeable cyclical pattern in the region: heightened insecurity, accumulation of defensive weapons, and intolerance of dissent. Unlike in democratic societies, the notion of state legitimacy in this region has become increasingly exogenous. The implications of weak political development further exacerbated by the long history of contrived control and lack of development. For far too long, natural political impulses have been suppressed. Political competition methodically prevented from reaching its full expression. Regardless of the historical origins of this institutionalized dysfunction, why must authority continue to oscillate between being imposed and contested?

Comparative politics helps determine the effectiveness of policies. It seeks to “explain differences between as well as similarities among countries,” by “exploring patterns, processes, and regularities among political systems” (Lim 2006, 12). Although the comparative method is distinct from the single case study, nonetheless, the “strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies” uses a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons (George and Bennett 2005, 18). Judgments about case comparability depend on the process of discovering “empirical patterns among potential cases” (Gerring 2007, 52). The clearer the patterns the stronger the causal relationship, and more sustainable the underlying assumptions.

Drawing comparisons is crucial for explaining how the British policing approach58 was more effective than the French direct approach. The two European administrations have much in

---

58 Minimizes the use of heavy firepower; relies on small units for conducting patrols; uses native help and skills to track and infiltrate; uses deception and intelligence gathering techniques for capturing rather than killing combatants; and applies a holistic approach, which involves coordination with the local police, civilians, and occupying military force. The indirect policing approach is often contrasted with the direct military approach, which relies heavily on coercive fire-power and massing of troops for shoulder-to-shoulder sweeps (Nagl 2005, 105).
common, nevertheless, their experiences yielded different outcomes (Boot 2013, Appendix). The links between causes and effects lie hidden in the details of these two case studies. Without first comparing and contrasting them, it would be impossible to detect the difference, let alone isolate the potential antecedent(s).

This study also examines the link between protracted armed rebellion and perception of state illegitimacy. For perception of illegitimacy to influence action, it must act as a motivator. However, motivation is endogenous and thereby must be inferred from behavior. Social and political movements happen to be collective actions reflecting “a broad social alliance of people who are associated in seeking to influence an aspect of political or social change (Lim 2006, 235). Organized protest is therefore a form of collective action, because it exhibits the four properties of a social movement: challenge, purpose, solidarity, and interaction (Lim 2006, 234).

Because participation does not require compelling reluctant free-riders to join, participation in movements is largely voluntary (Lim 2006, 239). Paradoxically, rationality and experience can be deterrents to participation. So, according to Mancur Olson, there are strong disincentives to participate, unless the movement is “an undertaking of vast change” by participants which “must be intensely discontented yet not destitute” (Lim 2006, 240). Evidently, rebellion consists of rational actors, voluntarily and cooperatively, engaging in a collectively irrational act of change. Notwithstanding, for movements to succeed they require an achievable goal, organizational structure, and strategically oriented leadership to provide impetus (Lim 2006, 244).

To understand this link, the first hypothesized claim contends the state’s exercise of lawful authority would reduce the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. The
premise is the legitimate exercise of authority induces cooperative compliance with minimal need for deadly force. If this claim is true, then socially constructed worldviews play a role in determining political behaviors and outcomes. Thereby, if the outcome of using force is continued armed civil conflict or escalation of the conflict, then this would indicate the state’s authority is in question. Keeping in mind, obedience due to coercive intimidation is not synonymous with compliance due to state responsiveness. If the comparison result conditionally affirms this claim, then the next objective is to discover the causal pathway.

The second hypothesized claim asserts the military approach increases the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. The assumption is military missions are inherently deadly to defend the state against aggression (Neep 2012, 15). The notion of a state turning such brutal force against its own people shocks the human conscious and represents a breach of the state’s legal responsibility (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 18). If the second claim is also true, then components of armed civil conflict hold tangible value and symbolic meaning.

The third claim asserts the policing approach would reduce the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. As a representative of the state, the authority of the security apparatus is an extension of the state’s. Fundamentally, the effectiveness of policing lies in its ability to induce compliance without the need to resort to overwhelming force. If this final claim is also true, effective governance can offer less costly alternatives than resort to coercive force to resolve grievances and maintain order.

In sum, proof of these three claims would establish the link between the duration of armed civil conflict within authoritarian Arab state and the consequences of ineffective
authoritarian governance. Thus, once armed civil conflict erupts its duration is linked to continued perceptions of state’s illegitimacy.

Empirical evidence on civilian policing has demonstrated the importance of establishing legitimacy at the most basic level. Thereby, when civilian policing is in fact effective, perception of its legitimacy is strongly linked to its process-based approach (Sunshine and Tyler 2003, 515). Meanwhile, conventional military tactics are inherently combative and inflammatory. If this study finds US policing missions in Iraq reduced the levels of violence below those of conventional military missions, then the influence of legitimacy perception on political behavior is confirmed.

Case Study

The case study method is a foundational step in exploring causal mechanisms. This method is exploratory and entails “the intensive study of a single case” (Gerring 2007, 20). This holistic method helps achieve deep understanding of the link between cause and effect, while preserving the case’s rich narrative texture “often lost in large-N cross-case analyses” (Gerring 2007, 5). Its micro-level sensitivity allows the identification of potential intermediate factors, which may lurk between causes and effects (Gerring 2007, 45). Moreover, it allows testing of causal pathways and their implications (Gerring 2007, 45). The virtue of this method is the strength of its internal conceptual validity, in addition to its unrivaled capacity for addressing social complexity and degree of variance (Gerring 2007, 43; George and Bennett 2005, 19).

Naturally, this method contains a certain degree of structural ambiguity. This is attributed to its double function, of discovering what is particular and what is general about a phenomenon (Gerring 2007, 78). The process is heuristic and valued for its capacity to generate new variables
and hypotheses (George and Bennett 2005, 20). More significantly, it allows the discovery of alternative explanations and the establishment of necessary-condition arguments (Gerring 2007, 4; George and Bennett 2005, 20). The most useful assertion possible through this method entails “the relationship of a variable to conjunctions of variables that are themselves necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome” (emphasis in original) (George and Bennett 2005, 26). This is largely due to the difficulty of distinguishing between claims of necessity and sufficiency. This can only be achieved through counterfactual testing (George and Bennett 2005, 26).

The case-study method exposes the “distinctive sequence of events” associated with a “particular historical, political, cultural, and social context surrounding an issue or concern” (emphasis in original) (Lim 2006, 46). Therefore, a single case, within a multi-dimensional context, can yield many within-case observations and causal pathways to examine. By the same token, this method does not discriminate between competing explanations on the basis of evidence” (George and Bennett 2005, 28). Examination of a single case without additional within-case observations “offers no evidence whatsoever of a causal proposition” (Gerring 2007, 31). Hence, to discover causal mechanisms, the next essential steps are performing within-case and cross-case analyses. The method of process tracing, applied during within-case analysis, is critical for ascertaining why the violence manifested in the form which it did.

The following chapter presents a detailed description of events for each of the three case-studies. The narrative format is typical of a qualitative research design. The three narratives include the relevant details associated with the procession of events leading up to the first onset of violence. Each narrative is followed by a summary of the outcomes and implications of each incident.
Within-Case Study

While a single case offers deep and thick insight into the specific features of an observation, the within-case method can confirm occurrence or non-occurrence of an effect (Gerring 2007, 49) Strength of the within-case method is in its external validity. Binary comparisons are especially susceptible to selection bias and the “overdetermination” of the dependent variable (Lim 2006, 54); however, the within-case comparison reduces the risk posed by this problem (Lim 2006, 57). At the same time, because the covariational design can be insufficient for proving causation, the method of process-tracing is used to link possible causes with observed outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 6). Ostensibly, process-tracing “safeguards against investigator-induced bias (George and Bennett 2005, 24).

Cross-Case Study

The distinction between the cross-case approach and the single case study is a matter of degree (Gerring 2007, 20). The difference lies in the method of defining observations, not their analysis (Gerring 2007, 66). While the case-study focuses on a single case, the cross-case method models causal relations by subjecting few cases to the same level of intensive examination (Gerring 2007, 66). The strength of this method is determined by the relative homogeneity of the cases being compared (Gerring 2007, 51). The process can provide useful information, so as long as the cases are sufficiently similar. Key to note, while causal relationships are deterministic, cross-case arguments are probabilistic (Gerring 2007, 55).

Causal investigations involves iterative tasks, so cross-case arguments “draw on within-case assumptions, and within-case arguments draw on cross-case assumptions” (Gerring 2007, 84). In turn, analyses of cross-case and within-case arguments are interdependent (Gerring 2007,
The two methods “often tell somewhat different stories, and there is usually no easy way to adjudicate between them” (Gerring 2007, 209).

**Case Selection**

The aim of this task is “to identify cases that reproduce the relevant causal features of a larger universe (representativeness) and provide variation along the dimensions of theoretical interest (causal leverage)” (Gerring 2007, 88). The process of selecting cases must consider the “cross-case characteristics of a group of cases” (Gerring 2007, 12). This step requires familiarity with the population of cases from within which the cases are chosen. A good theory not only helps identify this population, but also suggests which cases to select, and what would be an appropriate independent variable.

The method for selecting the three cases for this study was mostly determined by the research questions. The goal was to understand what constituted the “wrong turn” during OIF. The nature of the inquiry and familiarity with the geo-strategic locale drove the need to compare the US experience with others. It was imperative to find comparable cases to serve as close fits. Although selecting a case study based on the dependent variable is normally frowned upon, it was critical for this study to “identify which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome” (George and Bennett 2005, 23).

Whenever possible, primary sources were consulted to corroborate historical accounts. It was also possible to cross-check facts with official archival documents and datasets available online and by access to US military personnel whom have served in OIF. Furthermore, whatever gaps in real-time news coverage were encountered it was possible gain the missing information.
from autobiographical accounts. Finally, scholarly articles and authoritative texts were mined in the process of building the study’s frameworks and research design.

**Research Design**

The analytical framework begins by comparing the British and French responses to an outbreak of armed civil conflict within their protectorates during the interwar period. A previous study by Tony Smith (1978) asserted the British approach was more effective than the French largely due to its less conspicuous mechanism of asserting control (100). Arguably, the explanatory reason in Iraq is the government during that time was seen as more representative of the population. Therefore, this study asks:

**Q1**: How was the British approach more authoritative than the French in restoring order?

- **H₁**: The British policing approach restored order in less time and less casualties.
- **H₀**: The British policing approach restored order in equal or longer time and with equal or higher number of casualties.

To ascertain if the policing approach is more authoritative than the military approach, the policing approach is compared to the military approach during OIF. The study thus further asks:

**Q2**: How is the policing approach more authoritative than the military approach?

- **H₂**: The policing approach restored order in shorter time and less casualties.
- **H₀**: The policing approach restored order in equal or longer time and with equal or higher number of casualties.

The unique geo-strategic nature of the Middle East and the distinct internal and external interests of its population make it difficult to find “perfect fits” outside the region. Conversely, the history of the region is replete with recurring patterns of political dynamics. The three case-
students were selected based on the mix of commonalities and differences which lend themselves to comparison. All three cases entail foreign occupation that had to contend with an outbreak of armed rebellion. The British demonstrated relative tactical consistency in spite of the policy squabbles at the strategic level. Due to their preference for exerting indirect control and proficiency in coopting Iraqi elites, the British restored order in the shortest period of time and with the least casualties. Meanwhile, France’s penchant for culturally absorbing nations under its purview destined Syria to a drastically different fate. The French were slow in responding to the rebellion and less measured. Although they ultimately managed to expel the leader of the resistance, only by tempering their rigid approach were they able to remain in Syria as long as they did. Finally, the US managed to achieve its tactical and strategic military goals initially but continues to struggle with the consequences of its reckless foreign policy in the region.

What these cases have in common is their involvement in state-building missions while combating intrastate conflicts. Security operations often involve protection of non-combatants and employment of policing tactics. Post-occupation political and economic stakes polarized the indigenous populations based on distinct power and resource schema. Finally, the powers involved in this region during the interwar period were invested in stabilizing it. These selected cases nonetheless differed in their historical legacies, demographic constitutions, support of the occupation, and support for the rebellion.

John Stuart Mill’s Method of Agreement and Method of Difference along with the qualitative method of process-tracing are applied to compare the three case studies. Process-tracing links observations in a particular manner to yield an explanation. Mill’s Method of Agreement compares differing circumstances in all but one variable (Lijphart 1971, 58). In this study, the average number of daily casualties is the dependent variable. The independent
variables are onset of armed civil conflict, type of force, amount of force, number of security personnel, number of rebels, and type of political leadership. The dummy variables are the geographic location, military occupation, mission type. Next, Mill’s Method of Difference is applied. To preserve the fidelity of the phenomenon, the suspected antecedent(s), amount of force, must not be excluded heretofore from any following exploratory steps. In Mill’s Method of Difference the only differing circumstance, in otherwise similar circumstances, is identified as the required antecedent (Lijphart 1971, 58). The dependent variable is the duration of the conflict.

State’s authority and the population’s perception of its legitimacy can be inferred, at any-time and anywhere, simply by critical observation of benign or mundane daily interactions between citizens and their state. This is made possible by mandating the state penetrate the lives of its citizens. This study henceforth focuses on inferring the quality of this relationship through observing responses to demonstrations of discontent. The outbreak of protest often symbolizes reaction to policy dissonance, between shaped expectations and perceived realizations. Like any other cultural experience, the legitimacy of the claim lies in its interpretation, and therefore can only be inferred. The difficulty or ease, by which inference is possible, may be determined by the state’s capacity to relate to its citizens. Thereby, state response to discontent also reflects the state’s perception of claims’ legitimacy. State’s response can act as an amplifier, thereby either confirming impressions of disconnect or refuting them.

During these confrontations, each side attempts to exert their influence. Regardless, whether by protesting or maintaining order, collective action underlies both responses. The state is often represented by its designated security apparatus. And, most likely, the state’s response will fall along the graded spectrum for use of force – from as low as persuasive cautionary...
warnings to maintain order, to as high as employment of firepower to kill or disperse violent rebels. Again, it is assumed, responses to discontent, by either side, reflect deep and culturally ingrained impressions which influence interpretation of reality. Normally, impressions of the “other” are subjective and produced by strategic culture. Therefore, strategic culture is what ultimately determines the effort needed to manage the conflict.

Compliance, rather than obedience to coercive intimidation, is conceived as the positive response to authoritative orders (Sunshine and Tyler 2003, 514). Conversely, rebellion is a negative response expressed in the form of violence toward the state (Sunshine and Tyler 2003, 515). Thereby, escalation of violence only serves to inflame discontent, wrought on by perception of illegitimacy.

Because the implications of reconfiguring cultural identities are central to this study, the unit of analysis and observation must correspond to the historical boundaries of Levant and Mesopotamia, rather than their modern state delineations of Syria and Iraq (Barnett 1995, 492). The tribal nature of collectives relevant to this study requires making this adjustment. Meanwhile, major cities which were historically considered national hubs continue to be identified as such within their modern conceptions. Within this specified geographic and historical contexts, the three cases share the following features: post-conflict recovery, foreign intervention, aspirations of self-determination, cultural diversity, political and economic underdevelopment, socio-economic stratification, external influences, and regional security threats.

This chapter outlined the theoretical foundation for claims made about the links between perceptions of state’s authority and repercussions of ineffective use of force. Rationality is
integral to behavioral analysis, but so is the context shaping interpretation of the experience (Simon 1962, 401). Classical behaviorists, such as Simon, see rationality in decision-making as a practice of analytically approaching problems through the lens of certain static mental models. Moreover, they assert rationality in human decision-making is appropriate for the development of an ideal social state. However, individual and social contexts are equally important in shaping human behavior. Social construction of meaning must also be considered in any analysis of human behavior. An effective analytical framework incorporates the three theoretical models of rational choice, collective action, and constructivism.

To conclude, this chapter delved into what is entailed in establishing security in the aftermath of conventional combat operations. The geo-strategic context within which US military missions will likely take place was described as, simultaneously globalized and regionalized in a post-Cold War international system. The overshadowing concern is regional instability, precipitated by state failure and spill-over of armed civil conflict (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 10). The implications of intrastate violence, whether in terms of threats to human security or internationalization of conflict, could not be exaggerated. The prohibitive costs and dangers characteristic of military intervention missions demand an objective assessment of security threats and sober policy for containing them effectively.

Also within this chapter, the theoretical foundation underlying these dynamics was explored. Variations in responses to authority cannot be analyzed without also considering how context influences the interpretation of reality. The theoretical framework explained why the principles of three models - rational choice, collective action, and constructivism should be incorporated into the analytical roadmap. Although structural and functional perspectives are
invaluable *ex post* analytical frameworks, they are unable to explain variation in preference. Hence why, the contextual perspective must also be considered.

This chapter concludes with an outline of how this inquiry is conducted, by discussing the rationale driving the methodology and explaining the reason for opting for a comparative design. Mill’s Method of Agreement and Method of Difference are optimal for discovering causal links and verifying hypothesized claims. This comparative approach is further strengthened by combining the case-study approach with cross-case and within-case analyses. The study particularly relies upon the case-study method in constructing the narratives. This section, hence, provided the blueprint for the analytical framework. The research design contained a description of the relevant variables and the sequence by which the analyses proceed. The analytical framework in the final chapter examines the validity of the hypothesized claims, by applying the method of process-tracing to compare the three cases.

The following chapters discuss the three case studies – the British in Iraq and the French in Syria, followed by the US in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. The next chapter begins with a brief historical overview followed by detailed descriptions of the British and French case-studies during the interwar period, from 1919-1939. The narrative of each case outlines the sequence of events, as they unfolded within their distinct context, and which led to the first onset of armed civil conflict.
Chapter 4: The British and French Case Studies

Since the focus of this study is how the Arab state’s use of force influences responses based on popular perception of its institutional legitimacy, the inquiry now turns to the historical records for cases in restoring order. The rationale for selecting the case of the British in Iraq (1919-1921) and the French in Syria (1925-1927) was discussed in the previous chapter. Also discussed were the conceptual and theoretical frameworks within the context of the Middle East. Variations in responses to authority cannot be analyzed without also considering how context influences actors’ interpretations of reality. The following two chapters present the three case-studies in narrative format, while guided by the previously described research design.

This chapter begins with an overview of the historical context within which the European experiences in the Middle East unfolded. While the literature on the British experience in the Middle East was abundantly available, unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the French experience. It appears “the role of French forces in the Middle East is ignored, dismissed, or lightly mentioned” (Dean 2014, 1). This is odd, given the influence of the French in the region “reverberates into the twenty first century” (Dean 2014, 1). Lack of fluency in French is certainly problematic, since “[t]here’s no work in English solely focusing on French Diplomatic and military efforts in the Middle East during the Great War and its immediate aftermath” (Dean 2014, 1).

The historical narratives describe the British administration in Iraq and the second of the French in Syria, both during the interwar period. They outline the relevant structural conditions
and enacted policies which converged at critical junctures to yield armed civil conflict (Slater and Simmons 2010, 887). Left unaltered, relational patterns become cumulative over time; reinforcing a perpetual feedback loop and facilitating premonitions of outcomes (Wendt 1995, 80; Barnett 1995, 486). For this reason, when discussing events taking place within the context of the Middle East, it is therefore not unusual to have trace the original causes of the incident a couple of centuries back in time.

The impetus for this inquiry was strongly driven by the outcome of OIF. It aims to understand how this phantasmagoric experience unfolded with such impunity. Along with the grinding horror unleashed came stark reminders of the consequences of untamed human depravity. Rather than deliver a sovereign and stable Iraq, it produced an anarchic Hobbesian state long relegated to the history books (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 139; Hashim 2006, 293; Pfaff 2008, 11). The undeniable absence of a strong state enticed old hatreds to reach for the reigns. With all factions seeking their security needs elsewhere (Hashim 2006, 302), foreign bodies stepped in to state their claims to the ancient lands and further inflaming fears. The message this debacle sends, that the only other alternative to a covetous authoritarian state is languishing in Hobbesian anarchy, is rejected outright and exposed as a farce (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 3).

When Britain and France took charge of their Class A mandates of Iraq and Syria they too delivered unstable states (Angrist 2010, 16). The Mandate system, at the heart of the League of Nations, was one of the “most public expressions of the end of Britain’s predominant role in the world” (Dodge 2003, 5). The waning of British hegemony and threats to its imperialist free trade created “far-reaching changes to the international system” (Dodge 2003, 5). As the US was “drawn into the war against its better judgment,” it recognized the emerging need “to impose economic and political stability on the post-war world” (Dodge 2003, 5).
Meanwhile, the French and British crafted an amateurish scheme, known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, which undermined the region’s Wilsonian aspirations. Publicly they “paid lip service to the promise of Arab independence,” but secretly divvied up former Ottoman territories along Syke’s line in the sand” (Barr 2012, 26). Needless to say, this parochial scheme within the context of the Middle East set the entire enterprise onto a disastrous path (Fromkin 1989, 262; Barr 2012, 26; Corum and Johnson 2003, 54). Mistakes compounded by cruel twists of fate guaranteed no one would escape the ensuing nightmare unscathed, including the League of Nation’s legitimacy (Barr 2012, 27-28 and 54). After all, “legitimacy matters to international institutions and to the nature of the international system as a whole” (Hurd 1999, 403). This point was not lost on those who understood the implications.

On November 19, 1919, a speech by US Senator William Borah denounced the League’s system of mandates. He presciently cautioned, “when you shall have committed this Republic to a scheme of world control based upon force, upon the combined military force of the four great nations of the world, you will have soon destroyed the atmosphere of freedom, of confidence in the self-governing capacity of the masses, in which alone a democracy may thrive” (Borah 1994, 573). Indeed, the Mandates may have represented a victory for the state system, but far from a triumph for liberty (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 4). Which begs the question, what was life in the Middle East like before WWI?

The Pre-WWI Years

The Fertile Crescent landscape was once the site of ancient Levant and Mesopotamia. Its significance lies in its historical legacies and natural geographical endowments. For millennia, it connected Asia, Africa, and Europe; forming a continental bridge for trade and military routes
The region preserved civilizations within immutable borders - the Mediterranean in the west, the Anti-Taurus Mountains in the southwest, the Zagros Mountains in the northeast, Arabian Plateau in the southwest, Persian Gulf in the southeast, and the Euphrates in the east (Hourani 1991, 11). Life in the region primarily flourished due to an extensive irrigation system and adaptive nature of its people. Residents had to endure territorial encroachments by neighboring dynasties and occasional violent sweeps by raiding marauders. Resilience is an imperious requisite for surviving routine violence.

Threats to survival, natural and man-made, compelled heterogeneous collectives to conserve and coexist; thus, to focus on the pragmatic rather than ephemeral (Hourani 1991, 14; Batatu 1978, 19). Indigenous communities learned to adapt, thereby persevered through numerous dynastic change-overs (Hourani 1991, 132). It was the responsibility of the dominant elite to ensure continuity. Thereby their socio-economic ranking was reinforced through lineage or patronage (Batatu 1978, 7). What can be gleaned from dynastic histories in the region was the process by which new states were formed. They often began by molding a military force drawn from the nomadic warlike population (Hourani 1991, 215; Batatu 1978, 10).

At the most basic social level, whether in nomadic or sedentary communities, trust remains closely linked to communal ties (Hourani 1991, 10; Ma’oz 1999, 79; Olson 1971, 18; Batatu 1978, 8). Peasants and nomads are notoriously independent, distrustful, and self-sufficient (Thomas 2003, 546; Batatu 1978, 13). Their alliances based strictly on mutual interests. Not even “fellow Arabs offering money, arms, and a greater political role within self-governing states” could claim or secure bedouin support (Thomas 2003, 543). Tribal land was collectively owned and defended (Vinogradov 1927, 128). The tribal leader owns “the largest area so he would be able to defray the costs of tribal hospitality and collective gifts” (Vinogradov 1927, 128). More
broadly, fragile symbiotic relationships connected urban populations with the rural. Until the eighteenth century, ties between land cultivators and nomadic pastoralists were more threatened by climate and water shortages than by territorial disputes (Hourani 1991, 102).

Peasants subsisting on an agrarian economy require primarily “efficient control of land, water, and market communications” (Thomas 2003, 544). Thus, any conflicts between sedentary and nomadic populations revolved around “competition for water and grazing rights on desert margins” (Thomas 2003, 544). As the French quickly learned from an experience in 1924, following the installation of a motorized water-pump in Syria’s Jabal Druze, the sentimental outpouring of gratitude did not prevent the Druze chiefs from rising up against the modernizing administration months later (Thomas 2003, 545). Affiliations in the region outside blood ties tend to be fickle and foreign control is quite illusory (Thomas 2003, 545).

Many unambiguous and distinct social lacunae exist within the Middle Eastern landscape, but particularly between the urban and rural (Wiarda 2007, 71; Dodge 2003, 69; Batatu 1978, 13). The rural lifestyle is anything but monolithic. The hierarchical order of segmental societies is based on size; listed next in descending order: federation, tribe, clan, and house. The form of subsistence ranges from purely nomadic, semi-nomadic tribal cultivation, to settled village dwelling (Vinogradov 1972, 125). Tribal confederations are particularly worthy of note, because of the political power they wield (Vinogradov 1972, 126). For this reason, the Western habit of measuring ethnic dominance by population percentages within artificial boundaries is futile. It is therefore akin, arguably, to a foreign version of gerrymandering.

Within the Fertile Crescent, the three largest are Sunni. Their memberships can exceed tens of thousands, crossing Iraqi, Syrian, Jordanian and Saudi borders. They are often at war with
each other. The Dulaim and Shammar nomads are traditional archenemies, and ‘Anaza nomads tend to ally with Dulaim. Settled and semi-settled tribes tend to be Shi’a and form looser alignments (Vinogradov 1972, 126). Tribal affiliation provides “needed identity and sense of security”; however, daily behavior is “pragmatic and adaptive to situations as they arose” (Vinogradov 1972, 127). It is not unusual to find tribes with mixed sectarian sub-clans. Antagonism among tribes runs along interest lines rather than identity (Vinogradov 1972, 127).

While European travelers romanticized the bedouin lifestyle, the urban population disparaged it for its conservatism and non-literate norms (Thomas 2003, 545; Wright 1926, 756). Orientalist literature lauds bedouins’ love of freedom, resilience, loose hierarchical control, and apparent tribal egalitarianism (Thomas 2003, 545). These portrayals attest to the superficiality of their cultural experiences (Thomas 2003, 545; Neep 2012, 7). A more objective view would note the anarchic and opportunistic nature of migratory lifestyles. The tribal culture tends to be insular, intellectually inflexible, and distrustful of all things foreign. They cherish their oral histories and are “reluctant to reveal them to outsiders” (Thomas 2003, 545). Even the French “found it difficult to penetrate the complex culture of the bedouin” (Thomas 2003, 545; Omissi 1990, 91). The majority of the bedouin population is impoverished, warlike, “unconquered in the hostile spaces of the desert, had raided settled communities, and sometimes subdued them” (Omissi 1990, 91; Batatu 1978, 13).

In return for cooperation and safe passage, tribal sheikhs are “accustomed to receiving political subsidies from their nominal political rulers” (Thomas 2003, 542). In terms of state policing, the only form tribes are willing to tolerate is for “safeguarding them from predations from their near neighbors” (Thomas 2003, 542). The tribal practice of raiding and looting, although quite reprehensible, serves economic and social roles. So as long it did not encroach
upon settled terrain, it was viewed as means for redistributing wealth; as desperate measures reserved for desperate times (Thomas 2003, 550). Hence, tribal unrest was a common occurrence across Syria and Iraq (Thomas 2003, 543).

In contrast, at the local market merchants and craftsmen display their imports and skills, while peasants readily exchange their surplus for what they could not produce (Hourani 1991, 109; Batatu 1978, 19). Socio-economic overlays, not ideological ones, regulate these exchanges. The urban population relies on the rural to trade-in its surplus and act as the first line of defense (Hourani 1991, 137). In return, inhabitants of the periphery expect their clientele to subsidize their means for protection. Alliance of interests is the preferred practice; therefore, the potential costs of public displays of discord and disobedience are rarely witnessed openly in urban centers (Hourani 1991, 137). However, in the periphery, relations are volatile and property susceptible to contestation.

Due to the historical and geo-strategic significance of the Fertile Crescent, its population had grown accustomed to foreign intrigue and, in time, they too became adept at it. Their homeland, more often than not, had served as the battlefield upon which eastern and western powers fought their wars. Naturally, residents’ conception of territorial sovereignty would reflect this oft-disrupted reality. Consequently, imperial centers since the Roman Empire have had to oblige and negotiate with the region’s semi-independent, powerful local rulers for effective governance (Tikriti 2007, 204). Regardless of who ultimately prevailed, the occupiers could not afford for these local rulers to remain powerful enough to dominate (Tikriti 2007, 205).

The Ottomans conquered the region during the 1500s. The empire’s influence on the region was profound. It was dynastic in character and militarized in organization (Hitti 1970,
Ottoman bureaucrats organized the Levant region into three provinces: Aleppo, Damascus, and Tripoli. Each was strategically significant – Aleppo was located on an ancient trading route, Damascus a center for organizing pilgrimage, and Tripoli a port on the Mediterranean. The Aleppine plains and the Homs-Hama region were Greater Syria’s economic centers (Bou-Necklie 1998, 275). The Jabal Hawran region had produced grain for much of Syria and Arabia since Roman times (Provence 2005, 34). The Ottomans neither had the resources nor the will to offer these villagers security. They were content with merely collecting taxes to fund their expansionist military campaigns. Their bureaucratic administration was designed to ensure flow of funds and recruits.

The territory now known as Lebanon was then under autonomous Druze control. The Ottomans “realized at the outset that Lebanon with its hardy mountaineers of Druze and Maronites was entitled to a different treatment from Syria” (Hitti 1970, 729; Neep 2012, 47; Barr 2012, 123; Dean 2014, 2). Whatever armed conflict erupted back then was feudal, not religious. So the Ottomans extended the previous regime’s privilege of Lebanese autonomy, and imposed upon them comparatively light tribute (Hitti 1970, 729; Miller 1977, 550).

In the 1800s, a boom in migration and agricultural exports helped turn the tide around for the Jabal Hawran region (Provence 2005, 34). When Druze migrants had settled in this region they helped pacify it. Local authority was based on the capacity to protect the local villages from predatory bedouin raids (Provence 2005, 33). A sheikh is strong by his access to arms and, thereby, capacity to negotiate with local bedouins (Pfaff 2008, 16). Druze sheikhs lived in their village and worked their own fields (Provence 2005, 33). It was after several failed attempts at achieving independence, through subversive alliances with foreign powers and military
maneuvering, the Ottomans decided to bring the region under their direct control by stirring up strife between Maronites and Druze” (Hitti 1970, 735; Provence 2005, 43).

A twenty year civil war, between the Druze and their Maronite neighbors, ultimately came to head in 1860. A rift between Druze factions took on religious tones. This rift grew into a schism by each side eliciting European support. During the subsequent massacre of 1860, 150 villages were burned and 11,000 Christians perished (Hitti 1970, 735). An agreement among six European signatory powers, in 1861, afforded the Lebanese region a statute of autonomy from Constantinople (Fromkin 1989, 36). Thus, the Lebanese population, in 1864, was placed under Christian governorship (Dean 2014, 2), and no longer had to pay tribute or render military service (Hitti 1970, 736). Russia reserved the right to intervene on behalf of the Orthodox population, and France on behalf of Catholics (Fromkin 1989, 3; Angrist 2010, 12). This protective immunity allowed the Lebanese to pursue westernized development programs, which otherwise they would not have had. Accordingly, the Lebanese region prospered “as no other neighboring province” (Hitti 1970, 736).

At the other end of the Euphrates, Mesopotamia stood as a bulwark against westward territorial expansion by eastern powers. Enduring Sunni rejection of Shi’ite religious legitimacy was countered by sustained disruptions of the status quo. Shi’ite’s southern campaigns of proselytization were met with Ottoman military operations “to rein in what imperial officials considered renegade local power centers” (Tikriti 2007, 207). The Ottomans established secular state schools and prodded Sunni clerics to bring the population into the Ottoman fold. During the following centuries, a confluence of external threats, from military adventurism and growing trade ambitions, made Mesopotamia a more invaluable eastern line of defense (Hitti 1970, 737).
Also during the 1800s, rampant corruption, inertia, and growing external challenges, weakened Ottoman control over its vast expanse. The once strongly centralized Ottoman system of control devolved into a regime of benign neglect. Regional administrations became districts of communal self-rule, “denominations were allowed to manage their own affairs with minimal interference” (Tikriti 2007, 208). In time, local governing figures “were able to renegotiate their relationship with the center” (Tikriti 2007, 205; Angrist 2010, 10). Some were heavily invested in maintaining the status quo and hampered the modernization of the army. Some attempted to secure governorship succession. Others facilitated economic access to western powers. Having become extremely subversive, the Ottomans disbanded the system of local governorship in 1826.

In the meantime, Western European powers fretting over Russian expansion turned toward resolving the Eastern Question. France and Italy were entangled in Ottoman financial affairs (Neep 2012, 26). Germany had its commercial ventures in the region and was planning to build the Baghdad Railway (Fromkin 1989, 25). The British were fully engaged in the Great Game with Russia. The safety of the road to India was their “most deeply felt concern” (Fromkin 1989, 29; Omissi 1990, 20).

In hindsight, the Crimean war (1853-1856) was the determining factor in the Ottoman Empire’s irrevocable decline. By 1875, the government began defaulting on its financial obligations. Foreign creditors, especially Italian and French, inevitably gained control over decisions of financial implications (Hourani 1991, 282). In 1885 Britain exasperated by Ottoman corruption and financial mismanagement, “withdrew its protection and influence from Constantinople” (Fromkin 1989, 30). With Ottomans feeling increasingly resentful of British and French interferences, they turned to Germany for help. Bismarck’s military was the most
advanced at the time, the Russians’ had been drastically weakened, and British navy made less relevant (Fromkin 1989, 31). Meanwhile, Ottoman ground forces were by far the weakest.

During the nineteenth century, the population of the empire reached approximately 30 million – 16 million Turks, 9 million Arabs, 1.5 million Greeks, 1.5 million Armenians, and 0.5 million of other minority groups (Luft 2009, 46). The Turks were always “a dominant minority group in their vast domain and made no attempt at colonization in the Arab lands” (Hitti 1970, 716). Not only did the Ottomans have to contend with European challengers, but also Wahhabi crusaders from the Arabian Peninsula. Resurgence in Saudi territorial conquests posed a direct threat to the Ottoman presence in the Arabian Peninsula.

Elsewhere, particularly within the European provinces, forces for national independence were beginning to coalesce against the empire. These movements were “met with severe repression” by the Ottomans (Hourani 1991, 275). Growing concern over the welfare of Orthodox Christians under the Millet system thus came to the forefront (Hourani 1991, 277), but so did “the struggles of the various powers to secure paramount influence” (Hourani 1991, 275).

To reestablish dominance, the Ottoman centralized power began a campaign of reform, called Tanzimat (Fromkin 1989, 34; Angrist 2010, 10; Neep 2012, 20). Constitutional reforms led to secularization. Associations became strictly through guilds and unions. The methodical approach led to the modernization of the educational system, the army, and standardization of the overall bureaucracy (Angrist 2010, 10; Neep 2012, 29). As a direct result, the economy was transformed from one of subsistence to a thriving market economy. Inescapably, it also caused socio-economic schisms between collectives to further widen, particularly between the tribal and urban communities.
Having been subjected to numerous waves of extractive imperialism, locals learned to evade taxation and conscription by relying on communal property arrangements. Hence, the Ottoman Property Law of 1858 mandated the registration of all landed property. This drastic step “strengthened rural shaykhs and urban notables who had seen the potential advantage in regulated land speculation” (Tikriti 2007, 206; Batatu 1978, 6). Whilst land reform had limited success, by seeming alien to both officials and subjects (Angrist 2010, 11), they had a globalizing effect. They favored import and export trade with Europe (Hourani 1991, 276; Batatu 1978, 6). Trading merchants played a large role in determining “organization of production, advancing capital to landowners or cultivators, deciding what they should produce, buying it, processing it –ginning cotton and winding silk – and then exporting it” (Hourani 1991, 276).

The opening of the Suez Canal had led to “increased demand for Iraqi grain and wool” (Vinogradov 1927, 128). In turn, absentee landlords began “driving the peasants into producing more without any corresponding investment on their part” (Vinogradov 1927, 128). In 1908, a project to improve irrigation was completed, thereby dramatically changing the course of nine-tenths of Euphrates tributaries (Vinogradov 1927, 129). The surge of water flooded the southern areas of Mesopotamia and forced large-scale migration to nearby grounds (Vinogradov 1927, 129). It was a watershed moment for tribesmen, in particular. The sudden migration “increased friction and intertribal wars” (Vinogradov 1927, 129).

Thus, in the countryside and away from the landowners’ effective control, power did not lie with the tribal leaders but with intermediary agents closer to the land and the process of cultivation (Hourani 1991, 288). The new legal codes usurped the power and influence of those who controlled the former legal system (Hourani 1991, 277). Opening the Middle East to larger
markets led to the “dislocation of the economy, the loss of power and influence, the sense of the political world of Islam being threatened from outside” (Hourani 1991, 277).

Nevertheless, the Germans, British, and French remained optimistic about the Ottomans’ ability to transform into a modern European state (Neep 2012, 20). The Russians, naturally, were more skeptical. Overall, the consensus was no one actively encouraged the empire’s break-up (Hourani 1991, 275; Dean 2014, 4), especially with recent memories of Napoleonic wars and consequences for the peace of Europe. The Ottoman Empire was simply declining and beginning to lose its firm grip on power.

On the eve of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had already been driven out of Europe and northern Africa (Angrist 2010, 11). Whatever territories remained, their control over them was nominal. It was changes to property laws which proved the most consequential. Incidentally, the Ottomans’ intent for granting large swaths of land to influential families and investors was to cultivate, not to create a large land-owning class. Nonetheless, it led to such outcome (Hourani 1991, 289). The Ottoman officer corps reflected this fact. It was primarily composed of Sunni Arabs, “educated at the empire’s military college in Constantinople; an entire effendi class of multilingual elites” (emphasis in original) (Tikriti 2007, 208).

Between 1860 and 1914 the population in the Fertile Crescent grew by forty per cent, largely due to reduction in causes of famine and spread of epidemic diseases (Hourani 1991, 294). Although population growth did not necessarily translate into quality of life improvement; nevertheless, the transformative circumstances favored those who aligned with the forces of change and integration (Hourani 1991, 295). Profound socio-economic changes led to education reform, modernization, and improved communications and transportation systems (Vinogradov
Cosmopolitan cities grew rapidly, while provincial capitals grew more proportionally. As a result, “peasants lacked the power to obtain from the rural product more than the minimum they needed for subsistence, and lacked also the protection of the powerful in times of oppression and hardship” (Hourani 1991, 295).

Also, in the years prior to WWI, pan-Islamism was encouraged by “skillful German manipulation,” to draw the Ottomans away from other European powers (Luft 2009, 47; Thomas 2008, 17). Germany had launched an unconventional warfare campaign against “Entente powers’ colonies that ranged from the United States to Afghanistan” (Dean 2014, 2). Muslim missionaries were not averse to “emphasizing the differences between them and the ‘infidels’” (Luft 2009, 47). Inklings of nationalism only began spreading in the late 1880s. They were “not primarily directed against the encroachment of European powers” as much as problems of identity and political organization (Hourani 1991, 309). Dreams of independence and promises of self-determination drove Ottoman-trained Arab intelligentsia to align with the secularist Young Turks. Secret nationalist societies composed of educated and middle-class Arabs began sprouting throughout the Middle East (Ma’oz 1999, 79; Vinogradov 1927, 130).

Only when the Young Turks embarked on their genocidal campaign of Turkification did regional resentments reach their final crescendo. By 1915, Turkey was experiencing a wave of identity purification (Luft 2009, 43). Calls to purge the Turkish language from its Arabic and Persian elements alienated its co-religionists and non-Turks (Luft 2009, 47 and 53; Vinogradov 1927, 130). Arab students “repulsed and humiliated by the discrimination and harsh treatment” started their own nationalist secret societies (Vinogradov 1927, 130; Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 14). There was unity among Sunni and Shi’a views on future leadership, “to counteract the Turkish claim that the Ottoman sultans were the Defenders of the Faith” (Vinogradov 1927,
The Kurdish nationalist movement, which had never existed before, grew and “became an effective political force and one which could serve as a focus for other ideas about the way in which society should be organized” (Hourani 1991, 310). Thus, regional resistance to foreign occupation was not a rejection of occupiers but of policy. European presence was a reminder of Ottoman ineptness.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Britain’s industrial power had been steadily declining (Dodge 2003, 3; Omissi 1990, 20), so investors “preferred to place their money in dynamic economies in the Americas and elsewhere abroad” (Fromkin 1989, 32). Meanwhile, the Great Game meant Britain had to protect its trade route between India and Egypt (Fromkin 1989, 29). The British strategy for sustaining its economic viability was to support native regimes against invasion or subversion (Omissi 1990, 21). The British strategy of “control without occupation” rested on the belief colonies “could be cheaply policed by aircraft armed with gas bombs,” in support of ground forces (Omissi 1990, 21, 38 and 211; Barr 2012, 113). Air policing was “a blunt instrument that operated on the basis of group accountability” (Corum and Johnson 2003, 63).

By extension, the British artificially propped up “decaying regimes of Islamic Asia as a gigantic buffer” (Fromkin 1989, 27). The public and government tolerated air policing because of its modest success and cost-effectiveness (Corum and Johnson 2003, 65). In the meantime, French economic interests in the region were granted by sanctions during their intervention in Lebanon; thereby counterbalancing British influence (Hitti 1970, 751; Angrist 2010, 12). Expansionist trends had thrown the region “into the cockpit of foreign imperial machinations,” and the Great Powers “began to clash there as nowhere else” (Hitti 1970, 749; Scott 2011, 54; Barr 2012, 8; Dean 2014, 4). The British were training the Turkish navy; the French and Italians
the police and gendarmerie (Luft 2009, 23). When Germans realized a war with France would also involve a clash with Russia, Turkey’s stock in German eyes rose higher (Luft 2009, 25; Fromkin 1989, 58).

Inarguably, the Ottoman Empire was at its lowest on the eve of WWI - severely corrupt, fragmented, and festering with internal discontent (Luft 2009, 24). It could not and would not survive the consequences of entering the War alongside the Axis (Fromkin 1989, 35; Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 15). However, those vowing to fill the political void may have fell prey to their own hubris, forgetting the fact the Ottomans were the only ones to dominate the region for over four centuries.

British intelligence was unaware of the ongoing political maneuverings by the Ottomans. They “were conducted behind a veil of mystery that the British embassy time and time again had failed to penetrate” (Fromkin 1989, 38). Only three Turkish cabinet members knew of the 1914 defensive alliance with Germany (Luft 2009, 26). As a result, British advisors misidentified the nature of the revolutionary movements and miscalculated their intentions (Fromkin 1989, 43). Indeed, there existed great affinity between the Turks and Germans; however, strides toward German cultural dominance put off the Turks. Growing Ottoman suspicion and hostility toward the perceived German cultural threat strained relations between the two (Luft 2009, 36). The French were perhaps the most successful in penetrating Turkish society, at least until the turn of the century (Luft 2009, 35).

Post-WWI Regional Profile

By aligning with the Central Powers during WWI, the Ottoman Empire resigned itself to post-war dismemberment (Fromkin 1989, 259). Arab nationalists, led by the Hashemites, were to
be rewarded for siding with the British (Barr 2012, 20). So, in June, 1918, Britain declared all Arabs freed from Turkish control, and the principle of governance by consent was to prevail (Paris 1998, 775; Wright 1926, 744; Fromkin 1989, 254). Yet, while Woodrow Wilson’s promises of liberty still echoing (Neep 2012, 23), the League of Nations legitimated the secretly predetermined territorial divisions of the region (Binder 1999, 12; Wright 1926, 744; Fromkin 1989, 257).

For the most part, these divisions fell along provincial lines. Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul constituted the new state of Iraq, while Damascus, Acre, and Aleppo the new state of Syria. In 1920, the districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Bqa’ valley, Sidon, Tyre, and Jabals Druze and Ansariyya were annexed as the newly-formed state of Lebanon (Ma’oz 1999, 81; Fromkin 1989, 439). On November 7th, 1918, the British and French jointly declared the establishment of national governments and administrations for and by their free indigenous people (Paris 1998, 775; Wright 1926, 744; Thomas 2008, 15). Given the fact Iraq had “the most self-government” its independence was “provisionally recognized” (Wright 1926, 744).

The fundamental dilemma which the Mandates system posed to the British and French was how “to use local institutions packed with ‘reliable’ local clients as mechanisms of political control” while simultaneously being “constrained by the countervailing reluctance to concede meaningful political authority to indigenous populations” (Thomas 2008, 293). As Class A mandates, the role of the administrators in Iraq and Syria was “to provide such advice and assistance as might be necessary to achieve their full independence” (Hitti 1970, 752; Thomas 2003, 548; Neep 2012, 20). These guidelines, nonetheless, had not prevented the British and French from employing their colonial tactics extensively (Angrist 2010, 12; Neep 2012, 23; Thomas 2008, 15).
Ideally, the role of the state is to act as a mediator, attempting to resolve conflicts of interest or values among citizens. However, a state which competes as a self-interested agent becomes yet another competitor for power alongside other groups. The process by which power is redistributed can be influenced by organized groups formed to pursue and defend shared values and interests. The effectiveness of each system relied upon the power’s ability to coopt select indigenous elites, to work on their behalf. The primary task of these elites was to use their political capital to ensure the cooperation or acquiescence of subjects under their purview. Some have argued the sunken costs and post-war economic imperatives led to these same systems to administer the mandates (Smith 1978, 72; Thomas 2008, 15). Colonial intelligence gathering focused on “information about foreign powers, and internal security intelligence, which was devoted to political policing of the domestic population” and preventing internal subversion⁵⁹ (Thomas 2008, 16).

Administrators encouraged the politicization of ethno-religious identities enthusiastically but not independence or unification (Binder 1999, 20; Miller 1977, 549; Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 40). A growth in competing political ideologies and socio-economic strata made the national landscape unconducive to forming alliances (Angrist 2010, 13). Oddly enough, they critiqued the Iraqi military for lacking loyalties, but to “their class, ethnic, and cultural differences” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 40). The spread of secular pan-Arabism was rejected by fundamentalist zealots as antithetical to conservative political Islam. Competing identities made loyalties relative and single-issue alliances suspect or transitory (Ma’oz 1999, 80).

⁵⁹ In this context, subversion referred to “political activity deemed a potential focal point for organized opposition to colonial authority” (Thomas 2008, 17).
The French and British intelligence officers were agents of the imperial state; their governments “depended on incoming information to maintain order” (Thomas 2008, 294). The role of the intelligence officers was largely administrative; thus, they were “preoccupied with the daily tasks of local government” (Thomas 2008, 43). They were nonetheless “crucial to the consolidation – or the rejection – of western authority among the bedouin” (Thomas 2003, 541; Neep 2012, 32). However, French policies reflected their beliefs about colonial racial hierarchy, “those nearest the top could aspire to a comparable level of ‘civilization’ through careful imitation of French practices” (Thomas 2003, 548; Neep 2012, 45). Preventing bedouin dissent was “less a matter of repressive policing than of penetrating nomad society” (Thomas 2003, 542; Thomas 2008, 16). In the meantime, the British decision to assign military personnel, mostly Royal Air Force (RAF), to aid local government officials was out of expediency rather than policy (Thomas 2003, 548; Batatu 1978, 24). British decisions were not always determined by “policies in accordance with a consistent set of strategic objectives” (Scott 2011, 47). Instead, they were more influenced by “various interests of a departmental, domestic and personal nature” (Scott 2011, 47).

RAF was formed during the last year of WWI, and in order to gain its independence as a service, it had to justify its post-WWI role within the military (Mackey 2007, 28; Omissi 1990, 8 and 211). Inter-service rivalries led to advancing RAF appointees, as Special Service Officers, over more experienced army officers. Few RAF personnel “were well acquainted with colonial government” (Thomas 2003, 549). Hence, attaining bedouin compliance meant devising a system of security intelligence, to accumulate knowledge “pivotal to the imposition of meaningful imperial control” (Thomas 2003, 543; Thomas 2008, 18). Their reports to London included information about migration routes, grazing lands, water supplies, livestock raids, blood
feuds, etc. Consequently, rather than outlining tribal links “through kinship ties and shared
genealogical histories,” they delineated their affiliations by geographical distribution (Thomas
2003, 543). Later in the course of British administration, RAF implemented the policy of air
policing.

By now the French were beginning to struggle with “imperial and strategic over-stretch”
(Dean 2014, 4). In addition to fighting large battles on their own soil, the French faced anti-draft
revolts and a lengthy COIN campaign within their colonies (Dean 2014, 4). Essentially, the
“French were so short of men that they had to abandon garrisons” (Dean 2014, 4). The only way
to overcome the French military’s resistance to sending forces into the Middle East was by
forging “secret diplomatic agreements” (Dean 2014, 5).

In June 1916, the Hashemite Sherif of Mecca, Hussein, led an Arab revolt against the
Ottomans in the western region of the Arabian Peninsula (Barr 2012, 31; Al-Marashi and Salama
2008, 14). The Great Arab Revolt was sponsored by both the British and French (Dean 2014, 8).
Nonetheless, it “created greater tension and rivalry” between them (Dean 2014, 5). By inciting
the Arab Revolt in cooperation with foreign powers, Hussein earned the condemnation of the
larger Muslim community (Paris 1998, 776; Dean 2014, 7).

During initial negotiations with the British, Hussein had “carefully avoided a binding
territorial agreement” to enhance his prospects of creating “a self-governing Arab state” (Thomas
2003, 539). Thus, by the British undermining his program, they created “a spokesman for
Muslim frustration with the way things turned out after the war” (Bou-Necklie 1998, 277).
Therefore, subsequent efforts to silence him only “added to his aura as a resistance leader to
European domination” (Bou-Necklie 1998, 277; Thomas 2008, 15). Ultimately, the British
begrudgingly pushed along his sons’ ascendancy to the throne. In 1918 and with British support, Faisal “extended his claim of authority to include the cities of Homs, Hama, and Aleppo” (Neep 2012, 27). The British would have preferred placing Iraq under Faisal’s nominal rule than Abdullah’s, whom they viewed as “sensualist, idle and lazy” (Pool 1980, 338; Omissi 1990, 27; Barr 2012, 113).

In the aftermath of WWI, the British had found themselves torn between two potential strategies in the Middle East. T. E. Lawrence advocated, on behalf of the Foreign Office, supporting Arab autonomy and backing the Hashemite family (Barr 2012, 37). Lawrence was regarded as “the pre-eminent authority” on the region (Paris 1998, 783), and was attempting “to consolidate British Middle East policy-making into one department in Whitehall” (Paris 1998, 783). On the other hand, Arthur Hirtzel, the head of the political department in the India Office, and Percy Cox, the Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, were strongly opposed to Lawrence’s recommendation. Cox favored imperial control, therefore the backing of Ibn Saud (Paris 1998, 773). The India Office envisioned an Iraq as “a benevolent patriarchate, which consists of and to a certain extent is dependent on public opinion, but which retains executive control” (Pool 1980, 338). The inter-departmental squabbles ultimately played themselves out in Britain. In aggregate, factors such as assurances of independence, dearth in political leadership, spirited advocacy, religious notoriety, and proven operational track-record converged to thrust the Lawrence’s plan forward. It was nonetheless met with fierce opposition (Paris 1998, 777).

Fearing the political vacuum would be filled by a non-Muslim, an Arab Syrian congress proclaimed Faisal king of Syria, on March 8th, 1920 (Neep 2012, 27; Barr 2012, 98). Similarly,

---

60 The British Mandate in Iraq was managed by High Commissioners: Percy Cox, Arnold Wilson, Henry Dobbs, Gilbert Clayton, and Francis Humphrys. They were responsible for navigating, what most of the times, were London’s vague, contradictory, or non-existent directives.
twenty-nine Mesopotamians living in Damascus proclaimed Abdullah king of Mesopotamia (Paris 1998, 780; Barr 2012, 98). The Foreign Office summarily refused to acknowledge these proclamations (Paris 1998, 781). The India Office was bidding its time to find a better alternative to the Hashemites (Paris 1998, 781). In a broader sense, their stalling tactics were to avoid antagonizing the French, but also because they favored Faisal for Iraq (Paris 1998, 785).

Early in January, 1920, Faisal had reached a secret accord with the French Premier, Clemenceau, one with which Clemenceau’s bid for presidential election would not be jeopardized (Fromkin 1989, 410). The secret agreement was Syria would gain “its independence, but with exclusively French advisors” (Fromkin 1989, 410). Clemenceau explained, he “did not want his opponents to be able to claim he had been weak on Syria” (Fromkin 1989, 410). However, Clemenceau was not elected on January 17th, and his successor “lacked his inclination to save Britain’s face in the Middle East” (Fromkin 1989, 410; Dean 2014, 13).

By July, 1920, the French had become aware of Faisal’s encouragement of Syrian nationalist aspirations so, they expelled him from Damascus citing “treachery and duplicity” (Paris 1998, 785; Fromkin 1989, 438; Neep 2012, 28; Omissi 1990, 27; Barr 2012, 94). When the Foreign Office raised the possibility of considering Faisal for Mesopotamia, the French objected strongly (Paris 1998, 785; Barr 2012, 104). On his part, Faisal would not accept replacing his brother, as a nominee for Iraq, unless Abdullah was offered the kingdom of Transjordan instead (Pool 1980, 339). Subsequently, both were confirmed as kings to their own respective territory during the 1920 Cairo Conference, and officially crowned in August, 1921 (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 18).
On another front, Ibn Saud was relentless in undermining the Hashemites’ legitimacy (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 19). The ousting of Hussein’s third son, Ali, from Hijaz and establishment of a Saudi fiefdom instead delivered a blowsing crush and “brought tribal loyalties into question” (Thomas 2003, 541). Faisal “was not particularly popular with the people of Iraq” (Wright 1926, 747). The British undermined his rule in several ways; he “could not even claim that he had a monopoly on the use of force” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 19). He was further delegitimized by British control of the country’s finances and insistence on imposing his rule over the Iraqi population (Pool 1980, 340; Wright 1926, 747; Omissi 1990, 27 Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 23). The British chose to continue supporting Hashemite rule rather than nominating members of urban notable families, (Pool 1980, 339; Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 19).

In March, 1921, during the Cairo Conference, the British contemplated “how to reduce the exorbitant costs of British troop deployments in Iraq, while at the same time not impairing Iraq’s ability to defend itself” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 20). They decided to “to build up an Iraqi military, with air support provided by the Royal Air Force” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 20). The pool of recruits consisted of “more than 600 former Ottoman officers” Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 21). They were unemployed and influenced by the emerging nationalist ideas, therefore a threat to the new government. Only 250 were “accepted into the officer corps in 1922” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 21). The British had set a limit of 4,500 troops as the size of the Iraqi army (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 22).61

61 Faisal had requested 6,000 troops (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 22). The size of the military reached 7,500 by 1925 (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 23).
The British in Iraq

Britain “did not desire to control the region, but to keep any other European power from doing so” (Fromkin 1989, 27; Scott 2011, 54; Omissi 1990, 211). The British occupation of Iraq was “costly and unpopular” (Omissi 1990, 211). Additionally, as a War Minister, Lord Kitchner had a profound influence on how policies were shaped and implemented. He delegated power to chosen officers in the field whom were often ignored and dismissed (Fromkin 1989, 88). By granting those officers gravitas, he shifted the hub of policy-making to the colonial capitals (Fromkin 1989, 88). It also exposed him to misinformed advice on whom to deal with. He relied on his staff in the Foreign and India Offices to administer all matters Middle Eastern (Fromkin 1989, 89). However, commanding generals of British forces reported to him directly (Fromkin 1989, 89).

In November, 1914, the British landed at Fao and moved towards Basra (Omissi 1990, 19). This landing took place within the context of a war with Turkey and against a regional backdrop of “marked ideological activity, uncertain political groupings and accelerated economic change” (Vinogradov 1972, 131). The British repeatedly reaffirmed they came as liberators and “were not at war with the ‘Arab inhabitants of the river banks’ so long as they did not fight them first” (Vinogradov 1972, 132; Omissi 1990, 19; Barr 2012, 96). Weeks later Basra fell, but as the British progressed up the Delta, resistance intensified and took on a religious tone (Vinogradov 1972, 132). In defeat, the Ottomans turned on Iraqis. These early experiences with British occupation constituted “first-hand experience of modern warfare and weapons” and “contributed indirectly to the tribesmen’s political awareness” (Vinogradov 1972, 132). They learned mutual support best attained through Arabism.
Percy Cox arrived in Baghdad soon after it was captured in March, 1917. The aim was to “maintain order in the area until the future status of the country was decided upon” (Vinogradov 1927, 133). Hence, public statements on future policies “were cryptic and often contradictory” (Vinogradov 1927, 133; Omissi 1990, 19). A year later Mosul fell; Iraq by then was completely conquered (Vinogradov 1972, 133). In March 1918, Cox was transferred to Tehran to conclude the Anglo-Persian Treaty. He was replaced by his assistant Arnold Wilson (Omissi 1990, 19). Wilson ruled with a heavy hand (Omissi 1990, 19). He shared Hirtzel’s worldview and low opinions of Arabs’ capacity to self-govern (Paris 1998, 779; Barr 2012, 97). As the British acting Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, Wilson was an avid imperialist and a vociferous objector to any Arab government in Mesopotamia (Paris 1998, 780; Omissi 1990, 27). He “presented London with two stark alternatives: to hold Mesopotamia by force or leave” (Dodge 2003, 8). He resisted the implementation of the Hashemite policy every step of the way and was disinclined to follow his government’s directives (Paris 1998, 782).

Furthermore, Wilson’s exchanges with Ibn Saud, “criticizing Faisal’s Syrian regime,” strained relations between the Foreign and India Offices. The India Office was reluctant to remove Wilson from his post, partly to spite the rival Foreign Office and partly to not admit failure (Paris 1998, 782). Despite Wilson’s refractory attitude and repeated acts of intransigence, the India Office chose not to draw negative attention by removing him (Paris 1998, 781).

According to British accounts, constituting the state of Iraq came with many difficulties (Wright 1926, 751). The Iraqis were “illiterate and politically unconscious” (Wright 1926, 754). The Iraqi frontiers were “largely undefined and menaced by hostile neighbors” (Wright 1926, 751). The country was devastated by war. The population in dire poverty lacking means of defense and tax collection. They were also lacking in cohesion or sense of nationality (Wright
1926, 752). Security appeared to be “the most important consideration” (Wright 1926, 752). Under British tutelage, the Iraqi military grew to 20,000; the police to 6,000 (Wright 1926, 752).

The British, consumed by their Kipling-like morally superior self-image as “bringers of the benefits of civilization and progress to the ‘poor benighted heathen’,” could not conceive “the locals actually hated them or would deign to raise up arms against the vastly superior British” (Hashim 2006, 323). A series of antagonistic violent incidents erupted in 1918 and throughout the country (Vinogradov 1927, 134). The assassination of the British Political Officer in Najaf, an act orchestrated by members of nationalist secret societies, was meant to mobilize the population and incite a large-scale rebellion (Vinogradov 1972, 133). Membership in these groups was diverse and included “Shi’a merchants, Sunni teachers and petty civil servants, members of the ‘ulema’ and repatriated officers” (Vinogradov 1972, 134; Batatu 1978, 23). People from disparate backgrounds were coalescing over nationalist aspirations. The San Remo conference, in April 1920, decided the three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul fell under British control (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 15). When the news reached Baghdad, a committee of self-appointed delegates formally demanded Iraq’s independence. Wilson “called them a malcontent clique” and instead dismissed them (Vinogradov 1972, 135). Under the rules of the Mandate system, the British would essentially dictate all military affairs and the High Commissioner could veto any decisions” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 15).

Subversive political violence escalated (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 15), as the British government began reducing troop levels and stopped “wartime payments to local leaders for helping to keep the peace” (Scott 2011, 55). The British in Mesopotamia were growing

---

62 In 1922, Baghdad’s estimated population size, 200,000 (Batatu 1978, 35).
63 Basra’s estimated population size, 55,000 (Batatu 1978, 35).
64 Mosul’s estimated population size, 70,000 (Batatu 1978, 35).
increasingly alarmed (Vinogradov 1972, 135; Barr 2012, 100). On June 30th, 1920, a nationalist tribal leader was arrested. He was accused and jailed for not paying his taxes. That same day, an armed group stormed the prison and freed him (Barr 2012, 101). Mesopotamian tribes outside the Baghdad defense perimeter rose up in revolt (Paris 1998, 787; Batatu 1978, 23). Retaliatory and destructive acts followed in the vicinity – railroad tracks and bridges were destroyed, but soon spread to other provinces (Vinogradov 1972, 136; Barr 2012, 101). British forces found themselves surrounded by 131,000 rebels (Dodge 2003, 8; Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 15). They were being engaged simultaneously and their garrisons overthrown (Vinogradov 1972, 137).

At that time, the British military presence constituted 60,200 British troops (Corum and Johnson 2003, 55). The size of Iraq at that time was 170,000 square miles. A rebel force of 3,000 was “equipped with large quantities of modern rifles and machine guns (Corum and Johnson 2003, 55). The British commander in Mesopotamia cabled “the situation demands some drastic action such as [that] suggested” by Wilson (as stated in original) (Paris 1998, 787). Churchill authorized sending immediate reinforcements from Iran. Nineteen battalions and two additional RAF squadrons joined the two squadrons already in Iraq (Corum and Johnson 2003, 55). British forces attempted to “break the siege of Kufa through heavy bombardment” (Vinogradov 1972, 137; Corum and Johnson 2003, 55). If rebels harassed retreating detachments or attacked supply or communication lines, “the British set fire to whole villages and settlements (Vinogradov 1972, 133). The British also armed Assyrian refugees, displaced by the re-routing of river tributaries, and used them to fight tribesmen (Vinogradov 1972, 137; Omissi 1990, 64; Batatu 1978, 90).

---

65 Of those mobilized, 17,000 carried rifles “as accurate as those” held by the British (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 15).

66 Total of 4,984, to check the Iraqi army (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 22).
The asymmetrical response finally ended the revolt. The first outbreak had occurred five months earlier, “rebel’s supplies were depleted, their ammunition was running low and funds were very scarce” (Vinogradov 1972, 138). Reinforcements of additional 20,000 troops from India finally helped in stemming the revolt (Scott 2011, 55). The total number of Iraqi rebels killed was 8,450; the number of British casualties was 1,040 and 1,228 wounded (Corum and Johnson 2003, 55; Mackey 2007, 32).

The 1920 revolt in Iraq was “formidable only because of the numbers of tribesmen involved and because they were joined by many dissident former Ottoman civil servants and officers” (Omissi 1990, 213). Air power facilitated intelligence gathering and close ground support (Omissi 1990, 74; Corum and Johnson 2003, 54). It enabled “repressive forces to be directed more precisely and used more sparingly” (Omissi 1990, 213; Thomas 2008, 294). Essentially, air power served “ruling-class interests, even if only in an auxiliary capacity” (Omissi 1990, 25 and 213). Had the masses been inspired by ideological aspiration and led by a political party, air power would have achieved “only limited results” (Omissi 1990, 213).

As the summer wore on support of the India Office for Wilson began to wane quickly. Due to the cost of suppressing the revolt, the India Office took on a defensive stance (Paris 1998, 789). The cost was £40 million, twice the annual budget allotted Iraq (Vinogradov 1972, 138; Dodge 2003, 8). Rumors had been circulating about Faisal’s complicity in the revolt (Paris 1998, 791). Later that year, a report, absolved him and his government from any wrong-doing, but the India Office remained “convinced of Faisal’s complicity” (Paris 1998, 791). Furthermore, debates in Britain were raging about claims “the RAF in Iraq were indiscriminately bombing non-combatants” (Scott 2011, 57; Corum and Johnson 2003, 58).
Some doubted Churchill would have approved, citing his outrage, as Secretary of State, over “General Dyer’s massacre of Indian civilians at Amristar” (Scott 2011, 57; Corum and Johnson 2003, 59). The ongoing British policy was “to apply the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve the desired effect” (Scott 2011, 57; Corum and Johnson 2003, 59). Nevertheless, early air policing missions were brutal but according to procedures recommended by the local British political adviser and the ranking area RAF officer (Mackey 2007, 32; Corum and Johnson 2003, 57). The British “believed that the only thing the locals understood was the salutary application of force (Hashim 2006, 323). The policy was later changed by requiring RAF to “drop leaflets on offending villages prior to the attack” warning of an impending attack (Mackey 2007, 32; Corum and Johnson 2003, 59). It did not take long before dropping the leaflets was sufficient to compel rebels to surrender (Mackey 2007, 32; Corum and Johnson 2003, 60). The long-term consequence of deterring internal conquest led to “internal cohesion of the new kingdom and to secure its frontiers against Turkish revanchism” (Omissi 1990, 212; Batatu 1978, 24).

By the end of November, Wilson was removed from his post and replaced by Percy Cox (Vinogradov 1972, 138; Barr 2012, 100). The British proceeded to install Faisal as a king (Vinogradov 1972, 139; Barr 2012, 117). The British military presence was “made less visible,” by pulling out the troops and replacing them by RAF” (Vinogradov 1972, 139). A “badly bumbled Chanak crisis” between the British and Turks had placed “hostile Turkish army” at the northern Iraqi border (Dodge 2003, 23; Scott 2011, 56). In December, 1925, the League ruled “Mosul did belong in Iraq” (Scott 2011, 58). The validation of the unorthodox method of “control with reduced expenditure” meant air control could spread to other areas of the empire.
Modern Iraq gained its independence on October 3rd, 1932; however, “neither the British nor their protégés felt safe or at ease” (Vinogradov 1972, 139).

The Syrian experience taught Faisal to compromise and be wary of Arab nationalists. To the British, this would prevent him from fighting the French. The Hashemites continued to rule over Iraq until 1958, when a bloody coup by revolutionary nationalists ended the monarchical reign (Paris 1998, 793; Lawson 2010, 261).

The French in Syria

The French viewed “Wilson’s principles of trusteeship and eventual self-determination” with suspicion” (Neep 2012, 24). The French feared the Mandate system would open them to external interference; however soon realized they “had little choice but to accept” (Neep 2012, 24). Meanwhile, Britain was indeed “determined to exclude France from the Middle East” (Fromkin 1989, 396). So, they attempted to block the French from gaining control over Syria (Fromkin 1989, 396). Similarly, Syrians hoped British opposition would frustrate French colonial designs (Fromkin 1989, 409). The stand-off lasted nine months and relations between the powers became acrimonious. Meanwhile, the British economy began collapsing in the 1920s (Fromkin 1989, 387). The rising Mandate costs and demobilization missions required the British to withdraw from Syria in November, 1919 (Fromkin 1989, 409).

During that time, the main threat was posed by the Bolshevik revolution (Dodge 2003, 3). Moreover, the Young Turks had embarked on a genocidal rampage within their country (Bou-Necklie 1998, 276; Fromkin 1989, 211). As the waves of refugees began streaming into Syria, the French settled them in the Homs-Hama plains. Sunni Arabs, numerically dominant in the plains, began to chafe at this sudden influx. The congestion had intensified the economic
competition among poorer classes. Furthermore, it did not alleviate suspicions about the French agenda to dilute the Sunni Arab majority status (Bou-Necklie 1998, 276). Meanwhile, wealthy Arabs felt less threatened by the newcomers. They saw an opportunity to exploit lower class grievances (Bou-Necklie 1998, 276).

In the early stages of the Mandate “the French army in the Levant had grown to 70,000 men” (Neep 2012, 34). By 1920, the French had completely occupied Syria (Provence 2005, 49; Barr 2012, 119). Any regional resistance led to regional partition (Provence 2005, 50). The Mandate had split the Levant into states of Syria, Lebanon, and Jabal Druze. At the time, Syria had a “well-defined nationalist movement” (Provence 2005, 50). In fact, prior to the Great Revolt the French had to intervene in several revolts – among the Alawites (1919-1921), Bedouin (1920-1921), Aleppo notables (1921), and residents of Hawran (1921). Additionally, the pro-Ottoman faction was in deep conflict with the Syrian nationalists. Members of the pro-Ottoman movement did not see themselves as Arabs of Syria, but rather Ottoman subjects residing in their particular province (Ma’oz, 1999, 79). On the other hand, members of the nationalist movement saw themselves as Syrian and called for the independence of a larger state composed of all provinces (Ma’oz, 1999, 80).

The situation further devolved into “a kaleidoscope of ‘alliances’ varying from one day to the next” (Bou-Necklie 1998, 276). What was never in dispute, “everyone disliked the French and quarreled with each other” (Bou-Necklie 1998, 276). At some point, the Sunnis and Orthodox became incensed by French favoritism toward the Jesuits, so they took to the streets demanding independence. Whereas Sunnis wanted the French completely out, the Orthodox wanted the French to merely “stop favouring the Catholics,” but not leave; meanwhile Armenians favored the Orthodox’ position (Bou-Necklie 1998, 276).
The French ruled with a heavy hand, which only “nurtured rising nationalist and anti-imperialist feeling among the mandate populations” (Provençe 2005, 27; 51; Barr 2012, 124). By 1924, “budgetary restraints had caused its numbers to fall to a mere 15,000” (Neep 2012, 34). Farmers had suffered from years of drought (Provençe 2005, 27). While their harvest declined, their taxes rose (Provençe 2005, 27). Syrians were struggling with inflation caused by pegging their currency to the French franc (Provençe 2005, 27). Merchants and the Mandate government demanded payments in Ottoman gold (Provençe 2005, 27). The bedouin tribes tended to harass the French “in an indirect fashion, rarely engaging in overt rebellion” (Neep 2012, 35). As a result, the Syrian Desert represented to the French “a vast reservoir of potential insurgents” (Neep 2012, 35). To their surprise, “it was from rural Syria that the most successful anticolonial revolts were to be launched” (Neep 2012, 36).

In early 1925, the third French High Commissioner, General Maurice Sarrail, took his post. He “had abandoned the idea of paternalistically guided indirect rule for direct military rule” (Provençe 2005, 50). He was “a republican radical with no knowledge of Syria” (Provençe 2005, 51). He had been appointed as a “bearer of French civilization” and “the most famous leftist general in France” (Provençe 2005, 51). He supported, unequivocally and enthusiastically, the punitive “reform” measures, “designed to break the back of the Druze ‘feudal society’” (Provençe 2005, 51). In 1860, the Druze had fought a civil war with the Maronite Christians (Provençe 2005, 30). The Maronites “had long been unofficial French clients,” so when the Druze defeated them the French intervened (Provençe 2005, 31). The Druze fled their homes in Mount Lebanon and migrated to Jabal Hawran (Provençe 2005, 31).
So, on August 23rd, 1925, the revolt began in the Druze region of Jabal Hawran (Miller 1977, 545; Neep 2012, 36). The Druze are a doggedly insular society; their “[r]eligious beliefs, social customs, and geographic location reciprocally caused and reinforced” their isolation (Miller 1977, 551; Barr 2012, 123). The extent of their interaction with the French, or any power for that matter, was to ensure they “remain autonomous should a national state of Syria be created” (Miller 1977, 551). A combination of internal political strife among the Druze and the French rebuffing their petitions proved a combustible mix (Barr 2012, 125). On July 19th, “Druze farmers shot down a French surveillance airplane circling above their mountain home” (Provence 2005, 27). Next, the Druze attacked a small garrison. The “French were literally caught with their defenses down” (Miller 1977, 553; Barr 2012, 126). At the time, the French in Syria totaled 7,000 (Provence 2005, 58). A convoluted power struggle ensued between the Druze leadership and the French administration. The inability to resolve the Druze situation, eventually, demoralized the French forces (Miller 1977, 554).

In time the revolt grew, picking up momentum and non-Druze groups along the way (Miller 1977, 554; Neep 2012, 37). The protest then shifted to Damascus (Neep 2012, 37). As the riots rapidly spread “no part of Syria or Lebanon was secure against sudden disruption of life and property” (Miller 1977, 545). The violence continued to rage till October. Apparently, the French “seemed powerless to halt it” (Miller 1977, 545). Images of the administration’s “incompetence, impotence, and arrogance were widely circulated” in both Syrian and European press (Miller 1977, 545). The lack of immediate response by the French emboldened opportunistic outlaws to raid and pillage (Miller 1977, 555). They attacked farmers and merchants, thereby paralyzing the Syrian economy (Miller 1977, 555). These criminal acts were

---

67 Jabal Hawran’s population size, 50,000.
68 By 1926, increased up to 50,000.
committed by “outlaws, uneducated, emotional adherents of popular Islam” (Miller 1977, 556). Rebel leaders were repulsed and disassociated themselves from the criminal elements so they surrendered to the French (Miller 1977, 556).

While the rebels achieved dramatic victories at the outset, the government slowly reasserted “control over the devastated countryside, district by district and village by village” (Provence 2005, 141). According to a report submitted to the League, the French High Commissioner Sarrail, ordered and without warning the bombardment of Damascus (Miller 1977, 545; Provence 2005, 104; Neep 2012, 37). The ancient city was bombed “continuously for nearly twenty-four hours” (Miller 1977, 545; Barr 2012, 129). The total number of casualties in one day was 1,400 deaths (Barr 2012, 129). In the end the total number of rebels killed was 6,000. The French placed the corpses of twenty-four rebels on display at the principal public square, “arranged in rows for all to witness” (Neep 2012, 53). The loss and ruin unleashed a “torrent of violent and emotional criticism” (Neep 2012, 37; Barr 2012, 129). Nonetheless, the French colonial state managed to disown its “excessive, spectacular acts of violence by projecting such deeds as reflections of the innate violence of the primitive societies” (Neep 2012, 57). The French hold on the Mandate survived into World War II (Miller 1977, 546).

Most of the rebels fled into exile, so the French sentenced those named in absentia. In the meantime, anonymous rebels blended back into society. None of the traditional ruling elite supported the revolt and, therefore, were relishing the removal of the militant popular opposition (Provence 2005, 141). The exiled rebels continued their raids. The Druze had settled as refugees in northern Transjordan. By the summer of 1927, the British expelled and dispersed them throughout the region (Provence 2005, 142). Those who found themselves in Iraq offered to organize and train Faisal’s army (Provence 2005, 143).
In 1928, the National Bloc emerged as the leading political party in the Syrian mandate (Provence 2005, 141). Unlike the diverse rebel leadership, the Bloc leadership was elitist, uniform, and mutually exclusive (Provence 2005, 141). They were a product of the Ottoman military education, which was fully subsidized and offered a path to upward mobility (Provence 2005, 142). The Mandate power had “knowingly exacerbated the post class and factional split by selectively pardoning prominent exiles who could pass seamlessly into the ranks of the National Bloc (Provence 2005, 142). The French finally pulled out of Syria in 1946 (Lawson 2010, 411).

A study which had compared the British and French decolonialization approaches found the British more adept (Smith 1978, 75). Disparities between the two approaches were attributed to several factors: colonial legacies; personal connections with the US; domestic political systems and institutions; and the character of national elites (Smith 1978, 71). The British “had long grasped that the era of direct European domination had ended in the Middle East”; thereby, employed a pragmatic and cost-effective method of control (Neep 2012, 200). The French, on the other hand, “acted as if the Mandates system was an elaborate fiction”; thus, continued to exercise control over its subjects as if into perpetuity (Neep 2012, 200). Unlike the British, the French envisioned a French Federation inclusive of its colonies. The French had not contemplated the possibility of mandates calling for their independence (Smith 1978, 73).

This chapter provided a description of the European experiences within their historical context. The first described the British administration in Iraq, and the second the French in Syria, both during the interwar period. In order to understand political actions closely linked to cultural identity and nature of the collective, they must be examined within their geographical and historical contexts. Rationality is integral to behavioral analysis, but so is the context shaping the interpretation of the experiences. These cases demonstrated variations in responses to authority
during a unique phase in state development. The context involved a mix of foreign intervention, aspirations of self-determination, cultural diversity, political and economic underdevelopment, socio-economic stratification, external influences, and regional security threats. The next chapter provides a description of the third case study, as the US narrative during OIF. Similarly, the narrative describes the relevant structural conditions and enacted policies, which converged at critical junctures to yield violent revolt. Historical legacies influence relational patterns, which accumulate over time. Left unaltered, they may reinforce impressions and pre-determine outcomes. The prohibitive costs and dangers characteristic of stability operations demand an objective assessment of security threats and a sober policy for dealing with them effectively.
Chapter 5: The US Case Study

The previous chapter presented a detailed description of the historical context within which the British and French narratives took place. Both narratives described the circumstances leading up to the revolts and the administrators’ responses to the outbreak of armed civil conflict. Therefore, this chapter continues with a description of the third case, the US narrative during OIF, between the years 2003 and 2005.

Plans to invade Iraq came to the forefront on November 21st, 2001. President Bush “directed Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to update the Iraq war plan” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 104; Ricks 2006, 32). However, plans for OIF were not finalized until January of 2003 (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 104). While the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) embraced the “strategic theme of uncertainty” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 110), lack of specificity was sinfully antithetical to war planning. The SecDef had displayed an unvarnished “contempt for the accumulated wisdom of the military profession” (Ricks 2006, 75; Scahill 2007, xix). By selectively choosing his commanding generals, Rumsfeld had “little need to countermand” and therefore was able to argue “he never turned down a troop request from any of his generals” (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 90). Others in the military chain of command viewed his “reliance on slides rather than formal written orders” captured his “amateurish approach to war planning” (Ricks 2006, 75).

Even back then, it became abundantly clear Iraq war plans were going to have to overcome a series of hurdles before it could be realized. Most obstinate of them was its incoherence (Ricks 2006, 33). In the run-up to the invasion, tensions were mounting “between
the uniformed military and the office of the secretary of defense (OSD),” as Army’s cautious mindset clashed with Rumsfeld’s impatience (Ricks 2006, 33). Military concerns were ignored by both their civilian and military leadership (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 92); hence, they made their way into public discourse. Unfortunately, they met there a dead-end as well. The SecDef impetuously brushed off any military dissent about Iraq as the “result of ignorance” (Ricks 2006, 42 and 82). Senior military officials remarked there was “always pressure from OSD – could we do it smaller?” (Ricks 2006, 42). The top brass had three major concerns about invading Iraq: possible Iraqi use of WMDs, entanglement in urban warfare, and postwar occupation (Ricks 2006, 40). They were especially perturbed by having to divert assets and attention away from their operations in Afghanistan (Ricks 2006, 40).

In the summer of 2002, the military learned DoS will not be in charge of post-war plans (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 104). 69 This was an unexpected and sharp departure from the long-standing norm, established since the German and Japanese occupations (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 107). It was assumed either the Bush administration was concerned about coordination between “dual lines of authority,” or sensed DoS was “unenthusiastic about the coming war and might drag its feet if charged” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 108). 70 Either way, when the decision was announced DoS did not object (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 107). The theory behind the lack of resistance was DoS saw that DoD “had the money and resources to devote to the postwar mission and therefore was entitled to run it” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 108). Moreover, there was a running feud between DoS and DoD over “multiple points of friction” (Ricks 2006, 102). The split began at the top and worked its way down to the most tactical level (Ricks 2006, 103).

---

69 NSPD-24.
By August 2002, rhetoric about Iraq’s WMD threat took on a more urgent pace and “much shriller tones” (Ricks 2006, 46). DoS officials were “privately disturbed” by what appeared as a “sustained campaign of misrepresenting the intelligence on Iraq” (Ricks 2006, 46; Chomsky 2006, 18). The case for Iraq’s WMD threat was based on a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),71 issued in October, 2002 (Ricks 2006, 52). At the time, there was very little push-back (Scahill 2007, 342). Members of Congress, especially those facing mid-term elections, did not “feel they can do anything about it” (Ricks 2006, 61). In the Senate, 77 of 100 members voted to authorize the war and 296 of 435 in the House (Ricks 2006, 63). Not only were members of Congress intimidated by the Bush administration, but also members in the intelligence community and DoD (Ricks 2006, 66; Hastedt 2011, 184). The professional environment had become intensely politicized (Ricks 2006, 66 and 105; Hastedt 2011, 185). A year later, quality assessment of the NIE72 by the Senate Intelligence Committee investigated the IC’s handling of intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs, particularly implied the NIE “wasn’t really to assess Iraqi weapons program but to sell a war” (Ricks 2006, 53; Hastedt 2011, 209).

As events progressed, revelations continued to emerge about the justifications for the invasion. It was associated with a “combination of hyped newspaper stories and selective use of intelligence data” (Ricks 2006, 56; Hastedt 2011, 208; Senate SCI 2004). This unfavorable association tainted the public’s perception of the invasion’s legitimacy, domestically and internationally. Between 2002 and 2003, senior officials in the Defense Intelligence Agency

---

71 The National Intelligence Committee is the Intelligence Community’s “most authoritative written judgment concerning a specific national security issue. The Estimates are intended to provide policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information – regardless of whether analytic judgments conform to any particular policy objective” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2004, 9).

72 The NIE asserted Iraq “is reconstituting its nuclear program,” “has chemical and biological weapons,” was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents,” and that “all key aspects – research & development (R&D), production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons (BW) program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.”” (SSCI 2004, 14).
were aware a discredited source was injecting “misinformation directly into the system,” but their concerns were repeatedly rebuffed by OSD (Ricks 2006, 56; Chomsky 2006, 25; SSCI 2004).

There was an inexplicable disparity between the credibility of the source of information and OSD’s attitude towards it. The source of information on Iraq’s WMD capabilities was, either directly or indirectly, tied to an unsavory character by the name of Ahmad Chalabi. Obviously, he had found sympathetic ears in the Pentagon (Ricks 2006, 56; Gordon and Trainor 2006, 18); not to mention, he had “exploited adeptly” the HUMINT gap afflicting the intelligence community (Ricks 2006, 57). Rather than soberly and objectively judging the information to avoid resorting to war unnecessarily, OSD accepted his assertions uncritically as if to justify a hawkish call to war (Ricks 2006, 59).

Also in October of 2002, the world watched as the Iraqi regime declared “amnesty for all Iraqi convicts held in Iraq,” not just political prisoners but “thousands of convicted murderers, rapists, thieves, and thugs” as well (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 36). It was estimated the total of 9,000 prisoners were freed.73 Hence, the Coalition forces had to contend with Iraqi forces and “the most unpredictable, brutal, and agitated criminals” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 36). In light of all these facts, defense analysis advised, if going to war was inevitable to “go in and win this war quickly, and then be prepared to help stabilize Iraq over an indefinite period, five to ten years at a minimum” (Ricks 2006, 64). It also indicted, based on precedents and models “a total of 150,000 troops” are needed for invasion and to “stay above 100,000 for several years” (Ricks 2006, 64).

73 Cameron W. Barr, “Jailbirds Fly Free in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 22 October 2002. While it is not unusual to grant prisoners amnesty after a presidential referendum; however, it was almost absolute in this incident. It is assumed this was to bolster his popular image.
Already keenly aware “the Afghan situations had been marred by the excessively short-term approach of top defense leaders,” the uniformed military noted the same problem with the plans for Iraq (Ricks 2006, 70). They were aggrieved by the “insistence of the Pentagon on not using established deployment plans for units, and instead sending them out piecemeal” (Ricks 2006, 70). They recognized from experience these “grab-bag augmentations” are a symptom of headquarters run by staff “with little experience or cohesion” (Ricks 2006, 71). The quality of these products and turmoil they spurred “especially undercut the military’s ability to develop effective long-range plans” (Ricks 2006, 71).

Nevertheless, post-war plans were eventually produced by CENTCOM staff and tested in February, 2003. The test results indicated acute incongruity. The campaign’s proposed strategic objectives and produced conditions were at odds (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 105). Likewise, analysis by a Washington think tanks noted “gaping discrepancy between the Bush administration’s ambitious rhetoric and its limited commitment” (Ricks 2006, 65). Notably, when DoS aides learned the anticipated casualty rate was “three to five casualties per week after the fall of Baghdad” they refused to participate (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 114).

In the meantime, the Justice Department proposed a plan to rush “5,000 international police advisers” to Iraq “to fill the law-enforcement vacuum after the collapse of the Iraqi government” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 114). However, the White House decided to task a “50-expert fact-finding” mission instead (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 114). The plan which was ultimately approved by the White House anticipated handing over sovereignty to the new Iraqi government “no later than August 2003” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 114). Furthermore, “there would be no transfer to UN control or international administration in Iraq” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 115). This projected outcome hinged upon Iraqi security forces remaining in place, reforming the Iraqi
army, and the Iraqi government and the international community taking over responsibilities from the US military quickly. Predictably, “[a]ll these assumptions proved to be wrong” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 115; Hashim 2006, 30). They were proven faulty largely due to one emphatic White House requirement. The Bush administration expected “a firm program of debaathification” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 115).

In January of 2003, a US Marine division which was expected to “control much of Anbar” was dropped from war plans at the last-minute, because “Anbar would be treated as an ‘economy of force’ area” (Ricks 2006, 84; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 66). The alternative plan was to send a “relatively small number of Special Forces” instead, to prevent the launch of Scud missiles (Ricks 2006, 84). This decision “left open the door northwest of Baghdad for Baathists and intelligence officials to flee to the sanctuary of Syria, taking money, weapons, and records with them” (Ricks 2006, 84). This fateful decision facilitated the establishment of “safe headquarters for the insurgency that would emerge that summer” (Ricks 2006, 84). On the eve of the invasion, no one in the Bush administration could claim they were not warned in ample time or were not given detailed descriptions of all the dangers awaiting the arrival of the troops (Ricks 2006, 73). Not only were there misjudgments of facts, but also “major lapses in several major American institutions” (Ricks 2006, 85).

With all this as prologue, OIF was launched, on March 19th, 2003, by US-led Coalition forces. Its primary task was to topple the Iraqi regime and secure WMDs (Ricks 2006, 116; Phelps 2010, 137). On March 22nd, ground combat troops began executing their missions in Iraq,
with a total of 145,000 troops (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 28-9); in the form of “three Army divisions, plus a big Marine division and a British division” (Ricks 2006, 117). More specifically, 65,000 troops were distributed over: one heavy armored division – the 3rd Infantry Division (ID), one helicopter-rich light armored division – the 101st Airborne Division (AD), and two infantry brigades, plus some Special Operation Forces (SOF) units; 60,000 Marines; 20,000 British troops – 1st Armored Division (Ricks 2006, 117); and a large unit of 18th Military Police (MP) Brigade (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 41). The 18th MP Brigade was responsible for “establishing security in Baghdad and rebuilding its police force” (DePue 2007, 28). Although the Iraqi military was one-third weaker, it still “fielded about 400,000 troops and 4,000 tanks and other armored vehicles” (Ricks 2006, 117). Also lurking in the shadows in wait were “tens of thousands of irregular fighters” (Ricks 2006, 117).

As soon as Coalition forces were cleared to begin their missions, they swept north from Kuwait. However, MPs from the 18th Brigade “were ordered to freeze in there in Kuwait” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 43). On that same day, the 3rd ID entered Nasiriyah, while the British peeled to the right toward Basra, and SOF to the left westward toward the Anbar province (Ricks 2006, 118). The Marines, in-tow, were tasked with helping seize, then secure assets (Ricks 2006, 118). Although CIA assessments assured the Coalition forces “Iraqi commanders in the south would surrender and even bring their forces over to the side of the Americans by thousands,” none of these predictions materialized (Ricks 2006, 118). Instead, signs of aggression toward the troops presented themselves on that first day. While in convoy and on their way toward Samawah, via Nasiriyah, the 3rd ID’s cavalry came under fire by a group of

---

74 COPLAN 1003-98 was developed by General Zinni for a potential collapse of Iraq. The original plan called for 380,000 troops (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 26). SecDef Rumsfeld wanted a smaller and faster force. He convinced General Tommy Franks to shrink the force number to 145, 000.
Iraqi civilians as soon as they entered Nasiriyah (Ricks 2006, 118). Similarly, the next day, four soldiers “were killed in Najaf in the first suicide car bombing of the war” (Ricks 2006, 118).

On March 23rd, the 507th Maintenance Company was traveling in convoy; however, the unit at its tail-end missed a turn and was separated from the rest of the convoy. The unit of thirty-three soldiers found itself stranded without GPS, radio, or night-vision equipment. While attempting to reunite with the convoy it drove into Nasiriyah and was ambushed (Ricks 2006, 118; Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 43). As a result of the struggle which ensued eleven members of the unit were killed, nine were wounded, and seven were captured (Ricks 2006, 118). The troops were simply “not equipped to be there” (Ricks 2006, 119).

This incident gained international notoriety, not only for its inauspicious symbolism but also because two of the captured soldiers were female. A chorus of criticism followed, confirming the inadequacy of troop levels (Ricks 2006, 120). However, calls for more reinforcement were strongly opposed by OSD (Ricks 2006, 121). The SecDef retorted, “the invasion force needed to do a better job of protecting its lines of communication, and that the regiment would be ideal for operating independently, securing key intersections, and reconnoitering routes” (Ricks 2006, 121). This would largely be true however; the needed regiment of MP support was still in the pipeline (Ricks 2006, 121).

Army MPs play a dual role. When deployed “they often have to fight first, then take some degree of control within chaotic locations in order to instill a law-and-order environment as quickly as possible” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 12). Convoy protection was one of the major missions of MPs. OSD had refused to replace the 2nd AD stuck in the pipeline by the available 1st AD. Hence, the much needed protection was sorely missed when the convoy needed it most.
(Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 43). In the meantime, senior military officials “in both Washington and on the ground in Iraq worried as Baghdad was about to fall that the force lacked combat depth” (Ricks 2006, 121). Due to the rapid speed by which combat objectives were met, whatever postwar contingency plans were ever considered they were now made obsolete (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118). Unfortunately, plans for Phase IV – Post Hostility or Stability Operations were “never fully developed” (Phelps 2010, 137). The National Security Council (NSC) had “never approved Civil Affairs Annex G,” so field commanders in Iraq were left with “no post-conflict stabilization plan” (Phelps 2010, 137; Ricks 2006, 109). According to the chief planner at headquarters for the ground invasion force, the decision “not to send additional troops was the tipping point that led to the subsequent insurgency” (Ricks 2006, 122).

By April 4th, 2003, the 720th MP Battalion was finally cleared to depart Kuwait and head north toward Baghdad (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 44); “[r]ampant looting was already a big problem” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 45). Marines had stumbled into “vast, multiacre ammunition and weapons storage” bunkers outside of Kirkuk (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 44). Nonetheless, there were not enough troops to secure the cache, which was emptied within weeks by looters (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 44). Next, Iraq’s National Museum, presidential palaces, and the Chinese embassy met similar fates (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 45). When the 3rd ID arrived in Baghdad it had “no guidance for restoring order in Baghdad” let alone for dealing with “the obvious consequences of a regime change” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118). A power vacuum was created by “failure to immediately replace key government institutions” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118).

The 233rd MP Company arrived in Kuwait on April 6th, 2003 DePue (2007, 27). By then the tanks of the 3rd ID were “already roaming through Baghdad” (DePue 2007, 27). The US Air
Force (USAF) had already claimed an Iraqi air base located outside of Nasiriyah for its own use. After waiting two weeks to receive their equipment (DePue 2007, 27), the 233rd led the 519th MP Battalion north toward Baghdad (DePue 2007, 29). Mission assignments at Camp Virginia, Kuwait, were contingent upon arrival of equipment by sea (DePue 2007, 28). Thereby, some units’ assignments would shift abruptly (DePue 2007, 28).

For the first few days in Baghdad, the 233rd was the sole MP presence helping the 3rd ID “secure the heart of the city” (DePue 2007, 28). The MPs’ rules of engagement stipulated “they could keep magazines in their weapons but could not chamber a round” (DePue 2007, 40). Members of the 233rd “had no real blueprint to work from, little understanding of Iraqi culture, and no one in the company who spoke Arabic” (DePue 2007, 40). Their first active patrol was in an unarmed Humvee began on April 23rd (DePue 2007, 41). MPs patrolled the city in a two-vehicle convoy, with three to four personnel in each (DePue 2007, 41). The 3rd ID “had already established checkpoints at key locations scattered throughout Baghdad, and its infantry and armor units aggressively patrolled the city” (DePue 2007, 40). Although MPs received an “outpouring of enthusiastic support” in most neighborhoods, “the city was by no means pacified” (DePue 2007, 43). Only after a convoy was ambushed by a dozen Saddam-loyalists were they finally allowed to chamber a round in their weapons (DePue 2007, 45). It was slowly becoming clear the campaign needed more MPs than what was allocated. The original plan was to deploy 50 MP companies, but with 90 percent of the units “deployed somewhere in the world” they ended up with only a handful (DePue 2007, 45).

Following the fall of Baghdad, on April 9th, 2003, the western Anbar province which borders Syria and home of 1.2 million Sunni Arabs, was left unmanned but by a “thin American presence” (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 57). The cities of Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad form
what is famously known as the “Sunni Triangle”. The original plan was to send the Army’s 1st Cavalry Division to this province, but the SecDef had “pressed Tommy Franks to ‘off-ramp’ the division” (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 57). This, despite the province’s “potential to serve as an escape valve for the remnants of Saddam’s security forces, Anbar had been treated as a virtual afterthought” (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 57).

May 1st marked the “official end of combat operations in Iraq (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 53). The Bush administration had chosen the “deconstruction” approach for rebuilding Iraq. This approach required Coalition forces to first dismantle the existing security apparatus before building it anew (Dobbins et al. 2007, xx). Lack of security had created a vicious downward spiral. It allowed violence to escalate, which paralyzed the economy. Growing unemployment in turn fueled resentments, which were exacerbated by the inability to access effective institutions. Deteriorating conditions created the “primordial soup” subversive groups could only dream of. On April 11th, the SecDef, had famously dismissed the outbreak of looting countrywide as “Stuff happens” (Phelps 2010, 148; Ricks 2006, 136; Chomsky 2006, 29). There were no rapid reaction teams in place “to prevent the disintegration of social order and destruction of vital facilities” (Phelps 2010, 149). SecDef’s flippant response sent one of two equally dangerous messages, either the US did not care or “did care but was incapable of acting effectively” (Ricks 2006, 136). Such message “undercut the beginning of the U.S. occupation” (Ricks 2006, 136).

Not until the 4th ID finally arrived in Kuwait, on April 12th, was the 18th MP Brigade released to journey into Iraq (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 45). By then “much of the damage had been done” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 46). MPs from the 720th and 18th were expected “to secure, house, and process literally thousands of people detained during combat operations”
(Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 49). Thus, they took over the now-emptied Abu Ghraib prison complex (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 49). The 615th MP Company was tasked with chasing Iraqi Army and irregular fighters from their holdouts (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 50).

The swift toppling of the Iraqi regime in May, 2003, had signaled the official end of major combat operations. However, the political objective of pacifying the Iraqi population proved more elusive. By then, Iraqi sentiments toward the liberating forces began to sour (Cordesman 2004, 4; xvi). Initially, Coalition forces believed they were being harassed by a rag-tag clique of disenfranchised former Iraqi officers. Soon after, the country began experiencing a rash of violent activity. The outbreak of violence began on April 28th, 2003, when “US soldiers shot and killed fifteen people at an anti-US rally” in Fallujah and wounded sixty-five (Hashim 2006, 23). The dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces a month later further fuelled the anger of resentful Sunnis (Hashim 2006, 28 and 29). By the summer of 2003, resistance had intensified significantly and violence became more widespread.

Tempo of military missions during OIF varied according to the intensity of resistance to Coalition advances within Iraq. Army MPs were assigned to carry out many of Bremer’s “controversial decisions” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 54). On May 13th, Bremer authorized US military forces, “including the MPs patrolling the streets” to “shoot looters on sight” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 55). While the MPs agreed, the “ongoing rampage had to be stopped, and that hardened criminals were having a field day pillaging the city” however, they also recognized “a great number of looters were simply desperate Iraqi citizens struggling to survive the collapse of their already feeble economy” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 55).
On May 16th, CPA ordered the implementation of the de-Ba’athification program, with which “the top four levels of the party membership,” the equivalent of 1% and totaling 20,000 members, were henceforth excluded from public employment (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 119). Additionally, “the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporation, and government institution” were to be “reviewed for possible connections to the Ba’ath party” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 119). While CPA promised to double the number of MPs in Baghdad, “from two thousand to four thousand,” it would be “many months before Bremer’s public promise would be fulfilled (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 55). This was due the fact, “Rumsfeld initially refused the request” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 57).

On May 21st, MPs discovered the true intent behind Bremer’s gesture. On his first public appearance, Bremer pulled what soldiers saw “as a cheesy public relations stunt” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 55). He had appeared alongside MPs and Iraqi police officers “for a ribbon-cutting ceremony to reopen a small jail in downtown Baghdad” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 56). Some speculated it was “a very pathetic attempt by Bremer to divert public attention away from the harsh realities of Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities” (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 56).

On May 22nd, UNSC Resolution 1483 acknowledged the US and UK “as occupying powers in Iraq and lifted UN sanctions against the country” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 117). The following day, CPA issued its second order, thereby dissolving “all Iraqi national security ministries and military formations” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 120). The original prewar plan was “to co-opt and reform the Iraqi army” however, “circumstances on the ground proved different from those planned” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 120). Rather than capitulating on a large scale, none did and “[o]nly 7,000 Iraqi soldiers were taken prisoner” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 120). The Pentagon
had approved CPA’s decision without informing the NSC. They “did not hear of it until it was announced” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 120).

In mid-June, CPA followed with its third order, “to postpone the creation of a sovereign Iraqi government” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 121). Then, on July 4th, the CPA forwarded the SecDef its end state, which was a “durable peace for a unified and stable, democratic Iraq, with a vibrant economy and a representative government which underpinned and protected freedoms” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 122). In the meantime, the CPA and the US military command in Iraq – Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF 7) “were never able to establish an entirely satisfactory working relationship” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 122). This was largely due to the fact the US presence in Iraq was a “jerry-rigged command structure, in which there was no one American official” in charge. Thus, the unity of command “lay in Washington rather than in Baghdad” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 122; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 51). One of the main problems identified was the SecDef’s insistence on maintaining tight control of politically sensitive operations, “he had to approve the operation at least forty-eight hours in advance, a requirement that needed to be relaxed” for successful exploitation of fleeting and elusive opportunities (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 51).

Not only was the military intervention launched “on the basis of incorrect information,” but also without “an integrated civil-military and interagency plan” and in the “absence of a UNSC mandate” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 116; Ricks 2006, 56). Moreover, while the implications of regime change are quite serious, there was no effort made by the US “to consult neighboring governments about its plans for the future of Iraq” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 116). Arguably, the US must have surmised they would not find the project too appealing (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 116). It is also assumed institutional memory had compelled the UN to distance itself from this
intervention. It had limited the extent of its involvement to “providing immediate humanitarian relief” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 116). Not to mention, Coalition allies insisted on limiting their contributions to “patrolling the more secure areas of the country” and operating “under extremely restrictive rules of engagement” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 116). Perhaps the most complicating obstacle was Turkey’s refusal to grant basing privileges. This restricted the Coalitions’ ability to invade from the north and created delays.

In July, 2003, the CPA formed the IGC in anticipation it would assuage “Iraqi anger and humiliation at occupation” (Hashim 2006, 31). However, the CPA handpicking the key political figures from a group of sectarian exiles to form an interim government neither helped dispel the mistrust nor restored order (Hashim 2006, 31). Again, with news of Saddam’s sons being killed in Mosul, the Coalition assumed it had “dealt a decisive blow to the burgeoning insurgency of the former regime elements,” but, in fact, their “deaths had no appreciable negative impact on the insurgency; indeed, it spiked” (Hashim 2006, 31). In August, 2003, the Jordanian embassy and UN headquarters were bombed and the UN chief in Iraq killed. Thus, it became clear the insurgents were now “targeting high-value and high-visibility foreign targets and critical economic installations” (Hashim 2006, 31).

Since the beginning of OIF, the Bush administration was pushing against reports from the battlefield (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 12-13; Scahill 2007, 64; Hashim 2006, 298). Therefore, when Iraq was clearly in the throes of an insurgency the civilian leadership seemed unwilling to acknowledge this fundamental fact (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 12-13; Scahill 2007, 66). Nonetheless, the disruptive nature of insurgent violence hindered the implementation of policies
(Hashim 2006, xvi). The absence of security and diminished access to basic services, in turn, fueled the population’s discontent (Obaid 2006, 26).75

On August 19th, the UN mission in Iraq was attacked by a truck bomb, killing its chief (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 117). Only when the virulent violence spilled over regionally did DoD, finally and begrudgingly, acknowledge the incongruity of its rhetoric with realities on the ground (Cordesman 2006, 6). On October 16th and at the behest of US’ requests, the UNSC designated December 15th as the deadline set for the Interim Governing Council (IGC) to “submit a plan for drafting a constitution and electing a government” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 124).

The diverse membership of the IGC “was unable to agree on a single leader,” so the IGC presidency was rotated on a monthly basis (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 121). The CPA expanded its responsibilities, but “quickly ran into significant staffing shortages” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 121). High turnover rates “greatly limited its effectiveness and ability to establish relationships with local Iraqis” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 121). Complicating matters were the unrealistic expectations created in Washington. The harder Washington wanted to disengage itself from the unfolding quagmire, the more recalcitrant conditions in Iraq became. For example, when the transitional plan was move two months earlier, “the IGC complained that the United States was dictating rather than building consensus” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 124).

In January 14th, 2004, the CID began its inquiry into claims of abuse in Abu Ghraib, in which detainees were being tortured by MPs from the 800th Brigade (Cucullu and Fontana 2011, 67). By late May 2004, the “common perception throughout the theater is that a roadmap for the

---

75 According to Obaid (2006), in 2003, insurgent attacks against Coalition Forces, Iraqi Forces, and soft civilian targets ranged between 8-32 per day. In 2004, daily attacks rose to 19-77 and then escalated to 61-100 in 2005. During the 2005 elections, there were 300 attacks.
rebuilding of Iraq does not exist” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 122). On June 26th, two days before the transition deadline and “in secret due to security concerns, Bremer departed Iraq and the CPA ceased to exist” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 126). In his dust he left behind a $100 million project unfulfilled (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 86). To facilitate reconciliation, the CPA had earmarked this fund for a foundation to be administered jointly by the Arab, Turkmen and Kurds living in Kirkuk. Not only was the incoming US Ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, left in the dark about Bremer’s early departure but also his own aides (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 85). To foil potential security threats, Bremer’s hand over of Iraqi sovereignty meant “the U.N. and the CPA no longer had the authority to transfer the $100 million” (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 86). As a consequence, the foundation was never established (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 86).

A silver lining midst this moribund morass can only shine even brighter. Early examples of postwar successes were rare, but they did exist nonetheless. In Ar Rutbah, located far northwestern Iraq, on April 9th, 2003, an Army SOF unit, led by Major Gavrilis, drove into town. Ar Rutbah is located in the Sunni Triangle, close to Iraq’s border with Syria. It is “the only town of any size in far western Iraq” (Ricks 2006, 152). While the SOF unit came under intense fire, when it entered this town of 25,000 Iraqis, “it didn’t enter it in a hostile fashion” (Ricks 2006, 152). Gavrilis was largely successful in meeting his mission objectives and keeping his unit safe by focusing, first and foremost, on emphasizing “humility and restraint” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118). Not only did the unit empower local citizens and co-opt existing power structure, but also implement de-Ba’athification (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 1118). Rather than conceptualize de-

---

76 An audit report by SIGIR titled “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process,” was published on January 30th, 2005. The report found, while the CPA was temporarily responsible for managing the Development Fund for Iraq, he did not implement proper accounting practices nor oversight. As a result, $8.8 billion cannot be accounted for, nor is it possible to determine if the funds were used to fulfill the UN mandate 1483. These funds were allotted to pay for salaries, operating and capital expenditures.
Ba’athification as a purge, the unit used it “as a means for political change instead” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118). The unit also “enforced a strict rule that only U.S. military personnel were allowed to carry weapons” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118).

This approach proved beneficial to all involved. Unfortunately, this and similar local initiatives tend to be short-lived, because they are individually driven not institutionally (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118). Hence, as soon as these military units deployed out, locals were left at the mercy of the next set of circumstances (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 118). In contrast to Major Gavrilis’ conduct, Army Captain Shawn L. Martin of the 3rd Armored Cavalry, on July 13th, 2003, staged in Ar Rutbah a mock execution of one of the residents during interrogation. He was eventually court-martialed.

With little knowledge of the indigenous population, intervening forces could be easily deceived by aspects of the shadow state or their own cultural prejudices (Dodge 2003, 159). By Coalition forces assuming these aspects are “authentic representations of the Iraqi polity,” they will in essence reproduce the very structures they were tasked to demolish (Dodge 2003, 159). The Iraqi society the Coalition forces encountered was completely atomized (Dodge 2003, 160). Prior to the invasion, 40% of the Iraqi households were dependent on government payments, with only 21% were employed in the civilian arm of the state (Dodge 2003, 160). In the form of UN humanitarian aid, food was distributed through 53,000 grocery shops controlled by the government (Dodge 2003, 160). Because the government issues ration cards, applications for humanitarian aid allowed the government to secure loyalty and to collect “crucial information

about every household under its control” (Dodge 2003, 160). In terms of day-to-day survival, 60% of the population was dependent on state handouts (Dodge 2003, 160).

At the heart of the 2003 invasion remain unanswered questions and reasonable doubts. After thirty five years of “Ba’athist rule, the last twelve of which were spent under a sanctions regime explicitly designed to cripple institutions,” Coalition forces faced a daunting task (Dodge 2003, 157). The ruling dictatorship controlled and directed relations between the state and society (Dodge 2003, 157). Hence, the notion of civil society, based on “formal and semiformal legal rational links between the governed and the governing, transparently relaying information and resources, mutually constraining the behavior of both state and society” did not exist by any stretch of the imagination (Dodge 2003, 157). If the goal was to rebuild a failed state, then the question becomes how?

This chapter described the third case-study forming the basis of this study. The US narrative during OIF described the relevant structural conditions and enacted policies, which converged at critical junctures to yield violent revolts. Next, the final chapter applies the chosen methodology and compares the three case-studies to each other. The study aims to verify the hypotheses attempting to decipher how each approach differed in responding to armed civilian conflict. The analytical framework is designed to achieve this goal by discovering the underlying causal links.
Chapter 6: The Comparative Analysis

To understand the role of perception in precipitating rebellion and restoring order, it is insufficient to analyze the structural and functional factors alone. This study claims the influence of socially constructed worldviews in determining political actions must be taken into account as well. The theoretical framework had linked the notions of state authority, political violence, and collective action to each other. This chapter examines how each security approach led to the specific outcome following the outbreak of intrastate conflict.

To decipher how perceptions of reality influenced political behaviors, the three previously described case-studies are compared in this chapter. The comparative framework uses qualitative process-tracing to help assess the hypothesized claims. The first claim contends the state’s exercise of lawful authority should reduce the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. If this claim is true, then socially constructed worldviews play a role in determining political behaviors and outcomes (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 4). Thereby, if the outcome is continued armed civil conflict or escalation, then this would indicate the state’s authority is in question (Blanchard et. al. 2012, 3). Keeping in mind, obedience due to coercive intimidation is not synonymous with compliance and state responsiveness. If the comparison conditionally affirms this claim, then the next objective is to discover the causal pathway.

The second hypothesized claim asserts the military approach increases the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. If the second claim is also true, components of armed civil conflict hold tangible value and symbolic meaning reflecting the function of the instrument.
Finally, the third claim asserts the policing approach would reduce the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. If this claim is also true, effective governance is able to offer less costly alternatives than resort to coercive force to resolve grievances. In aggregate, findings of this study will help explain variances in policy outcomes.

Comparative politics helps determine the effectiveness of policies. By focusing on patterns, processes, and regularities among political systems, this method helps explain the differences and similarities between countries or historical periods. In using a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons, inferences are made stronger. The clearer the patterns the stronger the causal relationships are, and more sustainable the underlying assumptions. While a single case offers deep and thick insight into the specific features of an observation, the within-case method can confirm occurrence or non-occurrence of an effect. The strength of the within-case method is in its external validity. Whereas, binary comparisons are susceptible to selection bias, within-case comparison reduces this risk. Similarly, while the covariational design can be insufficient for proving causation, the method of process tracing, which safeguards against investigator-induced bias, can be used to link possible causes with observed outcomes.

Drawing comparisons is crucial for explaining how the British policing approach differed from the French in restoring order. By assessing the two approaches within an equal time span, the British approach resulted in relatively less casualties and restored order in a shorter period of time than the French approach. The two European administrations have much in common, yet their experiences yielded different outcomes. Therefore, the links between causes and effects lie hidden in the details of these two case studies. Without first comparing and contrasting them, it would be impossible to detect the difference, let alone isolate the potential antecedent(s). The
three cases were largely selected based on the research question. The goal was to understand what constituted the "wrong turn" during OIF. The aim of this task is to identify the relevant causal features of a larger universe and provide variation along its theoretical dimensions. The nature of the inquiry and familiarity with the locale dictated the need to compare the US experience with others. It was imperative to find cases which could serve as a close fit.

With the main utility of the state is effective management of power distribution, ensuring maximum participation of stakeholders is pivotal. Legitimacy itself is a normative description of the state’s function. For the state to attain and maintain its authority it must rely at minimum on the passive acquiescence of the majority. At the international level, the basis for this consensus is legal. Such external notion of legitimacy hypothetically reflects internal legitimacy. However, totalitarian regimes, whose governance is devoid of internal legitimacy, may resort to coercion and intimidation to impose order and compel obedience.

As discussed previously, states contribute to their own defeat by ignoring early signs of popular discontent or waiting for conditions to deteriorate beyond a certain point before responding. Such policy signals incompetence lack of situational awareness, whether as failure to identify major shifts in strategic momentum or by failure to extending credible control. When the state finally recognizes the threat it responds coercively, thus provoking a counter-reaction by resentful masses. The state may further plunge into a civil war and cause the conflict may spill-over regionally. A state’s propensity to turn its security apparatus against its own people has been linked to its degree of totalitarianism and drive for power.

To better understand how these processes produce their outcomes, this study hypothesized a link exists between the structural, functional, and symbolic components of a
system. The relative capacity of the state and the international system to function effectively depends on their capacity to elicit compliance at the state-level, not just obedience at the international-level. The legitimacy of the international system depends on its capacity and commitment to ensuring human security. The most basic and universal communal function is ensuring security, yet its standards of effectiveness remain arbitrarily enforced and conditional. The legitimacy of the international system could very well depend on the depth to which its norms have penetrated the psyche of the globalized collective. Naturally, these enhanced expectations carry implications. Within the realm of enforced acceptable state behavior, free-riding at the international level is equally unsustainable.

This study focuses on inferring the quality of legitimacy by observing responses at the state-level to outbreaks of popular discontent. The act of protest often symbolizes reaction to some form of disparity or policy incongruence, between shaped expectations and perceived realizations. Like any other cultural experience, the legitimacy of the claim lies in its interpretation; therefore it can only be inferred. The difficulty or ease by which inference is possible may be determined by the state’s capacity to relate to its citizens. Thereby, state response to discontent also reflects the state’s perception of claims’ legitimacy. State’s response can act as an amplifier, thereby either confirm impressions of disconnect or refute them.

During these confrontations, each side attempts to exert their own influence while simultaneously exaggerating their distinction from the “other”. Regardless, whether by protesting or maintaining order, collective action underlies both responses. The state is often represented by its designated security apparatus. And most likely the state’s response will fall along the graded spectrum for use of force – from as low as persuasive cautionary warnings to maintain order, to as high as employment of firepower to kill or disperse violent rebels. It is assumed responses to
discontent by either side reflect the depth of culturally ingrained impressions, which influence interpretation of reality and the intensity of reactions to it. Normally, impressions of the “other” are subjective and produced by strategic culture. Therefore, strategic culture is what ultimately determines the effort needed to manage the armed civil conflict.

For perception of state’s unlawful exercise of authority to animate the dynamics of rebellion, it must act as a motivator. Since motivation is endogenous, it must be inferred from demonstrated behavior. Social and political movements happen to be collective actions reflecting social alliance, seeking to influence an aspect of political or social change. Organized protest is therefore a form of collective action and exhibits the four properties of a social movement: challenge, purpose, solidarity, and interaction. Because participation does not require compelling reluctant free-riders and, moreover, there are strong disincentives to join, then participation in these movements is largely voluntary. So, movements aiming to undertake change must involve participants intensely discontented yet not destitute. Such revolts are undertaken by rational actors, voluntarily and cooperatively, engaging in collective and irrational acts for change.

Given the implications of reconfiguring cultural identities are central to this study, the unit of analysis and observation must correspond to the historical boundaries of Levant and Mesopotamia, rather than their modern delineations of Syria and Iraq. The enduring tribal nature of collectives requires making this adjustment. The basis for selecting these three cases in particular was the need to maximize comparability through selection of control variables. Variables held constant in this study are: geographical location, strategic significance, regional dynamics, political systems, population support, civ-mil relations, and the elapsed time since onset. The analytical framework compares the ends, ways, and means within a cultural context. For these movements to succeed they must fundamentally achieve their goal.
To understand this link, the first hypothesized claim contends the British indirect approach to governance reduced the level of violence by inducing compliance. According to Mill’s Method of Difference the only differing circumstance in otherwise similar cases is identified as the required antecedent. Within the specified geographic and historical context, the Mandate cases of Iraq and Syria share the following features: post-Ottoman conflict recovery, foreign occupation, aspirations of self-determination, cultural diversity, political and economic underdevelopment, socio-economic stratification, external influences, and regional security threats. The most obvious difference between the two is their approaches to establishing public order. Responses to the outbreak of armed civil conflict are compared in terms fatalities during the incident. Meanwhile, the security approach is the independent variable, operationalized as the amount of force used, direction of the conflict, participation of the elites, organizational cohesion. The resultant differences associated with the use of force will conditionally confirm there is a link between the approach and the lower level of violence.

The uprising in Iraq began on June 5th, 1920, within the outskirts of Baghdad. More than 131,000 armed tribesmen rose against the British administration, but were later defeated by RAF. The revolt ended on October 17th, 1920, which lasted 186 days. Damages on the British side included 1,228 wounded and 1,040 killed. On the Iraqi side, losses totaled 8,450 killed. Since the British took over control of their mandate in Iraq, crimes were on the rise due to the nascent nature of the established public safety organs. However, in time and especially in the aftermath of bombardment by RAF, outbursts of violence decreased dramatically. So much so the effectiveness of RAF was lauded by the British government and employed more extensively. The takeaway must not be aerial bombardment of civilians is condoned; rather, incrementalism once violence has erupted is counterproductive. Demonstrated resolve in ending violence is critical.
While the rebels did not meet their objective of gaining independence immediately; nonetheless, they did convince the administrators transfer of power needs to become more imminent. Moreover, the revolt also set an example of national resistance for the rest of the region. Due to the significant contribution of ex-Ottoman Iraqi elites, the movement demonstrated organizational structure and strategic direction. Not just by using more intense force alone, the British were able to establish better order by minimizing the duration of the revolt, co-opting support of rebel leaders, and demonstrating responsiveness to popular demands.

Meanwhile, the Syrian revolt against the French administration began in Jabal Hawran on July 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1925. The revolt ended on May 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1927; thereby, lasting for 684 days. More than 50,000 Druze tribesmen rose against the 20,000 French. The Damages on the French side totaled 137 killed. In addition to the archeological damage to Damascus, losses on the Syrian side, 6,000 Syrians were killed and 100,000 displaced. The rebel leaders were exiled. The crime level since the French took control was also on the rise, but rose further during the rebellion. Organizational coherence was characteristically absent, especially as the violence spread. Whatever leadership was present was fragmented and remained peripheral.

The French attempted to quell the rebellion and reestablish control over the Jabal (Barr 2012, 127). However, weather conditions and shortage of food and water the French had no choice but to withdraw after razing the village (Barr 2012, 127). Furthermore, their strategies for pitting rivals against each other were ineffective. Hence, the relative duration of the conflict was linked to lack of French readiness and initial tactical errors. The manner in which force was used engendered further alienation of the population and encouraged criminal predation. Rather than co-opt rebel leaders, the French contributed to the duration of violence by exiling them. Thus, the conclusion from comparing the two approaches corroborates previous findings.
The outcome of this comparison conditionally affirms the British approach was able to restore order in relatively shorter time and less casualties. Therefore, the implication of this finding is socially constructed worldviews play a role in determining political behaviors and conflict outcomes. Next, the objective is to discover the causal pathway. Mill’s Method of Agreement compares differing circumstances in all but one variable. For the fidelity of the phenomenon to be preserved the suspected antecedent, amount of force, cannot be excluded. So the amount of force associated with the US approach in Iraq, in terms of casualties, is thereby compared against the British during the interwar period.

The second hypothesized claim asserts the military approach leads to more casualties. In the period between May 1st, 2003 and June 30th, 2004, the number of Coalition fatalities due to hostilities was 14,007 deaths. Aside from surgically targeting despots, the near absence of bombardment during this initial period potentially prevented the alienation of the population. However, the inability to wrest criminal activity paralyzed other state functions. As armed conflict spread and increasingly took on sectarian tones, distrust imbued relations and quickly reversed initial advantages. This suggests the inability to establish security is what distinguished the British from the American experiences.

While all three democracies wished to leave behind a Western-friendly regime in power, only the British were able to do so without also requiring military intervention. Hence, the second claim affirms the military approach increases the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. The implication of this finding is both elements of armed civil conflict and the state’s response to the outbreak of conflict hold tangible value and symbolic meaning.

---

78 Iraqi casualties consisted of 7%, meanwhile, Syrian casualties were 12%  
Finally, the third claim asserts the policing approach would reduce the number of casualties killed in armed civil conflict. Only in few isolated incidents in which interactions resembled policing missions, such as the 233rd MP Company during the first year in Baghdad, in Ar Rutbah, where the level of violence was lower. Throughout this campaign, the most obdurate province was Baghdad.

Discussion

The durability of the state hinges upon objective provision of public goods, through impersonal institutional structures and bureaucratic administration. Therefore, trust and responsibility are foundational to perception of legitimacy and good Weberian governance. Civic culture and informal networks are fundamental for building such bonds of trust. Hence, for the state to perform its functions effectively it must penetrate society (Neep 2012, 8), identify collective ends, regulate interactions, and extract resources. To effectively direct the behavior of citizens toward collective goals, the state must compel them, by applying the pressure required to overcome resistance created by rational barriers. The use of coercion can therefore lead to social productivity and increased welfare, if properly sanctioned and organized. However, when the aims of the state and self-interests contradict, the urge to cooperate with the state diminishes. Divisive ideological barriers and strategies of polarization result in adverse behavioral outcomes, such as distrust and resistance.

Because citizens control modes of action, power resides in allocation of resources for activities. So, in essence, the role of the state is endogenous; its impulses can be predatory or developmental. Structured strategies of segregation or divide-and-rule prevent actors from organizing to resolve problems or conflicts of interests. Oppressive governments tend to prohibit
freedom of association and/or exchange of information to prevent uncontrollable political action. In a system of divide-and-rule interactions are controlled through institutionalized and bureaucratic patterns of organization. Meanwhile, in stateless societies, power lies in the hands of those who can simultaneously allocate resources for economic, military, and leisure activities.

The State-Society analytical approach views the state as an independent variable, a regulator of behavior and processes. At the domestic level, this approach views state autonomy and sovereignty as potential grounds for contestation. So, to understand the political behavior of an authoritarian government, an analytical framework capable of considering the role of state is essential. The link between perception of illegitimacy and dysfunctional state behavior lies in governments’ irresponsiveness to citizen grievances or resistance to allowing discursive space for opposition.

The main difficulty in establishing control over fragmented and heterogeneous Middle Eastern societies is the decentralized nature of value allocation. A policy for reducing conflict and enhancing cooperation must therefore devise effective strategies of relational control. This entails allocating the essential resources to control organization, differential payoffs, and ideology. To overcome contradictory interests, civic society needs to create opportunities to interact, persuade, coordinate, and apply selective sanctions if necessary.

There is nothing exceptional about the onset of armed civil conflict in the Middle East; however, conflict incidence is high. The region is distinguished by being most militarized, ruled by authoritarian governments, and with strong links to arms-producing governments. Although not as prone to armed civil conflict as states in Asia and Africa; nonetheless, being surrounded by other long-term conflict zones, the region has experienced a significant share of internal and
external intervention and, therefore, instability. Intrastate conflict spills over territorial boundaries when political elites, in the course of competing over contested institutional structure, mobilize one ethnic group at the expense of another. This is critical in framing intrastate conflict, whether in terms of nationalist resistance to empire expansion, or opportunism.

The British by appearing to disengage sooner from their protectorate secured their interests more cost-effectively and efficiently than the French. However, most Middle Eastern governments continue to struggle to attain symbols of legitimacy because they adopted their benefactors’ policies and tactics. Having failed to achieve electoral legitimacy, they turned to the transnational to compensate (Telhami 1999, 56; Angrist 2010, 56). Closely reminiscent of a bygone Cold War era globalized threats resurrected demands for security assistance and sponsorship (Angrist 2010, 56). What may appear as governments striving for regional leadership is in fact strongly driven by perceptions of internal and external insecurity (Telhami 1999, 53; Angrist 2010, 56).

State’s authority and the capacity to establish social order require credible legitimacy, especially, where the government functions as both an agent and an institution. Through meta-power the state, or a non-state actor, mobilizes resources to establish social order, reshape institutional procedures, or control political actions. Because meta-power involves imputations in which one agent dominates, the size and scope of stakes plays a significant role. Dysfunctional governments would rather maintain a static disequilibrium than attain optimality. Hence, perception of illegitimacy drives affected citizens to reconfigure political order. If rehabilitating a dysfunctional system is not feasible, an alternative is considered.
Compliance with state rules is mutually preferred for its underlying efficiency and effectiveness. Compliance, rather than obedience to coercive intimidation, is conceived as the positive response to authoritative orders. Conversely, rebellion is a negative response expressed in the form of antagonism toward the state. Thereby, escalation of force only serves to inflame discontent, wrought by perception of illegitimacy. Institutions, both formal and informal, can influence actors by affecting their strategic interactions. Strategic culture determines how actions by “others” are perceived and interpreted. To be able to convert community security into collective security, perception of institutional legitimacy is a fundamental pre-requisite. Compliance is further re-enforced in time, and the credibility of the feedback loop can be institutionalized structurally and functionally.

Rationality and utility of common goods are at the core of collective action. The state, unlike private organizations, may not be able to achieve Pareto-optimality, because it is responsible for providing both collective and non-collective goods to its citizens. The nature of diminished returns inherent in large organizations compromises a member’s commitment to shared objectives. The use of compulsory mechanisms is intended to trump personal calculus of gains and costs. Therefore, the state cannot rely on an individuals’ rationality to induce cooperation, because the Pareto-principle constitutes the rational obstacle to overcome. The delivery of non-collective goods, such as protection and defense, depends on members’ capacity to overcome rational barriers, by conceptualizing gains in non-zero sum terms.

Compliance with authority entails internalization of interests based on trust in state policies and procedures. The power of legitimacy is evident in the extent to which an actor feels compelled to oblige in spite of inconsistency or contradiction with own definition of interests. Order is traditionally maintained at the local level, wherein disorder is most disruptive to a
community. Use of force is therefore viewed in terms of its capacity to consolidate communal ties or fragment them. While public protest or acts of defiance are especially threatening to the state, since they signal loss of legitimacy and control, asserting dominance through the use of force may further erode the public’s confidence in the state’s commitment to cohesion.

Authoritarian Arab states are capable of systematically manipulating civil action to manufacture an image of legitimacy. Some have gone as far as exploiting their strategic rents to leverage their monopoly on power. High proportions of their expenditures are devoted to establishment and maintenance of their security apparatus. In the developed world, political structures exist to encourage growth of civil society, pluralist politics, and civ-mil relations. However, in the Middle East, governments have used them extensively as means to hinder social cohesion and trigger strife among communities. The strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the coercive apparatus had fostered robust authoritarianism and lack of political pluralization.

Due to the historical legacies of the Middle East, the population is exceptionally leery of divisive attempts to leverage one community over another. The outbreak of armed civil conflict is linked, in general, to a combination of factors, such as frustration (repression, suffering), opportunity (freedom to organize, access to finance, weapons, soldiers), and common identity (cohesion). In the Middle East, historical and cultural narratives direct relational choices. So, to understand the link between factors driving onset of armed civil conflict and those leading to effective resolution, cultural views on notions of legitimacy, communal solidarity, and sense of security are critical. The historical cases illustrated how responses to political mobilization and population control are both intellectually and contextually driven. Similarities and differences between the historical and contemporary cases suggest a combination of structural conditions and policies which may have converged, or not, at critical junctures to yield specific outcomes.
From the ashes of WWI rose two universalizing anti-imperialist ideologies. For Western European powers American propagation of unrestricted markets meant they could no longer “justify the annexation of territory they had acquired by the end of the war” (Dodge 2003, 6). Rather than European state interventionism, Woodrow Wilson advocated “collective management at the international level” (Dodge 2003, 7). While post-WWI mandatory divisions fell along provincial lines, French and British policies politicized differences and reinforced regional fragmentation (Wright 1926, 746). The worst damage however was caused by the “reluctance of post-Ottoman elites (often themselves derived from Ottoman elites) to give up any part of the ‘sovereign’ power they gained” from the collapse (Binder 1999, 13). They saw themselves as “heirs to the authority of the imperialist powers (Binder 1999, 13). At this juncture, the responsibility for failure falls squarely on post-colonial regimes (Angrist 2010, 71). The regional politics which followed cannot be explained solely by balance of power competition among great powers (Telhami 1999, 52).

According to the League’s charter, the ‘advanced’ mandatory powers were to create a Weberian state where none had existed before (Wright 1926, 744). They had to establish new centers of power from which power could be exercised. These new centers would become the focus of the segmental societies upon which power was exercised (Pool 1980, 331). Hence, the social and economic power vacuums the powers had to contend with were emblematic of “a political community where the social economic and cultural bases of politics were not firmly rooted” (Pool 1980, 332). That is not to say they did not exist at all; instead, they did not exist in a Weberian form. Furthermore, the competition for power which ensued, between those aiming to re-secure influence and those wishing to exploit new opportunities, “re-oriented the dynamic politics” (Pool 1980, 332; Thomas 2003, 539; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 302). From this new
order emerged political elite “formed of the disparate ruling groups of divergent former Ottoman army officers and tribal leaders into an elite based on class interests” (Pool 1980, 332).

Even though the British entered Iraq authorized by an international mandate “the Iraqis of the 1920s were deeply suspicious of British motives” (Dodge 2003, 158). By employing their colonial systems, both powers did not help dispel suspicions about the real motives for the intervention (Wright 1926, 746; Lim 2006, 14). Furthermore, growing suspicions were confirmed by other decisions, such as discouraging the use of Arabic, depreciating the native currency, implementing divide-and-rule policies, employing repressive espionage measures, using native governments as façade, and refusing to acknowledge developing nationalist aspirations (Hitti 1970, 752; Wright 1926, 752).

The Ottomans learned the consequence of changing power dynamics in the region. Power did not lie with the tribal leaders but with intermediary agents closer to the land and the process of cultivation (Hourani 1991, 288). The new legal codes usurped the power and influence of those who controlled the former legal system (Hourani 1991, 277). Opening the Middle East to larger markets led to the “dislocation of the economy, the loss of power and influence, the sense of the political world of Islam being threatened from outside” (Hourani 1991, 277).

Moreover, both administrations failed to tap the local political communities which existed prior to the partition of Ottoman territories. Both administrations within their protectorates formed “a small, self-conscious officer elite” (Thomas 2003, 547). They represented “an alien colonial power which initially possessed the ultimate authority” (Pool 1980, 332; Angrist 2010, 12). The manner by which they attempted “to demarcate ‘tribes’ by their geographical distribution rather than by the kinship ties and shared genealogical histories”
put on display their limited appreciation of the region’s complex system of affiliation (Thomas 2003, 543). Evidently, they also misconceived how Islam influences social behavior. They saw Islam as an entity controlled and manipulated by the person of the Caliph. This may explain what made the Sultan seem like a continuing threat (Fromkin 1989, 97). They believed, “in the Moslem world religion counts for everything” (Fromkin 1989, 96). For these reasons, local politicians often “cast their eyes beyond the borders” (Ma’oz 1999, 83), and competed over the same vestiges of legitimacy.

The bedouin tribes were perhaps the most adversely affected by the mandate system (Thomas 2003, 540). Disruptions to their food supplies and dislocation from their grazing lands proved “a more important determinant of tribal loyalty than any popular attachment to the Hashemite cause” (Thomas 2003, 543). Arbitrary territorial divisions and new laws seemed oblivious to the hierarchical and genealogical web of tribal links (Thomas 2003, 543; Angrist 2010, 12). Both administrations delineated new frontiers and communal boundaries, but the French went even further, by “creating semi-autonomous local states within a national polity” (Thomas 2003, 539; Neep 2012, 32).

The parceling of the region into English- and French-speaking blocs not only alienated the inhabitants of the region from each other, but also “minimized the degree to which any regional state might be able to assert its influence throughout the region” (Binder 1999, 13; Thomas 2003, 539). Clearly, European strategic interests required sustainment of economic dominance and balance of power (Angrist 2010, 11; Miller 1977, 548). Hence why no effort was made to rationalize, let alone legitimize, the political entities which emerged from these divisions (Wright 1926, 745). The overarching stipulation for modernization was “to facilitate imperialist
policy but not to a point that might diminish the political value of alliances with the traditional elites” (Binder 1999, 12).

More significantly, the colonial powers were successful in suppressing the majority of nationalist movements by crushing them with a brutal military response (Dodge 2003, 133). Therefore, in spite of all the infrastructural improvements and modernization efforts, feelings of resentment and discontent continued to metastasize (Hitti 1970, 752). The British relied upon local elites and the “heavily coercive power of airplanes” in administering these territories. They used coercive force to compensate for personnel and resource shortages (Dodge 2003, 158). By doing so, they deprived Iraqi leaders from an opportunity to harness their political capital and the Iraqi people from properly developing their civic identity.

Meanwhile, the French army possessed a more robust and rigorous cultural training program (Neep 2012, 32); nonetheless, they were “policing an entirely new imperial frontier” (Thomas 2003, 547). Their sedentarization project was “regarded as detribalization thinly disguised” (Thomas 2003, 540). The French were attempting, unsuccessfully, to break the powerful grip absentee landlords had on peasants (Thomas 2003, 540). Meanwhile, the British, also unsuccessfully, attempted to shore-up support for the new nominal rulers, by stabilizing “the turbulent frontiers of the two Hashemite states” (Thomas 2003, 541). With political unrest on the rise in Africa and Europe, both powers were unwilling “to part with their money in order to accommodate bedouin leaders” (Thomas 2003, 543). If responsible use of force and authority are critical to earning popular trust then, at this point, both powers had lost all authority and trust.

Baghdad was the site of one of the few military preparatory schools in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Those who attended were “provided with the opportunity for social and
political advancement unavailable to Ottoman Arabs elsewhere in the Empire” (Pool 1980, 333). Most of the Sherifian officers had had their introduction to military life through their attendance at this school” (Pool 1980, 333). In contrast, “those who attended the military College in Istanbul came from poorer and less prominent families” (Pool 1980, 333). The implications of these early experiences present themselves in future political relations of cooperation or rivalry. They were founded on the common knowledge of each other (Pool 1980, 335).

Those who fought with the Hashemites during the Arab Revolt later occupied the most prominent positions (Pool 1980, 335). The great majority of the new elites were once dependent on the Empire; now they were dependent on the new order instead (Pool 1980, 336). They were unsure of how to convert their position in the state into a position in society (Pool 1980, 336). They lacked followers or ready-made clientele (Pool 1980, 336).

Faisal’s rivals, particularly the tribal shaykhs, were numerically large, well-armed, geographically profuse, and quite adept at wielding political power (Pool 1980, 340). The only connection Faisal had with Iraq was through the former Ottoman soldiers which fought with him. They mostly came from the Sunni triangle and their roots were not deep (Pool 1980, 339). Not only was Faisal associated with foreign patrons, he also had to build support from a newly formed, religiously, ethnically, and economically heterogeneous state. He could not afford to alienate any of them. So, in effect, he had to simultaneously balance the demands and constraints of garnering domestic support with that of the British (Pool 1980, 339; Wright 1926, 755).

At first, the British attributed the growing tumult to lawlessness, incoherence, or habitual disorder (Fromkin 1989, 449). Perhaps because they assumed Iraqis “have no conception of nationhood yet” (Fromkin 1989, 451). Clearly this was a western conception of nationhood. In
reality, the political agenda of Arab nationalists constituted a larger construct. A holistic approach would have assessed the events in aggregate. The most plausible explanation for the flurry of revolts which erupted throughout the Middle East after the War, was the under-manning of both administrations (Fromkin 1989, 415; Mackey 2007, 32). While much of the Middle East had passively surrendered to British control, economic and demobilization pressures led to both French and British garrisons being so undermanned they emboldened local opponents everywhere (Fromkin 1989, 415).

Three interpretations of what may have precipitated the revolt emerged. Wilson described it as a “chaotic insurrection by anarchist tribes incited by Hashemite agents” (Vinogradov 1972, 123). Thereby, depicting tribes as easily manipulated mercenaries composed of “marginal people falling outside the national system” (Vinogradov 1972, 124). In reality, Iraqi “tribesmen were neither isolated not politically naïve” (Vinogradov 1972, 124). The second described it as a “Shi’a-inspired and dominated separatist movement to wrest power from the Sunnis” (Vinogradov 1972, 124). While it is true the Shi’a leadership was “instrumental in getting the bulk of the tribes to fight” and perhaps they felt “their status threatened by political developments,” however, there is “no evidence” it was aimed at Sunnis (Vinogradov 1972, 124). Finally, the third as “a regional tribal insurrection by traditionally independent people who were protesting the twin burdens of heavy taxes and foreign rule” (Vinogradov 1972, 124). This explanation admits the role of religious leadership but “minimizes the role of the urban élite in giving the revolt a broader national dimension” (emphasis in original) (Vinogradov 1972, 124).

All three perspectives are faulty, however, they do share call for independence as a common denominator (Vinogradov 1972, 124; Mackey 2007, 32). In attempting to transform its mandate to a Weberian state, the British failed to fully comprehend the state’s true worth to
Iraqis (Angrist 2010, 15). During British rule, “state institutions did not penetrate society, and therefore the state’s presence became neither permanent nor legitimate” in the eyes of Iraqis (Dodge 2003, 145). Hence, the final product was “built on extremely shallow social foundations,” and the government which inherited the country had to rely on use of violence and patronage to survive (Dodge 2003, 158).

The Syrians blamed the French for Faisal’s overthrow and the ongoing economic crisis (Provence 2005, 50). His supporters were either Iraqis who fought with him in the Arab Revolt or former Ottoman officers (Provence 2005, 45). Rather than follow Faisal into Iraq, they remained in Syria to continue fighting for independence. During his 22-month reign, Faisal aimed “to set up an independent and united state in Syria and to create a Syrian-Arab political community” (Ma’oz, 1999, 81). Though he “hardly had the power to interfere,” he kept his pledge to the Hawran Druze by staying out of their affairs (Provence 2005, 45).

The French, in the meantime, were keen on implementing divisive policies and colonial tactics which did not allow Syrian identity to mature (Miller 1977, 547). Syria’s notables resented French policies, which were designed to antagonize “those who were accustomed to exercising power” (Miller 1977, 548). The annexation of Lebanon further impeded any chances of cohesion (Ma’oz, 1999, 81). The revolt was precipitated by “perceived illegality and illegitimacy of French colonial rule” coupled with brutality and administrative incompetence” (Provence 2005, 27).

Some argued the revolt was caused by “the rise of Syrian nationalism”; however, this explanation “leaves unanswered why the French were ultimately able to suppress it so rapidly” (Miller 1977, 546). Others, dismissed the revolt as “unsuccessful, unimportant rebellion,” which
does not explain why it took six months to contain (Miller 1977, 546). Obviously, the revolt was significant for at least two reasons. It signaled the end of Ottoman control and “revealed Syrian nationalism was both nonexistent and not viable in the Syrian context” (Miller 1977, 546).

The reason for the protest migrating from Jabal Hawran to Damascus was because “Ottoman secondary education had recently forged links between people of diverse class, regional, and sectarian origins” (Provence 2005, 14). Subsidization was not made available to already prominent families (Provence 2005, 142). It is therefore not surprising “very few of the landowning elite took part in the revolt” (Provence 2005, 66).

Contrary to French and British predictions about the aftermath of Ottoman collapse, a “complete void” due to lack of rational structure did not manifest (Miller 1977, 546). Local administration during the Ottoman rule “functioned independently of the empire” (Miller 1977, 547). The French assumed Syria consisted of “groups which had always mistrusted one another within the Ottoman Empire”; thus, they had coexisted because otherwise they would be weak (Miller 1977, 547). A more reasoned view would have recognized Syria was already fragmented during the Ottoman rule, religiously though not geographically (Miller 1977, 549). If anything, Syrian independence created a needed “new form of social cohesion” (Miller 1977, 549). Hence, the revolt was “a popular political movement inspired in part by evolving and variable notions of national community” (Provence 2005, 149). Nonetheless, it represented local not national interests; “a break with the traditional elite politics” (Provence 2005, 149). It lacked coherence and ideological leadership; it was never inspired by sense of nationalism (Miller 1977, 550). It was about relationships forged through subsidized Ottoman education and grain trade. Only when the French studied the true nature of Syrian society were they able to pacify their protectorate (Miller 1977, 562).
The French had “failed to comprehend the significance of these relationships and the interdependence and connections among regions, classes, and sectarian groups in Syria” (Provence 2005, 14). Syrians from different backgrounds, religions, regions, and social classes united to frustrate the ruling mandate, by using tactics “far more radical than much of the elite leadership of Damascus was prepared to embrace” (Provence 2005, 13).

In comparing the British and French cases “the British proved to be ideologically, and especially institutionally, more fit than the French to cope with overseas challenges to their rule” (Smith 1978, 71). These differences were a reflection of the French own domestic and “very unequal capacities to process a problem” and procedures for ensuring control (Smith 1978, 71). Hence, differing political cultures led to different responses to tactics and, thereby, different policy effectiveness. The British had a more pragmatic and long-term vision of their interests (Nagl 2005, 36). They recognized the possibility of their subjects making “common cause with Washington” (Smith 1978, 72). They were “very aware of the temporary nature of their tutelage” (Dodge 2003, 2). Yet, perhaps the most obvious difference between the two is the nature of the opposition. In Iraq, resistance was exerted by elites, former Ottoman officers and loyalists. They posed “a more serious potential threat to British plans than did the politicians and orators of Damascus” (Fromkin 1989, 499; Pool 1980, 336).

In the aftermath of WWI, the British did not merely destroy the old order in the region, but also used the region as a “testing area of their worldview” (Fromkin 1989, 10-12; Angrist 2010, 12). Once Britain grew weary of maintaining global supremacy, it turned away from its creation (Fromkin 1989, 31; Angrist 2010, 15). Likewise, French domestic pressure forced the withdrawal of their troops in 1946 (Lawson 2010, 411). In the end, the administration of the

Both Woodrow Wilson and the Allies had “promised the peoples of the Ottoman Empire a better life” (Fromkin 1989, 263). However, where Wilson envisioned self-governance, the Allies ensured continued dependence (Fromkin 1989, 263). The British and French, as colonialists, each cultivated their own administrative system of control to manage the vast territorial expanse (Wright 1926, 747). Whereas the central feature of French control was their indisputable authority, the British preferred to rule indirectly The British exerted their control while concealed behind an indigenous façade (Wright 1926, 748; Fromkin 1989, 307). Consequently, they were not concerned “whether the colonies would be free, but rather which local nationalist factions they would favor with their support and over what piece of territory these new elites would be permitted to rule” (Smith 1978, 71).

The British, the consummate pragmatists, traditionally preferred to meet “colonial discontent by reforms which associated the subject peoples more closely with their own governing” (Smith 1978, 73). They felt confident they had developed “policies by a close study of facts” and reliance “mainly on powers of persuasion” (Wright 1926, 748). Meanwhile, they viewed the French administration in Syria as a failure. They thought it caused “continuous friction, as the advisors becoming impatient with the slow process of persuasion, were often inclined to administer directly” (Wright 1926, 749) Adding, the leading Syrian complaint about the French was they were “colonizing, not mandating” (Wright 1926, 750).

The French, on the other hand, had a relatively more limited experience in handling political change; therefore, were less adaptive. They were either unwilling or unable to
contemplate “the possibility of a colonial evolution towards independence” (Smith 1978, 73). As a result, they placed their subjects in an impossible position, “they were neither French nor free” (Smith 1978, 74). The process by which the French created their institutions and coordinated their resources, they did not envision in the future there could be “a partnership among equals within the ‘federation’” (Smith 1978, 74). French policies ensured their subject would remain dependent on the Union indefinitely. Hence, their difficulties arose, not from their inability “to provide complete and immediate independence to their colonies,” but rather from their obstinate resistance to offer separation as “a viable political option” (Smith 1978, 73).

The 2003 invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces was “fraught with problems, including a near complete disregard for historical precedence” (Phelps 2010, 4). Whether through autobiographical accounts or analysis of newly disclosed facts, evidence continues to emerge about the decision-making process preceding OIF – the lack of contextual awareness, lack of policy coherence, ambivalence toward accountability, and the inexplicable disregard of prepared plans (Lewarne 2007, 15; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 9). The US influence on Iraq’s political and military affairs is “analogous to the British experience” (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 200).

Since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the US stance toward Iraq had been removal of the Saddam regime. In launching OIF, US strategists were hoping to “open the door to political change, but with unprotected borders, the possibility of looting, sectarian strife, and bare-knuckled power struggles, Iraq might also become a veritable Pandora’s box” (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 7). When the manufactured opportunity finally presented itself, DoD was put in charge of post-war civil and military planning (Dobbins 2008, 107; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 81). Not only did DoD produce a plan devoid of specificity, but also “blocked several efforts to

—

plan across agency lines” (Dobbins 2008, 111). The “controversy associated with the invasion” and the firm US desire “to shape the postwar environment” were major reasons for the UN playing “a less significant role” (Dobbins, et al. 2008, 116). A review by the Select Senate Committee on Intelligence a year later confirmed, the 2002 NIE forming the basis for Iraqi WMD threat contained significant analytical failures, ” which “led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence” (Ricks 2006, 53). Furthermore, “the errors and exaggerations weren’t random” (Ricks 2006, 53).

As stated by General Abizaid, in July 2003, the process of developing 40,000 new and professional Iraqi security forces “takes years,” (Hashim 2006, 304). Thus, recruitment and training efforts focused on developing “civil defense forces that can cooperate with coalition forces,” and eventually could managed on their own (Hashim 2006, 304). While there was no shortage of recruits “willing to join because there were no other jobs available”; however, they were “interested less in the mission than in access to a regular paycheck” (Hashim 2006, 304). More significantly, power struggles ensued “between the CPA and the IGC over control of recruitment” (Hashim 2006, 304).

In the postwar era, cooperative Iraqis had “no sense of national cohesion or loyalty to government and country” (Hashim 2006, 305). The order of personal loyalties began with “close-knit extended families, larger tribal units, ethnic fellows or co-religionists” (Hashim 2006, 309). Unsurprisingly, the state struggled in dealing with numerous militias, whose existence serves to widen the ethno-sectarian gap between the communities (Hashim 2006, 299). CPA’s preferential treatment of the Kurdish militia “did not go unnoticed by others” (Hashim 2006, 299). The US was “reluctant to crack down on the Kurds, who have been allies during the war” (Hashim 2006, 302).
By early 2004, considerable focus was placed on “Iraqization” of the security forces in order to combat the insurgency and terrorism (Hashim 2006, 310). In time, however, US concerns were growing about the ineffectiveness of Iraqi security forces,\(^81\) whose “incompetence became evident in the fierce fighting of April-May 2004” (Hashim 2006, 306). The average number of patrols per week conducted by Coalition forces was 12,000, compared to the Iraqi’s 1,200 (Hashim 2006, 313). On January 5\(^{th}\), 2005, a report by DoS on the state of Iraqi security forces declared “Iraqi forces have been ‘rendered ineffective’ in many areas, and that due to intimidation and attacks by insurgents a large number of security personnel ‘have quit or abandoned their stations’” (Hashim 2006, 313).

Not until October 2005, did the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, in a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, articulate a potentially new strategy in Iraq of Clear, Hold, and Build. This proposed COIN strategy entailed sweeping through territorial areas methodically, to reclaim them from insurgent control, then securely holding onto them by executing stability and reconstruction missions. Incidentally, this strategy was previously introduced by Army Gen. Creighton W. Abrams in Vietnam, partly to pivot away from Westmoreland’s costly and ineffective strategy of bleeding the enemy into submission. Abram’s approach meant “a sharp drawdown in U.S. troops, an emphasis on training and advising local security forces, a focus on securing the capital, stress on intelligence operations over main-force battles and an aggressive effort to interdict enemy supply lines from neighboring countries.”\(^82\) In light of this disclaimer, a logical question presents itself, why did it take almost two years to offer an alternative operational strategy?

---

\(^81\) Estimated total of 14,000 to 15,000 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (Hashim 2006, 306).

The strategy of Clear, Hold, and Build was effective in Mosul and Kirkuk, but less so in Baghdad. The US failed to appreciate the system of food distribution which constituted the shadow state which supported the despotic regime. This outcome further confirms the importance of contextual awareness – the cultural composition of Baghdad is significantly different from other large cities in Iraq. Not only are the geographic characteristics significantly different than those in the mountainous north, but life in the north was relatively more stable due to cultural homogeneity and a decade of protection by Operation Northern Watch. In turn, the economic situation in the north was less desperate.

The Kurdish population was eager to cooperate with the Coalition’s effort to topple the Saddam regime. The Kurds keenly recognized the importance of sustaining security to quickly reap the benefits of the natural resources within their territories. This strategy required well-trained militia to fill in the vacuum and the peshmerga were more than willing to oblige (Hashim 2006, 301). However, they were resistant to using their “relatively well-trained forces” in fighting “conflicts outside the autonomous region (Hashim 2006, 301).

What the US strategy in Iraq clearly failed to accomplish was to motivate Iraqis to take charge of their liberated, but now fragmented, country. Perhaps it was the drastic US shift in objectives midstream, from liberation to nation-building, or it was the missed opportunity to self-correct, or it was the tendency to implement a one-size-fits-all strategy. Could the trajectory of the war have been favorably altered had these issues been properly addressed?

Deteriorating conditions were directly linked to decisions made by Pentagon officials. The lawlessness was ushered in by a power vacuum, which arguably could have been prevented (Hashim 2006, 17). Scrutiny of the policy-making process yields a series of deviations from
normally anticipated courses of action. At the political and strategic levels of US policy planning, events and developments made it abundantly clear “structured debate and disciplined dissent” during the process of decision-making were absent (Dobbins 2007, 66). Serious research into the possible costs of Iraq’s occupation and reconstruction were clearly lacking objective assessment (Dobbins 2007, 67). It was feared a leaked candid appraisal would complicate the administration’s ability to secure congressional and public support (Dobbins 2007, 65).

Moreover, subsequent confusion over the appropriate role of the military in combating violent extremism had enormous consequences on how detainees were handled (Dobbins 2007, 70).

Similar to the British experience, by disempowering specific elements of society and empowering others over them, the Coalition forces unwittingly incurred the wrath of previously influential swaths of society with an extensive network of supporters in the entire Middle East region (Dobbins et al. 2007, xx). The more sweeping the US objectives became the more resistance they inspired (Dobbins et al. 2007, 4). Regardless of the reason, the approach was incongruent with the stated ends.

In a poll conducted in June of 2003, 67% of Iraqis attributed the increase in violent attacks to loss of faith in Coalition forces (Conetta 2005, 5). In July, US troops began a campaign of de-Baathification and, to that end, increased control over the Sunni population (Conetta 2005, 23). Sunnis’ believed they were disproportionately affected by the reversal in fortunes and so, their ire grew in tandem with their feeling of persecution by the de-Baathification program (Obaid 2006, 4). The rapid descent from political, economic, and social stature contributed to their growing resentment of the occupation. The US, in turn, mistook Sunni indignant outrage for loyalty to the former regime and summarily dismissed it as retaliation (Cordesman 2004, 4).
Fair and equitable administration of law and disciplinary actions is crucial for national reconciliation. To achieve this state, intervening forces must arrive ready, with plans in hand, funding, and personnel to begin implementing security functions immediately. The US continues to rely on private contractors for this purpose (Crawford 2011; Krahmann 2010, 129). This policy proved, incontrovertibly, inferior (Krahmann 2010, 124). The US needs to rely on personnel with demonstrated loyalty, discipline, and interest in achieving a successful mission. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has failed to deploy any civilian police whatsoever due to continued challenges. Most post-conflict environments require at least two to twenty police officers for every 1,000 inhabitants (Quinlivan 1995). Intervening forces must anticipate a need to rebuild, reequip, and even pay, for the first years, a police force of this magnitude.

The bottom-up strategy of pacification, by paying off Sunni insurgents for their cooperation, stoked the greed of Sunni tribes and pitted them against the central government (Simon 2008, 64). In turn, it fostered the re-tribalization of Iraq and spread of sectarianism. It would have been wiser to formulate a policy which promotes, rather than undermines, national cohesion (Simon 2008, 61). This is possible through effective multilateral processes that spur top-down political reconciliation among factions. The HN must be weaned off external assistance to maintain stability once troops withdraw (Simon 2008, 75).

Conclusion

A pre-requisite of successful state formation is the attainment of a minimal degree of trust among involved actors, “to take one another’s interest into account, and to cooperate” (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 420). With the state’s main utility being the effective

---

management of power distribution, proven impartiality is pivotal for maximum participation of stakeholders. Levels of social control are reflected in the strength of state institutions. The scales of compliance, participation, and legitimation reflect the strength on an institution. Order is not a property of the state; rather, “it is a characteristic of an equilibrium” (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 600). It is, in fact, the citizens who “retain control over the means of coercion” and are able to restore the equilibrium by threatening violence against defectors (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, 600).

Conversely, ideological barriers and strategies of polarization are symptoms of relational controls run amok and result in adverse behavioral outcomes, such as distrust and resistance. Historically, structured strategies of segregation or divide-and-rule were implemented to prevent actors from organizing to resolve problems or conflicts of interests (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 421; Neep 2012, 32). Oppressive authoritarian regimes characteristically prohibit freedom of association and/or exchange of information to prevent uncontrollable political action from emerging. In a system of divide-and-rule characteristic of colonial administration, interactions are controlled through institutionalized and bureaucratic patterns of organization (Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975, 422).

Therefore, structural, functional and symbolic characteristics of a particular context influence the population’s behavioral response to authority, by either inducing compliance or inciting rebellion. As described, the duration of armed civil conflict within Arab states signals popular rejection of an authoritarian state devoid of legitimacy. In essence, regardless of the conflict’s cause of onset its duration is linked to people’s perception of the Arab state’s authority to use force and, more abstractly, the state’s internal legitimacy. The manner by which the state responds to an outbreak of rebellion is pivotal to determining the future of the incumbent
government. The state’s method of reasserting its control could either reinforce people’s perception of the state’s incompetence or help turn the tide in how the state is governed. COIN efforts conducted in the last century have been challenging for Western democracies. Insurgent-centric COIN may be successful when the insurgents are unpopular. However, so long as the insurgency maintains popular support it will retain its strategic and tactical advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and those of the population.

There is sufficient evidence to believe US policy-makers were well aware of the danger of appearing imperialist by the local and international audiences. Unfortunately, they misread the nature of this danger and allowed this fear to drive the campaign’s planning. The take-away from the historical lessons should have been the importance of accurately identifying the locus or source of power in the region. It is not the US military presence which unnerved the Arab population, but the coercive imposition of an unwelcome authority.

While Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic aspirations charmed their way into kindred Arab hearts, colonialists scoffed at all’s naïveté. They were equally miffed by American egalitarianism as with Arab’s audacity. They saw both as unworthy benefactors of fate’s fickleness. In hindsight, they were perhaps correct; hope is blind. The contradictions were painfully obvious for all to see, inherent in combining ideals of inclusiveness and realities of extraction (Bellin 2004, 150; Angrist 2010, 12). The French and British designed and organized new states to suit their “strategic, economic, and political requirements” (Thomas 2003, 539; Wiarda 2007, 9). However, in return for US assistance (Fromkin 1989, 257), the program had to be implemented “either in opposition to mass protest or with the acquiescence of a narrow sliver of elites.
This study argued the importance of building a security policy on a solid foundation, based on facts on the ground and conceptions of reality, not ideological wishful-thinking. Security is the foundational bedrock of state formation; it requires proof in performance to induce trust. Therefore, security’s durability can be inferred from its foundation. To trace outcomes to their origins, this study dissected the structural coherence of the system, at the national and international levels. The theoretical framework presented the Westphalian model as in fact a perfect fit for the Middle East. Essentially, the ongoing turmoil in the region can be traced back to misapplication of the Westphalian model and continued re-enforcement of an irrational status quo. According to this model, the state is a political entity imbued with the right to autonomy and territorial authority. Coercion applied against an established state is a violation of its sovereignty. It is equally abhorrent when the state abuses its legal privilege, by applying force against the will of its people in the name of protecting its autonomy. Constructivists argue the state is an “imagined” ideal, a construct of a larger international society in which shared values reinforce the authority structure.

The framework also argued the Westphalian concept of nation-state is a Euro-centric representation, in which the legitimacy of this collective is inextricably linked to functional territorial controls. The construct is about managing what is perceived as the threatening “other”, which exists outside the state, beyond the boundaries of political community. The discussion suggests the root of the region’s problems is the faulty application of the Westphalian model, not its incompatibility. Assessment of early development literature confirms “the West not only was biased but also raised false expectations for these societies to achieve” (Wiarda 2007, 61; Barnett 1995, 493; Fromkin 1989, 257). When members of the League Council and Permanent Mandate Council huddled together, in late 1931, to contemplate the prospects of mandate nations
assuming their place within the international system, perhaps they should have also reflected upon their capacity to reproduce in their own images. The post-WWI experience illustrated the British and French structural and functional approaches to re-establishing order. The Western liberal international order naturally unfolded within its own historical context. Therefore, legitimacy does not reside in the structures and functions of the system, but rather the nature of its origin and the values which bind it.

It would be unreasonable to expect the origins of legitimacy in the Middle East to resemble those of the West. For laws to be enforceable, popular cooperation is imperative. For state borders to imbue notions of sovereignty, this principle must be reflected at the individual level. For authority to be seen as beneficial, it must be reasoned into existence not imposed. Coercive authority is unsustainable in the long term, and will not form the basis of an enduring order. Thereby, the critical difference between the French and British approaches pertains to the method of establishing a perception of legitimacy.

As the British and French finally pulled out of their mandates, there remained a lingering belief the popular discontents they struggled with were the work of external agitation (Thomas 2008, 17). Indeed, the German pan-Islamic program continues to haunt the civilized world. However, the British and French were equally responsible for spreading notions of national identity within their backyards. Clearly, notions of nationalism were more potent due to their mythological promises of unity and sense of belonging; thereby, more threatening to geostrategic interests (Thomas 2008, 17).

This may perhaps be the most understated lesson undergirding the balance-of-power strategy. However, in terms of establishing a stable order the Great Powers demonstrated an even
more myopic approach. Great powers were left aghast when their own strategies were turned against them. With the US being the youngest of them all, ahistoricism is likely to be the most dangerous cultural trait which it must outgrow. Like the Fertile Crescent in its nascent years, geographic and demographic endowments were not enough to protect it from predation. Only by embracing their limitations were the people of the region able to persevere.

So, in terms of establishing security, what can the US glean from these historical experiences? If the purpose of the Mandate system was to prepare the liberated state to take its rightful place within the international system as an equal sovereign, then the colonial model was antithetical to such outcome. If sovereignty is contingent upon internal and external legitimacy, then the authority to rule requires acceptance of representation. The colonial model was designed to serve imperial ends, not to emancipate subjects. Power asymmetries, inherent in colonial relations, are what endowed equality its value. Colonialist authoritarian governments systematically repressed civic organization and political expression for fear of opposition.

The French and British models reflected their own ethnocentric worldviews during that era. The British were forced to adopt a more cost-effective method of establishing order. By attempting to bolster the impression of legitimacy, through operating behind a native façade, the British achieved more favorable results. The following sections contain comparisons of these three cases. British were, ideologically and institutionally, more fit than the French to cope with overseas challenges. Britain’s domestic politics, political institutions, and pragmatic desire to rule an “informal empire” cost-effectively afforded them a closer bond with the US. This fact was not lost on the people of the Middle East. For good or bad, not only will US policies and actions be judged by historical evidence, claims’ merits, but also in contrast to other western experiences in the region (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 200).
Another distinguishing characteristic of relevance is the adaptability of British policies. The outcome of the British experience hinged upon the perception of abiding by negotiated promises. In the context of the Middle East, words are binding and vengeance is the ultimate deterrent. Justice is meted as an equalizer at the most local level, in which all involved appreciate the stakes at hand. Therefore, the symbolic transfer of power by the British to a form of local elite constituted a good-faith effort. Moreover, by restricting their use of force to achievable outcomes the British helped reinforce the state’s image of competence and, in return, bought the British enough time to depart amicably. Unfortunately, it was a lesson lost on the Iraqi monarchic regime.

The British experience in Iraq, from 1914 to 1932, provides a cautionary note about the “ramifications of imposing order on an increasingly resentful population” (Dodge 2003, 158). It was “the way the British understood Iraqi society that came to undermine their attempt to build a stable state…set about devolving power to indigenous Iraqis they believed had social influence” (Dodge 2003, 158). This misstep can be attributed to a culturally biased and narrow misconception of Middle Eastern politics and culture. Whenever an external force lays claim to a territory in the Middle East, it must be prepared to defend it, either physically or ideologically. The extent of this defense reflects the depth of commitment. Hence why when it became clear to Arab nationalists the British and French administrators had no intention of granting their countries independence, they obliged them with an “exit strategy”. The campaign was by then already afoot, to convince the Europeans “that attempting to retain control over their Middle East holdings was going to be an increasingly difficult endeavor-and that the cost of staying outweighed the benefits” (Angrist 2010, 15).
The 1925 Syrian revolt demonstrated “the process of transformation began much earlier than has been argued” (Provence 2005, 149). Structural conditions, in the form of Ottoman socio-economic changes and imposition of a Mandate rule, were responsible for transforming Syria’s political culture. French administrators intentionally limited intersectarian collusion by dividing cities into “autonomous ‘statelets’” and attempted to insulate the “countryside from the urban contagion of nationalist agitation” (Provence 2005, 13). Hence, few expected “national resistance would emerge in the countryside and spread to the cities,” as it did (Provence 2005, 13). The revolt proved to be “the largest, longest, and most destructive” anti-colonial insurgency in the inter-war Middle East (Provence 2005, 12). Early French administrators had asserted their authority with such impunity and disregard for cultural optics they had to contend with a more virulent opposition.

Ultimately, the “wrong turn” for the US in Iraq was not in the form of the intervention but rather the substance. While the stated aim for launching OIF was presented in idealistic and liberal terms, neither the justification nor the facts accounted for the myriad of contradictions accumulated through history. In light of these unreconciled logical gaps, some could not help but feel put off by the unfolding events leading to the invasion. At one extreme, some suspected yet another convergence of self-serving motives at the elite level; on the other, some were amused by the mediocrity of the charade. The historical and cultural tone-deafness was made glaringly obvious to those unassuaged by the ideological rhetoric or dramatized stakes. Perhaps now they view Wilsonian idealism through more jaundiced eyes.

After all, the case for the invasion was made within the larger context of the US ensuring domestic and regional security. The new international framework allows the US “to retrieve the presumed stocks of WMD” and the UN “to supervise elections and the transition to a democratic
government” (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 9). Effectively, the more ambitious aim was couched in humanitarian terms. The goal of liberating the second largest oil reserve may strike some as cynical nonetheless, it would proffer alternatives. In the end, rather than deliver a sovereign and stable Iraq, the US intervention produced an anarchic Hobbesian state (Hashim 2006, 302). In an ironic twist, the subsequent absence of a strong state led factions in Iraq to seek external support. Weakening the state had removed the principal apparatus for restoring order.

Accounts of these historical experiences exposed the extent to which coercive dominance, to sustain a grip on power, had warped the natural socio-political dynamics in the region. The above discussion suggests lack of legitimacy renders exercise of authority ineffective and even counterproductive. Relational Control explains how power in structured relationships is used to alter interactions. It encompasses the transformative process by which old relationships can be redefined and restructured through application of power. The utility of the process lies in its ability to induce dynamic responses, such as cooperation, competition, or coercion. These responses are determined by the nature and potency of its three interrelated components: context, structure of the outcome, and attitude of actors’ toward each other. The outcome of the overall process would either lead to systemic integration or fragmentation of social relationships.

The predatory model of the state depicts the state as an agent which exists to extract revenue from a broader group of constituents. Tax hikes are needed to centralize power, but centralized control may instigate armed civil conflict by intruding upon pre-existing local polities. Taxes affecting property rights are an example of such intrusion. In such cases, war-making is the preferred approach for justifying resource extraction and eliminating competitors. When raising taxes is unfeasible, the state has to resort to incurring debt. External threats and
warfare may build a sense of national identity, by strengthening the national consciousness of ethnically homogenous societies, but it will fragment heterogeneous ones.

War and revolution can potentially mobilize previously excluded groups. Pan-Arabism stoked by emphasizing external threats and inter-Arab rivalry is achieved through manipulation of specific national identities. Oil-dependent states, devoid of popular legitimacy, mimic colonialist policies. They too assumed use of wealth and granting of access to opportunities would substitute kinship loyalties with ties of patronage. In reality, it was the support of an external sponsor which manufactured the myth of competence. This harsh truth is unavoidable during economic downturns. Power and top-down authority, in the absence of genuine legitimacy, are extremely difficult and expensive to maintain. Constructivists argue human conception of reality is endogenous. Identities and worldviews are formulated inter-subjectively, through social interactions and conveyed symbolically. By extension, sense of security is also socially constructed. Thus, exogenous controls are insufficient for compelling action. They must be laden with subjective meaning.

In the past, societies governed by uneasy clientage and elite cooption policing and intelligence gathering are pivotal. Steady accumulation of information about an identified constituency was misapplied based on the observers’ own perceptions of the context. They measured colonial success based on an ideal, popular acquiescence rather than acceptance. As a result, colonial administrators “meshed local opposition with external dangers because state repression presented opportunities for foreign opponents to exploit the inevitable discontent” (Thomas 2008, 301). To date, states continue their struggle with modes and methods of social control through use of force. Thereby, their search for ways to “reduce this deficit of repressive power” continues on (Thomas 2008, 302).
Use of aviation to better support ground combat forces, through surgical application of force, intelligence gathering, and speed of responsiveness. Nonetheless, aviation drastically transformed the physical dimension of the battlefield and will forever be associated with Western dominance. Aviation became a weapon to enforce government demands irreversibly altered the balance of power between the central state and the societies on the margins. In essence, air policing allowed the state to expand its reach, and to penetrate previously excluded communities.

The role of police in irregular warfare is primarily to transform the legitimate local government into an effective one. To achieve this goal, government representatives must first understand the human terrain of their environment. Security of the population is an intrinsic need and priority. The state can begin demonstrating its legitimacy by exercising its authority in a manner perceived by the population as beneficial and worthy of their support. In the aftermath of conventional combat, the presence of a competent police force could decide who will be declared the victor. Effective policing would require taking the lead on military missions, possessing diversified skills, and focusing on keeping the population safe.

Prior to WWII, the term politics had “referred exclusively to the formal political system” (emphasis in original) (Lim 2006, 15). Curiously, Weberian politics refer to the legal structure and process by which institutions and systematic bureaucracies organically facilitated the functioning of government. Hence, the British experience in Iraq is an example of a legal construct externally imposed and therefore devoid of internal legitimacy. In Iraq, a process-oriented definition of politics would have been more apropos.

Harold Lasswell clearly understood the distinction in his definition of politics, as a conflict “by and among elites” over “who gets what, when and how” (Almond 1987, 257). His
framework links the influences of “intrapsychic processes and their etiology” with interpersonal, social, domestic, and international political processes in an interactive loop (Almond 1987, 256). According to this definition, politics is a struggle with an organized structure, over values. The different ways and means (e.g. rewards, punishment, violence, etc.) employed give the conflict its character (Almond 1987, 259). He thus implored political scientists to discover the politics of preventing war instead, to aspire to a “commonwealth of human dignity” (Almond 1987, 256).

Policy Implications

Ideally, the aim of FID programs is to prevent the need for militarily intervention. However, if professionalism has not been internalized yet, the absence of oversight and accountability can further entrench an authoritarian ruling regime and exacerbate tensions. As a consequence, capacities developed through FID assistance would precipitate a need for intervention and to account for supporting despots. In the aftermath of a conventional military intervention, the occupying force will have to contend with the consequence of a collapsed authoritarian state. The war-torn state is likely to suffer from, as a remnant of its authoritarian past, institutional vacuum and/or internationalization of the conflict. Consideration of the context within which military operations take place is therefore imperative for comprehensive planning and implementation. The intervention itself will change power relationships within society, deciding who will benefit and at whose expense. Because security never exists in vacuum, those disadvantaged may frustrate efforts to re-establish order and implement security measures. Not only is assessment of the context critical, but also deciphering who should be in charge.

In order for use of force to bolster authority’s legitimacy, it must be perceived as competent and objective. Thus, policies for use of force must emphasize the role of accurate and
timely information. The responding authority must ascertain the source and cause of the as accurately as possible, lest the force it applies further aggravates the situation. The population’s perception of the central authority, not just the rebels’, must be gauged and traced to its roots. Not until the affected population learns to trust the responding authority will it offer its help in terms of collaboration or cooperation in reporting criminal or subversive activities. Without the passive cooperation of the local population, establishing a secure environment is rendered improbable. The implications of such outcome are ominous and foreboding. When goods, services, and the general public cannot circulate normally, political and economic reforms do not take hold. Militias and mercenaries tend to be incompetent, corrupt, or abusive, thereby require close oversight, mentoring, and institutional reform.

Learning from unanticipated circumstances and the ability to establish security in a non-permissive environment is a reflection of strategic culture. For the inexperienced, a tendency to habitually rely upon traditional means and methods of resolving armed civil conflict, even when they are ill-suited, is a detrimental trait. Lack in capacity or legal authority further complicates chances of success and erodes confidence. If the application of force is deemed necessary, a key requirement is to distinguish between individuals designated as "combatant" and "civilian". Although it is a pivotal prerequisite it is often beyond the means of military intelligence to discern. Moreover, if “suppression” methods are applied indiscriminately they will likely alienate populations whose support is integral to meeting objectives, both local and abroad. COIN efforts can be successful, especially if the insurgents are unpopular. However, so long as the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and those of the population.
The manual Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction outlined the major tasks and desired outcomes for the security sector. The posited objectives for establishing a safe and secure environment consists of five sub-tasks: cessation of large-scale violence; establishing territorial and physical security; maintaining public order and state’s legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Furthermore, each sub-task consists of creating necessary conditions. Cessation of large-scale violence requires: separation of warring parties; sustainment of cease fire and peace agreement; management of spoilers; and collection of intelligence. Establishing territorial security entails ensuring freedom of movement and border security. Physical security encompasses protection of vulnerable populations; protection of infrastructure; and preserving evidence of committed war crimes. Maintaining public order demands a comprehensive system of law enforcement, interim judiciary, and humane detention. Finally, maintaining the state’s legitimate monopoly on force requires disarming and demobilizing armed combatants, reintegrating them back into society, and reforming the security sector.

As made clear through experiences during OIF, following the establishment of minimal levels of security the primary mission becomes the pacification of the population, through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. Access to weapons depots must be heavily restricted and to heavy arms strongly regulated. Henceforth, any display of small arms must be restricted. Armed militia must be disbanded and its members offered alternative livelihoods. These tasks can be delegated to local community or tribal leaders, and in return held accountable for any breaches in agreements.

It is critical the intervening force arrives with a coherent implementation plan and clear exit goals. Adequate funding to perform tasks will vary according to the nature of the crisis, so intelligence gathering during the preplanning phase is critical. This can be achieved HUMINT.
capabilities or establishing links with the civilian population. One avenue is through active intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance. For agreements between parties to be enforced, the participation of an international force is often a prerequisite. As armies are scaled back or reformed, police forces must to be reformed and bolstered. Training functions must be administered by professionally trained law enforcement personnel.

There are obvious parallels between principles of criminology and political stabilization. The role of the police, as an extension of the state, is to mediate between conflicting views or values. This can only be achieved through deep understanding of the immediate context and stakes. The process by which power is redistributed can be influenced, similarly, by organized groups formed to pursue and defend shared values and interests. Advocates of Core Policing claim this approach allows a nascent government to establish security by proactively stemming the outbreak of violence. This approach leverages community inputs and feedback to combat crimes known to instigate intrastate violence. It encourages cooperation and informative exchanges by emphasizing the street-level contact between the police and citizens. This orientation in particular prioritizes the concept of space over time, to effectively prevent crime and respond to citizens’ needs.

The role of police in stability operations is to transform the legitimate local government into an effective one. Mission success demands thorough understand of the human terrain and robust intelligence collection. Security of the population is paramount; without it preventing spoilers from preying on the general public becomes impossible. Should the US military find itself involved, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, in interventionist missions it must prepare adequately and anticipate the need to cope with chaos and instability. Establishing security must be the first and foremost priority. Falling short of this objective, insurgents will undoubtedly
exploit the power vacuum and move to exercise their agendas. Improperly applied strategies or tactics can transform insurgents’ goals, cause the armed conflict to spill over into the neighboring region, and trigger geopolitical consequences harder to manage.

In essence, stemming armed civil conflict requires accurate identification of threats and targets for proper management. This would be impossible without at least the passive cooperation of the population. Historically, securing reliable population support has been police’s bailiwick. During the course of their training, execution of duties, and interactions with the public law enforcement personnel incrementally internalize the values of their profession and organization. In combination with clear oversight and emphasis placed on the desired organizational values, a unique sense of professionalism develops. The durability of policing, as an institution, attests to the importance of trustworthy management of the common. Law enforcement personnel master the art of securing public cooperation through the execution of their daily duties. Perception of state’s competence must begin at the most basic level.

Vulnerable populations, to date, remain woefully unprotected and at the mercy of unintended consequences. Inarguably, more must be done to protect them. The viability of the international system depends on maintaining its legitimacy and overall relevance. The foundation of the international system relies on states’ competence in administering force and delivering security. This study focused on discovering how US military operations can better protect vulnerable populations involuntarily caught in the cross-fire. While operational outcomes are never guaranteed, there is an urgent need to safeguard against compounded missteps. Left unchanged, future military allies and coalition partners may balk at collaborating with US-led missions. The establishment of security requires an enormous commitment in time, effort, and
resources. Otherwise, mismanagement of the occupation would unleash long dormant forces loath to being contained again.

As in all things bureaucratic or complex, the problem does not lie in the absence of solutions, but unawareness of their existence. In spite of the great strides made, during the 1980s, in bridging the communication divide between the US armed forces nonetheless, power struggles and fierce competition over resources remain as barriers hindering full cooperation. The military is a vital institution to the survival of a nation. Nevertheless, the US military continues to fight a two-front war, political and bureaucratic.

This chapter concludes by summarizing what is entailed in establishing security in the aftermath of conventional combat operations. The geo-strategic context within which US military missions are likely to take place was described as, simultaneously globalized and regionalized in a post-Cold War international system. The overshadowing concern is regional instability precipitated by state failure and spill-over of intrastate violence. The implications of intrastate conflict, whether in terms of threats to human security or internationalization of conflict, could not be exaggerated. The prohibitive costs and dangers characteristic of military interventions demand an objective assessment of threats within their context, in order to develop sober policies for dealing with the conflict. Stemming armed civil conflict requires access to reliable information and proper management. This would be impossible without the passive cooperation of the affected population. Law enforcement personnel are extremely adept at garnering the requisite elements of establishing trust at the most basic level.
Bibliography


Bowen, Stuart W. 2013 “Learning from Iraq: A New Model for Stability and Reconstruction Operations.” Presented at the Middle East Institute.


Ricketts, Peter. *Iraq: Advice to the Prime Minister*. Office of the US Secretary of State. 22 March 2002.


Skocpol, Theda. 1979. State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


U. S. House of Representatives. 2007. *Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.*


250