Exploring Public Value Creation in Cross-Sector Collaborations

by

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Abstract

This research study applies Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework to better understand collaboration and public value in the public sector, and to expand our understanding of public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. This study applies the only existing cross-sector collaboration framework (Page et al, 2015) of its kind to a cross-sector collaboration with different characteristics than those identified in the original study. The questions that guided this research centered on whether public value was created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force during its tenure from 2003 to 2012. To answer this question, the three dimensions of Page et al’s (2015) framework: democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes, were assessed. The assessment was completed utilizing a two-part qualitative study. First, the researcher conducted a document analysis to create a detailed project history of the task force from 2003-2012, and to capture the dynamics and structure of the task force. Second, semi-structured interviews were executed with 20 stakeholders that served on the task force between 2003 and 2012. The interview questions centered on the three-dimensional framework and the public value attributes that make up each dimension.

Using Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, this study finds the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was not successful in the creation of public value. The data analysis shows the task force was restricted in its ability to create public value because it was a mandated cross-sector collaboration. This suggests the need for future research which compares the implications of mandated collaborations and voluntary collaborations. Further exploration of the differences between mandated and voluntary collaborations should explore how to reduce the
negative effects of mandated collaborations on the creation of public value. Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework failed in its ability to assess public value creation in different and changing organizational cultures and socio-political conditions. Since cross-sector collaborations are dynamic in nature, more work is needed in this area to better assess public value creation.
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# Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................................... iv

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... vi

List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... vii

Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 12

Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design ................................................................................... 40

Chapter 4: Alabama Homeland Security Task Force........................................................................ 53

Chapter 5: Findings ............................................................................................................................... 87

Chapter 6: Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 117

References ............................................................................................................................................. 142

Appendix A: Interview Protocol ......................................................................................................... 152

Appendix B: Informed Consent ............................................................................................................ 154
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Summary of Public Value Propositions ......................................................... 18
Table 2.2 Three-Dimensional Framework ..................................................................... 36
Table 3.1 Three-Dimensional Framework Attributes and Indicator .............................. 48
Table 4.1 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force Appointments .............................. 60
Table 5.1 Core Themes from Interview Responses ....................................................... 90
Table 5.2 Was the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force Vertical and Horizontal Accountable? .... 92
Table 5.3 Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force Demonstrate Procedural Rationality, Procedural Justice, and Operational Control? ................................................................. 96
Table 5.4 Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force have Effective Performance, Efficient Performance, Equity of Benefits, Equity of Pay, and Problem-Solving Capacity? ......................................................... 104
Table 5.5 Summary of Findings .................................................................................... 113
List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Components of Cross-Sector Collaborations .............................................................. 19

Figure 2.2 Strategic Triangle ........................................................................................................ 26

Figure 4.1 Alabama Homeland Security Regional Map ............................................................. 66
Chapter 1: Introduction

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 left 2,977 Americans dead (Department of Homeland Security, 2002). Americans from different cultures, races, and ethnicities, with differing political beliefs and religions, were brought together by this terrorist attack. Americans prayed, cried, demonstrated anger, and were patriotic despite their differences.

In addition to the change in the American people, there was a change in how government was structured. Before the 9/11 attacks, the responsibilities of homeland security were dispersed among more than a hundred different government organizations (Department of Homeland Security, 2002). Post 9/11, President George W. Bush and Congress made the most significant realignment in the organization of homeland security in over half a century, by taking these 100 different agencies and placing them all under the same department: the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (US DHS) with the explicit responsibility of protecting the homeland.

As a result, US DHS created state-level offices or departments of homeland security. Some states chose to create offices in already existing departments such as public safety. However, some states created separate homeland security departments. US DHS provided billions of dollars to state-level offices or departments that in return worked with local homeland security points of contact and awarded funds to local first responders and government officials. Because these departments have the massive task of protecting the homeland (by focusing on border and transportation, emergency preparedness and response, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures, and informational analysis and infrastructure protection), the departments at the federal, state, and local levels were only able to achieve this task through collaboration with other organizations from multiple sectors.
In recent years, questions have been raised regarding the value of federal, state, and local departments of homeland security: Is this an efficient way to protect the homeland? Is the department doing what it was designed to do? Assertions have been made that their “continued existence is due to a vastly exaggerated assessment of the threat of terrorism and the department has been accused of some of the least cost-effective spending in the U.S. government.” (Kenny, 2013, p. 1).

US DHS, as well as the state and local departments or offices of homeland security, cannot perform their mission of protecting the homeland without working with outside organizations. Yet, critics of homeland security have asserted that “the core functions overseen by homeland security can be managed more effectively by other departments, especially where territorial battles undermine operational efficacy” (Mayer, 2014, p. 1). In addition, critics claim inefficiencies are because of this need to coordinate across organizational boundaries (Mayer, 2014, p. 1).

However, the agencies tasked with solving these complex problems often choose to collaborate voluntarily and out of necessity (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015). Another problem critics cite is the fact cross-sector collaborations go against the traditional roles of government. The organizational and sectoral boundary lines become blurred, and collaborations are challenged in their ability to create public value.

Public value is defined as the “extent to which a cross-sector collaboration achieves its overarching and subsidiary purposes, meets applicable mandates, and achieves lasting and widespread benefits at reasonable cost that no single organization could have achieved alone in a democratically accountable way” (Page, Stone, Bryson, & Crosby, 2015, p. 2). Literature on the ability of cross-sector collaborations to create public value is scarce. This is due to the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of the collaborations, which makes it hard to assess the creation of
public value within a cross-sector collaboration. Furthermore, these collaborations are seldom directly accountable to voters. Decisions and innovations occur across organizational lines and policy fields and therefore are often out of the view of elected officials. Collectively, these concerns make up what Papadopoulous (2007) defines as a democratic deficit.

Kettl (2006) points out that public administration is based on the ideas of creating stable and lasting structures with the ability to solve public problems in a reliable, efficient, and accountable way. However, when utilizing cross-sector collaborations to solve complex problems, there is difficulty in achieving reliability, efficiency, and accountability. This is because the five basic boundaries that shape the behavior of America’s administrative institutions are challenged: mission, resources, capacity, responsibility, and accountability. When programs are interrelated, it becomes harder to define the cross-sector collaboration’s mission. Government organizations not only have to carry out their own program, but they have to include other closely related programs. The allocation of resources is also complicated. With the ambitious goals cross-sector collaborations bring, there is a greater demand for money. Another concern with cross-sector collaborations is the challenge of managing multiple organizations with multiple moving parts. In a cross-sector collaboration, it can be difficult to determine individual roles in contributing to the success of the collaboration. Kettl (2006) states that “the rise of complex interorganizational service systems has created a new class of accountability problems” (p. 16). Also, a challenge exists for elected officials to hold street level bureaucrats accountable for their actions. The question becomes: Who is accountable for the performance of the programs being implemented by the cross-sector collaboration? Put another way: If everyone is in charge, who is in charge?
Problem Statement

Since governments are utilizing cross-sector collaborations more frequently to solve complex problems, it is essential to be able to assess how effectively they create public value through accountability, procedural legitimacy and substantive outcomes. These three goals—accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes—are the same standard applied to single government agencies (Page et al, 2015).

In the literature on cross-sector collaborations, there is a lack of focus on accountability and outcomes. One way to measure accountability and outcomes is by assessing public value. However, there is great debate in the literature on how to assess public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. Some literature focuses on processes and some focus on outcomes. Page et al (2015) created a framework that not only uses processes and outcomes to assess public value in cross-sector collaborations, but also takes accountability into consideration.

Page, Stone, Bryson, & Crosby (2015) propose a comprehensive framework to assess public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. Page et al (2015) define collaboration as “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations to achieve jointly an outcome that the organizations could not achieve separately” (p. 2). Public value is defined as the “extent to which a cross-sector collaboration achieves its overarching and subsidiary purposes, meets applicable mandates, and achieves lasting and widespread benefits at reasonable cost that no single organization could have achieved alone in a democratically accountable way” (Page et al 2015, p. 2).

In summary, they use the dimensions of democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes to assess public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. These three dimensions are typically treated separately in the public management, administration, and accountability literature. They are defined in the next sections.
Democratic Accountability

Democratic accountability in collaborative governance means being transparent and having open decision processes that are responsive to citizens, stakeholders, and authorizers (Holmen, 2011). For example, when making decisions, did the cross-sector collaboration make a policy decision that not only considered elected officials’ expectations, such as a governor, but also other stakeholders and the public?

Procedural Legitimacy

A collaboration’s procedural legitimacy is measured by how it adheres to laws, regulations, guidelines, and accepted professional practices (Leach & Sabatier, 2005). The ultimate goal of procedural legitimacy is to ensure that those who are affected by a decision feel that all involved used supporting evidence to guide their decision and that the decision being made was equal among the stakeholders and transparent.

Substantive Outcomes

Substantive outcomes are measured by how effectively and efficiently the collaboration achieved its goals, as well as if the stakeholders and the public benefited from the collaboration equally (Vangen & Huxham, 2012). For instance, one of the goals of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force during the time period covered by this study was to strengthen mutual aid and response teams. Did the cross-sector collaboration achieve the stated goal and did the goals benefit the stakeholders and the public equally?

Differences in Case Studies

Page et al’s (2015) case study was focused on a cross-sector collaboration in the transportation policy sector in Minnesota. Minnesota’s Urban Partnership Agreement was created when the US Department of Transportation set up a competitive proposal request to help with the funding of urban regions to integrate transit, tolling, technology, and telecommuting
strategies in an attempt to reduce traffic congestion. The collaboration consisted of federal, state, and local transportation agencies, nonprofit agencies, businesses, as well as local affected governments. The cross-sector collaboration was not mandated, but was necessary in order to complete all twenty-four projects approved by the US Department of Transportation.

The case study being utilized in this research has differing characteristics than the Page et al case study: it is in a different public sector, it is a mandated cross-sector collaboration, and has participants from a wide variety of sectors. The focus is homeland security, and the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force will be the case study utilized. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was mandated by the US Department of Homeland Security to apply for homeland security grant funds; whereas, Page et al’s case study was not mandated, but was necessary to complete the multiple transportation projects.

There is a stark difference in the variety of sectors that are part of the case study utilized by Page et al (2015) and the case study being utilized in this research. The homeland security grant funds were used to prevent, to protect, to respond, and to recover from terrorist attacks on American soil. To achieve this mission, the task force was made up of local and state homeland security agencies, and also local, state, and federal transportation, law enforcement, emergency management, and fire departments. In addition, representatives from agriculture, public health, criminal justice, port security, and airport authorities were a part of the collaboration. Nonprofit agencies, as well as local and state government were also a part of the collaboration. On the other hand, Page et al’s (2015) case study only consisted of federal, state, and local transportation agencies, nonprofit agencies, businesses, and government officials.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is to apply Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework to better understand cross-sector collaborations and public value. Page et al’s (2015) three-
dimensional framework is the only existing framework (Page et al, 2015), which includes not only the areas of processes and outcomes, but also accountability. This will be accomplished by applying the framework to another cross-sector collaboration that differs from the focus of the Page et al (2015) study and that has different distinct characteristics. This will expand our understanding and knowledge of public value creation in cross-sector collaborations.

Research Questions

The questions that will guide this research are centered on whether public value was created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. In order to answer these questions, the three dimensions of Page et al’s framework, which consist of democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes, must be assessed:

1. Was public value created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force? Why or why not?
   a. Was the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force democratically accountable?
   b. Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrate procedural legitimacy?
   c. Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force have substantive outcomes?

Significance of the Study

The literature suggests a strong debate as to where public value is created, the level at which public value is created, and who the beneficiaries of the collaboration are. Page, Stone, Bryson, and Crosby (2015) established a framework to assess public value creation in a cross-sector collaboration that addresses these conflicts. The framework is the only existing framework that takes into consideration the literature of traditional public administration, new public management, and public value management. Unfortunately, their framework caused more questions than solutions due to the challenges they faced in their research. One of the challenges was that Page, Stone, Bryson, and Crosby discovered that cross-sector collaborations are subject
to changes in their internal characteristics as well as their external environment (2015). They also found that through their assessment it was important for the researcher to develop a deep knowledge of the collaboration, including processes and structures (Page et al, 2015).

This research will examine the contents of Page et al’s (2015) framework in a different public sector. Consequently, this will expand the knowledge of public value creation in cross-sector collaborations and add to the debate as to where public value is created, the level(s) where public value is created, and who the beneficiaries of the collaboration are.

Theoretical Focus of the Study

The theoretical focus of this study centers around three bodies of literature: cross-sector collaborations, the concept of public value, and the creation of public value in cross-sector collaborations.

The cross-sector collaboration literature addresses various reasons why cross-sector collaborations occur. It then addresses the major theoretical frameworks related to cross-sector collaboration proposed in recent years. This literature demonstrates the lack of attention placed on accountabilities and outcomes within those frameworks.

The second body of literature involves the theories pertaining to public value. The literature identifies public value as one of the ways to measure accountability and outcomes in cross-sector collaborations. This literature discusses the three streams of ideas around the construct of public value and the fact that the definition of public value depends on the stream that is used. It also addresses the attempt to combine the streams.

The final theoretical body of literature used in this study focuses on public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. There has been limited literature on how cross-sector collaborations create public value. There are three main debates within the literature: where is
value created, at what level is value produced, and who are the beneficiaries of the collaboration? Page et al’s (2015) framework is an attempt to address these three main debates.

Methodology

Following Page et al (2015), this will be a qualitative study that will be completed in two layers. The history of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force will be detailed by reviewing project documents from 2003 to 2012, using the established indicators of each dimension’s public value attributes as a guide. These project documents include the initial and subsequent grant applications, grant agreements, memorandums of agreement, state legislature documents, task force meeting minutes, PowerPoint briefings and the initial and subsequent grant guidance that was issued by federal homeland security to the states.

Once the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force’s history has been detailed, the second step will be to conduct semi-structured interviews with a minimum of twenty members of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force between the years of 2003 and 2012. The responses to the interviews will be used to assess public value creation using the indicators developed by Page et al (2015) to identify public value attributes that make up their three-dimensional framework (democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes).

Limitations of the Study

The qualitative methods used in this study are essential in understanding public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. Qualitative methods are utilized to increase our understanding of the cases and situations studied. According to Brink (1993), “The validity of qualitative studies often hinge to a large degree on the rigor, competence, and skill of the researcher.”

There are strengths to using a case study. It enables the researcher to get a better view of a certain phenomenon or a series of events and can be useful in capturing the life in organizations
and organization activity. However, it has been criticized by some for lack of validity, reliability, and not addressing the issue of generalizability (Ali & Yosuf, 2011).

The enhancement of validity and reliability is usually done by utilizing multiple case studies and collecting data from multiple sources (Creswell, 2013). In this research, the researcher is taking an existing framework and applying it to a case study with different characteristics than the initial case study. By doing so, it is noted that the research is to be used to enhance the understanding of how public value is created in cross sector collaborations by looking at one distinct case study. In addition to collecting data by conducting numerous interviews, data collection comes from using archival documents.

The first part of the research consists of detailing the project history of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force by conducting an analysis of archival documents from 2003 to 2012. Documents were collected from the organization’s files that were made available for the purpose of the research. An analysis of archival documents provides insight into the workings of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force and will help guide the interview questions.

The second part of the research consists of conducting 20 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The use of semi-structured interviews allows for flexibility to approach different participants while covering the same data collection (Creswell, 2013). The interviews were transcribed and a content analysis was conducted using Nvivo. However, the truth of responses by interview participants is a concern. Bias may be introduced because of particular responses or characteristics of the participants (Creswell, 2013). Participants typically have unique characteristics, different orientations, and different perceptions. They may want to make things seem better or worse than they are. This is especially true since the researcher has worked with the participants being interviewed. In addition, since the interview participants served on the task force between five and fourteen years ago, the remembrance of
certain decisions may be affected. However, the researcher’s in-depth knowledge of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force can serve as a benefit in understanding those decisions. In addition, a risk of respondent bias can be reduced by making sure that the researcher understands why the researcher is there, what is the researcher studying, how will the data be collected, and how will it be used (Creswell, 2013).

Organization of Dissertation

This study is laid as follows: Chapter 2 includes a comprehensive review of the literature to explore theories related to cross-sector collaboration and public value. Specifically, there is an exploration as to why cross-sector collaborations form, the various cross-sector collaboration frameworks in recent years, and the different streams of public value. In addition, there is an exploration of how public value is created in cross-sector collaborations and the current debates and problems with assessing public value in cross-sector collaborations. In Chapter 3, there is an explanation of the methodology and research design, as well as the facets of qualitative research. Chapter 4 discusses and provides insight into the dynamics and structure of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force, and lays out the project history of the task force. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the research as well as provides an in-depth examination of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. Chapter 6 serves as the concluding chapter and explains the significance of the study and offers recommendations for future avenues of research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

In order to properly explore public value creation in cross-sector collaborations, a literature review of three primary areas is appropriate. The components of this theoretical review include: (1) cross-sector collaborations, (2) concept of public value, and (3) the creation of public value in cross-sector collaborations.

In examining cross-sector collaborations, this review first focuses on why cross-sector collaborations occur. It then addresses the major cross-sector collaboration frameworks that have been proposed in recent years. This section demonstrates the lack of attention placed on accountabilities and outcomes within the frameworks. A way to measure accountabilities and outcomes in a cross-sector collaboration is through the assessment of public value. The second portion of the literature review addresses the concept of public value. It examines the three main streams of public value and the attempt to try to combine the streams. The final section of the literature review focuses on assessing public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. It addresses the main debates and challenges in assessing public value creation in cross-sector collaborations and introduces Page et al’s (2015) framework that takes in consideration those debates, as well as combines the three main streams of public value. Page et al’s framework guides this research.

Cross-Sector Collaborations

Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2015) define cross-sector collaboration as “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that should not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately” (p. 648). Collaborative governance has become the way that government performs its
duties. Therefore, there has been growing interest in understanding to whom these collaborations are accountable and how to measure their performance outcomes.

In order to understand cross-sector collaborations, there needs to be an understanding of why cross-sector collaborations occur. Cross-sector collaborations can either be mandated or voluntary. A mandated cross-sector collaboration is when an organization is forced to collaborate with other sectors for information, resources, activities, and capabilities. Stone, Crosby, and Bryson (2013) asserted that government policies and grant programs often mandate that organizations create cross-sector collaborations in order to receive and maintain funding. An illustration of this would be when the US Department of Homeland Security mandated that all state homeland security offices develop a cross-sector collaboration in order to apply for their federal homeland security grants. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force is a mandated cross-sector collaboration. Andrews and Entwistle (2010) explained these mandates can detail who can be a part of the collaboration, who can make decisions in the collaboration, and establish performance measures or accountability mechanisms. Voluntary cross-sector collaborations are those in which the organization(s) decided to collaborate with other sectors, because they felt that working with others would help them achieve their mission or goal, not because they were mandated to do so. The Minnesota Urban Area Partnership was not a mandated cross-sector collaboration, but a collaboration formed because the projects approved by the US Department of Transportation could only be implemented by working with other sectors.

Another reason cross-sector collaborations occur is because of the dynamics in the political environment. One example of this is illustrated by Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2015), who found that “the cross-sector collaboration that formed in Minnesota as part of the federal Urban Partnership/Congestion Demonstration Program was initially stymied by the governor’s
refusal to endorse any initiative that involved tolling on preexisting highway lanes” (p. 652). In this particular case, the environment was conducive to creating a collaboration because of the lack of political support. Lober (1997) builds upon Kindgon’s (1995) concept of policy windows of opportunity. Lober (1997) asserts that collaborations form based on a problem, stream of worsening situations, combined with the existence of a solution stream (1997). The individual or organization recognizes the streams and mobilizes resources as well as partners around the opportunity. The problem or concern makes the environment conducive to creating a collaboration. Furthermore, Takahashi and Smutny (2002) argued that these “collaboration windows” are likely to create “static and non-adaptive governance structures” (p. 652).

Essentially, the cross-sector collaboration will only be able to address the problem at hand and will not be able to address other problems as they arise.

Kettl (2006) asserted that the 21st century has brought three new challenges that require multiple organizations from different sectors and multiple levels of government to work together to meet these challenges. These three challenges are: political processes that complicate administrative responses, indirect administrative tactics, and wicked problems that levy enormous costs when solutions fail (Kettl, 2006). Public organizations are finding it extremely difficult to adapt and respond to new issues because of political tensions, such as legislative gridlock. There has also been a heavy reliance on administratively complex tools, such as the use of contractors to implement the Clinton administration’s strategy of ending welfare. Kettl argues that “it is virtually impossible to find any public program that matters in which a single government organization’s jurisdiction can capture the features that determine success” (Kettl, 2006, p. 13). This nation, as well as the world, is now facing more complex problems, such as terrorism, with causes and consequences that have no boundaries. Friedman (2005) explains that as the world becomes flatter, many local issues affect the world and many global issues have
local implications. For example, the United States’ recession that happened in 2007 not only negatively affected the United States’ economy, but it also had negative effects around the world. The entire world is connected. Demirag, Stapleton, Khadaroo, and Stevenson (2012) point out that nongovernment partners can provide the needed expertise, resources, technology, and relationships in a joint effort to help ameliorate these complex problems. As a direct response to the need to address complex problems that have no boundaries, cross-sector collaborations are needed.

Major Cross-Sector Collaboration Theoretical Frameworks

There have been several major cross-sector collaboration theoretical frameworks published within the past decade. These theoretical frameworks, while similar, have distinct differences. Glaringly noticeable, is that each of these theoretical frameworks place little attention on accountabilities and outcomes.

In 2006, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone provided a summary of the various components of cross-sector collaboration that had been presented in the literature in their landmark article, “The Design and Implementation of Cross Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature”. This article set the stage for the great strides in cross-sector collaboration research in the last ten years.

Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) provided 22 propositions. They proposed that cross-sector collaborations are likely to form during times of instability (Bryson et al, 2006). A clear example of this is the creation of cross-sector collaborations after the terrorist attack of 9/11. Bryson et al (2006) also asserted that public policy makers will create a cross-sector collaboration when individual sectors have failed at solving a problem or if they believe the problem cannot be solved without working with other sectors. The major criticism after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was that each government agency, such as the transportation and the
justice departments, were tasked with protecting the United States from outside attacks, but they all failed individually. Policy makers and the president at the time concluded that these agencies all needed to collaborate in order to be able to properly protect the United States from terrorist attacks.

Another proposition is that cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when there is an agreement among the sectors that a problem actually exists, and/or if there were already existing relationships among the sectors at the time of the initial formation (Bryson et al, 2006). Having these linking mechanisms in place helps establish legitimacy and trust. Bryson et al (2006) also assert that the actual form and content of the cross-sector collaboration’s initial agreements and the process used to create them affect the outcome of the cross-sector collaboration’s work. It is very important that agreement is made on the purpose of the cross-sector collaboration, the commitment of resources, how to make decisions, how to handle changes, who will lead, and who will actually serve in the cross-sector collaboration.

Bryson et al (2006) state that cross-sector collaborations are more apt to succeed if they have committed sponsors and champions and effective informal and formal leaders. They define sponsors as “individuals who have considerable prestige, authority, and access to resources they can use on behalf of the collaboration, even if they are not closely involved in the day to day collaborative work” and champions are defined as “people who focus intently on keeping the collaboration going and use process skills to help the collaboration accomplish its goals” (Bryson et al, 2006, p. 47). The importance of having support from influential people and having individuals effectively lead is being expressed in this proposition. Bryson et al (2006) states that a cross-sector collaboration is likely to succeed when it establishes legitimacy as well as trust, and continues in engaging in trust building activities.
Another proposition that Bryson et al (2006) lay out is that all cross-sector collaborations must manage conflict to be successful. They also state cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they have both deliberate and emergent planning that uses stakeholder analyses, emphasizes responsiveness to key stakeholders, uses the process to build trust and capacity to manage conflict, and builds on the skills of the stakeholders (Bryson et al, 2006).

Furthermore, they explain that cross-sector collaborations can be successful when they have an “accountability system that tracks inputs, processes, and outcomes; use a variety of methods for gathering, interpreting, and using data; and use a results management system that is built on strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies” (Bryson et al 2006, p. 50). In addition, they explain that the collaborative structure is affected by environmental factors, that the structure is likely to change over time, and that it is likely to influence a collaboration’s overall effectiveness (Bryson et al, 2006). For example, with most cross-sector collaborations there are changes in who the stakeholders are due to time limits or even changes in leadership.

Bryson et al (2006) assert that the manner in which the cross-sector collaboration is governed (formal or informal) also influences how effective the cross-sector collaboration is. In addition, they explain that cross-sector collaborations are susceptible to power imbalances and shocks (Bryson et al, 2006). Moreover, there are competing institutional logics that influence the stakeholders’ ability to agree on process, structure, governance, and even desired outcomes (Bryson et al, 2006). They state that cross-sector collaborations create public value by doing the following: “building on individuals’ and organizations’ self-interests and each sector’s characteristic strengths while finding ways to minimize, overcome, or compensate for each sector’s characteristic weakness; when they produce positive first-, second-, and third-order
effects, and when they are resilient and engage in regular reassessments” (Bryson et al, 2006, p. 50).

Bryson et al (2006) propose a road map to recognizing success in a cross-sector collaboration. They “emphasized the importance of leadership in making sure that the components of initial conditions, processes, structures, governance, contingencies and constraints, outcomes, and accountabilities are aligned so that good things happen in a sustained way over time” (Bryson et al, 2006, p. 51). For this reason, they conclude success is hard to achieve in cross-sector collaborations. The success of the cross-sector collaboration depends on how the cross-sector collaboration is formed, the type of structure it is, whether or not there are processes in place that ensure transparency and inclusiveness, how it is governed, whether or not outcomes are being made and how they are being measured, how accountability is achieved, and what types of opportunities and limitations are placed on it (Bryson et al, 2006). Also, whereas before the emphasis was simply placed on outcomes or the achievements of the cross-sector collaboration, Bryson et al (2006) were the first to recognize that all these components were essential to the creation of public value by cross-sector collaborations. They were the first to encourage that future research of these components be gathered in a way that could easily guide research or help policy makers in government, business, nonprofits, the media, or communities understand when cross-sector collaborations make sense as well as how to design and implement them (Bryson et al, 2006).

Insert Table 2.1 Summary of Public Value Propositions

As a call to action, there were three early cross-sector collaborative frameworks: Thomson and Perry (2006), Ansell and Gash (2008), and Provan and Kenis (2008). The
frameworks have similarities, as well as differences. All of the frameworks focus on general external antecedent conditions, initial conditions, internal processes, structural elements, and outcomes. External antecedent conditions are the conditions in the environment that foster cross-sector collaborations, such as mandates, windows of collaborative opportunity, sector failure, and the need to share resources. Although the external antecedent conditions are important in the formation of cross-sector collaborations, the formation would not occur without the initial conditions, such as an agreement by all involved, pre-existing relationships, and leadership. Once the initial conditions are met, the internal processes help facilitate governance of the collaboration and help implement the agreements that have been established. There must be trust, commitment, and a shared understanding of the current problem. In order to carry out the mission of the cross-sector collaboration, the proper structural elements must be in place to carry out the mission. For example, in some cases when sectors collaborate, there are pre-existing hierarchies that must work with other hierarchies to achieve the same goal. Tensions and conflicts are inevitable in cross-sector collaborations and can affect the internal workings.

Insert Figure 2.1 Components of Cross-Sector Collaborations

The early collaborative frameworks differ in regards to the attention they place on general external antecedent conditions, initial conditions, internal processes, structural elements, and outcomes. For instance, some emphasize the importance of the role of leadership in collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006), while others focus on leadership activities (Ansell & Gash, 2008), and the structure of a leadership core (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Scholars disagree on whether collaborative governance is a separate component (Kenis & Provan, 2008) or is subsumed under process dynamics. An important weakness and
critique of the early frameworks is their lack of attention to accountability and outcomes, especially in the area of public value.

For instance, Thomson and Perry (2006) explored the cross-sector collaboration process, which they deemed a black box. They believed that public managers would benefit from analysis of the process by which partners interact by focusing on five dimensions: governance, administration, autonomy, mutuality, and trust/reciprocity. In the governance dimension, Thomson and Perry (2006) explain that stakeholders that seek to collaborate must discuss how to make decisions together about the rules that will govern the cross-sector collaboration and they need to create and agree on structures that will define their cross-sector collaboration. In the administration dimension, there must be clear rules and responsibilities and a capacity to set boundaries and establish concrete achievable goals (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 27). In the autonomy dimension, Thomas and Perry (2006) recognize that in a “cross-sector collaboration there must be a reconciling of individual interests with collective interests” (p. 27). In the mutuality dimension, it is recognized that there must be a mutual understanding that everyone in the cross-sector collaboration will benefit based on different interests (Thomson and Perry 2006). Mutuality cannot be achieved without reciprocity and trust. There must be a willingness on all parties involved to collaborate, a belief that everyone will be honest and make good on commitments as promised. Thomson and Perry (2006) conclude that collaborations should not occur if leaders are not aware of the collaboration process and are only focused on individual goals.

Ansell and Gash (2008) introduced another theoretical collaborative framework that focused on not only the collaborative process, but also starting antecedent/initial conditions, leadership and institutional design. They conducted a meta-analytical study of existing literature on collaborative governance and created a model of collaborative governance. They identified
critical variables that influence whether or not a collaboration would be successful. The critical variables included: starting conditions, leadership, and institutional design (Ansell & Gash, 2008). There was no focus on accountabilities and outcomes. In regards to starting conditions, Ansell and Gash (2008) assert that imbalances between the resources or power of different stakeholders, the incentives that the stakeholders have to collaborate, and the past history of conflict or cooperation among stakeholders determines whether or not a collaboration would be successful. According to Ansell and Gash (2008), “If there are significant power and resource imbalances between stakeholders, such that important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative governance requires a commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders” (p. 551). In their opinion, this is the only way for cross-sector collaborations to be successful. They also assert that a cross-sector collaboration can only be successful if the stakeholders believe that they can benefit from the collaboration and that the cross-sector collaboration is actually meaningful (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Ansell and Gash (2008) state, “a prehistory of conflict is likely to express itself in low levels of trust, which in turn will produce low levels of commitment, strategies of manipulation, and dishonest communications; and a history of successful past cooperation can create social capital and high levels of trust that produce a virtuous cycle of collaboration” (p. 553). In terms of leadership, it is important for a leader to command respect and trust of the stakeholders especially when the distribution of power is not even and the incentive to participate is not strong (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Institutional design refers to the protocols and rules that govern the cross-sector collaboration. Ansell and Gash (2008) explain that the protocols and rules that govern the cross-sector collaboration must be clear and the process must be transparent to be successful. Also, inclusion of all the stakeholders in the
decision-making process is important to the success of a cross-sector collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2008).

Ansell and Gash (2008) also identified factors that are critical within the collaborative process: face to face dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment and shared understanding. The authors assert that face to face dialogue is essential to building trust and breaking down any stereotypes that might hinder the success of the cross-sector collaboration. Also, Ansell and Gash (2008) point out that trust building is a time-consuming process, but it is very important to the success of the cross-sector collaboration. There are even issues of commitment from mandated cross-sector collaborations, so continuously fostering activities that strengthen commitment is needed (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Also, Ansell and Gash (2008) explain that at some point the stakeholders must come to a shared understanding of what they want the cross-sector collaboration to achieve as well as the fact that small wins are important. Ansell and Gash (2008) state “if stakeholders or policy makers cannot anticipate these small wins, then they probably should not embark on a collaborative path” (p. 561).

On the other hand, Provan and Kenis (2008) explored “network governance,” which is essentially another term for cross-sector collaboration. They define network governance as “groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal” (p. 231). Again, there was no emphasis on accountabilities and outcomes. The three basic organizational forms are: participant-governed, lead organizations, and network administrative organizations. Participant-governed network governance occurs when there is no separate unique governance entity. Lead organization network governance is when all activities and key decisions are coordinated by a lead agency. Network administrative organization is described as a separate administrative entity that is set up to specifically govern the network and actions (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Provan and Kenis
assert that trust, size of the network, goal consensus and nature of the task will determine the success of the network. For example, in a participant governed network, trust is high, the number of participants is few, goal consensus is high and the competency to complete the task is low. In the lead organization network, trust is low, the number of participants is moderate, the goal consensus is moderate, and the competency to complete the task is moderate. On the other hand, network administrative organization trust is moderate, the number of participants is moderate to many, the goal consensus is moderately high, and the competency to complete the task is high. They also recognize that no matter what network that is utilized, there are always tensions. There is a tension between efficiency and inclusiveness. Provan and Kenis (2008) point out that “the more that organizational participants are involved in the network decision process, the more time consuming and resource intensive that process will tend to be” (p. 242). Another tension is internal versus external legitimacy. Provan and Kenis (2008) explain that “internal legitimacy needs, which focus on the needs of clients, employees, board members, and other organizational stakeholders, are not always compatible with the broader external legitimacy needs of the network as a whole” (p. 244). The third tension Provan and Kenis (2008) explore is the one between flexibility and stability. They express the importance of being able to meet challenges and still maintain sustainability (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

Building on the previous theoretical frameworks (Bryson, Crosby and Stone 2006; Provan and Kenis 2008; Thomas and Perry 2006), Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2011) created an integrative framework for collaborative governance. Their framework expanded the definition of collaborative governance and integrated multiple components of collaborative governance (Emerson et al, 2011). Emerson et al (2011) defined collaborative governance as “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the
public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (p. 2). This definition is an expansion because it includes multiple sectors not just government institutions like previous scholars, such as Ansell and Gash (2008). Emerson et al (2011) explained that collaborative governance unfolds in a system that consists of political, legal, socioeconomic, and environmental influences. These influences create opportunities and constraints, as well as affect the performance of the collaboration over time. Emerson et al (2011) conclude that collaborative action is more likely to be implemented and goals achieved if there is a mutual understanding among the multiple sectors as to what the collaboration’s goals are and if there is a desire to work together to accomplish the goals.

Koshmann, Kuhnn, and Pfarrer (2012) created a theoretical framework for increasing and assessing cross-sector partnership value based on communication theory. They state “that the empirical evidence of cross-sector partnership’s effectiveness is scarce and makes it difficult to understand and assess their actual value, which results in the perception that the cross-sector partnership appears to produce little value” (Koshmann, Kuhnn & Pfarrer, 2012, p. 333). They asserted that the overall value of cross-sector partnerships is the ability to influence people and issues within the problem area (Koshmann et al, 2012). Koshmann et al, (2012) point out that communication practices can increase the impact of the cross-sector collaboration by influencing the stakeholders’ perceptions, as well as the general public. They conclude that the overall value of a cross-sector partnership is not based on “solely structural arrangement or antecedent condition, but efficient communication practices are the key” (Koshmann et al, 2012, p. 350).

In summary, Bryson et al (2006) provide a road map to what success would look like for a cross-sector collaboration with an emphasis on the importance of aligning leadership, initial conditions, processes, structures, governance, contingencies and constraints, outcomes and accountabilities. Ansell and Gash (2008), Provan and Kenis (2008), Thomas and Perry (2006),
Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011), Koshmann, Kuhnn, and Pfarrer (2012) explored these concepts further as detailed above. However, they all agreed just as Bryson et al (2006) had discussed, that success for a cross-sector collaboration is difficult because of its multiple moving parts with multiple sectors. In addition, there was little emphasis on outcome and accountabilities, which includes public value. The next section explores the concept of public value.

Conceptualizing Public Value

The literature identifies public value as one of the ways to measure accountability and outcomes in cross-sector collaborations. However, the specific constructs of public value depend upon the approach that is taken. In traditional public administration, efficiency was the only public value considered. The New Public Management (NPM) approach emerged as the dominant view in the 1980s and 1990s, bypassing traditional public administration (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2015). The public value that became the focus under the NPM model was effectiveness (Bryson et al, 2015). Now emerging is a model coined the new public value management (Bryson et al, 2015). In the new public value management approach, other values in addition to efficiency and effectiveness are being pursued, debated, challenged, and evaluated. For example, in the Page et al (2015) framework, not only is efficiency and effectiveness being recognized, but also equity, accountability, and procedural justice. This model re-emphasizes and re-introduces value-related concerns from the past that were always present, but not dominant (Bryson et al, 2015). Bryson et al (2015) state that this new movement has been growing in response to three major changes: “the growing importance, urgency, scope, and scale of cross-sector jurisdictional, cross-level, and cross-sector public problems facing the world; the realization that governments alone cannot effectively address many of these problems; and a
concern that public values have been and will be lost as a result of powerful anti-government rhetoric and a host of market-based and performance-based reforms” (p. 2).

There have been three streams of ideas around the construct of public value: public value in the singular (Moore, 1995); public value in the plural (Bozeman, 2002, 2007); and public value in terms of psychological and philosophical roots of the human activity of valuing (Meynhardt, 2009). Mark Moore’s (1995) landmark book Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government explored the concept of public value and focused on how the term could be used in practice. For Moore, public value is an objective state of the world that can be measured and that is extrinsic, intrinsic, and relational (1995). An example of this is illustrated in Moore’s assumption of public value as “a hierarchy of values in which effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, justness, and fairness are prime” (Bryson, et al, 2015, p. 3). Moore (1995) developed a normative argument and approach to help public managers understand how to create public value and to understand what the public values. His strategic triangle consisted of three components: the authorizing environment of mandates and political support, doing what is necessary to create operational capability to produce results, and actually delivering public value to the citizenry at reasonable cost” (Bryson et al, 2015, p 2). The questions that the strategic triangle asks are: what benefit does the service provide, what authority and legitimacy does the organization need to make it happen, and what skills, abilities and knowledge are needed to make it happen (Bryson et al, 2015)?

Moore’s approach has been criticized, especially by R.A.W. Rhodes and John Wanna (2007). They argue that Moore’s approach is a “paradigm, a concept, a model, a heuristic device
or even a story….as a result it is all things to all people” (p. 408). They are accusing Moore’s approach of shortchanging the importance of politics and elected officials, overemphasizing the role of public managers, and putting too much trust in public organizations, private sector experiences, and the virtues of public servants (Rhodes & Wanna, 2007). Moore (1995) is basically placing whether an organization creates public value in the hands of public managers and not taking in consideration the influence that elected or political officials have in shaping policy.

However, Alford and O’Flynn (2009) defended Moore and refuted Rhodes and Wanna’s (2007) argument against Moore. Alford and O’Flynn (2009) argue that Rhodes and Wanna (2007) operate out of an old public administration paradigm that draws a sharp distinction between politics and administration and thus ignores the fact that political appointees and civil servants often have considerable leeway to influence policy and decisions. Alford and O’Flynn (2009) highlight Moore’s strategic triangle, and argue that it gives the authorizing environment a crucial role to play in “placing a legitimate limit on the public manager’s autonomy to shape what is meant by public value” (p. 172). Alford and O’Flynn (2009) demonstrate the multi-dimensional aspect of public value by placing it in four categories: public value as management paradigm, public value as rhetoric, public value as a narrative, and public value as performance. Public value as management paradigm indicates that public value management is becoming a new paradigm that focuses on meeting the challenges of efficiency, accountability, and equity (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). This new concept is being accepted world-wide as a new paradigm after public management by practitioners and academia. Public value as rhetoric is built on the idea that the public value framework is used as a rhetorical strategy designed to protect the interests of bureaucrats and their organizations (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). When bureaucrats make policy decisions or changes, it looks better to say that they are making the decisions or
changes to create public value. Public value is also viewed as a narrative to explain the world of public managers (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). Public managers used to tell the stories of what they want to accomplish or achieve with the organization. It is also being used by practitioners and management enthusiasts as a performance measurement or management framework (Alford & O’Flynn 2009). Public managers can measure their actions by whether or not their actions created value.

In contrast to Moore’s (1995) singular managerial action focus, Barry Bozeman’s (2007) book Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic Individualism, emphasizes the policy or societal level and highlights the intersection of market successes and failures with what he calls public value successes and failures. Bozeman (2007) defined “public value as providing normative consensus about the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should and should not be entitled; the obligations of citizen to society, the state, and one another; and the principles on which government and policies should be passed” (p. 13). Essentially, Bozeman (2007) viewed public value as a reflection of a society’s core commitments and aspirations, as legitimated not only in cultural norms, but also political action. He realized that multiple values emerge over time and can vary in context (Bozeman, 2007). Moore (1995) simply saw public value being inherited by mandate, which means that it is the job of the public manager and government to create public value. Moore (1995) developed a normative argument and approach to help public managers understand how to create public value and to understand what the public values through his strategic triangle. Bozeman (2007) says public value failure occurs when neither the market nor the public sector provides goods and services required to achieve public values.

In an attempt to explore the boundaries and meanings of public value and to advance the study of public value, Bozeman and Jorgensen (2007) developed an inventory of public values
found in the public administration literature. They reviewed the largest circulation public administration periodicals in the U.S., United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries between the years of 1990-2003 (Bozeman & Jorgensen, 2007). In the end, Bozeman and Jorgensen (2007) assessed 230 studies dealing with public values. They found that “few studies provide methods of classifying values, and no single approach or typology was widely accepted” (Bozeman & Jorgensen, 2007, p. 358). Bozeman and Jorgensen (2007) identified constellations of public values based on their interpretations of the relationships among them: values associated with the public sector’s contribution to society (common good, altruism, sustainability); transformation of interests to decisions (majority rule, user democracy, protection of minorities); relationship between public administration and politicians (political loyalty); relationship between public administration and environment (openness-secrecy, advocacy-neutrality, competitiveness-cooperativeness); intraorganizational aspects of public administration (robustness, innovation, productivity, self-development of employees); and relationships between public administration and citizens (legality, equity, dialogue, user orientation) (p. 360). They found that some values are not considered as equally as important as other values (hierarchy), that some values are closely related (proximity), and that values can be related to one another in a variety of ways (causality) (Bozeman & Jorgensen, 2007).

Although the two main streams of public value are posited by Moore (1995) and Bozeman (2007), Timo Meynhardt (2009) provided the philosophical and psychological roots of public value. He explored both the philosophy of value (in singular) and the ontological nature of values (in plural). In contrast to both Bozeman’s and Moore’s approach, Meynhardt’s approach is “non-normative, in the sense of being nonprescriptive; is far from psychologically based; and emphasizes more the interpretation of public and private spheres” (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2015, p. 11). Essentially, Meynhardt (2009) believed that the public sector
(government) plays a specific role in creating public value, but so does the private and social sectors. In this view, there would be no legal obligations from an organization to create value. Instead Meynhardt (2009) perceived public value as “any value defining the qualities of relationships between the individual and how individuals or groups fulfill their basic needs” (Meynhardt, 2009, p. 206). Meynhardt (2009) does not emphasize institutions and individual processes involved in public value creation. Meynhardt (2009) emphasizes how interrelated the subjective and objective are. However, he does agree with Bozeman and Moore that public value is measurable (Meynhardt, 2009). He builds on Jorgensen and Bozeman’s (2007) inventory of public values to propose a public value landscape that helps identify public values in democratic public administration.

Meynhardt (2009) believes public values can be measured by four basic dimensions. One is the moral-ethical dimension. It considers the question of what are the moral implications on the individual as a person (Meynhardt, 2009). The second dimension is political-social. It considers the question of what are the political chances and risks (Meynhardt, 2009). The third dimension is utilitarian-instrumental. It considers what is the rational basis and what is the cost-benefit ratio (Meynhardt, 2009). The fourth dimension is hedonistic-aesthetical values, which asks what are the positive or negative experiences associated with the action for the individuals (Meynhardt, 2009).

There have been attempts to try to connect the two main streams of public value that Moore (1995) and Bozeman (2007) provide. Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg (2015) stated that the two streams are more alike than different. They asserted that both Bozeman (2007) and Moore (1995) view public values as objective states of the world that can be measured. Bryson et al (2015) point out that they both view public value in a democracy as extrinsic, intrinsic, and relational. This means that public value is created from the institutions in the environment, from
the individual and through relationships between individuals and society. They also call for a full integration of Moore’s strategic triangle with a broad range of Bozeman and Jorgensen’s public values (Bryson et al, 2015). They named this the public value governance triangle. There are three components to Moore’s (1995) strategic triangle as discussed earlier: authorizing environment, operational capacity and public value. The public values that Bryson et al (2015) included under operational capabilities included procedural legitimacy, procedural justice, and procedural rationality. Under public value, it includes Bozeman and Jorgensen’s criteria, as well as Meynhardt’s (2009) view that public value is relational. In terms of the authorizing environment, broad support from institutions, citizens, and individuals is included.

In later works, Bozeman moved toward integration of Moore’s approach by “explaining how to determine public values and by developing public values criteria and public value mapping tools, which can be used by public managers to determine what, how, where, when, and why public value should be created and by whom” (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2015, p. 14). Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg (2015) do admit that it is hard to integrate managerial action (Moore, 1995) with societal or policy values (Bozeman, 2002) in practice.

In another attempt to bring the two mains streams of thought on public value together, Bennington (2011) employs the concept of the public sphere. He sees the public sphere as “a democratic space which includes the web of values, places, organizations, rules, knowledge, and other cultural resources held in common by people through their everyday commitments and behaviors, and held in trust by government and public institutions” (Bennington, 2011, p.32). In essence, the public sphere is not just socio-political (Bozeman, 2002) or managerial (Moore, 1995), but is also psychological and physical (Meynhardt, 2009). He believes that the public is not given but must be continuously created and constructed, and that public value is contested and established through continuous dialogue (Meynhardt, 2009).
In summary, the two main streams are not completely integrated. However, there is a move to integrate them (Moore 1995 and Bozeman 2002) as indicated above. The full integration of the two main streams of Moore (1995) and Bozeman (2002) is absolutely necessary to advance the public value paradigm. The next sections will further explore public value creation in cross-sector collaborations.

Creating Public Value in Cross-Sector Collaborations

There has been a discussion of cross-sector collaboration and the relevant concepts and elements, as well as public value and the theoretical construct. Now there will be a discussion about the creation of public value in cross-sector collaborations.

There has been limited literature on how cross-sector collaborations create public value. There are three broad themes that define this literature. First, there is a debate as to where value is created. Is it created during the process of collaboration, as a result of the outcomes of the collaboration, or both? Second, there is a debate as to the level (i.e. stakeholders, society, organization) at which the value can be produced. Third, there is debate as to who the beneficiaries of the collaboration are. In turn, each one of these themes is discussed below.

The debate about public value creation focuses on whether value is created through the process of the collaboration (procedural benefit), or whether it is created from the final outcomes and impacts around the problem that the collaboration is expected to fix (substantive improvements) (Bobker, 2009). Kallis et al (2009) states that in a shared-power world, both process and outputs must be addressed and argue a collaboration may be successful in creating value through the process; however, it will not be sustained unless it is able to produce results to fix the problem it is intended to solve. Their arguments lead us to posit processes matter just as much as outcomes, but there is no agreement in the literature.
The public management collaborative literature documents some efforts to identify hard measures of outcomes. Andrews and Entwistle (2010) evaluated 16 local governments in the United Kingdom using cross-sector collaborations in their service departments. They identified hard measures of effectiveness (the indicator was formal service achievement); efficiency (indicators used were the input and output ratios); and equity in the provisions of services (the indicator was the extent to which the service department is providing services to the underserved) (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010). Yet, this does not address the concern of Connick and Innes (2003), who asserted hard measures were not enough. They proposed “adding indicators such as learning or the way in which the collaboration reshapes the policy context and instigates new forms of actions” (Connick & Innes, 2003). They emphasize the need to consider procedural indicators as well. There is policy literature that documents such procedural benefits, proposing indicators as varied as social and political capital, agreed-upon information and shared understanding, learning and change beyond the original stakeholders, innovation, a cascade of changes in attitudes, behaviors and actions, institutions and practices that involve flexibility and networks; continuous negotiation, learning and adapting goals in the context of disagreement and change (Innes & Booher, 1999; Kallis et al, 2009; Connick & Innes, J, 2003).

The second theme in the literature on how cross-sector collaborations create public value pertains to the level of analysis with which to explore value creation. Value can be created for a variety of actors, and each level can be studied as a different level of analysis. For example, we can examine value creation at the individual level, organizational level, as a partnership, and as a society. The fact that value can be created for different actors at various levels reinforces the idea that value is in fact a complex, multidimensional concept (Austin, 2010). For this reason, most of the literature only focuses on the partnership level. Austin (2010) analyzed twenty-four cases of cross-sector collaborations in Latin America, and he tried to identify the value created
for different partner organizations. The task itself was so vast and complex that it was difficult for him to explore the value created. Le Bert and Branzei (2010) explored how different organizations from different sectors define value and how they recognize and work with their partners in regard to that meaning. They explored this by comparing process narratives of successful and unsuccessful cross sector collaborations. This was also at the partnership level.

The third theme is the analysis of the impact of the partnership on the collaboration’s beneficiaries. There is very little scholarly literature on the impact of the partnership on the collaboration’s beneficiaries, or on society in general. One study that exists is by Cornelius and Wallace (2010), who conducted an in-depth case study of cross-sector collaborations in urban regeneration projects. They found “positive effects on the beneficiaries’ sense of procedural justice when the partnership governance is built upon negotiated values and strong community voice, and found a deficit on the effects of partnerships on accumulation of and access to goods that enable greater participation in society” (Cornelius & Wallace, 2010, p. 71). Austin (2010) analyzed social alliances in Latin America and showed the impact on beneficiaries’ access to goods and services that they did not have access to before.

Three-Dimension Framework

In recent years, Page, Stone, Bryson, and Crosby (2015) developed a framework to assess the public value produced by cross-sector collaborations. Their framework was an attempt to merge the public value paradigms of Moore (1995), Bozeman (2007), and Mehynhardt (2009). In addition, they recognized not only that public value outcomes need to be assessed in a cross-sector collaboration, but also that public value created by the process of the collaboration needs to be assessed (Page et al, 2015). This is the framework that will guide this research.

Page et al (2015) proposed a framework for public value creation by cross-sector collaborations that encompasses three dimensions that the literatures on public management,
administration, and accountability tend to treat separately: democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes (performance). They derived this framework from the three approaches of public administration: traditional public administration, new public management, and public value management (Page et al, 2015). Each component of the framework is discussed below.

A major concern of traditional public administration and of the democratic deficit critique is whether cross-sector collaborations are accountable. Democratic accountability is the idea that collaborative governance involves transparent, open decision processes that are responsive to authorizers, stakeholders, and citizens (Page et al, 2015). Page et al (2015) suggests that democratic accountability has both vertical and horizontal attributes. Horizontal democratic accountability is measured by responsiveness, collaborative partners, and external stakeholders; whereas, vertical democratic accountability is measured by responsiveness to authorizers and legal mandates (Page et al, 2015). Vertical democratic accountability ensures that the collaboration’s work is legal and supported by elected and appointed officials, while horizontal accountability can add public value through deliberation and agreement among stakeholders (Stoker, 2006).

Procedural legitimacy, a focal point of the public management approach, is the belief that processes within the collaboration are fair, transparent, rational, and intentional. Management is hard for collaborations, because each stakeholder has their own processes, systems, and organizational culture. Leach and Sabatier (2005) state that procedural legitimacy helps all involved to accept the results that collaborations produce. In addition, it ensures that the collaboration is being managed effectively. Page et al (2015) identified three attributes of a collaboration that are crucial to its legitimacy: procedural rationality, procedural justice, and operational control. Procedural rationality is the extent to which a decision process involves the
collection of information relevant to the decision and the reliance upon analysis of this information in making the choice (Page et al., 2015). Any decision that is made by a collaboration should be justified or explained if necessary. Procedural justice refers to the extent to which a decision is seen as fair and transparent (Page et al., 2015). A decision made by a stakeholder may not be agreed upon by everyone, but if the way the decision was reached is fair, then it will be more accepted. Operational control refers to the implementation of plans, budgets, and schedules to ensure that the cross-sector collaboration is doing exactly what was decided (Page et al., 2015).

Substantive outcomes are the focal point of the new public value approach. Substantive outcomes focus on performance accountability, which emphasizes effectiveness and efficiency. A collaboration can add public value by attaining its goals and ends effectively and efficiently. Also, equity must be taken into account. For Stone (2011), equity involves who benefits, what is distributed, and the process of distributing benefits. In addition to effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, enhanced problem-solving capacity is also an attribute of substantive outcomes. This measures the ability of the cross-sector collaboration to be innovative and solve pressing issues as they arrive during the life of the collaboration. Table 2.2 provides a summary of Page et al.’s (2015) three-dimensional framework.

Insert Table 2.2 Three-Dimensional Framework

Page et al. (2015) applied their framework to assess public value creation to the Minnesota’s Urban Partnership Agreement (MUPA), which was a joint undertaking of various federal, state, and local transportation agencies, along with a number of affected local governments. Funding came from the United States Department of Transportation and the state
of Minnesota, in the form of a grant. The United States Department of Transportation set up a competitive request proposal process that would grant urban regions funding to integrate transit, tolling, technology, and telecommuting strategies to reduce traffic congestion. The MUPA stakeholders submitted twenty-four projects and received $133.3 million from the United States Department of Transportation (Page et al, 2015). Implementation of those projects required cross-agency technical teams and working groups. Page et al (2015) conducted detailed, longitudinal research on the Minnesota Urban Partnership Agreement. From reviews of project documents and several waves of interview data gathered over three phases of the Minnesota project, they generated a project history.

Drawing from the project history, they applied their framework to consider how to assess the project’s creation of public value. However, what they found was that cross-sector collaborations are subject to changes in their internal characteristics and external environments, which is likely to influence assessments of their public value attributes. For example, since stakeholder involvement varied over time, horizontal democratic accountability was hard to assess due to the fact that the stakeholders had changed. They also found that the multi-faceted nature of public value and the complexity of each attribute in the framework required that the assessor develop deep knowledge and make delicate judgements about the specific context, processes, and structures of a collaboration and its pursuit of public value (Page et al, 2015). Thirdly, they found there are numerous trade-offs within the attributes and among the attributes mentioned earlier, democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes (Page et al, 2015). These trade-offs complicate the assessments of the overall public value a cross-sector collaboration creates, because its pursuit of one attribute or dimension of public value may compromise the pursuit of others. For example, in the MUPA cross-sector collaboration studied by Page et al (2015), democratic accountability required gubernatorial
approval of Minnesota’s proposal for federal funding, but the governor refused to support the federal requirement to toll existing lanes. The resulting compromise – tolling shoulder lanes – diminished performance accountability by compromising safety and complicated democratic accountability by satisfying the governor while dismay Federal Highway Administration representatives (Page et al, 2015).

This study will provide a more nuanced understanding of public value for researchers and practitioners, an area that is currently lacking clarification and empirical evidence. Most research that explores cross-sector collaboration and public value fails to consider the collaboration as dynamic and complex. Page et al (2015) attempt to consider this with their creation of the three-dimensional framework to assess public value in cross-sector collaborations. Consequently, the framework they created left more questions than answers as discussed in the previous paragraphs. They concluded, as many researchers have done in the past, that cross-sector collaborations are so dynamic they are difficult to study (Page et al, 2015). This research will expand the understanding on how public value is created in cross-sector collaborations.

Summary

This chapter addressed the body of literature and the theories pertaining to cross-sector collaboration, the concept of public value, and public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. In examining cross-sector collaborations, this review first focused on why cross-sector collaborations occur. It then addressed the various cross-sector collaboration frameworks proposed in recent years, with specific emphasis on the different components of cross-sector collaborations that those frameworks address. This section demonstrated the lack of attention placed on accountabilities and outcomes.

One way to measure accountabilities and outcomes in a cross-sector collaboration is through the assessment of public value. The second portion of the literature review addressed
the concept of public value. It examined the three main streams of public value and the attempt to try to combine the streams. The final section of the literature review focused on assessing public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. It addressed the main debates and challenges in assessing public value creation in cross-sector collaborations and introduced the framework that will guide this research, Page et al’s (2015) framework, that took in consideration those debates, as well as combined the three main streams of public value.

While Chapter 2 provides an overarching review of the theoretical body of literature pertaining to cross-sector collaborations, public value, and public value creation in cross-sector collaborations, Chapter 3 will explain the methodology and research design utilized to explore the research questions identified in Chapter 1, as well as the facets of qualitative research.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design

This chapter explains the methodological framework for this research. Specifically, it identifies the approach used to answer the research questions identified in Chapter 1. It provides a discussion of the research design, including case identification and selection, data collection, and data analysis.

Research Design and Methodology

Creswell (2013) lists the following instances for when it is appropriate to utilize the qualitative approach: when a problem or issue needs to be explored; when there is a need for a complex, detailed understanding of the issue; it can help explain the contexts in which people in a study address an issue or problem; it helps to develop theories when partial or inadequate theories exist for certain populations, and samples or existing theories do not adequately capture the complexity of the problem that is being examined. Exploration is needed when there is a need to study a group or population, and to identify variables that cannot be easily measured. Qualitative methodology is appropriate for this study because the problem involves exploratory research in a natural setting and the variables are unknown. The research will explore whether or not the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force created public value through document analysis and interviews of stakeholders that served on the task force from 2003-2012.

This research study uses an existing theoretical framework to enhance our understanding of public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. It applies an existing theoretical framework (Page et al 2015) to a cross-sector collaboration that has different characteristics than in the original study. The application of Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework can therefore provide a more nuanced understanding of public value creation.
This research study utilizes a grounded theory approach to qualitative research. The purpose of the use of grounded theory is to look beyond description, and to generate or discover theory. The idea is that development of theory is not easily generated, but that it is generated from participants who have experienced the process being studied. Creswell (2013) states, “a grounded theory study has movement or some action that the researcher is attempting to explain” (p. 85). In addition, grounded theory can also be utilized when there is an existing theory that might be incomplete or that has different variables than in the previous studies. In the case of this study, the process or action is the decision-making of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. Furthermore, an existing theory is being applied, but to a different public sector cross-sector collaboration to enhance the understanding of public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. Also, this research includes both a case study and a descriptive element. The descriptive element of the research focuses on the project history of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The case study portion of the research seeks to better understand how public value was created in the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. A key component of the grounded theory approach is conducting interviews. In-depth interviews of 20 stakeholders occurred, as well as a case study analysis of project documents to assess whether public value was created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

Research Questions

In order to explore how public value was created in the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force, the following questions guided the research:

1. Was public value created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force? Why or why not?
   a. Was the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force democratically accountable?
b. Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrate procedural legitimacy?
c. Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force have substantive outcomes?

These research questions are centered around the three-dimensions that make up Page et al’s (2015) framework: democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes. Democratic accountability is the idea that collaborative governance involves transparent, open decision processes that are responsive to authorizers, stakeholders, and citizens (Page et al, 2015). Procedural legitimacy is the belief that processes within the collaboration are fair, transparent, rational, and intentional (Page et al, 2015). Substantive outcomes focus on performance, which emphasizes effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and problem-solving capability (Page et al, 2015).

Case Identification and Selection

The literature identifies seven case selection procedures to consider: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different (Seawright & Gerring 2008).

1. Typical Case – is representative of the population.
2. Diverse Case – is representative in the minimal sense of representing the full variation of the population.
3. Extreme Case – is achievable only in comparison with a larger sample of cases.
4. Deviant Case – is considered an outlier.
5. Influential Case – is not representative, but has an influence on the independent variables.
6. Most Similar Cases – are cases that are similar except for the independent variable.
7. Most Different Cases – are cases that vary greatly except one independent variable and one dependent variable.
The case selection method for this research project is procedure number one, typical case study. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force is considered a representative case, but allows space to explore the casual mechanisms at work within the case.

Alabama Homeland Security Task Force represents the definition of cross-sector collaboration. Cross-sector collaboration is defined as “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that should not be achieved by organizations in one sector” (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015, p. 648). Page et al’s (2015) case study on cross-sector collaboration was the Minnesota Urban Partnership Agreement, which consisted of various federal, state, and local transportation agencies, along with a number of affected local governments. The area of focus was transportation and was limited in the number of sectors involved. In addition, the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration was not mandated, but simply necessary to complete the projects. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force case study utilized in this research focuses on the area of homeland security and consists of a wider variety of sectors than Page et al’s (2015) example. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was created as a requirement by the US Department of Homeland Security to apply for homeland security grant funds. In order to achieve its mission, not only did the task force have to consist of local and state homeland security agencies, but also local, state, and federal transportation, law enforcement, emergency management, and fire. In addition, representatives from agriculture, public health, criminal justice, port security, and airport authorities were a part of the collaboration. Nonprofit agencies, as well as local and state government were also a part of the collaboration.
In addition, the literature suggests that in order to better apply the framework that Page et al (2015) proposes, that the assessor must develop a deep knowledge about the processes and structures of the cross-sector collaboration. The researcher’s extensive knowledge about homeland security is a great benefit for this research because he or she will have a better understanding of the workings of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force, as well as be familiar with the various projects led by the task force.¹

Data Collection

Document Analysis

Data collection occurred in two phases. In the first phase of the study, there was an analysis of project documents from 2003-2012 relating to the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force using the indicators from the public value attributes as detailed in the Page et al (2015) framework. These documents and sources included official letters, state legislature documents, task force meeting minutes, reports, task force PowerPoint presentations, and the initial and subsequent grant guidance that was issued by federal homeland security to the states. This phase of the project was designed to help provide a detailed history and the dynamics of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

The use of document analysis to aid this research was very beneficial. First, it assisted in gaining important information about the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force and individual stakeholders that were involved in the decision making for the task force. Second, the document analysis helped inform the construction of potential interview questions. For example, in a 2004 study conducted by Goldstein and Reiboldt, a document analysis was utilized to generate interview questions to study poor families living in an urban community. The authors stated that

¹ The researcher worked as a Grant Program Manager with the Alabama Department of Homeland Security between the years of 2007-2012.
“interview data helped focus specific participant observation activities and document analysis helped generate interview questions” (Goldstein & Reiboldt, 2004, p. 246). Also, it helped verify the findings from the interviews. Third, document analysis helped in identifying key changes and decisions that were made by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. And fourth, the documents helped fill in the gaps from interview participants.

There are advantages and limitations to the use of document analysis in research. Advantages include cost effectiveness (Bowen, 2009), the general availability of documents (Merriam, 1998), and exactness in terms of identifying people and places involved in the issue (Yin, 1994). The limitations to document analysis are that the documents may be biased in terms of the document’s originator (Yin, 1994) and may contain insufficient detail (Bowen, 2009). In the case of this research, the documents were not as detailed in the early years, from 2003-2005. For example, meeting minutes were missing partially and entirely in those years, which limited the researcher’s analysis in the early years of the task force.

Interviews

The second phase of the analyses involved semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders who can provide insight into the key points identified by the document analysis and the detailing of the project history. These interviews were guided by Creswell’s (2013) best practices for interviews. He suggests developing an interview guide or protocol to record responses to the interview questions, which was completed before recruitment was started (Creswell, 2013)

There was a total of 48 possible interview participants because there were 48 different stakeholders that served on the task force between the years of 2003 and 2012. Recruitment and interviews were conducted simultaneously, depending on receipt of agreement to participate and the respondent’s schedule. Recruitment and interviews began in April 2017. Specific names and
contact information of the public officials were obtained from the Alabama’s state homeland security office record of membership.

Invitations were sent through email, mail and telephone. Of the 48 that were contacted, only three did not have an email or phone number. Those participants were contacted through mail only. The other potential participants were contacted either by phone or email. If the researcher only had a phone number, the potential participants were initially contacted by phone and then continued to be contacted by phone. However, if an email existed, the possible participant was initially contacted by email and then the subsequent primary method of contact was by phone. There were seven potential participants who declined to be interviewed due to inability to recall details of serving on the task force, one who was deceased, and twenty who did not respond to the initial invitation and subsequent invitations to participate. Creswell (2013) suggests that at least 20 interviews need to be conducted when conducting qualitative analysis. In the current study, 20 participants were interviewed.

Creswell (2013) encourages the researcher to make sure that the interviewee completes a consent form for the human relations review board. When participants agreed to participate, an informed consent form was emailed to the respondent. Interviewees were promised confidentiality but not anonymity, and each individual was required to sign an informed consent document prior to their interview. Each participant was assigned a code number and a master list of the interviewees was kept in a locked box.

After receipt of the signed consent form, an interview time was scheduled to accommodate the participant. All of the interviews were conducted by telephone.

The goal of the interviews was to assess public value creation within the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The questions were structured, but open-ended to allow the
researcher to ask follow-up questions as necessary. In keeping with the best practices of qualitative researchers, the interview questions were expanded as the interviews continued. As Creswell (2007) recognizes, the emergent detail can lead to the most successful information gathering opportunities.

The interview questions were based on Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework to assess public value creation in cross-sector collaborations, specifically the indicators of each public value attribute as displayed in Table 3.1. The first two interview questions addressed democratic accountability. The questions centered around whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force received any endorsements or informal support from elected officials or agency directors that served on the task force, and if the task force received any resistance, objections, or legal challenges from stakeholders and the public. The next four questions addressed whether the task force had procedural legitimacy. The questions probed as to whether the task force used evidence in making decisions within the task force, whether the stakeholders and the public were included in decision-making, how the decisions were communicated between the stakeholders and the project workers implementing the projects, and how exceptions to the process were handled.

The next six questions focused on substantive outcomes. The questions asked interview subjects to describe how the task force was able to reach its goals and what measures were used to assess it, whether the goals accomplished at a reasonable cost, how the benefits of the collaboration were allocated among the stakeholders and the public, how costs were allocated, whether there were any spin off collaborations and if there were any innovative approaches implemented to address challenging problems. The interview questions are available in Appendix A.
The duration of the interviews was from 30 minutes to an hour. At the beginning of each interview, the interviewer asked if the respondent had any questions regarding the study, particularly those related to its use and the overall confidentiality of information collected. If questions were presented, they were answered.

Interviewees consisted of the following former or current officials: the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security, the director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, the State Health Officer, the Commissioner of Agriculture & Industries, a representative from a county government, a representative from a municipal government, a representative from a county law enforcement agency, a representative from a municipal law enforcement agency, a representative from a paid fire department, a representative from a volunteer fire department, and a local Emergency Management Agency Director. In cases where the stakeholder could not be reached or thought they would not be able to offer sufficient input due to lack of attendance, the interview was conducted with a proxy. According to the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force By-Laws, each stakeholder could name a proxy to attend meetings and vote on their behalf.

It is important to note that the amount of time that the interview participants served on the task force varied. Some of the interview participants that were interviewed served on the task force for eight years, and some only served for one year. In addition, since the interview participants served on the task force between five and fourteen years ago, the remembrance of certain decisions was affected. However, the researcher’s in-depth knowledge about the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force served as a benefit in helping them remember the dynamics and
decisions of the task force. For example, the researcher was able to remember specific federal requirements for particular years or was able to have in-depth discussions about specific projects that a specific stakeholder was in charge of leading. In addition, the researcher was aware that bias may be introduced because each of them had unique characteristics, different orientations, and different perceptions. They may want to make things seem better or worse than they are. The researcher tried to reduce this by making sure that the interview participants understood why the researcher was there, what the researcher was studying, how the data would be collected, and how the data would be used.

When each interview was concluded, the respondent was thanked for his or her participation and told that if he or she had any questions in the future regarding the interview or the research project in general, he or she could contact the principal investigator or the faculty advisory. The interview was then concluded. Utilizing a technique that is standard in qualitative research, the interviews were recorded and transcribed after the interview had been conducted. In addition, during and after the interviews, notes were made about impressions of the interview, a technique recommended by numerous scholars (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Field & Morse, 1985; Morse, 2002).

Data Analysis

Best practices of data analysis in social science research were utilized during data analyses. Bowen (2009) asserts that document analysis requires that “data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical meaning” (p. 27). In this research, data analysis occurred in two phases. In the first phase, documents were analyzed to detail the project history and structure of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.
In the second phase, interview transcripts were analyzed to assess public value creation in the task force using the public value attributes according to Page et al’s (2015) framework. Page et al (2015) identified public value attributes that make up their three-dimensional framework: democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes. Those public value attributes were utilized to assess public value creation in the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. Page et al (2015) established definitions and indicators for each public value attribute within his framework and those same definitions and indicators were utilized. Each attribute, its definition, and indicators are listed in Table 3.1.

The technique of content analysis was utilized to analyze the data collected during the interviews. Schutt (2009) explains that “the goal of content analysis is to develop inferences from text (p. 471). There are advantages to using content analysis. One is that the document is usually easy to study. Also, it is inexpensive to use. It produces highly reliable data, and it is an unobtrusive method since the researcher cannot influence the behavior of the people being studied. The disadvantage to this method is that it may not be as objective since the researcher must select and record data accurately (Schutt, 2009).

The concept of validity is defined as “correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account” (Siccama & Penna, 2008, p. 91). In order to increase the validity of the analysis, a computer aided content analysis software called Nvivo was utilized. Siccama and Penna (2008) identified five strategies to increase validity by ensuring that the appropriate data is being used, the inquiry is thorough, and the best outcomes are being achieved when using Nvivo. These five strategies guided the data analysis. The five strategies are: interrogate interpretations for sound inquiry, scope data for a well-founded analysis, establish saturation for robust explanation, maintain audit and log trails, and use visual
representations (Siccama & Penna, 2008). Interrogation of the data within Nvivo means using the software’s available coding tools to create categories and coding to develop layered dimensions for coding themes. Scoping the data means specifying a subset of data to search, in which the Query tools allow for specifying what, how, and where to search and what do with the results (Siccama & Penna, 2008). Establishing saturation within Nvivo is accomplished by the usage of several of its tools to show connections between ideas and to clarify relationships and concepts. The Nvivo modeling tool helps establish that saturation by allowing for the investigation of emerging ideas without interrupting the database of documents in the study. Maintaining audit and log trails provides a way to track decisions and assumptions, as well as allow outsiders to see how decisions and assumptions have evolved over the life of the project. Nvivo screen captures can be used to maximize transparency when communicating research finds as well as to demonstrate that the software was used consistently.

Nvivo is a significant asset to categorizing and arranging themes after an initial hand analysis. For this research, the interview transcripts were uploaded into the Nvivo 11 software. Then the researcher created nodes based on the general themes of the interview questions. The data from the interview transcriptions were manually coded by looking at the responses of each interview participant and placing the responses in the appropriate node. In addition, the Nvivo 11 software assisted with counting multiple responses within a theme.

Conclusion

Corbin and Straus (2008) state, “Qualitative analysis is many things, but it is not a process that can be rigidly codified….it requires an intuitive sense of what is going on in the data; trust in the self and research process; and the ability to remain creative, flexible and true to the data all at the same time… researchers have to feel their way through, something that can
only be learned by doing” (p. 16). The next chapter will provide an analysis of the task force by exploring the dynamics and structure using the Page et al (2015) framework as a guide.
Chapter 4: Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

In order to better understand whether public value was created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force, it is essential to understand the dynamics of the task force. But to better understand the dynamics, there must first be an examination of the agency which formed the task force and an explanation of the various grant programs which funded the projects. This chapter provides an overview of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force and the projects under its direction, as well as an analysis according to Page et al.’s (2015) three-dimensional framework.

Federal, State, and Local Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security was created in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that happened on American soil. Former President George W. Bush led the way in the creation of the department, which housed more than 100 different government organizations under one department (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2002). President Bush believed the Department of Homeland Security would make America safer because its “primary mission would be to protect the American homeland; secure borders, transportation sector, ports, and critical infrastructure; synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence from multiple sources; coordinate communications with state and local governments, private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness; coordinate efforts to protect the American people against weapons of mass destruction; train and equip first responders; manage federal emergency activities; and the lessening of duplicate and redundant activities that drain critical homeland security resources” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 5). The Department of Homeland Security was divided into four divisions in order to achieve its mission: 1) border and transportation security; 2) emergency
preparedness and response; 3) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; and 4) information analysis and infrastructure protection.

Although the department absorbed more than 100 organizations to help achieve its mission, it continues to rely heavily on collaborations among other federal departments, state and local governments, and the private sector. For example, although part of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission is to prevent terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland Security still has to work with the Department of Justice and the FBI, since they are the lead law enforcement agencies for preventing terrorist attacks. The Department of Transportation still continues to be the lead agency in ensuring the safety of highways and roads, but the Department of Homeland Security is tasked with protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks. It is imperative that the two departments work together.

For the purposes of this study, the focus will be on the DHS’s collaborative efforts with state and local programs. In the 2006 Homeland Security Grant Guidance, it states that “an effective homeland security program hinges on sound program governance structures that help ensure the program is capable of conducting business across departments, agencies, and disciplines at all levels of government (p.87).” Each state is required to have a lead agency that manages its overall homeland security program, but it is recognized that the scope of the program transcends agencies and demands collaboration among all key constituencies in order to achieve success (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006)

Before the attacks on September 11, 2001, state and local governments were eligible for three federal grants pertinent to homeland security: 1) the State Domestic Preparedness Program (SDPP), administered by the Department of Justice, 2) the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG), administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and 3)
the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (United States Congress, 2006). After the September 11th terrorist attacks, new funding led to a total of six grant programs, administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that were designed to aid and enhance state and local homeland security programs’ capabilities. These six programs included: the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG), the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP). In turn, each of these programs is discussed in the following paragraphs.

The SHSGP provides assistance to local and state governments to prepare for a terrorist attack due to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (United States Congress, 2006). It authorizes the purchase of equipment to enhance first responder capabilities, as well as provides specialized training. The funds can be used to plan, design, develop, conduct, and evaluate exercises to assess the readiness of the state and local jurisdictions in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. The CRS Report for Congress (2006) explains that states were the only authorized applicants, but the following state and local entities were eligible to receive and use funding: emergency management agencies, homeland security agencies or offices, fire departments, law enforcement agencies, emergency medical services, hazardous material-handling personnel, public works agencies, public health agencies, government administrative agencies or offices, and public safety communication agencies or offices” (p. 5).

The LETPP provides funds to enhance the state and local law enforcement efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks (United States Congress, 2006). LETPP specifically focuses upon the prevention of terrorist attacks and provides law enforcement and public safety
communities working with their private partners’ funds to support the following activities: “intelligence gathering and information sharing through enhancing/establishing fusion centers; hardening high value targets; planning strategically; continuing to build interoperable communications; and collaborating with non-law enforcement partners, other government agencies and the private sector” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 87). In addition, the grant also supports law enforcement type training, exercises, equipment and personnel to better prevent and respond to terrorist attacks (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 87).

The UASI grant program is a discretionary program that provides funding to high-risk and high-threat urban areas to help prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks (United States Congress, 2006). Only cities with a population greater than 100,000 and any city with reported threat data during the past year are eligible for the grant (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). The grant is used to “address the unique multi-discipline planning, operations, equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high density Urban Areas, and to assist them in building and sustaining capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from threats or acts of terrorism” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 76). Exercises, training, and equipment purchases to build capabilities are strongly encouraged.

The EMPG funding is designed to provide assistance in the development, maintenance, and improvement of state and local emergency management capabilities (United States Congress, 2006). The Federal Emergency Management Agency established the grant for the purpose of providing a system of emergency preparedness for the protection of life and property from hazards and to jointly work with states and locals (US Department of Homeland Security,
2006). However, each state governor is responsible for determining the amount of funds that is given to the local agencies.

The MMRS program provides Department of Homeland Security jurisdictions with the capabilities to handle a mass casualty event due to a terrorist attack, as well as hazardous materials incidents, epidemic disease outbreaks, or natural disasters (United States Congress, 2006). States are encouraged to pass through 100 percent of grant funds, but may retain 20 percent to facilitate strategy assessment and capability integration between the State and MMRS jurisdictions (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). The MMRS grant requires the establishment of linkages among emergency responders, medical treatment resources, public health officials, emergency management offices, volunteer organizations and other local elements working together to reduce the mortality and morbidity that would result from a catastrophic incident (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006).

The CCP is “created to coordinate volunteer organizations with the mission to make local communities safe and prepared to respond to any emergency situation” (United States Congress, 2006, p. 9). More specifically, funds are to provide resources for states and local communities to: “1) bring together the appropriate leadership to form and sustain a Citizen Corps Council; 2) develop and implement a plan or amend existing plans to achieve widespread citizen preparedness and participation; 3) conduct public education and outreach; 4) ensure clear emergency communications with the public; 5) develop training programs for the public; 6) facilitate citizen participation in exercises; 7) implement volunteer programs and activities to support emergency responders; 8) involve citizens in surge capacity roles and responsibilities; and 9) conduct evaluations of programs and activities” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 106).
According to the USA PATRIOT Act, the states were to use four of the six programs (SHSGP, LETPP, EMPG and CCP) in “conjunction with units of local government to enhance the capability of State and local jurisdictions to prepare for and respond to terrorist acts including events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, and biological, nuclear, radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive devices” (P.L. 107-56, Sec. 1014(a)). The UASI and MMRS grants were allocated at the discretion of DHS to certain urban areas and metropolitan medical systems. Within DHS, the Office of Grants and Training was tasked with administering these grants for state and local governments and were designed to help local law enforcement agencies, fire departments, emergency medical services, hospitals, and emergency managers prepare for, prevent, mitigate, and respond to manmade or natural disasters.

In order to meet the required mandate that all states have a lead agency to manage their state’s homeland security program, Alabama created the first cabinet-level state homeland security department in the nation. The Alabama Department of Homeland Security was created in 2003 by the Alabama legislature with the passage of the Alabama Homeland Security Act of 2003. The act “designated the department to coordinate the receipt, distribution, and monitoring of all funds available from any source for the purpose of equipping, training, research and education in regards to homeland security related items, issues, or services” (Alabama Department of Homeland Security History, 2017). In addition, the department was designated and authorized to coordinate all operations and activities of the state related to homeland security efforts.
Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

Purpose

In order to carry out its mission, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security has to coordinate efforts and work with local and state agencies from different sectors and disciplines, such as emergency management, agriculture and industries, and public health. This mandate requires the creation of a cross-sector collaboration, which became the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

According to the bylaws of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force, the task force is “an advisory body to the Director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security on matters pertaining to the comprehensive plan for the prevention and protection of Alabama citizens and Alabama’s critical infrastructure from acts of terrorism and; as necessary, the efforts required to respond and recover from a terrorist related event” (p. 1).

Structure

The task force consists of the following members: Governor (Ex Officio Chairman), Director of Homeland Security (Vice Chairman), Director of Emergency Management Agency, Adjutant General, Attorney General, Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, State Health Officer, Director of Public Safety, Director of Transportation, Director of Finance, Director of the Alabama Port Authority, State Fire Marshal, a representative of county governments, a representative of municipal governments, a representative of county law enforcement agencies, a representative of municipal law enforcement agencies, a representative of paid fire departments, a representative of volunteer fire departments, a representative of local emergency management agencies, a representative of local emergency communications districts, a representative of Alabama Airport Authorities, and a representative of judicial branches. As demonstrated in
Table 4.1, the task force members that are not state officials are appointed by state officials in accordance to 31-9A-12, *Alabama Code*, 1975. Each of these appointments is made from a list of three nominees. All of the appointments have to be in writing and a copy of the appointment letter has to be given to the Recording Secretary, which is the executive assistant of the Director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security. Each of the representatives serve a three-year term, but could serve multiple terms if appointed again. The state agency directors serve as long as they are employed by their respective agency.

Insert Table 4.1 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force Appointments

Meetings

The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force is required to meet at least once each quarter of the year. To comply with the Alabama Open Meetings Act, each scheduled meeting is made public and citizens are invited to attend. This law guarantees that Alabama’s citizens have open access to governmental bodies. In addition, the task force stakeholders receive both an email and letter at least one month in advance of the scheduled meeting.

According to the Bylaws of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force, if a member of the Task Force cannot attend a regular or special meeting, the task force member can designate a representative to attend the meeting as a proxy, but this designation has to be in writing at least five days before the regular meeting date and at least 24 hours prior to a special meeting. The proxy has the same voting power as the task force member. The Governor serves as the *ex officio* chairman of the Task Force and the Director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security serves as the vice-chairman. A quorum for the meeting consists of a majority of the members or designated proxies. If the chairman misses any of the meetings, the vice-chairman is authorized to perform all the normal duties of the chairman in his or her absence. According to the task
force meeting minutes, the chairman of the task force was never present at the task force meetings, so the vice-chairman conducted all the meetings. If a vacancy occurred in an appointed position, then the Recording Secretary had to send out a notice to the designated appointing authority within 30 days and the vacancy had to be filled within 90 days.

Decision Making Process

Prior to 2006, federal DHS did not require that any assessment be completed. Funding was simply decided by the population of each state. This meant that states like California received more homeland security grant funding than states like Mississippi. But starting in 2006, in order to apply for any of the state and local homeland security grant funding from DHS, a program and capability review was required. The program and capability review is a process to help define the state’s needs in order to comply with the national priorities set by DHS and the all-hazard National Preparedness Goal (Alabama Department of Homeland Security, 2009). For the Alabama Department of Homeland Security, the program and capability review is led by an independent strategic planning agency. The stakeholders involved in the program and capability review were the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Alabama Department of Homeland Security, Alabama Department of Public Health, Agriculture and Industries, Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center, Alabama Department of Public Safety, and the Governor’s Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives. It is important to note that the stakeholders that served on the program and capability were not the same stakeholders that made up the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. These stakeholders are lead agencies in the process because of the expertise that they bring to ALDHS and US DHS priority areas. Once the program and capability review is complete the enhancement plan can be completed. The enhancement plan is a “multi-year, multi-funding source plan to maintain key strengths or address key weaknesses
through the implementation of initiatives” (Alabama Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The enhancement plan is used in the development of the investment justification to send to DHS for grant funding. The investment justification is the actual request for funding for near-term priorities identified in the enhancement plan (Alabama Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

According to the task force meeting minutes, to help make funding and programmatic decisions, the stakeholders of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force are presented with the results of the program and capability review, investment justifications, a thorough list of previously funded projects, and a list of US DHS priorities (Alabama Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The vice chairman presents them at the meetings. The stakeholders discuss and vote on funding priorities and projects following Robert’s Rules of Order. The vice chairman then takes the results of the vote and briefs the chairman (governor) and the Alabama legislature homeland security oversight committee (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). Once briefed, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security submits for funding from US DHS.

Once funding is released, the decisions that are made during the task force meeting are communicated back to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security and that is communicated to the implementers of the projects through an official letter. The implementers of the projects are required to provide budget detail worksheets and they are presented to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security for formal approval. Once these budgets are formally approved, grant agreements and memorandums of agreements are issued and projects begin. In addition, as required by US DHS, bi-annual strategy implementation reports were required by each stakeholder to receive funding to track the implementation of the projects. This was enforced by the Alabama Department of Homeland Security.
It is important to note that the state and local grants were two-year grants and some were extended passed the two-year deadline. As a result, the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force had numerous projects occurring simultaneously. Some of the projects were the same, but some were different due to the changes in the US DHS priorities for that particular year. For example, in 2003 the focus of the projects was on enhancing and building mutual aid teams. Although this remained a major project each year, there were new projects, such as enhancing interoperable communications.


Although the task force is still in existence, for the purpose of this study, the focus will be between 2003 and 2012. The years 2003 and 2012 are important years. The year 2003 was the start of some of the projects that the task force would be in charge of implementing and sustaining throughout its existence. The year 2012 marked a full year of leadership change within the task force, as well as a shift in its priorities. It is important to note that Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was not in existence in 2003 as defined by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force By-laws. Instead, the Alabama Homeland Security Work Council was in existence, which was created by the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security. This working group led the efforts to conduct the Alabama Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy. This was an assessment of economic drivers and critical infrastructure in relationship to threats and vulnerabilities and current state and jurisdiction capabilities and needs pertaining to weapons of mass destruction (Alabama Homeland Security Strategy and Assessment, 2003). Once the Alabama Department of Homeland Security became a staffed state agency with a legislative charter, the Alabama Homeland Security Work Council was dismantled and the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was created with specific by-laws under the direction of the governor of Alabama.
Changes in the Make-up of the Task Force

Since the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force is made-up of a majority of cabinet-level directors that were appointed by the Governor of Alabama, there were small changes in stakeholders over the eight-year period. And since the Governor of Alabama serves as the chairman of the task force and the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security serves as the vice-chairman, there was no change in those two positions until there was a change in governor, which only occurred once between 2004-2012.

From 2004 to 2005, there was a change in the stakeholders representing the attorney general, finance director, state fire marshal, and county law enforcement. From 2005 to 2006, there was no change in task force stakeholders. From 2006-2007, there was a change in the stakeholders representing the department of public safety, the local municipal law enforcement agencies, and the local emergency management agencies. From 2007-2008, there were changes in the stakeholders representing the state emergency management agency, adjutant general, local 911, and airport authorities. From 2008-2009, there was a change in stakeholders representing the municipal government agencies and the judicial branch. From 2009 to 2010, there was no change in task force stakeholders. In 2011, Alabama elected a new governor. This meant that 2011 was the first time that the chairman and the ex officio chairman were different. As a direct result, all stakeholders changed except for public health, port authority, state fire marshal, municipal government agencies, volunteer fire departments, airport authority, and the judicial branch. This was simply due to the fact that those stakeholders’ positions were not affected by the election of a new governor and they were able to finish out their three-year term. From
2011-2012, there was a change in stakeholders representing the finance department and the volunteer fire departments.

The next sections will explain US DHS funding priorities and the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force’s funding patterns from 2003-2012. The US DHS funding priorities set the tone as to what projects that the task force would approve and fund.


In order to understand the funding pattern of 2004, there must first be a discussion of the funding pattern for 2003. In 2003, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security received $34.5 million from the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). There was no guidance from the US Department of Homeland Security as to how the funds were to be expended. So, the primary focus of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was the creation and supplying of law enforcement and mutual aid support teams on a regional basis throughout Alabama. The state of Alabama was divided into seven regions and each region had multiple mutual aid teams. The teams were created to assist in the response of a man-made or natural disaster and were tasked with responding to those types of incidents within their respective regions, but also could be called to respond in other regions upon request. Eight regional law enforcement teams were created and designed specifically to respond to law enforcement type incidents. There were 44 regional mutual aid support teams as well, that ranged from water rescue to hazmat response (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The number of mutual aid support teams in each region varied. However, most teams were stationed in the bigger cities of each region. For example, Region 1 (the City of Mobile) housed multiple mutual aid teams. Also, there was funding for an exercise and training program to properly prepare the mutual aid teams and regional law enforcement teams.
National Priorities

The FY 2004 Homeland Security Grant Guidance provided more guidance than what was provided in 2003. The most important addition was that at least 80% of the grant funds had to be allocated to local units of government, but a state agency could enter into a memorandum of understanding to “hold” funding for local units of government (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004). This remains a requirement of homeland security funding. Also, grant funds were encouraged to be used on “homeland security and emergency operations planning; the purchase of specialized equipment to enhance the capability of State and local agencies to prevent, respond to, and mitigate incidents of terrorism involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons and cyber-attacks; for costs related to the design, development, and conduct of a State CBRNE and cyber security training programs and attendance at ODP-sponsored CBRNE training courses; for costs related to the design, development, conduct, and evaluation of CBRNE and cyber security exercises; and for costs associated with implementing State Homeland Security Assessments and Strategies” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 6).

In addition, grant funds were encouraged to be used to provide law enforcement communities with funds for the following activities: “1) information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks; 2) target hardening to reduce vulnerability of selected high value targets; 3) threat recognition to recognize the potential or development of a threat; 4) intervention activities to interdict terrorists before they can execute a threat; 5) interoperable communications; and 6) management and administration” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 38).
Grant funds were also encouraged to be used to include citizens in homeland security initiatives. This includes bringing together the appropriate leadership to form and sustain a Citizen Corps Council as well as developing and implementing a plan for the community to engage all citizens in homeland security, community preparedness, and family safety. Also, this includes conducting public education and outreach to inform the public about its role in crime prevention, mitigation, emergency preparedness for all hazards, and public health measures, including bio-terrorism. Grant funds were used to encourage personal responsibility and action as well as for developing and implementing Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Neighborhood Watch, Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), and Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004).

Funding Patterns

In 2004, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security received $37 million in grant funding from the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was officially created this year. As a result of the national priorities, the primary focus of the task force was enhancing interoperable communications, information sharing, infrastructure protection, and ensuring that funding was received by all 67 local jurisdictions rather than by region. The task force approved projects that enhanced prevention and protection while continuing to improve response and recovery by the continuous funding of the mutual aid teams and the regional law enforcement teams. Funding was used to enhance interoperable communications among local first responders and state agencies, which included the purchasing of computers and radios so that there was basic interoperability. In addition, funding was approved to enhance information sharing and infrastructure protection, which included state agencies that participated on the task force, such
as emergency management, public health, transportation, and the attorney general’s office. Also, this was the first year that the task force decided to provide funding to all 67 counties in Alabama and a federally recognized Indian tribe to enhance prevention, protection, response and recovery at the local level (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). Counties such as Jefferson, Mobile, Montgomery, and Madison received a greater share of the funding due to population size and increased risk of possible threats. Funding ranged from $500,000 to $865,000 (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2004) per county. Other counties received much lower allocations ranging from $75,000 to $200,000 (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2004). With this inclusion, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security had to appoint local county points of contact, which were majority local emergency management agencies and a few law enforcement agencies, for each Alabama county. The homeland security county point of contact oversaw his or her respective county’s homeland security program. In addition, he or she was in charge of a smaller version of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force made up of first responders and government officials representative of their individual counties.

2005 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

National Priorities

There were more specific priorities set by the US DHS in 2005. US DHS funds were to be used to build and maintain the capabilities that were established in previous years. There was a requirement to be National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant, which is a nationwide approach that requires all levels of government and first responders to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from incidents (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005). Another national priority was to develop capabilities to prevent, detect, interdict, and respond to IED terrorist attacks (US Department of
Homeland Security, 2005). Enhancing tactical interoperable communications was also a priority, which means that all emergency responder agencies should be able to communicate with each other while responding to an incident (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005). The incorporation of the National Response Plan (NRP) in all facets of response became a priority. The NRP is an “all discipline, all hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005, p. 53). In addition, the establishment of an Institutional Awareness Training, which covers basic awareness training for prevention and deterrence of terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, explosive devices, and radiological and nuclear materials was a US DHS priority (US Department of Homeland Security 2005). The creation of the Catastrophic Incident Plan (CIP), which incorporates procedures on how to respond to mass casualties as well as damage and destruction that severely affects public infrastructure, the environment, the economy and government functions was a priority of US DHS (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005). Finally, an emphasis was also placed on public awareness and citizen participation with the purpose of educating the public on the importance of being prepared in case of a man-made or natural disaster as well as to be trained on how to assist trained first responders. (US Department of Homeland Security, 2005)

Funding Patterns

In 2005, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was awarded $28 million in grant funding from US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2005). All 67 counties received funding, however; the focus areas of emphasis were equipment training, citizen outreach, security of public buildings (courthouse security), and lessons learned from state wide response events (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2005).
The funding allocations for the counties were the same as the 2004 allocations. Also, the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force approved funding of personal protection equipment for law enforcement vehicles, sustainment for the Regional Law Enforcement Teams (training and equipment), and evidence collection kits for Regional Law Enforcement Teams (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2005). These teams were stationed in each of the 8 regions. In addition, funding was approved to enhance and maintain the capabilities of the mutual aid teams.

The state-level focus was on statewide exercises (funding was granted to the emergency management agency), security for the statewide mail room (funding was granted to the attorney general’s office), information-sharing databases (funding granted to public safety and criminal justice system), intelligence fusion cells (funding granted to criminal justice), infrastructure protection (funding granted to public safety and public health), and anti-terrorism prevention (funding granted to agriculture and industries) (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2005). A part of the information sharing was the creation of Virtual Alabama, for which funding was granted to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security to lead this project. Virtual Alabama used 3D visualization of state assets and imagery. In addition, funding was approved for medical response in the four metropolitan areas in the state: Birmingham, Mobile, Huntsville, and Montgomery (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2005).

2006 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

National Priorities

The FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Guidance detailed US DHS priorities. They included formalizing mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities and states to share equipment, training, facilities and personnel during an emergency, as well as conduct exercises to address response issues beforehand (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Also, it
was emphasized to continue the implementation of NIMS and NRP (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). In addition, strengthening information sharing was a priority, so that accurate information about the identity of the enemy, where they operate, how they are supported, and potential methods of attack can be shared (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Enhancement of interoperable communications, which includes governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training and exercises, usage of equipment, strengthening chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) detection, response, and decontamination capabilities were priorities (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006).

Also, US DHS emphasizes the need to strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities, which includes “preparing jurisdictions to provide oral medications during an event to their entire population within 48 hours via a network of points of dispensing (PODs) staffed with trained/exercised paid and volunteer staff and conduct planning, training, exercises to pre-identify the staff, hospital beds, and other resources that can be deployed or used following a catastrophic event” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 4). And the final priority was the continuous establishment of CIP and Emergency Operation Plans (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006).

Funding Patterns

In 2006, there was a dramatic decrease in homeland security funding. As a direct result, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was awarded only $15.5 million in grant funding from the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). Funding was allocated based on risk and the effectiveness of the application that was submitted by the Alabama Department of Homeland Security.
The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force agreed again to fund agriculture terrorism that was led by the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). This consisted of enhancing the state agriculture team’s ability to respond to disaster areas. The task force also focused on medical resourcing as led by the Alabama Department of Public Health. A database was to be created to keep track of every physician, nurse, specialist, and certification (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). In addition, the task force funded a mobile hospital and a cache of ventilators.

The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force provided funding for the establishment of a fusion center for the state of Alabama. The fusion center is an information sharing system that is instrumental in creating an effective capability for information generation and sharing by all state and local agencies (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The fusion center is also instrumental in improving criminal justice databases, expanding the technology platform and standards by which local agencies can share data and receive information, as well as enhancing information exchange with the private sector (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center initially led this project. The fusion center would allow for intelligence information to flow from federal, state, and local entities and vice versa in an efficient, timely, and confidential manner (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). As in years past, projects including information sharing were funded. The emphasis was on the fact that law enforcement agencies have access to sensitive information, but the need was to find a way to allow other state agencies such as the Alabama Emergency Management Agency to have access to it. An initiative called the Homeland Security Information Generation was funded as a direct result of this need (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). This initiative would help in the gathering of very specific terrorism information as well as aid the
integration of local police and municipalities. A major component of this was the visualization of data through Virtual Alabama that was initiated in 2005.

Funding was also provided to train first responders in the National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan as required by federal homeland security. This project was led by the Alabama Emergency Management Agency. As in the past, the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force provided funding to the Mutual Aid Teams (including the Regional Law Enforcement Team) and to all 67 counties, which included equipment purchases, exercise, planning, and training (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). Task Force required that each county participate in a multi-jurisdictional exercise, as well as establish an Emergency Operations Center that meets the minimum standard for capabilities and equipment (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006).

There was a strong focus on enhancing citizen participation in response and recovery as demonstrated in past years, which was led by the Governor’s Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2006). Also, there was an emphasis on interoperable communications and this project was led by the Alabama Department of Homeland Security. Interoperable communications is the ability of first responders to communicate and share voice and data information. The funding was to be used to find a way to connect county to county, as well as to connect counties to the state emergency operations center and the Alabama Department of Public Safety.

2007 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

National Priorities
The FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Guidance detailed US DHS priorities. This included building and sustaining a Statewide Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource (CI/KR) Protection Program with a focus on how to prevent and respond to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that pose a threat to infrastructure, such as malls, stadium and ports (US Department of Homeland Security, 2007). As in years past, the enhancement of information sharing was a priority. States and localities must establish the means to gather, analyze, disseminate, and use terrorism information, homeland security information, and law enforcement information relating to terrorism (US Department of Homeland Security, 2007). The enhancement of statewide communications’ interoperability continued to be priority, as well as developing and adopting statewide communications interoperability plans by the end of the calendar year. (US Department of Homeland Security, 2007). Finally, the focus was on strengthening preventive radiological/nuclear detection capabilities to protect the nation from radiological/nuclear attacks by terrorists (US Department of Homeland Security, 2007).

Funding Patterns

In 2007, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security only received $11.5 million in grant funds from the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). Due to the even more drastic reduction in funding, not all 67 counties in Alabama received funding. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force discussed how to fairly distribute money to each county. The task force agreed to divide the state into 7 regions and give funding to each region (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The amount of funding that the region received was based on the population of the region. Each region had a homeland security point of contact. In addition to the county homeland security task forces, the creation of a regional homeland security task force occurred. This task force consisted of all the county
homeland security points of contact for each region. This regional task force had to work together to develop projects that would be beneficial to the entire region. Also, additional funding was granted to the regions to sustain the already established capabilities of the now 54 mutual aid teams and Regional Law Enforcement Teams (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007).

There were several projects that the task force approved and funded. One project was the enhancement of Gulf States Interoperable Communications. This project was designed to enhance the relationships for interstate as well as intrastate regional collaboration between Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2007). Also, there was emphasis in enhancing interoperable communications within the state of Alabama. In order to tackle such a big project, the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force decided to create an interoperable communications sub-committee to handle interoperability challenges. The sub-committee worked on finalizing a tactical interoperable communications plan (that included a formal communications resource database) by enhancing existing interoperable communication capabilities and incorporating them with new technologies (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The Alabama Department of Homeland Security was granted the funds to lead this initiative.

The second project focused on enhancement of the fusion center. In addition, funds were used to staff the fusion center and develop its organizational structure. Funding was granted to the Alabama Department of Public Safety and the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center to implement this project.

The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force also approved funding for the Alabama Department of Public Health to sustain and enhance the state’s pharmaceutical caches, medical
supply/equipment, and storage capabilities (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). This included expanding the state’s existing stockpile of medication, supplying 3,000 staffed beds and 4,000 un-staffed beds and medical needs shelters, as well as establishing and supplying a mobile critical care facility (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007).

The third project that was funded was the enhancement of the state’s citizen preparedness and participation programs led by the Governor’s Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives. This was implemented through a statewide public awareness campaign to prepare citizens for disasters, develop a comprehensive database of volunteers’ capabilities and credentialing capabilities, as well as to enhance citizen corps programs and councils that cover the entire state (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2007).

The fourth project consisted of building more robust agricultural terrorism incident detection and response capabilities led by Agriculture and Industries. This was completed by establishing a centralized, secure database for food and agriculture as well as safety and defense information, enhancing laboratory surge capacity and diagnostic ability (being able to conduct numerous laboratory tests at one time), developing a statewide agricultural checkpoint and reporting system, and strengthening the agriculture response team’s capabilities for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) detection, decontamination, and response (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force also provided funding to the Alabama Emergency Management Agency for the enhancement of the state’s implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Plan (NRP), and the state’s emergency response plan. This project included updating the state emergency operations plan, as well as the local agencies’
emergency operation plans and integrating NIMS into all incident and event management processes (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007).

The sixth project was to develop and deploy technology for optimal allocation of human physical medical resources led by the Alabama Department of Public Health. The sixth project did the following: purchased and pre-deployed the necessary equipment to quickly adapt existing mass-transit vehicles for mass patient movement during and following catastrophic events; equipped and trained the existing mobile mortuary unit; purchased and equipped a Mobile Operations Center for the Alabama Department of Public Health; and enhanced the existing public health response infrastructure, which included the addition of a Pediatric Disaster Response Network for children who require medical attention after a disaster (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force also helped the Alabama Department of Public Safety get the state in compliance with the REAL ID Act, which changed how driver’s license would be issued and authorized so that they could be accepted by the federal government for official purposes, such as getting on a plane and entering a federal building (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2007). According to task force meeting minutes (2007), there was an objection to this project being approved, but approval was ultimately decided due to the fact that public safety was not easily able to obtain grant funds like other departments.

2008 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

National Priorities

The FY 2008 Homeland Security Grant Guidance detailed US DHS priorities. They remained the same as in 2007, but with an emphasis on two areas. They included strengthening improvised explosive device (IED) attack deterrence, prevention, and protection capabilities.
Also, an emphasis was placed on enhancing explosive device pre-detonation response operations so that bomb squads would have the necessary tools to defeat actual or suspected devices (US Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Ultimately, the goal was to prevent an IED attack from achieving terrorist objectives (US Department of Homeland Security, 2008). In addition, there was an emphasis on strengthening preparedness planning, which included fixing shortcomings in existing plans, such as mass evacuation and sheltering, resource/commodity management. Special emphasis was placed on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), CIKR Protection, and health and medical services for catastrophic events (US Department of Homeland Security, 2008). According to the grant guidance for 2008, at least 25% of the grant funds had to be utilized on law enforcement projects that addressed these two priorities, since there was no longer a separate law enforcement grant.

Funding Patterns

In 2008, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was awarded $12.5 million in grant funds by the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). The projects that the task force approved were similar in nature to the 2007 projects discussed earlier, but with a few notable additions. For example, the information sharing projects stayed the same—enhancing technologies so that information sharing could be done by all state and local agencies and extended to as many states as possible. The Alabama Department of Public Safety and the Alabama Criminal Justice System were provided funding to lead the charge with the information sharing project.

The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force provided local funding to mutual aid teams, as well as funded all seven regions so that they could fund projects that were important to them. In addition to funding the NIMS training, there was also training provided in making a
Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) for all levels of government and the private sector (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). The COOP plan was emphasized because in case there was a terrorist attack or natural disaster, there was a plan in place so that essential government functions would still be operational. The Alabama Emergency Management Agency was funded to handle these projects. Once again, the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force focused on agri-terrorism detection, response and security. The focus was on building up the agricultural geospatial information program, which included linking to Virtual Alabama and planning and training that included holding state-wide training, full exercises and tabletop exercises (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). Tabletop exercises are exercises in which the agencies discuss how they will respond to a specific incident or incidents. Agriculture and Industries were provided funding to implement these projects.

The task force also provided funding for five levels of medical shelters that could be identified as alternate care sites in case of a disaster (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). There was also an enhancement of medical communications vehicles and an enhancement of the ability to share lab information throughout the state (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). The task force funded medical emergency preparedness outreach programs, such as Get 10. The Get 10 initiative encouraged citizens to have these 10 essential items ready for an emergency: water, food, a can opener, medications, first aid, a flashlight, a radio, clothes, personal care items, and any important documents (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). Whereas in previous years, the task force provided funding to supply the mortuary operation response team (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). All of the medical projects were led by the Alabama Department of Public Health.
The task force provided funding to the fusion center again under the direction of the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center so that needed software could be purchased along with a proper secured website, and so that proper planning and training could be accomplished and received (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). The task force authorized and funded the fusion center to be moved to a more secure location.

As in years past, citizens corps funding was provided to the Governor’s Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives to aid in educating and training citizens on disaster response. The Be Ready program and camp was also funded. The program and camp promotes citizen preparedness through emergency preparedness, survival and first aid, developing an emergency kit, creating a family disaster plan, water survival, light search and rescue, disaster psychology, triage, career exploration, and terrorism awareness (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008).

Enhancing interoperable communications continued to be a priority. However, this year the focus was on building out the ACU-1000s across the state, in vehicles, and in regions. The ACU-1000s provided local and wide area interoperability by directly connecting to a network simultaneously (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). This was again led by the Alabama Department of Homeland Security.

The task force also approved a new project called the school video pilot led by the Alabama Department of Homeland Security. This project would allow access in public schools during a crisis using the Virtual Alabama tool (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). The task force approved funding to fund the Gulf States Common Operating Picture, in which Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana could share Virtual Alabama and GIS data in case of a disaster (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008). A new project approved by
the task force for the Agriculture and Industries was the funding of the identification and assessment of critical infrastructure using a common assessment methodology and establishing a centralized secure database for food and agriculture safety as well as defense information (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2008).

2009 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

National Priorities

The FY 2009 Homeland Security Grant Guidance detailed US DHS priorities. These priorities were the same as 2007 and 2008 as detailed above.

Funding Patterns

In 2009, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was granted $12 million in grant funds from the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2009). All of the projects from the previous year remained the same, except for a few. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force provided funding to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security for the Advance Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Program. The training was designed to help law enforcement train on how to respond to an active shooter incident, particularly in schools (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2009). Also, an additional component of NIMS was the decision to have resource typing conducted at the local level, developing and implementing a credentialing system for emergency management personnel, installing and implementing the Emergency Management Incident Tracking System (a web-based incident tracking/management system), and conducting Incident Command System training throughout the state of Alabama (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2009). The Alabama Emergency Management Agency was approved for funding for this project. In the case
of interoperable communications, there was a continued focus on ACU1000s. This time, funding was used to ensure that national interoperable frequencies were programmed in all ACU-1000 radios and all upgrades to the ACU-1000s were completed (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2009). Just as in previous years, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was tasked with implementing the interoperable communications projects.

Another new project focused on the preventative, radiological, and nuclear detection program. The task force decided to use funding to develop plans and procedures on how to respond to radiological or nuclear incident, to inventory existing equipment and determine what additional equipment is needed, and develop a training and exercise program (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2009). The task force approved this funding for distribution to the local units of government.

Another new project that was funded by the task force was Virtual Alabama. This program was always funded, but never as a separate project prior to this year. The task force wanted to grow the program, to further the school video initiative, and purchase the needed server to increase user capacity and integrate other areas, such as 911 addressing and sex offender registry (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2009). The funding was used to inform the public of this new technology through a public outreach campaign. The Alabama Department of Homeland Security was in charge of implementing this project.

A new project within the medical area was the funding of portable digital x-ray equipment for the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, and portable emergency dental equipment (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2009).
National Priorities

The FY 2010 Homeland Security Grant Guidance detailed the US DHS national priorities, and they were the same as they were in the two years prior, except for the addition of border security for the states that had a problem with immigrants crossing the border illegally.

However, The FY 2011 Homeland Security Grant Guidance detailed some new priorities. One was, advancing “Whole Community” security and emergency management, which means developing collective, local abilities to handle terrorist attacks and natural disasters, respond quickly to them, and recover in a way that sustains or improves the community’s well-being (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Also, US DHS emphasized the importance of “developing and maintaining emergency operations plans (EOPs) by engaging the whole community in thinking through the life cycle of a potential crisis, determining required capabilities, and establishing a framework for roles and responsibilities” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011). Resource typing, inventorying, organizing, and tracking resources before, during, and after an incident became a priority (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011). Another priority was the maturation and enhancement of State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, so that they are completely ready to receive, analyze, gather, and share threat-related information between the Federal government and State, local, Tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011).

Funding Patterns
In 2010, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was awarded $11 million in grant funding from the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2010). The same projects that were funded in 2009 were funded in 2010. The only difference being that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force had to fund the same projects with less funds. The decrease in funding continued in 2011; the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was only funded $6.3 million in grant funds (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting 2011). In addition to the significant difference in funding, there was also a change in the chairman and the co-chairman of the task force (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting Minutes, 2011). As a direct result, there was a change in the stakeholders serving on the task force. The task force continued to fund the Alabama Fusion Center to enhance and sustain its capabilities. The task force also decided to continue to fund Regional Law Enforcement Teams and the other Mutual Aid Teams. The sustainment of Virtual Alabama and the enhancement of statewide interoperable communications projects were still funded under the direction of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security. In addition, this is the year that each region did not receive funding directly. According to the task force meeting minutes reviewed from 2006-2012, this was the first time that a stakeholder voted in opposition to the task force; however, it was not enough to make the proposal fail.

2012 Alabama Homeland Security Task Force

National Priorities


Funding Patterns
In 2012, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security only received $1.5 million in grant funds from the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Task Force Meeting, 2010). The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force funded the same projects as 2010 and 2011, but with significantly less money.

Summary

The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was a mandated collaboration by the US Department of Homeland Security. It consisted of politically appointed state agency directors and local first responder agencies, in which the Governor of Alabama served as the *ex officio* chairman and the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security served as the vice-chairman. From 2004-2011, neither the ex officio chairman nor the vice-chairman changed, and there was very little movement in stakeholders. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force approved and funded multiple projects over a seven-year period. As with most federal grant funding, they had to follow specific guidelines of the grant and spending priorities that were set by US DHS. This helped determined what projects were approved and where the funding would go. In addition, as required by US DHS, a program and capability review and enhancement plan had to be created to apply for homeland security funding. The task force was presented with this information to help them in making decisions to approve or not approve projects. Once the projects were approved, the vice-chairman was required to brief the Alabama homeland security legislative oversight committee as well the Governor, before submitting the requests to US DHS. Then, once funding was approved by US DHS, the project implementers were notified and had to submit budget detail worksheets to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security for it to issue grant agreements and memorandums of understanding.
The funding that was given to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security steadily decreased and it also affected the projects that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force approved and funded. For example, in the early years the local units of government received direct funding, and in the later years, the funding went to a regional concept. Eventually, there was no funding being given to counties except through the sustainment of the mutual aid and regional law enforcement teams. Also, it is important to point out that throughout the task force’s history there was only one time that a stakeholder voted in opposition to the projects being voted on. This occurred in 2011 when there was a new ex-officio chairman and vice-chairman, and it was the first time that funding was not directly given to the counties.

This chapter provided a background of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security, the various US Department of Homeland Security grant programs, and a general analysis of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force by explaining the dynamics and structure of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force as well as its funding patterns. This is all very important in exploring whether public value was created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The findings of both the document analysis and Nvivo analysis are contained in Chapters 5 of this document.
Chapter 5: Findings

In this chapter, I briefly revisit the purpose of this study. Next, I discuss the methodology used and the data analysis conducted. Finally, I provide an in-depth discussion of the findings using Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework as a guide.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research study was to apply Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework to better understand collaboration and public value in an additional public sector, and to expand our understanding of public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. This was accomplished by applying the only existing cross-sector collaboration framework (Page et al, 2015) of its kind to a cross-sector collaboration with different characteristics. In the Page et al (2015) three-dimensional framework, the cross-sector collaboration examined was in the transportation sector. Whereas in this study, the focus was on homeland security, particularly the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. Other notable differences are that the Page et al’s (2015) cross-sector collaboration was not mandated and did not consist of participants from a wide variety of sectors. On the other hand, the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was a mandated collaboration, and consisted of participants from a wide variety of sectors. Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework is unique because in assessing public value, it takes into consideration all of the following: processes, outcomes, and accountabilities. Other frameworks focus only on processes and outcomes.

Methodology and Data Analysis

The question guiding this research is: was public value created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force? In order to answer that question, an assessment of Page et al’s (2015)
three-dimensional framework occurred, which consisted of democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes. The research questions guiding this research were:

1. Was public value created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force? Why or why not?
   a. Was the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force democratically accountable?
   b. Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrate procedural legitimacy?
   c. Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force have substantive outcomes?

By doing a qualitative study in two parts, an assessment of public value creation was completed. First, a document analysis was completed to analyze the dynamics and structure of the task force, as well as to get a detailed project history of the task force between the years of 2003 and 2012. The researcher used the three-dimensional framework’s public value attributes and the sample indicators of the public value attributes as a guide. The second part of the qualitative analysis included semi-structured interviews with 20 stakeholders that served on the task force between 2003 and 2012. The interview questions were all centered on the three-dimensional framework (democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes), the public value attributes that make up each of the three dimensions, and the sample indicators for each public value attribute. The researcher uploaded responses from the interview transcripts into the Nvivo 11 software. The Nvivo analyses resulted in the creation of themes based on the general themes of the interview questions. The data from the interview transcriptions were manually coded by looking at the responses of each interview participant and placing the responses in the appropriate theme.

The analysis of the responses to the interview questions yielded 11 core themes that reflect the characteristics of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The themes consisted of: 1) support, 2) challenges, 3) decision-making, 4) exceptions, 5) communication methods, 6)
goals, 7) efficiency, 8) benefits, 9) allocation of costs, 10) innovations, and 11) spin-off collaborations.

Table 5.1 is a representation of the themes identified by the interview protocol and the Nvivo data analysis, as they relate to the dimensions and the indicators of each public value attribute that make-up Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework. The table lists the 11 core themes from interview responses. Column one is the name of each theme. Column two lists the dimensions. Column three lists the public value attributes and column four provides the indicators of each public value attribute. Column five gives the number of participants that mentioned the theme or responded to it by comment(s). Column six is the frequency of coding per theme for that category.

The table lists the themes in the order of the interview protocol and as it correlates with the public value attribute of each dimension (democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes). The themes of support and challenges reflect the indicators to assess the public value attributes of democratic accountability, which are horizontal and vertical democratic accountability. The support theme includes the following indicators: endorsement or informal support from elected officials, agency directors, and stakeholders. The challenge theme includes the following indicators: resistance, objections, or challenges by elected officials, agency directors, the stakeholders, and the public.

The themes of decision-making, exceptions, and communication methods reflect the indicators to assess the public value attributes of procedural legitimacy, which are procedural rationality, procedural justice, and operational control. The decision-making theme include the following indicators: logic of planning, decision-making and implementation, inclusive decision-making practices, and the existence of data-driven plans, reports, and budgets to make decisions.
during meetings. The exceptions theme is representative of the indicator of soundness of procedures to handle exceptions. The communication methods theme includes the following indicators: logic of flows of information and authority and the use of requirements, budgets, and schedules to track projects and activities.

And themes of goals, efficiency, benefits, allocation of costs, innovations, and spin-off collaborations reflect the indicators to assess the public value attributes of substantive outcomes, which are effective and efficient performance, equity of benefits, equity of payment, and problem-solving capacity. The goals theme includes the indicator of achievement of intermediate and final outcomes. The efficiency theme includes the indicators of ratio of benefits produced to costs incurred and the presence of innovative cost savings produced by collaborative problem solving. The benefits theme includes the indicator of perceptions of the distribution of benefits by researchers, stakeholder, or the public. The allocation of costs theme includes the indicator of perceptions of the distribution of costs by researchers, stakeholders, or the public. The innovations theme includes the indicator of new approaches to address challenging problems. The spin-off collaborations theme includes the indicator of spin-off collaborations.

Insert Table 5.1 Core Themes from Interview Responses

The next sections provide an in-depth discussion of findings from both the document analysis and the Nvivo analysis.

Discussion of Findings

The overall research question was whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force created public value. An analysis was conducted of three dimensions of public value framework in order to assess public value creation. The application of the three-dimensional framework, and the evidence collected and analyzed by document analysis and Nvivo analysis of semi-
structured interviews leads me to conclude that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force did not create public value. Although the task force was democratically accountable, it lacked transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making, which is the foundation of procedural legitimacy. Also, the task force lacked the ability to provide equity of benefits, equity of payments and efficient and effective performance, which are important public value attributes of substantive outcomes. Further discussion of each dimension and public attribute is in the next several sections.

Democratic Accountability

The first part of assessing whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force created public value was to assess whether the task force created democratic accountability. Democratic accountability is the idea that the cross-sector collaboration is responsive to authorizers, stakeholders, and citizens. According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, there are two public value attributes associated with democratic accountability: vertical democratic accountability and horizontal democratic accountability. Discussion of each of these two attributes is below.

Vertical and Horizontal Democratic Accountability

Vertical democratic accountability is the extent to which decisions and implementation are legal and responsive to authorizers (Page et al 2015). According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, indicators are endorsements or informal support from elected officials or agency directors, memorandums of agreement signed by public authorities, and resistance, objections or sanctions imposed by elected officials or agency directors.

Horizontal democratic accountability is the extent to which decisions and implementation respond to collaboration partners and other stakeholders (Page et al 2015). According to Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, indicators of horizontal democratic accountability are
endorsements or informal support from stakeholders or the public, public opinion supportive of the collaboration, and resistance, objections, or legal challenges by stakeholders or the public.

Utilizing the indicators listed above to analyze responses to interviews and through document analysis, an assessment was made of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was democratically accountable. Table 5.2 provides the results of the assessment of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force were vertical and horizontal democratically accountable. It can be concluded that the task force was democratically accountable because in general, it had the support of elected officials and state agency directors. The majority of the stakeholders of the task force were state agency directors. And if they were not state agency directors, they were stakeholders that were appointed by elected officials. The next sections provide more details of the assessment.

Insert Table 5.2 Was the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force Vertical and Horizontal Accountable?

Interview Analysis of Vertical and Horizontal Democratic Accountability

Two interview questions explored whether vertical and horizontal democratic accountability were characteristics of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

Question 1: Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force receive any endorsements or informal support from elected officials or agency directors participating in the task force?

Question 2: Was there any resistance, objections, or legal challenges expressed by stakeholders or the public? If so, what were they and how did the task force respond to them?

One indicator, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was whether the task force was supported by elected officials, agency directors, stakeholders and the public. The responses from the interview participants demonstrate that the task force had the
support of the stakeholders, elected officials, and state agency directors; however, it was difficult
to determine if it had support from the public.

The participants mentioned that there were minimal recollections of any negative
thoughts about the task force. For many participants, the Alabama Homeland Security Task
Force served as way to network with colleagues and friends. Everyone pointed out that the task
force had the support of the elected officials because in order for local stakeholders to serve, they
required an appointment by an elected official.

Participant 1 stated, “In order to be allowed to serve, the elected officials there within the
county had to approve of it.”

One particular sector that was mentioned that supported the task force was the sheriff’s
community, and how instrumental they were in garnering support for the task force in the
beginning.

In addition, the participants noted that the governor was the top elected official in the
state of Alabama and he was the *ex officio* chairman of the task force. Furthermore, participants
pointed out that the majority of the stakeholders on the task force were agency directors
appointed by the governor.

Participant 13 noted, “The governor was very, very supportive from the very beginning,
and his cabinet pretty much knew that it was something he wanted, so they were
supportive also.”

Participant 10 stated, “I think that the task force was supported by most of the agency
heads, and certainly the department of agriculture and industries, and the commissioner.”

Another indicator of vertical and horizontal democratic accountability, as established by
Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was whether the task force was faced with any
resistance, objections, or legal challenges from elected officials, agency directors, stakeholders
and the public. Participants expressed that in the beginning there was a little resistance of the
establishment of the task force from stakeholders, but eventually they worked through them to find resolutions. Participants noted that some of the negativity towards the task force was due to the lack of understanding of what homeland security was.

Participant 1 mentioned, “Nobody really understood what and how homeland security was going to actually do, or what their mission was going to truly be.” Participants also noted that because the stakeholders didn’t fully understand the role of homeland security in the beginning, there were battles with the emergency management community. Participants explained that the emergency management community thought they could handle the money and that they did not need another state agency or another level of bureaucracy. However, the participants discussed the importance of coming to an agreement despite these challenges, and they truly believed that they overcame this issue.

Document Analysis of Vertical and Horizontal Democratic Accountability

As stated above, one indicator of vertical and horizontal democratic accountability, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was whether the task force was support by elected officials, agency directors, stakeholders and the public. Similar to the responses to the interviews, the document analysis also indicated that the elected officials, stakeholders, and agency directors supported the task force. No indication was evident from the document analysis that the public supported or did not support the task force.

According to the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force’s By-laws, the governor of Alabama, an elected official, led the task force, and the majority of the task force consisted of state agency directors. As demonstrated in Table 4.1, an elected official appointed the task force members that were not state officials, such as the representative of the county law enforcement agencies.
In addition, another indicator of horizontal democratic accountability, according to Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, is the presence of memorandums of agreement (MOA). Signed MOAs from multiple state agencies between the Alabama Department of Homeland Security and local governments existed to meet state and local percentage requirements set by US DHS. As discussed in Chapter 4, local projects needed to make up 80% of homeland security funding and state projects needed to make up the remaining 20% of homeland security funding.

In regards to the indicator of any resistance, objections, sanctions or legal challenges imposed by elected officials, agency directors, stakeholders, or the public, there was no indication of that during the document analysis.

The next section will discuss whether or not the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force created procedural legitimacy.

Procedural Legitimacy

The second part of assessing whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force created public value is assessing whether it demonstrated procedural legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy is the belief that processes within the collaboration are fair, transparent, rational, and intentional. According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, there are three public value attributes associated with procedural legitimacy: procedural rationality, procedural justice and operational control. Table 5.3 provides the results of the assessment of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated procedural rationality, procedural justice, and operational control. The findings below will demonstrate that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force did not have procedural legitimacy because it lacked the three public value attributes of procedural rationality, procedural justice, and operational control.
Procedural Rationality

Procedural rationality is the extent to which the decision process involves the collection of information relevant to the decision, and level of reliance upon analysis of this information in making the choice (Page et al 2015). According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, sample indicators are logic of planning, decision-making, and implementation; existence of data-driven plans, reports and budgets; and use of evidence to make decisions during meetings of collaboration partners.

Utilizing the indicators listed above to analyze responses to interviews and through document analysis, an assessment of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated procedural rationality was made. The assessment revealed that data-driven reports, plans, and budgets existed, but not everyone had access to the reports to make decisions during the meetings. The vice chairman of the task force (director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security) presented the information to the task force, but the task force members did not understand the information enough to utilize it in decision making. The next sections provide more details of the assessment.

Interview Analysis of Procedural Rationality

One interview question explored whether procedural rationality was a characteristic of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

Question 1: Was there any use of evidence, such as data driven plans, reports, or budgets, in making decisions within the task force? If so, describe how they were used in making decisions?
Two indicators of procedural rationality, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, were the usage of evidence to make decisions during meetings of collaboration partners and a logic of planning, decision-making and implementation. Participants noted that they were not provided any documents beforehand to help make decisions. In fact, they only viewed PowerPoint presentations during their meetings where the director would discuss the priorities, funding allocations, and provide a brief history of past projects. Participants asserted that the director would not provide handouts for funding decisions and seemed to talk fast in an effort to prevent one from taking notes or to understand information presented.

Participant 3 stated, “They told us what was gonna (sic) happen. Refused to even give us copies of what they were showing on the slides. I made more than one request to have copies of the slides and was told I’d have to get it later. I was told three or four times, my security clearance wasn’t high enough for me to be able to see the information I was voting on.”

Document Analysis of Procedural Rationality

As stated above, one indicator of procedural rationality, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, is the presence of data-driven plans, reports, or budgets. Copies of PowerPoint briefings provided detail information about the results of the program and capability review, investment justifications, a thorough list of previously funded projects, and a list of US DHS priorities. In addition, a copy of the 2003 Alabama Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy appeared to have provided guidance to the task force as to what projects to fund in the early years.

Another indicator of procedural rationality, as stated above, was the use of evidence to make decisions during meetings of collaboration partners. According to the task force meeting minutes, to help make funding and programmatic decisions, the stakeholders of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force were briefed with the results of the program and capability
review, investment justifications, a thorough list of previously funded projects, and a list of US DHS priorities (Alabama Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

Procedural Justice

Procedural justice is the extent to which stakeholders perceive collaboration decisions and activities to be fair and transparent (Page et al 2015). According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, an indicator of procedural justice is the use of inclusive decision-making practices involving a wide range of participants and viewpoints, and the nature and range of citizen engagement practices. Utilizing the indicators listed above to analyze responses to interviews and through document analysis, an assessment of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated procedural justice was made. Although there was an appearance of practices that fostered inclusive decision-making, often times the stakeholders did not feel encouraged to express those viewpoints. In addition, public announcements of meetings provided an open forum for the citizens of Alabama to become engaged in the task force, but the task force did not actively encourage their participation in the decisions of the task force. The next sections provide more details of the assessment.

Interview Analysis of Procedural Justice

One interview question explored whether procedural justice was characteristic of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

Question 1: Were stakeholders within the task force and the public included in making decisions? If so, what inclusive decision making processes were in place within the task force?

One indicator of procedural justice, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was the use of inclusive decision-making practices involving a wide range of participants and viewpoints. Participants felt the “good ole’ boy” network was in place, which changed the dynamics of the placement of funding. For example, local stakeholders
expressed that state stakeholders received more funding than everyone else on the task force. Other participants mentioned that some agencies would get more attention than others, particularly on the law enforcement side.

Others shared the belief that the design of the task force was not to set priorities or to convey those priorities to the director.

Participant 10 noted, “The office of homeland security would put $300,000.00 to this region and that region. And as far as the task force members, we didn't have really any input into where the funds were going. The meetings were more of a briefing than a round table discussion, but I never heard any complaints that this was not working or this was not fulfilling whatever it was supposed to fulfill.” Ultimately, decisions were made without the task force having a voice. The directors, as previously mentioned, would make all final decisions.

Participant 1 said that the director would simply say, "I appreciate your recommendation, but there are factors that have not been discussed. We're going to leave it like it is. The task force was basically a sounding board for the chairman of the task force to express the projects he wanted to fund."

According to participants, the only opinion that mattered was the governor’s, and the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security didn't mind making that known.

Participant 3 noted, “The director had little or no regard for anybody else because he had never worked in state government, and he obviously was used to doing whatever the generals told him to do, and his general was the Governor.”

Participants asserted that the Task Force was a show run by the director at the direction of the governor, and the stakeholders were there only so the governor and the director of Alabama Department of Homeland Security could say they had input from all these various agencies.

Participant 5 stated, “They (governor and the director of Alabama Department of Homeland Security) could say they had all these people working together, but in fact no input was ever sought.”
However, participants did express that they felt like they were a part of the decision-making process.

Participant 5 noted, “One of the big things that I remember that we did was, there was a lot of federal grant money flowing, and our committee appropriated this money to different fire departments, police departments, state troopers, whatever, and we did that as a group.”

Another indicator of procedural justice, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was the nature and range of citizen engagement practices. The interview responses did not provide any insight into public involvement in the decision-making process of the task force.

Document Analysis of Procedural Justice

As stated above, one indicator of procedural justice as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was the use of inclusive decision-making practices involving a wide range of participants and viewpoints. According to the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force By-laws, a requirement of the task force was to hold one meeting a quarter to express opinions and to make decisions. In addition, no decisions could be made without the majority of the stakeholders being present at a meeting.

Also, as indicated by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force meeting minutes, the meetings followed the Robert Rules of Order, to ensure that everyone had the opportunity to voice opinions and to vote. However, it is evident in the task force meeting minutes that stakeholders’ opinions were absent. The meeting minutes indicated one time, in which a stakeholder adamantly opposed the task force vice chairman’s (director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security) presentation. And in this case, the opposition was from a local stakeholder who expressed concern about the local counties not receiving any direct homeland security funding in 2011.
Another indicator of procedural justice, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was the nature and range of citizen engagement practices. To comply with the Alabama Open Meetings Act, the citizens were invited to attend each scheduled meeting. This law guarantees that Alabama’s citizens have open access to governmental bodies. Evidence of this was evident through correspondence between the secretary of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force and the Alabama Secretary of State.

Operational Control

Operational control is the extent to which collaborations use requirements, budgets, and schedules to oversee projects and activities (Page et al 2015). According to Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, indicators of operational control are the use of requirements, budgets, and schedules for projects and activities, logic of flows of information and authority, and soundness of procedures to handle exceptions.

Utilizing the indicators listed above to analyze responses to interviews and through document analysis, an assessment of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated operational control was made. The assessment shows that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force lacked operational control. The task force lacked clear procedures to handle exceptions. The next sections provide more details of the assessment.

Interview Analysis of Operational Control

Two interview questions explored whether operational control was characteristic of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

Question 1: How were decisions that were made communicated between the task force stakeholders and project workers that were implementing the projects?

Question 2: How were exceptions handled?
One indicator of operational control, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, is the logic of flows of information and authority. The general consensus of the participants’ responses was that the Alabama Department of Homeland Security ensured that the decisions that the task force made were communicated to the agencies that were implementing the funded projects. Participants discussed how the Alabama Department of Homeland Security sent out notices and awards that the task force approved to the counties and state agencies receiving the funding. In addition, participants explained that they would communicate the decisions of the task force within their own sector.

For example, participant 12 explained, “They (stakeholders) would talk to their people and kind of give them a heads up of what’s happening with funding and what projects were approved.”

Another indicator of operational control, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was the soundness of procedures to handle exceptions. The participants were not aware of any procedures to handle exceptions. However, participants expressed one major concern, the use of leftover funding. They later learned of funded projects without the knowledge or approval of the task force.

Participant 18 stated, “The Alabama Department of Homeland Security would just re-allocate it in the office according to those priorities and they would just make those internal decisions instead of going back to the task force.”

**Document Analysis of Operational Control**

As stated above, one indicator of operational control, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was the logic of flows of information and authority. Examples of this indicator consisted of copies of grant agreements with funding letters and memorandums of agreement that were issued by the Alabama Department of Homeland Security to agencies that were implementing the projects.
Another indicator of operational control, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, was the relevance of requirements, budgets, and schedules to projects and activities. Along with the grant agreements and funding letters, there were copies of budget detail worksheets. As stated in Chapter 4, the implementers of the projects provided budget detail worksheets and conducted presentations to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security for formal approval. Once these budgets were formally approved, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security issued grant agreements and memorandums of agreements and then projects began. Also, each grant agreement indicated the completion of projects within a two-year period, as required by US DHS. In some cases, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security extended projects past the two-year period with approval from US DHS.

Substantive Outcomes

The third part of assessing whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force created public value is assessing whether or not it had substantive outcomes. Substantive outcomes focus on performance accountability, which emphasizes effectiveness and efficiency. According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, there are five public value attributes associated with substantive outcomes: effective performance, efficient performance, equity of benefits, equity of payment, and problem-solving capacity. Table 5.4 provides the results of the assessment of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated effective performance, efficient performance, equity of benefits, equity of payment, and problem-solving capacity. The findings below indicate that the task force did not have substantive outcomes because it lacked in the areas of effective and efficient performance, and in equity of benefits and payment.
Effective and Efficient Performance

Effective performance is the extent to which the collaboration achieves its goals (Page et al 2015). According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, an indicator of effective performance is the achievement of intermediate and final outcomes produced by collaborative activities. And efficient performance is the extent to which the collaboration achieves its goals at reasonable costs (Page et al 2015). According to the Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, indicators of efficient performance are the ratio of benefits produced to costs incurred and the presence of innovative cost savings produced by collaborative problem-solving.

Utilizing the indicators listed above to analyze responses to interviews and through document analysis, an assessment was made of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated effective and efficient performance. The assessment showed that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force lacked in the areas of effective and efficient performance. Although the task force had ways to measure goal achievement, not everyone was aware of how that was being accomplished and there was wide-spread confusion as to the goals of the task force. And although participants believed that the task force was in general accomplishing its goals at a reasonable cost, there was no benefit-cost analysis completed to measure efficiency. The next sections provide more details of the assessment.

Interview Analysis of Effective and Efficient Performance

Two interview questions explored whether effective and efficient performance were characteristics of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.
Question 1: How would you describe the task force’s ability to reach its goals? What measures were used to assess whether the collaboration reach its goals (intermediate and final)?

Question 2: Were the goals accomplished at a reasonable cost? If yes, how was efficiency achieved and measured?

An indicator of effective performance, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, is the achievement of intermediate and final outcomes produced by collaborative activities. A common underlying thread among the interview responses was that Alabama Homeland Security Task Force’s goals could have been achieved without the task force. Also, confusion existed as to what the task force’s goals were. In addition, some participants could not identify an assessment utilized to assess whether the collaboration was meeting its intermediate or final goals.

Participant 1 stated, “If administering of the grant or the funds was the goal of the task force, then yes, the task force met its goal, but could that goal have been reached without the task force? Absolutely.”

Participant 13 noted, “My feelings and thoughts was the goal would have been reached regardless of the task force, and other than you know the goal was to administer X-million dollars, to distribute X-million dollars in funds and we distributed X-million dollars in funds.”

However, some participants recalled tools being used to assess whether goals were being achieved.

Participant 10 stated, “Each sector that got funding had to go back and do basically performance metrics.”

Notably, some interview participants described the task force’s ability to reach its goals in a positive manner.

Participant 10 stated, “It was probably most successful in communicating what everybody else was doing and leveraging resources within the entire state community.”

Participant 19 shared his level of support by noting that “The task force was fantastic, and I don't know of any other way that one could have pulled together that many different folks and agencies to make it work and force them to get along.”
Participant 11 in particular felt that there was a good start to the task force and reflected on its effectiveness by saying, “There was a lot of work that I thought was really valuable, but as those resources started drying up, and as the administrations changed, personnel changed, those goals changed.”

An indicator of efficient performance, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, is the ratio of benefits produced to costs incurred. Participants viewed the task force as being in place to oversee the practices of the governing board and as a regulatory buffer, keeping the peace amongst the groups since there were so many.

Participant 1 asserted, “The task force stopped a lot of political maneuvering to do things that probably were not in the best interest of the entire state.” Other participants stated that since there was a lot of people from different areas of expertise and many elected officials on the taskforce, it helped ensure efficiency. For instance, if there was a piece of equipment that the law enforcement sector needed to purchase, there were representatives from state, county, and city law enforcement that were knowledgeable about whether the equipment was a good purchase and if it was being sold at a reasonable cost.

Participants did note that limited guidance and little to no requirements from US DHS in the early years affected the task force’s ability to accomplish projects at a reasonable cost.

Participant 18 specifically said that there were some programs that evoked immediate questions of: “How are they going to sustain that? If they can’t sustain it down the road, then did we waste money? What is going to be the life of that project?” However, as funding began to decrease with more guidance and requirements from US DHS, the task force was forced to be more efficient. Participants reflected on the fact that they tried not to duplicate resources. Participants also noted how each agency had to demonstrate that their projects were reasonable and justified before the task force approved them.

Document Analysis of Effective and Efficient Performance

In regards to the public attribute of effective performance, as stated above, one indicator, is the achievement of intermediate and final outcomes produced by collaborative activities. As
stated in Chapter 4, there were bi-annual strategy implementation reports required by US DHS to ensure that stakeholders were implementing the projects within the 2-year grant period. In addition, in order to apply for funding, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security conducted required program and capability reviews. The reviews were conducted annually, so the task force could see the accomplished goals and what areas still needed more attention. In addition, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security created an enhancement plan. An enhancement plan is a “multi-year, multi-funding source plan to maintain key strengths or address key weaknesses through the implementation of initiatives” (Alabama Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

In regards to the public attribute of efficient performance, as stated above, one indicator, was the ratio of benefits produced to costs incurred. No documents indicated that there ever was a benefit-cost analysis completed to ensure the achievement of goals at a reasonable cost. Equity of Benefits and Equity of Payment

Equity of benefits is the extent to which benefits of collaboration are spread appropriately among stakeholders and the public (Page et al 2015). According to Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, indicators of equity of benefits are estimates or perceptions of the distribution of benefits by researchers, stakeholders, or the public. And equity of payment is the extent to which costs of collaboration are spread appropriately among stakeholders and the public (Page et al 2015). According to Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, indicators of equity of payment are estimates or perceptions of the distribution of costs by researchers, stakeholders, or the public.

Utilizing the indicators listed above to analyze responses to interviews and through document analysis, an assessment was made of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated equity of benefits and payment. The assessment showed uneven distribution
of benefits and payments. The majority of the inequality of benefits and payments was a result of the task force simply following US DHS priorities and requirements. The next sections provide more details of the assessment.

Interview Analysis of Equity of Benefits and Payment

Two interview questions explored whether equity of benefits and payment were characteristics of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

Question 1: Explain the extent at which benefits of the collaboration were spread appropriately among all stakeholders and the public.

Question 2: How were the costs allocated?

An indicator of equity of benefits, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, are the estimates or perceptions of the distribution of benefits by researchers, stakeholders or the public. Participants mentioned that the specific agency or jurisdiction that was receiving funding needed to demonstrate how they would benefit, but also how other surrounding agencies and jurisdictions would benefit. The participants understood that certain stakeholders or agencies benefited from the task force as a result of US DHS priorities.

Some participants mentioned that in the years of regional allocations due to decreases in homeland security funding, the task force decided on the funding amounts per region by population. The Alabama Department of Homeland Security notified the regional homeland security points of contact and they were encouraged to pull together all of the stakeholders in their region to decide what the region’s top priorities were. Not every participant was completely satisfied in their distributions, but noted they had the ability to function in their capacity as needed.
Participant 11 noted, “If you ask anybody, I think most of them would say ‘No, we didn't get what we wanted, but we got what we essentially could get and deserved, and based on the decision of the task force.’”

Nevertheless, participants did report that some people benefited more than others.

Participant 17 specifically noted, “My guess is, entities that were relatively strong on their own with their own resources benefited less than entities that had fewer resources, such as local communities.”

Participant 7 asserted, “The Alabama Department of Homeland Security benefited the most from the money, more so than anybody.”

Participant 5 stated, “Law enforcement received the most benefits over all organizations.”

Also, participants expressed that funding was very heavy on the state side because many of the members were appointed by the governor in their regular day-to-day job or their immediate supervisor was appointed by the governor. And some participants asserted that whatever the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security suggested, they were forced to approve it. In addition, participants indicated that the state of Alabama benefited as a whole due to the homeland security funding they received.

An indicator of equity of payment, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, are the estimates or perceptions of the distribution of costs by researchers, stakeholders or the public. Participants discussed that cost allocation was simply based on how funding was assigned and distributed based off of US DHS and ALDHS priorities.

Document Analysis of Equity of Benefits and Payment

Although both equity of benefits and payments have indicators that focus on participant perceptions, which would be drawn mostly from interviews, it is important to note that the document analysis of federal homeland security grant guidance did provide some data on participant perceptions. According to the US DHS grant guidance, there were specific priorities for each year, and the task force had to fund projects that met those priorities. The researcher details these priorities in Chapter 4. In addition, US DHS required that local projects consist of
80% of the funding and state projects consist of 20% of the funding. The task force did utilize memorandums of agreement completed by local entities. The task force would then grant the funds to the state agencies under the understanding that the funds would be used for local projects. It had the appearance of providing the majority of the funding to the locals, but in reality, the funding was being granted to state agencies. In addition, US DHS emphasized law enforcement type projects, alongside the requirement of using 25% of the funding on law enforcement type projects.

Problem-solving Capacity

The definition of problem-solving capacity is “new behaviors or norms that increase the potential to address complex problems” (Page et al 2015, page number). According to Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, indicators of problem-solving capacity are spin-off collaborations, more effective collaborative decision-making, and new approaches to address challenging problems.

Utilizing the indicators listed above to analyze responses to interviews and through document analysis, an assessment was made of whether the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force demonstrated problem-solving capacity. The assessment determined that the task force did possess problem-solving capacity. The assessment showed examples of spin-off collaborations that occurred as a result of the task force, as well as innovative approaches taken to meet new challenges. The next sections provide more details of the assessment.

Interview Analysis of Problem-Solving Capacity

Two interview questions explored whether problem-solving capacity was a characteristic of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force:

Question 1: Discuss any spin-off collaborations that occurred as a result of the task force.
Question 2: Discuss any innovative approaches that were implemented to address challenging problems.

One indicator of problem-solving capacity, as established by Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, is the presence of new approaches to solving challenging problems. This indicator refers to innovation. Participants mentioned that Virtual Alabama was innovative because one could go back and look at affected areas and overlay tornado paths, hurricane spots, and infrastructure. Virtual Alabama used 3D visualization of state assets and imagery. Other participants mentioned the Alabama Mutual Aid System (AMAS) as an example of innovation. The AMAS consisted of teams that assisted in the response of a man-made or natural disaster within their respective regions. In addition, the teams could respond in other regions upon request. Participants stated that although AMAS was created in 2003, the system has proven to be very beneficial to the state of Alabama in terms of being able to respond in times of need.

Participant 1 noted, “The AMAS system was very innovative, which has led to what we have today. We have a robust mutual aid structure with all this equipment tied together.”

Also, participants recognized the informal networks and collaborations that developed as a result of the task force as being innovative. Before homeland security funding, most of the stakeholders had no or little contact with each other. These collaborations and networks that developed outside of the task force allowed stakeholders to work on projects outside of homeland security funding.

Another indicator of problem-solving capacity is the occurrence of spin-off collaborations. Participants viewed AMAS as a spinoff collaboration. They also described the interoperable communications committee as a spin-off collaboration. The interoperable communications committee was created to meet the challenge of ensuring communication between all first responders when responding to a natural or man-made disaster.
Participants attributed the creation of numerous first responder committees at the local level to the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The task force mandated public sectors that never would have sat in the same room to work together. Once the public sectors began to understand the challenges that each were facing, they began to reach out to each other to work on other projects together. Others pointed out the formation of collaborations within their respective sector as a direct result of the task force funding.

Participant 19 stated, “We got some state agencies talking that didn't know about the capabilities and assets and resources that each other had; but could now see and figure out how they could leverage those assets.”

Document Analysis of Problem-Solving Capacity

One indicator of problem-solving capacity, spin-off collaborations, could be easily identified in PowerPoint presentations and task force meeting minutes. In addition to the AMAS and interoperable communications committee, collaborations occurred across state lines in regards to agri-terrorism and mass casualty response.

Summary of Findings

The researcher assessed public value creation by analyzing interview responses and document analysis by using the indicators developed by Page et al (2015) to identify public value attributes that make up their three-dimensional framework (democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes). The application of the three-dimensional framework, and the evidence collected and analyzed by document analysis and Nvivo analysis of semi-structured interviews leads me to conclude that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force did not create public value. Although the task force was democratically accountable, it lacked transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making which is the foundation of procedural legitimacy. Also, the task force lacked in its ability to provide equity of benefits, equity of payments and efficient and effective performance, which are important public value attributes of

Insert Table 5.5 Summary of Findings

In regards to democratic accountability, the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was supported by elected officials (the authorizers) and for the most part, stakeholders. At the beginning of the development of the task force, there was direct opposition by the emergency management community, but the sheriff community supported its formation. Also, there was confusion as to what homeland security meant and how this new department of homeland security in Alabama would fit in with the emergency management community who was in charge of response. The sheriffs community’s support helped garner much needed support to make this task force more accepting to other sectors in the beginning.

In regards to procedural legitimacy, the stakeholders of the task force were not given any type of supporting evidence to help them make decisions on the task force. In fact, there were a few who were denied information. The vice chairman of the task force provided decision-making information to the task force through PowerPoint briefings. He provided a detail briefing of past projects, national priorities, and recommendations for funding. Some stakeholders felt the vice chairman of the task force restricted their ability to take notes during the meetings. The Alabama Department of Homeland Security conducted a program and capability review (as required by the US Department of Homeland Security) to help guide funding decisions of the task force. Interestingly, there were very few stakeholders that were aware of this.

The task force did not literally make decisions as to the funding of projects. The projects were already decided on by the vice chairman of the task force and the ex officio chairman. The
stakeholders of the task force made recommendations, but the vice-chairman and \textit{ex-officio} chairman did not take those recommendations seriously; rather, discussion was kept to a minimum. The stakeholders also voted on the funding of projects, however, their input was not welcomed. This type of control of the task force was made possible because the majority of the stakeholders were state agencies under the direction of the governor, which served as the \textit{ex officio} chairman. The \textit{ex officio} chairman and vice chairman remained the same until 2011 as noted in Chapter 4.

The task force had no clear procedures to handle exceptions; however, it appeared that the staff at the Alabama Department of Homeland Security would handle anything that would garner an exception, such as the use of discretionary funding. The stakeholders and the agency or project workers implementing the projects created organized and efficient avenues of communication. The Alabama Department of Homeland Security was the agency that was in charge of notifying the implementers of the decisions of the task force by letters, awards and/or memorandums of understanding. In addition, the stakeholders also notified their respective sectors of decisions that were made by the task force.

In regards to substantive outcomes, the overall goals of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force were not clearly communicated. Participants expressed that the homeland security’s goals would have been achieved without the task force. However, through program and capability reviews, the enhancement plan, as well as the bi-annual strategy implementation report, the achievement of goals were measured, but only a few stakeholders were aware of these reports. Also, the task force used no tools to measure if the goals were reached at a reasonable cost. It is clear that in the early years that some projects were funded, but were not sustainable. However, the task force utilized the funding more efficiently towards the later years due to a decrease in funding and the fact that US DHS actually provided specific guidance on how the
funding should be used. It is important to note that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force did attempt to not duplicate resources as they were making decisions about funding.

The task force did not distribute the benefits in a fair manner, in which the US DHS grant guidance affected its ability to do so. US DHS had specific priorities for each year, and the task force had to fund projects that met those priorities. In addition, US DHS required that local projects consist of 80% of the funding and state projects consist of 20% of the funding. The task force did utilize memorandums of agreement completed by local entities. Then they would grant the funds to the state agencies under the understanding that the funds would be used for local projects. This gave a false appearance that the majority of the funding was allocated to local projects. In addition, law enforcement type projects were emphasized by US DHS, alongside the requirement of using 25% of the funding on law enforcement type projects.

Outside of the US DHS requirements, the task force did try to ensure that the local stakeholders benefited equally amongst themselves in the early years, by providing each same-sized county with the same amount of funding. In the later years, the task force provided funding to each region by population size. The task force followed a similar pattern in regards to how they allocated costs. However, there was still significant benefit imbalance between state and local stakeholders, as well as law enforcement and all other stakeholders.

The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was very innovative, as demonstrated by their use of Virtual Alabama to be able to help first responders respond inside of any mapped school or building. Virtual Alabama was created in response to the rise in active shooter incidents in public buildings. Also, innovation is demonstrated in the strong mutual aid system (AMAS). Each area in the state of Alabama can receive assistance in times of natural or manmade disaster. In addition, both formal and informal spin-off collaborations occurred as a direct result of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.
Chapter 5 provided a discussion of the findings that resulted from document analysis and Nvivo analysis of semi-structured interviews. Next, Chapter 6 will discuss the general findings as it relates to the literature, implications of these findings for both theory and practice, the limitations of the study, and provide direction for future research.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this final chapter, there will be a discussion of the general findings as it relates to the literature, significance of study, limitations of the study, possibilities for future research and lastly, the researcher’s final thoughts.

Background of the Study

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, there is a lack of focus on accountability and outcomes in the cross-sector collaboration literature. One way to measure accountability and outcomes is by assessing public value. However, there is great debate in the literature on how to assess public value creation in cross-sector collaborations because of their dynamic nature. Page et al (2015) created a framework that included processes, outcomes and accountability in the assessment of public value in cross-sector collaborations. And they tried to create a public value assessment framework that captures the dynamic nature of a cross-sector collaboration.

This research study applies Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework to a cross-sector collaboration with different characteristics than the original case study to expand our knowledge of public value and cross-sector collaborations, and to help us better understand how to assess public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. The question that guided this research centered on whether public value was created by the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force during its tenure from 2003 to 2012. To answer this question, the three dimensions of Page et al’s (2015) framework: democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes, were assessed. The application of Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework, and the evidence collected and analyzed by document analysis and Nvivo analysis of semi-structured interviews, led me to conclude that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force did not create public value. Although the task force was democratically accountable, it lacked
transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making, which is the foundation of procedural legitimacy. Also, the task force lacked in its ability to provide equity of benefits, equity of payments and demonstrate efficient and effective performance, which are important public value attributes of substantive outcomes.

Chapter 5 provides an in-depth discussion of the findings. The next sections discuss the general findings as it relates to the literature.

Relationship Between the Findings and the Literature

Existing Relationship

Since the Alabama Department of Homeland Security was a new agency, there were no already established relationships with this particular agency, which is why it was not initially supported by the emergency management community. This finding supports the literature. In the landmark 2006 study, Bryson et al proposed that an already existing relationship among the sectors at the time of the initial formation affects the outcome of the cross-sector collaboration’s work because an existing relationship helps establish legitimacy and trust. The finding supported the significance of having an existing relationship among the sectors at the initial formation and how not having one can affect the outcome of the cross-sector collaboration’s work.

Sponsors, Champions and Formal Leader

This leads me to my other general finding. The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force garnered support in the beginning of the task force by a committed sponsor, which was the sheriff community. The champion of the task force in the early years was the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security because he had a vested interest in ensuring the collaboration remained intact. The task force also had a strong formal leader in the governor. The sponsor, champion, and formal leader helped establish trust and legitimacy in the early years of the task force. This finding is supported in the literature. Bryson et al (2006) concluded that
when there is no existing relationship among the sectors, it is essential that the cross-sector collaboration has sponsors or champions, including a formal leader, to help establish legitimacy and trust. The sponsor, champion and leader bring prestige, authority, and access to resources.

Mandated Cross-Sector Collaborations

An important finding was the impact that a mandated cross-sector collaboration versus a voluntary cross-sector collaboration can have on its ability to create public value. Since the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was a mandated collaboration, the rules of the task force, task force members, and the projects funded were heavily decided on by the US Department of Homeland Security. The literature supports this finding. Andrews and Entwistle (2010) explain that often mandated cross-sector collaborations such as the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force are told who can be a part of the collaboration and who can make decisions in the collaboration. As a direct result, the other sectors do not agree on the purpose of the cross-sector collaboration, the commitment of resources, how to make decisions, how to handle changes, who will lead, and who would actual serve. Also, Thomson and Perry (2006) explain that stakeholders that seek to collaborate must discuss how to make decisions together about the rules that will govern the cross-sector collaboration. In the case of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force, all of this was dictated by the US Department of Homeland Security. And according to Ansell and Gash (2008), complete participation in the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration increases the chances that it will be successful.

The distribution of benefits of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was not done in a fair manner; however, that was impacted by US DHS grant guidance. US DHS had specific priorities for each year, and the task force had to fund projects that met those priorities. However, the general consensus of cross-sector collaboration literature is that the hallmark of a successful cross-sector collaboration are stakeholders who believe they can benefit from the
collaboration, and who feel the cross-sector collaboration is actually meaningful. Ansell and Gash (2008) recognize that significant power and resource imbalances determine whether or not a collaboration will be successful, and if there is significant imbalance it is important to develop a strategy to empower and represent the weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders. Thomson and Perry (2006) recognize that there must be a mutual understanding that everyone in the cross-sector collaboration will benefit based on different interests. As Andrews and Entwistle (2010) recognized, “mandated cross-sector collaborations are often not free to make decisions about what projects to pursue and fund (690).

A finding that differs from what the literature currently indicates is that mandated cross-sector collaborations can be innovative. Andrews and Entwistle (2010) assert that mandated cross-sector collaborations are generally not very adaptive or innovative, but this proved to be the opposite for the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. This might be a different case because of how huge the area of homeland security is, so one can take on a multitude of emerging problems without stepping outside of its requirements.

Planning and Decision-Making

The Alabama Homeland Security Task Force did have a planning process in place through the program and capability reviews, but all task force members were not involved in the process nor were they aware of the process. In addition, it appears that some stakeholders had access to reports, plans, and budgets to help make decisions, while others did not. This finding is confirmed in the literature. The general consensus in the literature is that cross-sector collaborations need to have stakeholders that are involved in planning and decision-making, and there are a variety of ways to gather and use data to make decisions. Ansell and Gash (2008) state that cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed if they have both deliberate and emergent planning that involves all stakeholders. Bryson et al (2006) assert that a
comprehensive decision-making process builds trust and capacity to manage conflict, and builds on the skills of the stakeholders.

Inclusiveness

One could make the assertion that the task force was simply a way for the governor (ex-officio chairman) and the director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security (vice-chairman) to implement their own agenda under the requirements of the homeland security grant without the meaningful input from the task force. The general consensus of the literature is that it is important for a cross-sector collaboration to have a clear and transparent process so that every stakeholder feels like they are a part of the decision-making process. Ansell and Gash (2008) pointed out that a successful cross-sector collaboration depends on if the protocol and rules that govern the cross-sector collaboration are clear and the process is transparent; moreover, the stakeholders must feel like they are an important part of the decision-making process. They also assert that a cross-sector collaboration can only be successful if the stakeholders believe that they can benefit from the collaboration and the collaboration is actually meaningful (Ansell and Gash 2008).

Communication

There was a lack of communication between the chairman of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force and the state agency director stakeholders as well as the other stakeholders regarding how they came up with the recommendations and/or projects that were presented to them. And although the task force had established goals each year, the chairman of the task force failed to completely communicate those to all stakeholders. They were not given any evidence based reports, and they were not even allowed to have copies of the briefings by the chairman of the task force. This lack of communication might have been a direct result of having quarterly meetings rather than meeting on a more frequent basis.
The importance of effective communication in the success of a cross-sector collaboration is supported in the literature. There must be clear communication practices established among the stakeholders and between the cross-sector collaboration and the workers or agencies implementing the projects. Emerson et al (2011) conclude that collaborative action is more likely to be implemented and goals achieved if there is a mutual understanding among the multiple sectors as to what the collaboration’s goals are and if there is a desire to work together to accomplish the goals. Koshmann, Kuhn, and Pfarrer (2012) emphasize the importance of having clear communication practices. This includes all forms of communication, written and verbal.

Leadership

Although the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force’s leaders, the *ex officio* chairman and vice-chairman, were limited in what they could do because of mandates, such as who could serve on the task force and funding of projects, they also had the opportunity to make the decision-making process more transparent and inclusive. The literature does support the importance of leadership in the ability of a cross-sector collaboration to create public value. Bryson et al (2006) emphasized the importance of leadership in making sure that the components of initial conditions, processes, structures, governance, contingencies and constraints, outcomes, and accountabilities are aligned so that good things happen in a sustained way over time. Ansell and Gash (2008) clearly recognized that it is important for a leader to command respect and trust of the stakeholders especially when the distribution of power is not even and the incentive to participate is not strong.

Significance of Study

Theoretical Significance
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is great debate in the literature as to where public value is created, the level at which public value is created, and who the beneficiaries of the collaboration are. Page, Stone, Bryson, and Crosby (2015) established a framework to assess public value creation in a cross-sector collaboration that addresses these conflicts. The framework is the only existing framework that takes in consideration the literature of traditional public administration, new public management, and public value management.

This research study applied Page et al’s (2015) framework in a different public sector, a mandated cross-sector collaboration with participants from a wide variety of sectors. By applying the three-dimensional framework to the Minnesota Urban Agreement cross-sector collaboration, Page et al (2015) found that cross-sector collaborations are subject to changes in internal characteristics and external environments, and they asserted that this impacted the assessment of the public value attributes. As a result, they found numerous trade-offs among and between the public value attributes. For example, since stakeholder involvement varied over time, horizontal democratic accountability was hard to assess due to the fact that the stakeholders had changed.

These same issues were present with the application of Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework to the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. In assessing whether or not the task force created public value, the researcher did have to take in consideration changes in funding and priorities from US DHS, as well as changes in stakeholders and even leadership although it was a relatively small change. There were trade-offs within and among the attributes. For example, the stakeholders in the task force did change and it was hard to assess how the changing of stakeholders affected the assessment of horizontal democratic accountability. A glaring limitation of the framework is that it did not provide efficient insight as to how society or the political environment affected the task force’s ability to create public value.
An improvement to the framework would be to include a public value attribute within each dimension that specifically addresses social and political issues that might hinder or assist in the creation of public value. In this study, the semi-structured nature of the interviews assisted in capturing a little of this information, but not enough to truly assess its impact on the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force’s ability to create public value. For example, were there any political decisions or scandals that might have affected the task force’s ability to create public value? Were there any issues or problems, such as terrorist attacks or a financial crisis, that might have affected the task force’s ability to create public value?

The one advantage that the researcher had that Page et al (2015) didn’t was that there was already a deep knowledge and understanding of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. This advantage helped the researcher make delicate judgements about the specific context, processes, and structures of a collaboration and its pursuit of public value. For instance, the researcher was knowledgeable in how the task force meetings were conducted, the process of how homeland security grant funding was decided, and was even familiar with the various projects that the task force approved between 2003-2012. As explained in Chapter 2, public value is one of the ways to measure accountabilities and outcomes in cross-sector collaborations. Since the focus of this study was on the creation of public value in cross-sector collaborations, this research study added to the area of accountabilities and outcomes, in which limited attention had previously been placed.

Applied Significance

Governments are utilizing cross-sector collaborations at a higher rate to solve complex problems. For this reason, it is essential to be able to assess public value creation in them to learn how to create a cross-sector collaboration that is accountable, follows norms related to procedural justice, and produces substantive outcomes. As the application of cross-sector
collaborations to solve complex problems continues to increase, we need to better understand how to make these entities more accountable, ensure their processes are transparent and fair, and that they are creating substantive outcomes. The application of the Page et al (2015) three-dimensional framework is one way to ensure that the cross-sector collaboration is creating public value. Practitioners now can ask themselves the following questions: Is the cross-sector collaboration being accountable to elected officials, state agencies, stakeholders and the public? Is the cross-sector transparent in its processes and inclusive in decision making processes? Are the goals of the cross-sector being met efficiently? How are the costs and benefits allocated? Is it fair? Is it able to problems solve through innovation and spin-off collaborations? These are all important questions that will give a great indication as to whether or not the cross-sector collaboration will and is creating public value.

Limitations of the Study

The first part of this research study consists of detailing the project history of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force by conducting a document analysis from 2003 to 2012. Documents were collected from the organization’s files that were made available for the purpose of the research. A document analysis provided insight into the workings of the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force and helped guide the interview questions. However, it is important to note that some documents were missing between the years of 2003-2005, so a thorough analysis of documents were not as possible in the early years.

The second part of the research consisted of conducting 20 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The truth of responses by interview participants was a concern. Bias may have been introduced. Participants that played significant parts in the task force, may have wanted the task force to seem “better” than what it was. While participants who were not a focal part of the task force or who had a personal vendetta
against major players of the task force, may have wanted the task force to seem “worse” than what it was. This is especially true since the researcher worked with the participants being interviewed. In addition, since the interview participants served on the task force between five and fourteen years ago, the remembrance of certain decisions or the workings of task force may have been affected.

Another limitation of this study is that the indicators of the public value attribute of Page et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework were not clear, especially in the area of democratic accountability. For instance, one indicator of horizontal democratic accountability was informal or formal support of stakeholders. However, the definition for horizontal democratic accountability was responsive to stakeholders. There is no clear connection between the definition being provided and the indicator.

Page et al (2015) recognized even with the three-dimensional framework that they created that it is still hard to assess public value in cross-sector collaborations. Similarly, as Page et al (2015) recognized this as a limitation in their study, the researcher of this study recognizes this same limitation. The reason is because one must take in consideration external characteristics and internal characteristics when assessing the public value attributes. This is hard because cross-sector collaborations are dynamic. They are constantly changing and shifting.

Future Research

The literature already indicates that it is hard for a cross-sector collaboration to be successful because there must be an aligning of leadership, initial conditions, processes, structures, governance, contingencies and constraints, outcomes and accountabilities. There are multiple moving parts with multiple sectors. One of the distinctions between the Page et al’s (2015) study and this study was that one cross-sector collaboration was mandated and the other
one was not. Interestingly, the fact that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was mandated affected its ability to create public value. Since the task force was already mandated with specific requirements, the stakeholders were forced to enter into an agreement with each other. The mandate limited who would actually serve on the task force. It limited who would be the leaders of the task force, it limited how decisions would be made, and it limited the goals of the task force and what it would be able to achieve. This mandate helped create a sense of distrust, which is detrimental to the success of a cross-sector collaboration. For future research, it is important that as cross-sector collaborations are created, that we fully understand the implications of how public value is affected by a mandated cross-sector collaboration versus a voluntary cross-sector collaboration. As we explore the differences more deeply, then it is essential that we understand exactly how we can ensure that mandated cross-sector collaborations are not limited in their ability to create public value.

There is a lack of focus in the area of accountability in cross-sector collaborations; however, the Page et al (2015) study includes the dimension of democratic accountability to assess public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. The findings from this study indicate that the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force was democratically accountable, but lacked procedural legitimacy and substantive outcomes. The conclusion was that the task force did not create public value. So the question that arises is how can a cross-sector collaboration not have procedural legitimacy and substantive outcomes, but be democratically accountable. As a result, future research would benefit with more exploration as to whether being democratically accountable really determines whether a cross-sector collaboration creates public value. This research challenges whether or not democratically accountability is really important to public value creation in cross-sector collaborations.
Also, more work needs to be done on how to better assess public value creation that efficiently takes in consideration those external and internal characteristics that are constantly changing in a cross-sector collaboration. This is a challenge that Page et al (2015) recognized and so have other scholars as well. However, as more research focuses on public value creation in cross-sector collaborations, the closer we get to figuring out better ways to assess it.

Final Thoughts

This research examined the dimensions of Page et al’s (2015) framework in a different public sector, a mandated cross-sector collaboration, and a cross-sector collaboration with a wide variety of sectors. This research expanded the knowledge of public value creation in cross-sector collaborations and added to the debate of to where public value is created, the level(s) where public value is created, and who the beneficiaries of the collaboration are.

The problems and issues that government agencies are called on to solve are often so complex that they require cross-sector collaborations to address them and find solutions. Utilizing cross-sector collaborations to handle these complex problems, such as terrorism, is the norm now because of the need to share knowledge and resources to solve them. For this reason, it is important that we understand public value creation in cross-sector collaborations. This research study was small in scope; however, it has helped expand our knowledge on cross-sector collaborations and public value.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 1: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to form in turbulent environments.</th>
<th>Proposition 2: Public policy makers are most likely to try cross-sector collaborations when they believe the separate efforts to address a problem have failed.</th>
<th>Proposition 3: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when one or more linking mechanisms, such as powerful sponsors, or existing networks, are in place at the time of initial formation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 4: The form and content of a collaboration’s initial agreements, as well as processes used to formulate them affect the outcomes of the collaboration’s work.</td>
<td>Proposition 5: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they have committed sponsors and effective champions at many levels who provide formal and informal leadership.</td>
<td>Proposition 6: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they establish the legitimacy of collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 7: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when trust-building activities are continuous.</td>
<td>Proposition 8: Because conflict is common in partnerships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when partner use resources and tactics to equalize power.</td>
<td>Proposition 9: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they combine deliberate and emergent planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 10: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when their planning makes use of stakeholders, uses process to build trust and the capacity to manage conflict, and builds on distinctive competencies of the collaborators.</td>
<td>Proposition 11: Collaborative structure is influenced by environmental factors.</td>
<td>Proposition 12: Collaborative structure is likely to change over time because of ambiguity of membership and complexity in local environments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 13: Collaboration structure and the nature of the tasks performed at the client level are likely to influence a collaboration’s overall effectiveness.</td>
<td>Proposition 14: Formal and informal governing mechanisms are likely to influence collaboration effectiveness.</td>
<td>Proposition 15: Collaborations involving system level planning activities are likely to involve the most negotiation, followed by collaborations focused on administrative-level partnerships and service delivery partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 16: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to</td>
<td>Proposition 17: Competing institutional logics are likely</td>
<td>Proposition 18: Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 Summary of Public Value Propositions
succeed when they build in resources and tactics for dealing with power imbalances and shocks.

within cross-sector collaborations and may significantly influence the extent to which collaborations can agree on essential elements of process, structure, governance, and desired outcomes.

they build on individuals’ and organizations’ self-interests and each sector’s characteristic strengths while finding ways to minimize or compensate for each sector’s weaknesses.

Proposition 19: Cross Sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they produce positive first, second, and third order effects.

Proposition 20: Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they are resilient and engage in regular reassessments.

Proposition 21: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to be successful when they have an accountability system that tracks inputs, process, and outcomes; use a variety of methods for gathering and interpreting and using data; and use a results management system.

Proposition 22: The normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector collaborations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 19: Cross Sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they produce positive first, second, and third order effects.</th>
<th>Proposition 20: Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they are resilient and engage in regular reassessments</th>
<th>Proposition 21: Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to be successful when they have an accountability system that tracks inputs, process, and outcomes; use a variety of methods for gathering and interpreting and using data; and use a results management system.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Figure 2.1 Components of Cross-sector Collaborations**

![Figure 2.1 Components of Cross-sector Collaborations](image-url)
Figure 2.2 Strategic Triangle
Table 2.2 Three-Dimensional Framework
### Democratic Accountability

- **Horizontal Democratic Accountability**—measured by collaborative partners and external stakeholders.
- **Vertical Democratic Accountability**—measured by responsiveness to authorizers and legal mandates.

### Procedural Legitimacy

- **Procedural Rationality**—is the extent to which a decision process involves the collection of information relevant to the decision and the reliance upon analysis of this information in making the choice.
- **Procedural Justice**—is the extent to which a decision is seen as fair and transparent.
- **Operational Control**—the implementation of plans, budgets, and schedules to ensure that the cross-sector collaboration is doing exactly what was decided.

### Substantive Outcomes

- **Effectiveness**—measures of intermediate and final outcomes of activities that relate to collaboration’s goals.
- **Efficiency**—benefit cost analysis to identify the most cost-effective way to implement project.
- **Equity**—benefits and costs of the collaboration are split equally among the stakeholders.
- **Enhanced Problem Solving Capability**—measures the ability of the cross-sector collaboration to be innovative and solve pressing issues as they arrive during the life of the collaboration.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Dimension</th>
<th>Attribute of public value</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Sample indicators to assess attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Democratic Accountability | Vertical democratic accountability | Extent to which decisions and implementation are legal and responsive to authorizers                                                          | -endorsements or informal support from elected officials or agency directors  
- MOAs signed by public authorities  
- resistance, objections, or sanctions imposed by elected officials or agency directors                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Democratic Accountability | Horizontal democratic accountability | Extent to which decisions and implementation respond to collaboration partners and other stakeholders                                      | -endorsements or informal support from collaboration partners or stakeholders  
- public opinion supportive of the collaboration  
- resistance, objections, or legal challenges by stakeholders or the public                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Procedural Legitimacy   | Procedural rationality     | Extent to which decisions are based on technically and administratively sound data, analysis and planning                                    | -logic of planning, decision-making, implementation  
- existence of data-driven plans, reports, budgets  
- use of evidence to make decisions during meetings of collaboration partners                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Procedural Legitimacy   | Procedural justice         | Extent to which stakeholders perceive collaboration decisions and activities to be fair and transparent                                      | -use of inclusive decision-making practices involving a wide range of participants and viewpoints  
- nature and range of citizen engagement practices                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Procedural Legitimacy   | Operational control        | Extent to which collaboration uses requirements, budgets, and schedules to oversee projects and activities                                  | -relevance of requirements, budgets, and schedules to projects and activities  
- logic of flows of information and authority  
- soundness of procedures to handle exceptions                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Substantive Outcomes    | Effective performance     | Extent to which collaboration achieves its goals                                                                                           | -achievement of intermediate and final outcomes produced by collaborative activities                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Substantive Outcomes    | Efficient performance     | Extent to which collaboration achieves its goals at reasonable costs                                                                       | -ratio of benefits produced to costs incurred  
- presence of innovative cost savings produced by collaborative problem-solving                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Substantive Outcomes    | Equity of benefits        | Extent to which benefits of collaboration are spread appropriately among stakeholders and the public                                      | -estimates or perceptions of the distribution of benefits by researchers, stakeholders, or the public                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Substantive Outcomes    | Equity of payment         | Extent to which costs of collaboration are spread appropriately among stakeholders and the public                                          | -estimates or perceptions of the distribution of costs by researchers, stakeholders, or the public                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Substantive Outcomes    | Problem-solving capacity  | New behaviors or norms that increase the potential to address complex problems                                                              | -spin-off collaborations  
- more effective collaborative decision-making  
- new approaches to address challenging problems                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representative of County Government</th>
<th>Appointed by the Governor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representative of Municipal Government</td>
<td>Appointed by the Speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of County Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Appointed by the Speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of Municipal Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of Paid Fire Departments</td>
<td>Appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of Volunteer Fire Department</td>
<td>Appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of Local Emergency Management Agencies</td>
<td>Appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of the Local Emergency Communications Districts</td>
<td>Appointed by the Lieutenant Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of the Judicial Branch of Government of Alabama</td>
<td>Appointed by the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.1 Alabama Homeland Security Regional Map
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORE THEMES (11)</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Public Value Attribute</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Freq of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Democratic Accountability</td>
<td>Horizontal and Vertical Democratic Accountability</td>
<td>Endorsement or informal support from elected officials, agency directors, and stakeholders</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>Democratic Accountability</td>
<td>Horizontal and Vertical Democratic Accountability</td>
<td>Resistance, objections, or challenges by elected officials, agency directors, the stakeholders, and the public</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Procedural Legitimacy</td>
<td>Procedural Justice and Procedural Rationality</td>
<td>Logic of planning, decision-making and implementation, inclusive decision-making practices, and the existence of data-driven plans, reports, and budgets to make decisions during meetings</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptions</td>
<td>Procedural Legitimacy</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
<td>Soundness of procedures to handle exceptions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Methods</td>
<td>Procedural Legitimacy</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
<td>Logic of flows of information and authority and the use of requirements, budgets, and schedules to track projects and activities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Substantive Outcomes</td>
<td>Effective Performance</td>
<td>Achievement of intermediate and final outcomes</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Substantive Outcomes</td>
<td>Efficient Performance</td>
<td>Ratio of benefits produced to costs incurred and the presence of innovative cost savings produced by collaborative problem solving</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Substantive Outcomes</td>
<td>Equity of Benefits</td>
<td>Perceptions of the distribution of benefits by researchers, stakeholders, or the public</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of Costs</td>
<td>Substantive Outcomes</td>
<td>Equity of Payments</td>
<td>Perceptions of the distribution of costs by researchers, stakeholders, or the public</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovations</td>
<td>Substantive Outcomes</td>
<td>Problem-Solving Capacity</td>
<td>New approaches to address challenging problems</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinoff Collaborations</td>
<td>Substantive Outcomes</td>
<td>Problem-Solving Capacity</td>
<td>Spin-off collaborations</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2 Was the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force Vertical and Horizontal Accountable?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Value Attribute</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vertical Democratic Accountability</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal Democratic Accountability</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3 Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force Demonstrate Procedural Rationality, Procedural Justice, and Operational Control?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Value Attribute</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Rationality</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.4 Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force have Effective Performance, Efficient Performance, Equity of Benefits, Equity of Pay, and Problem-Solving Capacity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Value Attribute</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Performance</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient Performance</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of Payment</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-Solving Capacity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Attribute of public value</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procedural Legitimacy</td>
<td>Operational control</td>
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<td>Effective performance</td>
<td>Extent to which collaboration achieves its goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Efficient performance</td>
<td>Extent to which collaboration achieves its goals at reasonable costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Extent to which benefits of collaboration are spread appropriately among stakeholders and the public</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Substantive Outcomes</td>
<td>Problem-solving capacity</td>
<td>New behaviors or norms that increase the potential to address complex problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Stone, Melissa M., Barbara C. Crosby, and John M. Bryson (2010). Governing Public-


Appendix A

Interview Protocol

Introduction

My name is Melissa Bailey and I am a PhD candidate in Public Administration and Public Policy at Auburn University. Through my dissertation, I am exploring public value creation in cross sector collaborations. In my study, I am assessing how public value was created in the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force that you were a stakeholder of at some time during the years of 2002-2012. This interview is being conducted to assess public value creation within the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

Please read over and sign the informed consent form. Essentially, this document states that: (1) all information will be held confidential, (2) your participation is voluntary and you may stop at any time if you feel uncomfortable, and (3) we do not intend to inflict any harm.

Thank you for agreeing to participate.

I have planned this interview to last no longer than one hour. Our conversation will be recorded. I have a few questions that I would like to cover.

Interview Questions

Democratic Accountability

1. Did the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force receive any endorsements or informal support from elected officials or agency directors participating in the task force?

2. Were there any resistance, objections, or legal challenges expressed by stakeholders or the public?
   a. If so, what were they and how did the task force respond to them?

Procedural Legitimacy

3. Were there any use of evidence, such as data driven plans, reports, or budgets, in making decisions within the task force?
   a. If so, describe how they were used in making decisions?

4. Were stakeholders within the task force and the public included in making decisions?
   a. If so, what inclusive decision making processes were in place within the task force?
5. How were decisions that were made communicated between task force stakeholders and project workers that were implementing the projects?

6. How were exceptions handled?

Substantive Outcomes

7. How would you describe the task force’s ability to reach its goals?
   a. What measures were used to assess whether the collaboration reached its goals (intermediate and final)?

8. Were the goals accomplished at a reasonable cost?
   a. If yes, how was efficiency achieved and measured?

9. Explain the extent at which benefits of the collaboration were spread appropriately among all stakeholders and the public.

10. How were the cost allocated?

11. Discuss any spin off collaborations that occurred as a result of the task force

12. Discuss any innovative approaches that were implemented to address challenging problems.

Conclusion

Thank you for participating in this study. There is a chance that I might contact you to clarify information or ask additional questions. If you have any questions or concerns afterwards, please contact me at (334) 315-9120 or at JOHNS84@auburn.edu.

Post Interview Comments and/or Observations:
Appendix B

(NOTE: DO NOT SIGN THIS DOCUMENT UNLESS AN IRB APPROVAL STAMP WITH CURRENT DATES HAS BEEN APPLIED TO THIS DOCUMENT.)

INFORMED CONSENT

for a Research Study entitled

“Exploring Public Value Creation in Cross Sector Collaborations”

You are invited to participate in a research study to assess public value creation in the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force. The study is being conducted by Melissa Bailey, PhD candidate, under the direction of Dr. Cindy Bowling, Department Head, in the Auburn University Department of Public Administration and Public Policy. You were selected as a possible participant because you served on the Alabama Homeland Security Task force between the years of 2002 and 2012 and are age 19 or older.

If you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to participate in an interview, which will consist of several questions. Your total time commitment will be approximately 1 hour. The interview will be recorded.

No risks are anticipated.

If you participate in this study, you can expect to receive the benefit of sharing your experiences of serving on the Alabama Homeland Security Task Force.

If you decide to participate, you will incur no costs.

If you change your mind about participating, you can withdraw at any time during the study. Your participation is completely voluntary. If you choose to withdraw, your data can be withdrawn as long as it is identifiable. Your decision about whether or not to participate or to stop participating will not jeopardize your future relations with Auburn University, the Department of Public Administration and Public Policy.

Your privacy will be protected. Any information obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential. At no time will your actual identity be revealed. You will be assigned a random numerical code. The key code linking your name with your number will be kept in a locked file cabinet in a locked office, and no one else will have access to it. It will be destroyed after five years from the completion of the research. The data you give me will be used for
completion of my dissertation and may be used as the basis for articles or presentations in the future. I won’t use your name or information that would identify you in any publications or presentations.

If you have questions about this study, please ask them now or contact Melissa Bailey at 334-315-9120 or Dr. Cindy Bowling at 334-844-6152.

A copy of this document will be given to you to keep.

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Auburn University Office of Research Compliance or the Institutional Review Board by phone (334) 844-5966 or email at IRBadmin@auburn.edu or IRBChair@auburn.edu.

HAVING READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED, YOU MUST DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY. YOUR SIGNATURE INDICATES YOUR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE.

___________________________________  _______________________________________
Participant’s Signature   Date                                 Investigator Obtaining Consent   Date

___________________________________  _______________________________________
Printed Name   Date                                 Printed Name   Date

Participant’s initials _____