Wild by Design
The Technological Construction of Authenticity, Wilderness, and Nature in America’s National Parks, 1860-1945

By

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the origins of American national park experiences. It explores how several social groups attempted to make the national parks conform to their expectations and desires using political power, financial investments, and democratic advocacy by profiling tourists, government policymakers, business owners who wanted to profit from parks, nature enthusiasts, park rangers, and parks’ former residents. It argues that these groups collectively contributed to a paradigm that defined national parks as unique, wild, natural, unpeopled, profitable, legible, and easily accessible.

The dissertation features case studies on Shenandoah and Death Valley National Parks that show the paradigm’s portability. Even though neither of those places was like the national parks created before them, those sites’ supporters succeeded at adding them to the National Park System by physically and rhetorically changing them to fit the park paradigm. The dissertation focuses on these parks because they both entered the national park system in the 1930s, because their staff’s consciously shaped them to be like preexisting national parks, and because both entered the system to accomplish objectives unrelated to natural conservation.

This dissertation features archival materials from both parks’ internal archives, the US National Archives and Records Administration, and the auto tourism collection at the Benson Ford Research Center. The evidence shows how a constellation of actors and contemporary circumstances aligned to shape the American National Park System.
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**Introduction**

This dissertation is about the ways the United States’ national parks matured as a technological system. It argues groups of people shaped them in a process that attempted to reconcile competing and often inconsistent sets of priorities. The ways that process played out in early, western national parks set important precedents for what became the National Park System. This dissertation refers to the suite of characteristics embodied in those precedents as the “park paradigm.”

Important elements of the park paradigm include creating opportunities for unique forms of outdoor recreation, preserving supposedly natural places, providing access to authentic wilderness, and allowing for tourists’ comfort and convenience. This dissertation explains how several groups of people interacted to embed those attributes in the park paradigm. It then transitions to case studies that illustrate how promoters reshaped other places so that they would live up to the established paradigm.

The dissertation focuses on the period from the mid-nineteenth century to the close of the Second World War. It explores how precedents set in parks like Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Glacier put the National Park System on a trajectory guided by technological momentum. It points to mid-century modernist development of the National Park Service’s Mission 66 construction program as the logical outgrowth of precedents set before the Second World War (especially those set by tourist business owners and political policymakers). It also frames that development as a moment of technological closure. As a transcontinental technological system, the national parks stabilized around providing natural leisure experiences using urban infrastructure.

Development in early western national parks such as Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Glacier set the system on a path-dependent course that ensured designers would prioritize mechanized accessibility, entrée to amenities such as hotels, and the construction of urban infrastructural systems. The national parks reflected a broader progressive consensus that celebrated these systems’ modernity and
attractiveness. By embedding and enmeshing these systems in parks, it also made it much more
challenging for future managers to choose different ways of providing access, accommodations, and
services because urban infrastructure became one of the defining parts of visitors’ experiences.

While national park experiences were, and still are, socially constructed, many of the central
elements that visitors have come to expect as parts of park experiences (namely driving on paved roads
and traveling from destination to destination in cars) have taken on lives of their own. In late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Americans’ general faith in technological progress led to the
widespread adoption of unnatural machines intended to help access natural experiences. This attitude
reached its apogee with the post-World War II construction program known as Mission 66.

Thanks to a Congressional appropriation of $1 billion dollars spread over ten years, the program
touched every part of park management. Mission 66 projects included the installation or improvement
of thousands of miles of roads, the construction of hundreds of visitor centers and comfort stations, and
the expansion of developed areas in almost every national park unit. The National Park Service staff
who oversaw the program had come of age during the Great Depression and advocated against mining,
logging, or military training that would have permanently damaged parks during the Second World War
Mission 66 represents a moment of interpretive closure.

The success and support park managers enjoyed while constructing new infrastructure
demonstrated the stability of the park paradigm and the consensus that developed around it in the
post-war period. The consensus did not last, and Mission 66 eventually ran into stiff resistance from the
burgeoning environmental movement. Environmentalists believed the plan created more problems than
it solved. By redefining the problem the National Park System was meant to solve, auto-skeptics
contributed to a new paradigm that placed greater value on preservation than access. Even after that
development, those units of the National Park System that already had substantial roads, lodges, or
other infrastructural systems largely retained them (though newer units ended up far less developed).
This dissertation approaches the momentum that drove infrastructural development in the National Park System as having evolved over time. It situates individual parks as elements of a technological system that tourist business owners (especially railroad companies) initially designed as attractive destinations for wealthy tourists. It explains how large construction projects (including park road networks, power plants, water treatment facilities, and maintenance or administrative buildings in developed areas) designed to accommodate tourists would be difficult or impossible to remove from parks and have in some cases become attractions in their own right. It also links the abstract experiences those systems were designed to deliver with the expansion of the National Park System after 1916.

When Congress created the National Park Service in that year, the new agency was responsible for managing 35 national parks and monuments. In order to increase the agency’s relevance to Americans who lived far away from existing parks, Stephen Mather, the National Park Service’s first director, argued for the creation of additional national park units. In this he was joined by nature enthusiasts (who wanted to preserve or conserve wild places), tourist business owners (who wanted to profit from increased tourism), government policymakers (who viewed national parks as potentially useful tools to accomplish policy goals), and tourists (who wanted to have national park experiences closer to home). Mather’s plan was complicated by the fact that most of the places where Americans lived were not near western national parks. One of the reasons these groups collectively succeeded at expanding the National Park System was that the park paradigm provided a set of attributes that served as a model for land development.

In other words, rather than finding more park-like places, the national park paradigm allowed them to reshape “wastelands” so that they would provide experiences like those found in western national parks, such as Yellowstone, Yosemite, or Glacier. This meant creating new, central monumental
attractions, setting up new roads and infrastructure, and providing easy access to tourists who wanted to travel in comfort.

The dissertation begins with profiles of the relevant social groups who shaped park development and then transitions to addressing the ways the precedents these groups established in early national parks set the standard for future units that came into the National Park System. The dissertation describes six groups that influenced national park development. They include:

- Political policymakers or Federal Government officials
- Business owners who profited from their association with national parks or tourist business owners
- The US National Park Service
- Nature enthusiasts
- Tourists
- Residents who lived in or near parkland who did not profit from tourism

Members of each of these groups contributed to the precedents that defined the park paradigm. They also all contributed to efforts to bring new units into the National Park System. This dissertation addresses two case studies of how those additions played out through profiles on Shenandoah and Death Valley.

In Virginia’s Shenandoah National Park, the National Park Service reversed the process it had used to identify attractive destinations in the west. It first identified an area that was attractive as a potential destination because of its proximity to Americans in the east and the relatively small number of people who lived there, and then it created a central, natural attraction visitors could experience there. By constructing Skyline Drive, the National Park Service created a central attraction that the agency intended to accommodate the automobile and invited tourists to drive to experience it. The agency also systematically expelled mountaineers who lived on the Blue Ridge because they were
“misusing and degrading” the land and because their presence was incompatible with creating an unpeopled space that would live up to the park paradigm. In other parks, the National Park Service worked to use existing tropes on the value of tourist attractions to make previously “wasted” and “abused” land live up to the park paradigm.\footnote{In Death Valley, California, the National Park Service reinterpreted land that was formerly understood solely as a place to be feared or to be mined for use instead as a tourist destination. The agency also selectively reframed miners who worked there as contributing to the area’s scenic appeal while dismissing the Shoshone Indians who had lived there for at least centuries because they supposedly degraded and misused the landscape. The agency coupled this reinterpretation with extensive infrastructural development (built on that already begun by tourist business owners) intended to provide urban amenities to visitors in the Valley. By adding urban infrastructural systems, like water treatment facilities and roads, the agency helped make the Valley into an attractive leisure destination. The National Park Service simultaneously worked to emphasize the Valley’s appeal as a place where visitors would understand and access the privation and hardships of Euroamerican pioneer life. In so doing, the National Park Service reinterpreted that part of the Mojave Desert as a place where tourists should want to visit rather than avoid.

Both of these cases represent departures from the narrative political policymakers, nature enthusiasts, and National Park Service staff claimed defined the national park paradigm. Rather than following the model supposedly set in early national parks where scientists, explorers, business owners, or political policymakers identified attractions that were “worthy of federal protection,” a constellation of external factors beyond supposed scenic merit affected Shenandoah and Death Valley’s addition to the National Park System. Nonetheless, Shenandoah and Death Valley’s eventual addition was dependent on reinterpreting these units to fit the paradigmatic definition of national parks.
The case studies on Shenandoah and Death Valley show how expectations developed in early, western national parks gave later park promoters the abstract framework they needed to reshape other places to be like them. This dissertation addresses the process of reinterpretation at some length for both parks by exploring both places’ pre-park histories and explaining how previous uses did not conform with parts of the park paradigm. It then follows how park creation advocates worked to rhetorically and physically reframe the parks’ landscapes so they would become more park-like. The dissertation pays special attention to how the National Park Service worked to control and minimize supposedly non-conforming uses so that parks became more administratively and physically similar.

The case studies on Shenandoah and Death Valley help explain a broader move by the National Park Service to manage sites across the United States that its leaders believed contained superlative, unique scenery and history. The case studies also reflect the interactions between private business owners, nature enthusiasts, government officials, and tourists who all advocated for creating additional national parks and the residents who often resisted those efforts. The interactions between these groups resulted in seemingly contradictory outcomes in terms of the ways parks are managed, the goals the parks are intended to accomplish, and the ways advocates managed to bring these units into the National Park System. One of the primary attributes park advocates implicitly embedded in the park paradigm was a strong utilitarian justification for parks’ creation.

The kinds of utilitarian justifications park advocates adopted revolved around their ability to serve as sources of profit for tourist business owners, as outlets for federal relieve spending, and as attractive, non-urban destinations for tourists who wanted to escape increasingly crowded American cities. These social groups’ decision to define utility in terms of extrinsic goals rather than parks’ intrinsic value is a central part of understanding how, why, and when parks were established. It is also consistent with natural resource development priorities across the United States and with the earliest western parks’ establishment and development.
This continuity emphasizes the centrality of precedents set elsewhere to national park development. It may also help explain nature enthusiasts’ willingness to either build or interpret supposedly unnatural elements out of park sites. Park supporters’ willingness to argue for new sites’ merit as tourist destinations in spite of extensive pre-park-era development demonstrates the symbiosis between Gilded Age and Progressive Era sensibilities of modernity, racial hierarchy, and almost blind faith in technological systems and nature enthusiasts’ stated goals to use park infrastructural development to preserve remnants of the natural world and restore natural functioning in areas that they believed other humans had damaged.

In Shenandoah, park supporters argued that they would reclaim wasted land from profligate mountaineers who were misusing it and living in a degenerate society. In Death Valley, park supporters argued that providing access for tourists would help Euroamericans reclaim what would otherwise remain unoccupied wasteland. Thanks to special dispensation, it would also not prevent miners’ attempts to reap a mineral harvest from the land. Park supporters succeeded at arguing non-conforming uses did not categorically disqualify Shenandoah or Death Valley from becoming parks because targeted development would provide access, improve amenities, and preserve natural values and attractions that helped set those areas apart from other, less unique tracts of land in the east and west.

The national parks that developed as a result were consciously shaped to live up to expectations casual tourists, political policymakers, and professional authors developed in early western parks. The process of reshaping them meant erasing or minimizing the effect of uses that did not conform to the national park paradigm. Park managers accomplished this with specialized forms of development. In the process, this development obliterated evidence of or reinterpreted residents’ presence because it had been reframed as improper and wasteful.
Euroamericans singled out Native Americans’ use of park land as especially improvident. By applying a utilitarian ideology that privileged industrial and agricultural development at the expense of Native Americans’ traditional lifeways, Euroamericans justified displacing populations across the continent. They simultaneously ignored or minimized the ways Native Americans had shaped the land to improve their lives. This may have been due to a lack of knowledge or part of a larger mental schema that justified displacement on the grounds that natives were “misusing” the land by not developing it in the same ways Euroamericans did for farming, to feed livestock, or to intensively mine.

All of the groups that shaped national parks had their own agendas. Membership in these groups was not mutually exclusive and sometimes overlapped. Nonetheless, these broad categories help frame the priorities that motivated various groups to advocate for and against national park designation, development, and management.

In the pages that follow, you will read about each of these groups’ priorities and the ways they worked to achieve them in national parks. Collectively, these groups shaped the National Park System and helped create a paradigm that mediated visitors’ park experiences. The “park paradigm” or “park idea” is a central part of parks’ identities and appearances. It was first shaped in the American west and park supporters used it as a model to select and design all the parks that followed.

Understanding the interplay between competing groups is complicated. They negotiated through a contentious process ethnologist Anna Tsing described as “friction.” Tsing defined friction as “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference.” She used this concept to interpret interviews with groups who influenced the development and preservation of Indonesia’s rain forests.

Tsing wrote about how participants in Indonesia’s rain forests’ development shared different descriptions of the same objective events with her. She explained how groups’ contested facticity created “systematic misunderstandings” that complicated communication between them. She also
argued that those disagreements enhanced their ability to work together to create shared narratives and existences.⁸

Tsing explained that the incompatibilities between nature lovers’, government officials’, business owners’, and former forest residents’ perspectives helped her understand that documenting the differences in goals, objects, and strategies could result in a diversified perspective rather than a homogenized one. Acknowledging the differences between accounts and interweaving the inherently incompatible perspectives into a narrative helped Tsing highlight the interconnections between each group without having to reconcile their experiences into a single narrative.⁹ The result was that she was able to simultaneously tell stories of dispossession and acknowledge the economic and social benefits that resulted for some people from the changes.

Tsing’s research attempts to explain what she describes as “the universal.” The universal is an overarching, totalizing, and ultimately ineffable truth that humans continually strive to understand.¹⁰ It provides a common link between the individual encounters with the “sticky materiality” of the world. Tsing described her work as the antidote to social scientific and historical studies that were limited to culturally-specific values ignoring the overall benefits or losses humanity accrued from exploitive and destructive forms of development.

Through her study on friction, Tsing attempts to consider her empathy for groups displaced by change and the supposed “progress” achieved through creative destruction. She attempts to reach a balance by acknowledging that both kinds of groups are pursuing access to the universal. In the process, she assimilates place, culture, and socially-specific connections. The specific actions, their contexts, and the connections between them provide the “grip” that changed society in an attempt to access larger, universal perspectives.¹¹

Those perspectives are evident in the resistance, adoption, confusion, and acceptance that attended change. Approaching each of these actions where their incompatibilities come into contact
through friction liberates her narrative from focusing on teleological ends and refocuses it on how the struggle over goals and hierarchies contribute to social and cultural evolution.\textsuperscript{12} Having an understanding of Tsing’s approach helped frame the approach to research in the pages that follow. This dissertation contextualizes the negotiation that led to national park creation and emphasizes the apparent contradictions between creating national parks in places like Shenandoah and Death Valley, which were fundamentally different from the places like early western parks where the most important precedents for national park management were set. The process of defining the national park paradigm involved friction between groups whose priorities were often incompatible and resulted in conflict, collaboration, and compromise.

Contact between groups with different priorities shaped the National Park System and helped define the park paradigm. I categorize the groups that shared common interests to describe the parks’ paradigmatic frame. This dissertation applies Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch’s model to characterize the social construction of technology to contextualize individual national parks’ development as part of a larger technological system. It argues that management of the National Park System happens within its own paradigmatic context.\textsuperscript{13} That paradigm provided the boundaries for acceptable management actions and leisure activities in parks, helped define what it meant to visit or manage them, and set the foundations from which they would continue to evolve.

That evolution came about within the overall framework of a paradigmatic conception centered on ideas of uniqueness, authenticity, beauty, and wilderness. The way that process happened is similar to the one proposed by John Staudenmaier in his description of Thomas Kuhn’s and later Edward Constant’s concept of paradigmatic change. Staudenmaier argues Constant’s frame of “governing conception” is dependent on the membership of the community of practitioners who use it. In other words, the consensus over how any governing conception should function changes over time but within basic, agreed-upon parameters.\textsuperscript{14}
Those parameters are defined by the specialists who often take past technical achievements as models for future work. In the case of American national parks, that meant building on management practices initially developed in places like Yellowstone and Yosemite and exporting those practices to new and sometimes radically different places. This is in keeping with Kuhn’s paradigmatic model, which frames technical paradigms as resources to use and not as rules to follow. Different groups of people used the park paradigm as a tool to accomplish different things. The parameters of the paradigm helped direct the National Park System’s technological trajectory.

The park paradigm became less flexible as the national park idea gained technological momentum. Park managers shaped the system to accomplish a discrete set of goals that became less and less inclusive over time.\(^\text{15}\) The need to integrate new parks in to the existing paradigmatic system led to significant constraints on how federal policymakers, tourist business owners, and National Park Service rangers designed and managed them. It also informed the ways members of those groups made administrative decisions about how to shape large areas of land they wanted to become more “park-like.” Collectively, the groups that defined the paradigm constructed a consensus on what level of human intervention affected the thresholds for wildness, uniqueness, and authenticity in supposedly natural places. This tacit agreement on acceptable levels of human intervention invested places with special value because it allowed park managers to claim these parks had not been altered by humans even though they contained many artificial systems. In other words, the national park paradigm allowed park supporters to claim they were unaltered and authentic natural spaces even though they contained roads, lodges, and the systems to support them. This reflects an emerging late-nineteenth century sensibility that increased the value and attractiveness of authentic things and experiences.

The period when the national park paradigm emerged and matured, from 1870 to 1940, overlaps with the period when the scholar Miles Orvell argues, “the notion of authenticity became of primary value” in American society.\(^\text{16}\) At that time, Americans reacted to increasingly urban and
technological environments around them by putting greater value on vernacular and supposedly natural artifacts and places.

Orvell argues the concept of authenticity gains appeal from awareness of the possibility for fraud. That possibility increased in the nineteenth century when consumers began to question how the machine, with its power to produce almost infinite numbers of replicas and reproductions, might have altered culture.\textsuperscript{17} Technological change during the industrial revolution created opportunities for both willful misrepresentation and accidental misperception.

The reaction to technological change began to insinuate a desire for authenticity as part of consumer culture. Orvell argues that the tension between imitation and authenticity is a key constituent in American culture. I build on Orvell’s work by addressing national parks’ development in the context of users’ desire to access authenticity through places they perceived as natural.

New technologies that facilitated instantaneous communication, almost effortless travel, and access to seemingly unlimited forms of energy changed their users’ lives. According to Orvell, these systems’ users experienced “a chaos of sensations” that altered their streams of consciousness in both measurable and imperceptible ways. Orvell argued that the “chaos” altered perceptions of what it meant for places or artifacts to be “real.”\textsuperscript{18} He uses material culture, photography, and literature to help explain how definitions of “reality” have changed over time. He also addresses the appeal of the unknown by arguing Americans were willing to travel to escape urban areas because, “authenticity lies always...elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{19}

Americans’ reaction to urban living and industrialization is central to Orvell’s work and to this study. Even though new, technological systems contributed to the urban, industrial environments that national park visitors professed to be escaping, paradoxically, tourists also used them to access “nature.” Users willingly assimilated these technological systems into their “natural” experiences at least partially because business owners, nature enthusiasts, and political policymakers positioned these
systems as parts of tourists’ experiences. These systems’ presence in national parks speaks to the subtle dialectic that opened when promoters described competitors’ goods or services as always being just short of providing ultimate satisfaction. In the gap between consumers’ present state and ultimate satisfaction, the promoters attempted to influence prospective park users by framing national parks as undeniably authentic.20

This gap reflects the realities of market saturation and the appeals to authenticity that began to emerge in advertising around the turn of the twentieth century. Advertisers’ use of authenticity to sell many different kinds of products and experiences also reinforces its general attractiveness. Far from being restricted to one type of product or service, authenticity is relevant and appealing to consumers from across the nation and around the world. This dissertation addresses the natural authenticities visitors traveled to experience in national parks as tools to access what Tsing referred to as the universal.21

Access to the universal helped Americans’ have enjoyable, meaningful experiences in their trips to national parks. It also reflects the expectation that the reason tourists could have those experiences there was that national parks were different from other parts of the United States. Historians have also engaged the discourse on what it meant for places to be authentically natural, wild, or sublime and deconstructed the values visitors vested in those attributes. Two of the best known are William Cronon and Roderick Nash. Other historians, like Richard White, Carolyn Merchant, and Jennifer Price have moved the discourse on wild places and nature from natural preserves to encompass the entire human and non-human world. All of these authors addressed the ways Euroamerican attitudes toward nature evolved over time. One of the primary concepts they address has to do with the fact that it was a significant departure for Euroamericans to treat wilderness as a restorative or recreational space.

In Wilderness and the American Mind, Roderick Nash argues that most people did not consider wilderness to be a regenerative space until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. He explains
how Americans have viewed wildness and explains how people eventually framed it as a place to go for
recreation but not to stay in. Nash also defines a number of the inconsistencies and contradictions
Americans embedded in the idea of wilderness.22

Both he and William Cronon argued the idea of wilderness was anathema to early
Euroamericans. They explained how Euroamericans used words like “deserted,” “savage,” “desolate,”
or “waste” to describe wilderness until the mid-nineteenth century. They explained how most people
believed that wild places belonged at the margins of civilization and were inherently unattractive and
dangerous. People avoided and tried to reclaim them, but they did not visit them for pleasure.23

Nash argued that authors, artists, and academics reframed wilderness by using it as a place to
access the sublime (or as a place to have spiritually transformative experiences).24 Both he and Cronon
explain how romantic authors and artists emphasized landscapes’ ability to give people a glimpse of
God. They explained how authors such as Emerson and Thoreau reframed formerly fearsome places by
transmuting their overwhelming size or unique appearance as sublime icons.25

Nash and Cronon also described how historians like Frederick Jackson Turner endowed
wilderness with increased political and social significance by associating it with the Euroamerican,
triumphant frontier epoch. As evidence, they cite Turner’s provocative claims about the closure of the
frontier and how late-nineteenth readers’ consciousness of wild land’s apparent scarcity rose at the
same time the US Government designated the first national parks and tourists started traveling to see
them.26 Nash argues the creation of national parks by the United States government in response to this
consciousness was one of the United States’ greatest accomplishments. He characterizes the parks’
emergence as dependent on “the genius of American land policy,” the United States’ republican
rejection of European private parks, and the increasing scarcity of undeveloped land. These factors led
the government to create and permanently preserve large, natural parks.27
Nash’s largely positive view of national parks framed them as proving the United States’ economic prosperity, intellectual maturity, and democratic virtue. His perspective also set the stage for critical reassessment of the national park’s genesis and operation by initiating and framing some of the central ideas that influenced American land management policy and by listing some of the justifications that were integral to inaugurating the country’s tradition of celebrating its national parks. In an article on wilderness in the national parks, he concludes by arguing wild places remind humans they are “member[s], not master[s] of a commodity that extends to the limits of life and the earth itself.” In this way, Nash points toward a more complex understanding our environment. In the end, his work largely reinforces the differences between wild places and developed ones.

William Cronon took a more critical view of the wilderness-developed area dichotomy in his essay “The Trouble with Wilderness.” Cronon hints at problems with this division, writing, “it quietly expresses and reproduces the very values its devotees seek to reject,” by which he means wilderness contributes to materialism and commercial consumption. He also raises questions about how wild preserves, such as parks, give urban-industrial populations implicit absolution for lifestyle choices that degrade nature every day, and about environmental and cultural imperialism when we try to transfer American wilderness values to other places and people. In the process, he questions the implications of tourists seeking out true “wilderness experiences.”

The larger “trouble” Cronon wants to address is, “there is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness.” Even though our culture treasures wild places, Cronon argues the habits of thinking that flow from this cultural construction can be problematic. Cronon argues preserving large tracts of wild land can be good, but he questions whether these discrete, tightly regulated tracts might actually be in direct conflict with the values their creators wanted them to protect - those being the supposedly independent, non-human forces nature exercises when it is free to function without us.
Cronon questions approaching humans as interlopers in nature. In fact, he argues humans are integral to understanding the ways we are changed by and change the places we live, work, and visit for recreation. He argues perpetuating the dichotomy of wild or non-wild places based on the presence or impacts of humans is counterproductive. In the process, he raises concerns about the viability of continuing to look at “environmentalism” as primarily protecting large tracts of open land, biological diversity, or endangered species. Cronon argues restricting environmental activism to these causes because they protect “real nature” is problematic because they do not reflect the entirety, or even the majority, of the nature we interact with and rely on to eat, breathe, drink, and find shelter.

Cronon pushes back against the belief that society became “unnatural” when humans adopted agriculture, moved in to cities, or industrialized. Instead, he argues that we live and work around and in real nature every day. He questions whether mobilizing public support for traditional environmentalist causes might actually do more harm than good for the values adherents to the movement claim to protect. Cronon argues the concept of wilderness is an effective tool that helps individuals make responsible decisions about how to manage our planet, but that the places it glorifies, like national parks, are geographically and ideologically distant from where most humans actually live.

In arguing this, Cronon questions environmentalists’, tourists’, federal policymakers’, and nature enthusiasts’ perceptions of national parks as uniquely wild or authentic preserves of pre-human landscapes and animals. He critiques environmentalists who have taken a tokenistic approach to conservation by focusing their efforts on remote places many humans may never visit. Cronon’s critique is relevant in that it may help explain the broad base of support enjoyed by the National Park Service and the simultaneous hostility many Americans feel for other government bureaus with environmental missions, most notably the US Environmental Protection Agency.

Even though the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for managing industrial and commercial activities that have a greater effect on most Americans’ day-to-day lives than the National
Park Service, it has not been able to sustain the same high level of public support. This dissertation addresses the National Park Service’s popularity and argues one of the reasons for it is that the large protected areas that are parts of the National Park System are accessible, legible, and attractive to tourists, business owners, federal policymakers, and nature enthusiasts across the United States. This dissertation explores how those constituencies interacted to shape the paradigm for park management. An integral part of that paradigm is the natural/non-natural dichotomy between supposedly authentic, natural, wild places and the supposedly mundane, every day, or common urban landscapes that Cronon questions.

Acknowledging this difference helps address its relevance, popularity, and influence on the national park paradigm. The relationships between humans and the natural world are complex, and we occupy a “middle ground” where our actions influence nature and nature influences us. One of the historians who describes those relationships is Richard White.

White reframes the prevailing Euroamerican, dualistic view of human civilization and non-human nature by focusing on how people have worked to both change and accommodate natural forces. White describes the feedback loop between human desires and actions and the nature’s agency. His work provides a synthetic view that highlights the ways humans and nature interact. White’s work is emblematic of the broader literature that increases the relevance of ideas of wilderness and nature by taking them outside of national parks.

White’s work speaks to the need for addressing how multiple constituencies affect the ways society approaches what it means to be wild or natural. It also shows how “wild” places’ relationships with humans have evolved over time. In this dissertation, White’s “middle ground” and Anna Tsing’s concept of “friction” informed the framing of how different groups interacted to pursue their own interests in national parks. This dissertation builds on White’s geographically-constrained middle grounds to explain how Federal policymakers, tourist business owners, and park rangers exported the
concepts first developed in the American west to establish national parks in other parts of the United States. White’s work also speaks to the relevance of broadening the discourse to understand the kinds of values associated with “real wilderness” contrasted with human-built systems or structures.

This dissertation attempts to address the ways in which visitors’ feedback from those anthropogenic structures and technologies affected national park experiences. It raises questions about how urban experiences and consumerism affected the ways visitors and park managers perceived national park landscapes and animals. Understanding consumption’s role in defining what it means for places to be national parks is key to explaining their popularity among people who have never traveled to or near them.

Jennifer Price has reframed nature by addressing manufactured products and their connections with the “natural world.” Price questions when and how users stop considering objects natural and start considering them artificial. She uses examples, including birds adorning late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century women’s hats, pink, plastic lawn flamingoes, and a store named “The Nature Company,” to explain connections Americans have made – and missed – with nature. She also explores how consumers vicariously experience nature by purchasing consumer goods made from or designed to evoke faraway “natural” places.39

This dissertation engages Price’s work to explore the ways in which business owners constructed a particular type of naturality and reinforced parks’ authenticity, wildness, and attractiveness through the sale of specific kinds of consumer goods. Manufacturers, retailers, and authors used and contributed to ideas of naturality in national parks in order to sell products like aftermarket auto parts, camping equipment, or travel guides. These products helped define many consumers’ expectations for national park experiences long before they ever set foot in one. The products also helped increase the relevance of national parks for city dwellers who might never visit one.
In short, these products helped raise consciousness about national parks’ existence and the kinds of experiences tourists should expect to have in them. They increased the parks’ accessibility for potential visitors across the United States. Consumer products also helped highlight the parks’ importance as venues for new, scientific research by highlighting the unique historical, geological, and biological assets they contained. That research is significant not only for its role in making the parks legible to scientific and non-scientific audiences, but also for the gendered ideologies it overlaid on national park land and attractions in it.

Carolyn Merchant addresses how many of the ideas undergirding the scientific study of nature are inherently sexist. She addresses nature as a nurturing provider and as in need of rearrangement through scientific management in her book *The Death of Nature*. Her work helped shape the discourse on western perceptions of nature to consider issues of dominance, control, and power from a perspective that questioned women’s subordination by a scientific, patriarchal society.40

This dissertation builds on Merchant’s work by deconstructing the National Park Service’s management priorities and its work culture. Merchant’s approach to western scientists’ subordination of women through science contributed to conclusions about the National Park Service’s work culture. It also contributed to the deconstruction of assumptions about recreation and nature and their implications for understandings of appropriate ways to use and manage America’s national parks. The dissertation highlights the National Park Service’s contributions to ideologies of masculine hierarchy and white mastery of feminine nature in American national parks.

Collectively, these authors highlight the origins of perceptions of natural “reality.” Each addresses how important elements of the park paradigm developed and changed over time. In their own ways, each of them engages with ideas related to constructing the paradigm by writing about spaces where nature, beauty, wildness, and functionality intersect. On their own, though, none
attempts to access the universal. They raise questions about the philosophy behind ideologies of nature, wilderness, and authenticity that remain largely unaddressed.

Other authors, like Robert Elliot, address the ideas behind our assumptions about the intrinsic value of places human development affects. Elliot argues places humans have not modified seem more real than the places, such as mines, cities, or farms, we have. He argues unmodified landscapes have unique values that no human-made reproduction could ever truly replicate. Elliot claims unaltered nature retains value because of its particular “genesis and history” and claims natural preserves are analogous to unique, historical artifacts.41

Elliot characterizes ecological artifacts as being similar to original objects in museums. He also argues natural processes are not good in and of themselves (e.g. he argues natural disasters and disease are not good), but that we invest certain natural artifacts or processes with special value based on their origins. He also argues that, by demarcating places like national parks to be natural preserves, humans turn unmodified natural places into artifacts. Nonetheless, he concludes that this does not make those places any less attractive, enjoyable to see, or authentic. Elliot explains how viewers’ perception of places, like national parks, determines their authenticity. 42

He argues different forms and types of knowledge influence the ways viewers perceive what it means for places to be authentically wild. When they enter wild places, visitors apply their knowledge (whether limited or extensive) of ecological processes to experience something that they find valuable and meaningful. Elliot argues evaluation and understanding go hand in hand and that peoples’ understanding of wild places elicits raw, emotional responses. He claims visitors will go out of their way to experience authentic, ecological attractions. 43

Elliot is careful to argue that he does not believe protecting authenticity on its own provides prima facie justification to prevent actions that might be environmentally disruptive. Rather, he argues authenticity is one of many values that might provide a reason to adopt or reject potentially impactful
environmental policies. Elliot’s frame is compelling because it rightly emphasizes the appeal of authentic experiences. It legitimizes interpreting the desire for authenticity as part of a rational, coherent ethical system. This dissertation builds on Elliot’s interpretation by situating authenticity as a primary value that contributes to national parks’ identities and their popular appeal.

Authenticity is one of several values, including natural beauty, untamed wildness, and uniqueness tourists use to evaluate the desirability of products, places, or experiences in national parks. Some of the first American national park sites included the largest geothermal area in the world, the tallest trees on earth, and the deepest lake in the United States. Park supporters interpreted them as "authentically natural” because of their unique genesis and seemingly unchanged, appearance. Grouping these sites together in the National Park System helped build shared cachet that enhanced their appeal.

In order to maintain the legitimacy of that claim, tourist business owners, federal policymakers, nature enthusiasts, and National Park Service rangers all worked to protect the attributes that contributed to visitors’ perceptions. In the pages that follow, this dissertation makes arguments on how different groups shaped national parks’ identities by pursuing their individual interests to achieve their own priorities. In the process, it explores inconsistencies in park promoters’ and managers’ rhetoric and actions. It also explains how park residents, most of whom were destined for displacement, shaped parks both before and after their removal.

This dissertation does not argue that there ever was one objective definition for what a national park ought to be. The concept has meant many things to many different groups simultaneously. The cooperative and conflicting friction between those groups has shaped the way parks have functioned over time. Rather than determining the propriety of any particular groups’ values or priorities, it contextualizes how stakeholders shaped the national park paradigm.
Section 1 - Profiles of groups that shaped the National Park Paradigm

All of the groups that shaped national parks had their own agendas. In this dissertation, I identify six, broad groups of people who influenced the park paradigm. Membership in these groups was not mutually exclusive, and they sometimes overlapped. Nonetheless, these broad categories help frame the priorities that motivated various groups to advocate for and against national park designation, development, and management. As stated above, the groups include:

- Political policymakers or Federal Government officials
- Business owners who profited from their association with national parks or tourist business owners
- The US National Park Service
- Nature enthusiasts
- Tourists
- Residents who lived in or near parkland who did not profit from tourism

For officials in the federal government, the best ways to approach parks were as tools to achieve policy or political objectives. Sometimes those objectives included preservation as an end in itself, but very often, they did not. Political policymakers sometimes created national parks to protect the plants, animals, or geologic features inside their borders, but they usually tried to accomplish other goals at the same time. Their actions left a legacy of conflicting mandates and set precedents that complicated managing national parks as natural preserves.44
Politicians realized that national park units not only attracted tourists, but also provided opportunities to accomplish policy goals and to create jobs. Especially after the stock market crash of 1929, park units served as an outlet for federal relief spending on conservation and construction projects. The civil servants who were responsible for managing those projects implemented a variety of programs intended to improve those park neighbors’ lives. Politicians used the parks as instruments to implement social and political policies whose raison d’etre had little or nothing to do with preserving their landscapes or ecosystems.45

To tourist business owners, the best way to manage parks was the most profitable way. One of the ways they tried to increase visitation was by marketing them as more attractive than other potential destinations. To do that, business owners highlighted parks’ wildness, natural authenticity, and beauty. These attributes were essential to make tourists believe parks worth paying to experience. Since tourists are willing to pay more for products they believe are real, businesspeople consciously cultivated the parks’ popular image as being incontrovertibly natural.46 Business owners’ decision to tell tourists that the parks were authentic had an important side effect: it forced them to camouflage things that they thought tourists might find unnatural or inauthentic.

When businesspeople added amenities like hotels, viewing platforms, or roads that they could charge to use, they had to make those facilities seem like they belonged in the unique, primeval, untouched landscapes they claimed tourists were visiting. This meant that they found creative ways to make those either blend or disappear in to landscapes. The reason they spent time and money on disguising infrastructure was that they wanted to protect park’s supposedly natural cachet.47

Business owners in faraway cities also used the national park brand in order to sell products. Manufacturers, authors, and retailers all associated their products with national parks in order to drive sales. Their strategy shows how they also viewed parks as lending value to whatever they wanted to sell. The cars, books, and camping equipment they sold helped embed the act of consumption in the
park paradigm. They used sites’ alleged authenticity to convince tourists they should travel to see nature’s “wonderlands.”

No group adopted the idea of the parks as wonderlands more enthusiastically than the National Park Service. Park rangers coopted the parks’ popularity and association with wildness, authentic naturlality, and beauty to use them as classrooms where they facilitated lessons in a particular brand of citizenship that celebrated masculinity, the conquest of untamed wild places, and American democracy. Under the leadership of their first Director, Stephen Mather, park rangers played the parts of protectors of uniquely American, democratic places where anyone could go to see timeless treasures that they were part of the nation’s shared inheritance. They framed the parks as deriving value from the opportunities they provided for Americans from all walks of life to learn about their country’s natural heritage, their neighbors from across the nation, and themselves.48

In order to establish their authority in places that were parks long before the service’s creation, Mather cultivated a culture that vested park rangers and administrators with the authority to arbitrate the kinds of activities compatible with maintaining authentic, natural spaces.49 In so doing, he established park rangers’ claim to be experts on park development. Many park rangers tried to reinforce their claim to expertise by arguing that they appreciated parks in the most appropriate ways.50 The rangers’ success at projecting prowess and at associating themselves with experiences most visitors already enjoyed in parks helped them exercise authority in them. The type of parks they inherited, which their predecessors heavily engineered to accommodate large numbers of tourists, coupled with the National Park Service’s commitment to attract even more visitors when they opened parks to car drivers, meant they often clashed with the advocates who were responsible for parks’ designation in the first place.51

Nature enthusiasts had a special concern for the relationship humans have with the non-human world. Most of them considered our relationship fraught. They expressed concern about humans’
destruction of some parts of the natural world and our efforts to save other parts for recreation (and the 
preservation of our species). Some of the most vocal park creation supporters were nature enthusiasts 
who were concerned humans did too much of the first at the expense of the latter. They supported 
using the parks as preserves where nature would run its own course and visitors could travel to see it 
acting without human interference.52

Beginning in the 1920s, nature enthusiasts who supported protecting parks as natural preserves 
lobbied against what they considered the “over-building” of infrastructure by tourism business interests 
and the National Park Service. They wanted to preserve the values they saw in natural spaces.

Historians like Paul Sutter explain how park advocates like Robert Sterling Yard and Robert Marshall 
transitioned from supporting intensive infrastructural development to arguing that it compromised the 
purpose for which they thought the parks had been established: preservation.53 In order to preserve the 
landscapes and animals they valued, preservationists argued against the construction of infrastructure 
like roads or lodges that they thought compromised the parks’ value as wilderness preserves. They 
argued that parks were just as threatened by the rangers, tourists and businesspeople who wanted to 
“improve” them as by people who wanted to harvest the raw materials contained in them.

Preservationists who wanted to protect nature in the parks argued that allowing unlimited 
numbers of tourists to drive in them would destroy their landscapes, just like logging, farming, or mining 
would. In order to protect the parks, they argued against building infrastructure to accommodate 
drivers or large numbers of tourists. By minimizing the construction of hotels, restaurants, and, most 
importantly, roads, preservationists hoped they would prevent visitors damaging the authentic, natural 
landscapes they treasured as havens of peace and solitude. Pursuing their agenda was complicated 
because, like the other groups of people who influenced park development, they needed support from 
members of other groups in order to justify pursuing their goals. One of the most important groups 
they courted was tourists.54
As tourists looked for vacation destinations, government officials, business owners, park rangers, and advocates for natural preservation all told them that the most scenic places in the United States were in national parks. As a result, tourists visited the parks in ever-increasing numbers. They traveled to escape the cityscapes that defined their everyday lives, to experience the freedom that is often associated with the American west, and to immerse themselves in what business owners advertised as the monumental grandeur of nature.55

Some preservationists pointed out the contradictions in tourists’ expectations that urban infrastructure would enable swift and comfortable access to natural places, but they largely failed to stem the tide of drivers.56 Tourists were both driven by, and the drivers of, all the other groups that influenced national park development.57 By courting their support, government officials, nature enthusiasts, National Park Service rangers, and businesspeople all tried to advance their own agendas.58 These groups’ pursuit of their interests had the side effect of disfranchising the people who lived in or near parks.

The residents who lived in and near the parks prior to their integration into the National Park System had fundamentally different expectations for them than business owners, most politicians, park rangers, nature enthusiasts, or tourists. They did not have much in common with tourists who traveled to them for leisure, people who wanted to save tangible and intangible values they associated with the land, government officials who used the parks to satisfy policy objectives, rangers who wanted to use them as classrooms for citizenship, nor the businesspeople who wanted to profit from them. Locals called the attractions tourists traveled to see simply “home.” The Blue Ridge Mountain people of Shenandoah, miners of Death Valley, and Timbisha Shoshone Indians of the Mojave Desert had been making their living in the places tourists came to visit for decades or centuries. They had no need or desire to build the scenic roads or modern infrastructure to serve the wants of tourists.59
Residents approached land, plants, and animals as sources of food, fuel, and as commodities for use or sale. Many of them had already adopted or desired many of the technologies tourists relied on for leisure (electrical appliances, telephone service, roads, and the automobile, for example), but they interpreted them in fundamentally different ways than tourists who viewed parks as places to have immersive experiences in nature. The experiences tourists wanted to have in parks were different from the ones they had in cities.  

The telephone exchanges and water plants the National Park Service installed in parks, like Shenandoah and Death Valley, were technically similar to others across the United States, but they served a fundamentally different need. In cities, those systems contributed to the character of America’s emerging, urban landscape. In New York or Chicago, for example, they made it possible for millions of people to live in increasingly cramped areas and still enjoy clean drinking water and streets. In the desert west, those systems were part of the life-sustaining network that enabled the creation of cities and large farms on otherwise parched lands. In Los Angeles, the same systems literally made the desert bloom. In parks, they performed technically similar functions for different purposes.

Urban infrastructure (such as water treatment and power plants) is the single most important tool that park managers use to sustain the illusion of emptiness in places that are actually intensely used. In national parks, electrical, water, and waste collection systems obscure the rapid movement of goods and people across large, apparently unpopulated areas. They allow park managers to simultaneously accommodate large numbers of visitors in relatively small areas and make it appear that people are not there at all. In other words, the systems that enable access to the unique, natural places are the same ones that define life in the urban spaces most of the tourists who travel to parks call home every day.

Residents who lived in or around parks thought that the new construction did not provide convenience or comfort to them. Instead, they watched as businesspeople, nature enthusiasts, tourists,
and political policy makers argued that using those systems to accommodate visitors was more appropriate than using them to improve residents’ work and home lives. Residents might have supported building water or power plants to improve their lives, but they were frustrated when park managers used them to accommodate tourists and subverted existing communities’ claims to the land. As time wore on, businesspeople, people who wanted to use parks as natural preserves, politicians, and park rangers gradually adopted an ideology that framed humans’ residence in parks as compromising their natural authenticity and value because places with people in them were unnatural. Park supporters argued that peoples’ residence made places incompatible with accession the park paradigm. Residents argued to stay, but usually they did not succeed. Their failure is evidence of their exclusion from the paradigmatic consensus about who ought (and ought not) to be in a national park.

As the US Government expanded the National Park System, business owners realized that the designation of “national park,” which they treated like a brand (a symbol or signifier of value that differentiates similar products from its competitors) was popular with tourists. Business owners and government policymakers realized that places called national parks attracted tourists. In order to take advantage of the cachet offered by park designation, they advocated creating more national parks to draw tourists to their communities and to sell goods and services to them. When the flow of visitors to the parks began to degrade their landscapes, people who owned businesses in parks changed parkscapes to satisfy visitors’ (i.e., their customers’) expectations for them. Businesspeople did not try to preserve the land as an end in itself. They made changes to ensure that people would still want to travel to see the parks. Sometimes their goals meshed with other groups more easily than others.

For example, businesspeople recognized the romance popularly associated with pioneer life and realized it might attract people to parks. They also had to grapple with the fact that the resident mountaineers who actually lived in the land they wanted to use for places, like Shenandoah National Park, were neither picturesque nor romantic. Many people claimed the mountaineers looked dirty,
poor, and pathetic. The mountaineers compromised the park’s authenticity because they did not contribute to the supposedly unique, frontier atmosphere to which businesspeople claimed parks provided access. In other words, these residents were not compatible with the park paradigm.

Businesspeople wanted to make Shenandoah live up to the western precedent that parks should not have permanent residents. They wanted people to experience places different from their homes. They also wanted to shape places like Shenandoah to be more like western parks so that they would fit the existing brand. Park rangers did not allow mountain residents to stay in their homes, but the rationale behind their expulsion was more complicated than simply that their presence did not match the park paradigm.

At the same time business owners argued to make a national park in the Blue Ridge, nature enthusiasts, National Park Service staff, and federal policymakers argued for creating a national park there, too. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Resettlement Administration (RSA) concluded that the mountaineers would be better off if they left their homes. RSA officials believed they would improve mountain people’s standard of living by moving them to new homes on the Shenandoah Valley floor. Sociological research made them believe that the mountain isolation prevented people from living up to their potential. The federal agency lent legitimacy to business owners’ belief that the mountain people detracted from the frontier atmosphere that made the park unique. The RSA gave formal sanction to the tourism business owners’ claim that the mountaineers’ homes were unattractive, and helped legitimize throwing them out of Shenandoah so that it would match the park paradigm.

The business owners’ claim shows how they held the implicit assumption that there was a proper park experience. Every group implicitly claimed to have found the one best way to manage parks. In the first section of my dissertation, I explain how different groups perceived each of their best ways. I also explain how they interacted with people who wanted the parks to function differently. I
explain how they interacted to reach an evolving settlement about what it meant for places to be parks. Conflict defined that process.

Members of each group advocated for uses and policies that were incompatible. They nevertheless all fed into the collectively held idea of what parks ought to be. Looking at how they reconciled their disagreements shows how each group reconciled with others to resolve their disputes. In the process, they shaped the park paradigm.

For example, after the National Park Service took over management of Death Valley in 1931, businesspeople and resident miners who held mining claims tried to open gas stations and hotels to serve the stream of tourists there. The National Park Service argued these facilities would detract from the quality of the landscape they wanted to present to visitors and tried to prevent miners from building or operating them. When the National Park Service ordered the miners to cease building, they appealed to the General Land Office of the Department of the Interior. In the end, the land office did not allow any new businesses to open because they determined mineral claims were not supposed to be used for anything other than mines. In this case, the National Park Service wanted to prevent the development because the agency wanted to preserve the natural landscape, but their success at protecting those values had to do with the General Land Office’s policy on mining claims. The National Park Service provided services for motorists at other places in the park.

Just like in Shenandoah, this case shows how different groups interacted to influence not only the new park’s appearance, but also its accession to the park paradigm. Groups’ ability to make new places live up to the standard that units established before them set influenced their eventual success or failure in adding new units to the park system. Thanks to the precedents set in popular parks like Yellowstone, Yosemite, and the Grand Canyon, the paradigmatic consensus was that parkscapes were places where people could go to experience immersive natural experiences that were accessible by railroad and automobile. People who ascribed to that consensus, including those who wanted to
preserve nature and natural processes in parks, people who profited from people traveling to or wanting to learn about parks, rangers in the National Park Service, and federal policymakers all advocated adding new units to the system for different reasons.

The park idea, paradigm, or brand was integral to the emergence of the National Park System. Technologies are not products of permanent settlements brokered by individuals who discover the single best way of delivering a good or service. They change in response to their users’ needs. It can be very difficult to change technological systems after people and institutions adopt them.

In national parks, hotels, roads, overlooks, or trailheads are very hard (or at least very expensive) to move. In some cases, groups of people have agreed to move or obliterate power plants, or roads, but the process can require decades of negotiation. Even in cases where changes could have apparent a priori benefits (such as lowering management costs or improving visitor safety), satisfying visitors’ long established expectations has sometimes meant that they did not change. This shows how technological momentum shapes the National Park System’s ongoing development. Momentum’s significance in this and similar processes is part of a larger conversation on whether technology shapes people or whether people shape technology.

Thomas Hughes, the historian of technology, argues the interplay between physical components and social priorities at the time of their creation shapes technological systems. Hughes argues the initial expectations systems designers seek to satisfy have a lasting effect on their appearance and purpose, so he characterizes their later development as influenced by momentum. He claims that technologies usually follow the trajectory set by their original designs. Hughes uses case studies on the development of electrical power generation infrastructure to argue that it is difficult to reshape large systems after users adopt them.

In the case of the national parks, I argue that the attractions the system protects have become conflated with the infrastructure constructed to expedite access to them. That infrastructure seemed
indistinguishable from the parks when people put it in them, but today it constrains (or at least complicates) remaking the National Park System. Park visitors and managers in the past made decisions whose consequences would be very difficult to change today. By choosing some forms of construction and avoiding others (like building large and luxurious lodges instead of exclusively building campgrounds or preventing overnight visitation altogether), they also embedded their social norms and leisure expectations in the parks. They set the expectations that define what it means for places to be parks.

In order to get what we want from the parks today, we have to ask hard questions about whether the old expectations people had for them are the same as our own. We can also ask whether we want to change the park paradigm to allow access to new kinds of experiences. If we decide to make a change, we will have to fundamentally reassess the kinds of experiences we want to have in parks and whether the way we built them still matches our desires. Changing parks means deciding who will get access to experiences they enjoy in them.

In the chapters that follow, this dissertation explores what different groups wanted to experience or access through parkscapes. Different groups enjoy, or want to provide access to, radically different kinds of experiences. In the pages that follow, this dissertation addresses each groups’ ideas and explains how they influenced the park paradigm. It also explains the friction that developed as groups advocated for changes to the park paradigm and how they shaped others’ expectations for parkscapes in the process.
1.1 Federal Parks - National Parks as instruments of the State

"There is nothing so American as our national parks.... The fundamental idea behind the parks...is that the country belongs to the people, that it is in process of making for the enrichment of the lives of all of us."

Franklin Roosevelt

A Methodist minister described the United States in 1875 as “grasping with one foot the Rocky Mountains, and with the other the Alleghany.” He said it had “one wing flapping the waters of the Pacific, and the other stirring up the waves of the Atlantic – his beak dipped in the northern lakes, while his tail [lashes] into foam the waters of the Gulf.” The Nation’s continental triumph was the result of a single, driving force: Americans’ faith in and efforts to improve their country. The minister claimed “American progress has accomplished [this] fact - almost.”80 Going from “almost” to “actually” would eventually involve half a century of war, public works projects of a size never been seen before, the creation of new ways of life, and the extinction of many old ones.81 The federal government was involved in every facet of that process, which, as it advanced, shaped the park paradigm.82

Politicians and federal employees played a central role shaping the national park idea. They wrote the legislation to create them, prescribed the activities allowed in their boundaries, and influenced the businesses that operated in them.83 The parks are not only manifestations of the government’s foresight, but testaments to the many forces that influence the adoption of any federal legislation.84

The benefit of examining the effects of all those actions together is that it highlights the importance of state power in the shaping of the park paradigm.85 It also shows how the national parks are inherently political landscapes.86 This chapter addresses the combined impacts of politicians and
civil servants whose work they directed. It includes a case study on how the National Park Service worked to achieve politicians’ goals but does not address how the agency influenced the park paradigm.

I address the National Park Service separately from the rest of the federal government for two reasons. First, because that agency did not exist when lawmakers created the earliest national parks and set some of the National Park System’s most enduring management precedents. Second, even though the National Park Service is a government agency, its employees believed they were different from other federal workers. This dissertation addresses the National Park Service’s exceptionalist ideology and its influence on the park paradigm in another chapter.

Many politicians and civil servants shared an interest in achieving national policy goals through the creation and use of national parks. Many other politicians and civil servants also opposed creating them because they believed parks would prevent land’s productive use. In this, they reflected the political landscape of the nation. Considering policy-makers’ role in park creation and management shows how altruistic nationalism, crony capitalism, and scientific utilitarianism all played roles in national parks’ designation and management by Congress. As is explained in this chapter and the chapter on tourist business owners’ influence on park development, parks embody all of those influences to varying degrees. The interplay between these groups shaped parks’ landscapes. When Congress decided to reserve a portion of the public domain in perpetuity for “the benefit and enjoyment of the people,” it set a new precedent. Paradoxically, Congress based its decision on the same logic used to justify disposal of public lands to private owners in the century that had gone before.

Federal land policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth century was both utilitarian and (often) corrupt. Politicians who made the laws about what land was for sale, for how much, and for how long often profited handsomely from buying and selling it. The ostensible justification for these sales was that they ensured fertile land ended up in the hands of the most industrious people.
The reason the federal government pursued a policy of land disposal was that most policymakers believed finding private owners for it would guarantee its most productive use. Policymakers embraced increased productivity (defined as increased farm or mineral output) as an a priori benefit to the United States and to society. Maximizing the land’s productivity justified everything from the expropriation of Indians’ land to the eventual transfer of millions of acres to railroad companies that built the transcontinental railroads (which amounted to the same thing).92

When they provided testimony during the debate on whether Yellowstone should be designated as the first national park in 1872, members of the United States Geological Survey were called on to assure Congressmen that setting “the Wonderland” aside from settlement would not frustrate farmers, ranchers, or miners who might want to settle there.93 Speaking to the House Committee on Public Lands, Ferdinand V. Hayden, leader of the geological survey’s most recent expedition into the region, argued that making the land into a park was the only productive way to use it.

He testified, “The entire area comprised within the limits of the reservation contemplated in this bill is not susceptible of cultivation with any degree of certainty.” Furthermore, he claimed the winters would be too long and hard to raise stock, and that the land probably did not have many valuable minerals in it because it was all volcanic rock.94 Hayden’s testimony helped convince Congress to pass a bill permanently setting aside almost 3,500 square miles of land to be “reserved and withdrawn from settlement, occupancy, or sale under the laws of the United States, and dedicated and set apart as a public park or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people.”95 Yellowstone’s designation was an important precedent that set the foundation for Congressional and executive actions creating the rest of the National Park System.

Congress set the parkland aside “for the benefit and enjoyment of the people,” but only because they were convinced it was worthless to use for anything else.96 Many people who enjoy visiting national parks today implicitly claim the park paradigm advances the altruistic goal of creating a “public pleasuring
ground,” but the reasoning that the land might as well be a park because it could not be used for anything else points to a deeply ingrained contradiction. Congress’s assumption that the land’s value was based on its productive potential, their belief that it would not be productive if it were farmed or mined, and their conclusion that a park that would endow otherwise worthless land with a productive purpose was at least as utilitarian as it was altruistic.

Still, it points to one of the park paradigm’s essential elements: inclusion in the National Park System increases places’ commercial value and productive engagement within the American economy. Places that are labeled as national parks are more attractive destinations than places that are not parks. Tourists seek out experiences in them even when they seem similar to places that are not parks. Once a place has the title of national park, it is more likely to enjoy recognition as being historically significant, beautiful, grand, or authentic. The label communicates to visitors that they should expect to see impressive, unique high quality attractions there. Congress’s conscious decision to set parks aside in order to increase land’s productive potential, and therefore their value, is deeply ingrained in the park paradigm.

It set a precedent that other promoters eventually followed across the United States. The move to designate a park around the thermal features at Yellowstone seems like a departure from the federal government’s long tradition of privatizing public land, but, in reality, it was an attempt to enhance the value of a worthless parcel of the public domain so that it could serve the same purpose as private ones. It was a kind of second best solution to a problem that the 42nd Congress settled for rather than allow people to frustrate themselves farming, ranching, or mining there. It reflects federal officials’ historic desire to use places called parks to accomplish policy objectives first and to conserve nature or preserve scenic wonders second.

Even though the decision to create the first national park was based on Congress’s desire to increase Yellowstone’s utility, members of the government viewed this and subsequent parks as
instruments for the execution of broad policy goals, as local outlets for federal appropriations ("park barrel")¹⁰⁰, as well as legitimate treasures in need of federal stewardship and protection. The process by which those priorities were rhetorically reconciled in the park paradigm began in the middle of the nineteenth century. The friction between adherents to these sets of priorities (including elected government officials and civil servants, railroad executives, and nature enthusiasts) provided the connections that set the initial trajectory for park management decisions and priorities. Lawmakers’ desire to increase the public domain’s usefulness led them to prevent its settlement by Euroamerican farmers, miners, or ranchers. This is an example of how different ideologies, Congress’s desire to increase the west’s Euroamerican population and its usefulness to the American state, came into contact resulting in the creation of a new kind of federal reservation, a national park. They also set the precedents that defined the scope of the park paradigm.

In the aftermath of the bloodiest conflict in American history, waves of settlers struck out toward the Pacific in search of new opportunities in what appeared to be an endless, inexhaustible frontier. Politicians decided to use parks’ geographic and rhetorical proximity to western battles and frontier life to memorialize that epoch and the story of America’s western conquest in general. Policymakers embedded the values and ideas associated with America’s conquest of western lands and subsequent lionization of the Euroamericans who lived on the frontier in the park paradigm.

*The Perpetual Frontier – National Parks as islands of land that resembled pre-settlement America and as tools to accomplish federal policy objectives*

In an era defined by the expropriation of land for Euroamerican use, Congress set Yellowstone aside from the rest of the public domain as a national park because it would be wasted — just like the Indians’ land. In creating the first national park, policy makers were acting both to preserve the land as an aesthetic asset and to maximize its productive value.¹⁰¹
During the Progressive Era, politicians repeatedly returned to the idea of federal management for western lands by withdrawing several new national parks and national monuments for “the benefit and enjoyment of the people.” The politician who is most often associated with the drive to create new parks is Theodore Roosevelt. During his administration, he signed bills to create five new national parks (an increase of more than 100% in number), executive orders to create 18 national monuments (enabled under the Antiquities Act, which Roosevelt supported), along with 4 national game preserves, 51 federal bird reserves and 150 national forests.102

Roosevelt and his administration also took actions that raised questions about the appropriate scope of uses for federal lands held for conservation or preservation. The debate over how to manage land in Yosemite National Park, and specifically whether it was appropriate to use them for infrastructure projects that benefited city residents many miles away, led to one of the best-known controversies in conservation history and the construction of the O’Shaughnessy Dam. Supporters of the dam claimed it would provide “the greatest good to the greatest number” by providing water to the fast growing city of San Francisco. Critics claimed the water it impounded would destroy one of the most beautiful parts of Yosemite and work against the purpose for which Congress set it aside. They believed the park’s purpose was to preserve the landscape and animals there. The city of San Francisco’s eventual victory shows the resonance of Progressive lawmakers’ desire to use the land for “utilitarian” purposes. It also galvanized other Progressives who were park preservation supporters and contributed to their activism in creating a federal agency with special responsibility for protecting national parks.103

Congress appropriated almost no money for national park management until the creation of the National Park Service in 1916. However, by the 1930s, members of the political establishment made funding them a much higher priority. This change began with the founding of the National Park Service and accelerated as the political situation evolved later years. As time went on, politicians realized park
appropriations were useful tools to accomplish policy goals. The reason parks came to the fore in the 1930s was the way politicians used them as part of the New Deal.

On a visit to Glacier National Park in 1934, Franklin Roosevelt used nature as a tool to assert American identity. In doing this, he tacitly engaged a transnational discourse on nature and national identity in which national parks were integral. In the speech, Roosevelt articulated his vision of country unified through nature.

There is nothing so American as our national parks. The scenery and wild life are native and the fundamental idea behind the parks is native. It is, in brief, that the country belongs to the people; that what it is and what it is in the process of making is for the enrichment of the lives of all of us. Thus the parks stand as the outward symbol of this great human principle.

Roosevelt’s interpretation of the parks dovetailed with a founding mythology that hotel owners and retailers created, and the National Park Service willingly adopted, but also created a justification for his administration to use them in a new and unprecedented way.

The Great Depression threw millions of Americans out of work and into despair. With nearly a quarter of the country’s workers unemployed, millions displaced from their homes by drought and foreclosure, and industrial plants at a standstill, Americans turned to the federal government for relief. Franklin Roosevelt’s promise to use federal power to take bold and persistent action that would stem the Depression’s tide won him the presidential election of 1932. The tactics Roosevelt chose to combat the Depression had profound implications for institutions across the United States, including the national parks.

Under the direction of Harold Ickes’ Department of the Interior, and Harry Hopkin’s Works Progress (later Project) Administration (WPA), the parks became outlets for federal relief. Government paid contractors paved roads, built bridges, constructed lodges, and welcomed visitors along with newly-hired cadres of park rangers and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) enrollees. The Roosevelt administration justified the unprecedented expansion of federal
involvement in peoples’ day-to-day lives under the auspices of emergency relief for unemployed Americans and their families. If it had not been for the general policy objective to put people back to work, it is possible there never would have been a WPA, CCC, or other programs that ultimately realized the vision Ickes and his contemporaries had for the national parks. Since the idea of expanding the federal government was controversial, the projects relief agencies worked on were, whenever possible, uncontroversial and associated with supposedly a priori benefits.\textsuperscript{110}

Many people greeted the New Deal growth of the federal government with skepticism or outright hostility. In order to manage their criticism, the Roosevelt Administration countered complaints by coopting their claims that the welfare state would sap Americans’ initiative. One of the ways that the Roosevelt Administration justified its decision to spend money on the construction projects in parks was that the projects reinforced the “traditional American values” of self-reliance and rugged individuality the New Deal’s critics accused it of eviscerating.\textsuperscript{111} One of the reasons the administration chose to focus so much energy on parks was that they evoked the frontier experience that many Americans had just watched slip away.\textsuperscript{112}

Numerous examples in American pop-culture show the ways Americans’ associate self-sufficiency, initiative, and grit with life on the frontier. The popularity of everything from Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West Show, to the game “cowboys and Indians,” to western movies and literature point to the currency of western ideas in everyday American life both in the late nineteenth century and today.\textsuperscript{113} Those ideas’ genuine popularity, accessibility to voters, and relevance to the Roosevelt Administration combined to make them integral parts of the New Deal strategies to improve the infrastructure in national parks.

Landscape architects, engineers, and thousands of laborers made the parks fulfill Harold Ickes’ goal of making them “living pictures of the great past of our country.” Ickes wanted to preserve places where people could go to experience the ethos of “Manifest Destiny” for
themselves. He glorified Americas’ conquest of native people and the natural world in order to increase what he defined as productivity and drive progress.  

The Department of Interior built structures and designed infrastructure that would allow people to “get back to the land” and see “primitive America.” The parks were supposed to look as they might have before Euroamericans arrived in them. Government designers used motifs popularized by retailers and hotel owners to make the continent’s pre-Columbian history compatible with twentieth century technological conveniences.

In order to make the parks seem primitive but also accommodate modern ways of life, the Department of the Interior hired classically trained structural and landscape architects. They collaborated with the National Park Service architect Albert H. Good to write the book of Park Structures and Facilities in 1935. Its authors used the hotels that private tourism business owners built in places like Yellowstone, Grand Canyon, and Glacier National Parks for inspiration. The guide helped designers replicate the same styles in structures across the United States. In fact, the book was so widely used that one historian wrote about how “the New Deal did not innovate so much as it mass produced” rustic architecture in the parks.

In her history of park service architecture, Linda McClelland provides detailed, technical descriptions of how the book changed the ways roads, sewers, parking lots, guard-rails, and even drinking fountains were constructed so that they would appear to blend with the “primitive” landscape. By designing structures to look bespoke, plain, and simple, architects subtly encouraged people to associate them with the experience of Euroamerican settlers who had only recently crossed the frontier. They accomplished the goal by reducing the visibility of mechanical systems and emphasizing rustic elements.

McClelland wrote about how the architects built roads and trails to, in the words of landscape architects, lie lightly on the land so that they gave the illusion that the natural landscape in parks was
undisturbed. She explained how park facilities “were fashioned with native or pioneer building techniques to create facilities” that harmonized with the native landscape.120 That sensibility left an indelible mark on the parks that bears testament how integral it was to the park paradigm.121

McClelland argues that federal landscape architects were willing to overlay roads, parking lots, and rustic buildings onto wilderness areas because they thought construction projects, as long as they appeared natural and did not compromise nature, improved the land and provided employment at the same time. Designers intended “Park’itecture,” as designers later called it, to help visitors connect with a homogenized version of the past. Phoebe Cutler characterized the style as an homage to treasured values that associated western conquest and American progress with Americans’ standard of living and present way of life. She described how the Roosevelt administration used the national parks to preserve and revive esteemed ideals that some people thought modern society (and the government itself) was destroying. She wrote about how landscape architects’ designs largely reflected the consensus, shared by the military and civil service, that the parks should portray “a continuous, homogenous, and astonishingly congenial vision of the land.”

The designers attempted to celebrate the spirit of democracy and pioneer strength. Landscape architects worked together with laborers from the Civilian Conservation Corps and land managers in the National Park Service to create an accessible, democratic space where they claimed anyone could visit and immerse themselves in an environment like the one where early Euroamericans self-reliantly worked to build the country.122

That visible legacy is a physical manifestation of policymakers’ influence on the park paradigm. The projects politicians and bureaucrats chose to work on in the parks, coupled with their political usefulness as an outlet for labor, embody the consensus understanding of what a pioneer, wilderness experience was “supposed to be like.” As the Depression-related construction work went on, other federal bureaucrats used the roads, buildings, and trails CCC and WPA enrollees built in parks to
encourage solidarity and celebrate the “American way of life.” New Deal administrators memorialized their success at reshaping the land through the Federal Arts Project and a program to write a guide to the United States.

Conserving Creativity - The Federal Writers Project

One of the WPA’s most ambitious, but least-known projects did not have anything to do with construction, but with writers working at thousands of desks across the United States. Policymakers hoped the Federal Art Project would conserve the talent and skills of artists who found themselves on relief and without means to continue their work. One part of that initiative, the Federal Writer’s Project, put almost 7,000 unemployed authors, editors, and publishers to work writing what was intended to be a comprehensive American Guide to all forty-eight states as well as Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.

Critics laud the guidebooks as masterpieces of modern literature. Historian Douglas Brinkley wrote, “the WPA guides were composed by the most dazzling group of writers America has ever produced.” John Steinbeck described it as “the most comprehensive account of the United States” ever written. In spite of the guide’s plaudits, the authors’ supposed radicalism also led to the creation of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the project’s premature termination in 1939.

Political opponents of the Writers Project claimed enrollees were working on “a lot of useless, worthless...projects,” and nearly one in four Americans ranked its superior agency, the WPA, as the worst part of FDR’s government in the months preceding the 1940 election. As a bureau of the WPA, the CCC was also the subject of intense scrutiny and sometimes-bitter ire. Even eighty years later, some Americans who lived through the Depression remember relatives railing against its stultifying effect on the nation’s commerce and character.

The reason for that rancor may have been that it was different from nearly every federal project that preceded it. The project’s goal was not to design practical infrastructure or conduct scientific
research, but to document the nation as writers found it. Administrators of the WPA hoped they could use the nation’s untapped human capital by putting it to productive, public minded use. The agency’s head, Harry Hopkins, thought that even though “work relief costs more than direct relief...the cost is justified. First, in the saving of morale. Second, in the preservation of human skills and talents. Third, in the material enrichment which the unemployed add to our national wealth through their labors.” He and the agencies he managed through the WPA’s intellectual branch, known as Federal One, looked at public lands, like the national parks, as needing physical and intellectual conservation. The authors of the federal writer’s project presented the parks as wonderlands. Behind their scenic prose was a persuasive subtext that encouraged readers not only to see them but to consume them.

In their guide to California, the state became “that legendary land of perpetual summer, of orange groves in sight of snowy peaks, of oil wells spouting wealth, of real estate promising fortunes, of cinema stars and bathing beauties.” It was more “than sunshine and vineyards and orange orchards, bathing beaches and redwood trees and movie studios.” It was, according to a quotation the Guide’s authors attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, a place where “at every turn we could look further into the land of our happy future.”

The language they used to describe the state encouraged people to visit it. The writers framed it with a litany of interesting, novel, uniquely Californian places. In fact, they thought that if a Californian went traveling, they were “apt to say to himself as he looks at the parts of the rest of the country: ‘I have seen all this before.’” Whether in the state’s soaring mountains, its undulating foothills, lava crags, juniper, redwood, or sequoia forests, high plateaus, seashores, or desert, all were well known to residents of the Golden State and were waiting to be discovered by readers who the authors intoned should want to be part of Stevenson’s happy future. Some of the places that shone brightest were in the state’s well-known national parks.
Along the western slope of the Sierra Nevada, the big trees of what were then called Sequoia and General Grant National Parks (today Sequoia Kings Canyon National Park) clung to the hillsides that had hosted them from time immemorial. The authors told the story of their induction as the third unit of the national park system and explained how they were stewarded first by the army, and later, after the arrival of the National Park Service, by Colonel John R. White. Under his direction, the writers said the parks had become “a model recreational and conservation area,” and its well-known big trees were complemented with other aesthetic assets for peoples’ enjoyment.

The guide’s authors highlighted features along the park’s main road like Hospital Rock, which they claimed was the site where “Indians stored their food, held pow-wows, and ministered the sick and injured;” Amphitheater Point, which “overlooks the canyons below and the distant San Joaquin Valley;” and Moro Rock that towered 4000 feet high, along with the better known Giant Forest. The authors did not write their itineraries thematically but geographically. They ran from outside the park toward its interior along the only road there. Their descriptions made what were otherwise unassuming forested valleys into destinations. They used narrative to make the landscape more attractive to tourists.

By making the parks literally legible, the itineraries in the writers’ guides served as testaments to their federal sponsors’ twin intent: first, to provide work for authors who would otherwise draw relief payments without any productive work to show for them, and second, to encourage Americans to explore their own country by creating destinations that emphasized America’s unique character. By writing on particular parts of the country, the guides highlighted individual regions’ characters, but integrated them into a homogenous, national whole. By using places like the parks as points of focus, the guides’ authors encouraged their readers to redefine their understanding of what it meant to be part of a larger, national community. They legitimized experiencing many Americas. In so doing, they served as uniquely different artifacts that contributed to a national character united under the banner of
the National Park Service and federal stewardship. So while Congress and the president designated each park unit for different reasons, their inclusion in a system gave them coherence and celebrated the diversity of Americans’ lived experiences.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{Federal Influence – Summarizing the federal government’s contribution to the park paradigm}

It is impossible to consider the national parks without addressing the American federal government’s involvement in their creation and management because they are, in fact, parts of the government. In the following chapters, I explore how other groups also affected the park paradigm and how they variously supported, encouraged, or resisted federal involvement in park projects. The friction between those other groups and their priorities and the larger, national policy objectives of federal lawmakers had an important effect on the face of the National Park System.

Federal involvement highlights the ways historical precedents informed the creation of parks and their management after integration into the system. It raises uncomfortable questions in our time about how policymakers embedded those precedents in some of the most cherished landscapes in the United States. Considering factors like government sponsored Indian removal, the displacement of former residents from eastern national parks, and Yellowstone’s creation as a reclamation project all call into question the supposedly altruistic motives that some historians and many enthusiastic supporters of and visitors to them claim led to parks’ creation.\textsuperscript{134} The national parks are inherently political spaces where past policymakers left a legacy for modern Americans to consider whether and how the park paradigm embodies their beliefs and morality.
1.2 - Selling Scenery - Businesspeople in National Parks

“It is a business proposition.”
Robert Sterling Yard

Tourist business owners who capitalized on parks had a significant impact on the national park paradigm because they set precedents federal policymakers and the National Park Service generally followed. In this section, I explain how business owners who operated hotels, who sold driving and camping products, and who associated their goods or services with national park experiences influenced the parks’ physical and rhetorical shape. By codifying sets of expectations about how tourists should consume national parks, business owners helped set significant precedents that defined normative national park experiences.

Hotel owners, guidebook authors, and outdoor recreation manufacturers and retailers belong in this group because they all used the national parks as marketing tools. They used nature in parks as a tool to enhance their products’ attractiveness to consumers. One of the ways they did that was by invoking (and consciously constructing) parks’ authenticity. They used it in order to attract tourists who would be willing to pay to see, stay in, and say that they experienced superlative places. In the process, they also ingrained consumption in national parks’ raison d’etre.

People who ran businesses in parks or that capitalized on them commodified aspects of national parks in order to create products that people would buy from them. Those products ranged from hotel stays, to books, to cars, to tours, to camping equipment, to mobility itself. The products’ sellers monetized ideas, places, and experiences associated with national parks to attract buyers for their products. I discuss tourists’ perceptions of park experiences and their significance as consumers in another chapter because their idea of the “best way” to manage a park was not based on profit, but on
accessing novel and unique experiences. In this chapter, I address how business owners’ shared desire for profit, and their use of the national parks to gain it, was the driving force behind their contribution to the park paradigm.

A Business Proposition – Businesspeople using parks to promote their financial interests

New rail lines built after the American Civil War made vast stretches of land accessible to eastern markets and travelers. In order to defray the high fixed costs associated with building new, transcontinental mainlines, companies like the Union Pacific, Northern Pacific, and Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe decided to use scenic attractions in order to sell tickets to tourists. Railroad companies used western scenery to attract Eastern tourists to “discover” the west. Their interest in promoting tourist travel was an important part of making “The Wonderland” of Yellowstone a national park.

As early as the 1840s, some “mountain men” told stories about a remarkable place near the headwaters of the Yellowstone River where the lakes boiled and plumes of steam rose from deep within the earth. They described otherworldly scenery in terms most people dismissed as outright lies. Their descriptions nonetheless stoked curiosity.

In 1869, David Folsom and Charles Cook, two Montanans who lived near Helena, decided to go at their own expense to see whether the rumors were true. After they got back, their description of the region was so fantastic that neither the New York Tribune nor Harper’s magazine was willing to print it. In the end, the only paper willing to print it was the Western Monthly Magazine, whose publishers were friends of one of the explorers. The article excited interest among many westerners, but especially Montanans who were near “the Wonderland.”

One of the westerners who wanted to see Yellowstone after they heard Cook and Folsom’s account of it was Nathaniel P. Langford. Langford was an associate of Jay Cooke and an occasional employee of the recently organized, but uncapitalized, Northern Pacific Railroad. In 1870 when
Langford heard that the rumors of otherworldly geysers, thermal terraces, and bubbling mud-pots within easy reach of a spur from the Northern Pacific’s mainline might be true, he wanted to use them to draw favorable attention to the company and its imminent bond sale. Langford recognized that if he could substantiate the explorers’ claim that there were geological wonders in the area, it would draw tourist traffic all along the mainline and encourage investment in the company. In order to confirm the stories, he decided to organize an expedition to explore the area himself. 

The Washburn-Langford-Doane Expedition submitted the first report to Congress about Yellowstone. Their work inspired Ferdinand V. Hayden, a geologist who worked for the federal government, to visit in 1871. Hayden’s account of the geysers, thermal basins, and other oddities was the first scientific description of the area. Unlike other explorers’ accounts of the area, Hayden included photographs to prove what he had seen there. W.H. Jackson (who subsequently built a career on photographing scenery in Yellowstone), went along with a glass plate camera. In the report Hayden wrote for Congress, he suggested that Yellowstone should be set aside as a public park. In the years that followed, people contested who should get credit for the idea to create Yellowstone National Park, but historians have proven that the first recorded mention of it was not from a scientist or a preservationist, but a businessperson.

In fall 1871, Hayden received a letter on stationary from Jay Cooke & Co., Bankers, Financial Agents, Northern Pacific Railroad Company. The letter’s writer, A.B. Nettleton, who worked for the company, wrote

Dear Doctor [Hayden]:

Judge Kelley has made a suggestion which strikes me as being an excellent one, viz.: Let Congress pass a bill reserving the great Geyser Basin as a public park forever - just as it has reserved that far inferior wonder the Yosemite Valley and big trees [through a grant to the state of California]. If you approve this [,] would such a recommendation be appropriate in your official report?
Kelley was a Congressman from Pennsylvania who supported expanding the United States’ rail network by whatever means he had at his disposal. Kelley was, as a member of Congress, familiar with the Washburn-Langford-Doane expedition’s report and hoped Hayden would include the suggestion that Congress reserve the land for public use in his official report.

This seems strange in light of the fact that Kelley was a member of Congress with the power to introduce the idea on the floor himself, except that he was, in the words of a former historian of Yellowstone National Park, “influential in the affairs of Jay Cooke & Co., and familiar with the firm’s advertising campaign, [so] he preferred to advance his suggestion through Nettleton rather than directly.” In other words, the Northern Pacific proposed creating Yellowstone to advance their financial interests. In fact, the idea was so obviously tied to the interests of the railroad that Kelley, one of the company’s advocates in Congress, worried that proposing it himself might seem like a brazen attempt to shape government policy to the company’s advantage.

Hayden was, nevertheless, receptive. He thought Yellowstone was truly unique. This led Jay Cooke to write W. Milner Roberts, the Northern Pacific engineer supervising company work in Montana:

> It is proposed by Mr. Hayden in his report to Congress that the Geyser region around Yellowstone Lake shall be set apart by government as a reservation as [sic] park, similar to that of the Great Trees & other reservations in California. Would this conflict with our land grant, or interfere with us in any way? Please give me your views on this subject. It is important to do something speedily, or squatters & claimants will go in there, and we can probably deal much better with the government in any improvements we may desire to make for the benefit of our pleasure travel than with individuals.

Even before Cooke received a reply from Montana, he had set the Northern Pacific’s promotional wheels in motion. Through the governor of Minnesota, he contacted Nathaniel Langford and asked him to head to Washington DC. Cooke also began to collect printed versions of Langford’s account of the region by soliciting *Scribner’s Magazine*, in what national park historian Aubrey Haines called described as the opening move in a publicity campaign that put the Langford article and selected Jackson
photographs from the Hayden Expedition in the hands of influential Congressmen.\textsuperscript{148} It did not take long for those efforts to bear fruit.

After briefly flirting with granting Yellowstone to the state of Montana (which Congress ultimately dismissed because it would require taking land from other territories), Congress passed a bill to set the land aside under federal management “for the benefit and enjoyment of the people.”\textsuperscript{149} The Northern Pacific was pleased with the change because it ensured they would be able to deal with the relatively cooperative Department of Interior when they built a line to the park’s “wonders,” instead of having to deal with possibly hundreds of individual landowners or several states.

In the years that followed, the park proved so popular that everyone who had any knowledge of it in the 1870s claimed a part in the story of its creation.\textsuperscript{150} Congressional representatives, former frontiersmen, and members of the United States Cavalry all proudly claimed at the park’s fiftieth anniversary in 1932 that they had had the foresight to save “the Wonderland” from rampant despoliation. Conspicuously absent from that narrative was the silent underwriter of the park’s principal concessionaires, the Northern Pacific Railroad.\textsuperscript{151}

The National Park Service memorialized the story on a plaque that at the junction of the Gibbon and Firehole Rivers. The agency’s historian wrote about how explorers on the Washburn Expedition first suggested the idea of setting [that region] apart...as a National Park.”\textsuperscript{152} That story is romantic. It is also almost certainly untrue.\textsuperscript{153} It obscures that the idea to establish a park was rooted in the Northern Pacific’s desire to establish a federally sanctioned reserve that would be a popular destination for passengers on its railroad.

That is not to say that high-minded, civic rhetoric is untrue or that business and altruism were, or are, incompatible. It is to say that, while the high-flown rhetoric historically associated with places like Yellowstone is romantic, it ignores the centrality of the tourism business to the stories of parks’ creation.\textsuperscript{154} In Yellowstone’s case, the number of supporters who wanted to take credit for what turned
out to be a tremendously popular idea overshadowed the role that the Northern Pacific played in shaping it. It helped establish the myth that persists in many places, even today, that democratic altruism was primarily responsible for Yellowstone’s and other parks’ creation.  

That myth is a pervasive part of park identities and a treasured element of many supporters’ perceptions of park landscapes. The myth manifests itself in the more than 200 plaques dedicated to Stephen Mather that appear across the United States, in the hagiographic literature that often glorifies early tourist business owners like David and Jennie Curry (in Yosemite), and in modern nature enthusiasts’ lionization of preservationists like John Muir and Robert Marshall.

Business owners did not coordinate a conspiracy to create national parks. However, that does not change that Northern Pacific and later Union Pacific and Central Pacific’s pursuit of profit definitely drove the process of park designation and early development. Telling the stories of precedent-setting parks like Yellowstone without acknowledging tourist businesses’ role in them glosses over business owners’ significance setting precedents that shaped the park paradigm.

**Beyond the Myth — Business’s alliance with the National Park Service, nature enthusiasts, and the Federal Government**

This is not to say business owners had carte blanche in parks. Tourist business owners’ interests did not always determine how parks looked or worked. After the National Park Service took over park operations in 1916, rangers often clashed with businesspeople about how to manage them.

After the National Park Service took over management of Yellowstone, for example, the new agency’s director faced resistance from business owners who wanted to prevent the cavalry from leaving the park. In a biography of Stephen Mather, the park service’s first director, the author described how one of Yellowstone’s concessionaires, Huntley Child, confronted the director in his Washington office.
Child allegedly barged into Mather’s Washington, DC office to say that he refused to allow the US Cavalry, which had been protecting the park since 1886, to leave because they were the best customers he had. Mather explained that with the National Park Service’s creation, the Cavalry would, indeed leave, and he was willing to take whatever steps were necessary to make sure its transition to managing the park was smooth. When Child remained defiant, “Mather dictated a telegram to the park directing that all Yellowstone buses be commandeered by armed guards. Childs yielded.” The army decamped for good about a year later.¹⁵⁹

That episode shows how Child viewed the park as marketplace with a reliable customer base for his stores. He did not want to have civilian management in the park if it meant he would lose his best customers. Child did not get his way, but Mather’s threat that the government would take over Child’s concession rather than shut it down shows how he still wanted to provide access to food and consumer goods in the park.

Mather also built on a campaign begun by American railroads during the First World War to “See America First.” In order to entice some of the wealthy tourists displaced from the traditional grand tour, railroad companies advertised how western American national parks could provide access to the same kinds of experiences as a European vacation. The railroad companies’ appeal to tourists’ sensibilities about making American travel a higher priority than European travel points to the high regard and value tourists placed in overseas, and especially European, destinations. It also points to the influence of European precedents to shaping American national park experiences that railroad companies wanted to compete favorably with them.

The encouragement to “See America First” shows how Mather and his lieutenants sometimes used European precedents in their justifications to establish new parks and new businesses in them. It shows how European precedents shaped the American national park paradigm. Mather and his peers treated the monumental attractions of the American west as tools that would help the United States
prevent the expatriation of tourists’ time and treasure and also demonstrate the country’s aesthetic and cultural superiority over European destinations.\textsuperscript{160}

In the years to come, Mather and the park service tried to build strong relationships with business owners in and around parks and even adopted many of their management ideas and priorities (including direct connections with European precedents). In 1917, the first publicist of the National Park Association (a private entity Mather created and partially funded to advocate on behalf of the National Park Service), Robert Sterling Yard, wrote:

We want our national parks developed. We want roads and trails like Switzerland’s. We want hotels of all prices from lowest to highest. We want comfortable public camps in sufficient abundance to meet all demands. We want lodges and chalets at convenient intervals commanding the scenic possibilities of all our parks. We want the best and cheapest accommodations for pedestrians and motorists. We want sufficient and convenient transportation at reasonable rates. We want adequate facilities and supplies for camping out at lowest prices.

Yard characterized these uses as compatible with preserving park landscapes, and implied that they were part of what made other, well known leisure landscapes worth visiting. He associated the National Park Service with commercial services as well as wildlife science when he wrote, “We want good fishing. We want our wild animal life conserved and developed. We want special facilities for nature study.”\textsuperscript{161} Yard’s decision to say that “we want” development shows how close he considered the National Park Service’s relationship with business. His decision to describe the desire for new means of transportation, tourist facilities, and research in the plural shows that he and his employers at the National Park Service considered working on those projects as in both their interest as well as hotel owners, transportation providers, and retailers. The National Park Service stood to benefit from private development in the parks.

Yard argued the parks would only satisfy Americans’ expectations when that construction was complete, but he believed most citizens did not want to pay for the work “at the expense of the United States Treasury.”\textsuperscript{162} In other words, Yard supported new construction, but he did not support the
United States Government paying for it. In the end, he did not believe Congress needed to appropriate funds for the work because the land was a valuable commodity the government could leverage to get private developers to pay for the construction.

Yard claimed, “this a business proposition and must be built up soundly. We have the biggest and finest stock of scenery in the world and there is an enormous market for it. We can sell it at a profit, and the profit will buy our development.” In fact, “the bigger the business grows the greater the reduction of costs and the lower the charges. When we are doing a national business on Switzerland’s scale, we can match Switzerland’s low prices.” He concluded emphatically, “there is the story in a paragraph. It is a business proposition.”

It is hard to say whether Yard believed bringing business into parks was primarily desirable as a means to an end, namely to have them pay for buildings and roads that urban-dwelling tourists wanted, or as a utilitarian end in itself to help justify the park’s existence. No matter what his motive was, the National Park Service cemented people who profited from tourists as central players in the paradigmatic park experience. Other groups of people also collaborated with business to pursue their interests in the parks.

Those who supported preserving nature as an end in itself echoed the National Park Service’s support for private business development in the parks. The well-known conservationist and advocate for the creation of Rocky Mountain National Park, Enos Mills, once said, “our splendid national parks, if properly developed, would become an inexhaustible source of wealth.” For a model, Mills echoed Yard’s praise of Switzerland, which “had become wealthy by the effective exploiting of her scenery. She prepared by establishing a national park system several years ago. Australia and New Zealand [sic] are also planning such systems.” With jingoistic flourish, he argued, “What they can do, we can do.” As it turned out, his enthusiasm had ample precedent and justified promise.
**Railroads lead the way – Attracting the wealthy to make the people’s parks pay**

Beginning with the Northern Pacific in Yellowstone, parks were sites of large-scale investments by railroad companies. The companies were active advocates for establishing new national parks, and were eager to invest in providing services to tourists in them. They actively promoted and developed them in order to make them into inexhaustible sources of wealth.  

The first hotels built in the national parks were almost all built by large railroad companies or by shell corporations that had their backing. The first buildings were modest. Early visitors to Yellowstone complained about sparse accommodations and poor service, so railroads were quick to change the parks to match visitors’ expectations. They made investments to attract rich visitors.

To the railroad companies’ way of thinking, if the parks were going to serve as destinations, they might as well attract “the right kind” of visitors. In order to cater to a higher class of tourists, they designed opulent buildings that juxtaposed genteel amenities with rustic, western décor. The early visitors who traveled to use these facilities were wealthy enough to pay to reach them and take time away from work to use them.

In their histories on the rise of mass tourism, the historians John Jakle and Cindy Aron explain how the modern industrial economy increased leisure time and enabled leisure travel by a newly enriched middle class. When these tourists began to travel extensively in the late nineteenth century, they arrived in places like Yellowstone and Yosemite to find park infrastructure already in place. These later, middle class tourists encountered landscapes that already had entrenched management regimes based on catering to the needs and budgets of upper class travelers.

Their popularity made the hotel's luxury synonymous with the western park experience. The Old Faithful Inn (1903) and New Canyon Hotel (1910), both at Yellowstone, and El Tovar (1905) at Grand Canyon were monuments to their owners’ expectations to profit by attracting wealthy customers to stay
in those parks. The architectural style that railroads’ architects chose for the hotels made people feel as though they were staying in part of the landscape.

The hotel’s builders wanted them to blend into the landscape. As a result, hotel owners, which were almost all railroad companies, built rustic enclaves in remote forest, lake, and mountain settings. The previously modest structures evolved into ambitious complexes built of indigenous material in vernacular forms. Those forms set the national park lodges apart from monotonous Eastern and Midwestern hotels. Architects created a romantic image and sense of place that helped give the parks a special character. Railroad companies profited from park visitors by using novel and immersive experiences to attract them to hotels across the west.  

In projects supervised by the architect Gilbert Stanley Underwood, the Union Pacific Railroad built lodges at Bryce Canyon, Zion Canyon, and the North Rim of the Grand Canyon that combined local stone, logs, upper walls of shake siding, and soaring roofs that were reminiscent of Adirondack buildings to evoke a frontier atmosphere. Later, other designers used Indian motifs juxtaposed with Art Deco forms repeated on floors, on walls, and even in linen curtains. The buildings’ skillfully joined notchings, stone based fireplaces, casement sashes, and rustic bent twigs set alongside sturdy log porches, which were all intended to make visitors associate parks with the mythical frontier (whose identity was itself based on the superiority of European-American culture, the conquest and selective appropriation of Indian lifeways, and a belief in progress). At the same time, the buildings’ scale and appearance evoked feelings of permanence that were both familiar enough to reassure visitors’ expectations of comfort and exotic enough to evoke associations with the hardship of life on the old frontier.

At the North Rim of the Grand Canyon in particular, Underwood’s second El Tovar (the first burned down) seemed to be a natural extension of the landscape it stood in. With its battered and buttressed stonewalls rising up alongside the great crevasse, and its low pitched, shingled roof blending into the surrounding forest, the new hotel seemed almost organic. By incorporating ornamental and interesting
In the years that it operated in Yellowstone, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company (and its subsidiary Yellowstone Park Company) spent millions of dollars building structures that they thought fit with the landscapes around them. The company wanted the buildings’ style to complement the grand landscapes their advertisements promoted. Buildings like the Old Faithful Inn helped shape a rustic ideal that defined the national parks for generations. When more people started to visit the parks in the 1920s, rustic design became problematic because it could not accommodate enough tourists.

Tourists were disappointed when they encountered crowds, noise, or trash in parks starting in the 1920s. Those experiences did not live up to the ideal national parks were supposed to live up to, so they complained to concessionaires, park rangers, and Congress, about how “over-visitation” was making the parks less natural. Their complaints show how rusticity and solitude were central to their expectations for national park experiences. Park managers decided to use more rustically camouflaged structures and systems to restore the park’s “naturality” and spread visitors over a greater area in parks.

In the preface to the architectural guide Park Structures and Facilities, Arno Cammerer, the National Park Service’s third director, wrote about how “in any area which the preservation of the beauty of Nature is the primary purpose” park managers needed to take care not to compromise the area’s appearance or natural functioning. He said park managers would have to be careful not to make the parks seem too urban and that preserving nature meant subordinating other design needs to making sure buildings and roads appeared “to belong to and be a part of their settings.” The National Park Service decided to follow the precedent set by architects like Underwood, who worked for railroads and other business owners, to make buildings “lie lightly on the land.”
The only reason people ever found those systems in parks was that business owners provided them for rich tourists who wanted plush accommodations and easy access to attractions they found interesting. Those tourists’ expectations and the infrastructure businesses built to satisfy them contributed to the creation of a technological landscape where urban systems and natural places seemed indistinguishable. Tourists who traveled to the parks in their earliest years inaugurated expectations that defined the paradigmatic National Park experience.

They used modern structures, transportation technologies, and management techniques to provide access to what were supposedly unique, non-urban, natural places. The National Park Service expanded access to those services. The agency’s willingness to use technological systems to accommodate ever-increasing numbers resulted in part from the precedents businesses set in them.

Another reason the National Park Service worked to increase access to commercial services in parks was that Stephen Mather decided to use visitation statistics to demonstrate the parks’ popularity with the American people. He coordinated with the businesspeople who were already operating in the parks to advertise so that they attracted more visitors. The increased number of visitors who traveled to the parks as a result improved business owners’ profitability and justified Mather’s requests for increased appropriations from Congress. Mather also inaugurated his own public relations campaign to link the interests of citizens, businesses, and the federal government.  

In his introduction to Robert Sterling Yard’s *National Parks Portfolio*, a promotional book that Mather commissioned, Yard claimed that the American people were overlooking “an economic asset of incalculable value.” Mather wrote the reason for publishing the *Portfolio* was to “bring some realization of what these pleasure gardens ought to mean, of what so easily they may be made to mean, to this people.” In the rest of the book, Mather and Yard used wildlife, scenery, and railroad company owned facilities to show that the parks were scenic and economic assets that more Americans should travel to enjoy.
Railroad companies gave about $43,000 toward the printing costs for the first edition of Yard’s *Portfolio*. Their partnership reflected a shared desire to increase visitation in parks. The book is evidence of the link between railroad companies’ profits and Stephen Mather’s goal to increase Congressional support for his “scenery business.” In spite of their profitability in the early years of National Park Service management, railroad companies’ fortunes sank in the 1920s and 1930s. The National Park Service’s adoption of the railroad company’s management methods in its early years set the agency on a path to continue managing the parks like their predecessors had. Mather and Yard were also so effective at promoting the parks that they increased the number of people who expected access to rustic experiences in them. 176

Hotel owners linked rusticity, the frontier, and a western ethos with parkscapes under a “park brand” to increase visitation and profit. In the process, they shaped tourists’ expectations for park experiences. In order to satisfy those expectations and increase political policymakers’ support for their agency, administrators in the National Park Service allowed hotel owners to operate their businesses and to profit from them. The brand railroad companies used to emphasize national parks’ attractiveness helped people who sold park related goods or services profit across the United States.

*Consuming Nature – Businesses use parks to sell products*

Far away from western parks, in crowded and congested eastern cities, businesspeople took advantage of the national parks’ aura of rusticity to increase their sales. They used the parks’ reputations as restful and healthy retreats (which railroad companies helped foster through aggressive advertising) to encourage consumption. They marketed products that they said would help people escape to the quiet, less rushed, and pastoral places. Paradoxically, they were selling the same devices responsible for making urban life noisier, faster, and less healthful. The automobile embodies that contradiction more clearly than any other technology.
Americans initially viewed the automobile merely as a replacement for the horse and buggy, but they quickly realized it provided opportunities to have new kinds of experiences. In his interpretation of the car’s influence on life in small mid-western towns at the turn of the last century, playwright Meredith Willson singled out the Model T Ford for making people want to “go, want to get...out the door, seven, eight, nine, ten, twelve, twenty-two, twenty-three miles to the county seat.” Unfettered by rails and schedules, drivers could chart their own itineraries at their own pace. The only limitations on auto-travel were the availability of food and fuel and the number of hours an operator could stand to drive in a day. Businesses capitalized on that flexibility to claim that cars were the best tool to help people escape urban life. They claimed owning a car and driving on roads would help people escape traffic and the human-built world.

Auto manufacturers encouraged prospective customers to take their cars on trips to natural places, like the national parks. Camping gear outfitters claimed that a variety of appliances would make park camping less stressful and more enjoyable. Publishers printed books explaining the nuances of auto-travel and auto-camping and claimed that national parks made perfect get-away destinations.

They all appealed to consumers’ intuition that natural places, like national parks, were authentic destinations in order to sell goods and services. Their success or failure hinged on the park paradigm’s currency to different groups of consumers. In the process of capitalizing on tourists’ desire to access authentic, wild places, they both tapped into and shaped their expectations about places like national parks.

Auto manufacturers encouraged drivers to see their cars as tools for exploration. At the Ford Motor Company, a distinct sub-set of advertisements targeted drivers who wanted to get out of cities and into open country. Broadsides published in 1925 titled, “Away From the Crowds,” “Off the Beaten Path,” and “Out Where the Paving Ends” show Ford’s desire to associate their automobiles with a particular kind of leisure travel. Once in the wilderness, Ford encouraged “city dwellers to reclaim precious hours
from the routine of work, for recreation and exercise; to find the wholesome and necessary relaxation that only fresh air and sunshine assure.” The ad showed that executives at Ford believed they could sell cars not only as tools to reach the wilderness, but also as part of that destination. 

Another ad titled “The Trail that leads everywhere” shows a family camping in a mountain clearing with their Model T. The image implies that cars were not just useful to reach trailheads, but belonged beyond them. The ad shows a family camped around a fire at the foot of a mountain range and an impressive pine forest. Rather than leaving its car in the background, the family has included it in its circle around their campfire. The ad says, “Touring makes an appeal to everyone, and the Ford is the sensible and practical way to enjoy this healthful pastime.” The ad does not mention how the automobile contributed to the need for a “healthful pastime” outside of cities in the first place.

One of the things that made escape to the country appealing were all the cars in urban areas. As shown by this ad, people were willing to accept the automobile’s ability to help them escape the city instead of focusing on its part in, figuratively, driving them from it. 

In other ventures off the beaten path, the advertisers claimed that

The real charm of touring lies in leaving the main-travelled [sic] highways and exploring the thousands of alluring side-paths. These dirt roads and trails lead to spots of rare beauty unvisited by the throng—where better camp-sites may be found—finer fishing and lovelier scenery.

The ad reminded prospective buyers that only a Ford could carry them to such rugged locales. This sales pitch implies that without a car (in this case a Ford), these areas would be inaccessible except to the hardy few with the time and resources to undertake a minor expedition to reach them.

In other ads, passengers’ personify their automobiles like fellow travelers.

Ever noticed the cars you meet in out of the way places, approached by narrow, twisting trails, or rough country roads? ...Take your Ford this summer and explore. There are delights awaiting you away from the beaten path that few know. Leave the crowds and the highways behind you. It costs but little—and it will be a vacation you will never forget.
The advertisers integrated automobiles into the landscape by making the machines indistinguishable from their passengers. The passengers in the car met other cars. They did not meet other people. These ads ignored the acrid smoke of uncatalyzed auto exhaust and focused on the sweet smells and sights in wilderness spaces. No destinations were more attractive than the national parks.

Auto manufacturing businesses like the Ford Motor Company recognized that the national parks were attractive destinations and used them to sell cars. The maker of the Model T reminded motorists, “more than 8900 Ford cars from every section of the country visited Yellowstone National Park...in 1924. The ad encouraged people to “take a real vacation this summer...visit the Yosemite Valley, the Grand Canyon, [or] Glacier National parks.” The ad writers simultaneously introduced and took advantage of the national park paradigm by associating Ford cars with the real landscapes in America’s national parks.

The ad writers invoked the cachet railroad companies helped build for the parks. They promised using a car to travel to one of America’s national parks would be meaningful because they were authentically wild and natural destinations. They used the parks’ authenticity to sell a product, and, in the process, helped make the automobile part of paradigmatic park experiences.

In the same ad, a man, woman, and two children speed past a sign that marked the Continental Divide. The car’s ability to crest the backbone of the continent proved it was able to provide access to unique, untamed, wild places. The Continental Divide had value because it was unlike other places in the US. The National Park Service marked the divide with a sign and Ford featured it in their ad because they thought it was an attraction worth seeing. Framing the divide in this way makes the automobile seem like an unnatural conqueror of nature, but for the drivers that was not the case.

In these ads, Ford never described their cars conquering nature. They described them as enabling drivers’ access to it. Ford’s decision to name national parks and include a sign that visitors would find in them in their advertisement both capitalized on and contributed to the park brand. It built on to the park paradigm by explaining that the parks were rugged, natural places. Car companies made their product
part of the park paradigm. This was different from the precedent railroad companies set in the national parks.

In an advertisement from 1916, the Great Northern Railway did not try to sell rail travel (no matter how luxurious it was). Rather, the company tried to sell the sights awaiting passengers in national park destinations. The ad’s author wrote, “Glacier Park is established as America’s Vacation Paradise - for reasons [emphasis in original]. It surpasses the Old World’s most famous Nature-Pictures in mountain splendor, the azure beauty of its 250 skyland lakes.”

Since the advertiser was a railroad company, it seems reasonable that they would have included an image of a train, but none is present. Instead, they show a White Company autobus before a placid lake and rugged mountain skyline. In this context, even though the railroad had moved tourists west, they apparently thought that the cars would be more attractive to potential customers than a train might be. It is hard to say why the railroad company chose to present itself that way, but it seems possible that they did not think trains were as compatible with authentic wild spaces as the automobile.

In a Northern Pacific advertisement, autobuses drive next to a brown bear cub and through the Roosevelt Gate at the north entrance of Yellowstone. The ad promise prospective visitors “A Scenic and Educational Vacation Trip [at] Yellowstone Nat’l Park Through [the] Gardiner Gateway and [the] Northern Pacific Ry.” Once again, the railway itself is invisible, but the company made a point of mentioning and showing that “comfortable automobiles [have] replaced stage coaches this summer, [enabling] you to see more of the wonders of this great vacation land.”

In this context, the automobile’s ability to extend tourists’ travel range and increase the number of stops they could make in a day demonstrates their value. The advertiser tied the automobile’s utilitarian ability to increase the number of stops visitors could make during their limited time at the park, with the park itself. Unlike trains, they integrated cars into the landscape tourists traveled to see.
Auto companies’ influence on the park paradigm was a totally contingent development. If advertisers had wanted to sell cars’ ability to get tourists to exotic locales, they could have done so with or without picturing the product they were selling, like the rail companies sometimes did in their advertisements. They did not.194

Auto manufacturers’ success at having their product interpreted as a valid part of authentic wilderness experiences was apparent to manufacturers of other goods. As auto sales accelerated in the first three decades of the 20th century, manufacturers of all kinds of other products rushed to cash in on the car companies’ good fortune by selling products for drivers to use with them. In the process, they also helped shape the park paradigm.

Appliances for the Wilderness – Businesspeople and travel authors sell to consumers in the wild

In their 1920 catalog, the Allen-Lawrence Co. advertised “light weight tents [for] camping, canoeing, hiking, auto. etc.,”195 but only car drivers only had one marketed to them. By separating auto-camping from other wilderness-based activities, this manufacturer implied that auto-campers had different needs than other “woodsmen.” The manufacturer showed that auto-campers were not “campers” in the traditional sense of the word. They were building on and adjusting the existing tradition of camping to suit their needs. Through a long series of often-minute changes to existing technology, consumer drivers and the manufacturers who sold products to them collaboratively extended the scope of an existing past-time into new functional, geographic, and business areas.196 The products they consumed and sold, respectively, helped define the national park paradigm.

Before visitors took their cars “off the beaten path,” most of them bought all kinds of consumer goods that were supposed to make their trips more convenient and enjoyable. Companies sold tents, trailers, tools, and all kinds of other products to consumers across the United States. Manufacturers told consumers that their products were essential to have enjoyable, comfortable, and simultaneously
immersive natural experiences in places like parks. The goods they sold shaped visitors’ expectations for parks as well as opinions about what being in them should be like. In the process, they also helped solidify the automobile’s place in the park paradigm.

Guidebook authors helped shape the ways that tourists expected to experience national parks and encouraged people to buy specific kinds of products to use in them. Guidebook buyers were looking for inspiration, information on popular, local tastes, and guidance to meaningful places and experiences. By identifying the places and products they said tourists needed to access authentic experiences, and to guide them to beautiful places, guidebook authors also changed how their readers framed the park paradigm. They may have contributed to making cars part of the authentic experiences tourists wanted to have in parks. Guidebook authors responded to the automobile’s popularity by consciously assimilating it into the park paradigm.

In *Camping and Camp Outfits*, published in 1890, George O. Shields describes trekking into the wilderness as flight from “the rough-and-tumble struggle for bread,” and as a place of refuge. Besides retreating from economic competition, Shields said that forays into the wild gave campers the opportunity to shed society’s regulations and expectations. Camping, he said, allowed “perfect rest...where they can feel free to wear what is most comfortable, to come and go when they will, to eat and sleep and wake as they will,” ungoverned by fashion or etiquette. While Shield’s description does not seem so different from the stated-motivations of many auto-campers, the substance of his book shows that the experiences he wanted to help facilitate were very different from auto-tourists.

For example, Shields describes the centrality of guns to pre-automotive campers. He said, “It is presumed that every man who goes on a camping trip of any kind, for pleasure or on business, and even if the principal business is to be fishing or resting, will carry fire-arms of some kind.” The reason for campers to carry a gun were that “in nearly every wild country there is game, either large or small, and
nearly every man likes to shoot at it when he sees it.” The Complete Campers Manual even suggested that campers should buy a “tent pole gun rack” so that they could store their firearms safely in camp.

Carrying guns shifted from being an integral part of camping in pre-automotive guidebooks to a prohibited activity in later ones. The Federal Government prohibited sport hunting in national parks like Yellowstone (except when hunters were encouraged to kill “nuisance” species within the park). In fact, park rangers disabled guns visitors brought when they visited.

New guidebooks that catered to car drivers helped change what it meant to camp. In the process, the authors shifted lands that were formerly associated exclusively with fishing or hunting to more aesthetically based pursuits. Auto campers were usually more interested in taking advantage of their mobility to see new places than in staying in one or a few places to hunt. The lands took on new identities rooted in their appearance rather than the animals that lived in them thanks to businesspeople’s desire to profit from a constituency of drivers that outnumbered hunters. One of the ways the authors justified that shift was with conservation and preservation based rhetoric.

In order to make them function as sanctuaries for wild game, preservationists (and perhaps some conservationists who wanted to protect game reserves where animals could reproduce) succeeded at having all hunting banned from all national parks beginning with Yellowstone. The enabling legislation for the park stipulated that the Department of Interior prevent the “wanton destruction” of game within its boundaries. It took almost twenty years to pass legislation to establish penalties for hunting, but it was clear from the beginning that Congress did not intend for big game hunting to be part of visitors’ park experiences.

Businesspeople who wrote guides for auto-campers explained the ban as “sensible” and did not describe guns as worth carrying. The guides used justifications informed by nature enthusiasts’ beliefs about the value of preserving natural functions to explain why to prohibit hunting in national parks. Having firearms inspected and disabled became part of the park experience.
In his account of visiting Yellowstone in 1920, a visitor named Bayard Paine recalled that the first thing rangers did after he paid them the park entrance fee was to disable his rifles. He wrote, “The guns are then sealed with a wire and a lead seal similar to [a railway] box car seal.” The difference between the old camping experience and the new one also led to opportunities for manufacturers to sell many new consumer goods.

One of the most prolific guidebook writers around the turn of the twentieth century was Frank E. Brimmer. Brimmer authored books for several publishers on a variety of topics related to auto-camping. Brimmer said his readers needed new manufactured products to have successful, meaningful camping trips.

Some of the items he said were essential were appropriate coats, boots, bedding, and stoves. Brimmer wrote, “the right outfit for motor camping will take out all the ‘rough stuff’ of a traveler’s experience on the road, but maintains his readers will still be able to “see America from your tent door!” This juxtaposition is one of the features common to all of Brimmer’s work. He argues that motor tourists could see the real America without having to “rough it.” “One may live ‘at home away from home,’ with the outfit that makes every member of the party happy and comfortable.”

Brimmer was undoubtedly right that these products would make camping more comfortable and convenient. They also made auto-camper’s trips less like the frontier experiences Brimmer claimed they would have driving across the country. This complicated Brimmer’s claim that auto-camping put Americans in touch with their forebears. Looking at camping guidebooks published before Brimmer’s shows how little basis his claim of experiential equivalence had in reality.

In contrast to Brimmer’s claim that wild America was at auto-campers’ tent doors, earlier camping guides said that it took a lot of work to reach. In their guidebooks for campers, George O. Shields’ and Francis Buzzacott’s descriptions of reaching a campsite illustrate this point well. Both authors wrote at length about the process of packing goods into “camp.” Before reaching camp, or even
picking up a pack, however, Buzzacott warned his readers that should the outfit exceed “forty pounds per man (which is the limit a man should burden himself with) either packers should be employed or a pack mule and saddle used.” Similarly, Shields told his readers, “The first thing necessary for packing is a pack animal of some description. Whether it shall be a mule, burro, or horse, is a question which many must decide for themselves.” After selecting a suitable animal, Shields provides an in-depth explanation of how to lash supplies to the beast over the next twenty pages. Though the railroad might help campers set out on their trips, horses facilitated the bulk of travel to and from campsites. The wilderness that Brimmer promised to auto-campers at their tent doors differed markedly from the one pre-automotive authors wrote about. The differences apparently did not detract from tourists’ belief that camping was a good way to access natural places.

The accounts everyday Americans wrote about the free public campgrounds across the country show that they thought of them as pleasant and authentic. Those accounts show how authors like Buzzacott and Shields helped influence Americans’ acceptance of a different definition of wilderness and parks than their predecessors experienced. That wilderness was not as harsh as it used to be.

Not only did the automobile change the way that Americans perceived the wilderness, it also showed how they changed what they thought qualified as outdoor expertise. Francis Buzzacott claimed to be a veteran of the Zulu Wars in British South Africa, the Spanish-American War, and expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctic. Frank Brimmer was a former professor from the northeast who claimed he was qualified to give advice about camping because he had traveled extensively throughout the United States. The fact that he believed auto-tourists would be willing to accept the advice of “one of their own” says something about the wilderness they were traveling to see. Auto-campers’ experiences usually involved the intellectual appreciation of nature, not the actual, physical conquest of it; they left that to people like Buzzacott.
Brimmer and Buzzacott’s readers’ may have been traveling to different kinds of places (those being easily accessible frontcountry campsites versus challenging to reach, remote backcountry ones), but both authors claimed to be directing their readers to the same, abstract place. That was a regenerative wilderness. Even though guidebook authors sold their books to different audiences, they used similar language to describe the places their readers would visit. Auto travel simplified access to wild spaces, and, more importantly, expanded the lexicon to change what constituted authentic wilderness in the first place. In the process, guidebook authors helped document and popularize the changes other businesspeople, like hotel owners, were making in parks. These authors gave their changes official sanction in print and encouraged ever-increasing numbers of tourists to experience them using their cars.

Conclusion – Still a business proposition

It was never a forgone conclusion that “the park experience” would involve cars or consumer goods any more than it was predetermined that it would not involve concerts or movie theaters. Hotel owners’, retailers’, manufacturers’, and authors’ success at using parks to sell products and experiences led to permanent associations between them. As I showed here, they successfully used them to sell train tickets, consumer goods, books, and experiences to urban consumers. Business owners are responsible for a great deal of what tourists expect when they come to national parks.

Their work ended up in the magazines, advertisements, and products that people bought across the United States. As a result, tourists test-drove, read about, and purchased goods that they used on their trips long before they left on them. That activity extended businesspeople’s influence beyond individual park borders. Tourist business owners sold wilderness experiences they mediated using goods or services that they sold for a profit.
Businesspeople set the precedents that defined visitor expectations for generations to come. They made park infrastructure appear distinct but function like similar systems in cities and towns. They set standards the National Park Service later worked to uphold. They shaped landscapes where the lines between wild and urban systems blurred and, in many cases, merged. They inaugurated a tradition that made the act of consumption integral to authentic park experiences. They contributed to the creation of a National Park System whose natural appearance was a technological artifact.
1.3 - Call of Nature – The Nature Enthusiasts of the Conservation Community in National Parks

“The earth laughs in flowers.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson

“In wilderness is the salvation of the world.”
Henry David Thoreau

“The mountains are calling and I must go.” 218
John Muir

Campers carry books (or parts of them) by Edward Abbey, Wallace Stegner, and John Muir on long, backcountry treks to the same places where their authors found literary inspiration.219 Park rangers and scientists hang portraits of Aldo Leopold, George Melendez Wright, and Howard Zahniser on the walls of their offices and in their vehicles. Tourists buy kitsch with images or sayings of Theodore Roosevelt, Rachel Carson, and Enos Mills printed on it. In many cases, these peoples’ identities have become indistinguishable from the places they fought to bring under federal protection. The parks owe a great deal of their popularity to these enthusiasts’ success at imprinting an ideology predicated humanity’s relationship with the natural world on them. The enthusiasts’ common interest centered on humanity’s relationship with nature and their shared answer to a single, implicit question. What kinds of human actions degrade the earth and what kinds improve it?

Was the flower’s laughter stifled when people built roads so they could drive to experience it? If in wilderness was the preservation of the world, but that wilderness had no room for human visitors, for whom was it being saved? Was the mountain’s call to miners any less meaningful than hikers?

Beginning in the eighteenth century, nature enthusiasts worked to define the discourse about wild authenticity. They exercised significant influence on the ways tourists approached national parks through the articles, books, and speeches they gave about what visitors should expect to find in them.220

In contrast to the ideology of earth as a “storehouse for man,” people who believed preserving nature should be an end in itself challenged businesspeople, politicians, and eventually park rangers to
reconceptualize the earth’s trees, wildlife, and mountains as having intrinsic value, divorced from their potential utility as raw materials for the various and sundry uses of an industrious population.221

Beginning in the eighteenth century, some nature enthusiasts argued humans’ actions damaged the planet, sometimes irreparably. 222

In contrast to the consumptive ideology that vested natural resources’ value solely in their ability to provide products for human use, nature enthusiasts argued humans damaged the earth when they exploited it. That damage, they argued, inhibited nature’s ability to sustain its supply of commodities for a growing population, and, more importantly, interrupted natural processes that they claimed had intrinsic value. Their approach to humans’ impact on nature was largely a reaction to the sensibility Euroamericans brought with them from life in Europe and represents a significant ideological change from the way most people understood wilderness before then.

Christianity and the church had a significant effect on western thought. Biblical frames of wilderness as being hostile, dangerous, and potentially deadly informed the way people approached spaces where people did not live. As those spaces shrank and other ideas influenced western thought, people reframed wilderness as potentially regenerative.223

Philosophers, scientists, politicians, and wilderness enthusiasts who glorified the natural world’s intrinsic order built the ideological framework that vests places we call “wild” with special power and meaning. They laid the groundwork to transition from viewing the natural world as a threatening place to a restorative one. That transition began in the eighteenth century with the work of thinkers like Alexander Humboldt and matured in the writing of romantic and transcendental authors to give us the generally positive view of wilderness that environmental advocates espouse today.

Historical Precedents – Discovering value in nature’s order
In the 1845 volume of *Cosmos*, Alexander Humboldt described a nature whose interconnectedness necessitated rethinking the impact that humans were having on all its parts. Humboldt argued, “nature considered rationally, that is to say, submitted to the process of thought, is a unity in diversity of phenomena.” He described that unity as composed of blended harmony of all things into “one great whole animated by the breath of life.” Humboldt wrote that understanding nature in that way presented a great opportunity.

Unlike the everyday places like towns, farms, or workshops that defined day-to-day life, the natural world offered opportunities for rest and recreation. He wrote about how, in places unmolested by development, a “communion with nature awakens within us perceptive capacities that had long lain dormant.” That communion offered a unique chance to revive peoples’ emotions and intellect.

Humboldt developed that opinion through many years of exploration around the world.

Humboldt had himself explored the natural world extensively, and was, by the time of his death in 1859, acknowledged for his scholarly observations on the natural world. His writing covered places from Europe to the Americas to Asia. He wrote extensively on the interconnectedness and sublimity of the natural world. The popularity of Humboldt’s ideas influenced a generation of naturalists who then laid the practical groundwork to justify preserving natural spaces in the decades to come.

Beginning in the early nineteenth century, George Catlin, George Perkins Marsh, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Thomas Moran, and Albert Bierstadt inaugurated the age of environmental romanticism in the United States. Unlike the early European-American settlers who described the wilderness as a place of privation and pain, they interpreted it as a regenerative, contemplative space. The popular writing of Henry David Thoreau and his contemporaries encouraged Americans to reconsider what wilderness might mean to them. It was not until around the time of the American Civil War that George Perkins Marsh began to argue that those ideas had currency for public policy.
One of the first Americans to write extensively about humans’ responsibility for changing wild places was George Perkins Marsh. The son of a Vermont lawyer, Marsh distinguished himself early in life as a man prone to misfortune, but not melancholy. He studied law, but did not practice because he found clients rough and uncouth. He farmed sheep but faced bankruptcy when the price of wool dropped. He was the owner of a woolen mill that first burned and was then crushed by drift ice. He speculated in land, sold lumber, and quarried marble – always losing money. He successfully argued for the establishment of the Smithsonian Institution and was elected a Congressman from Vermont, but even his wife said he was “entirely without oratorical charm.” He must have been relieved in 1850 when President Zachary Taylor nominated him for a diplomatic post. Marsh went abroad as a member of the United States diplomatic mission to the Ottoman Empire. It was in Turkey, and subsequently Italy from 1861-1882, that he began to ruminate on people’s place in the landscape. In Europe, Marsh found his voice as a writer and advocate for the natural world.230

The barren terraces and abandoned homesteads that pockmarked the Mediterranean countryside provoked Marsh’s curiosity, and he wrote extensively comparing them to the landscapes he had left at home. “I should like to know,” he once wrote a friend in England, “whether the newness of everything in America” affects Europeans “as powerfully as the antiquity of the Eastern continent does us.” Marsh’s awe resulted from frequent comparisons of Mediterranean landscapes with American ones. He wrote that while irrigation enabled the desert around him to bloom, wild plants were almost totally absent. He thought that people were shaping every part of the landscape.231

Marsh’s descriptions of his travel abroad were not unique, but the conclusions he drew from the land were different. In *Man and Nature*, Marsh wrote that the relic-littered countryside was a legacy bequeathed by the mismanagement of natural resources. Marsh thought that the lack of trees (and consequent rarity of shade), lack of arable soil, and lack of water in depopulated areas of Turkey proved
that people in the past must have managed the land there badly.232 He wrote with foreboding that he thought his fellow citizens were ravaging North America in the same way.

He expressed worry about how the earth was “fast becoming [an] unfit home for its noblest inhabitant.” The Italian countryside proved that a few centuries’ improvident use had the potential to leave his homeland “greatly reduced in both productiveness and population” at best, or “deserted by civilized man and surrendered to hopeless desolation” at worst. The “multitude and extent of yet remaining architectural ruins, and of decayed works of internal improvement, show that at former epoch a dense population inhabited those now lonely districts.” By the 1860s, though, they could not have been able to support even one regiment of soldiers.233 While he acknowledged geology and climate were partially responsible for the way those parts of the country looked, he assigned most of the blame for the land’s appearance to a single, pernicious source.

It was “the direct violence of hostile human force” that was responsible for the land’s degradation. Marsh wrote that it did not matter whether the damage was “the result of man’s ignorant disregard of the laws of nature, or an incidental consequence of war, or of civil and ecclesiastical tyranny and misrule.” Marsh concluded that humans were “the causa causarum of the acts and neglects which have blasted with sterility and physical decrepitude the noblest half of the empire of the Caesars.”234 Roman land reverted to “dry and barren wilderness.”235

In order to prevent the environmental collapse that he blamed for the fall of Rome, he went on to argue that Americans needed to reconsider what farming, mining, and timbering did to the land. Rather than bringing more and more land into production, he thought that “the primitive geographical and climatic features of these countries… [ought] to be, as far as possible, retained.”236 Marsh did not know the words, but he was advocating what policymakers describe today as sustainable development.237
He was one of the first prominent American authors to claim that the nation would realize great value in leaving some parts of the nation undeveloped. In Marshes’ view, “the process of fitting them [natural places] for permanent civilized occupation” required that homes and places of industry “be so conducted as not unnecessarily to derange and destroy what, in too many cases, it is beyond the power of man to rectify or restore.” Nevertheless, when it was in peoples’ power, Marsh thought people had a responsibility to do what they could to reverse the damage they had done.

Marsh thought that people had few choices other than to work to repair the damage resulting from the “negligence or wantonness of former lodgers” whose damaging actions would eventually make the earth uninhabitable. He argued that the only way to ensure that earth stayed a place where we would thrive would be to reverse the destructive changes people were making and allow the planet’s processes to function naturally again. He said that by restoring landscapes to their “former form and function” people would bring the planet back into balance. He did not think that the choice to repair past damage was one between waste and comfortable living or non-consumptive use and privation. In fact, improving humans’ standard of living was an integral part of Marsh’s calculus for advocating a new direction in environmental planning.238

Marsh thought, “man’s utmost ingenuity and energy must be tasked to renovate a nature drained, by his improvidence, of fountains which a wise economy would have made plenteous and perennial sources of beauty health, and wealth.” If society failed in that regard, it would frustrate a rapidly growing population that needed new sources of subsistence. The consequence being social and political instability or revolution.239

Marsh’s work accrued authority to the nascent community who believed natural processes deserved protection from misuse. They wanted to regulate and prevent improper uses of the land so that they would preserve its natural functioning. They claimed the authority to arbitrate the kinds of uses that to ought to be permitted and prohibited.
The scientific management of forests began in Europe as early as the sixteenth century and was enmeshed in the state building process there. The kind of scientific forestry movement that grew out of Prussian Universities and set the standard for forest management was an important element of the move toward more active conservation of forests in the United States. Many of the early professional foresters in the United States were educated in German universities. They claimed special expertise and attempted to use their knowledge to advocate for scientific management of forests and the protection of natural places in the United States.  

Claiming that expertise allowed those who believed natural processes deserved protection to use their influence to formally sanction practices that turned out to be integral to national parks’ creation as well as their functioning and appearance today. In short, they made and justified management decisions that were important to shaping the park paradigm.

Marsh’s belief that Euroamericans had the ability and responsibility to improve the land hinged on his understanding of the appropriate role for humans in the landscape. Unlike the farmers, miners, and ranchers who claimed the earth’s assets (such as river flows, mineral deposits, or forests) should be harnessed to meet immediate, human desires, Marsh built on the ideology inaugurated Humboldt and romantic authors and artists to argue that nature was managed best when it managed itself. He understood it as having an intrinsic order humans sometimes disrupted. By framing the discourse on wild places in that way, Marsh laid the groundwork for a new cohort of thinkers who saw value in nature itself. In so doing, he also incidentally provided the ideological justification for what some contemporary environmentalists regard as one of their movements’ original sins. With a few exceptions, policymakers created national parks without regard for the claims of families or entire tribes of natives who used to live on or near them. One of the reasons Euroamericans dispossessed Indians from the national parks was that authors like Marsh framed their presence as harmful to the landscape, flora, and fauna contained in them.
In his report to the State of California about how the Yosemite Valley ought to be managed, Frederick Law Olmstead wrote,

Indians and others have set fire to the forests and herbage and numbers of trees have been killed by these fires; the giant tree before referred to as probably the noblest tree now standing on the earth has been burned completely through the bark near the ground for a distance of more shall one hundred feet of its circumference; not only have trees been cut, hacked, barked and fired in prominent positions, but rocks in the midst of the most picture picturesque natural scenery have been broken, painted and discolored, by fires built against them.

Olmstead believed that if no one stopped the Indians, it would not be long until Yosemite’s “natural charm will be quite destroyed.”

Euroamerican people who wanted to reside in the west claimed they wanted to dispossess Indians because they were not using the land. Nature enthusiasts wanted to expel Indians because they were mis-using the land. As Olmstead reported, Indians who lived in many national parks deliberately set fires, hunted, and farmed in them. Nature enthusiasts believed these activities interrupted the processes they wanted parks to protect, so they worked to force Indians out of them.

The distinction between these two Euroamerican justifications for expelling Indians from land is important. Even though they did not use the same logic, they reached the same conclusion. Euroamericans who wanted to reside in western places and those who wanted to preserve nature in them achieved a consensus that Indians were bad land managers. One of the significant outcomes from this was to justify expropriation of land from people who were mis-using and to embed it in the park paradigm.

The groups who made management decisions for the national parks derived some of their authority from an ideology that legitimized expropriating land from native people. That ideology justified Indian removal because it protected “natural” processes. By working to “protect” nature from native people, environmental advocates were building on Marsh’s work. They were also setting the stage for a new kind of environmentalism that took Marsh’s ideas about the value of natural
processes and applied them to everyday life or imposed them on other peoples’ lives. Those ideas contributed to the concept of ecological succession. That concept stipulated that national parks should be climax preserves where natural inhabitants and forces, like predators and wildfire, needed active management to prevent degeneration.247

Climax ecosystems represent the culminating stage of natural succession.248 Their hierarchical position implies a level of permanence or at least stability. Many people who wanted to protect natural processes believed that national parks protected climax ecosystems. These kinds of descriptions were common by the turn of the twentieth century and show the values people expected national parks should protect. 249

For example, in a New York Times article published in 1885, one author claimed that the dispersion of seeds demonstrated “How Nature Does Her Best to Keep the Earth Fruitful.” The article said that researchers were only slowly coming to understand how important the plant’s own methods of atmospheric dispersal were to the maintenance of “plants [finding] a new place to grow in.” The author wrote about how nature had its own “wonderfully ingenious” mechanisms. He claimed that the plants, and therefore nature itself, deserved most of the credit for maintaining earth’s verdure. This was in contrast to people who claimed that they were improving the land by reclaiming it for human use. The newspaper article’s author personified nature and claimed that “she does all she can to protect the seeds, and, secondly, constructs them so that they may be more readily dispersed, for without these precautions there would soon be sterility.” The author claimed that, even if the plants were not useful to people, they were still important to keeping the planet’s “perfect balance,” which allowed people to live here.250

This reporter personified and gendered nature to claim its innate intelligence would keep the earth’s systems operating in harmony. His claims are the logical outgrowth of the ideas presented by authors like George Perkins Marsh who claimed Americans were harming the world around them. He
argued nature knew as well (or better) than people how to reproduce itself and was able to identify and rectify imbalances in its systems, and he clearly delineated between those “natural” systems and human ones. While the plants might “not be useful per se−”, they still deserved to be protected. This implied that they had intrinsic value. That intrinsic value would be compromised if humans interfered with the way the system functioned.

The prevailing belief held by most Euroamericans and especially nature enthusiasts that nature and humans operated in separate spheres is significant here for the implications it had for wildland preservation in the national parks. This consensus understanding of separation meant that wild places had special value that would be compromised if humans interfered with them. While they agreed that humans disrupted nature, nature enthusiasts disagreed about why nature was worth protecting in the first place. In the years to come, different groups developed competing ideologies to justify protecting natural places and processes.251

The Conservation versus Preservation Debate – Managing parks for production or protection

Two groups coalesced around different ideologies. Their interests were the same insofar as they agreed unplanned, unrestrained development in natural places was undesirable, but they disagreed about why people should regulate development.252 Fundamentally, they disagreed about whether places like national parks ought to be sources of raw materials for industry or whether they should serve primarily as nature preserves.253 Conservationists argued that humans should manage nature to maximize its productive potential. Preservationists argued that it had intrinsic value whether humans realized material benefits from it or not. The latter believed nature deserved protection whether it directly benefited humans or not.254

Both groups contributed to the park paradigm. Conservationists argued for the scientific management of natural processes to maximize material production and turned a similar sensibility to
the tourist industry inside them. Preservationists argued to prevent all extractive development in natural places, but also compromised with tourist business owners in order to justify their objectives to the public at large. Gifford Pinchot explained those priorities in utilitarian terms when he said conservation ought to realize “the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run.”

The two groups’ identities crystalized in the debate over how to manage Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park. Beginning in 1901, officials from the city of San Francisco, led by Mayor James Phelan, petitioned the US Department of Interior to build a reservoir at Hetch Hetchy Valley. Even though their application was denied on grounds that Yosemite was a national park, the city continued applying and, after the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, found a receptive audience with Secretary of the Interior James Garfield. Partially out of acknowledgement that the city might need a new source of water to fight fires that could result from future natural disasters, the “commodity conservationists” successfully argued that their dam would provide the greatest good to the greatest number of people.

In response, John Muir and the Sierra Club appealed directly to nature enthusiasts, travel business owners, and tourists to argue that the valley’s true value was as a natural preserve and a tourist attraction. Muir claimed that interfering with the valley’s appearance by building a dam there and flooding it would destroy one of the most beautiful potential tourist destinations in California and the world. The claimed building a dam would destroy one of the most “picturesque spots” with the most “beautiful scenic features” there state had to offer. They also claimed it was a potential “gold mine” that could attract untold numbers of paying tourists.

The disagreement between Muir’s preservationists and politicians in San Francisco also entered into the debate over what constituted “good government.” With the Progressive movement at the peak of its strength and Americans’ growing faith in the power of technology and development to improve their lives, Muir faced the challenge of justifying why Hetchy Hetchy deserved protection. In order to
make his arguments relevant to progressive politicians and voters and to nature lovers, he approached the problem from utilitarian and romantic points of view.

In the end, when San Francisco built the dam it succeeded because of the coalition between supporters who wanted to ensure their city would have enough water to grow and conservationists who believed that harnessing the land’s natural functioning to serve the greatest number of people was the most appropriate course of action. The outcome in Hetch Hetchy, combined with preservationists’ failure to prevent extensive road and building construction in Yosemite Valley, galvanized those who had sought to preserve the valley for more traditional hiking tourists’ use because they realized the precedent set in Yosemite might be expanded to allow infrastructural development in other national parks across the country. The result was that preservation supporters organized to protect national parks from similar acts of “desecration.”

Preservationists and conservationists often clashed, but they agreed places like parks provided refuges where natural processes could persist unhindered by humans. They also agreed that those processes’ persistence was scientifically valuable. Like Humboldt or Marsh, they believed that humans usually damaged nature when they irrevocably or thoughtlessly changed it suit their needs. They shared a belief that thoughtful planning would allow visitors to gain something meaningful from nature.

In the years to come, both groups used scientific research to justify their particular points of view. In the process, they empirically documented them. They also contributed to a growing discourse in the public sphere that gave “nature” popular recognition as a place where white and blue collar workers who were worn down by city living could go to restore themselves. This was driven both by nostalgia for lost homes and farms and city resident’s reaction to modern ways of life. This impulse to withdraw from modernity as recreation is both encouraged and documented by authors like John Muir in travel books from the turn of the twentieth century.
In books like *The Mountains of California*, published in 1894, *My First Summer in the Sierra*, published in 1911, and *Travels in Alaska*, published in 1915, John Muir waxed eloquent about nature’s beauty and argued in favor of protecting natural places so people could experience spiritual regeneration in them. He wrote, “wilderness is a necessity” where people would find “fountains of life.” He thought America’s wild, untouched “landscapes are growing more beautiful from year to year, notwithstanding the clearing, trampling work of civilization” in other places. Muir and his preservationist allies wanted to protect the natural sites so that, whether people visited them or not, they would provide opportunities for wild, unconfined types of recreation. They believed that wild places where there were not any unnatural impositions, were essential to human functioning. Wilderneses were places that people could experience the real fullness of God’s creation. That said, even Muir, who was one of America’s most vocal advocates for preserving wild places, acknowledged that society could not keep all of them as well as the benefits of industrial production.

While John Muir is usually associated with the uncompromising abolition of development in natural places (most famously in Yosemite National Park’s Hetch Hetchy Valley where he failed to prevent the construction of a dam that impounded water over its spectacular scenery), he did not believe that preservation and development were always incompatible. In response to a proposal that would change the government’s plans to manage forest reserves and parks, Muir admitted, “it is impossible, in the nature of things, to stop at preservation.” He wrote, “the forests must be, and will be, not only preserved, but used.” When people managed the forests responsibly, he said they would become, “like perennial fountains, [which] may be made to yield a sure harvest.” He wanted to make sure that when people logged or mined in them they did not harm forests’ underlying, natural integrity. In this, Muir was speaking to the utilitarian calculus of policymakers in the progressive era. Other park advocates, including the National Park Service’s first director, used the same arguments to attempt to get tourists, politicians, and local residents to support preserving land in national parks.
Muir and other preservationists like Benton MacKaye, and ultimately Robert Sterling Yard, began to class park developments like hotels, roads, or other infrastructure as being just as bad for natural functioning as mining or logging were. They worried that accommodating large numbers of tourists compromised the parks’ natural functioning to such a great extent that they compromised the parks’ authenticity. As a result, they sometimes clashed with other people who supported prescribing areas in parks to allow highly impactful and highly popular activities like driving, staying in hotels, and having access to highly visible and unnatural forms of recreation.

Stephen Mather, who was a founding member of California’s Save the Redwoods League before he helped found the National Park Service, argued that it would be in the agency’s interest to make park travel easier, by promoting improvements in hotels, camps, and other concessions and in roads and other transportation facilities both inside the national parks. [This would] sell national-park integrity to the point where Congress would (a) add to the system all the appropriate sites possible, (b) keep out inappropriate sites, (c) keep established sites safe from invasion, (d) purge the established sites of private holdings.263

In short, Mather thought that the material development at existing park sites would demonstrate the system’s importance and prove their value to the people of the United States. He also believed it would help codify the park paradigm by defining the kinds of places that should be national parks and ensuring the National Park Service would have exclusive jurisdiction over them.264

Mather and Muir agreed that extractive industries such as mining and lumbering degraded the land partially because of the intellectual precedents set by thinkers like Humboldt and Marsh.265 So, in spite of the fact that they had different opinions about whether wild places like parks ought to be mined, lumbered, or reserved for recreation, they and their allies made it harder for people who wanted to maximize their economic productivity (people who included former park residents) to make management decisions in those places. Ideologies like Humboldt’s and Marsh’s led people to coalesce around land management regimes that they hoped would prevent people from disrupting natural processes.
Protecting the Scenery – Interests that nature enthusiasts shared with other groups who influenced the park paradigm

Conservationists, preservationists, hotel owners, transportation providers, retailers, and government officials all agreed that parks deserved protection because of their superlative scenery. They did not agree about what made the scenery worth protecting. Unlike government officials or businesspeople, conservationists and preservationists valued the scenery both because its natural appearance proved the natural systems they valued in it were intact, and because of its intrinsic beauty. Tourist and travel business operators valued the scenery because tourists were willing to pay them to access it. Government officials valued the land’s appearance because parks were becoming increasingly popular with their constituents and because restoring landscapes provided an outlet for federal money. To conservationists and preservationists, nature deserved protection as an end in itself, and the only way natural places would stay beautiful was to make sure they were under the protection of the federal government. In short, people treated parks as means to achieve their own ends. Conservationists and preservationists nevertheless aligned themselves with these other groups in order to bring parks that would protect natural processes into existence.

Contact between their differing priorities created the friction needed to move national park policy and the national park paradigm in directions it might not have gone otherwise. The accommodation and points of common interest between preservationists and tourist business owners and conservationists and federal officials and residents embedded particular priorities in both. Preservationists succeeded at having otherwise saleable federal land withdrawn as federal reservations (in the case of Yellowstone, Yosemite, Crater Lake, and other large, natural national parks). Conservationists’ success at damming Hetch Hetchy ultimately stymied their attempts at large scale, extractive or infrastructural development in other national parks because of the opportunities they gave preservationists to appeal to and ally themselves with tourists and nature enthusiasts.266
That strategy was effective at mobilizing public support, but it meant that they had to compromise on when and how nature functioned in them. Most of these groups did not use science to ground their decisions. Nature enthusiasts made value judgements to achieve their policy goals. The result was that the majority of visitors supported protecting parks’ natural facades but not the processes that were responsible for them. When policymakers agreed to designate popular scenic attractions as national parks, they did not take the scope or scale of those processes into account when they decided how big or small they ought to be. The result was that the parks did not protect the natural processes conservationists and preservationists valued as well as they might have liked. It also led to tension between those nature enthusiasts who wanted to preserve natural facades and those who wanted to make sure the facades evinced what they considered proper, natural functioning as framed through empirical research.

Park administrators had a strained relationship with conservation and preservation minded biologists and ecologists because the scientists wanted to manage the parks in ways that would have minimized humans’ effects on and easy access to them. Their ideas were often not compatible with the goals of National Park Service staffs’, hotel owners’, transportation providers’, or retailers’ desires. In spite of administrators’ stated adherence to “scientific management,” their actual decision-making process usually took for granted that if the parks appeared natural, people could not be degrading them. That logic helped legitimize constructing massive infrastructural projects like roads, power plants, and water treatment facilities in them. Those projects required significant changes to the land. In spite of their disdain for those kinds of construction, the conservation and preservation communities still worked together with business promoters in order to establish individual parks and the National Park Service.

Conservationists and preservationists compromised with businesspeople and government officials in order to create national parks, but they were frustrated as years went by and National Park
Service staff did not act on their management proposals. As I will explain in section 1.5, when conservation or preservation minded groups challenged them, park rangers usually opted to rely on their institutional authority, rather than science, in order to justify their decisions. The result was that while conservationists and preservationists supported creating parks, they did not always support the ways they were managed, and they often disagreed among themselves about how to improve policies in them. The challenges they faced at achieving their goals spoke to how nature enthusiasts arrived at different conclusions based on Humboldt and Marsh’s ideas.

Preservationists struggled to convince other park supporters that the changes developers made to parks made them less natural and, therefore, less valuable. Preservationists’ legacy of environmental enthusiasm nonetheless had a significant impact on the parks through their dedication to pursuing natural purity as part of park policy. In the 1920s, when the US Government created national parks beyond the American west, the preservationists, tourists, national park rangers, and political figures who championed them claimed that they would be escapes from the modern world where visitors could experience supposedly bygone times when nature had been its own master around the world. Nature enthusiasts’ advocacy owed its justification to the ideas of Humboldt and Marsh who helped lay the intellectual framework for looking at the natural world as a system with its own order and immutable logic. It helped justify the parks’ existence and lent to their value as places of refuge both for nature’s rehabilitation and for human recreation.

When preservationists and conservationists disagreed about the kinds of activities that were compatible with both natural preservation and human recreation, they debated what constituted appropriate uses for park land. Fundamentally, they were trying to negotiate how to manage the land in such ways as they found desirable. The standard they used to judge desirability was based on what it meant for those places to be authentically wild. Different groups had different thresholds of authentic wilderness, and this was one reason why their perceptions of supposedly natural places differed. By
interacting and experiencing friction with other groups in the process, they shaped the national park paradigm.
1.4 - Following the Holiday Road – Tourists in the National Parks

“What do you say we go over to Box Car Pond – they tell me the shack there isn’t being used – and camp out?”
“Well, all right, Mr. Babbitt, but it’s nearer to Skowtuit Pond, and you can get just about as good fishing there.”
“No, I want to get into the real wilds.”
“Well, all right”
“We’ll put the old packs on our backs and get into the woods and really hike.”

Sinclair Lewis – Conversation between George and his fishing guide Joe in *Babbitt*.

Visitors make up the largest group of people who influenced the national park paradigm, but they did so largely as a result of popular literature that glorified that kind of recreation, advertising that enticed them to buy products that enabled travel in “nature,” and in response to the romantic art and literature that glorified “sublime” natural spaces. In short, tourists largely acted on tourist business owners’, nature enthusiasts’, political policymakers’, and National Park Service recommendations for them. Their purchases, votes, and time provided the utilitarian justifications to pursue inconsistent policies that other groups wanted to impose on the parks. Tourists acceded to advertisers who sold tickets, hotel stays, and commercial products. They yielded to politicians who used the parks to advance their own political objectives. They deferred to conservationists and preservationists who made claims about appropriate park management. They complied with National Park Service decisions that affected access to national parks.

Even though they are the largest group that influenced park development, the records they left are not as accessible or traditional as those left by the politicians, hotel owners, or park rangers who managed the places they visited. They left a rich text through their consumption of national park experiences and in receipts, personal travel accounts, and snapshots. All of the things tourists left behind point to the values they wanted to access and the kinds of memories they wanted to make in parks.

Even though tourists did not always agree on how the parks ought to be managed, they agreed on why they should be; that was to provide meaningful recreational experiences. Businesspeople,
politicians, members of the National Park Service, and people who wanted to protect nature as an end in itself succeeded at pursuing their own agendas insofar as they succeeded at convincing tourists that their policies would provide those experiences. Groups succeeded at gaining tourists’ support when they convinced visitors that theirs was the most meaningful, enjoyable, or authentic vision to run parks. Their approaches framed tourists as passive participants in the park creation process. This does not mean tourists actually were (or are) subject to business owners’, politicians’, or nature enthusiasts’ visions for parks. It does mean that members of those groups approached tourists as potential patrons. Business owners, politicians, nature enthusiasts, and park rangers all reframed their priorities in order to prove that their plans would make (or keep) the parks places where visitors would want to go on vacation.

Tourists wanted to use parks for recreational experiences they saw as appealing (and natural authenticity was sometimes central to that appeal). Tourists usually did not care about particular policy objectives, preservation projects, or park administrative policies as much as other groups. They cared more about discovering unique, enjoyable, and meaningful experiences. However, as their innumerable, inconstant, and incompatible preferences showed, they did not all share the same definition of what kinds of experiences were appealing.

In the abstract, authentic experiences are accessible in many places (like art galleries, amusement parks, or museums). The national parks’ popularity with tourists speaks both to the intrinsic qualities that made them attractive and to the fact that the other groups who had stakes in promoting them succeeded at convincing tourists they were some of the best places to have meaningful experiences. Tourists, in turn, influence the park paradigm through a feedback loop when they expressed preferences for particular kinds of amenities, services, and experiences. The groups that catered to their wants most effectively were able to use tourist support to pursue their own agendas.

This process does not imply business owners’ bad faith. Understanding the process helps explain how tourists open to suggestion helped them exert seemingly invisible influence on the park paradigm.
Tourists’ preferences, and other groups’ decisions to cater to them, show how important they were. Tourists did not share the same priorities with other groups, so it really is not fair to compare theirs’ with those of the people who catered to them. They were willing to accept policies that other groups suggested to them if they believed they would result in enjoyable, worthwhile experiences in the parks. What is interesting is how tourists in different decades expressed the same desire for authenticity in different ways. Different groups appealed to tourists more effectively in some times than others. They also responded to visitors’ changing tastes in order to get their support.275

Manufacturing Opportunities for Leisure – The Early History of National Parks

When the first Euro-American visitors came to Yellowstone in the 1870s, they did not describe it as an enjoyable place to be. Nathaniel P. Langford, who later became superintendent of Yellowstone, made fun of his experience in the park wilderness when he wrote about the first official survey of the park, the Washburn-Langford-Doane Expedition.276 He described his struggle to escape from downed timber and brush somewhere in the park’s backcountry:

...each man was insisting up his own particular mode of extrication, and when our tempers had been sorely tired and we were in the most unsocial of humors, speaking only in half angry expletives, I recalled that beautiful line of Byron’s ‘Childe Harold,’ ‘There is a pleasure in the pathless woods,’ which I recited with all the ‘ore rotundo’ I could command, which struck the ludicrous vein of the company and produced an instantaneous response of uproarious laughter, which, so sudden is the transition between extremes, had the effect to restore harmony and sociability, and in fact, to create a pleasure in the pathless wilderness we were traveling.

Langford’s description highlighted that, until other groups reframed the wilderness a place to go for leisure, European-Americans thought Yellowstone was an unpleasant place to be. Businesspeople, government officials, and park rangers used different kinds of rhetoric to frame new understandings of the park in order to draw people in and service their own agendas. Viewed in this context, the wilderness was only as wild as the people viewing it thought it was. Members of the US Government expedition that
explored the park in 1870 barely survived their visit to Yellowstone. The scenic attractions that elicited tourists’ acclaim just a few years later were dangerous to them.

Railroad company promoters reframed Yellowstone as a place tourists should visit for leisure (which I refer to as a leisurescape). As was discussed in the section on tourist businesses, their work set the precedent for adding other places to the National Park System. They framed parks as pleasure spots by describing their natural features as providing novel and interesting venues for recreational exertion and relaxation. Their success at attracting visitors helped form a constituency that other groups subsequently tried to influence to support their own policy objectives. The descriptions of parks that visitors wrote in the earliest years after their promotion by businesspeople show how those places took on new meanings.

Unlike Nathaniel Langford and the park’s other early Euroamerican explorers, the new visitors emphasized wilderness’s positive traits in their descriptions of Yellowstone. One of the reasons they viewed the wilderness differently was that business owners who wanted to profit from travel to parks reframed and changed them. In guidebooks like the ones published by the Wylie Camping Company, the tourist camp owner claimed, “The tourist [in Yellowstone] experiences a full sense of satisfaction, as far as the wonderful is concerned.”277 The guide’s authors claimed that visitors would be satisfied when they experienced the park’s many natural wonders. One of the visitors those descriptions drew into the park was the British author, Rudyard Kipling.

Kipling wrote about his visit to the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone in 1889 in his book *American Notes*. Viewing the Canyon from the trail he accessed near the Canyon Hotel (“you’ll find all about it in the guide books”), Kipling wrote the canyon was “graven by time and water and air into monstrous heads of kings, dead chiefs-men and women of the old times.” Flowing beneath him, the Yellowstone River was so distant that none of its “sound of strife could reach us.” He described a spectacular scene. “The sunlight took those wondrous walls and gave fresh hues to those that Nature had already laid there.” He
watched as the night “crept through the pines that shadowed us,” on the sides of the canyon while “the full glory of the day flamed in that Canyon.”

Kipling’s description shows how promoters succeeded at making Yellowstone seem exceptional and detached from the everyday life. Kipling’s description also highlights how his visit was highly curated. In fact, business owners in the park shaped it in fundamental ways. The park’s layout was the product of promoters’ location of roads, hotels, restaurants, and overlooks. Kipling’s experience of looking out over the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone was not directly influenced by business owners, but his travel over US Army Corps of Engineers built roads, in a business owners’ stage coach, and onto a purpose built overlook meant that they had a great deal of control over how he literally and figuratively approached it.

He connects the canyon to classical imagery and describes the onset of darkness as a beautiful event. The language he chose showed how he interpreted Yellowstone’s wildness positively. He described the onset of darkness (which in other frames seemed terrifying) in poetic terms and put special focus on the canyon’s ability to help him transcend the noise of the river below. That statement is emblematic of a large part of what visitors came to expect from their park experiences and the shape of the park paradigm. Tourists traveled to withdraw from the everyday and immerse themselves in natural, sublime places. In fact, when people did not get to feel withdrawn, they were disappointed and angry.

Sometimes, they described behaviors that violated their expectations as criminal. When Owen Wister wrote about his visit to Yellowstone in the early 20th century, he spoke from moral high ground when he questioned

Why will people scrawl their silly names on the scenery? Why thus disclose to thousands of whom will read this evidence that you are a thoughtless ass? All very well if you wrote your name, your address, and the date on the North Pole; but why do it in some wholly accessible spot where your presence represents no daring, no endurance, nothing but the necessary cash to go there?
Frederic Remington wrote that people who “defaced” the park deserved punishment. He thought, “when the man from Oshkosh writes his name with a blue pencil on her sacred face, let him spend six months where the scenery is circumscribed and entirely artificial.” Remington’s counterpoint of a prison cell to the Yellowstone wilderness highlights how he thought the park differed from human built places. Even though most people would agree that the parks are preferable to a prison cell, this contextualizes Remington’s experience as a park visitor. Remington did not see the park’s wildness as drab or confining. He interpreted immersion in nature as providing opportunities to experience beauty and freedom.

Remington personified the park, saying that visitors should “respect her moods, and let the beasts she nurtures in her bosom live.” He described it as personal and feminine. He was arguing that allowing nature to take its course was preferable to changing it. By gendering the park as feminine, he associated it with a life giving and sustaining power. The wilderness could only share that power with visitors if nature took its course. For most visitors in the parks’ early days, the most important measure of health was appearance. Scientists lent credibility to that measure by writing gushing descriptions of their own after they visited the parks starting in the late 19th century.

One visitor claimed the park’s landscape was so spectacular that he heard “the matter-of-fact chief of the Geological Survey to exclaim ‘Such a vision is worth a lifetime; and only one of such marvelous beauty will ever greet human eyes!’” Another visitor claimed, “looking back a full century we find that the story of the Yellowstone park is a sequential link in the chain of epochal events...which achieved at least [sic] the winning of the West.”

Those testimonials show how tourists appropriated parts of the frames other groups used to describe the parks in order to justify describing them as unique, novel, and, ultimately, authentic. Tourists assimilated endorsements by scientists (many of whom thought it was important to preserve natural processes), policymakers, and businesspeople, and coupled them with their first-hand experiences to
conclude that they were desirable destinations. The emergence of a narrative that linked leisure and nature in the parks eventually led to complications when visitors who came to see the parks early in their history visited again and realized that they had changed.

Bradford Torrey, a nature writer at the turn of the twentieth century and a peer of Henry David Thoreau, John Burroughs, and John Muir who all published through Houghton Mifflin, wrote about his experience as a visitor to the Grand Canyon. He couched his description of natural features in classical allusion and wrote to extol its sublimity. Referring to himself in the third person after watching a bird at the Grand Canyon, “he laughed quietly at his foolish self, so taken with the sight of a bird, and so inadequately moved by all this transcendent spectacle of form and color. Verily, as common wisdom has it, it takes all kinds to make a world; and among the all kinds there must needs be for a few odd ones.”

Torrey’s description seems calculated to make its readers conscious of the author’s self-awareness and belief that the Grand Canyon was a profound place. By providing his account in the third person and describing the bird as a “transcendent spectacle” he demonstrates a belief that places like the Grand Canyon are places where people could access a depth of feeling that they could not experience in everyday life. By claiming “among the all kinds there must needs be for a few odd ones” he shows how that place allowed him to access individuality and independence, but, more importantly, demonstrates that he associated those values with the Grand Canyon.

Torrey’s statement shows how important he thought authenticity was, even if it meant he was one of the “odd ones.” The fact that the canyon inspired him shows how he used it as a tool to access his own identity through a place he perceived as naturally sublime. Torrey used the canyon to access and share deeper knowledge of himself. Later in his life, when he visited another national park, he wrote with disappointment about how he thought visitors missed the opportunity to access similar parts of themselves.
When he drove to Yosemite in the 1920s, Torrey criticized the tourists around him for failing because he did not think they were appreciating it properly. In a memoir on his travels through the west, Torrey seemed disappointed to find “that so many well-dressed, intelligent–appearing persons, finding themselves surrounded with all this grandeur should be contented to stare about them for a day or two, expend a few expletives, snap a camera at this and that, and anon be off again.” He was disappointed that no one seemed willing to take the time or make the effort to experience Yosemite the way he experienced places like the Grand Canyon. The reason they did not was that other influences featured more prominently in the ways they wanted to experience parks than the ones that Torrey valued.

Technology mediated Torrey’s national park visits. Technological change drove newer visitors’ shift from old understandings about what constituted authentic park experiences. While some visitors continued to describe experiences like Torrey’s, many other accounts show that most were, in fact, perfectly content to “snap a camera at this and that, and anon be off again.” The change is interesting because the tourists who drove to the parks, and spent less time in them than most early visitors did — still describe enjoying their experiences for the same reasons Torrey did; because they evoked authenticity through feelings of individuality, independence, and importance. In the years between Torrey’s first visits and his later ones, new infrastructure provided access to purportedly old, wild places in new ways. The change distressed older visitors, but felt natural to the younger ones who followed them. Torrey himself alluded to the centrality of technology in mediating his experience, but never seriously addressed how or why he assimilated it into the wilderness or how it affected what it meant to have an authentic experience in it. Understanding those impacts provides perspective on how technologies like the automobile and new consumer products influenced the park paradigm.

*Traveling in Nature - Tourist Transportation*
In his description of a trip to the Grand Canyon, Torrey chronicled the view from a rail car across Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico before reaching a destination that he described only as “magnificent, magnificent...but it is too much like the pictures. I must wait till they have been forgotten, and I can see the Canyon for itself.” Returning to the canyon the next day, he did not mention the terrain again except to explain how it influenced his bird watching.

His description of travel by train foreshadowed later visitors’ travel by car because the itineraries railroad companies set for visitors in national parks persisted even after most people drove to them. His experience was also different from Euroamerican explorers, who were among the first visitors to parks. Struggles defined the accounts of early explorers who visited places that later became national parks. The places that leisure observers wrote about in Romantic prose were the same ones early explorers described as forbidding places they wanted to escape.

One of the first and best-known early accounts of a visit to Yellowstone was titled Thirty-Seven Days of Peril. Truman Evert’s book about his journey through Yellowstone as a member of the Washburn-Langford-Doane Expedition was fraught with disorientation and injury, and it almost ended with his death. Everts got separated from the rest of the expedition somewhere near Yellowstone Lake and wandered for weeks through the park’s land alone. Everts wrote about how he felt “a crushing sense of destitution” when he realized he was alone and lost. In the days that followed, that destitution turned to panic as he felt “weakness [taking] the place of hunger.”

Everts narrowly escaped bears, drowning, and madness induced by starvation. His visit was anything but enjoyable. His experience shows how the place that became a leisurescape could also be very dangerous. The earliest transportation network the Army Corps of Engineers designed and built in Yellowstone prevented accidents like Evert’s by guaranteeing access to food and reliable (if not speedy or comfortable) transport through the park. The changes the army, hotel operators, and storeowners made to keep tourists comfortable and safe did not seem to change how they described the park.
Everts wrote that he had gone on the expedition into the Yellowstone region in hopes that “the hardships and exposures of a month’s horseback travel through an unexplored region would be more than compensated by the grandeur and novelty of the natural objects with which it was crowded.” There was no way that he bargained for being lost in it, without any a source of food. After he left the park, he still described it as being filled with “stupendous scenery.” The hotel operators and retailers who started setting businesses up there in the years after Everts escaped to make that scenery more accessible. They wanted to prevent people experiencing the hardships that almost killed the park’s early, Euroamerican explorers.

Tourists who visited the park in the years to come rode in stagecoaches and cars through the wilderness, but their accounts show how they believed they were abstractly accessing the same feelings of isolation and hardship that Everts did. Those characteristics contributed to the land’s wildness and were consistent with the authentic kinds of experiences people wanted to have in them. In other words, since later tourists also wanted the land through which they traveled to be wild, it was. They helped perpetuate the place that almost killed Everts as a frame of mind, even though technologies changed the way they accessed it. They accomplished that by defining the parkscape in opposition to the domesticated places that most of them called home.

_Parks As the Other – Framing national parks as different from urban spaces_

Most tourists’ urban and suburban homes primed them to look at “undeveloped” places like parks in particular ways. Promoters honed in on certain aspects of urban life to make parks seem exotic, alluring, and enjoyable. As early as the 1890s, people in large urban areas started using modern forms of mass transportation to commute from suburban homes to urban workplaces. The flow of people to new suburbs accelerated with the adoption of affordable cars in the 1910s.
In New York and Chicago, Buffalo and Detroit, and most famously in Los Angeles, Americans used their automobiles to access homes built in formerly agricultural hinterlands. They were attracted to new, suburban developments by an aesthetic ideal that associated good living with “greener” homes. Americans’ movement out of crowded cities into streetcar, and then automotive, suburbs was a reaction to the crowding and filth that defined life in the nation’s congested, urban areas. City dwellers’ migration to these new areas allowed them to experience less pollution, but also led to the destruction of formerly pastoral places.

As city-dwellers and suburbanites watched farms and fields succumb to tract developments ringed by a growing sprawl of concrete roads, “the country” beyond them seemed more and more picturesque. In contrast to urban places, farmland and undeveloped areas seemed healthier and more secure. City dwellers valued access to those attributes for themselves and their children. They celebrated the importance of access to wild places by making their homes in formerly unoccupied places, and by aligning themselves with conservationists and preservationists who wanted to protect natural reserves outside of urban areas.293

In the years to come, tourists who lived in suburbs became a significant constituency who supported creating and funding national parks. Those families’ association of suburban living with health and wellness helped them find value in parks. Thanks to their federal custodianship under the National Park Service, the parks seemed like places where their adults and children safely and enjoyably indulged the impulse for exploration that some of them fondly remembered from their own childhoods on the farms and other non-urban settings that new homes replaced. As the American population of suburban dwellers continued to grow in the years that followed, they became the largest and most vocal group that visited the national parks. They were from different social and economic classes, and they were overwhelmingly white.
The auto tourists who traveled west at the beginning of the automobile age were affluent enough to afford to buy cars and to take time away from work to travel, but usually were not wealthy enough to visit all of the hotels and restaurants that were built for wealthy visitors in the nineteenth century. Just as it had opened new areas to development around cities (usually between existing streetcar lines), the automobile helped provide access to areas where there were no rail lines. Advertisements lured them to the parks on the promise that they would be able to have the same kinds of experiences richer, rail-based tourists had from the affordable comfort of their cars.

Business owners in the parks claimed visitors would get to experience the same place Truman Everts had 50 years earlier but without any of the danger and discomfort he suffered. The paradox was that they accessed the same supposedly wild and dangerous place using technologies that were meant to prevent discomfort and death. Using technologies, like the automobile, to access western wildernesses made experiences there more like the urban areas people claimed to be traveling to escape.

The automobile influenced every aspect of tourists’ travel. They changed how tourists reached western destinations, where they slept, what they ate, and the other tourists with whom they traveled. They were the reason motels, gas stations, and, of course, roads were such conspicuous parts of tourist development. It might seem like they would have made it harder for people to have meaningful experiences in parks because they made them less unique and more like urban areas, but according to tourists’ accounts, they did not seem to have had that effect for most visitors.

As Earl Pomeroy argued in his book, *In Search of the Golden West*, tourists looking for particular experiences are likely to find, or construct, the one they want before they return home. Travel accounts show that tourists suspended their disbelief and embraced cars as a part of the landscape. Rather than return home having experienced nothing but seemingly endless hours of peering through the windows of a steel projectile hurtling down bumpy roads, early auto-tourists described their drives as wilderness
adventures. Business owners who sold travel experiences repackaged the large expanses of land that tourists used to think of as obstacles to be destinations in their own right. As a result, tourists interpreted the act of driving to parks as a leisure activity. The change encouraged tourists to associate beauty and scenic sublimity with accessibility.296

The automobile led many tourists to value ease of access as an important factor in defining natural sites’ beauty. Cars changed the ways tourists evaluated landscapes. By bringing formerly hard to reach places within a day’s drive, the automobile changed seemingly inhospitable wastelands into potentially enjoyable destinations. The automobile made the land more useful. Automobiles helped businesspeople and park rangers accomplish their own goals in national parks, so they framed them as improving it. Auto-camping guide authors listed roads, campgrounds, and other infrastructural developments alongside poetic descriptions of the wild places they accessed. Ease of access became one element that determined whether places were beautiful or not and, in the process, an important part of the park paradigm.297

Auto tourists wanted to be able to drive into national parks. At the same time, businesspeople, government officials, and park rangers claimed that increased visitation justified spending public money on them. Therefore, in order to attract more tourists to visit, park managers opened national parks to drivers. In order to make the parks attractive destinations for those drivers, they had to add new infrastructure to them.298

Park managers aimed to make the parks easy for auto-driving tourists to use. That meant taking advantage of the factors that led people to buy cars in the first place -- convenience, comfort, privacy, and economy.299 Part of doing that involved minimizing the differences between driving in cities or agricultural exurban areas (where people became accustomed to their cars satisfying their expectations) and in national parks.

Businesspeople, government officials, and park rangers all used ease of access to frame guidebooks, advertisements, and tours to entice visitors into traveling to parks. In the process, they
created streamlined itineraries and concentrated tourists around a shrinking number of increasingly well-known attractions. In the process, they shaped tourists’ expectations and helped cement itinerary-based travel, use-justified-preservation, and attraction-based itineraries as parts of the park paradigm.

Tourists shaped the park paradigm as consumers of products and experiences. Other groups used their preferences to pursue their own policy agendas. Those groups made parks venues for commercial consumption and set the precedent for using utilitarian justifications to make policy decisions in them. Tourists’ willingness to spend money on park experiences and policymakers’ willingness to use that spending to justify pursuing their own goals in them helped embed satisfying tourists’ desires as an important part of parks’ raison d’etre.’

**Mechanical Detours – Auto Maintenance and Wilderness Experiences**

In a *Popular Science* article published in 1923, Harold Blanchard claimed that driving a car made it easier for tourists to access hard to reach places.

Only a few years ago the fascinating summer sport of ‘camping out’ was limited to a very few vacationists who were willing to ‘rough it’....Today the automobile, with its constantly increasing number of new accessories providing home comforts, has brought the joy of the open road and the wooded places within reach of every one.

Blanchard is saying that the automobile made wild places like national parks more accessible, but in his next paragraph, he makes it sound as though motorists have merely shifted the “rough” burden from the woods to the garage.

It is not as physically demanding to drive a car as it was to drive a wagon, but, for a mode of transportation that attracted users because it was allegedly convenient, it still required a lot of mechanical knowledge to operate. Before going on any kind of trip, Blanchard wrote that drivers should make sure their cars valves are ground, the breaker points properly adjusted, the lubrication system clean, the clutch in adjustment...the transmission and rear axel [sic] in good condition and lubricated....Wheels, universals and steering gear should be lubricated, brakes adjusted,
and a spare fanbelt taken aboard...tires should be examined and spares purchased if necessary... [and] all nuts should be tightened, including those holding the electric wires.\textsuperscript{302}

This litany of repairs shows how complicated driving or preparing to drive could be. It also shows that taking a road trip required a significant level of familiarity with auto mechanics and the physical ability to perform repairs independently on the road.

Just as household appliances appeared to reduce the amount of work housewives were expected to perform but changed peoples’ expectations about what they should accomplish, automobiles made parks more accessible but also brought new complications to traveling.\textsuperscript{303} Tourists’ accounts of their drives across the country are litanies of auto repair. In his account of an early outing, one driver reminisced that in spite of a week’s “laboring and tuning,” one of his first long trips left his car a near total loss. On a long forty mile drive, he had to fix “…fouled plugs, tire punctures, faulty carburetor performance, [and] water and dirt in the gasoline.” Then “without warning, a deafening clanking and clattering rose from under the hood. I knew the worst had happened--the connecting bearings had ‘let-go’.” The author recalled having his car towed by a horse team to the nearest town accompanied by the jeers of local youngsters who recommended that he adopt a more reliable form of transportation.

Experiences like these suggest that if any technology was incompatible with the supposedly natural, restful, and contemplative experiences that hotel owners, railroad companies, and retailers said people could have in parks, it was the automobile. It was perhaps exactly for that reason that the automobile became the most important technology that shaped tourists’ expectations and, by proxy, the park paradigm. In order to make the noisy, noxious, and mechanically unreliable machine fit with the rest of peoples’ expectations for the parks, they reshaped the park paradigm. Cars became part of nature by fitting them into the utilitarian frame that hotel owners, railroad promoters, and manufacturers had been trading on for years. The automobile fit into business owners’ longstanding willingness to capitalize on tourists’ desires for quick, comfortable visits to national parks. It also gave government officials reasons
to improve access to otherwise “worthless” land and enabled increased visitation, which allowed nature
enthusiasts to argue that we should bring more places into the National Park System.

Park promoters took advantage of the real-world benefits and marketing, which convinced
Americans to buy cars in the first place. They took advantage of automakers’ marketing that treated car
ownership as a necessity, to position driving as an important part of experiences in national parks.
Automakers’ and park promoters’ success in that field is evidenced by the way that writers approached
auto infrastructure in the parks. They did not treat it as an imposition, but integrated it into the existing
understanding of parkscapes. Tourists who drove to national parks accepted the changes largely without
criticism because, even though they involved changing the way they looked, they believed the changes
would improve experiences in them. Authors who wrote about the parks framed auto infrastructure
in them from a utilitarian perspective that encouraged tourists to interpret it as improving the land, rather
than compromising its authenticity.

The National Geographic writer Leo Borah captioned a photo of Mount Rainier National Park to
draw attention to “a recently completed highway [that approaches] the sunrise side of Mount Rainer.”
The road is almost invisible in the photo. Borah’s decision to point it out highlights how he framed it as
an improvement, not simply as a change to tolerate. He drove that point home with a description of the
pre-automotive past.

Borah juxtaposed his description of Washington’s wilderness with an account of Puget Sound’s
first settler families. He wrote that settlers there landed “alone in the unknown green land of mighty
timber from which they were to hew their homes.” He describes a young woman “clasping her two-
months-old child [who] sat on a log and wept. To her the primeval evergreen forest, sweeping up from
the gray waste of the sound to misted heights of snow-capped mountains, suggested only nostalgic
longing to go back to the Illinois prairies.” The new highway made it easier and more comfortable for
drivers to visit the same places. Driving allowed tourists and residents to experience the “same” primeval forest without having to work as hard to do it.

In the article, National Geographic featured a photo of an automobile between towering cedars on the new Mount Baker Highway (the road to Mount Rainier). In the photo’s caption, Borah says, “these fine thoroughfares bring scenes of natural grandeur within the reach of thousands who could never visit them hiking. Any one [sic] not a trained woodsman would be utterly lost in a 10-minute walk from established trails, either here or in Mount Rainier National Park.” Thanks to the automobile, the land was useful because its “scenes of natural grandeur [were] within the reach of thousands.”

Borah might have invented the settler mother and child to fit his narrative. His description of the wilderness they were in nevertheless illustrates his belief that, where the automobile had not yet reached, America’s landscape inspired foreboding and awe. Land through which only a trained woodsman could travel was intimidating and only inspired a nostalgic longing to return to civilization. Borah was describing a new kind of place where people could immerse themselves in wild places like parks authentically without experiencing the privations of pioneer life. That expectation became a central part of the park paradigm. The automobile imposed new kinds of hardships on the people who chose to drive them to parks across the United States, and, at the same time, created new opportunities for leisure in places that most people had understood as being inhospitable.

On a journey to Yellowstone National Park that I revisit later in this section, a tourist named Bayard Paine wrote at length about a broken vacuum accessory on his Cadillac’s engine, fouled spark plugs, and flat tires. While describing one instance of cleaning his car’s spark plugs, he explicitly referenced consciousness of being in the “‘wilds of Wyoming’ where rattlesnakes and bears roam at will.” That was an obvious observation, but Paine’s remark shows how he did not think that the automobile compromised his ability to access a wild place. On the one hand, drivers battled their cars, and on the
other, they believed they were immersed in authentically wild (which connoted struggle with nature), untamed places.\textsuperscript{306}

Recalling a summer journey from Colorado to Yellowstone in 1926, Charles R. Monroe recounted two specific instances of trouble with a friend’s new Model T. On their final approach uphill to the park, “the Model T again demonstrated its inadequacies for mountain climbing. We couldn’t make the grade...[so we knew] the load must be lightened. All four passengers were forced to climb out and give a helping hand” to get their car over the top. And later, in a predicament reserved for Model T owners, Slim was forced to pilot his car down several miles of steep grade without the aid of engine compression or brakes. “We used our foot pedal brake until the brake lining burned to a crisp. With a brake failure, a Model T driver had no choice but to use the reverse pedal as a brake. But in a few miles the lining of this drum was also gone.” Though the group narrowly avoided disaster, Monroe’s car was laid up in Mammoth Hot Springs over night to replace its brake bands and reverse drum.\textsuperscript{307}

So, while drivers were able to reach places that would have been harder to reach only a couple of decades earlier, their adventures were fraught with technical problems. In order to bring a car in and out of a national park, drivers had to deal with problems that sometimes required a higher degree of technical skill to overcome than urban problems. In spite of the fact that automotive maintenance was occupying more of tourists’ time, and physical trekking less, their descriptions of travel as being natural and wild persisted. That continuity says something about auto travel’s impact on drivers’ perceptions of authentic nature.

Tourist descriptions of travel mark the shift toward driving in a variety of ways. Charles Monroe wrote at length about his group’s experience driving to Yellowstone and described seeing antelope, stopping at the Thermopolis mineral springs, and camping along the side of the road. Once they reached Yellowstone, Monroe described notable features including geysers, mud pots, and the Mammoth Hot Springs. He and his group did not spend much time at any of those attractions, but Monroe did not write
Bayard H. Paine of Grand Island, Nebraska, detailed a nineteen-day trip from his home to Yellowstone in 1920. The tour consisted of three cars and thirteen people. Throughout the approximately 2,000 mile journey, Paine and his son (Bayard Jr.) kept journals recording each day’s events. Following their return to Nebraska, they typed copies and gave the book to their friends.

The book’s readers discover the misadventures on poor roads and mechanical mishaps the party endured, but do not learn much about the scenery the Paines passed through. In the book’s first twenty pages, there is no description of the land’s appearance, except as it related to road grades and beds. Paine’s subordination of scenery to road conditions shows how the automobile influenced every part of travelers’ experience in and around parks.

For example, once, when he left the main road, Paine explained that he had to put chains on his car’s tires so that they would get traction on the soft bottom-land soil in the Platte River Delta. Three pages later, he commented on the steep road that led from Wheatland to Douglas, Wyoming, and stated that “the view from the top was glorious and the Rocky Mountains [were] getting closer all the time.” Near Thermopolis, Wyoming, he wrote about “the utter desolation of the world outside [the car].”

In all of these cases, Paine showed how tourists viewed the world literally through their cars. They did not see or immerse themselves directly in their environments. They had experiences with landscapes, but not in them. They were always in their cars. Paine’s car was a sanctuary from inhospitable wilderness and a tool to take him into places that were new and unique to him.

Paine and his group arrived at Yellowstone not long after they left Thermopolis. For their four days in the park, Paine made eleven pages of remarks (out of 56 total pages of text). He began his remarks on the park with a comment on “the beautiful arched Chittenden Bridge....” Paine’s decision to feature
an artificial artifact so prominently in a travelogue ostensibly focused on Yellowstone shows that he did not think the bridge was out of place there. To the contrary, he thought it was an enjoyable part of the park’s scenery. The bridge derived its beauty from its natural-seeming curves and its ability to provide access to the other parts of the park.\textsuperscript{310}

In the eleven pages that followed, Paine wrote two about bears picking over hotel trash piles, one on regulations for automobiles in the park, two on mileages between attractions, one on a bear encounter, two on a discussion of what route to take home, one on his Yellowstone automobile admission tag, and devoted the remaining space to photos (spread over five pages). The group visited Old Faithful, which Paine complained was 20 minutes late, and Handkerchief Pool. In spite of the fact that accessing both of those sites forced the group to drive past many other thermal features (whose protection was the express purpose of creating a park at Yellowstone in the first place) they were the only two features he ever mentioned.\textsuperscript{311}

It is impossible to know why Paine did not describe all the other thermal features he passed, but it makes sense that he chose to write about the two he did because they were so well known. Their prominence in Paine’s account of his trip matches their ubiquity in other descriptions of the park. They provided evidence of another contribution tourists made to the park paradigm.\textsuperscript{312}

\textit{Leisure and Conspicuous Consumption – Attraction based travel and the national park paradigm}

Tourists travel to national parks to consume leisure conspicuously.\textsuperscript{313} The attractions that tourists visited in places like Yellowstone were important because their notoriety meant that descriptions of them were, by their nature, conspicuous. People who talk about visiting attractions like the Statue of Liberty, Eiffel Tower, Great Wall of China, or Old Faithful display their ability to travel and associate themselves with the intangible attributes of the places they visited more easily than people who go to less well-known locales.
Visiting well-known places like Yosemite Valley, Crater Lake, or the Grand Canyon allowed visitors to communicate their ability to travel in the same way that buying expensive, name-brand products conspicuously shows wealth. Immediately recognizable destinations make it easy for others who hear about travel to connect with them. While referencing any travel destination would signify a tourist’s ability to disengage from the workplace, going to one that others are familiar with and that has cachet, like national parks, makes the travel seem like the fulfillment of a nationally shared aspiration, like a rite of passage. Paine’s travel account shows that managers were successful at creating attraction-based itineraries in national parks. Those layouts helped concentrate visitors in small parts of the park. They also sustained a self-perpetuating process whereby people heard about the most popular places in parks before they got to them, wanted to see them, and then told friends or family to see the same things and places.

In the account of his trip to Yellowstone, Bayard Paine only described Old Faithful and Handkerchief Pool at length. When he visited, those thermal features were two of the best known in the park. Paine’s description of them made his experience accessible to others because they had a frame of reference to fit them into; even if they did not know where or what Old Faithful or Handkerchief Pool were, readers would know that they were famous.

Businesspeople, nature enthusiasts, political policymakers, and park rangers laid the groundwork for tourists to experience national parks in this way. Businesspeople built hotels around them. Government officials funded roads that carried people to them. Park rangers claimed their preservation proved the greatness of the American, democratic experiment. Nature enthusiasts used them as evidence of the power of unmolested nature to do miraculous things. The result of all of their efforts was that the parks were well known and attracted many people to see them. The increasing numbers of visitors who arrived in parks by car around 1916 restricted future managers’ ability to change the attractions that tourists would want to see. Auto infrastructure limited future managers’ flexibility because it was too
difficult, expensive, or politically complicated to change. Not many drivers commented on how driving affected their park experiences. They seem to have assimilated their cars into parks without much critical thought.\textsuperscript{316}

Bayard Paine could have used his car to spend more time at a small number of attractions in the park, but he and his group chose to spend a short time at a large number instead. Compared to the people who visited the park before them, they accelerated their visit. The mileage charts Paine kept show that he and his family saw more of the park in less time than would have been possible by stagecoach.\textsuperscript{317} His experience was objectively different from the tourists who came before him. It shows how drivers experienced Yellowstone and the parks modeled after it differently than visitors who arrived in them by rail. They wanted to see more in less time without having to walk, but did not describe the parking lots and other car related systems that facilitated their travel. Cars led to the construction of roads, bridges, and parking lots, but not to their inclusion in what it meant for places to be national parks. Tourist accounts like Paine’s show how auto infrastructure was becoming more and more common in parks, but it remained effectively invisible to them (but, as Paul Sutter explained, not to those who advocated for preserving parks’ wilderness).\textsuperscript{318}

Bayard Paine’s account of his visit to Yellowstone shows how some tourists accepted automotive infrastructure in national parks without extensive critical commentary. The fact that most chose to not to comment on it, even though they noticed it, shows that tourists thought cars were compatible with, or even contributed to, the experiences they wanted and expected. Their decision to assimilate the automobile there had a profound impact on the park paradigm.

\textit{Driving Home - Assessing the Effects of Automobility on the Park Paradigm}

It is common for some (especially modern-day environmentalists) to claim that cars degraded park experiences by making formerly remote areas easily accessible. Preservationists claimed park
landscapes remained ecologically intact only because they were hard to access. By making it easy for anyone to see nature without much work, preservationists believed the automobile destroyed the very qualities that made national parks worth visiting in the first place.\textsuperscript{319}

The value of visiting a national park with or without much effort is in the eye of its beholder. The only thing that makes a difference about either experience is what the person visiting expected and how their expectations reflect whether they were having a meaningful experience. The fact that tourists drove cars and still described their visits to parks in terms revealing that they saw them as authentic show that they did not feel cars compromised the park’s authenticity. Their descriptions show that they understood their cars as extensions of themselves and not as impositions on the land.

Travelling by car changed the ways park visitors experienced time and place. In his description of the drive to Yellowstone, Bayard Paine admitted that he and his friends overlooked some scenic features in the interest of saving time. When “we came to Hell’s Half Acre [we] only paused for a drive around the rim and then rushed on in our mad run that was to take us to Douglas by night.” The Paine group’s desire to reach town is emblematic of drivers’ expectations in general. It demonstrates how drivers expected their cars to improve their mobility through most places, not their mobility to them. Rather than taking advantage of their cars to see areas that had been more challenging for tourists to reach before they could drive to them, most motorists’ accounts evince the desire to “make time.” They used the automobile to move them farther than would have previously been possible in a day.\textsuperscript{320} As Paine’s daily mileage charts from Yellowstone show, auto tourists had the option to pack their time with visits to many more sites than had previously been possible for visitors who access parks by rail and stagecoach.\textsuperscript{321}

In an article about a motor tour from Chicago to the Pacific Coast and Yosemite National Park, E.E. Cook described his drive from Lincoln, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri. The author remarked, “the scenery was especially good...around Carlinville where the road was a winding ribbon of cement running through wooded hills and valleys. We longed to stay a day or two but we were on schedule and St. Louis was our
goal.” When Cook reached Santa Fe, he seemed disappointed not to attend church on a Sunday morning. “We would have liked to have gone, but the way of the tourist is hard and we left to meet La Bajada.” (La Bajada was a gravel-paved road on a steep hill outside of Santa Fe.) “This famous hill is truly a whizbang with its 27 hairpin turns and 7 percent grades.” Cook’s disappointment is hard to understand because it was entirely self-imposed. His disappointment raises questions about how much control car owners believed they had over their travels and how being able to travel quickly may have made drivers feel obligated to hurry. Tourists’ willingness to forgo sights on the margins of their routes seems almost ironic given that, unlike the rail travelers who preceded them, they were in total control of their itineraries and schedules. Their stories show how, even when they had the ability to stop, or at least slow down, drivers usually chose to get somewhere else instead of exploring where they were.

If it had not been for their rush to get from place to place, auto tourists might have taken more time and exerted more effort viewing the places they passed instead of expending a few expletives and snapping a camera before moving to the next attraction on their itinerary. Their decision to embrace the car and its ability to get them from place to place had a profound impact on the park paradigm. It helped cement the utilitarian expectation that parks should be designed to accommodate many visitors at a small number of places and helped set the stage for another important constituency to leave its own mark on the park paradigm.

1.5 - Not Just another Government Bureau – The National Park Service

The establishment of the National Park Service is justified by considerations of good administration, of the value of natural beauty as a National asset, and of the effectiveness of outdoor life and recreation in the production of good citizenship.

Theodore Roosevelt

When he left government service in 1933, the Park Service’s second director, Horace Albright, said in a letter to agency staff that “The National Park Service, from its very beginning, has been an outstanding organization because...[its leaders have] worked increasingly and with high public spirit to
carry out the noble policies and maintain the lofty ideals of the service as expressed in law and executive
pronouncement.” His agency was different from other federal bureaus, he argued, and its spirit was
worthy of protection. “Do not let the service become ‘just another Government bureau’; keep it
youthful, vigorous, clean and strong.” After all, “we are not here simply to protect what we have been
given so far; we are here to try to be the future guardians of those areas as well as to sweep our
protective arms around the vast lands which may well need us as man and his industrial world expand
and encroach on the last bastions of wilderness.”

Albright characterized the park service in the same terms promoters had often used to describe
national parks. It was fresh, wholesome, and above the fray of workaday life. He claimed the
National Park Service was dedicated to something loftier than the rest of the government’s bureaucracy.
He believed its staff was ordained to pursue a higher calling and execute an exceptional mission. To
Albright and the staff he had hired and trained, it represented the things most worth protecting in the
United States: the landscapes, scenery, and animals that gave the nation its unique character. The
language he used to describe the service says a lot about how he saw his agency and the land it was
entrusted to protect.

When he explained the necessity to steward public lands for future generations, Albright said
that “our protective arms,” were outstretched around America’s “last bastions of wilderness.” He
described the agency’s possessory interest in keeping wild places wild. He did not distinguish between
the parks’ staff and the agency that employed them. To Albright, they were the same. That association
is important because the precedents he and Stephen Mather set for the agency defined the way its staff
saw the parks and how they impacted the park paradigm.

This chapter explores how a small group of founders shaped the National Park Service around a
masculine, patriotic ideology that framed the national parks as classrooms for a particular kind of
citizenship. It profiles some of the staff who were attracted to work for the new agency and use one of
their struggles to find permanent employment to argue that Mather and Albright succeeded at creating a mystique around the identity of the park ranger that inspired the public’s trust and admiration. The National Park Service used that trust to claim that it was the only legitimate arbiter of the park paradigm.

The culture of the National Park Service is steeped in a mythology that links the service’s founders to altruistic conservation. It invests them with great foresight for their actions to bring scenic sections of the public domain under National Park Service management before extractive industries or intensive tourist development were allowed to destroy them. It also uncritically accepts the founders’ vision for the parks as living civics classrooms. That story enjoys such currency that, in hundreds of parks today, plaques dedicated to the Service’s first director, Stephen Mather, proudly remind their viewers “there will never come an end to the good he has done.”

This mythology enjoys currency because it is, largely, true. Stephen Mather and his immediate lieutenants, Horace Albright, Arno Cammerer, Thomas Vint, and Robert Sterling Yard, succeeded at mobilizing popular support for the preservation of some spectacular pieces of the public domain as units of the National Park System. Their success was the product of shrewd management on the part of Mather, the attractive identity Robert Sterling Yard succeeded in establishing a National Park System, and a hagiographic origin story that Horace Albright and his successors created and perpetuated for them all.

The values that inspired the transformation of formerly untouristed landscapes across the country into scenic attractions called parks had to do with the service’s success at embedding masculine, patriotic ideas in them. It has to do with their success at framing the parks as efficient and progressive. Mather and his peers took the same experiences that defined life in urban cities and reframed them as tools to preserve wilderness. The wilderness they wanted to preserve was a living testament to American greatness and a place where visitors had the opportunity to exercise masculinity. Rangers
used national parks as venues to share information about research on the continent’s history and pre-
history and made arguments that took advantage of the latest scholarship on park lands, sometimes
generated by National Park Service staff themselves. Park rangers imprinted the Progressive faith in
good government’s potential to improve the human condition on the parks and embodied it at the same
time. It is a little ironic that the rangers used government power to preserve the precedents set by
transportation providers, hotel managers, and retailers before 1916.

Products of Precedent – Ideas and people that shaped the National Park Service

Railroad companies like the Northern Pacific, Union Pacific, Great Northern, and Atchison
Topeka and Santa Fe all contributed to the establishment and development of national parks along their
mainlines. Their interests differed from the other groups that advocated for park designations or were
involved in their management. The railroad companies’ interests were primarily commercial, but they
were responsible for presenting the parks as attractive vacation destinations. The fares railway
companies offered to national parks provided access to the agency’s founding director when he visited
them for the first time in 1905.

Stephen Mather was born in California, in direct line from the family of Increase and Cotton of
New England, on the Fourth of July in 1867. He graduated from the University of California in 1887. He
entered the family business managing mines and made a fortune that freed him from the need to work
before his fiftieth birthday. Just after the turn of the twentieth century, in search of a new challenge, he
became a member of the Sierra Club and discovered the places where he chose to spend the rest of his
life. Beginning with a climb in Mount Rainier National Park in 1905, Mather developed a love for wild
places that made him an evangelist for conservation.

One Mather biographer wrote that the climb “had left him a changed man” and a “spare time
mountaineer.” For the rest of his life, he said Mather went to find solace and refreshment by climbing
on western mountains. He wanted to make sure that the mountains stayed open to Americans who
wanted to recreate as he did. After he met John Muir in 1912, Mather began to believe that lumber,
mining, and power barons were damaging the wilderness. As a Californian, he was alarmed to see
loggers using the Swamp Lands Act to claim groves of big trees near Sequoia National Park.333

Legend long had it that those transfers led Mather to write a complaint to an old classmate,
Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane, that got the response, “Dear Steve, if you don’t like the way the
National Parks are being run, come down to Washington and run them yourself!” Even though Lane and
Mather were graduates of the same alma mater, the University of California at Berkeley, they graduated
several years apart and did not know each other in school. In reality, another of his college classmates
recruited him to work in the department. He was Assistant Secretary, Adolph Miller.334 In 1915, goaded
by Miller, Mather started working at Interior pro bono to advocate creating a federal bureau for the
national parks. Mather worked with Miller’s former staff assistant, Horace Albright, to design a
campaign to impel Congressional action on a park bill.335

Mather used his business contacts to get influential members and staff of the Sierra Club,
American Museum of Natural History, and National Geographic Society to support the creation of a
bureau to manage the national parks. Early in his tenure with Interior, he took representatives from
each of these groups, as well as several members of Congress, on a two-week trip to the Sierras at his
own expense. Gilbert Grosvenor, later president of the National Geographic Society, described Mather
as “immune to fatigue.” For fun, “whenever we passed a waterfall, Mather shouted: ‘here we get a free
shower.’” Whereupon “he and the hardier members of the party leaped off their sweating horses,
stripped, and in a few seconds were shouting and slapping under the icy water from snowfields just
above. Mather enjoyed this ‘treat’ four and five times daily.”336 The trek resulted in the donation of
funds from the National Geographic Society and a promise for political support from the Congressional
dellegation to create a bureau for the national parks.337
By taking the group on a tour of the Sierra, Mather modeled a robust, rugged masculinity that would permeate every corner of the organization he was shortly to help found. In this, he was typical of the Rooseveltian man living according to “the doctrine of the strenuous life” who believed that success comes “not to the man who desires mere easy peace, but to the man who does not shrink from danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil and who out of these wins the splendid ultimate triumph.”

While Theodore Roosevelt was probably that kind of masculinity’s best-known spokesman and practitioner, he typified a generation of men, of which Mather was a member, who came of age at a time when the United States was undergoing a profound economic and social transformation and was becoming one of the world’s great powers. In that world, a man’s capacity for strife defined his virility. In Mather’s case, he chose to “strive” in the natural world rather than against human adversaries. He used nature as a space to test himself and invited those with him to do the same. In the years that followed, he used events like his trip to Yosemite to model it to the public, his peers, and the new National Park Service. Many staff who came to work in the National Park Service followed his lead.

Trips like the one he led to Yosemite also established Mather as the public face of the new National Park Service and as the archetype of the staff who administered them day to day: National Park Rangers. According to Horace Albright, then Superintendent of Yellowstone National Park and Mather’s de facto second in command, rangers needed to be “mature men with fine personalities and experience in the out-of-doors in riding, camping, woodcraft, fighting fires, and similar activities.” Albright elaborated in the preface of a book about working in the national parks he co-authored in 1928 that the reason the men he wanted to hire should be so disposed was that “if a trail is to be blazed, it is ‘send a ranger.’ If an animal is floundering in the snow, a ranger is sent to pull him out; if a bear is in the hotel, if a fire threatens the forest, if someone is to be saved, it is ‘send a ranger.’”
By associating adaptability and manliness with being a ranger, and celebrating rangers as the face of their agency, Mather and Albright associated masculinity with competence. In the process, they embedded it into the park service’s professional culture. Their decision to associate those ideas had far ranging consequences that continue to affect park policy to the present day. At the time they made those decisions, it was also a good administrative move.

*Picking up the cans – Inspiring active and enthusiastic citizenship using the idea of American exceptionalism*

Rangers protected the landscapes that Mather, Albright, and their peers, such as John Muir, thought were the most beautiful in America. In order to pay their salaries, it fell to the two administrators to generate public support for the formal creation of the National Park Service, and to gain an appropriation for the agency from a skeptical Congress. In order to do that, Mather counted on mobilizing an army of citizen supporters who would encourage their Congressional representatives to fund them.

In order to stir up the interest he hoped would generate support, Mather decided to use the parks as classrooms in citizenship. He hired his friend and former coworker from time he had spent as a reporter for the *New York Sun*, publicist Robert Sterling Yard, to tell the story of the parks as monuments to American greatness. Under the auspices of the Department of the Interior, but at Mather’s personal expense, Yard produced *The National Park Portfolio* and distributed it free to Congressmen, libraries, and schools across the United States. It presented the parks as emblematic of the national spirit and testaments to America’s exceptionalism.

In the book’s preface, Secretary Franklin Lane wrote, “the United States...does more; it furnishes playground[s] to the people which are, we may modestly state, without any rivals in the world.” Lane thought, “the Nation has been saving from its domain the rarest places of grandeur and beauty for the enjoyment of the world” and echoed the businessmen who had encouraged Americans to experience
their own hemisphere before traveling east. He wrote that “those who have hitherto found themselves
enticed by the beauty of the Alps and the Rhine and the soft loveliness of the valleys of France may find
equal if not more stimulating satisfaction in the mountains, rivers, and valleys which this Government
has set apart for them and for all others.”

Yard used the parks to argue that the United States was a great and exceptional nation. He gave
brief descriptions that featured their scenic beauty and importance as testaments to America’s claim to
monuments equal or exceeding the beauty of those found in the cities and countryside of Europe. He
provided romantic descriptions of park areas in fourteen states and US territories.

His description of Yellowstone was headed “The Land of Wonders” and features colorful
descriptions of the park’s many geysers, rivers, lakes, and waterfalls with “fishing waters unexcelled.” It
details the park’s sublime canyons, which together presented “a spectacle of color unequaled.” He
stated that the “innumerable wild animals which have ceased unduly to fear man” were impressive and
that the park was, “in fact…unique as a bird and animal sanctuary.” Yellowstone was “In short…not only
the wonderland that common report describes; it is also a fitting playground and pleasure resort of a
great people; it is the ideal summer school of nature study.”

Lane’s claim that the parks had unrealized potential for recreation and study implied that
making them more accessible would help them rise to their full potential. Yard wrote that the “great
hotels and many public camps” as well as “two hundred miles of excellent roads” had improved their
landscapes by helping visitors access them. He treated the roads as a tangible testament to the ethos of
progressive development that Mather and his rangers hoped they could extend to other natural sites
across the United States.

Yard also argued Americans should see the parks as superior to the sites associated with human
history in Europe. In a section titled “Many-Colored Canyon” he wrote that “The steep slopes are
inconceivably carved by the frost and the erosion of the ages. Sometimes they lie in straight lines at
easy angles from which jut high rocky prominences. Sometimes they are carved from side walls. Here and there jagged rocky needles rise perpendicularly like groups of gothic spires.”

Yard was using the steep slopes, easy angles, and gothic spires of the canyons to evoke associations with the palaces, fortresses, and cathedrals that are associated with Western Europe’s cultural identity and lineage to classical antiquity. He was asserting America’s claim to a monumental identity of its own and implying its superiority because human hands had supposedly not shaped the United States’ natural landscapes. Unlike the European buildings designed and built by people, the parks were products of processes beyond human control. Yard was framing the parks as more authentic than the buildings they competed with for visitors. He went on to reinforce that authenticity by emphasizing the parks’ role as unique habitats for increasingly rare animals.

Yard emphasized the park’s importance as a refuge for animals that had become scarce across the rest of the United States. He argued, “Yellowstone National Park is by far the largest and most successful wild-animal preserve in the world. Since it was established in 1872 hunting has been strictly prohibited, and elk, bear, deer of several kinds, antelope, bison, moose, and bighorn mountain sheep roam the valleys and mountains in large numbers.” He highlighted that even “antelope, nearly extinct elsewhere, are observed.” Thanks to the park’s success at proscribing hunting, Yard promised that “the animals have long since ceased to fear man as wild animals do everywhere except in our national parks.” Though he acknowledged, “few tourists see them who follow the beaten road in the everlasting sequence of stages,” he promised that “those who linger in the glorious wilderness see them in an abundance that fairly astonishes.” He did not mention that the Park Service managed the killing of predators like wolves to make sure that their prey species’ numbers remained high.

Yard appropriated the popularity of animals associated with the United States frontier by featuring them in his descriptions of the National Park System. In the process, he associated the new agency with what many preservationists and conservationists already argued was a uniquely American
success story. He attributed the US Army’s success at enforcing the regulations that made Yellowstone so exceptional to the rangers who had arrived there after the park had existed for over forty years. He also tacitly affirmed the park service’s support for the federal legislation that had criminalized former residents’ activities on parkland that had included hunting, mining, and lumbering and that gave the new agency a reason for being.352

The bison had special significance because they were almost extinct. The herd in the park was the last wild one anyone knew of in the United States. Yard wrote, “the Wild Herd is a Remnant of the Wild Herds on the Plains, which were Driven Back by Hunters and Sought Refuge in the Mountains” of Yellowstone. The bison’s survival, and the western identity that drew so much from animals like them, was dependent on the newly arrived rangers.353 In fact, he argued that the rangers not only enabled visitors’ encounters with wildlife, but also enhanced them through thoughtful management.

Since the bears were “never shot at, never pursued, they are comparatively as fearless as songbirds nestling in the homestead trees.” Unlike the skittish wildlife of the east, or urban areas, “wilderness bears cross the road without haste a few yards ahead of the solitary passer-by and his accustomed horses job on undisturbed.” He did not mention that the reason the bears were so visible was that they were becoming dependent on the park’s garbage dumps and tourists’ handouts for food.354

Unlike the animals they knew as game elsewhere in the country, “deer by the scores lift their antlered heads above near thickets to watch [peoples’] passing,” and “Elk scarcely slow their cropping of forest grasses.” This was not to say that the animals’ lives were free from human influence. Yard was careful to assure visitors that the park service looked out for every aspect of the animals’ welfare. In “winters of heavy snow...park rangers scatter hay by the roadside” to make sure none of the animals lacked for forage.355
His description of the park service’s management decisions emphasized that, even though the agency characterized its decisions as designed to maintain natural settings, they based their management decisions reasons on ensuring visitors to the parks had pleasurable experiences in them. The park service’s decision to take actions like feeding ungulates in winter was part of the changes the agency made in the parks that would allow people to have experiences that its staff considered meaningful in them. Those experiences were dependent on people being able to see wildlife associated with the exceptional, frontier identity. Accessing that identity through the parks gave people opportunities to imbibe democratic nationalism through masculine exertion. It proved the success of federal management of wild places and encouraged people to view visiting parks as an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of American citizenship. In order to guarantee access to that identity, park staff took other actions to improve the wilderness. The many fish that had called Yellowstone home from time immemorial provided opportunities for recreation that were “unsurpassed” in part because park rangers stocked the rivers with non-native fish that competed with the native “famous cutthroat” and grayling. Yard implicitly claimed that the animals, fish, and scenery were not only exceptionally wild, but also easy to see. In the book, he set his descriptions of the landscape next to photos of the large, comfortable hotels that railroad companies built in the park.356

In the end, the National Park Service used opportunities for recreation as tools to advance its educational agenda. The point of protecting/improving the parks and the experiences that they provided was to teach a lesson on civic engagement through manly strife. Yard concluded the Portfolio by saying that “the National Parks belong to you” and that “they are the great national playgrounds of the American People for whom they are administered by the Department of the Interior.” Yard used the parks’ exceptionalism to justify their protection by a public service and used them to claim that all of their wonders made the National Park Service different from every other federal agency. The perception that the national parks’ keepers were not just members of “another government bureau”
pervaded the park service’s public image and its internal culture.\textsuperscript{357} It also helped legitimize the agency’s claim that it would use the parks as classrooms for civic engagement.

Stephen Mather said that the parks were ideal classrooms to make engaged, patriotic citizens when he responded to criticism that the agency was opening them up to too many “tin canners.” Some critics, like the advocates for preserving park wilderness Paul Sutter profiles in \textit{Driven Wild}, claimed that the “lower class” of visitors who began to come to the parks after they opened to auto traffic were ruining them.\textsuperscript{358} Critics claimed “the mob” did not use parks appropriately and that they would destroy them. Mather disagreed. He said that the parks belonged to everyone, even litterers. “We can pick up the cans, it’s a cheap way to make better citizens.” Mather was framing the parks as a classroom where citizens would experience their government doing the people’s work.\textsuperscript{359}

Mather made that vision more compelling by associating his agency with a preexisting discourse on monumentalism in the parks. Like the promoters who claimed that the parks rivaled the scenery and antiquity of Europe, Mather used their natural features to claim for the United States high standing among the great powers of the earth.\textsuperscript{360} Unlike the promoters who used that association to benefit their businesses, he used it as evidence of the nation’s greatness.

They selectively associated the National Park Service with well-known parts of America’s identity. Their vision of the United States as defined by those attributes ultimately exposes a hubris because it shows their prejudices and assumptions about what it meant for places to be valuable. The next section in this chapter shows how park rangers embedded ideas about what it meant to be middle class, white, and American in the parks. It also raises questions about the impact of their decisions on the park paradigm in the present day.

\textit{Send a Ranger – Staffing the National Park Service}
In a document referred to as the Vail Agenda that staff in the park service wrote in observance of the agency’s 75th anniversary in 1991, they admitted that “new hires are the most persistent, not necessarily the most qualified.” Their admission acknowledged a culture that values enthusiasm more than competence. That culture resulted from precedents set at the time of the National Park Service’s creation and reflects the idiosyncrasies and preferences of its founders.

Mather’s greatest contribution to the service was probably not as an advocate for appropriations, increased autonomy, or management responsibilities within the federal government, but his personal enthusiasm for national parks and the staff who worked in them. Mather embodied and cultivated the image of a ranger not only as a person with frontier sense, but with a confident bearing and tact. He was personally inseparable from the service and tried to embody the esprit de corps that he worked to intertwine with the ranger’s professional identity. Mather succeeded at modeling a progressive and vigorous ethic that attracted like-minded employees to work for the United States, and him, in the field.

He presented the identity by appearing publicly in a ranger’s uniform, paying for the construction of egalitarian ranger housing and recreational facilities out of his own pocket, and by encouraging the relaxed, but professional atmosphere that encouraged members of the “ranger corps” to mix socially without regard to office or park. According to his contemporaries, these efforts succeeded at fostering a collegial culture among rangers at parks across the United States. He was personally involved in most of the early decisions regarding who would superintend and staff the parks. The First World War stymied his work for a while. It did not take Mather long after the guns fell silent for him to create a corps of park managers who shared his convictions.

Mather wanted to build a staff that would bring his vision for the parks to fruition. Horace Albright wrote about that time, “Mather went ahead stocking his bureau with competent operatives, fearing nothing, not even the restraints of civil service. He wanted, until he finished that job, to keep the civil service away from his park superintendents and rangers and his monument custodians. He felt
that he had to be free to unload misfits and to shift his other men around until he had arrived at his best combination.” The kinds of rangers he wanted were “self-sufficient, resourceful enough not to have to turn to Washington except in major crises, adaptable enough to get on with the local community, and urbane enough to handle the whole diverse traveling public, from nobility down.” Mather believed the kinds of employees the National Park System needed were very had to find, and he resisted limits on his ability to recruit broadly without regard to the usual civil service process or restrictions. The kinds of staff Mather wanted would be above the political fray and distinguished from other applicants by their “manliness” and personal enthusiasm for the national park idea.

One of Mather’s early recruits was an ex-army major whom he met in Hawaii. Roger W. Toll was a graduate of Columbia’s school of engineering, a former employee of the Coast and Geodetic Survey in Alaska, and a veteran of the Great War. According to Horace Albright, Toll visited him in Washington, DC, to talk about working for the National Park Service while he was stationed in the capital, and he went out of his way to stay in touch with Albright after he left for a new assignment. When Albright found out that Mather and Toll would be in Hawaii at the same time, he encouraged them to meet. Mather was so impressed that he hired Toll to superintend Mount Rainier National Park. After two and a half years, Mather transferred him to Rocky Mountain National Park. Then, in 1929, he succeeded Horace Albright as the Superintendent of Yellowstone. Albright wrote glowing reports on his performance at Yellowstone, and some agency employees thought he had bright prospects for one day becoming the agency’s director, but he died along with the much-esteemed Park Service biologist, George Melendez Wright, in an automobile accident while traveling to assess newly proposed park areas in 1936.

Mather personally helped advance the career of John R. White. Born in Britain, White went abroad in his youth to pursue adventure as a mercenary. He found it in Macedonia, where he fought alongside the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. He left the Balkans to pursue a life in the New World
in 1897 and arrived at the Klondike in time for the peak of its great gold rush. At the end of the gold rush in 1899, he went to Seattle and enlisted in the US Army to fight in the Philippines during the Spanish American War. After Spain’s surrender, he transferred to the new, colonial Constabulary, and fought for a decade in the Philippine Insurrection before retiring as a Colonel and returning to the United States in 1914. He did not stay long. He went to Europe for service with the Red Cross until 1917, when he achieved a commission with the Signal Corps, and then, having learned to fly on his own time, transferred to the Army Air Corps. Following the war, hoping to avoid the tedium of garrison duty, he walked into the Washington Office of Horace Albright to ask for a job. Legend has it that Albright was impressed with White’s credentials and was disappointed that the only jobs vacant at the time were for field rangers. Even though that work was ostensibly beneath a colonel in the regular army, White accepted a position at the recently designated Grand Canyon National Park. White served there and at General Grant and Sequoia National Parks as ranger, chief ranger, and superintendent, respectively, until 1947.369

The eventual chief photographer of the National Park Service, George A. Grant, owed his initial entry into the National Park Service to Albright’s patronage. Born in Pennsylvania in 1891, Grant worked as a mechanic and steel mill hand before entering the army to serve in World War I. Grant expected to fight in Flanders, but he ended up stationed at Fort D.A. Russell in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Grant’s time in the west left an indelible mark on the young easterner and probably changed the course of his life.370

After the army discharged him at the end of the war, Grant returned east but immediately began to plan his return west. In the spring of 1922, he started work as a temporary, seasonal ranger in Yellowstone National Park. While he was in the park, Grant started to work as a photographer. He set up a darkroom to process his own snapshots and soon moved on to more technically complex exposures. Grant shared his prints with the park for promotional purposes. The New York Times even
used one of his photos, an image of Horace Albright with three bear cubs, for a feature story on Yellowstone.371

Even though Albright promised a permanent job if he wanted it, Grant left government service at the end of the summer season. He said he thought “the proposed plans for my winter work ...hardly merit the use of a whole winter’s time” and would “make me feel like a pensioner.” He went east, but stayed enthusiastic about working for the National Park Service in another capacity. He felt that the service needed a professional photographer, so he decided to acquire the skills to do the job himself.

Grant took a job at the Pennsylvania State College as a photographer for their department of agriculture. Later he switched departments to work as a photography instructor.372 After almost five years of practice and regular correspondence with Horace Albright, he applied for a National Park Service job in 1927. His initial appointment fell through, but his attempt to get the job highlighted the kind of person Mather and Albright attracted to the park service.

Toll, White, Grant, and the other rangers who staffed the park service’s distant outposts were cut from a different cloth. They were the kinds of people Albright later described as “topnotch personnel.” One of the things that set them and many other new employees apart from other applicants for government jobs was that they not only aggressively pursued employment, but willingly accepted demotions simply to get their feet in the door. Their persistence and willingness to accept any position simply to be associated with the service was common. Over time, it became a rite of passage.

Grant’s decision to develop an entirely new skill set to meet a need he perceived in the agency also became a typical part of the path to permanent employment. Grant honed in on the agency’s evolving interest in photography and, in order to serve it, personally assumed the tremendous opportunity cost associated with reeducating himself with no promise of a job. He was one of many employees who showed that personal sacrifice for professional advancement was an accepted and even celebrated part of National Park Service ranger culture.373
The people who make those sacrifices are also the same ones of dubious competence mentioned in the Vail Agenda. They willingly spend time and money to gain certification as emergency medical technicians or paramedics, to earn federal law enforcement credentials, to become graphic designers and photographers/editors, to attain advanced degrees in environmental studies or interpretation, and to travel across the United States for jobs that sometimes last only a few months at a time. The reason they are willing to make those sacrifices is the attractiveness of the ranger identity.

Americans who wear “the green and the gray” benefit from their predecessors’ success at providing visitors to the parks with meaningful experiences. The agency’s founders created an origin myth that stoked an enthusiastic esprit de corps. The National Park Service successfully pursued an idealistic mission that led to exceptional public trust. Rangers today benefit from that trust as members of the “thin green line” that stretches back to Mather himself.

Paid in sunsets – Professional enthusiasm, National Park Service culture, and the park paradigm

Grant’s failure to get a job when Albright first encouraged him to apply to be a National Park Service photographer in 1927 left an administrative paper trail that explained why the park service wanted to hire its own photographer in the first place. The agency wanted more control over images of the national parks so that it could highlight places and things commercial photographers who worked for publishers or business owners usually did not photograph. They wanted to capture the “physical improvements in parks,” as well as “geological and biological photographs for use in museums and lectures...lantern slides, enlargements, and other material needed by the park service.”

Getting specialized photos using contract photographers would be expensive, so Horace Albright, who became director after Mather’s retirement in 1929, made hiring a permanent photographer a priority. Hiring a photographer was also another move by the agency asserting its expertise in arbitrating what kinds of experiences visitors ought to have in the parks. They wanted a
photographer literally to frame the kinds of places and experiences visitors would find in them.

Albright’s push dovetailed with using the parks as classrooms where people would learn Mather’s kind of citizenship. The photographer’s job fit in with the service’s design to use the parks as classrooms. It embodied the desire to create media that would convey discrete intellectual and emotional meanings about manliness and citizenship through nature.377

Robert Sterling Yard’s illustrations in The National Parks Portfolio foreshadowed the agency’s desire to control its messaging, but they relied on Yard’s ability to fund operations at the National Park Association from private donations. After Herbert Hoover’s election in 1928, Congress approved funding for a “photographer at large” in the 1930 fiscal year. As a result, George Grant came into the service’s education division, based at the University of California Berkeley.378 He traveled at his own expense to California and then embarked on what would be the first of almost thirty summers traveling to parks and monuments, consulting superintendents and naturalists, taking and printing negatives, and contributing to the educational division in Berkeley. In the process, he also helped reinforce the park ranger’s expertise and right to arbitrate the kinds of experiences that people should find meaningful in them as part of the park paradigm.

At all of his stops in parks en route to Berkeley, Grant encouraged park employees to become photographers and shared a lesson how to capture high quality photos because “you fellows are living in the most beautiful parts of our country. You have pictures almost anywhere you look. If you haven’t already adopted photography as a hobby it is because there must be a screw loose somewhere.”379 He shared a similar lesson at a meeting of Park Service naturalists in Washington DC in 1929. It was so popular that the agency prepared it for publication and distributed to all members of the Park Service in 1932. In the process, he helped form the national perception of the parks and influenced park rangers’ perception of the places they managed.380 Grant’s photos, all of which immediately entered the public domain, were important in bringing specific aspects of the national parks to Americans’ attention.
The types of photos Grant shot emphasized the parks’ immense scale. He framed photos with people so that they were dwarfed by huge landscapes if he included them at all. His photos showed how overwhelming physical features like mountains and forests could appear. His photos contributed to the idea of parks as monuments to America’s greatness that were analogous to large and imposing Greco-Roman Ruins, Gothic Cathedrals, and Victorian wonders that travelers went to see in Europe. Grant also enhanced forests’, mountains’, and deserts’ monumental currency by selecting subjects that emphasized the National Park System’s truly continental scale.381

Grant logged over 12,000 road miles in his first three years on the job. He shot photos in Montana and Wyoming in summer and California and Arizona in winter. He filed his photos in park archives and the Interior Department’s headquarters office in Washington, DC, where they documented the assorted wonders of North America. Even after park budgets initially shrank and the photographer’s duties contracted after the onset of the Great Depression, he did not have to wait long until other government programs helped fund his work and amplified the National Park Service’s civic and manly message in the process.

When Franklin Roosevelt entered office in 1933, Horace Albright persuaded him to transfer all the national monuments and battlefields administered by the Forest Service and War Department to the National Park Service. At the stroke of a pen, Roosevelt doubled the size and scope of the National Park System. Not long after, the Roosevelt administration set up the first Civilian Conservation Corps Camp in a national park. By taking these actions, Roosevelt provided new impetus and support for Grant’s travels across the country and at the same time expanded his responsibilities.

Besides documenting park development for educational purposes, Grant recorded the Civilian Conservation Corp’s work in the parks. He made prints of enrollees at work building roads, terracing hillsides, and clearing brush across the United States. The National Park Service, Department of the Interior, and several New Deal bureaus all used Grant’s photos to promote their work.382
Personal photography was increasingly popular at the time Grant entered the field, and it was nearly ubiquitous by the 1930s. The medium’s power for description and generalization presented an opportunity to create a normative vision of the world that entered common memory as a facsimile of reality. It extended photographers like Grant’s singular visions and helped them imprint them on thinking around the country and world. Grant and the National Park Service used this power to multiply the effect of his work and spread it widely to tourists, political policy makers, and tourist business owners.383

The National Park Service made parks more accessible through Grant’s pictures. It shared them with Congressional representatives, tourist business owners, and members of the public. In 1934, the US Postmaster featured some of Grant’s images from Zion, Grand Canyon, Mesa Verde, Glacier, and Crater Lake national parks in a series of stamps. He made submissions to National Geographic magazine that they included in 1934 and 1936 issues. In the process, the National Park Service and elected officials used his photos in the public discourse on expanding the National Park System.384

One place where Grant’s work proved especially influential was at Olympus National Monument in western Washington. In the 1930s, Olympus was managed by the conservation oriented US Forest Service. The Forest Service managed the monument for timber production, which required highly visible logging operations.

After seeing pictures of the area, the National Park Service’s director, Newton Drury, believed the trees at Olympus ought to be preserved. In order to make his case to President Roosevelt to transfer the monument to National Park Service management, Drury sent Grant to photograph Forest Service sanctioned clear-cuts. In his pictures, Grant juxtaposed the clear-cuts with the pastoral landscape of snow-capped mountains and azure blue lakes to support Drury’s argument that the Forest Service was destroying Olympus’s natural beauty.385 Those photographs gave Franklin Roosevelt a
reason to visit the Olympic Peninsula to see it for himself and helped persuade him to support the creation of Olympic National Park there.  

Whether at Olympic, the Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, or any of the other nearly one hundred sites the National Park Service managed by the 1930s, Grant framed his work to reflect the ethos of conservation and professionalism that Mather, Albright, and their lieutenants instilled in his agency from its earliest days. He helped codify a very particular vision of what a wilderness was supposed to look like, who was supposed to visit it, and how visitors should use it.

The larger than life landscapes that Grant immortalized were superlative in the strongest sense of the word, but his photographs encapsulated Grant’s and the National Park Service management’s views of race and class. Grant’s photos framed the wilderness as an immortal testament to the view of the service’s founders, and a memorial to their collective, ethnocentric hubris. When humans appeared in Grant’s photos, and they usually did not, they were usually male. Women and children only appeared as subordinate members of nuclear families. This was a projection of the sensibility that informed Mather, Albright, and other early park managers’ Rooseveltian masculinity.

The vision of wilderness that the new service sought to imprint on the places they managed was, by their own admission, homogenous, ethnocentrically white, and based on the presumption that there was a single, best way to manage the landscapes that would maximize their scenic and emotional appeal. That vision built on the identity railroad companies’ “See America First” campaign had used to present the national parks not only as scenic attractions, but also as cultural and natural tools of progressive, civic nationalism.

None of these attributes compromises the validity or currency of the National Park Service’s identity today, but it might help explain why the service is struggling to attract new, non-white constituencies to visit the parks. The National Park Service is taking action to broaden the System’s scope to include places with stories of people who were not white and male. That said, the National
Park System’s best-known and most popular units were fundamentally shaped by the masculine, progressive nationalist vision Mather and Albright imbued it with around the turn of the twentieth century. Trying to make the parks appealing to more Americans might require more than cosmetic attempts at including previously unrepresented groups’ points of view. It might require revisiting the agency’s founding in a way that acknowledges its association with a set of values that is increasingly incompatible with life in the United States and world in the twenty-first century.389

What makes that even more challenging is that, for a current majority of national park visitors, that identity is not only appealing, but also cherished. To change the parks in fundamental ways - like they were changed in order to serve as vehicles of progressive, white middle class modernity through the construction of infrastructure like roads, hotels, and power plants - they might have to be reshaped in ways that will prevent them serving their original, and still highly popular, purpose. The evolution of American culture away from its former celebration of homogeneity to its current acceptance of plural identities will make that transition difficult. In the future, it is possible organizations with pedigrees like the National Park Service might have to be radically changed or even abolished in order to make room for new ways of thought and differently oriented institutions.390

Whether or until that happens, it remains important to understand the ways the National Park Service’s creation influenced the park paradigm. By exploring the service’s creation, we can begin to understand why the parks look and work the way they do today. We can also begin to understand why the agency’s staff conflicted so often with the other groups who vied to influence the management of places that will hopefully still be celebrated as “the best idea we ever had.”391
“Here, in this national park – in the mountains, in the country, away from it all—there is tension. Most visitors don’t feel it because they are blissfully unaware. They might notice an errant headstone, an old medicine bottle, even the exoskeleton of a broken woodstove by the side of the trail. But it can all be easily shrugged away...It’s so much easier that way, not to know too much.”

Sue Eisenfeld.392

“Gone,” a former resident said of the large tin-roofed house that once stood in the hollow among five mountains in what is now Shenandoah National Park. “They knocked it down and burnt it up.” Next to the house’s foundations is a pile of trash filled with shards of pottery and a large glass jug, metal hardware grown thick with rust, and a piece of a horseshoe. Below is a spring covered by a concrete archway, spilling onto the small run where a salamander crawls from under a rock.393 That corner of Shenandoah National park is emblematic of a tension that exists in almost every unit of the National Park System.

In order to establish many of America’s most popular national parks, local, state, and federal agencies used their power through the right of eminent domain or simply intimidation to redraw boundaries and redefine the public interest. They bought, seized, and appropriated land from willing and unwilling owners to make parks across the nation. For the residents who used to live in them, dispossession and coercion and not recreation or leisure define the early history of national parks.394

Residents’ presence shaped every unit of the National Park System, whether there is a physical trace of their lives in them today or not. When formerly occupied places became parks, family homes were demolished, farmers’ fields filled with bison, and foragers’ forests filled with campers. As these things happened, business owners, the National Park Service, and the US Government erased residents from the places they used to call home. This section addresses how the people who thought of parks as home acted as foils to shape the park paradigm.
Unless they stood to profit from the parks’ visitors (in which case I address them as businesspeople), residents’ perspectives often conflicted with national park creation advocates. Residents usually resisted parks’ creation and often pushed back against tourist travel to them. One of the reasons they acted that way was they did not see park land the same way other groups did.

Unlike nature enthusiasts, residents believed they could improve the land by changing it. Unlike the transitory tourists whom they derided as phonies or shallow incompetents, residents saw the land as a home and a place to find sustenance for their families, not a passive, scenic retreat. Unlike the park rangers who wanted to use the land to teach their brand of citizenship, residents wanted to use it to practice mining, farming, and logging. Unlike the US Government and state officials who represented tourists who lived far away or who chose to support tourist business owners or nature enthusiasts, residents wanted to use the land to satisfy their own needs through subsistence farming or market driven mining, logging, or ranching. Even when residents shared other groups’ interests, pursuing them complicated residents’ lives. 395

Hal Rothman characterized some residents’ transition to the tourist economy as a “Devil’s Bargain” because the economic and social benefits they believed they would gain changed their ways of life in the process. They accepted the bargain so that they could live in the places where they were no longer able to profit from produce like crops, minerals, or timber, all of which were off-limits inside the parks. 396

The change disproportionately affected Native Americans and poor, Euroamerican settlers. The former bore the brunt of those changes’ negative consequences. In Yellowstone, Yosemite, the Grand Canyon, and Mesa Verde, especially, Congress swept tribes aside to create scenic reservations for white, urban-dwelling, leisure-traveling publics. 397 It is a sad irony that some of the landscapes nature enthusiasts, park rangers, and US Government officials wanted to bring into the National Park System only existed because of American Indian interventions in them.
The United States’ relationship with Native Americans is fraught with violations of justice and decency. When Euroamericans acknowledged American Indians as residents, they usually did not consider their presence legitimate. Indians’ expulsion from land Euroamericans wanted was common, but their dispossession from parks was contingent on other factors that shaped the park paradigm.398 Until the end of the nineteenth century, it was an open question whether resident Indians would become an attraction in some parks or not.399

Some nature enthusiasts framed Indians as an important element of what made the land worth saving. The artist George Catlin proposed that the bison and Indians deserved protection in “a nation’s park” as early as 1832.400 As it turned out, most Americans believed that the only way civilization could progress in North America was to destroy them both. After the continent started to seem “over-civilized,” and businesspeople, government officials, and tourists started to support saving the wilderness instead of settling or mining all of it, they still had to contend with the American Indians’ legacy on them.

Native Americans laid claim to lands in places including Yellowstone, Glacier, Yosemite, Mesa Verde, and the Grand Canyon, and once lived in nearly every other National Park. Tourist business owners, the National Park Service, and the US Government reinterpreted American Indians’ history and presence to suit the expectations of the mostly white, urban and suburban tourists who traveled to see them. Business owners presented Blackfeet dancers in Glacier National Park, but the government refused to give Indian names associated with park places official sanction.401 In the Mesa Verde National Park, Congress directed rangers to protect the remnants of the Anasazi culture “from injury or spoliation,” but the reason they did so was to tell the story of “primitive man contained within the [park’s] established boundaries.”402 In Yosemite Valley, tourists stayed at the swank Ahwanee Hotel, named for Sierra Miwok Indians’ word for that place. At the same time, the hotel operator and National
Park Service struggled to find a “natural” means of keeping the meadow clear so visitors would have a clear view of the valley. Indians used to farm there, but that was too unnatural to allow.403

In all of those cases, and many others, National Park Rangers, tourists, nature enthusiasts, tourist business owners, and US Government officials all made decisions about how they would assimilate residents to park experiences. They mostly agreed that parks should be unpeopled, recreational wilderness where tourists should visit and no one but caretakers should live.

Making the land seem unpeopled was problematic because so much of it used to be home to Indian farms, camps, villages, or cities. In order to make the land fit their expectations, it had to be physically and rhetorically depopulated. As a result, park managers selectively omitted or minimized American Indians in their descriptions of parks. In the process, they sensationalized some of their customs and caricatured their culture.

For example, in spite of the fact that native obsidian artifacts quarried in Yellowstone are found as far away as the Great Lakes, Park rangers claimed American Indians were afraid of the thermal features in Yellowstone and did not live or visit there.404 In desert parks like Death Valley, rangers claimed Indians had either never lived in them, or simply ignored their stories.405 Their selective appropriation of Indian culture affected tourists’ perceptions of the parks and dovetailed with more general characterizations of non-white culture in the US.406

William Bancroft, Frederick Jackson Turner, and Theodore Roosevelt all described America’s conquest of the western half of North America as a triumph of the national character and a testament to the will of its people (by whom they meant EuroAmericans). Their interpretation of citizenship degraded non-white peoples’ humanity. They were part of the US Government’s sanctioned disfranchisement and exclusion of Indians from public life.407

Native American activities that had created some park landscapes, like burning (which created meadows for hunting), lumbering, and farming, were proscribed because they seemed unnatural to the
people who managed the parks. Early managers’ descriptions of park lands described their Indian residents as poachers, squatters, arsonists, and outlaws. The American Indians who set purposeful fires, hunted, or cut trees were officially reprimanded and unofficially harassed for their failure to appreciate natural beauty.  

Indians’ presence was inconsistent with the paradigmatic understanding that parks should be uninhabited, natural spaces, so nature enthusiasts, government officials, and park rangers worked to force them out. The process of reinterpreting residents’ occupation and consumptive use of the land from productive to criminal was tightly enmeshed with the evolution of wilderness as a space for recreation, and with the forces that shaped the park paradigm.

To make those landscapes authentically wild, nature enthusiasts, government officials, and park rangers systematically redefined Indian activities as criminal. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, American lawmakers redefined what constituted legitimate use for the environment by passing new laws that regulated hunting, cutting trees, and setting fires on public land. These activities were tied up in various schemes to “improve” the land through homesteading, reclamation through irrigation, as well as use as parks.

In all those places, the US Government, tourist business owners, nature enthusiasts and the National Park Service removed Indians from their homes and established legal precedents preventing their return. They succeeded because of precedents other Euroamericans set as they took over native land across the United States. One reason Native Americans failed to retain title to the land was that most Americans did not take their way of life or values very seriously. Most Euroamericans considered the Indians’ presence less legitimate than theirs.

The US Government’s willingness to enforce the new regulations was central to the creation of national parks. Indian residents who subsisted on the land watched as the law made their way of life less and less tenable. Indian and Euroamerican residents shared an understanding of the land as a
material resource and, while they might also have invested it with meanings related to its physical beauty and spiritual essence, they were more concerned with subsistence than scenery. That was one of the reasons why Indians did not generally play a large part in westerners’ conceptions of development there. Their lifeways were not only incompatible with park advocates’ plans for the places they called home, but with the plans Euroamerican settlers had for them.413

Flooding west in the wake of the Civil War, Euroamericans saw it as their divinely ordained mission to pacify what they saw as a savage land.414 The farms, ranches, and towns they built effectively broke up the plains that had supported the bison that were central to plains Indians’ ways of life. They introduced their own resident ethos to the land. In contrast to the Indians who ranged widely over the land, the Euroamericans built stationary, compact settlements and reinterpreted the land around the commodities it contained.

The Gospel of Development – Euroamerican Residents

On May 24, 1804, Meriwether Lewis and David Clark led the Corps of Discovery past the last, permanent European settlement on the Missouri River. They were on a mission to identify “the most direct & practicable water communication across this continent for the purposes of commerce.”415 In the course of what turned out to be a two-year expedition, they produced one of the first comprehensive, written descriptions of the North American landscape.

In the Upper Missouri Breaks (which is now a national monument), they described being touched by “Seens [sic] of Visionary enchantment.” They described the river’s banks as full of “much hard rock; & rich earth.” They concluded that all around them “the country still continues level fertile and beautifull [sic].”416
Lewis and Clark used the term “beauty” to connote the land’s potential productivity as well as its aesthetic attractiveness. They emphasized its richness and fertility. The explorers’ descriptions stoked Americans’ aspirations to use the land’s beauty for their profit.

Passing through lands unlike any they had ever seen before, the Euroamericans who followed Lewis and Clark, first in a trickle and then in flood (especially after passage of the Homestead Act in 1863), wrote about the region’s endless prairies, soaring mountains, and abundant timber. These settlers emphasized the commercial value of their natural resources in their descriptions of the region. They also described the land’s beauty.

What beauty meant to them was different from what it meant to other Euroamericans, especially nature enthusiasts. Resident, Euroamerican settlers highlighted and celebrated their ability to shape land, plants, and animals. Euroamerican residents treated the land as a place for industry, not recreation. Their point of view had important implications for the creation of national parks because businesspeople, nature enthusiasts, government officials, and tourists ultimately worked together to prevent residents from developing extractive industries in them. The efforts to resist resident development helped codify other parts of the park paradigm. It was a reaction to a very different way of viewing the same beautiful places.

These residents’ point of view was inextricably linked to the boosterism that attended North America’s conquest by Euroamerican settlers. The belief that “rain follows the plow,” that artesian wells would enable the development of semi-arid areas, and that there were mineral riches in every mine typified many aspirant residents’ belief that anything was possible there. Reports from the region emphasized the territories’ potential as a field for material development and showed settlers’ optimism that they would extract wealth from the land.

In contrast, nature enthusiasts, tourist business owners, and tourists themselves had a completely different view of the land. Residents based their perceptions on plans to actively reshape
the land. In contrast, tourists wanted to experience the land as it was. Resident descriptions employ practical prose, while tourist narratives use more figurative language to describe the same (or similar) spaces. Tourists wanted to experience the land passively, even if they commented on its potential ability to support businesses and people.

Business owners, government officials, National Park Service staff, and tourists all worked to marginalize resident perspectives. Residents acted as a foil to those who were enthusiastic about park development for leisure and natural preservation. Residents came from every class of society (though most were poor). One group that helps provide perspective on the differences between residents and tourists are Methodist ministers.

Methodist ministers’ travel accounts show the difference between tourists’ point of view (to which businesspeople, government officials, nature enthusiasts, and the National Park Service all catered) and residents’. The ministers’ accounts of their time in the west emphasize residents’ desire to create homes and extractive industries to take advantage of the land’s beauty and juxtapose them with tourists’ scenery-based descriptions of the land. The church structure the ministers worked in during the decades immediately following the American Civil War makes their descriptions especially useful.

Historians of the Methodist church describe the so-called “itinerating urge” that sent ministers out to ride circuits around the American west and world. The church did not assign itinerant ministers to any single parish, but sent them riding from church to church across large geographical areas. As a result, they did not live in any place for very long, and they moved around the west in search of opportunities to preach. In the process, they experienced and had opportunities to write about its vast landscape. As more Euroamericans moved across the west and permanent towns emerged (where ministers often settled with their spouses and families), the itinerating urge dissipated (to the great concern of leaders in the church) and ministers became residents of individual communities.
Itinerant and resident ministers’ descriptions of the land differed. Since the ministers shared similar educational backgrounds and convictions, their accounts remove confounding factors that make comparing other descriptions problematic. The words residents chose to describe the land emphasize their desire to change their surroundings. Resident ministers’ accounts show how tourists used beauty passively for aesthetic appreciation while residents reshaped it. Comparing their descriptions helps highlight some of the differences that set resident perspectives apart and eventually served as a foil to the park paradigm.

*Using Beauty – Aesthetics, Fertility, and Prosperity*

On a recreational hike he took while traveling through the east, a Methodist minister described his hike up Big Bald in the Unaka Mountains of eastern Tennessee adjacent to the future Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Ascending the mountain, he crossed a stream that was “beautiful beyond description” and reached its summit in time to watch the afternoon sun fall toward the horizon. Looking toward the present day Great Smoky Mountains National Park and “Clingman’s Dome, Mt. Mitchell, The Roan, and Grandfather,” he wrote about how the clouds “wove themselves into fantastic shapes, and took on all shades of color as the sun dipped toward the horizon. Great castles, with frowning monts and battlements stood out upon the air. Armies of angels, their banners flaming with scarlet and gold, marched through the midheavens. The gates of the eternal city itself opened to reveal the everlasting radiance of a better world.” The group watched the sky past dusk, “turning round and round to note the different effect in different quarters of the sky - and smitten more and more with the sublimity of the scene.”

For miles around the peak, mountains with ridges covered by untouched forest “beggedare description.” Those words imply that the forest was so beautiful words were inadequate to describe them. Not far below where that forest stood, loggers were felling trees to harvest their bark.
Along our route in the afternoon were stretched a great many magnificent spruce pines that had been cut down simply for the tan-bark which they yielded and then left to rot on the ground. It looked to me almost like a profanation…to spoil for less than $2 a giant forest which has taken God a half century to grow, is wastefulness of an extreme character.

Farther up the path, when they walked past a saw-mill, the minister commented that it seemed impractical to finish lumber “worth $20 per thousand feet [which] must be hauled fifteen miles over the roughest of roads to the nearest depot.”

This description emphasized the mountains’ and forests’ beauty and took issue with actions that would have destroyed it. When the minister confronted the fact that resident loggers wanted to destroy the forest to produce marketable timber, he made a utilitarian argument to justify leaving it alone. He wanted to experience the land without changing it. By judging the trees’ aesthetic value as exceeding their practical value, he justifies leaving them uncut. To the minister, destroying the forest seemed illogical.

The minister’s description of the forest is a tourist’s. Like the nature enthusiasts who argued using parks to draw tourists made better economic sense than allowing Euroamerican settlers to take up residence in them, this minister argued against allowing residents to sell the trees. He articulates a tourist perception that residents did not understand or appreciate the value of the beauty their work destroyed.

The area’s residents wanted to get something different out of the landscape than tourists did. Tourists wanted a figurative “mountain-top experience.” Residents wanted a literal one. The difference between their desires still defines the way that people frame conversations about managing land.

In his essay, “‘Are You an Environmentalist, or Do You Work for a Living?: Work and Nature,” Richard White argues recreational visitors to natural places identify “nature with play and making it by definition a place where leisured humans come only to visit and not to work, stay, or live.” In contrast, the people who live in those same or similar places experience them through work. He claims, “work
entails an embodiment, an interaction with the world, that is far more intense than play. We work to live.” The other groups that shaped the park paradigm shaped it in opposition to those kinds of experiences.424

Even though having a figurative mountaintop experience involves work, that work is qualitatively different from the kind that residents experienced. Residents interpreted trees’ ability to provide employment and income as more valuable than their appearance in situ. Tourists, on the other hand, masked the bodily labor their visits involved by framing it as recreational play. Tourists segregated the nature they visited from “real” work.425

The difference between the ways they treated the forest highlights the divide between tourists and residents. The tourist criticized the lumber-cutters because extractive industrial activity made it harder for them to access a meaningful leisure experience. The lumber cutters changed the forest to suit their needs, but, to the person who saw their work, misappropriated it to perform the wrong kind of work. The difference between resident and tourist perceptions of places is especially apparent in the language they chose to describe their experiences.

In the case of the Methodist ministers, they invoked Biblical allusions when they were describing places they visited for a short time. When they stayed put for years at a time, they usually did not use Biblical allusions or naturalistic descriptions nearly as often. The ministers who lived as permanent (or semi-permanent) residents wrote about the common-sense solutions they applied to solve everyday problems. They used practical, active words that implied their desire and ability to change the land when they wrote from places where they went for long-term assignments.

In contrast to the minister who went climbing in the Smokies, the reverend Samuel A. Weber, who was on a long-term assignment to the Pacific Coast, described the place he travelled to in practical terms. During his twenty-one-month assignment, Weber wrote, “the rainfall...was by far greater than in any one season since 1862.” He also wrote, “Last summer many wells had to be deepened owing to the
Weber did not invoke Noah or the flood in his description of rain. He did not beseech Moses or Aaron to guide him through the parched summer. He used the American South, not Canaan, as a reference to describe his neighbor’s produce. He did not invoke a plague to describe fruit withering on the vine waiting for shipment. The minister used words that showed his rootedness and his practical connection with the land. His account was an empirical litany of things he actually saw and experienced. Unlike the writer who claimed the clouds were full of “armies of angels, their banners flaming with scarlet and gold, marched through the midheavens,” Weber kept his description literally and figuratively grounded.

Weber framed his account around day-to-day descriptions of labor, not scenic abstractions or allusions. Visiting ministers’ descriptions were very different from Weber’s. Visitors used foreknowledge based on the Bible or simple presumptions to frame the way they described the land. Weber framed his experience around actual, physical work. The difference between them shows how Euroamerican tourist and resident perspectives about the land differed. They also differed in the ways that tourists passively imposed their own reality on places, while residents actively shaped their reality on and through them.

Dean MacCannell argues that simply seeing a site is not a touristic experience. He says, “An authentic touristic experience involves not merely connecting a marker to a sight, but a participation in a collective ritual” that connects one’s own experience at a site to that of others. As evidence, he told an anecdote about a woman he knew in Northern California who lived at the base of a mountain who
was “perfectly aware of the name of the mountain and its fame, but who did not know that ‘her’ mountain was ‘that’ mountain.” In other words, she did not connect it to a group or context outside of herself. It was merely “hers.” MacCannell argues that tourists can only have real experiences when they connected their own perspective of a place to one that they know others had as well.  

In contrast to tourists’ desire to use collective definitions of attractions to passively consume places, residents wanted to actively use them for their individual benefit. The difference is significant because it clarifies the distinction between tourist and resident perspectives. As noted earlier, rather than passively indulging their preconceived, collectively defined and shared expectations for western people and landscapes, residents defined their descriptions of the region using practical terms. Residents’ articles were about actively managing places, plants, and animals. In the case of Methodist ministers, they also wrote about growth or declines in attendance at different parishes. They also wrote about the construction of new buildings and local politics. Tourists’ articles usually focused on subjects such as prospects for future growth, the land’s potential abundance, or the appearance of the land (usually its beauty or desolation).

In a letter from Berkeley, California, Reverend L.C. Renfro proudly pointed to the construction of “many church facilities” as evidence that he and his fellow ministers had established a permanent Methodist presence in the west. Rather than gathering in crude or primitive frontier buildings, Renfro said his parishioners wanted an easily accessible, permanent structure for their worship services. “We need a church where our people can attend without taking long rides on the street cars every Sunday to Sunday School and Church service. We have a number of members there now and they keep coming. We must give them a home or they are gone.”  

These parishioners’ desire for a home was indicative of their desire to live permanently where they were. They did not want to be tourists. They aspired to be residents. Renfro’s complaint that he could not retain converts without a church building shows how he experienced that desire. It also
shows how accommodating the resident perspective in the park paradigm could be problematic, and may help explain why many of the people who were residents in their day-to-day lives became tourists after they settled in new communities across the west.

As residents succeeded at creating the permanent homes they wanted, some of them gave their support to creating parkscapes that prevented active work. The reasons that many of them supported withdrawing park land from active use were tied to the same utilitarian ethic that other groups used to justify creating them. They were tied to their perception that nature was becoming scarce.

As nature got scarcer, some residents claimed that some parts of it, the most authentic ones, should be set aside for protection. Those areas seemed more valuable in their own right than as farms, mines, or ranches. The residents who ultimately became park supporters as members of other groups couched their support for them in the same utilitarian terms that businesspeople, government officials, and people who wanted to protect natural spaces and processes all used to justify creating the parks.

Perspectives on preservation – Residents approach to the scarcity of nature

Starting around the turn of the twentieth century, many nature enthusiasts and tourists began to argue that natural resources needed to be protected from human use. Writers lobbied for federal or state governments to prevent extractive industrialists from destroying natural resources through over-development. The reasons that nature enthusiasts thought rivers, forests, and mountains needed protection differed. I previously explained how some argued the land should be conserved or preserved. Residents, on the other hand, were primarily concerned with using natural resources.

A Methodist minister wrote, “The recklessness with which American farmers destroy their timber is amazing. It is time they were calling a halt. If the process of deforestation goes on much longer at the rate of the last few decades, we shall have a genuine timber famine.” In that context, the reason deforestation was undesirable was that it would cause a shortage of marketable commodity,
lumber, not because the trees had intrinsic value. Preventing a lumber shortage was one of the reasons that some residents supported increased federal involvement in land management (which did not always result in the creation of national parks).

Some Methodist ministers argued that federal oversight was the only way to ensure the protection of western forests from unsustainable cutting. One wrote, “the Preservation of the forests, especially where they occupy ground that can be used profitably only for growing timber, and the restoration of such forests where they have already been destroyed is one of the most important of all government enterprises.” The reason the government should get involved was that it could manage the forests more sustainably and profitably than individual residents could.

The minister cites German success with nationalizing forest management to justify the American government doing the same. “The Prussian Government received last year 56,000,000 Marks from the sale of timber cut from the forests belonging to the crown. Public forests can be made to pay for themselves by the sale of timber, and to pay well.”432 By properly maintaining forests, lumbermen could be assured steady returns from the land. At the same time, government management would prevent destructive practices like clear-cutting that sometimes caused erosion on privately managed land.

Other residents claimed that some forests’ unique qualities meant that they deserved protection. In the case of California’s giant redwoods, some ministers wrote that several groves of the big trees that are now in or near Yosemite National Park deserved protection because “their age runs far up into the thousands [of years].” Trees in the Mariposa Grove needed protection from “the lumberman… [who would] threaten the utter destruction of many of [them].” The federal government needed to prevent lumber cutters’ permanently preventing people from experiencing these one of a kind trees. Residents also argued that animals deserved federal protection.

In this they joined conservationists, preservationists, and the National Park Service to influence the park paradigm. By the turn of the twentieth century, so few buffalo remained on the plains that
only careful management saved them from extinction. In an article titled, “The Last of the American Bison,” one minister worried that only 154 of the animals were “sheltered in Yellowstone National Park.” He thought that the park’s harsh winters, the threat of wolf predation, and poaching meant that bison could disappear completely.433

That article’s apocalyptic tone makes it seem strange that hunters decimated the herds with impunity less than a generation before. In fact, an article printed in the same paper by another minister less than a decade before had described the destruction of the bison as an essential step in civilizing the west. While the slaughter “might seem like cruelty and wasteful extravagance, the buffalo, like the Indian, stood in the way of civilization and the path of progress...The same territory which...was supporting those vast herds of wild game is now sustaining millions of domestic animals, which afford the food supply of hundreds of millions of people in civilized countries.”434

With bison on the brink of extinction, residents, tourists, and nature enthusiasts started to treat the species more sentimentally. This author advocates the buffalo’s preservation and renewal but, unlike the forests, stops short of suggesting a practical need to retain the animal. He implied that the reasons to save the bison were intangible or related to their intrinsic value.

Resident westerners who supported conserving and preserving animals or forests were the often among the same people who later traveled to the parks as tourists. These types of observations show how some residents believed increasingly scarce and unique natural resources deserved to be managed differently from more common ones. The reason it is worth looking at the different justifications is to show how some residents adopted positions where they supported “not doing” things on land that they simultaneously claimed was fertile for agricultural, mineral, and animal cultivation. They still wanted to take advantage of the land’s material fertility to enrich themselves and support their families, but when they and/or other groups succeeded at creating parks, that led many of them to
take the devil’s bargain that traded their cultural autonomy for material security. It also caused many of them to resist park creation.

When residents resisted creating parks, they did so because the things their supporters claimed they were protecting did not seem scarce or unique enough to be permanently set aside. In other words, residents subverted the trope of authenticity in order to justify pursuing their own interests. Residents’ belief that beauty translated into fertility made the creation of permanent park lands seem impractical and out of touch.

Their utilitarian frame led them to believe that they would be better off developing the land’s material potential than by permanently setting it aside for tourists to passively experience. The reason they were not able to prevent park development—and, as I explain addressing Shenandoah National Park, ended up forced out of them—was that they did not find an effective way of couching their perspective as the most authentic. The residents who resisted park creation did not view the places being set aside as scarce enough to deserve special protection, or framed their scarcity as meaning that they would be more useful if they were mined or otherwise developed to do actual work with the resources they contained.

In the final estimation, the disconnect between residents’ beliefs about national parks and other groups’ hinges on each groups’ expectations for them. Tourists and their allies wanted to passively consume leisure experiences while residents wanted to actively engage and change the same places where those experiences are possible. Residents’ efforts to resist park development is evident across the United States. Their resistance helped park supporters organize in opposition and, in the process, clearly articulate and implement what became key parts of the park paradigm.
1.7 – Conclusion: One Best Way

“National parks are simultaneously very real places and the embodiment of an idea...That idea—that a nation’s most majestic and sacred places should be preserved for everyone, and for all time—we now call the national park idea.”435

Dayton Duncan

The national parks are part of Americans’ shared heritage. They are a conspicuous success for their relevance and popularity. They enjoy acclaim as relics of early America, for the glimpses they give of a supposedly natural bygone order, and as evidence of our good intentions for the natural world.

Yellowstone’s remote backcountry appears more natural, untouched, and wild than the parking lot at Old Faithful, but the parking lot gets far more attention - so much so that rangers in Yellowstone joke that 95% of visitors see 5% of the park.436 The fact that different groups of see both kinds of experiences as enjoyable shows how people satisfy their desires for leisure in the same place in different ways. The national park paradigm enjoys cachet and currency because, no matter what kind of experiences visitors want to have in the parks, they believe the parks are authentic, and therefore places where meaningful experiences are accessible.

This popularity is manifest in the acclaim national parks enjoy as well as in the efforts by preservation groups and elected officials who work to add units to the system. One of the reasons members of Congress and nature enthusiasts across the United States want areas they care about designated as National Park Service units is that the status confers cachet for its association with it. This does not mean that all of these groups expect to experience the parks in the same ways.

The fact that businesspeople, government officials, nature enthusiasts, tourists, park rangers, and residents in national parks often expressed incompatible opinions belies the more complicated relationships all of them had with the places they fought over managing. Even though their management philosophies are contradictory, they collectively demonstrated a shared belief that there was, in fact, one best way to manage natural places. No matter what practices each of them favored, all advocated for their own belief that there was a proper way to maximize access to national parks’
tangible or intangible values. Historians and land management professionals have memorialized members of every group for their supposed foresight in protecting national park lands. However, the reality is that park supporters like Mather, Muir, and their peers’ modern acclaim has as much to do with their rhetorical success enshrining particular values as parts of national parks’ identities as with the National Park Service’s supposedly superior methods of managing them.

In other words, each of these groups’ reputations is due in large part to their success at convincing park visitors who came after them that they made appropriate choices to manage the land. Every group wanted to find fulfillment in the parks, but had their own ideas of what national parks ought to be like. The result was that the parks became artifacts that integrated parts of all of their visions.

As that process played out, groups with opposing views often expressed their concerns in remarkably similar terms – and were motivated by similar needs and historical processes. While their interpretations were culturally distinct and used to articulate radically different ideas about what the parks ought to be, they all experienced them as crucial to their political, cultural, and even spiritual identities.

As additional national parks came into the system, the park paradigm set the standard for how to manage them. The rest of this dissertation addresses how that process played out in two parks. It explains how and why Shenandoah and Death Valley, places that were nothing like preexisting parks, ended up managed like Yellowstone and Yosemite. It argues that the reason Shenandoah and Death Valley ended up that way was due to other parks’ popularity and the push of technological momentum.
Section 2 – An Eastern Park in the Western Tradition – Reshaping Shenandoah to fit the park paradigm

Seventy-five miles west of the United States Capitol in Washington, DC, there is a natural reserve in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia. More than one million people came to enjoy its high vistas, tumbling waterfalls, and abundant wildlife in 2017, but it was not always a natural attraction.439 The year before Franklin Roosevelt formally dedicated the park in 1935, more than one hundred families still called it home, thousands of acres stood logged and barren, and public roads crisscrossed its backcountry.440 The National Park Service imposed a new identity on the formerly inhabited lands to make it match the paradigm for parks that the agency, business owners, nature enthusiasts, the US Government, and former residents had all shaped in the American west.

Shenandoah came into the National Park System for reasons only incidentally related to its appearance or supposed uniqueness. It was located near eastern population centers full of potential tourists who nature enthusiasts, government officials, and national park service personnel all wanted to court for their political support. It was home to residents who, according to nature enthusiasts, were not using the land properly, but who nonetheless helped visitors immerse themselves in a nostalgic, primitive, pioneer experience. Business owners who thought they would profit from attracting more tourists to the Blue Ridge supported creating a national park there. In order to make Shenandoah fit the park paradigm, it had to conform to the expectations tourists developed in large, undeveloped, natural parks in the American west. In order to reshape it, first it had to enter the public domain.

Since almost all of the land in the eastern US was privately owned by the 1920s, park supporters had to figure out how to acquire land to create the park before they could change it to be like other units of the National Park System. In Shenandoah, that required the cooperation of state and county authorities who acted on behalf of the federal government to acquire land from willing sellers and through the right of eminent domain. Officials from the Commonwealth of Virginia worked with federal employees in a variety of New Deal agencies, as well as the National Park Service, to acquire land there.
The park supporters’ success at harnessing government power to acquire land for the park shows how the park idea had gained legitimacy as part of a maturing technological system. 441

After the state acquired the land and transferred it to the federal government, it fell to the National Park Service and Civilian Conservation Corps to reshape it so visitors would have the same kinds of experiences that were accessible in older parks in the American west. Since the National Park Service wanted to use Shenandoah to build a constituency that would support increased appropriations for national parks across the US, it was important that Shenandoah not only provide a high-quality experience, but also that it be actively associated with other parks. Park rangers reshaped the park so that it would provide access to inspiring experiences using monumental attractions in a natural setting. Sending that message required reshaping the landscape to erase its previous occupants. In order to understand how that transformation took place, this chapter introduces an eccentric businessperson and explains how he set the stage to make Shenandoah a national park.

Yodeling in the Mountains - George Freeman Pollock’s Skyland Resort

George Freeman Pollack was the son of a well-heeled, old northeastern family in Washington, DC. He spent some of his summers exploring along the Blue Ridge with his father, who had a financial interest in mines there. Pollock claimed that when he saw the land around what became Shenandoah for the first time in 1886, “[I] raved and shouted and probably would have yodelled [sic] if I had known, at that time, how to yodel.” He reveled in its isolation and took pride in his belief that “except for a few of the farmers who lived near the foot of the Mountain, no travelers from the ‘lowlands’ had ever visited” the places where he traveled. 442 He claimed that “the Mountain and the area surrounding it were undeveloped wildernesses, the only access from the Valley being an old, single horseback mining trail” that had been built for a short-lived copper boom immediately before the American Civil War. 443
In Washington, he attempted to impress on his father, whose mining claims were in the mountains, that the land would make a good tourist resort. He glossed over potential complications such as the “primitive conditions” and did not mention “that I did not [initially] wish to stay very long” because of a fear of rattlesnakes. Pollock claimed that by “waving my arms and gesticulating” and by explaining what the area looked like “in the best language I could command,” he convinced his father to buy land there.

Through a combination of guile and genuine enthusiasm, Pollock also succeeded at convincing some of his father’s business partners to invest in the construction of buildings for a summer resort. With their help, he bought “5371 acres which included Stony Man Mountain, a portion of Thoroughfare Mountain, Hot Mountain, some of hazel Mountain, a goodly portion of Hawksbill; all of Miller’s Head, Bushy Top and Dry Run Canyon; and a portion of the headwaters of White Oak Canyon.” He named his resort Stony Man Camp (the predecessor to Skyland Resort) and decided to subdivide it into lots around a central lodge. He marketed the lots to Washingtonians who wanted to escape the city’s summer heat and mosquitoes.

The resort never lived up to his claims that it was “a veritable paradise on earth,” but his project set an important precedent. Pollock’s construction of a resort inaugurated a tradition of viewing the land around the Blue Ridge as a leisurescape. Framing the land on the Blue Ridge as a recreational space started the process of shaping it to fit the park paradigm, but also ignored the residents who called it home.

Pollock was using the land differently than the residents who already lived there. When he started work on Stony Man Camp, the Blue Ridge was home to hundreds of families who lived in isolated communities around the mountains. They used the land to support themselves and their children, not for leisure. Pollock reframed their work there so that it would contribute to the leisure experiences he wanted to provide access to through his resort.
Caricature and condescension defined Pollock’s characterization of his neighbors, whom I refer
to as mountain people, mountaineers, or residents. He described them as relics of a bygone era and
made them out as living specimens of the hardy frontierspeople who had blazed trails that paved the
way for modern civilization. He wrote about their idiosyncratic habits and claimed they had a wretched
standard of living. At the same time, he associated them with positive attributes like independence and
individuality.

For example, he described the “bare-footed mountain men” who came to visit the camp shortly
after he started construction. Writing in the 1930s, he wrote that when he first arrived on the mountain
in 1886, all of them “carried a gun, for at that time and for twenty years afterwards you never saw one
of those mountaineers without a gun over his shoulder.”\textsuperscript{449} Pollock’s description implies the
mountaineer’s poverty (they did not even wear shoes), their disconnection from modern, eastern
society (where carrying a gun in public would have been anathema), and their self-reliance (carrying a
gun implies the mountaineer’s ability to “live off the land”).\textsuperscript{450}

In the years to come, Pollock used those stereotypes to capitalize on the mountaineers’
association with the land around Stony Man Camp. He treated the mountaineers as a spectacle to
amuse his guests, a source of labor for his many construction projects, and a font of anecdotes that lent
local flavor the camp atmosphere. In the process, he simultaneously weaved their story into the area’s
identity and asserted that they were backward and misusing the land.

For example, in his history of the resort, Pollock wrote “the story of a killing which had taken
place two miles from Stony Man Peak (and about a mile from Skyland) at the log cabin of Tom Parks.”
Pollock explained that

\begin{quote}

Parks had a brother in law [sic]...who had been hiding for months in the fastness and
seclusion of his mountain home, safe from the officers of the law at Madison
Courthouse twenty-five miles away. In the meantime, a few of the Parks’ [family] hogs
had been killed in the forest and the Parks had accused members of the neighboring Sisk
family that lived in the wilderness east of what is now known as Hawksbill head and just
about five miles from the Parks’ cabin.
\end{quote}
He described a “feud [that] had been smoldering for over a year when the Parks family received word that on a certain night the Sisks were going to seek revenge for the hog-killing stories which had been circulated about them.” The night of the raid, “there was some drinking, but as the mountaineers, armed with their old Kentucky-style squirrel guns, huddled in the firelight of the old log cabin and awaited the attack, their voices were low and hushed.” When the raiders arrived “Mrs. Parks whispered: ‘Hy’ar they come.’” In the ensuing melee, one of the attackers was shot dead. Much to everyone’s chagrin, Pollock said that the Parks family had been duped. The intruders advancing on the Parks’ cabin were not their neighbors. They were deputy sheriffs coming to arrest Tom Parks on a charge of bigamy.451

The way that Pollock told the story of the Parks and Sisks gives the impression that they not only had poor judgement, but that they lacked at best the initiative or at worst the ability to prosper in modern society. His description of them as willing to commit murder in retribution for the theft of pigs implied that they were petty and had either chosen not to, or were incapable of, being civil. It also implies an anachronistic distrust of public institutions such as law enforcement agencies and courts.452 Pollock’s emphasis on the event’s proximity to his resort was intentional and intended to associate parts of the mountaineers’ supposedly novel and interesting lifestyle with it. Pollock took advantage of that association to try to convince tourists to pay for homes there.

Pollock recognized one of the reasons tourists were willing to spend money was to escape their everyday lives and the heat of Washington DC. He attempted to lure them out of the everyday in a novel atmosphere that was unique partially because of the mountaineers who lived there. Local residents suffered the indignity of Pollock’s abuse, but also benefited from the work he paid them to do at Stony Man Camp. Collectively, they were all working to shape the place that tourist business owners, tourists, Resettlement Administration officials, and National Park Service rangers decided was worthy of becoming a national park. Consistent with other units of the park system where businesspeople shaped
perceptions of park resources to their benefit, Pollock continued to shape the narrative surrounding Stony Man Camp to his profit at residents’ expense.

Pollock used stories about encounters with his neighbors to build a narrative that implied their inferiority to the visitors he encouraged to go see them. He also used stories about the maintainers to connect Stony Man Camp with the recently disappeared frontier that some eastern tourists were nostalgic to experience. In so doing, Pollock used eastern lore to access the frontier experience tourists traveled to experience in western national parks. It helped tourists recall the supposedly glorious past when Euroamericans battled Indians, the elements, and each other to settle in unhospitable places. In some cases, he was even able to weave himself into that narrative.

In his history of Skyland Resort, Pollock told the story of his first encounter with his neighbors in an area known as Nicholson Hollow. Before the trip, Pollock’s guide, John Printz, “was full of forebodings as to what my reception might be” and tried to talk him out of going. Printz explained that the reason why “this isolated community had been christened Free State Hollow was because it was really a free state.” Pollock said, “the mountaineers were seldom disturbed by outside officers, it being too rough and wild for sheriffs and their deputies.” Pollock nevertheless made up his mind to go, and set off without a guide, with the advice to approach “Old Man Aaron Nicholson” who was “the ‘granddaddy’ of the entire clan” when he arrived there.

The journey was not easy. He said, “in the descent from Stony Man Peak to the Hughes River the going was very rough with cliffs and rocks everywhere. I had to twist and turn but I knew that as long as I was going down and following the headwaters of the mountain stream, I was all right.” When “a clearing and log cabin came into view,” he confessed, “I was somewhat fearful, [as] unheralded and unknown, I approached the mountain settlement” a stranger. In the distance, he saw a “massive, bow-legged form” who turned out to be from the hollow’s namesake family: Aaron Nicholson.
According to Pollock, he greeted the man by saying “‘How do you do, Mr. Nicholson? I have heard you spoken of by Mr. John David Printz with whom I am now staying in the Page Valley, and he told me you were a fine fellow, a peaceful man, and that I would get a good welcome from you.’” The only note he made about Nicholson’s apparel was that he “walked out, feet bare (as, in fact, were the feet of all the Hollow people) and when he extended his hand, I knew that we were going to be friends.” Then he noticed “the old man’s eyes traveled to the Kodak which seemed to fascinate him. He had never heard of photographs and I doubt whether he had ever seen a newspaper picture or an illustrated book.” As a small crowd gathered around them, Pollock recorded what Nicholson had to say.

He wrote Nicholson’s response in vernacular. He said the old man greeted him by saying “Wal, stranger...I am powerful glad to see you. I heerd tell of John David Printz over thar’ in Page, but I never see’d him. You hain’t got no gun and you air nothin’ but a boy. I sure reckon you hain’t no revenoo man. But, stranger, I want to know: what brought you into Free State Hollow? [sic]” Pollock explained that he wanted to explore the hills and get to know the residents who called them home. He complimented Nicholson for his “real good mountaineer home.”

With introductions out of the way, Pollock said he sensed Nicholson “seemed inclined to carry on further conversation.” Nicholson asked, “what mought be your fust name and whar do you come from?” Pollock explained, “I come from the City of Washington where the President of the United States lives.” He said, “you should have seen the faces of this group as I made that announcement.” Nicholson was impressed and said, “Wal, George, I reckon you and the President is good friends if he is your neighbor.” To which Pollock replied, “Yes, surely we are good friends. Everybody is a friend of the President. He is the great ruler of this country, yours and mine.” Nicholson was impressed and took the opportunity to ask his guest a question that Pollock retold in a manner that demonstrated his erudition and sophistication.
Nicholson asked, “wal, George, I mougt ask you a question. You appear to be a tolerable
edicated boy. Ken you spell ‘scissors?’” Pollock said, “that flabbergasted me and every person in the

group became extremely attentive, craning their necks and poking their heads forward to hear my
reply.” Now at the climax of his story, Pollock wrote that he replied “why surely I can spell scissors.
That is very easy. S-c-i-s-s-o-r-s. Scissors.” Pollock wrote, “old man Nicholson looked amazed. He
turned around, gazed at his sons, daughters and friends and as much as if to say ‘that settles it,’
remarked to one and all: ‘this here is a really edicated boy.’” In fact, Nicholson turned to tell his eldest
son that “only one man has ever been in the Free State Hollow who could spell that word and he was a
schoolteacher who visited Sue Nicholson several years ago in the Hollow down near Nethers Mill.”

As his coup de grace, Pollock asked members of the crowd if he could take a picture of them
with his Kodak camera. “Nothing doing!” Nicholson said. “They seemed to think that that would be a
terrible thing but finally a couple of the young men,” who apparently were not isolated enough to be
disinterested in currency were tempted by a silver dollar pose. The pair were frustrated when he “had
to explain to them that the pictures could not be taken out of the box immediately but had to be carried
away, treated chemically and then printed by the sunshine.” That request put Pollock in a quandary, but
he ultimately resolved the issue by carefully taking the camera’s film out of the camera and explained
that he need to take it to Washington to have the images processed before he could show them. That
explanation satisfied the boys, so they allowed Pollock to go on his way.457

Pollock’s account of meeting his mountain people was probably partially an artifact of memory
(it having happened decades before he wrote it down), and his perspective as a city-dweller, but it
nonetheless shows that he did not hold the mountaineer’s way of life in high regard. The story, and the
vernacular prose he chose to record it in, seems calculated to give the impression that the mountaineers
were not only uneducated, but also inarticulate, superstitious, and generally uncivilized. Pollock
reduced the residents to such a cliché that anyone who accepted his account at face value probably
would not regard the mountaineers with much respect or afford them much dignity. In short, he degraded their humanity. That said, Pollock’s prejudice was not exceptional and it enjoyed official sanction.\textsuperscript{458} What makes it worth discussing is that the same mountain residents he belittled played an important part in shaping his resort’s, and later the park’s, popular identity.

\textit{Mountain Home – Residents effect on Shenandoah’s identity}

Part of Pollock’s resort’s appeal to visitors was its association with early America. The residents Pollock parodied were important parts of making the region into a tourist destination. In brochures and posters he published to promote the resort, Pollock capitalizes on the “mountain folk.” Advertisements for the resort promised visitors would see “The Native Mountaineers in the Dances and Pastimes” along with “The Rustic Bark-Covered Cabins” they called home. He included descriptions of them alongside promises of “Wonderful Fairy-Like sunset-and Cloud Effects, The Unsurpassed ‘Cascades of White Oak Canyon,’” and “Towering Mountain Peaks and Frowning Cliffs” to build the case that his camp was “unique, novel, [and] original.”\textsuperscript{459} In a word, he contended that the mountaineers were one of the attractions, and that their presence contributed to the region’s authenticity.

In the \textit{Bugle Call}, a weekly paper Pollock printed about camp news in the summer, Pollock tried to accrue cachet to his resort by using the mountain peoples’ homes as settings for stories. In the paper, Pollock recounts trips he either arranged or encouraged to immerse visitors in his version of mountain culture.\textsuperscript{460} On a trip to the Parks’ Family Cabin in 1898, Pollock wrote that he and “the trampers” arrived “just in time for dinner, which tasted especially good.” Visitors wrote, “it is very interesting to study these mountaineers. Their ideas differ from ours in many ways.” Pollock thought his visitors were impressed with the mountaineers and wrote that, on this particular hike, “one member of our party thought that was the most enjoyable part of the trip.”\textsuperscript{461} Visits to the mountaineers’ novel
homes were so popular with resort visitors that he worked to expand access to them in the years to come.

In order to guarantee that visitors would have the opportunity to have experiences like the one in *The Bugle*, he took advantage of the mountain residents’ desire to make money. Pollock paid mountain families to do work for his visitors and to take them on guided tours in the area around his resort. By paying the mountaineers for their work, Pollock was using a strategy that was already common in national parks across the country. He was making a devil’s bargain with them. Pollock paid the mountaineers to appropriate parts of their way of life, but he denigrated them in the process.\(^\text{462}\) Pollock’s actions had ample precedent in other parts of the National Park System.

In Glacier National Park, the Great Northern Railway employed Blackfeet Indians to entertain passengers near the company’s terminal. At the Grand Canyon, the Fred Harvey Company kept a large stock of Navajo souvenirs, curios, and trinkets on hand along with the Indians who made them.\(^\text{463}\) In both cases, the Indians profited by selling experiences or objects, but ended up othered as a result. In those cases and others like them, tourist business owners who profited from the cachet the Indians’ identities lent to the parks claimed that those arrangements were mutually beneficial to customers and the residents they employed. Pollock made a similar argument by framing himself as a benefactor to the mountain people around his resort.\(^\text{464}\)

In his history of Skyland, Pollock wrote that mountaineers living within ten miles “made at least part of their living off of Skyland, and those of Corbin Hollow depended altogether on us for their livelihood.” Pollock claimed that “we gave them a market for their baskets, fruit, and berries; gave them employment working in the garden and cutting wood; and [building] all of the trails for miles around Skyland, which cost thousands of dollars, were built by mountain people to whom I either gave contracts or else employed as day laborers.” In fact, he believed it was a “simple fact that I was the only employer in the whole region.” Pollock claimed he was doing a service to the residents who lived near
Skyland because he did not realize any benefit from paying them or attracting tourists to his resort except through their work’s improvements to his property.\textsuperscript{465}

Pollock’s description of the mountaineer’s relationship with Skyland is self-aggrandizing. He claims that the residents were the beneficiaries of his largesse. His description fits the narrative he used to make the resort an attractive tourist attraction and belies the more complicated relationship he and the resort had with residents on the Blue Ridge. It also ignores how the relationship between Pollock and the mountaineers influenced the precedents that shaped Shenandoah National Park.\textsuperscript{466} The mountain’s residents played an important role in defining how Pollock ran Skyland and, as a result, influenced the ways government officials, nature enthusiasts, and tourists perceived the land eventually incorporated into Shenandoah.

Pollock’s presentation of the residents who called the mountains home was paternalistic and condescending, but give and take defined the relationship. For example, he wrote that in order to have dry firewood for the summer, trees needed to be felled during the winter. But the mountain people Pollock said depended on income from Skyland were unwilling to work for wages in the winter. To get the work he needed done completed, Pollock appealed to the mountaineers in a different way. He claimed to take advantage of their pride.

Pollock wrote about how he “learned that the mountain people would come out for a shooting match no matter the time of year nor how cold. Moreover, while they would not cut wood in the winter for wages, they would do so as an admission fee to my shooting matches.” The hotelier said, “each man who cut two cords of wood would be paid for the wood and, in addition, would be entitled to enter the match and compete for the interesting and useful articles which I would bring up as prizes.” One of the most popular items he brought “was a .22 caliber Marlin repeating rifle, a picture of which I had sent up in advance to my Caretaker, Eddie Parks.” He said, “such a rifle had never before been seen in that part of the country and, oh, how the mountaineers longed for it!”\textsuperscript{467} In this way, Pollock managed to get the
work he wanted done and satisfy the residents who worked for him. His need to adjust the tactics he used to get wood cut shows the limits of his influence among the mountaineers.

While Pollock presents himself as the senior partner in his relationship with the mountain people, the story shows how they retained ultimate control over their lives, and were almost certainly better off than his other, debasing descriptions of them implied. Pollock’s telling of the story about the rifle makes his employees out as simple and lazy, but also demonstrates that they might not have had so great a need of the wages he paid them, after all. If they were unwilling to work for money, it raises questions about how much of his description of their sloth was a self-serving trope that simultaneously helped fit them into popular stereotypes and preconceived perceptions of residents who lived in Appalachia. Reinterpreting the story to access this hidden transcript also restores some of the dignity his caricatured descriptions deprive the mountaineers of.468

Assessing the discrepancy between Pollock’s account of the mountaineer’s dependence on him, and his account of their interest in his shooting match, leaves questions about how he perceived their agency.469 The questions he raised about their intelligence and civility seemed to confirm that they needed his patronage, but, as I explain later in this section, his admission that they did not have to work for him says otherwise. Pollock also told stories about mountaineers who were nasty and brutish.

Early in Pollock’s tenure on the mountain, he shot a series of photographs featuring local scenes he planned to use in advertisements for his resort. In the winter of 1893-94, he received a letter from John Printz “stating that high winds and zero weather had made White Oak Canyon more beautiful than it had been in many years.” Since Pollock “had been hoping to get some winter pictures of the various waterfalls [he] was therefore quite excited.”470 Along with Joseph Moyer, his bookkeeper, and Printz, Pollock went to see the canyon. When he arrived, they found “Its cascades and waterfalls frozen into fantastic shapes and the beautiful evergreens which lined its sides were often covered with frozen spray
from the falls.” After snapping a few photos and preparing to leave for home, they heard a mountaineer they knew named Fletcher yell to them from a cliff that he wanted to see them.

The group had discussed him on their walk to the Canyon and worried that Fletcher “had developed a great dislike for me [Pollock] despite the fact that, except for one occasion, we had never met.” On that day, he called down “Polick [sic], I want to see you up here; I want to have a settlement.” When he arrived at the top of the falls, Fletcher ordered his son, who was with him, “bead on them Sonny” with his long rifle and then proceeded to “hit me full and square on the jaw, knocking me down on the ice.” In the fight that followed, “Fletcher, talking continuously and punctuating his remarks with an occasional blow, soon made it plain that he was getting his revenge for my ever having come into that country.” While at the same time, “he had pulled and twisted his mustache until blood was running down from his lip to his mouth and in his rage he looked like a demon.” Pollock said the mountaineer “accused me of doing all sorts of things, mainly that I had not accepted his way of running the mountains, and talked as though he was actually the owner of the land, while his conduct and remark showed that he figured I was entirely through. He just wanted to make sure I would never come back.”

Neither the beating nor any of Fletcher’s threats, which climaxed with a promise to murder Pollock if he ever saw him again, put him off. In the years to come, he not only returned annually, but also increased his holdings and influence around the mountains. The episode demonstrates that, while Pollock had an eye for the picturesque, he had a fundamentally different way of looking at the mountains than did the residents who called them home.

When Pollock described the land Fletcher called home, he decided, “he would never have come to such a forsaken place and have remained so long” unless he were “connected with dark doings in another part of the country,” but it might also have been possible that the mountaineer’s rage was directed at something else. Skyland heralded a new era for the Blue Ridge Mountains and not everyone
was excited to see the old one slip away. Life in the mountains was defined by more than isolation. To many of the residents who lived there, it was the only home they knew and, for many of their families, had been for generations. As their later actions showed, when Pollock monetized and marketed it as scenery, the mountain people saw what he was doing as a threat to their way of life.472

We can only speculate what exactly drove Fletcher to blows, but what he did seems to show that he felt his title to the land was more legitimate than some hotelier’s. Pollock’s statement that the mountaineer “…talked as though he was actually the owner of the land…” shows how different his interpretation of legitimate ownership was from Fletcher’s. To Pollock and the tourists he drew to Shenandoah, land was a commodity. Whoever held its title was its owner. To Fletcher, though, holding title seems to have been less important. Pollock’s willingness to defame Fletcher as “connected with the dark doings in another part of the country” misses the point that, while he might in fact have been an outlaw, he was trying to remedy what he apparently saw as a great problem. The disconnection between residents’ views of the area and the views of the tourist business owners’ like Pollock would shortly become an issue of national importance as a movement emerged to advocate Shenandoah’s designation as a park.

Selling Shenandoah – George Pollock and the park paradigm

In his report on the activities of the National Park Service to the Secretary of the Interior for the fiscal year 1923, Stephen Mather wrote about the potential to expand the National Park System in the east. Specifically, he thought that “a typical section of the Appalachian Range…with its native flora and fauna [should be] conserved and made accessible for public use and its development undertaken with federal funds.” In response to the report, Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work took steps to identify areas of the Appalachians that would be “suitable for national parks.” He created a commission to investigate possible sites and methods of acquiring them for use as parks.473
In their final report to the Secretary, the Southern Appalachian Park Commission wrote about how they investigated sites in Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. The sites they selected to consider had all been nominated by local citizens who had filled out a questionnaire that asked for “location, area, maximum and minimum altitude, and special scenic features” as well as “whether the area had been lumbered, and the approximate price that would probably be asked for the land involved.” The questionnaire was designed to make it easy for the commission to determine whether the possible park lands fit the park paradigm – or, in their words, were up to park standards.

The items the commission chose for the questionnaire identified features they associated with the precedents set for parks in the west. They were looking for isolated places large enough to assure visitors could escape crowds and find seclusion. Those places were comprised of novel landscapes and contained places that had the potential to evoke sublime experiences through special scenery. They were trying to identify places that had the potential to be real parks. George Pollock composed his answers to the questionnaire so that Skyland would live up to the commission’s expectations of access to the kinds of wild, unconfined recreation that were already popularly associated with the western parks where the paradigm was born.

Pollock made his submission in support of Skyland’s admission to the Park System in 1924. “Dictating to my stenographer a rough draft of our answers,” Pollock said, “we all got excited with the task…and no wonder! We were convinced that we had a real national park site to present and our answers not only sounded good, they actually were good.”

He described the area’s “beautiful waterfalls,” its wide variety of trees, and “all kinds of hardwood which in large portions of this area have never been touched with the axe.” When it came to addressing his resort and its neighbors’ presence on the land, though, he was less forthcoming. To answer the question “does the area contain improvements such as towns, factories, mines, farms,
quarries, hydroelectric power plants or other developments?” Pollock wrote, “no—absolutely free.” In an answer to a question on the quality of the region’s forests he wrote that “except for sporadic fires of a few acres in extent, which have not destroyed big timber there has been no devastation by fire throughout this entire region.” Pollock concluded that another “reason why this area should be at once taken over by the US Government, from the standpoint of public policy, is that most of it has a great deal of commercial timber on it, and negotiations are active for its exploitation in the immediate future.”

To say that Pollock stretched the truth is an understatement. It is impossible that he was ignorant of all the development that had taken place in the area, because he was responsible for it. Only a few years before, he wrote proudly in The Bugle about how “the system of water-works which supplies the cabins and Dining Hall with water has been changed” so that “now a great abundance of water is supplied.” The change was to remove a “hydraulic ram that formerly pumped day and night” and to build a new, gravity fed system that used a reservoir, pipes, and septic system that covered many acres of the resort. In order to provide milk and meat for guests at Skyland, Pollock directed the removal of trees to create pastures that were full of stock managed by the mountaineers.

He also did not write about the fires he and the mountaineers had periodically fought to keep other areas around Skyland forested. During one particularly bad season, he wrote, “I gathered a force of helpers and...made a dash up the Mountain through blinding smoke, filled with fear and trepidation as to what we might find upon arrival. From the lights of the fires it looked as though Skyland was surely burning.” These fires were an annual, or at least semi-annual part of life at Skyland, so his omission of them, and the firefighters who fought them, along with the infrastructural improvements he had made around the resort, make him seem especially two-faced.

The reason Pollock described the land around Skyland the way that he did was to make it fit the park paradigm better. He knew that large stands of first-growth timber would make Skyland seem
unique, especially in the east. He knew that the absence of human development was essential to make the area live up to the standard set by the unpeopled landscapes that were already parks. He knew that claiming the forests had not been “damaged” by fire and contained different kinds of trees was important in order to prove that they were worth visiting for their beauty (which meant seeing an exceptional landscape that was not influenced by injurious forces from nature or lumber cutters). That said, Pollock succeeded in their object to raise the committee’s interest in visiting potential parklands in the Blue Ridge.

After reviewing Pollock’s submission, the committee sent a delegation to see the places he described in the fall of 1924. When they arrived in Front Royal (later to be the northern boundary of the park), they were greeted by “several hundred residents headed by a band.” With Pollock leading them, the committee spent several days exploring near Skyland before they suspended the visit so that the full committee could travel to see the site. When they did, the waterfalls, canyons, and forests Pollock picked to show them made a significant impression on them. Skyland occupied a prominent place in the commission’s report to the Secretary of the Interior.

In their report, the commission wrote, “nature calls us all, and the response of the American people has been expressed in the creation, so far, of 19 national parks.” Unfortunately, “all but one are west of the Mississippi River.” So “the two-thirds of our population living east of the Mississippi has contented itself with a few State parks, not knowing that in the southern Appalachian Range there are several areas which fill the definition of a national park, because of beauty and grandeur and scenery, presence of a wonderful variety of trees and plant life, and possibilities of harboring and developing the animal life common in the precolonial days but now nearly extinct.” In order to correct that, influential advocates including John D. Rockefeller Junior advocated and helped pay for the establishment of parks centered on the Great Smoky Mountains near Gatlinburg, Tennessee, and the Blue Ridge Mountains near George Pollock’s Skyland resort in Virginia.
The parallel movement to establish a national park south of Shenandoah in the Smokies is indicative of how attractive parks were to business owners and politicians from that area as well. The desire to designate areas that would be kept under federal protection for recreational use was more popular than ever because these areas provided opportunities for “wild” experiences that eastern audiences increasingly wanted to access.482

The reason the Smokies seemed attractive was the same as what Pollock had written in his application for Shenandoah. The mountains there were covered with significant old-growth forest (much of which was cut before the park’s formal designation), it was isolated, and it provided opportunities to become immersed in nature. Writing about Shenandoah, the historian John Ise explains some of the specific values he hoped to access there.

Ise wrote, the combination of “topographic features of great scenic value...waterfalls, cascades, cliffs, and mountain peaks, with beautiful valleys” there made Shenandoah worthy “for development into a national park” that “would compare favorably with any of the existing national parks in the West.” Given the precedents set by the extant parks, it is not surprising that the committee justified Shenandoah’s addition to the national park system by talking about the old growth forests and scenery it would contain. The “forests, shrubs, and flowers, and mountain streams with picturesque cascades overhung with foliage, all [of which were] untouched by the hands of man” were exceptional resources that needed to be protected. The committee thought that, under National Park Service management, the Blue Ridge site’s scenic spaces would be opened up for camping and fishing and serve as “a natural museum, preserving outstanding features of the southern Appalachians as they appeared in early pioneer days.”483

The National Park Service decided that bringing Shenandoah into the system quickly was imperative because “all that has saved these near-by [eastern] regions from spoliation for so long a time has been their inaccessibility and the difficulty of profitability exploiting the timber wealth that mantles
the steep mountain slopes.” Given the “rapidly increasing shortage and mounting values of forest products,” the trees were faced with “the immediate danger that the last remnants of our primeval forests will be destroyed, however remote on steep mountain side or hidden away in deep lonely cove they may be.”

The commission’s justifications for including Shenandoah in the National Park System were consistent with the ones that brought western lands into it with two significant exceptions. First, they continued to rely on but reframed the utilitarian logic that justified creating parks like Yellowstone by claiming that the reason to create a park was to prevent the extraction of natural resources rather than to reclaim the land for recreational use. They said the forests in the proposed park were becoming commercially attractive due to a scarcity of timber. That meant they needed to be protected from logging; whereas in parks like Yellowstone, eminent scientists like Ferdinand V. Hayden had argued that since farming, mining, and other forms of industry would be unprofitable, the only productive way to use the land would be as a space for recreation. Second, they planned to change the proposed parkland in order to make it fit expectations for easy access and to provide monumental experiences.

When Yellowstone, Glacier, Mesa Verde, and most of the other western parks entered the system, they were practically inaccessible, except by using horses for an extended expedition. Railroads and road builders built transportation links to them after they were designated. In the Blue Ridge, the commissioners argued that the new park site’s “accessibility by rail and road” made it ideally suited for inclusion in the emerging national park system. The commission was arguing that ease of access was an important part of what made the land around the Blue Ridge worthy of being a national park.

While it was true that Shenandoah would be more accessible than other parks had been when they were created, and with tourists’ expectation that leisurescapes would be easy to access already embedded in the park idea, the commissioners took a different approach to it that had important implications for new parks’ management. Rather than simply protecting the landscape, the advocates
who helped designate parks like Shenandoah in the east wanted them designed from the first with easy accessibility in mind. In Shenandoah, though, they faced a problem. Tourists could travel throughout the proposed park, but it was accessible in all the wrong places.

“The Single Greatest Feature” – Making Shenandoah monumental

All over the Blue Ridge, the cabins of hundreds of mountain people who called that land home were accessible by foot, pack train, and even auto. Areas that had formerly been hard to access were developed by the time the Park Commission came to visit Skyland. “On August 6, 1937,” Pollock said, “I made an automobile trip through Nicholson Free State Hollow accompanied by my nephew and by Charlie Sisk, the former outlaw.” As they motored down the road, he marveled, saying “what a contrast compared with the trip I made many years before down over the top of Stony Man Peak to Old Man Nicholson’s cabin when there was not even a footpath.”

Roads simplified access to the formerly isolated backcountry, but complicated park supporters’ stated goal to preserve a place that would be free from the “density of population, together with the commercial development in progress or in prospect” that defined most of the east. In order to make the land conform to their vision for it, the National Park Service and government officials looking for shovel ready projects for the federal relief efforts after the onset of the Great Depression would make substantial changes at the expense of the residents who called it home. The most significant change they advocated presented a paradox.

In their final report, the prospective Blue Ridge park’s greatest scenic asset was not the trees, waterfalls, or animals tourists could already see there. The commission said that “the single greatest feature” of the new park was the unconstructed “sky-line drive along the mountain top.” The commissioners wrote that it would follow “a continuous ridge” along the highest part of the mountains and provide views “looking down westerly on the Shenandoah Valley...and [easterly] on the Piedmont
Plain stretching” out toward the horizon. They thought that, after it was constructed, “few scenic drives in the world could surpass it.”

Pollock and the park commission claimed that Shenandoah was worthy of protection and would attract visitors because it was different from the urban areas that surrounded it. However, in the commission’s description of the potential park, Shenandoah’s first growth forests, waterfalls, and pioneer legacy were ultimately considered less significant than the “single greatest” asset the National Park Service would build there. The park planners wanted to use the skyline drive to invest Shenandoah with legitimacy by giving it a central, monumental attraction. Park advocates’ belief that they could construct a monumental attraction for Shenandoah is confusing and edifying.

Since the western park’s central attractions were products of nature, it seems inconsistent for eastern park advocates to propose building anything that would be like them. The park commission’s belief that a road could be the central attraction that they would use to justify setting the park aside shows how the tourist business owners and nature enthusiasts who advocated making a park at Shenandoah thought that roads and other infrastructural improvements could be useful tools that would help tourists access nature. The road’s ultimate acceptance as the park’s raison d’etre also shows how different groups pursued their own interests by working together toward creating the park.

The National Park Commission, which worked on behalf of the US Department of Interior, supported the creation of a park along the Blue Ridge because they thought it provided exceptional opportunities for recreation that were consistent with parks in the west. The National Park Service director, Stephen Mather, believed that the only way he could increase appropriations for his agency from Congress was to make it relevant to more Americans. He hoped to do that by moving into their backyards and bringing eastern sites under National Park Service management.

Mather’s push to find eastern sites that he could add to the system dovetailed with George Pollock’s long-standing desire to increase Skyland’s visibility and visitation. He thought park designation
would draw more tourists to visit his resort. Together, they all succeeded at convincing Congress to authorize the creation of a park in the Blue Ridge. Congress stipulated that the land for the park would have to be donated by private owners or acquired by the Commonwealth of Virginia. As a result, years of negotiations between Virginia’s government and small landowners, political appointees at the Department of the Interior, and eventually park rangers and CCC enrollees all influenced the park. It was also the subject of litigation that rose all the way to the US Supreme Court, and was eventually influenced by the onset of the Great Depression. All of those groups acted to pursue their own interests by framing their motives as helping to make Shenandoah National Park more authentic, and to make it fit the park paradigm.
Different conceptions of leisure impact applying the park paradigm to the Blue Ridge

“In our study of man’s composite existence” Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work said when he addressed the fifth annual meeting on state parks at Skyland in May 1925, “we find civilizations rising in splendor from out of the shadow, only to dissolve into nothingness from whence they came, after completing their cycle of existence.” As civilizations rose and fell, he claimed, “ruins are superimposed on ruins, and all are now covered by the dust of the ages.” In a departure from past ways of life, he thought, “we have gradually established an artificial life dependent upon the indoors, until now to complete the cycle we are turning back to the simpler pleasures found in the woods, in contact with nature.” He speculated, “it may be the urge of the returning cycle that is drawing our people from the conveniences of modern homes, which it has taken so long to design and build, to the more natural surroundings of the outdoors.” No matter the reason, he thought that “we are attempting after a fashion to complete the cycle begun by the forebears of those in this region who struggled to overcome the forests and wildlife we now seek to conserve.” Work concluded, “let us not overlook the underlying purpose of the outdoor movement, which is to give us a momentary glimpse of the simpler things of life, to increase our appreciation of nature, to bring us closer to the scheme of the creation and educate our children ‘through Nature up to Nature’s God.’”

Secretary Work espoused the orthodox faith in utilitarian progress that most Americans believed was responsible for their nation’s rapid industrialization and urbanization at the turn of the twentieth century. In his speech, he reinterpreted industrialization to argue that it might be possible to have too much of it. He argued that someone needed to take action to save civilization from itself. By keeping a small piece of the natural world intact, he hoped that visitors would stay in touch with the world that had impelled humans’ conquest of nature in the first place.

Work was arguing that by preserving a part of the world they had so thoroughly mastered, Americans would leave a reminder to their heirs that, while they had subjugated the earth, they were
still subject to “the urge of the returning cycle” to live in nature again. To Work, stifling that spirit would be just as disastrous as permanently giving into it. By establishing parks, he was trying to establish breathing spaces where American democratic and spiritual virtues would thrive. The Secretary was arguing that by saving places like Shenandoah as outdoor classrooms where people could exercise their “innate” need to struggle against nature, they would be better able to tap the spirit that had made the United States a manufacturing and commercial colossus. 492

Conference attendees were probably receptive to the ideas in Work’s speech. His audience included many supporters of the nascent Shenandoah National Park. George Freeman Pollock, who was the event’s host, and a delegation from Shenandoah Valley, Inc. (a regional chamber of commerce) and the Northern Virginia Park Association (a group of property owners associated with Skyland and nominally led by Pollock that shared two members with Shenandoah Valley, Inc.) were all there.493 Together, they would be responsible for advocating the park’s designation by Congress and assisting with the acquisition of property for it.

Work’s speech provides a window into some of the motivations that may have resonated with the nature enthusiasts and government officials who wanted to use federal policy to rectify problems with modern life. Some of the park’s most active advocates wanted to use nature as a retreat from the hustle and bustle of city living that they feared was enfeebling Americans. They wanted to set places near eastern metropolises aside for wilderness “re-creation” in the most literal sense of the word. In the process, they hoped to curb civilization’s excesses and provide opportunities for city dwelling tourists to get in touch with the primal, primitive experiences Work alluded to in his speech. One of the best known and most influential was Benton MacKaye.

MacKaye was one of the central architects of the Appalachian Trail, which runs more than 2100 miles from Georgia to Maine. In Shenandoah, his desire to preserve wild places conflicted with the other groups who desired to create a park for drivers. He was working to prevent the over-development
of the east so that Americans would still be able to experience wilderness. Like Work, MacKaye asked questions about whether city living, and the industries that enabled it, always improved humans’ lives. He once asked

Why is it that the beauty of nature must be spoiled by Man? Man, though the highest of beings, is, in one [sense], the lowest, never contented until he has spoiled all the beauty of nature in his power by cutting down vegetation, killing animals, and even cutting down hills when he has the power to do so ...

In order to ensure access to the kinds of natural beauty that he thought were being threatened by development, MacKaye advocated what he called “A New Approach to the Problem of Living.” 494

In an article he published in 1921 titled “An Appalachian Trail, A Project in Regional Planning,” MacKaye claimed, “the ability to cope with nature directly—unshielded by the weakening wall of civilization—is one of the admitted needs of modern times.” He wanted to help city dwellers to enjoy “the strength of progress without its puniness…its convenience without its fopperies.” MacKaye proposed to achieve this through the creation of “A Strategic Camping Base [in] The Appalachian Skyline.” 495

Since there were already popular and “extensive national playgrounds” reserved in the west he thought it was time to establish similar places elsewhere. Specifically, he thought new wild reserves needed to be created “as near as possible to the center of population. And this is in the East.” The best place to add to the nation’s wild reserves was “the skyline along the top of the main divides and ridges in the Appalachians... [which] would form a camping base strategic to the country’s work and play.” 496

MacKaye proposed reserving land along the high ridges of the Appalachian Mountains to serve as a centrally located retreat and a thoroughfare for recreation. He hoped to preserve and provide access to “the primal aspects of the days of Daniel Boone” as well as the “secluded forest, pastoral lands, and water courses, which, with proper facilitates and protection, could be made to serve as the breath of real life for the toilers in the bee-hive cities along the Atlantic seaboard and elsewhere.” He also proposed that the land might be included in some kind of park. 497
In “the Appalachian belt” MacKaye said he thought there were “probably 25 million acres of grazing and agricultural land awaiting development” that would fulfil the twin goals of serving as a recreational retreat for city dwellers and as a pastoral alternative to city living which would preserve the best parts of traditional, agricultural lifeways in the east. He thought establishing a park there would improve residents’ lives. He claimed the park would appeal to anyone who had “ever stooped down and gazed in the sunken eyes of either…the Carolina ‘cracker’ or of the Green Mountain ‘hayseed.’”  

MacKaye said the project would require taking four principal actions.

MacKaye proposed:

2. Constructing shelter camps along the trail approximately a day’s walk apart.
3. Establishing community groups to maintain the trail and shelters.
4. Creating food and farm camps to supply hikers walking along the trail and serve as semi-permanent natural retreats and alternative homes for city dwellers.

MacKaye’s vision encompassed a utopian plan for creating a recreational complex that would provide city residents from across the east with literal and figurative breathing space. He also hoped it would serve “in a very literal sense, [as] a battle line against fire and flood—and even against disease.” The plan would provide new opportunities for recreation in the eastern United States. It would also allow MacKaye and nature enthusiasts like him to rehabilitate the land so that it functioned more naturally (and therefore better).

MacKaye’s plans enjoyed popularity among other supporters of rewilding and outdoor recreation, including the first president of the Potomac Appalachian Trail Club (PATC), Myron Avery. The PATC was one of the community groups that MacKaye advocated creating in his 1921 article, and was responsible for trail management along the Blue Ridge. Avery became an active advocate for MacKaye’s Appalachian Trail and for Shenandoah National Park.

From the beginning of conversations on creating a national park in the Blue Ridge, MacKaye and Avery were active supporters of setting aside land where they could put the trail. When it came time to
negotiate with the Commonwealth of Virginia, National Park Service, and business owners about the appropriate placement of their trail in the park, all of them disagreed.

While MacKaye, Avery, and other trail advocates agreed in principle with Work and Mather’s desire to create a park in the Blue Ridge, they all had different understandings of what leisure there ought to be like. While all of them wanted to create a regenerative space, they disagreed about what kinds of experiences ought to be allowed in that area and what activities would be effective at accomplishing their goals. This led to disagreement between them with respect to the kinds of visitor facilities that would be allowed in the new park, the acquisition of land, and the activities encouraged there.

Business owners, along with the National Park Service, generally wanted to place the Skyline Drive as high as possible in Shenandoah along the same path that Appalachian Trail supporters also wanted for their walking trail. Conflict between the groups influenced the way that Virginia conducted land acquisitions as it reinforced the necessity of acquiring all of the high country. It also led to a split between the trail idea’s creator, MacKaye, and his apostle, Avery.

Before the park was formally designated, and before all of the land for it had even been acquired, construction began on sections of the Skyline Drive. In his history on the construction of the Appalachian Trail, Jeffrey Ryan recorded MacKaye’s response to the construction. MacKaye wrote

The Appalachian Trail should above all things be a wilderness foot-path and that while so far as possible we will want to have a skyline trail, it may be necessary in some sections, such as the Shenandoah National Park, to depart from this general idea and that we should as far as possible seek the primitive environment for the Trail. ...I cannot help feeling that Myron with all his indefatigable energy and enthusiasm has not fully grasped the idea of the Appalachian Trail...The whole question of road vs. trail is very fundamental.

In 1931, with Skyline Drive already under construction, this meant that supporters of the Appalachian Trail had to organize quickly to respond to it. Under MacKaye, they proposed an alternative route for the road. MacKaye proposed, in order to keep roads away from the already-blazed sections of the
Appalachian Trail, the federal government use another route. The alternative provided some windshield vistas, but it would have forced drivers out of their cars to see everything hikers experienced on the already completed sections of the trail.502

MacKaye’s plan stalled. Mather was on record as early as 1920 saying, “the [national] parks and [national] monuments are becoming more and more the vacation grounds of the American traveler” and “more than 60 per cent of the park visitors come in their own private automobiles.” To Mather, those travelers were more than simply tourists. He said they were “the potential settlers, potential investors” that were “worth a lot locally, but...also worth a great deal nationally” because their travel “relieves the overpopulated areas of the East and distributes their overplus [sic] where it is needed and can do the most good.”503

MacKaye failed to convince a majority of members in the Appalachian Trail Conference to object to the road’s construction. He also differed from Avery in his understanding of what kind of landscape would provide a meaningful experience for visitors to places along their proposed trail. In a letter to Avery, MacKaye stated succinctly that “you are for a connected trail—whether or not wilderness. I am for a wilderness trail—whether or not connected.” Avery’s vision acknowledged the complications inherent in negotiating with business owners, National Park Service officials, and the Commonwealth of Virginia. His more pragmatic approach ultimately eventually prevailed in the construction of Skyline Drive and the Appalachian Trail. Historian Jeffrey Ryan explained that the “NPS was firmly behind Skyline Drive, and potentially other skyline routes like it, because the president, the US Congress, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the motoring public were behind it.”504 As a result, the National Park Service and federal government constructed Skyline Drive in spite of the objections of MacKaye. Dissenters like MacKaye, Aldo Leopold, and Robert Sterling Yard, who objected to the construction of roads in wild places, ultimately organized the Wilderness Society to increase their influence and prevent similar construction projects in the future.505
The differences on how the land ought to be shaped boiled down to disagreements over what constituted a worthwhile, regenerative place. Nature enthusiasts all agreed in principle that setting aside a federally managed, national park on the Blue Ridge would be a good thing. They disagreed over what constituted an authentic, wild, and, therefore, healthful retreat. The unequal settlement between nature enthusiasts who wanted to avoid building roads in the park and business people, National Park Service employees, and politicians who supported road construction reflected the power Stephen Mather exercised in the park’s development. Mather’s vision for what recreation in a national park ought to be like turned out to be one of the driving factors behind the way many parks were shaped. Understanding his motives, and how they influenced his subordinates in the National Park Service, helps explain how Shenandoah got its shape.
In 1923, when conversations about establishing a national park in the American east began, the future of the National Park Service was far from certain. In its first seven years, the agency took over guardianship of nineteen national parks and some two dozen national monuments, but its long-term prospects were tenuous at best. The service suffered attacks from other, competing executive agencies and politicians who argued it had too much authority over land management issues. It suffered from a chronic lack of resources, and it endured enhanced scrutiny under the leadership of cabinet Secretary Albert Fall (who illegally accepted bribes related to the lease of a federal oilfield near Teapot Dome, Wyoming). It was, in short, not a propitious time for the new bureau to come of age. For the agency’s director, Stephen Mather, it seemed a period of unique opportunity.

When Stephen Mather helped organize the National Park Service in 1915 and 1916, he came to his post with considerable experience not only as a conservationist, but also as an organizer and a promoter. Mather made his fortune by popularizing borax as a laundry staple under the Twenty-Mule Team brand name. He intended to build the National Park Service the same way he had borax: by manufacturing demand through advertising. Therefore, while he set Robert Sterling Yard to work on the previously mentioned National Parks Portfolio, wrote articles in popular publications, and persuasively lobbied Congress, he also set about the most far-reaching part of his campaign to date. He worked to raise the national parks’ popular profile across the United States.

Mather knew that no amount of popular demand for parks would strengthen his agency if it did not have a tangible “inventory” of accessible places to satisfy it. Of the nineteen national parks managed by the service in 1923, all but one was west of the Mississippi River, and two of those were in Alaska, while more than half of the country’s population lived on the eastern seaboard and in the upper Midwest. Western sites might excite interest, but it was unrealistic to expect all, or even most,
Americans to travel to them. In order to make the system accessible, relevant, and popular, and to encourage voters to support the whole system, he advocated creating new parks in the east.508

Horace Albright put it succinctly when he wrote about conversations he had with Mather near the end of the First World War that he and the director understood “eastern parks were the wave of the future. Most of our population lived east of the Mississippi, most of the Congress represented them, and appropriations would be more generous if eastern areas were included.”509 In order to make the most of easterners’ Congressional influence, Mather and Albright used their connections and official influence in the Department of Interior to lay the groundwork for new parks there.

Mather understood that bringing national parks to citizens’ doorsteps would increase their relevance. He also believed that the courteous and motivated rangers he employed would build public trust through their dedication and professionalism. Mather wanted to export the park paradigm to the east in order to sustain it in the west. Since some of the sites that came into the system because of Mather’s push to the east were aesthetically different from the ones in the west, it shows how those sites’ supposed scenic merit was only one in a constellation of factors that led to their admission to the park system.510

National parks in the west centered on monumental attractions. In Yellowstone, they were the geysers. In Yosemite, it was the valley. And in Grand Canyon, it was the canyon itself. The scenic quality of the western parks, coupled with their distinctiveness, had given their advocates prima facie evidence to argue for their preservation. Mather, Albright, Yard, and their peers wanted to avoid bringing lands that did not have similarly unique attractions into the system because they might dilute its quality and, in the process, make Americans question whether it ought to exist at all.511 Therefore, it was reasonable that, when they looked to the east, Mather and his lieutenants wanted analogous features in the parks they were creating there.
As the National Park Service assimilated new parks into the system, the sites’ advocates scrupulously sought out and publicized viewpoints, attractions, and animals that they could describe as being monumental and unique. At Acadia in Maine, they claimed in 1919 advocates wrote, “nowhere in the world is there such a wonderland of sea, cliff, lake and forest as nature has lavished on this great Maine Coast Resort.” In so doing, advocates invoked the same kind of language nature enthusiasts and tourist business owners used for more than 35 years to describe “the Wonderland” of Yellowstone. However, that was problematic in Shenandoah because, in spite of the way that George Pollock described the mountain ridge, it was not unique.

Shenandoah’s integration into the existing park system also illustrates an important phase in the development of a new technological system. The proposed park had farmers’ fields, homes, and the infrastructure that sustained them. Park advocates did not set the land aside to save anything exceptional. They *reshaped* the landscape so that it would be more like other national parks. Their decision to reshape the land shows how important the park paradigm was to park development and how its shape had stabilized.

The idea of what a national park ought to be was firmly established thanks to the precedents set by businesspeople and government officials in the American west. Stephen Mather was working to find new places where he could overlay that paradigm to make it physically accessible to an eastern audience. In Shenandoah’s case, rather than protecting an inherently beautiful place, Stephen Mather, nature enthusiasts and tourist business owners used the paradigm to justify creating one. He was using the national park brand to “sell” a product; experiences in nature. He profited from peoples’ consumption of the parks through the support they told their representatives in Congress to lend to his National Park Service.

While Mather successfully lobbied for the creation of eastern parks in the Great Smoky Mountains, Mammoth Cave, and Isle Royale, Shenandoah is the most illustrative example of how
precedents set in the west justified creating of an entirely new kind of natural experience in the east. Mather tweaked the park paradigm to make it fit eastern expectations and landscapes better. One of the most significant ways the new parks differed from their western predecessors was their land’s pedigree.

Along the Blue Ridge, the land park supporters wanted to include in Shenandoah was split into hundreds of parcels that covered more than 520,000 acres and meandered into multiple counties and local jurisdictions. Before they could start acquiring land, someone had to convince a doubtful Congress that a few hundred acres of first growth forests, mountaineers’ fields and pastures, and a small population of white-tail deer deserved national park status. The strategies they employed involved a loosely coordinated, but multi-pronged, campaign that used contradictory justifications to accomplish their goal.

Private Land for Public Parks – Acquiring land for Shenandoah from willing and unwilling sellers

When parks like Yellowstone, Glacier, and the Grand Canyon entered the system, most or all of their land was still in the public domain. When the government acquired privately owned land in the west for the early parks, it was usually limited small “in-holdings.” In the east, where the federal government had disposed of most of the public domain at least one hundred years before, parklands had to be acquired from private landowners in toto.

In some cases, national park supporters offered donations of their land or worked privately to get enough money to buy it from willing sellers. Their action was part of the growing movement with other supporters like Benton MacKaye, but its advocates had to grapple with the fact that most of the eastern places they wanted to establish parks had been logged, mined, grazed, or farmed. The process of acquiring land for park establishment posed unique problems that western park projects did not face.
In Shenandoah’s case, establishing a park meant acquiring hundreds of private holdings that were almost all occupied by resident populations. While Mather succeeded at convincing Congress to authorize a park in the Blue Ridge with the help of advocates like Benton MacKaye and local businesspeople like George Pollock, he failed to get any funds to buy land there. The scale of the project meant that aggregating a contiguous plot for a park required the involvement of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Congress approved of the park in principle, if its land would be acquired with non-federal funds and then donated to the government. Since the Commonwealth of Virginia saw the park’s creation as being a potential boon to businesspeople along the roads that would lead to it, they cooperated in the process of land acquisition by passing a special bill that enabled the condemnation of private land for use in the park. The bill also created a commission to oversee land acquisition with the ultimate purpose of donating it to the federal government.

In the bill, the state legislature set out broad authority for the commission to acquire land. They streamlined the condemnation process by requiring that court proceedings be held in county rather than municipal courts and authorized the recruitment of special investigators to assess the land. The legislature empowered the investigators so that they would “not be restricted, limited, or bound by any rule or precedent established for commissioners or appraisers appointed under the authority of paragraph forty-three hundred and sixty-six of the Virginia Code or of any law heretofore enacted authorizing the condemnation of lands.” It authorized them to take “any lawful act which a prudent man might or would take or do in an effort to ascertain and determine such a fact or such facts in a matter of material importance” for the state’s condemnation case, and to retain the service of “such technical and clerical assistance” as they might deem necessary. Those assistants could include “stenographers, surveyors, guides, and the like, as the court or judge may...approve and allow.”
This law empowered an extra-judicial group of assessors to set prices, investigate titles, and negotiate with landowners prior to formal condemnation proceedings. The state government showed its emphatic support for the park project by empowering its agents to act with such broad authority to acquire land. The state government’s actions also show how committed Virginia was to creating a national park whether the residents who lived on the land wanted one there or not. In the months and years to come, residents criticized the latitude assessors had to dispose of their property. The residents who wanted to retain their homes used two lines of reasoning to justify staying in them. One was to argue that the state had no right to condemn land for use in a federal park. The other, which says more about the currency of the park paradigm, was to argue that their land was unworthy of inclusion in the National Park System. For the time being, the park’s supporters were more concerned about their need for funds to pay willing sellers to avoid condemnation than they were about the legal problems that would later attend that process.

To that end, the Virginia Chamber of Commerce and Shenandoah Valley Inc. chartered the Shenandoah National Park Association to collect funds and receive donated land. In April 1926, the state’s governor, Harry Byrd, chartered the Virginia Conservation and Development Commission to organize all of the state’s land acquisition efforts. To run it, Byrd tapped his former campaign manager, William Carson. Carson’s job was to supervise the survey, appraisal, and purchase of the estimated 4000 properties within the congressionally authorized boundary.521

When “the question regarding the class of land to be first acquired was taken up,” State officials decided to “plan to purchase virgin timber tracts [first] to insure the preservation of these tracts and to stop any further lumbering.” If cutover tracts were essential to the project, “it was brought out in the discussion that some of these cut-over tracts if protected from fire might within 15 years or so be covered with a good growth of trees or other vegetation.” True to the system’s western roots, Arno Cammerer, assistant director of the National Park Service cautioned the land there “should be of
national park caliber” or else the Secretary of the Interior would not recommend that Congress accept
it.522

To ensure that the land would meet that standard, the commission required the National Park
Service to inspect and approve the land before the state would take action to purchase or seize it. The
state wanted to take that course to pursue purchase of the unlogged tracts along with “the best national
park features of the region.” They wanted to buy 250,000 acres “on the main ridge, including spur
ridges and canyons lying between them from Mount Marshall to Jarman’s Gap, plus such occasional
holdings elsewhere within the designated area as can be secured at low cost.” The commission hoped
that their strategy would establish “reasonable values for later acquisition of other holdings by purchase
or condemnation.”523

The land that had not been cut over would be a centerpiece of the new park and be the site for
the development, as early as practicable, of the feature that would function as the park’s monumental,
central, scenic attraction: Sky-Line Drive. Boosters promised the road would be a scenic masterstroke
and began to plan a right of way that would provide a viewshed unlike anything else in the east. A
viewshed is analogous to a water-shed. The geographical area is visible from a discrete location. It
includes everything in the line of sight, but excludes points beyond the horizon or that are obstructed by
terrain or other features. In Shenandoah, landscape architects wanted to situate the Sky-Line Drive
where its views would be least impacted by human shaped objects. Along most of the drive, the most
conspicuous structures in the viewshed were the sheds, barns, and homes of the mountaineers who
called the Blue Ridge home. They were not compatible with the park paradigm, and the park
commission had to decide what to do with them.524
Disposing of Homes – Deciding who could stay in Shenandoah

The Virginia Conservation Commission faced “the question of [whether] allowing small settlers to [continue to] occupy their present holdings within the park areas” would be allowed after the park entered the system, or not. The problem, as the commission saw it, was that if all the farmers who lived in the park area were going to be allowed to stay there, they would detract from the scenery the park was supposed to protect. Since deciding to displace all the residents would probably be unpopular and complicate the acquisition process, they wanted to find a middle ground between blanket expulsion and universal accommodation.

The lack of a formal policy to address the problem stemmed from a fundamental difference between the commission’s view of Shenandoah’s purpose and the National Park Service’s. While Stephen Mather wanted his agency to establish parks that were unpopulated like the ones that already existed in the west, the commission represented the interests of the businesspeople and nature enthusiasts in the State of Virginia. They had a common end in mind, the creation of a national park, but envisioned different means to achieve it. The difference between them had important implications for the people who called the Blue Ridge home.

The commission attempted to mollify local residents and satisfy the National Park Service by offering them short-term leases to allow them to remain the park. After the leases terminated, they would have to move out. They concluded, “it might be possible...under regulations that might be made in the future, to permit desirable settlers to occupy their present holdings for a short term of years, subject to removal at the end of such period or earlier if they became undesirable for any reason.” That said, when the commission decided how it would negotiate for the purchase of parkland they decided that “there should be no qualifying conditions [allowing for continued long-term tenancy] attached to such purchases, and that the question regarding settlers within the park areas might well be left for future decision.” In the end, the commission was not very transparent with respect to what kinds of
settlers were “desirable” for park purposes. As many residents there were shortly to find out, their perception of their own desirability, the commission’s, and the National Park Service’s frequently differed.

The commission’s decision to offer nothing longer than short-term agreements (usually terminating after a few years) to residents meant that all the residents who held property in the area, including those who owned or rented residences at Skyland (many of whom had supported the park project thanks to George Pollock’s support for it), would have to sell it and leave. As word of the decision not to allow landowners to stay leaked out, “several residents of Skyland...appeared before the commission and recommended that the park line as tentatively indicated on the existing maps be changed to exclude certain residences lying in or near Skyland settlement.” The commission claimed it would give the matter due consideration, but “it was the consensus of opinion that it was not only injudicious but practically impossible to change the line to meet the wishes of land which it was necessary to include within the park.” When the same property owners broached the subject of obtaining life leases to extend their private tenancy, the commission deflected the question.526

The commission advised the residents to avoid “bringing up the question in such a manner as to force a decision from the Secretary of the Interior at that time, as they felt it would induce numerous property owners throughout the area to ask similar permission, which would result in a great number of privately held lands within the heart of the park, contrary to the policy of both the Secretary of the Interior and the National Park Service.” In response, Arno Cammerer reiterated that “unless conditions under which the Government would accept these lands were complied with it would, in his opinion, be impossible to get the proposed parks [Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountains] established.”527

In response to the National Park Service’s firm opposition to allowing significant inholdings in the new park, the commission acknowledged, “after the areas were taken over as national parks the people now residing within them would, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior,
be required to move outside the parks.” In response to questions from park residents regarding how former church and school properties would be treated, the National Park Service released a statement that “these must be secured as the major part of the remainder [of land] required to comply with the provision of the act [specifying minimum park acreage] before the park can be finally established.” In other words, since the residents would be gone, the buildings would be vacant and remanded to the National Park Service.

The decision to acquire all the property within the park boundary is traced, at least in part, to the service’s western legacy, where it usually exercised exclusive jurisdiction. More importantly, it shows how the park service presumed to have the exclusive right to arbitrate what kinds of experiences people would have access to in the new park. If individual landowners were allowed to retain land there, it would complicate (or prevent) park rangers from executing agency plans to create an eastern wilderness in the western tradition. They assumed, probably correctly, that part of the western parks’ appeal was that they were different from the places city residents saw every day. While they were rustic and invoked the area’s pioneer heritage, the cabins and farms that dotted the parkland made it seem less wild than the park rangers wanted it to be. In order to make it different, the park service wanted to acquire all the land there and change it to match their perception of “real” wilderness. Therefore, in the months ahead, and because of the direction they received from the park service’s Washington Office, the commission set about acquiring fee simple title to some 385,000 acres.528

The National Park Service had two reasons to resist allowing any private in-holdings in Shenandoah. First, from an administrative perspective, park rangers knew that administering land owned by different owners would be complicated and might leave an avenue for development that did not match the park paradigm. Second, from a practical perspective, it would be hard to secure the park’s viewsheds without having a great deal of control over the land beneath and around the proposed Sky-Line Drive.
As was previously discussed, this led the Virginia legislature to pass a special law that empowered the Virginia Conservation Commission to begin acquiring land “with the power of eminent domain for the condemnation” of land intended “for use as a public park or for public-park purposes.”

There would be many of those cases in the decade to come. Through a fitful process that involved surveying, court proceedings, and, finally, seizure, the commission acquired land that had been privately owned for generations.

In many cases, the families who they dealt with had been living in and around the new park in some cases for hundreds of years. Living in the shadow of a mountain that bore their name, the Lewis Family, for example, had sent delegates to endorse their county’s support for the Declaration of Independence. They had successfully lobbied for their representatives to sign the Constitution, and they had acquired a plantation (originally run by slave labor) that covered more than 2000 acres on and around “the Mountain.” Their family had grown tobacco, harvested timber, and worked in mines there since the beginning of the eighteenth century. The US Government gave the last of those activities special consideration before it consented to accept land there for park use.

*Mining Minerals – Maximizing land utility in the Blue Ridge*

The National Park Service consulted William M. McGill, assistant state geologist. He evaluated the land’s potential for mineral development and found “there are not sufficient showings of either manganese or iron in any of the old workings to justify further exploration.” The service’s collaboration with a geologist is telling for two reasons. It shows how ingrained utilitarian imperatives were in the park paradigm (the agency wanted to make sure that valuable mineral deposits would not be integrated as part of the park, and, thus withdrawn from commerce), and it emphasizes the National Park Service’s commitment to using leisure experiences to reclaim land for productive use.
McGill’s conclusion that there were not valuable mineral deposits within the park boundaries provided justification for the agency to reshape the land there to serve a new, recreational purpose. The process of making the national park-type of leisure experience accessible in Shenandoah would result in the displacement of hundreds of families from their homes, and the creation of new infrastructural systems in them.

Now, the winds of change blew at Lewis Mountain, and surveyors began to plat their land for sale to the state commission at the rate of $6 per acre. When the National Park Service set its sights on their farm, the group largely dismissed that heritage as less worthy of preservation than the land’s potential value as scenery. The National Park Service, abetted by the Virginia Conservation Commission, was not only making a value judgement about the land’s best, utilitarian application, but also tacitly arguing that its old one had been improper.

In a process that William Carson and his agent Ferdinand Zerkel repeated hundreds of times throughout the Blue Ridge, they said residents’ activities on the land made it less valuable. This had the dual benefit of making it cheaper to buy and of giving the park another reason for being, to restore the damaged land to its natural state. In the process, they gave credence to the park service’s claim (based on conservationists’ ideas) that creating a national park at Shenandoah would have the utilitarian benefit of increasing the land’s value through scientific management.

Besides providing opportunities for recreation, Shenandoah provided opportunities to reform the land along professionally and politically expedient, utilitarian lines. Remaking land in the Blue Ridge as a park provided opportunities for federal officials and nature enthusiasts to reclaim “damaged” land following one hundred years of supposedly profligate use by mountaineers. Park advocates claimed the mountaineers neither understood nor appreciated the land’s value or natural functioning. Creating a park allowed National Park rangers to exercise the conservation expertise; they developed in the west to reclaim that land. Like Pollock, the rangers judged parts of the mountaineers’ lifestyle in order to
justify claiming they needed to change. As was previously explained, the reasons for the mountaineers’
disconnection from modern lifeways had to do with their particular origins and stories. Their culture’s
origin is key to understanding why and how residents were disfranchised from the formal park creation
process.
2.3 - Calling the Mountains Home – A prelude to dispossession

When he arrived in North America sometime around 1669, John Lederer, a 25-year-old German scholar who had studied medicine, cockily announced that he intended to travel farther into the American interior than any Englishman. While his boasts antagonized some of the British colonists who lived in Virginia, they were welcome news to its governor, William Berkeley. The governor hoped that Lederer would finally find the long sought Northwest Passage that would enable him to promote trade with the Indians, locate valuable minerals, curb French influence in North America, and lead to a new trade route with the Far East. When Lederer set off on what turned out to be a seven-month sojourn in the backcountry, he departed with high hopes and official sanction. When he returned, and tried to tell what he had seen, he met with doubt from receptive observers and outright derision from more hostile skeptics. While his frosty reception may have been based as much on jealousy as on the merits of his account, subsequent expeditions largely confirmed his observations.534

On a series of three “long marches,” he was probably the first Euroamerican to see some of what later became attractions in Shenandoah National Park. He specifically described climbs up what later came to be known as Hawksbill Peak, Peter’s Hill, and Hightop. He also provided some of the earliest accounts of the Indians who called the Shenandoah region home. He thought that their “faculties of the minde and body” were well used because of their use of “emblemmes” to communicate. In their language culture “by the figure of a Stag they imply swiftness; by that of a Serpent, wrath; of a Lion, courage; of a Dog, fidelity.” He also found that they were aware of the British migration to the Chesapeake and wrote that “by a Swan, they signifie the English alluding to their complexion and fight over the Sea.”535 He also described their monotheistic faith, use of a calendar “arranged on a string or leather thong with knots of varying colors” and general eloquence and cultural sophistication. He found that “many of them advance their natural understandings to great knowledge in Physick, Rehetorick, and Policie of Government.” Lederer also explained that he witnessed their
councils in session and wrote that he admired them for them. In fact, he believed they evinced “as much Judgement and Eloquence as I should have expected from men of Civil education and Literature [in Europe].”

In spite of Lederer’s positive view of the Indians, they did not get to stay on the land very long. Even in the seventeenth century, American Indians in the Alleghenies had been indirectly ravaged by European influence for more than a century. Disease and internecine war between tribes competing for access to the animal pelts for which Europeans were willing to trade manufactured goods played havoc on their populations and culture. And while Europeans attempted to regulate colonists’ contact with the Indians by requiring licenses to trade with them and official sanction to settle farther west, by the start of the eighteenth century it was apparent that their way of life was in rapid decline. While some Europeans held out hope that they could cooperate to benefit from their knowledge of the region, the Indians’ presence confounded notions of property ownership and title in ways that would resurface several hundred years later during the creation of Shenandoah National Park.

In the end, the combination of Euroamericans’ numerical and military supremacy, desire to spread westward, and the Indians’ declining fortunes meant that, while cooperation over trade, and perhaps even mining, might have been possible, they were ultimately dismissed. As Euroamericans pushed into the region, they found it teeming with game and timber. Though they never exercised direct control over the area, the Iroquois Confederacy’s influence there had meant that, to the Indians, the Shenandoah region functioned as a kind of game reserve and fur plantation.

So it is not surprising that even at the turn of the eighteenth century, Euroamericans were pushing into the sparsely populated region to take advantage of what they, and the Indians before them, saw as raw materials waiting to be taken to market. The historian Darwin Lambert wrote that the “starting gun for the land race toward the Shenandoah-Blue Ridge” was fired in spring of 1710 when Alexander Spotswood arrived from Britain to serve as the lieutenant governor of Virginia. His worry
about French incursions down from the Great Lakes drove him to encourage settlement up to and over
the Blue Ridge in order to discourage further French sallies there. He engineered the Euroamerican
settlers’ movements to the profit of Great Britain and himself.

By using knowledge gained from his official position, he acquired land and mines that he
eventually developed into a substantial iron smelting operation. He then went west himself to explore
the land that eventually became part of Shenandoah National Park. Ascending near what is today
referred to as Swift Run Gap, and perhaps by way of Big Meadows (in the central part of the park), he
and the other explorers discovered “human marks on trees and guessed the route was used ‘by the
Northern Indians’” before they continued on. After hunting and fishing, they “buried a bottle with a
paper incolosed [sic], on which he writ that he took possession of this place in the name and for King
George the First of England” and then returned home.540

While this event probably had about as much significance as a ceremonial groundbreaking for
the development that followed it, Spotswood’s actions are still important. Besides proving that the Blue
Ridge was traversable, and confirming that there were resources there that might have value for trade,
Spotswood carried west what turned out to be an important legal tradition: the concept of land tenure.
By claiming the land for King George I, he extended a tradition that would have important consequences
for his countrymen, their heirs, and eventually the residents who made their homes on the land that
became Shenandoah National Park.

Over the next two hundred years, Britain, France, and eventually the United States fought over
land around the Blue Ridge. During the initial rush of European settlement there, even some Britons
were surprised by how rapacious their countrymen were when it came to possessing the land. In his
history of the region that eventually came into the park, Darwin Lambert, one of the park’s first rangers
and a life-long devotee of the Blue Ridge landscape, quoted an early settler named Benjamin Harrison
who said that “‘I must confess my feelings are hurt and my humanity shocked’ by ‘the unbounded thirst
of our people after Lands they cannot cultivate, and the means they use to possess themselves of those
that belong to others.” Their “obsession with possession” led Euroamerican settlers to establish estates
that sometimes grew to several thousand acres.

This system of ownership had significant implications for patterns of settlement throughout the
region. Unlike New England where yeoman farmers held fee simple title to mostly small, contiguously
developed farms, squatters quickly began to settle in the large unmanaged areas between the
sanctioned estates. Large, government sanctioned surveys that demarcated the official boundaries of
individual land holdings had the paradoxical effect of contributing to the creation of a vast common
where Euroamericans let their livestock graze, went to harvest wood, and built cabins where they and
their families lived. When landowners challenged the squatters in court for their failure to buy or rent
the land, courts often rendered verdicts that substantiated the squatters’ claims by right of use (which is
generally in line with the same utilitarian mindset that undergirded so much of the development of the
United States).541

The Euroamerican settlers were set apart from the Indians who had preceded them around
Shenandoah and the Blue Ridge in that they interpreted possession of the land as demonstrating title to
it. Most of the mountaineers who eventually contested the large landowners’ title did so because they
were driven to financial extremity by their inferior position among gentlemen farmers along the coast.
 Rather than compete the with slave planter class that established large estates in the east, they struck
out on their own to eke out more modest incomes by their own labor in “the west.” When they did,
they brought their culture and their kinships with them.542

*Mountaineer Society – Building communities and a way of life along the Blue Ridge*

In a land whose Euroamerican history grew from conflict between Britain and France, the United
States and Britain, and eventually the Federal government and southern rebels, mountain communities
would prove to be one of the most enduring ties that residents had to the land they called home. Their association with the land and each other strengthened over the years as formerly distinct groups of English, German, and Scots-Irish settlers intermingled and began to melt together. While each of these communities had their own distinct customs (and, in the case of the Germans, language), they bequeathed a unified legacy to the land that became Shenandoah by contributing their names and cultural flair to some of the most popular attractions that eventually came into the park. Names like Jarman, Thornton, and Turk that the park service assigned to mountains and passes were originally the names of farmers on or in each of them. Those names help make their stories legible, in spite of the fact that none of them has actually lived there since the 1930s. Their lengthy absence has not erased their identities.

Some of the most persistent reminders of the mountain communities that used to dot land inside Shenandoah National Park are the community members they left behind. Burying grounds were important to the mountaineers. They are evidence of the physical rootedness in the landscape. They remain important sites for cultural remembrance and community gatherings.

The communities they occupied evoke the romance of a bygone era, and contribute to Shenandoah’s cachet through a sense of loss. It is easy to feel nostalgia for the time when Shenandoah was full of residents, but, paradoxically, if they still lived there, it would prevent tourists from feeling that sentimental longing. The activities that allowed residents to live in the park would have prevented its creation because they were incompatible with the park paradigm. The residents worked in a variety of industries from farming to metalcraft that relied on their ability to reshape the landscape into commodities for subsistence and for sale.

Though it was on the periphery of early America’s plantation economy, the upland country that surrounded the future park boundary was, at least initially, home to a significant number of slave-run plantations. Along the park’s eastern boundary (closest to the coast), planters grew tobacco, raised
cattle, and cultivated wheat (mostly for their own consumption) starting in the mid-eighteenth century. The plantation owners were enthusiastic to move into the “empty” land there and to set up large farms.\textsuperscript{544}

At the headwaters of Doyle’s River on 740 acres they claimed in the 1750s, for example, the Brown Family made everything they needed to live except for manufactured goods and sold their excess to other farmers around them. Their farm and other upland plantations served as economic and social nodes. The farmers who worked the marginal land along the Blue Ridge Crest (where the park would eventually be established) had a far less visible impact than other residents who earned their livelihoods in the region, but they interacted regularly with the lowland planters in commerce. The region only became a major focus for development when residents discovered minerals in the area.

While the mines were in no way as economically significant to the region as agriculture, they still impacted the nascent park’s landscape because of the demands their managers placed on particular resources, most significantly timber. Though the National Park Service consulted a geologist who concluded that they are not worth mining, there are iron ore deposits both inside the park and just outside its border.\textsuperscript{545} Mining in them was mostly accomplished by open cutting with a pick and shovel. Ore was hauled by wagons away from the mines to one of several furnaces in the vicinity. At the furnaces, workers made charcoal from the forests that surrounded them to smelt the metal.

The process of making the charcoal necessary to sustain these furnaces was very labor intensive and ecologically destructive. First, wood was cut and split into cords. Second, the cords were brought together in circles that were usually about thirty feet in diameter and stacked several feet high. Third, the pile had to be coated with a layer of wet leaves and mud about five inches thick on its sides and eight inches thick on its top. Fourth, the pile was set on fire, allowed to burn down (ideally to about one-fifth its former size), and then allowed to cool. Fifth, workers packed the finished charcoal to use in a furnace.\textsuperscript{546}
Around Shenandoah, historians estimate iron smelting in the early nineteenth century required about 8000 acres to support one charcoal blast furnace. Just within the park boundaries, there were four furnaces in service for the better part of half a century. There were more furnaces outside the park. Keeping them active required the intensive harvesting and re-harvesting of trees over at least 32,000 acres of what is now parkland. Iron was not the only mineral residents mined around Shenandoah.

As was previously addressed, George Freeman Pollock and his father came to the Blue Ridge on a tip they could buy valuable copper mines. Pollock and fellow investors poured thousands of dollars into the Stony Man Mining Company while other speculators attempted to develop the Dark Hollow Mine (near falls of the same name that would become one of the most popular attractions in the park). Pollock dismissed these efforts in later years saying “the copper mine proved to be worthless” but “to this day considerable slag and other materials can be found there.” The one mineral that had durable appeal for extractive industrialists around Shenandoah turned out to manganese.

Valuable for its use in alloys of iron, aluminum, and copper, miners had profited from a large deposit of Manganese near the park. Just outside the present boundary is Crimora, a town about ten miles northeast of Waynesboro, between the park’s Turk Mountain and Davis Mountain-Wildcat Ridge. The mine is outside of the park’s boundaries, but its presence is worth addressing for that reason. While the National Park Service allowed other mines that had sustained local residents to become parts of the park, they specifically excluded Crimora because it had potential as a mine. Rather than close it off from mining by putting it inside the new park’s boundaries, Virginia’s state geologist and National Park Service officials agreed to leave it out.

Their decision helped satisfy extractive industrialists who had a stake in the Shenandoah region, but were not involved in the tourist trade. By keeping Crimora out of the park, supporters of wilderness preservation and National Park Service officials demonstrated that they considered the miners who they
satisfied as being more politically and economically significant than the small-holders they displaced only a few miles away. The miners and mine owners got that concession because they had a more legitimate and productive claim on the land than the mountaineers who nature enthusiasts, government officials, and National Park Service personnel were expelling from other parts of the Blue Ridge.

Using the Blue Ridge – Extractive industry and farming impacts

Constant clearing, cropping, and grazing had “worn out” most of the land in Shenandoah National Park and the east by the middle of the eighteenth century. With returns for old staples like tobacco and wheat slipping at the same time farmers in the deep south and continental west were entering the market, it became harder and harder for farmers along the Blue Ridge to make ends meet. At a time when market forces seemed to be impelling the consolidation of holdings to deal with the new competitors, existing families were more hard pressed than ever. By the early twentieth century, they increasingly turned to land sales in order to keep their estates solvent.

The new buyers who moved on to the land were largely lowland farmer-grazers who wanted mountain pastures to increase their cattle production. When the State of Virginia began acquiring land for Shenandoah National Park in the early 1930s, about one sixth of what they eventually bought was being used to graze cattle. The transition to grazing meant that huge parts of the formerly forested or farmed land was covered in bluegrass when the park commission began working to acquire it.

Its appearance in comparison to the parkscapes National Park Service rangers were accustomed to seeing in the west would have important implications for the residents who lived on and owned it when assessors decided how much they would be paid during condemnation proceedings. The grazers’ title to the land and their ability to make productive use of it meant that they would have a significant amount of influence on the way the Virginia Conservation Commission assessed it. The grazers’ use of the land was so productive that a pamphlet the Department of Agriculture published in
1927 described the mountains there as “one of the most important beef-producing sections of the United States.”

In order to manage the day-to-day operations of the land, and of their cattle herds, most owners took in tenants who were responsible for the everyday maintenance of facilities, such as salt licks and fences. The tenants also occasionally worked for wages that owners paid for mowing or more extensive building maintenance. That said, they had no contracts, and they usually did not pay rent, or take payment for the minding cattle or dealing with unexpected problems on the mountain. In order to supplement their income, many of the tenants maintained side enterprises as farmers, but more importantly as loggers.

The forests of Shenandoah provided a veritable cornucopia to the highlanders who made their homes among the trees. Besides providing structural timber for their homes, the trees provided the raw materials for mountain arts and industries. Long winter nights provided ideal opportunities to build items for use or sale later in the year. Plentiful chestnut trees provided opportunities to harvest bark that was valuable for hide tanning. Demand for timber in the city meant that logs could always be turned in to ready cash at one of the nearby sawmills.

With the notable exception of about 1,100 acres near “The Sag” at the top of Staunton Gap, all of the forests in the park were second growth. This meant they had all regrown after being cut down. Prior to their use by Euroamericans, archaeological evidence suggests that large areas were also subject to Indian management by fire or tree girdling (killing the trees by making a cut around their bases). The fact that so little of the forest in what became the park was first-growth belied its promoters’ claims that the trees there were exceptional specimens of what the landscape had looked like before Euroamericans arrived; but even as they discovered this, it did not dissuade the Department of Interior or Virginia Conservation Commission from moving ahead with plans to establish the park.
Prior to the creation of the park, families managed the forests in response to market forces and their individual needs. Tanning was one of the most significant activities that impacted the forest’s composition and appearance. The practice provided an important source of supplemental income to residents who often kept small stacks of bark drying in their homes. The bark functioned almost like money in a bank, ready to haul and sell for something they might urgently need or want.558

They sold the bark to tanneries primarily in the Shenandoah Valley that processed hides harvested mostly from Midwestern meat packers. The tanners built in the Valley to take advantage of their proximity to chestnut trees and eastern markets.559 Residents harvested most of the bark from live trees that they left standing, but they also cut some to sell at local sawmills.560 The number of trees they harvested in this way did not significantly change the way the forests looked, but cutting other kinds of trees for timber did.

Cutting wiped out large swaths of the Blue Ridge forest. The oaks, hickories, ash, and locust trees that were common in the region were all popular with loggers. The Virginia Hardwood Manufacturing Company of Browntown operated several mills inside the proposed park boundary and had surveyed all the trees they wanted to use in their 7000 acres. As they and other companies harvested their trees, they left vast eroded hillsides, muddy rivers, and only distant memories of old-growth trees.561 In short, the southern Appalachian forests were following the lowland forests (where slave planters used to live) into oblivion.

The land’s appearance contributed to a perception among policymakers, preservation advocates, and park rangers that the mountaineers were feckless, shortsighted, and generally unable to responsibly determine how natural resources should be used. The residents saw the trees that they cut as a renewable commodity that restored itself every half generation, or so. They had no compunction about taking advantage of the wealth endowed to them by the forests for profit. Their actions ultimately had important ramifications.
A forester wrote in 1905 that, in the Southern Appalachians, “a clean lumber job is seldom seen.” The forester complained, “there is great waste of good timber” because “care is seldom taken to throw trees where they will do the least damage to themselves and to others.” He went on to denounce the practical forestry of the region as exhibiting a “total lack of provision for future crop [as] characteristic of the lumbering now carried on in this region.” In short, the forester concluded, “logging operations [there] have generally shown an inexcusable slovenliness, as foreign to good lumbering as to practical forestry.” The forester argued the only explanation of why anyone would cut lumber that way was residents’ economic poverty.

He thought that since “almost all of the work has been done by the farmers of the region in order to supply their fuel and other household material and to add to the poor living afforded on their farms” it was understandable that their harvest techniques were wanting. After all, “these men are often hampered by lack of capital, are generally wanting in the knowledge requisite to good lumbering, and have had always to contend with the difficulty of obtaining expert loggers to carry out the work.” Essentially, they cut as they needed with little thought about what affects their actions might have on the landscape in the future. While the foresters conceded that lumbering was “an important industry” and the sawmills were still “small-scale operations,” their impacts on the forest were unacceptable. So, while the residents’ actions were understandable, as later policy decisions proved, that did not make their perceived profligacy forgivable.

The State of Virginia used the mountain peoples’ actions to justify dispossessing them and to impose a new management paradigm on the land. It probably would have been very hard to establish a park in other parts of the US, but conditions on the Blue Ridge turned out to be propitious for repossessing it. Most of the land that the National Park Service and Virginia Conservation Commission
wanted to acquire for the park was owned by absentee landlords and was either unoccupied or inhabited by tenants or squatters. This arrangement, where residents did not necessarily hold title to the land they lived on, was a legacy of patterns of tenancy that ran back generations.

When the crown had established large land grants as far back as the eighteenth century, the grantees established relationships with families whose descendants frequently passed from one landlord to the next over successive generations. While this arrangement was seen as mutually advantageous, it left the tenants in an awkward liminal state where they lacked the legal standing for independent recourse when their landlords’ property was condemned. If the landlord chose not to contest condemnation, or if they sold willingly, the tenants did not have a right to object to the proceedings. Up until those landlords decided to sell their land for use in the park, they worked symbiotically with their tenants.\textsuperscript{564}

Tenants counted on their landlords for everything from loans of money to loans of homes and equipment. Property owners depended on their tenants to take care of day-to-day maintenance on their property. In addition, since many of the relationships between tenants and property owners persisted for generations, it was not uncommon for them to develop friendships or at least cordial working relationships.\textsuperscript{565}

The culture that developed between lowland landlords and upland tenants was one of the defining characteristics of life in the Blue Ridge. It bespoke an earlier time and preindustrial relationship between capital and labor that counted as much on individual reliability as on fiduciary responsibility to assure that work was done adequately and promptly.\textsuperscript{566} As nature enthusiasts, tourist business owners, and National Park Service employees began contemplating creating a national park in the Blue Ridge, it was clear that even though the tenants and their landlords occupied geographically similar spaces, they no longer shared that preindustrial point of view. The compartments in which each group found itself would have important implications for the highlanders’ ways of life and access to land that they had, in
many cases, occupied for generations when the National Park Service began eying the area in the mid-1920s.

One of the reasons that the highland residents found themselves at a disadvantage in talks with the Virginia Conservation Commission and the National Park Service was the popular perception that they were backward. The fact that they seemed superstitious and enamored of independent living, that they were fond of fiddles, unwritten songs, unwritten stories, and moonshine; and that they were generally unreceptive to the “civilizing” influences of the wider world made them seem strange to the city dwelling tourists who met them. Their customs were part of what contributed to the perception that they were not worthy to stay on the land. According to one historian, urbane observers thought the mountaineers’ customs were antiquated and idiosyncratic, but the characteristic that highlighted their backwardness was their desire to continue living in the mountains.567

The reality was that nearly five hundred families lived in the mountains. They were not an organized or homogenous group. They were spread over eight counties and were so scattered and relatively small in number that they had little interest in or influence on local politics. Most of them cultivated one to eight acres, but a few worked nearly 100 acres. They were far from influential or well regarded. It is difficult to understand them on their own terms because they did not produce many records of their own. Understanding them is also complicated because the researchers who recorded their perceptions of the mountain residents might not have observed their true lifeways. These factors contributed to nature enthusiasts’, government policymakers’, and National Park Service employees’ negative perceptions of the mountaineers and probably contributed to their eventual removal from the land that became part of Shenandoah National Park. 568
2.4 – Hollow Folk – Popular perceptions of residents of the Blue Ridge

Writing about the mountain folk’s first encounters with people like George Freeman Pollock and later park promoters, and echoing the businessman’s history of his time at Skyland, the historian Darwin Lambert argues, “to the mountain folk, the city folk were...characters.” Lambert argued the urban visitors’ unsophisticated reactions to the mountaineers and to the wild nature that surrounded their homes amused mountain residents. He argued the mountaineers worked to take advantage of visitors’ reactions. When the “dudes” were around “they’d put on their worst clothes instead of their best” and would “go barefooted when they might not otherwise.” They consciously embodied “bumpkin’ry” simply to see their visitors’ reactions.569

Lambert said mountaineer men would make a point of carrying old guns and would intentionally overuse words and phrases that caused puzzlement or amusement. Their acting had some truth to it in that some of their shirts were, indeed, old and brier torn, and their vernacular was speckled with the pokes [sacks], breshes [brushes], and pizens [poisons] of older English, but the reality was that this was a façade. The performance contributed to perceptions that the mountaineers were destitute and deprived of the comforts afforded by modern living. It also dovetailed with a popular perception that social scientists, popular authors, and policymakers had built for them over the past two hundred years.570

Since at least the turn of the twentieth century, the people who inhabit the Appalachian Mountains were portrayed in popular dramas and scholarly works as being ruggedly independent, provincial in their worldview, and crude in their social habits. Their identity’s origins were often romanticized by outsiders who saw their way of life as novel and evoking connections with a bygone, pioneer era. While the history of the mountains’ Euroamerican settlement was fairly well known, some tourist business owners, government officials, and social science researchers used popular historical groups to explain how the area became culturally distinct.571
When he arrived there in the 1930s, Civilian Conservation Corps Colonel Joseph Kock claimed that in the process of tearing down the homes of the Shenandoah’s former residents, he and his men discovered “Hessian and British buttons tucked between the logs.” Kock speculated that they had come from the uniforms of deserters from the British Army during the Revolutionary War. The colonel’s association of the people he and his men removed from the park with deserters from the British Army cast them in a poor light. It implies that their ancestors were inconstant, disloyal, self-interested, and venal, as well as on the wrong side of America’s War for Independence.

Similarly, in a speech on the prospect of relocating residents from the park, Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur (who was a successor to Hubert Work) wrote them off as degenerate. He was quoted as saying “no matter what is done with these people they will be better off. They have nothing to lose.” He also claimed that of the six families living in one hollow all had the names of Corbin or Nicholson; therefore, their brothers and sisters must have been intermarrying for some time.572

Associations like Kock and Wilbur’s dogged the mountain people who, much to their misfortune, had to contend with popular, political, and academic prejudice alike. Kock’s story about the buttons may have carried weight in social circles, but might not have gotten him notice among more professional historians. In the late nineteenth century, though, academics made similar associations between the mountain people, the colonial past, and traditional folkways.573

When they started documenting local music in the late nineteenth century, antiquarians argued, “the folk-lore of the British Isles yet lingers here untouched and unchanged.” Historians helped legitimate assumptions about the character and culture of the residents who called the Blue Ridge home by writing about the relation between present day ways of life and connecting it to past precedents.574 Professionals wrote about mountain people engaged in all kinds of nefarious behavior. As a result, the popular press ran stories that claimed to tell the stories of mountaineers whose actions ranged from reckless disregard for the law to incest.
In a monograph on the American South, several historians wrote, “for more than a century these mountaineers dwelt practically aloof from the people in that big world lying just outside the pale of their own beloved mountains.” They were detached from the rest of society, the historians claimed, and “neither sought nor desired to have outsiders in their lives.” Their “isolation from their own kind [other humans], from the valleys and cities as remote and vague to them as a foreign country, begot in them secretiveness and suspicion of the few who intruded into the mountain fastness.”

Even when historians gave positive descriptions of the mountaineers, some were patronizing. In a history on southern highlanders, John Charles Campbell wrote that when he took shelter in a mountaineer cabin during a storm, “we sought to establish friendly relations with the little daughter cuddled in fear of the storm and in shyness of strangers, in her mother’s arms.” He described the “fire lighted up the room furnished with a simplicity one might duplicate in many a mountain cabin of the South.” And after the storm passed there “came a halloo from the stalwart young husband, as he returned from the clearing with axe gleaming over his shoulder.”

Campbell’s description does not inspire confidence in the mountaineers. His claim that the little daughter “cuddled in fear” due to shyness of a stranger may have been accurate, but reinforces the supposed cultural isolation and provincialism of mountain dwellers. His statement that the “young husband” returned with a “halloo” likewise implies a lack of literacy and sophistication. Overall, his description seems to show a mixture of benighted amusement and cool condescension toward the mountain people. Even when writers tried to dispel popular misconceptions about them, authors presented the mountaineers as inferior to farmers and city residents who lived elsewhere in the United States.

In the introduction to his 1913 book *Our Southern Highlanders*, Horace Kephart, a well-known outdoors enthusiast and author at the turn of the twentieth century, acknowledged that the word mountaineer “...conjure[s] up a tall, slouching figure in homespun, who carries a rifle as habitually he
Kephart thought that “there is just enough truth in this caricature to give it a point that will stick” because, after all “our typical mountaineer is lank, he is always unkempt, he is fond of toting a gun on his shoulder, and his curiosity about a stranger’s name and business is promptly, though politely, outspoken.” Kephart thought most outsiders used “glimpses from afar” to justify faulty opinions. So, he sagaciously asked, “what do they learn of the real mountaineer?”

The answer, he thought, was not very much. To get to know the mountaineers in a meaningful way, outsiders needed to spend time with them and understand what it meant to make homes in the valleys, the hollows, and the hillsides. And for the few who did, they would learn that “this same odd people is more purely bred from old American stock than any other element of our population that occupies, by itself, so great a territory.” After dwelling five or six generations “unaided-and untroubled by the growth of civilization”, they were still living according to the “customs and ideas [that were] unaltered from the time of their forefathers”.

Kephart thought the mountaineers had a more legitimate claim on knowledge of the nation’s true character and identity than just about anyone else did. After all “our backwoodsmen of the Blue Ridge...are still thinking essentially the same thoughts, still living in much the same fashion, as did the their ancestors in the days of Daniel Boone.” Kephart did not think that meant that they were inflexible, stupid, or degenerate. He contended, “they are a people of keen intelligence and strong initiative when they see anything to win.”

In fact, the story of how they had sustained themselves and their families for so many generations was, to Kephart at least, defined by their ability to overcome misfortune, their willingness to suffer tribulations, and their eventual triumph over adversity. In order to understand them, “we must, for a time, decivilize [sic] ourselves to the extent of going back [emphasis in original] and getting an eighteenth century point of view.” In the end, though, the mountaineers’ lack of traditional civility
helped government officials, nature enthusiasts, and the National Park Service justify removing them from park land.

Kephart’s belief that tourists needed to “decivilize” themselves in order to get back to the mountaineers’ point of view was consistent with Secretary Work’s claim that national parks provided opportunities for people to attempt “after a fashion to complete the cycle begun by the forebears of those in this region who struggled to overcome the forests and wildlife we now seek to conserve.” Kephart was making the same argument as Work about needing to get in touch with the past. The difference between his logic and that of the National Park Service and nature enthusiasts was that the Secretary thought the mountaineers were mired in the wilderness. Kephart thought their society was an authentic island of primitive America. While Kephart’s perspective was at least based on first-hand interaction with the mountaineers, his description of them still reflects his personal point of view. That problem confounds understanding the mountaineers on their own terms.

The mountaineers variously supported, resisted, or relented to the creation of Shenandoah National Park, but understanding their perspective is harder than understanding the advocates who were involved in the creation of the park because:

1.) They left relatively few written records
2.) It can be unpleasant to learn about stories associated with injustice and loss
3.) The National Park Service willfully obliterated their material culture
4.) Their accounts of life in the Blue Ridge might have been influenced by the difficult assimilation experience that dogged them after they left Shenandoah.

These problems aside, some sources provide a partial account of the mountaineers’ points of view. The mountains in and around what became Shenandoah National Park are a choppy sea of small mountains with valleys and hollows running outward in all directions with no large population centers or direct access to navigable rivers, railroads, or highways. The land’s physical isolation contributed to a
popular perception that the people who lived there were intellectually isolated. Articles in popular publications said residents’ “little world [was confined] within a radius of a few miles from [their] cabin.”580 A writer for the Geographical Journal of London claimed that they had met “one woman who, during the twelve years of her married life, had lived only ten miles across the mountain from her own home, but had never in this time been back home to visit her father and mother.” Another local was quoted as saying that s/he “had never been to the post-office, four miles away” and still another “had never seen the ford of the Rockcastle River, only two miles from her home, and marked, moreover, by the country store of the district.”581

The reporter took the stories about residents in the mountains at face value. There are other accounts that corroborate the article, but archaeological and social studies indicate that its claims are probably false. The story attempts to attribute a premodern romance to life in the mountains. It hearkens back to an allegedly simpler time and, simultaneously, implies residents were unimaginative, simplistic, and complacent. It attributes an allure and romance to the premodern lifestyle that they claimed people were living in the mountains and fits into a broader narrative about life along the Blue Ridge.

At the turn of the twentieth century, John Fox, a journalist from Kentucky, claimed mountaineers were “shut off by the mountains that have blocked and still block the commerce of a century.” He said they were living where there were “no navigable rivers, no lakes, no coasts, few wagon roads, and often no roads at all except the beds of streams.” He described the residents who grew up in those places as being like everyone who came before them. The residents born there “lived in the cabin in which his grandfather was born, and in life, habit, and thought he has been merely his grandfather born over again.”582 Fox was characterizing mountain people and society as static. He argued the place where they lived was shaping their temperaments, personalities, and proclivities.
While his claim about the peoples’ geographic isolation was objectively accurate, the reporter’s conclusion that isolation meant they were somehow degenerate was inaccurate. Authors’ willingness to equate geographic isolation with strong, and usually unqualified, connections to a static culture do not stand up to scrutiny. While it was true that rough mountain roads and dispersed development complicated contact between people in the Blue Ridge (and all along the Appalachian Mountains), the country was well traversed.

Sociologists began to argue as early as the 1930s that people in the hollows might not have been as isolated as other authors, government officials, or nature enthusiasts claimed. In a study completed around the land that became the Great Smoky Mountain National Park, one young graduate student asked locals to talk about their lives. Among the issues they asked about were hunting, their subjects’ home lives, and their social lives. One woman sang several traditional ballads to him. After finishing “Lord Thomas,” a common mountain song, she sang “Come All You Young Ladies” to the untraditional tune of “On Top of Old Smoky,” but next sang the exotic song, “Come All You Texas Rangers.” The researcher noted the disjunction at the time and another historian writing about the incident thought that “likely as not its singer learned it from the radio.” The fact that radios were common enough in the land that eventually came into the park there says something about the level of isolation that at least some people in the mountains lived with.

In an effort to disentangle the mountain peoples’ home lives from the mythology that social scientists, policy-makers, and the popular press built for them, a number of groups are trying to find new ways of understanding their habits and culture. By conducting archaeological digs, consulting census and property records, and comparing testimony from different researchers’ accounts of interviews with the residents who lived in or near the park, a new picture of their lives is beginning to emerge. Dispelling the rumors that surround what the “hollow folk” were actually like is sometimes complicated by the testimony of mountaineers themselves.
In oral histories collected by the National Park Service in the 1970s, former residents claimed that around Corbin Hollow “they were good people but were the poorest class of people” who “did not [even] have a bed...They slept on the floor, maybe a pile of rags and stuff like that in their house.” In spite of that testimony, all the homes sites surveyed in Corbin Hollow had bedframes, or pieces of them, nearby. According to one team of historians, this indicates a disjunction in former residents’ perception of past and present communities. They theorized mountain expatriates invented or selectively remembered parts of their shared history to differentiate themselves from neighbors in the places where they live now. The researchers described former residents’ memories as “a blend of the remembered and the received” and thought that the culture described in books like Hollow Folk might have been influenced by a similar myopia.

When they described the experience of making apple butter, contributors to an oral history project mixed nostalgia with objective description. George Corbin, whose family cabin is today managed as a hiker’s refuge along the Appalachian Trail, claimed “some of the best time[s] we had whar [sic] when we did apple butter boilin’.” While he acknowledged that the process required that everyone who participated stay up all night, he seemed to fondly recall, “we drank moonshine, played music and couples took turns stirrin’ the apple butter.” Even though the historian who recorded his story wondered, “why did they enjoy this work? It is a long tedious job to make apple butter yet most families in the Blue Ridge looked forward to the time of apple butter boiling.” She thought reason why was that “it was fun because everyone got together.”

The romance of mountain communities was a common subject in stories told by former residents. In her history of the mountain folk, Recollections: The People of the Blue Ridge Remember, Dorothy Noble Smith blended their first person accounts of life in places throughout the park with an overarching narrative about the values that had been lost when their homes were destroyed. She wrote “society today is content with an occasional luncheon, dinner or bridge game,” but that was not how
mountain residents lived. In another part of his oral account of life in Corbin Hollow, George Corbin said, “we’d all get together in the evenin [sic]; and sing.” The evenings were so spirited and the music so much fun to play that Corbin thought “with play’ the Jew’s Harp so much I practically wore off one side of my mustache.”

Corbin’s pleasant recollection of his time living on the land that eventually was added to Shenandoah probably left out most of the mundane or unpleasant events that attend residents’ day-to-day existence there. In other archaeological digs, besides finding discarded farm tools and cast-off building materials, one of the most common finds in the diggings are commercial food jars. They appear to have come from across the United States.

This implies that the residents who lived there were working to do more than subsist. They apparently had enough excess produce that they were able to trade not only for necessary tools and staples, but also for luxuries like canned fruit and milk. Assessing the leavings of the mountaineers’ material culture gives historians new opportunities to understand who they were, what their lives were like, and how they influenced the shape of Shenandoah.

Archaeological evidence shows how outside observers’ perception of the mountaineers may not have matched their lived reality. Residents were probably not as isolated or as provincial as tourist business owners like George Pollock or National Park Service and CCC personnel believed they were. The difference between the way that he and other park promoters presented the mountaineers and their lived reality was important because it had implications for the way that government policy-makers, the National Park Service, and tourists approached their tenancy in the park.

Businesspeople selectively appropriated pieces of the resident mountaineers’ identities in order to enhance the recreational appeal of Shenandoah as a national park. The cachet that residents added to the Blue Ridge helped make the region seem unique, novel, and in touch with the primitive past. By selectively focusing on parts of residents’ lives, Shenandoah’s promoters succeeded at making the
proposed park seem consistent with the precedents set for national park lands in the west. One of the reasons that Shenandoah could live up to the park paradigm’s standards was that the residents who used to live there lent pieces of their identities to the park, even though they were physically expelled from it.

Park managers used the mountaineers’ supposed sloth to argue that they were not making the best possible use of the land. Using utilitarian justifications, the Department of Interior and National Park Service helped frame their work as more deserving of public support than the mountaineers’ was. Like businesspeople, they also selectively incorporated parts of the residents’ lifeways into the park’s identity.

Visitors encountered the residents through park designated place names, the objects residents left behind near popular hiking trails, and first hand when they visited places like Skyland. Visitors were receptive to seeing residents’ culture as defined by rugged independence and love of the outdoors. They did not support allowing residents to stay because that would prevent Shenandoah’s entry into the National Park System. Residents had to be their own advocates if they wanted to stay in the park.

Resisting Displacement – Reactions to resident dispossession

The next chapter discusses how the machinery of federal relief efforts affected mountaineers’ erasure from the landscape, but this one addresses the residents’ reactions to it. It also lays the groundwork to explain how they nevertheless affected the eventual appearance of the park. Most of the documents that preserve the mountaineers’ voices are today kept by the National Park Service in the form of letters written by residents in the process of being expelled from their former homes on the Blue Ridge. They wrote to express their indignation, their frustration, and eventually their resignation. Besides showing the friction that existed between different members of the mountain communities and
the National Park Service, the letters are important for their acknowledgement that the residents in the mountains did not believe their land was suitable for use in a national park.

Residents of the Blue Ridge attempted to negotiate their relationship with the Department of Interior, Virginia Conservation Commission, and National Park Service by appealing directly to those organizations’ senior leaders. In letters to the park engineer at Shenandoah, the Director of the National Park Service, the Secretary of Interior, the Governor of Virginia, and Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt, they explained why they ought to be allowed to continue their lives in the manner to which they were accustomed.593

In some cases that meant taking advantage of changes the National Park Service was attempting to impose on the park to their advantage. The letters they left behind show that their characters did not match the supposed identities for mountaineers at that time. While their letters’ spelling and grammar is far from erudite, the residents come across as complicated people expressing legitimate concerns. They do not seem so hollow when allowed to speak in the first person. While some writers were polite and interrogatory, some wrote plaintive petitions, and others expressed outrage, many belie a shrewd understanding of the situation at hand.594

As residents who voluntarily sold their land moved away from the mountains, their neighbors wanted to take advantage of the homes and possessions they left behind. For example, mountaineers wrote to the National Park Service asking whether they could pick the fruit left behind in their neighbors’ abandoned orchards. The fruit in them ripened and seemed ready for use, except that park rangers were preventing residents from picking it. Unlike the mountaineers who saw the fruit as a source of food or profit, the park rangers saw it as an unnatural intrusion on the landscape that they wanted to remove. The rangers discouraged that kind of use.

One resident wrote, “I have asked the force [sic] ranger for them but he did not come down hear [sic]…Velt [a former resident who had moved] have got his yard full of apples in we got none. Will
you please send [sic] the force ranger down hear.” The author said that “I am up on Skylian [sic] at work you send ranger up hear an tell me. In [sic] send me a note to get them.”

These kinds of letters show how the mountaineers’ understanding of the land differed from park rangers’. They interpreted it as a source of sustenance and not a place for escape or leisure. They wanted to take advantage of the land’s natural resources to sustain themselves and their families in the ways they had for generations. The arrival of park rangers both complicated their access to traditional lifeways, and provided new opportunities for them to harness their surroundings (as is shown in the case of apple picking). Those opportunities were limited, and residents argued that the National Park Service lacked the standing or justification to seize their homes for use in a park.

In an especially high profile case, Robert H. Via, a landowner, challenged the constitutionality of Virginia seizing land to be given to the federal government. Via’s attorneys claimed that the state’s seizure of his land violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and that it was not a “public necessity” to establish a park “pleasuring ground.” While his case was heard by the US Supreme court, it ultimately dismissed his case “on the ground that appellant has an adequate remedy at law.” The court apparently concluded that the availability of a remedy, even if it was not satisfactory to the complainant, satisfied the government’s obligations under the Fifth Amendment. Lacking a sufficiently protective legal recourse, landowners raised other protests.

They made utilitarian arguments. Owners protested that the grazing along the Blue Ridge was not replaceable. To them, “It would be a great sacrifice” to give up land in the highlands because there was not land in the valley “sufficient to pasture our cattle.” Their arguments show how they implicitly believed the land was not only irreplaceable, but to be misused if it came into the park permanently. By withdrawing pasture from productive use, park designation would make it impossible for them to support themselves and their families. This seems to contradict testimony from park supporters like
Stephen Mather, who claimed, “there is no doubt but that the State of Virginia as a whole should be warmly behind this project as it will be of great economic value to them.”

Indeed, the argument that grazing land would be better used for non-park purposes affected the shape of the park. Since grazing land was generally acknowledged as being more valuable than farm land or forest, it commanded a higher price. This was another reason, besides the siting of Skyline Drive, that the conservation commission gave preference to more easily acquired, cheaper non-grazing land higher along the Blue Ridge. Park historian Darwin Lambert described the acquisition process as assembling “a jigsaw puzzle of mostly-low-value tracts...that would make a contiguous whole acceptable as a national park.” The commission planned to keep costs down by “adding on rocky ridges that would come cheaply” to the park while leaving more expensive, potentially fertile land out.

As residents began to realize they were going to be relocated whether they liked it or not, they sometimes used the rhetoric of authenticity to argue they ought to be able to take the buildings from the area with them. Elmer Hensley, late of Swift Run, Virginia, said he wanted to take his old buildings, “tear them down and build...them again in the valley near Elkton” on the grounds that “they are all old buildings I don’t think they would be much good in the park.”

Similarly, another resident wrote to say that since he believed the park was “giving permission to pull down old buildings to get them out of the way” he wanted to demolish an “old frame building at Simmon’s Gap which is not much good” so that he could “use the material in some building I am doing elsewhere.” The same resident requested “permission to take the wire fence down as I don’t feel you have any need for it and I could use it to advantage.” He also asked whether “the Church could be used there indefinitely.” The resident claimed, “I’m going to build a church this summer and would like to have those windows if that must be taken down. One window is a memorial and of course would like to put it elsewhere.”
These residents appropriated the logic behind the claim that the park was to be a great natural preserve. They used the idea to justify taking pieces of the built environment for their personal gain. They used the National Park Service and preservationists’ stated desire to create a natural preserve in order to legitimize taking their neighbors’ former property for themselves. In some cases, they also used the same logic to argue that the whole park endeavor was fundamentally flawed.

One Virginia resident argued, in a letter to President Hoover that “The Shenandoah park area cannot be included in the national park system without lowering the standard for national parks” because “to be included in that system an area should be unique and virginal.” The writer claimed, “the scenery of the Blue Ridge is repeated again and again from Maryland to northern Georgia,” and the “area is not virginal.” The author said the land’s natural value was compromised by the fact that “part of it has been cleared, plowed, and pasture; and well nigh all of it has been logged at one time or another.” He said that bringing the area into “the national park system would tend to break down the distinction between national parks and any park that might be established by a state for recreational purposes.”

The author, a former employee of the Virginia state forester’s office named Alfred Ackerman, was using park supporters’ own logic to argue that the Blue Ridge would never fit the park paradigm. It was not suitable because it would never be able to live up to the standards set by preexisting parks. The fact that the National Park Service, businesspeople, and conservationists continued to push for the creation of the park there shows how different groups’ interests contributed to the momentum propelling it forward.

Nature enthusiasts and National Park Service officials were not the only ones who pushed the project ahead. As it turned out, one of the most powerful allies that pushed the park’s creation forward was not a discrete group of people, but Americans’ collective reaction to the Great Depression.
2.5 – Shenandoah as an instrument of federal policy- Using the park as an outlet for relief by creating a natural preserve

Shenandoah entered the National Park System at a very turbulent moment in the United States’ history. After the Stock Market Crash of 1929, many workers lost their jobs and called on the Federal government to take drastic steps to relieve their economic distress. Among the programs the government initiated after Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932 were the Works Progress Administration, Resettlement Administration, and, probably most importantly for places like Shenandoah, the Civilian Conservation Corps. These federally funded programs provided labor for projects like the ones needed to make Shenandoah conform to the park paradigm. While Roosevelt and his administration probably did more for the park than anyone before or since, prior to his election, the park enjoyed another advocate in the White House.

Landing a President – A federal ally for Shenandoah

In an article about him, one journalist said that William Carson “is largely responsible for interesting the Federal authorities in building the Skyline Drive” and gave him credit for bringing the park “to its present state of near completion.” According to the writer, the reason was that Carson had “a reputation for getting what he goes after.” Starting in the mid-1920s, he had gone after a powerful advocate for Shenandoah, and managed to secure one through an accident of geography, compelling story telling, and by not so subtly manipulating a mountain stream.

Early in 1929, Carson went headhunting in Washington for a powerful ally to support Shenandoah’s creation. Recognizing that having the president on his side might be a good thing, he took special notice when he found out that President-elect Hoover was angling for new fishing hole and private retreat within a few hours of the White House. Carson convinced Hoover to consider trying a camp near the proposed Shenandoah National Park. In order to hedge the park’s proximity to Washington and the
relative seclusion of its hollows, Carson then convinced locals to stock the Rapidan River with fish for Hoover to catch.  

Once the president visited the area around the Rapidan River, he was hooked. He and his wife used their own money to buy 164 acres and construct more than a dozen buildings to house himself and guests on weekend retreats. The Marine Corps obligingly agreed to a training exercise constructing a road to the buildings and constructed their own camp nearby to secure it. The result was that Hoover became the neighbor of some of the residents the park was shortly to displace. The president and his wife spent their own money to construct and staff a school for the mountaineers in hopes that they would benefit from education.  

Hoover’s unwillingness to provide “direct relief” made him infamous, but he sanctioned appropriations for public works projects. The combination of a significant drought and onset of the Great Depression in 1929 threw thousands of Virginians, especially farmers who lived around Shenandoah, out of work. As Congressmen lined up to find support for their districts, one of the projects that drew their attention was the as-yet unconstructed Skyline Drive.

Thanks to support from President Hoover, the road received its first federal appropriation in 1931. The result was that when some newspapers were headlined “Railroads Now Face Their Gravest Crisis,” and “Homestead Racket Stirs Los Angeles” there was another headline that read “Virginia Takes Note of New Scenic Road.” According to its author, “Only this week the Federal authorities are making a survey with a view of extending the Skyline Drive at both ends…” to create a road with a “northern terminus…[at] Front Royal and the southern Waynesboro,” which “mark the upper and lower ends of Shenandoah National Park now in the process of creation.” The article’s author said the road would cover almost 100 miles and was going to cost $15,000,000 dollars to build. That would be $15,000,000 spent on local tools and labor.
In another article written years later, one journalist said that the fact it was “built with Federal Funds” was “the result of the pleading insistence of the Virginia Conservation and Development Commission and...Shenandoah Valley, Inc.” The reason their pleading was successful probably had just as much to do with the political needs of the government officials who desired an outlet for federal funds in Appalachia, the National Park Service’s desire to have a presence in the east, and tourists’ and conservationists’ support for expanding the park system as with the areas’ scenic merit. The result, especially after Franklin Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933, was to increase and intensify public involvement there through new government agencies.

When Franklin Roosevelt visited Shenandoah prior to its formal induction into the National Park System, the star destinations of his tour were the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps in its present day north and central districts. On his visit to one camp, he watched a pageant put on by enrollees (the term for participants in the CCC) who ceremonially showed their desire to banish depression from their midst. In “the burial of old man depression and fear and the return of happy days,” two enrollees carrying banners marked “C.C.C.” and “NIRA [National Industrial Recovery Act]” walked toward a covered object labeled “fear” that torchbearers behind them set on fire. As the covering burned, it revealed “Old Man Depression” in effigy, which they also burned with Roosevelt’s encouragement “that’s right, burn him up” as the camp bugler played “Happy Days Are Here Again.”

The Roosevelt Administration created the CCC in response to the unprecedented difficulties young people of working age faced during the Great Depression. Army and civilian supervisors oversaw most of the Corps’ work reshaping Shenandoah. That labor force and its supervisors did not always share the National Park Service’s priorities, and they worked to provide opportunities for young enrollees to strike a blow against the economic and social conditions that had left them without work or hope.
When the Roosevelt administration created the CCC in 1933, the first camps established by the new agency were located in what became Shenandoah National Park. Their placement was the result of several coincidences. First, the camps were in an area acknowledged as being economically backward. Second, they were near an ongoing public works project initiated by the Hoover Administration that was already popular with most of its neighbors and the traveling public thanks to publicity organized by the National Park Service, Virginia Conservation Commission, and Shenandoah Valley, Inc. Third, the camps were close to the national capital where politicians, and the Roosevelt Administration, thought they would benefit from close oversight of enrollees’ work. There was no shortage of projects for them to work on.

Private contractors were responsible for the actual construction of Skyline Drive, but CCC enrollees were involved in just about every other part of park construction. They worked on trails, fire roads and towers, log comfort stations, construction projects associated with Skyline Drive, and picnic grounds. They also worked to remove the unnatural impositions that complicated making the Blue Ridge like national parks in the American west.

The National Park Service needed to remove the buildings and residents from the land. The Civilian Conservation Corps needed to prepare formerly occupied spaces for re-wilding by planting trees and restoring viewsheds that appeared natural. The first step was removing the mountaineers and their livestock from the park.

In May 1933, several years before the Park’s formal induction into the National Park System, one of the most frequent subjects that came up in letters about work in the park was the CCC’s progress removing fencing and farm equipment from along Skyline Drive. In one letter to the CCC’s chief engineer, James Lassiter, from the National Park Service’s eastern division chief, Oliver Taylor, Taylor lamented that, “Mr. Pollock states that there seems to be no chance of getting the cattle out of the hills so that we can
do away with fences... [this season, therefore] it would seem that improvement should be made on the...road."611

Other correspondence from Washington DC makes it clear that officials at the Department of Interior took an active interest in the crew’s progress in completing these tasks. In another letter to chief engineer Lassiter the National Park Service division chief complained

We are asked so many questions here in Washington about what we are doing at Shenandoah and in other parks, but at Shenandoah in particular since it is close to Washington, we have more inquiries regarding it than for other places. Will you therefore please keep me a little better informed on your work and in regard to the time you undertake new projects?

In consequence, Taylor asked for information “at once on the progress of the Rapidan camp work [near President Hoover’s former fishing camp], and your plans for improving the Skyland road”612

Getting appropriations for CCC work managed by the National Park Service hinged on speedily servicing inquiries like this one. Legislators’ willingness to support projects like the ones in Shenandoah reflect a combination of park officials’ success at convincing politicians and other government officials that money appropriated to them would be well spent in the fight against the Great Depression. Legislators’ support also reflects their deference to the expertise that rangers in the National Park Service claimed in managing projects to improve the landscape for recreational and educational purposes. Park rangers used CCC labor in order to reshape Shenandoah along the lines of its western predecessors and to create a wilder landscape.

Wild Expertise - National park rangers exert administrative control in Shenandoah

Staff from the National Park Service began serving in advisory roles at Shenandoah before it officially entered the National Park System in 1936. Their duties were usually technical and often involved providing input on decisions about where to situate different types of infrastructure and where to remove others. They made decisions about isolating certain parts of the park from automotive or trail access
while making others easier to reach. Unsurprisingly, they made those decisions based largely on western precedents.

Building on their success at designing roads in western parks like Glacier and Mount Rainier, engineers from the National Park Service’s Landscape Division of the agency’s Western Field Office in San Francisco developed a process to design essential road infrastructure, like roads, bridges, guardrails, culverts, and overlooks that harmonized them with natural settings in parks. In 1930, one of the western office’s members, Charles Peterson, transferred east to establish the Eastern Division of the Branch of Plans and Design, which was eventually responsible for managing roadwork in a number of new, eastern parks, including Shenandoah.

Horace Albright, the National Park Service’s second director, described Shenandoah’s purpose succinctly when construction on Skyline Drive began in 1931. He said that the park would “be allowed to revert to the care of Mother Nature with every effort being bent to help Nature reclaim and repopulate the region as she sees fit.” The efforts “being bent” involved using professionals like Peterson and Lassiter to change the park’s environment through fire suppression, road construction, wildlife protection, human removal, landscaping, and engineering to create a landscape that had never been seen on the Blue Ridge before.

Maps drawn less than a decade before the park’s establishment showed six roads traversing the mountains from east to west. Park historian Darwin Lambert claimed that there had been more than a dozen at one time or another. Since the roads bisected areas that the National Park Service wanted to manage in a “primeval state,” they were near the top of the list of changes they wanted to make there after taking over.

Correspondence between officials in the Park and Washington emphasized the necessity of removing roads in the interest of creating a more natural space. One letter addressed to a prominent local park booster made it clear that the service intended to acquire “fee simple title to all roads within
the park.” Doing so would guarantee national park administrators’ control of the area where they intended nature to shape and “repopulate the region as she sees fit.”

The road access issue was emblematic of a larger shift in policy along the Blue Ridge. Even before they worked to close the roads, park rangers attempted to charge the $0.25 park entrance fee to anyone who used them. It was one of the first things park rangers did to assert their authority in the Blue Ridge. While the Park Service made some concessions to former residents, such as promising perpetual access to families whose graveyards were in the park, they operated above the general fray. As they asserted their control over access to the park, administrators similarly sought to gain control of important natural resources in it.

In the National Archives file on National Park Service infrastructural development from the early 1930s, a large folio is dedicated to the problems administrators were having establishing the service’s right to water in and near the parks. In a letter from A.C. Carson (brother of William and Chief Council for the Virginia Conservation Commission) and James Lassiter, they explained the park’s conflict with the town of Luray concerning access to water sources in the park. Carson said “it will readily be seen from an examination of the data furnished herewith, that the total amount of the lands in, or to which the Town of Luray retains any rights, and reserved to the town of Luray, is limited to a few acres on which their pipe lines are located.” Carson was arguing that the Park Service should not back down from a legal judgement that promised the bulk of Luray’s former claims to parkland be reduced. He also included a copy of the judgement enumerating the property that the city would lose as a result. The list included “two miles of 12 inch terra cotta pipe...a storage and feed reservoir of approximately 300,000.00 gallon capacity...” as well as “a 6 inch iron pipe...being approximately 3 ½ miles in length.”

The fact that the Virginia Conservation Commission had gone out of its way to acquire this land, partially at the behest of the National Park Service, shows how confident they were in its potential for rewilding, and in their desire to make sure that the agency, not local residents, would have ultimate
control over its disposition. While other pipes built by the town stayed in place, these were listed as structures to be surrendered to the park.

The National Park Service’s desire to control those resources demonstrates that they believed they ought to be the arbiters of how that water was used and that the previously disturbed land could be restored to its natural condition. By attempting to gain control of Luray’s water infrastructure in the northern part of the park, park staff were attempting to assert control over an important resource that affected the lives of local residents. They did so in the interest of being able to control what the land looked like and for whom it functioned. The reason they wanted that level of control was to ensure that they would be able to shape the appearance of the park.

In a letter from the National Park Service’s chief forester, George Coffman, and chief naturalist, George Wright, to James Lassiter, the former made clear that the preservation of scenic features was to take precedence over all other imperatives in the new park. To be specific, they directed Lassiter to maintain the park’s public roads in such a way as to maximize visitors’ enjoyment of the landscape. They highlighted that necessity in a letter concerning fire roads and recreational trails, saying that the “distinction [between them] is based on the fact that the general public will not ordinarily be using the fire suppression roads and trails and consequently the need for removing wildlife abodes for observation immediately adjacent to these fire protection venues is not urgent.”

The letter frames “wildlife abodes” as an impediment to landscape appreciation, in spite of the fact that Horace Albright claimed allowing “nature [to] reclaim and repopulate the region” was the park’s purpose. It shows how important the appearance of naturality was to the National Park Service and provides more evidence of the agency’s belief that it had the right and duty to arbitrate how the park looked and functioned. It also emphasizes the high priority park officials placed on road construction and viewshed management.
Where the National Park Service expected visitors would use foot trails near Skyline Drive, scenic utility informed park administrators’ management decisions. They wanted to take advantage of the park’s natural resources for visitor use and ensure that none of their actions compromised the views tourists expected to enjoy there. For example, in Shenandoah’s Central District, park administrators argued that Whiteoak Canyon ought to be recognized as “one of the most beautiful scenic attractions in the Park.” As such, it got special attention to ensure it would be protected.

In a letter James Lassiter wrote to Oliver Taylor after the park was dedicated, Lassiter described the area as “one of the scenic spots of the Park with its tumbling cascades and falls.” He said the stream was subject to seasonal fluctuation, writing to Taylor that “as you know, this stream becomes very low [in summer], with a corresponding lowering of the scenic value of the canyon.” Lassiter wrote, “the diversion of water at the head of this drainage area will materially affect this stream” so “consideration should be given to this before directly deciding to utilize the waters from White Oak Canyon for [other purposes].”627

In order to assure adequate flow to features such as White Oak, the park service undertook extensive studies to quantify seasonal changes in stream levels.628 With the help of the State of Virginia, US Geological Survey, and CCC labor, the park service constructed weirs (small dams) to collect data on the flow of twenty-three springs and eight rivers in 1934.629 Writing about the structures used for these studies, a park service landscape architect cautioned engineers from the State of Virginia to keep them “as low as possible and...as inconspicuous as you can.” With respect to a particular weir that was located in the “proximity of Skyline Drive,” the architect cautioned that “this weir should be kept as low as possible and unusually well-constructed, great care being taken to have as little cement as possible and to darken the smooth crest with lamp black so that it is almost the darkness of stone.” However, so long as these factors were taken into account, the architect was happy to approve the use of weirs as “not be objectionable from our standpoint.”630 The fact that engineers received direction not from a naturalist, but a landscape architect, and that the project was undertaken primarily to guarantee springs’ scenic
function, demonstrates that the park service was concerned not with natural preservation, but natural appearance.

Preexisting users also frustrated the National Park Service’s efforts to supply water for visitors to drink and bathe. Since Shenandoah shared its borders with several established towns, like Luray, its water rights had to be addressed before tapping many of rivers and springs that eventually flowed out of the park. In other areas, too much water made it hard to accommodate tourists.

At a former filling station’s site along the Lee Highway (US 211), a road engineer wrote about a spring discharging effluent in the right of way. Noting the water’s potential to imperil traffic, he suggested, “if this meets with your approval...we will...clean up the site where the filling station was located...and will improve the [site’s] appearance.” The engineer meant removing all evidence of the former business and the water from the spring that it formerly hid.

In response to a similar problem elsewhere in the park, an engineer from the Public Health Service had suggested that the National Park Service construct concrete retention basins above the roadway and connect them to drinking fountains at road level. Even these officials betrayed sensitivity toward maintaining naturality when they noted that, “instead of making the structure of concrete, masonry laid in cement mortar would prove equally satisfactory and would perhaps present a more attractive appearance. The top could be a large stone slab instead of a concrete slab.”

These projects highlight assumptions that contributed to the codification of the national park paradigm. In all cases, designers approached water’s excess or scarcity as an engineering problem. They did not make it a priority to protect the park’s ecology.

This demonstrates the centrality of human decision-making to the character of Shenandoah’s supposedly natural spaces and highlights the paradox that policy-makers and engineers created a “nature park” by simultaneously establishing and eliminating infrastructure ranging from roads, to utility lines, to water management systems. In Shenandoah, the National Park Service exchanged one set of human
priorities for another when they decided to manage formerly settled land as an aesthetic asset. Park
managers may have obscured the fact of their imposition by careful construction and camouflage, but
nonetheless left evidence of their desire to make the land conform to expectations that had informed
management throughout the National Park System.
2.6 - Shenandoah’s Accession to the Park Paradigm

The National Park Service adopted most of the precedents set by George Pollock when they took over management of Shenandoah. The agency also ultimately displaced him and the mountaineers who used to call the park home. In that process, they were using their knowledge of other parks to make Shenandoah like them. Policymakers influenced Shenandoah’s development through their involvement with the acquisition of land for the park and the deployment of emergency conservation workers there. People who wanted access to a more picturesque landscape in the east favored preserving the Blue Ridge for its supposed naturality and wildness. Park rangers imposed new rules on the land to assert their institutional authority and to make the park more like the other places they already managed in the American west. Together, all of these groups helped create a wild, eastern landscape in the tradition of the great western national parks that tourists had streamed to see for fifty years before. The immediate effects of their work show in the way that tourist business owners and other authors framed Shenandoah in guidebooks, the ways they framed other policies after the park’s creation, and the National Park Service’s moves to codify their authority there.

In the 1940 book Virginia: A Guide to the Old Dominion, WPA authors described Shenandoah as being a scenic wonderland full of natural curiosities. They described the park as being in “the very heart of the mountains” and gave the impression that its scenery was wild and unchanged by humans. Where the Skyline Drive came near the Appalachian Trail, they wrote about the “magnificent views” and “wooded ravines of occasional rocky crags” with the fertile farmland of the Shenandoah Valley below.635

One of that guidebook’s sponsors for printing (the federal government left publication of state guides to the states they were about) was the Virginia Conservation Commission. This same group was responsible for acquiring the land and political lobbying to create the park from the 1920s on. Even though Shenandoah takes up only a small part of the guidebook, it nonetheless serves as a touchstone. The guide’s authors twice invoke Shenandoah’s national park status to demonstrate the value of their
state’s natural beauty. They attempt to entice potential visitors with the lure of seeing not only a pleasant landscape there, but also an authentic parkscape.

The writers feature it with the other National Park Service managed areas in the state in the guide’s general information section. They frame the parks as essential parts of itineraries in the state and claim that tourists should visit them.636 In all of this, the authors attempted to evoke the park’s uniqueness, sublimity, and beauty. The result was that visitors traveled there in ever-increasing numbers. Visitation at Shenandoah went up almost continuously from 1936 (when the park formally opened) until 1941 (when wartime rationing prevented most leisure travel).637

In the years before Shenandoah’s creation, business owners in and around Shenandoah National Park relied solely on business and local travelers as patrons. After Shenandoah opened to the public, more than one million tourists traveled to the area every year.638 The construction of Skyline Drive, which justified calling the lands’ scenery monumental, facilitated national park designation, which subsequently made it a destination for tourists who would not have visited there in such large numbers otherwise.639

The park also served as an outlet for federal relief spending during the Great Depression. At the dedication for the park, Franklin Roosevelt described it as a triumph of human “husbandry” and thought that it deserved recognition for its role in putting unemployed workers back to work and displaying American values as much as it did for its natural beauty. He described how Shenandoah, along with other parks, was “conserving our priceless heritage...by giving hundreds of thousands of men the opportunity to make an honest living.” He was enthusiastic about the role of federal oversight in encouraging people to get back to the land and exercise initiative by allowing them to throw off the “involuntary idleness” of the Great Depression.640 Roosevelt also tied Shenandoah to the larger National Park System that spanned the United States.
He described how the park, “together with its many sisters”, was part of a national movement to conserve the citizens and land of the United States. In short, he attempted to argue that the federal government was using Shenandoah and the other parks like it as a tool to accomplish policy goals related to alleviating the human suffering of the Great Depression. Americans were not only getting to access “the smell of the woods, and the wind in the trees,” but they were also getting to engage in useful work, which would enrich “the character and happiness of our people.”

In short, Roosevelt argued that national parks like Shenandoah were essential to the functioning of the United States and that his administration’s use of them to relieve human suffering was accomplishing the twin goals of renewing hope for humanity and nature by restoring places like Shenandoah to their historic state. Not everyone was enthusiastic about the changes National Park Rangers, tourist business owners, and nature enthusiasts supported for Shenandoah. In fact, many critics were skeptical or even hostile about how the new infrastructure, especially Skyline Drive, changed the land there.

Robert Sterling Yard was an early supporter of Shenandoah who initially described the park site in the *National Parks Magazine*, published by the National Parks Association, as being “an invaluable exhibit of the wilderness the covered eastern North America...when our forefathers settled at Jamestown and Plymouth.” Yard was convinced that the park site was going to preserve wilderness in its native state and provide opportunities for easterners to get back to the land without having to go far from home. Local boosters appropriated some of Yard’s text in a pamphlet they released extolling the virtues of establishing a park on the Blue Ridge.

In the end, Yard and other supporters of wildland preservation argued against developing parks centered on the automobile. In reaction to development in parks that were also like Shenandoah, Yard tried to prevent the expansion of the National Park System beyond the “crown jewel” parks that had defined the park paradigm because he worried new additions would compromise the existing high
quality of the system. He also initiated a public discourse on addressing the automobile as a technology that had an objective effect on the way tourists traveled to, experienced, and interacted with nature and each other in the National Park System.643

In fact, the reaction against Skyline Drive among some nature enthusiasts propelled the creation of the Wilderness Society. Benton MacKaye, Harold Anderson, Robert Marshall, Robert Sterling Yard, and Harvey Broome met in Washington, DC, to found the group just a few weeks after Shenandoah’s formal accession to national park status. Their work helped frame a new discourse on wild places’ authenticity that hinged on their roadlessness.644

All of these constituencies interacted to shape the way Shenandoah developed and the ways that tourists experienced the park in years to come. Their work to make the Blue Ridge consistent with the park paradigm, whether through their support or their criticism of it together made Shenandoah a parkscape. It also served as a model for the development of other parks that were even less similar to the places where visitors defined the park paradigm.
Section 3 - Mojave’s White Heart

3.1 – An Introduction to Death Valley

Death Valley is the hottest, driest, lowest place in North America. Its name connotes hardship, privation, and mortality. It is by any measure one of the least hospitable places on earth. It is also home to the largest national park in the lower 48 states.

The story of how a place whose name is death entered the National Park System involved input from miners, hotel owners, explorers, park rangers, and politicians, who all advocated its designation for different reasons. Some of them made their homes in the Valley and supported themselves by mining or ranching for almost a hundred years before its addition to the National Park System, and they systematically erased or ignored the native residents who had once called it home. In the process, they reshaped and reinterpreted it to meet their needs.

They used the minerals and water there to build homes and businesses. They also inaugurated scientific studies that have continued to the present day. In the process, they made the place legible in a way that resonated with people around the United States and the world.

Even after it entered the National Park System in 1933, the Valley retained its reputation as a wasteland. Promoters in and outside of the government had to find creative justifications to encourage tourists to visit for leisure. Hotel owners and officials from the Department of Interior argued that, because of its uniqueness and superlative attributes, the Valley fit the park paradigm. They succeeded at having it designated as a National Monument managed by the National Park Service. Unlike other national parks, it continued to host extractive industries because the business owners who ran them contributed to its mystique and appeal.

Unlike the residents expelled from Shenandoah, the miners and prospectors who worked in Death Valley continued living and working there because park administrators and lawmakers believed they enhanced the park’s utility and mystique. The reason why was that nature enthusiasts who
advocated preserving the Mojave solely as a nature preserve could not justify expelling them from land that had marketable minerals in it.

Death Valley became a national monument in 1931 and only acceded to formal status as a park in 1994, but its designation as a monument nonetheless meant that policymakers believed it worthy of management by the National Park Service and that it lived up to the park paradigm. Its landscape stillness and isolation set it apart from all of its predecessors and shows how portable the national park idea was. Its creation shows how the park paradigm acquired momentum over time. Rather than finding places that matched existing national parks to add to the system, groups including nature enthusiasts, National Park Service rangers, and tourist business owners chose to reinterpret formerly “wasted” landscapes like Death Valley as recreational spaces that deserved protection as national parks. Like in Shenandoah, the ways those groups rhetorically reinterpreted and physically reshaped Death Valley show how they believed they could make places fit the park paradigm.

This was especially difficult in Death Valley’s case because of society’s long held and inauspicious associations with deserts. While romantics reinterpreted wilderness to be a redemptive and recreational space, almost none of them addressed the ways that tourists could enjoy arid places. A possible exception is the way that artists and authors characterized the Anglo-French conflict in the deserts of Egypt during the Napoleonic wars, but it is hard to say that they treated the desert as much more than a canvas where they told stories steeped in nationalism and martial pride. That said, similar ideas pertaining to nationalism also informed the creation of Death Valley National Monument.

When tourist business owners and extractive industrialists began to reinterpret Death Valley as less of a wasteland and as more of a leisurescape in the late 1920s, part of the reason why was that the National Park Service was arguing to broaden the park paradigm to bring representative parts of all the United States into the National Park System. This desire sprang partially from administrators’ desire to increase the size and importance of the system and their implicit belief that, as a great nation with
impressive landscapes, it would enhance Americans’ pride in their country if Death Valley came into the system. Since the Valley was a desert and it had some superlative qualities, it was a good fit for their need.

Bringing Death Valley into the National Park System also coincided with the emergence of conservationists’ and preservationists’ desires to see minerals and places used sustainably and rationally and with political policymaker’s willingness to empower them to make decisions about those issues. Bringing the Valley into the National Park System promised to systematize its use and ensure that developers would not destroy its productive potential or its appearance.

The most complicated part of bringing Death Valley into the National Park System was that it was objectively so different from every other national park. Unlike Sequoia, which preserved first-growth trees, or Glacier, which preserved forests, lakes, and mountains, or even Shenandoah, which preserved second-growth trees, the landscape in Death Valley was stark. Supporters, like nature enthusiasts, who thought that Death Valley should be a park had to contend with detractors who saw it solely as a wasteland.

In the chapters that follow, I explain the ways different groups framed, used, and lived in Death Valley long before it became a national monument. I explain how their conceptions of the Valley, which had nothing to do with leisure or tourism, had an important influence on the kind of park it ultimately became. I also explain how their conceptions of the Valley influenced the way people around the world understood what it was like there.

I then explain how a mining company, the Pacific Coast Borax Company, reframed the Valley in order to profit from tourists visiting there. Their actions coincided with the National Park Service’s desire to expand the system into the desert and with local tourist business owners’ realization that a national park designation would benefit them and their businesses. I connect their desire to profit from the Valley with the utilitarian ethos that informed park creations across the United States, where tourist
business owners, National Park Service rangers, political policymakers, and tourists reinterpreted wastelands as possible tourist attractions in order to make them more productive.

I conclude that one of the most significant reasons these groups were able to reinterpret Death Valley as a leisurescape was that they were able to make it fit the park paradigm. By reshaping the park to host tourists, they framed what had formerly been intimidating parts of its identity as being undeniably authentic and, therefore, attractive to visit. Their success shows how they used the park paradigm to reclaim Death Valley and, in the process, preserve it as part of the National Park System.
3.2 – Residents of Death Valley – Visible and Invisible

Compared to places like Shenandoah, not many people lived in Death Valley before it entered the National Park System. The only residents who lived there permanently were a few hundred Native Americans and Euroamerican prospectors or employees of the Pacific Coast Borax Company. Neither homesteaders nor commercial farmers had a substantial presence in Death Valley because so little of its land is arable. The relatively small number of people who did live there played a very significant role in shaping its popular identity.

Death Valley’s residents played an outsized role in the national park it became. Euroamerican anthropologists’ descriptions of the Indians who lived there helped justify seeing Death Valley as a wasteland because they did not have land they could farm and had to move seasonally to cope with its extreme climate. The small number of miners and prospectors who lived there shared accounts of how hard life was with newspaper reporters, in books and articles, and by keeping records about the weather. Their accounts made Death Valley accessible to readers across the United States and contributed to its cachet as a unique and dangerous place.

Together, Indians and Euroamerican prospectors helped lay the groundwork for the ways the outside world saw Death Valley. The prospectors and miners also made physical changes to the land in order to take advantage of the mineral wealth there. Their mines and the products produced with minerals from them, helped make the Valley better known. They prepared outsiders to acknowledge Death Valley as a unique place and as a potential tourist attraction.

The Timbisha Shoshone Indians probably lived in Death Valley for more than a thousand years before any Euroamericans arrived there. Their success living in such an extreme climate without the aid of air conditioning equipment, farming, or well drilling machines is impressive, but the Euroamericans who encountered them did not judge them very positively. In the earliest accounts recorded by western explorers, the Indians appear only as specters. When the first Euroamericans passed through the Valley
in 1849, they were glad they did not encounter any Indians in person. Later records indicate that some Euroamericans actively avoided the Indians, much to their detriment.646

In at least one case, an old Indian approached Lieutenant George Wheeler’s survey party that mapped parts of the Valley in 1869. Wheeler wrote about how the Indians thought it looked like some members of the party were in danger of dying so they tried to show the survey party the way to a spring. Wheeler and his colleagues declined the hospitality because “they were much afraid of him and would not let him come within hailing distance, preferring to perish in the rough wild desert than trust themselves in the hands of treacherous Indians.”647 The survey party’s behavior probably had more to do with their experience with Indians elsewhere in the United States than the behavior of the Timbisha Shoshone themselves, but it nonetheless shows that old stereotypes played in to European-American perceptions of them there. In accounts left by scientists of their contact with the Indians, a less threatening picture emerges.

In one of the first scholarly articles written about the Timbisha Shoshone, the anthropologist Frederick Coville wrote “they are now nearly exterminated and their customs and language are little known,” and numbered only “about twenty-five individuals...all of whom were living in the Panamint mountains.” In his account of the landscape that they lived in, he helped explain why he thought there were so few of them living there.

He described the Valley as “an apparently unlimited plain, devoid of trees and grass, without streams or springs, but provided with a vegetation of cactus and scattered low shrubs of greasewood and creosote bush.” He thought it was “absolutely wanting” for the necessities of life and was surprised to see anyone living there. Coville claimed the Indians in Death Valley lived desperate lives. He was especially interested in understanding what kinds of foods they ate. He wrote that unlike the Indians he had encountered elsewhere in his journey across the continent, these residents did not say “‘what will furnish us the best food?’” but “‘what will furnish us any food?’” In the report he wrote about them,
Coville wrote that the scarcity of resources was probably the defining characteristic of the group’s way of life.\textsuperscript{648} Strangely, he claimed that the Indians’ ability to live without any technological conveniences or outside aid showed how backward they were. Unlike the pioneer Euroamerican settlers or explorers whose lives of privation and hardship on journeys across the continent proved their initiative and adaptability, Coville said the Indians’ self-sufficiency pointed to their attainment of “a refinement of a kind quite opposite to that of civilized communities.” In other words, their apparent willingness to live lives disengaged from Euroamericans, or even other Indians, pointed to their barbarity.\textsuperscript{649}

Coville wrote that the Indians subsisted on a combination of native plants and animals. He said the Timbisha ate plants that grew in the high canyons around the Valley, cactus plants that they cultivated by growing near where they lived, and edible plants or animals they gathered in the wild. He concluded that because the Indians were gathering instead of farming, their society must be primitive and that they were probably not very smart.\textsuperscript{650}

Coville said that they did not have any stoneware and appeared to use wicker and pack baskets instead. He said they adopted a small number of technologies from the EuroamERICANS who they sometimes met on surveying, scientific, or prospecting missions. The knives, spoons, tin plates, iron kettles, and sieves he saw around the Valley showed that they wanted these goods. He claimed that their way of life must have been inferior to Euroamericans’ because the Indians seemed interested in getting more goods through trade. Coville claimed that because the Indians were unable to satisfy their desires for these goods except through trading with EuroamERICANS, they were inferior to white westerners.\textsuperscript{651}

In contrast to the EuroamERICANS they traded with, the Timbisha made the tools they needed from the materials around them.\textsuperscript{652} Coville described how they made bows and arrows from reed stems, willow shoots and from the desert juniper. He described how they made hemp, glue, and arrowheads,
all from materials they harvested in the Valley. He explained how the Indians treated their home as a place to live and as a source of resources that supported them. They must not have made much of an impact on the landscape because they faded into the margins of Euroamerican reports on Death Valley.

In a US Geological Survey report from 1929, the authors do not mention seeing any Indians in the Valley. Similarly, when the Bureau of American Ethnology (part of the Smithsonian Institution) compiled its *Handbook of the Indians in California* in 1935, its authors did not mention the Timbisha. The only mention that book makes of Indians anywhere near Death Valley is of “the lowly desert tribes and simple-minded folk of the southern coast.” The Handbook described the desert-dwelling Indians as “kinsmen, however remote, of the famous Aztecs.” Therefore, while the Handbook’s authors said, “the Shoshonean subdivisions appear as if raying in a semi-circular fan from a point in south-central California on or near the Kern River,” they did not say anything about a ray over Death Valley.

That said, recent scholarly work on the history of Death Valley and the federal government’s 2001 acknowledgement of the Timbisha Shoshone’s right to about 8000 acres of land as a permanent homeland demonstrate that the Indians had a more significant presence in the region than past researchers admitted. That said, another group, miners and prospectors, are given far more credit for shaping the Valley. The next several sections of this dissertation detail the impacts they had in the Valley and the influence they had on the way it entered the National Park System.

Euroamerican miners’ interests enjoyed more support than the Indians’ did. This was probably because the miners were better at leveraging political and business connections outside of the Valley and because they enjoyed recognition as legitimate users of public land in the eyes of policymakers in Washington, DC. The miners’ presence in the Valley, their involvement in its establishment as a unit of the National Park System, and their influence on its management were probably the most important forces that shaped Death Valley’s rhetorical and physical shape before and after it became a park unit.
Miners retained the right to explore for minerals after the Valley entered the National Park System. The miners, or more accurately the companies that owned mines or claims in the Valley, succeeded at arguing their use of the land produced positive outcomes. Their use of the land was the most utilitarian way anyone could use it. Their cause also enjoyed popular support because of their business’s association with the pioneer way of life.

Just like the mountaineers of Shenandoah, outsiders associated some parts of the miners’ lifestyle with a romantic, supposedly heroic, past. The miners’ presence in the Valley led outsiders to associate their lifestyle with it. They also gave the place its name.

“So Long, Death Valley!” – Naming as place making

The origin of Death Valley’s name is a matter of some contention, but scholars generally agree the first Euroamericans who visited there in the mid-nineteenth century probably gave it. Their story is the one that park promoters told and retold to substantiate that Death Valley fit the park paradigm because it was unique, raw, and seemed authentically wild. The name is problematic in that it has no basis in the Timbisha Shoshone’s traditions or with the land itself, but many visitors claim it evokes a connection to what they consider a treasured story of Euroamerican perseverance in the old west, and no one has ever made a substantial attempt to change it to anything else. The name emerged as part of the story about how one group of Euroamerican migrants experienced the Valley in 1849.

Sometime in the late fall of that year, a group of migrants set out from Salt Lake City along the Old Spanish Mission Trail bound for Los Angeles. They were part of one of the largest mass migrations in human history. They were traveling toward the gold strike and mines near Sutter’s Mill on the American River in California. The migrants knew they had started late in the season but hoped that by traveling through the “Great American-Desert,” they would avoid the worst of winter and beat the thousands of others who were converging on California from around the world. It was probably because
they wanted to beat everyone else that when a rider (whose name has been lost to history) approached them on the trail and claimed that he could lead them directly across the Sierra Nevada Mountains, instead of through Los Angeles and then up the California coast, many of them jumped at the chance.658

While their trek began smoothly, they soon found themselves on a large, empty, dry plain with nothing but steep mountains hemming them in on every horizon. Contrary to their guide’s claims that they could travel directly through the desert, they were moving into territory that was not passable in their wagons. When they descended the modern day Furnace Creek Wash, they found themselves totally isolated.

Surrounded on three sides by high mountains, they continued west until they ran out of forage for their oxen and water for themselves. They began to succumb to exhaustion and despair.659 In the absence of a strong leader (their mysterious guide had disappeared long before), individuals began to splinter off from the main wagon train and attempt to make their own ways out of the Valley. Since they did not have enough food to make the trip on their own, the families who remained approached two of the unattached men in the group with a proposition. 660

Members of the wagon train asked William Lewis Manley and John Rogers to go on ahead, buy food, and return with directions out of the Valley. The men accepted the plan and started on the long walk to find help. As they waited for deliverance, the families watched helplessly as all the other single men in their group decamped to follow another route out of the Valley. They were alone.

When they had almost run out of food, the group abandoned their wagons, made sacks to carry what was left of their supplies on the backs of the oxen, and prepared to set out south. They hoped they would be able to walk south of the mountains and escape to Los Angeles. Words must not have been able to describe their relief when, after twenty-five days, Manley and Rogers returned with flour, beans, a mule, and a route for escape. As they crested the pass that took them out of it for the last
time, someone in the party allegedly turned to say, “Good-bye, Death Valley,” thus giving that place the moniker that would become a defining part of its romance and allure.661

Historians and enthusiasts immortalized the group as “The Lost ’49ers.” William Manly wrote the best-known account of their struggle to escape the Valley. It is similar to Truman Everts’ book about his ordeal being lost in Yellowstone. His autobiography, Death Valley in ’49, took advantage of the cachet associated with the Valley in a bid to increase sales. It is also the source of the story about how Death Valley got its name. While his account of life in the west is not as well-known as Everts, past critics lauded the book for its association with the frontier epoch.662 Historically, many academics considered his book the definitive source of information on Euroamericans’ “discovery” of the Valley.663

Whether the ’49ers story is apocryphal or not, multiple historians cite it in their work on Death Valley. In his history on the Mojave region, Richard E. Lingenfelter wrote how he believed nothing about the Valley “is more compelling or more intriguing than its name and all that it grimly suggests.” Lingenfelter believed that the name transformed the land. It simultaneously bestowed a stigma on it and invited consideration of its subtle beauty by evoking its status as the lowest, driest, hottest spot on the North American continent.664

The name invites a morbid reaction from anyone who hears it. Some reject it as inhospitable, and others embrace its novelty. Some shudder at the prospect of walking through the valley of the shadow of death. Death Valley’s name is one of the tools that makes it instantly legible to the outside world.

Death Valley’s name tacitly links it to Biblical precedents and the historical discourse on wilderness as dangerous and isolated.665 The name evokes a connection to passages and stories in the Christian Bible that would have been well known in the mid-nineteenth century. They include the 23rd Psalm, which references a “walk through the valley of the shadow of death,” Ezekiel’s visit to a valley of
dry bones, and John’s description of hell as a low place with a lake of fire in Revelation. This subtle connection helped establish an identity for the Valley.  

Place names represent the perceptions and values of those who pick them. The first Euroamericans who visited the Valley textually inscribed their values on it when they christened it with death. Their name’s persistence shows how much our perceptions owe to theirs. Names identify geographical identities and represent cultural values that reflect sense of place. The Euroamericans who followed the ‘49ers built on the implicit narrative the name established for the Valley and set the stage for decisions that eventually changed its popular perception, physical appearance, and ecology.

Prospecting in the desert

In the years that followed the ‘49ers escape from the Valley, many other migrants passed through and settled around it. Very few stayed there for very long. It was only after the end of the great gold rush of 1849 that prospectors traveled there intentionally. They were not interested in experiencing Death Valley as a scenic attraction, and their expectations and experiences helped define the way most outsiders understood it for many years thereafter.

Prospectors, mining engineers, and surveyors all described the landscape in and around the Valley as denuded, barren, and ugly. They emphasized how hazardous it could be and said it was a hard place to live. In one prospector’s account of the Mojave region from the turn of the twentieth century, he said that there was literally nothing to see there. In order to explain how boring he thought the area was, he alluded to a common eastern experience and asked, “did you ever travel through a country so unattractive that for want of something to divert your attention...you would for miles and miles count the number of telegraph poles between each mile-post?” If riders had done that, or if they had “kept-cases” on the number of miles traveled and used a timetable to figure out how long it would take to reach their destinations by train, then they had probably only just begun to “appreciate how devoid of interest to the ordinary traveler” that part of the country was.
That prospector, Orin Merrill, was a “tenderfoot” who moved west to make a living in one of the hardscrabble mining towns that dotted the West. His account of the Death Valley region is typical of the many Euroamericans who traveled west in search of easy wealth. His account sheds light on how miners who wanted to profit from the Valley’s minerals perceived it. 668

Enticed by tales of romance and fortune, Merrill moved to Nevada in April of 1905. He arrived just in time to experience the boom that accompanied the discovery of gold near the town of Rhyolite, which is less than 10 miles outside of the present day Death Valley National Park. Merrill aspired to make his fortune in the new town. Mining promised wealth and prominence in the growing community, but when he arrived, he had neither that nor any money. 669

In order to make his small “grubstake” last longer, Merrill traveled humbly and slowly. On one “hike,” traveling between towns he tried to cut across a mountain range instead of going around it. When he started out in daylight, he had aimed himself toward a seemingly low pass, but by the time he got there, he realized that this pass was only the first of many in an undulating sea of earth. Merrill was about to live one of the stories that helped give the Valley its morbid name.

Merrill wandered in the general direction of Rhyolite for a day and a night before the rising sun made his lips dry and his tongue swell. He took shelter under small creosote bushes, but they did not offer any relief from the sun. 670 As he felt himself becoming delirious, he stumbled onto a road and paid a passing traveler $2.50 for a drink of water and a ride to Las Vegas. After resting there, he bought more supplies and set out walking again, this time following the road.

It is hard to say how seriously to take Merrill’s description of this “near death experience,” but it shows that the desert was a place he thought no one would want to visit for leisure. The desert was a place to escape by any means necessary. It was not a place to relax or even linger.

When he finally got back to Rhyolite, he did not describe the place as being comfortable, safe, or pretty. He described a landscape and soundscape dominated by work. He wrote that even though he
looked upon “a blue and entirely cloudless sky,” every few moments the mountains echoed with
thunder. Blasts from the mines pierced the air as workers pried minerals free from the earth. He
mused that the town could have been named “Echo” because of the constant reverberations from
blasting in the mines. He joked that since the rock “Rhyolite has always been there, while the echo has
only come with man,” the rock had “…‘prior claim’” to the town’s name. Merrill wrote that anyone who
lived in a mining camp understood the importance of respecting preemption, so he conceded that the
place deserved to be called for the rock that made it up instead of by his name for it.671

Merrill’s description of Rhyolite is typical for prospectors who worked in the Mojave Region.672
They treated western lands like those in or near Death Valley primarily as places where they could make
money. They did not treat and usually did not believe that the desert would be an attractive place to
visit for a vacation. Merrill’s deference to Rhyolite’s geologic identity (another construct) shows how
he understood its essence as anti-human.673

His perspective as a prospector made him an aspirant resident. He wanted to make the land
productive so he could get rich from it. His desire to make a home in such an inhospitable place
demonstrates his faith in humans’ ability to reach a settlement with the landscape and turn an
otherwise barren waste into homes. In Death Valley, that work hinged on prospectors’ ability to locate
ores they could mine profitably. Merrill was only one of a relatively small number of miners trying to do
exactly that. One of his peers helped raise the Valley’s profile throughout the United States and later
became one of its most famous attractions.

“Praise me or condemn me, but don’t ignore me.” - Walter Scott and Death Valley

Orin Merrill was one of a generation of prospectors who went west to find their fortunes. There
are no records to quantify how many others lived like him, but the prospectors left an indelible mark on
the West’s culture and its regional cultural identity. Their supposed self-reliance and willingness to suffer discomfort, isolation, and poverty in hopes of becoming fabulously rich contributed to a mystique that others who lived later wanted to experience and imitate. One of the people who helped contribute to that identity was a well-known resident of Death Valley named Walter Scott.674

In a special news item printed on the Society page in 1906, a journalist working for the *New York Times* wrote, “Walter Scott has returned from another of his disappearances into Death Valley desert, and is at Barstow with more gold than he has ever exhibited.” According to the reporter, “Scotty has been through a fiery [sic] region, and appeared in Barstow blistered head to foot” but did not seem much the worse for wear. The reporter seemed relieved that Scott had survived and thrived in such an inhospitable place.

In a column on the opposite side of the same page, another reporter wrote an update concerning “The Trial of the Century” that involved Evelyn Nesbit and William Stanford White, which was making headlines from coast to coast.675 To the contemporary reader, it might seem strange that the *New York Times* bothered to print a story about a single-blanket prospector in the California desert, but “Scotty” was no ordinary prospector.676 Unlike most of his desert peers who lived and died in quiet anonymity, Walter Scott became a legend in his own time. He succeeded at rising to the national spotlight by shrewdly managing his image as a westerner, consciously embodying the rags-to-riches trope that perennially enthralls Americans, and associating himself with the most forbidding place in America, Death Valley.677

Born on a farm in Cyntianaville, Kentucky in 1872, Walter Edward Perry Scott made his first trip west in the 1880s. He went to Death Valley to work at the Harmony Borax Works on a crew surveying the Nevada-California border (it is unclear which he actually did because, as one park ranger wrote, he never told the story of that part of his life the same way twice).678 Scott left California when a talent scout for Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West Show discovered him in 1884. He spent the next half-decade
traveling the United States and the world. In 1900, after leaving the show and unsuccessfully trying his hand at gold mining during the rush on Cripple Creek in Colorado, he came up with a new scheme to make money.679

At some point while he was in Colorado, Scott acquired a sample of “float-ore” that was nearly pure gold. He took the ore and traveled to New York where he presented himself as a prospector looking people to invest in (or “grub-steak”) a mine in the west. The story he told prospective investors was that he had struck a fabulously rich vein of ore, but needed financial support to bring it into production. For a few thousand dollars, he said, they could have a half-interest in his mine. The wrinkle in his scheme (which surfaced years later) was that he did not have a mine. In order to hedge against anyone asking to visit the mine, he told people it was in the most inhospitable place he could think of: Death Valley.680

Scott took the money investors gave him and used it to increase his celebrity. He claimed that his very public antics and drinking binges proved the mine’s richness. He used the notoriety he gained to solicit more money from other “investors.”

The scheme worked so well that Scott managed to vault himself into papers across the United States. In newspaper articles that started appearing around 1905, Scotty was headlined as “Croesus” and described as one of the most original and exciting Euroamericans who had come out of the west.681 The first and probably most successful stunt Scott contrived to get himself in the headlines involved one of the technological systems that is most intimately associated with the West, the railroad.

On the afternoon of July 9, 1905, Walter Scott boarded the “Scott Special” (or the “Coyote Special”) at the Santa Fe Railroad Station in downtown Los Angeles and rode into history on a record breaking run to the Dearborn Street Station in Chicago. The 2300-mile trip usually took almost 60 hours, but Scott’s train made it to Chicago in 44 hours and 54 minutes. In their coverage of what was, at that time, the fastest run on the Santa Fe Railroad’s main line, the New York Times reported that he was
“kissed by enthusiastic women, his bedraggled suit torn to ribbons by the yelling scrambling crowd” and that he had to flee an enthusiastic mob and seek refuge in the Great Northern Hotel. When he arrived, he reportedly told a clerk to “send up...two gallons of brandy and two gallons of whiskey, and all the glasses you can spare.” When the liquor went to his room “it came with the house detective.” With their glasses filled, the same question must have been in all his guests’ minds because one blurted out “‘Mr. Scott, if you own a mine, where is it?’” Scott replied that it was “‘Where the devil himself can’t find it...My mine is in the lower edge of Death Valley where no man can ever go—no man but Wallie Scott.’”682

He continued the thrills by traveling on to New York by way of the Twentieth Century Limited. The reporter who covered the trip said, “he came without ostentation, but when he arrived at the Grand Central Station, on Track 13, there were fully 500 persons waiting to have a glimpse at him.” When he left the platform, photographers snapped his picture on the platform and several reporters left with “exclusive” interviews. The reporter repeated, “the mine which Scott is supposed to own and from which he draws his wealth is situated in Death Valley, some hundred miles from Barstow.” The reporter seemed almost disappointed to report, “stock in it has not been offered for sale—yet.”683 Scott’s arrival and his claims of owning a mine in Death Valley did not impress all New Yorkers.

Just two days after he arrived in New York, another reporter there wrote skeptically about his claims to great wealth.

We would all like to believe that Mr. Scott is the long missing link between Western realities and Western romances—that he is a simple child of nature, son of the plains and the mountains, who exhilarated by sudden wealth and incidental strong waters, has come East under the grotesque delusion that he can amuse himself more violently here than in his native wilds. But the man does not fit the theory. The Death Valley Live One’s naïveté is all too obviously a somewhat laborious pose, assumed for reasons not yet revealed. Mr. Scott has been here before, several times, [while a rider in Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show and]...his rough and uncomfortable clothes are almost surely the costuming of a part...To the cynical and suspicious the indications are that the object of Mr. Scott’s visit is to get wealth rather than to get rid of it.
The reporter wrote that no one with any business sense would ever invest in Scott’s mine. What they
could not know, and probably would not have believed, was that, while Scotty would successfully court
other investors, his reason for acting the way he did had as much to do with attracting attention for its
own sake as it did with making money. Scott’s desire to be featured in newspaper headlines (using $5,500
he borrowed from the owner of another mine around Death Valley who wanted to collaborate with him
to attract investment) might have resulted from his experience riding with Buffalo Bill.

“Buffalo Bill” Cody’s success at building his show into an international sensation sprang as much
from his ability to project the ethos of an authentic westerner as it did from his (legitimate) claims to have
experienced life in the West. Historians have characterized Cody as embodying the coming together of
old and new, nature and culture, past and future, and Scott was much the same. He purposely embodied
what outsiders thought the West was so that he could profit from their perceptions of him.

Scott was building a reputation and recognizable brand for himself. In the process, he was
simultaneously defining and popularizing an identity for Death Valley. Scott, like many others who wanted
to profit from places’ identities, understood the value of establishing a personal brand for himself. In
other words, the point of developing a brand is to reassure consumers that what they are buying is, in
fact, a genuine product of high quality. Branded goods are real. Scott built an identity that helped him
enter the world of high finance and fashionable social circles. It was effective because he seemed genuine.
The only problem with Scott’s claims was that they were in fact fake.

In a 1940 court case brought by one of his “investors,” Julian Gerard, formerly of the
Knickerbocker Trust Company, Scott had to admit that, “the stories of his fabulous secret gold mine were
‘absolutely fictitious.’” In fact, when asked, “how much money have you taken from mining ventures in
the last thirty years?” his reply was, “none, and I have no secret mine.”

The judge hearing the case was so incredulous that he called Scott “a cheat.” The judge shamed
Scott for sending many “come-on” letters that said he had a mine and many productive claims in Death
Valley. Judge Benjamin Harrison found for the plaintiff, Girard, and awarded damages. The judge said the only assets anyone had been able to find registered in Scott’s name were seventeen mining claims that no one had ever done any assessment work on.

Scott’s most valuable asset turned out to be intangible. He used his identity as an authentic westerner to cultivate a relationship with an influential and wealthy patron who provided him with a comfortable home, credibility, and a life of leisure. Their relationship helped change the Valley’s popular perception and foretold an emergent interest in using it not only for industry but also for leisure.

White Heart – Early Leisure Visitors to Death Valley

At the turn of the twentieth century, some Americans might have thought it was unusual for two white, upper class, American women to take a trans-continental vacation without their husbands. For two women to vacation together in the Mojave Desert and ask for directions to Death Valley probably seemed bizarre. Yet Edna Brush Perkins and Charlotte Jordan did exactly that and wrote about the experience in White Heart of the Mojave: An Adventure with the outdoors of the Desert.

Perkins, a social reformer, painter, and prominent women’s suffragist from Cleveland, Ohio, traveled with her friend Charlotte Jordan to see Southern California. They were bored with the urban life of San Diego and Los Angeles. They were fascinated by the “great desert” that the Atchison-Topeka & Santa Fe train (which loosely followed the same Old Spanish Mission Trail that the lost ‘49ers had once walked along) passed through and wanted to go back and explore it. Perkins wrote that they went to the desert to escape “the roofs of the city spread for miles to blue hills or the bright sea... [and] the smoke of tall chimneys [that] rolls into the sky that fills all the space between you and the horizon and the sun.” They rented a car and drove into the desert not entirely knowing what to expect there, other than a break from their every-day lives in the East.
The reason for the trip was to satisfy a desire for novelty and to have unique experiences. Perkins wrote, “our real craving was not for a play hour, but for the wild and lonely place and a different kind of freedom.” Perkins also explained that neither she nor her friend, Jordan, thought they could have those kinds of experiences in western cities. She said they had known when they left home “that such places as Santa Barbara, Redlands, Riverside, and San Diego would be for us nothing more than points on the way to somewhere else.” They craved a visit to the “great empty space just east of the Sierra Nevada Range and the San Bernadino [sic] Mountains vaguely designated as the Mojave Desert.”

Perkins interpreted the desert without foreboding. She approached it as a place to withdraw from civilization and enjoy a kind of contemplative isolation that was the antithesis of city living. When she and Jordan started asking how they could get there, they were surprised by the way local residents treated their question.

Perkins and Jordan looked at a map and decided to drive through Cajon Pass into the high, arid plains outside of Los Angeles. They asked residents to give them advice about things they could see or do when they got there, but were “met with discouragement on every side.” To the people of southern California, she said, “it seemed to be unheard of for two women to attempt such a thing.” The locals they consulted said they were “apt to have long stretches of sand where [they] would get stuck” and that they should reconsider going at all.

Local residents’ attempts to discourage the trip shows how they viewed the desert. They did not interpret it as a restful or contemplative space. Even in the age of William Mullholland, when engineers managed to reclaim vast tracts of land for homes of thirsty Angelinos, the Mojave was beyond the pale. Residents told the two women that the Mojave was a dangerous wasteland, that their desire to visit it was misguided, and that seeing it through could be dangerous. The residents might have given the advice they did because the women’s ultimate destination was the most isolated and forbidding that
they could have imagined. The fact that they were women also almost certainly factored into the advice they got from locals.\textsuperscript{694}

Their experience may point to the same kind of discourse that informed the ways the National Park Service shaped leisure experiences in national parks across the United States. This points to the pervasiveness of assumptions associating wild places with masculine experiences.\textsuperscript{695} It also points to the assumptions Jordan and Perkins made about wild places themselves.

Looking at the map when they began to plan their trip, Jordan had suggested that they should go to Death Valley. When Perkins asked her why, she said “‘because I am tired of looking at the Twenty Mule Team Borax boxes and wondering what kind of place they came from that could have a name like that.’” Perkins admitted that initially she did not think that Jordan’s curiosity was a good enough reason “for me to risk my life,” but she eventually agreed to go.

The reason Jordan changed her mind was that she was curious, too. She said that going to that “savage, ruthless-looking country, naked in the sun” presented opportunities for recreation that she had not considered before.\textsuperscript{696} She balanced her misgivings with an admission that “mountains and valley [were] full of the outdoors and nothing but the outdoors!” and that was what she wanted to use her vacation to see. She thought that going to the desert would give her the chance to “feel...being alone in the sagebrush” and enjoy its unique appearance. She wondered, “how free the sweep of the wind must be, how hot the sun, [and] how immense the deep night sky [must be].”\textsuperscript{697}

Neither Perkins nor Jordan wanted to pass up the chance to have those kinds of experiences and wrote that they decided going into the Valley was worth the risk. When they actually arrived in the desert, in spite of the fact that she did have unique opportunities to withdraw from her everyday life because of the land’s vastness, emptiness, and barrenness, it turned out to be more dangerous than she had expected it would be. She joked that actually going to the Mojave after planning in the comfort of the city was “like playing with a kitten and having it turn into a tiger.”\textsuperscript{698} As Perkins went on to explain,
the experiences that ultimately made the trip an adventure instead of a disaster were the unique experiences that helped the pair consider their place in the landscape, their vulnerability during moments of real danger, and the technological systems that enabled them to travel safely through the Valley.

When the pair arrived in the desert, they spoke about how different it was from their homes in the East. They thought that the residents they encountered were, in large part, responsible for that difference because they evoked the region’s frontier past. Perkins wondered aloud when a man and his pack animals rode by “loaded with cooking utensils and bedding” whether he might be a prospector. Jordan replied that he must have been because the man was carrying “his pick on the second mule.” Perkin’s speculation is interesting for two reasons. First, because she said that calling the mule “an ass” was both more honest and lent better atmosphere to the scene. Second, because she invented a character for him.

The atmosphere Jordan assigned to “her prospector” was based on the alleged romance of the pioneer past. Jordan decided that, unlike all the prospectors who “died of thirst in Death Valley,” since this one had not, he must have been heading for a mine he had discovered. She said, “he tries to work it himself but it does not pay very well because he can’t get enough out, and he can’t sell it because too many booms failed, and nobody will invest. So he goes up and down in the sun and has a good time.”

The process Jordan used to invent this man’s life says a lot about what she must have thought about residents like him. She invented a backstory for his character with the experiences she thought a prospector ought to have had. She assumed he was living a rags to rags existence because stories from residents like “Death Valley Scotty” made that identity accessible and popular. Scott told stories that made potential visitors who lived outside of the Mojave region, like Perkins and Jordan, believe that prospectors were hard-nosed, practical people who understood the special, inaccessible values in places
like the Valley. The man himself remains anonymous, but Jordan’s view of him leaves a legacy to
consider.

Her speculation is worth discussing because the process she used is the same as the one we all use to understand and appreciate the world around us. We use what we already know to draw
conclusions about the things we do not. That process is significant for tourists in places like Death Valley because, after it became a national park unit, the perceptions and expectations that outsiders (including nature enthusiasts, tourist business owners, and National Park Service rangers) associated with it at that time were inscribed on the landscape. The Valley’s identity as a tourist attraction was, in effect, formally constructed along the same lines that Charlotte Jordan constructed her prospector.

Perceptions of parts of the Valley’s history, including the experience of the lost ‘49ers, miners, and prospectors, were all permanently memorialized through a series of technological decisions that used cartography, mobility systems, and infrastructural systems that gave them permanent substance. Acknowledging that process gives us the opportunity to understand and evaluate whether the values associated with the systems past groups created are still significant to us.

In order to discuss the ways nature enthusiasts, tourist business owners, and National Park Service rangers did that when the Valley became a tourist attraction, it is important to understand who shaped the land there before they arrived. Industrialists who operated extractive mines were the first to capitalize on recreation there, and they helped shape the kinds of experiences tourists expected to find there. Until the 1920s, most of the people who encountered Death Valley in everyday life did so as consumers in the form of commercial products made from the minerals mined there. The person responsible for making sure they knew where those minerals came from was Stephen Mather.

*Selling borax – Stephen Tyng Mather and Death Valley*

One of the other significant events that contributed to the Valley’s perception by outsiders was an advertising campaign inaugurated by a Californian working for the Pacific Coast Borax Company in
New York City. Its necessity was a testament to the success of operations at the company’s mines that produced more borax than there was a market for at the time. The advertising campaign simultaneously broadened borax’s popular appeal and associated it with Death Valley by using its desert origins to demonstrate its value.

The person who designed the campaign was Stephen Tyng Mather. Born the scion of a famous eastern family with roots in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Mather started working for the Pacific Coast Borax Company in 1892 following time spent as a reporter for the New York Sun. Mather’s biographer claimed that he was fascinated with the story of borax’s discovery and thought it ranked along with the 1849 gold rush as one of the highlights of California’s history. He decided to introduce the public to that romantic story and borax’s pioneer associations to sell more of it. He initially had a hard time getting the attention of consumers, because he did not have an advertising budget, but found creative ways to share the information anyway.

In order to get other groups to advertise free, Mather sent letters “from housewives” about borax’s usefulness to about fifteen magazines whose publishers marketed to middle-class, white women. Years later, his biographer seemed almost surprised to write, “all these letters were printed.” Then, using the contacts he had developed as a reporter for the Sun, he planted dozens of syndicated items under titles such as “Why Nero Used Borax” or “Manna of the American Deserts” to drum up more interest in it.

One of the problems Mather faced promoting borax was that other companies were also marketing products that used the common chemical name to describe them. In order to differentiate Pacific Coast Borax Company products from competitors’, Mather suggested using a brand he at first wanted to call “mule-team” and, eventually, “twenty-mule team” as an homage to the waggoneers who hauled the mineral out of the Valley. In so doing, Mather made a link between Death Valley’s popular perception as a remote, primitive place and the product he wanted to sell.
Besides evoking nostalgia for the romantic West, the image of the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s sturdy wagon piloted by a rough and tumble muleskinner reminded urban consumers who saw it that mining and moving borax was a lot of work. It implied that borax had to be a valuable commodity for a company to pay to move it out of one of the most fearsome places on earth to them. Anyone who saw the label and understood the story associated with it would believe that, whatever they had pay to buy borax, it was a bargain. After all, they were buying something that someone else had literally walked through the Valley of Death to obtain.702

By masking the company’s self-promotion behind the contrived words of seemingly disinterested consumers, and reminding consumers of the mineral’s exotic origin, sales grew.703 Mather followed his successful branding initiative with company-sponsored literature on the virtues of using borax in the home. In The Magic Crystal, published in 1915, the company paired suggestions of uses for the mineral “In the Kitchen...In the Laundry...In the Nursery...In the Sickroom... [and for] Toilet and Medicinal uses” with an account of how the mule teams did their work. The company claimed that the mineral’s value at promoting good hygiene and being “an absolute necessity to many industries and an invaluable aid to the housewife” was implicitly derived from its remote origins in the desert of California.704

Mather wrote how the famous 20-mule team came into use in transporting the Borax mineral from the mines in Death Valley 165 miles to the railroad at Mojave, California. He described the hardship on the wagon teams who took twenty days “to make the round trip under a scorching sun...up and down the rocky canyons and steep grades of the Funeral Mountains and over the burning sands of Death Valley.”705 It does not take much imagination for readers of the pamphlet to realize that it was a lot of work to move borax to market, but, since it was so valuable to modern life, the work was worth it. Mather’s success at creating a popular market for borax ultimately led him to take over the company’s office in Chicago, Illinois. Before he left that office, he trained a successor named Christian Brevoort
Zabriskie, who would not only rise to a commanding position in the company, but also reappear as a central figure in the establishment of the tourist trade in Death Valley. According to his official biographer, after Mather arrived in Chicago, the strain of working at break-neck pace for Francis Marion “Borax” Smith, the president of the Pacific Coast Borax Company, led to a falling out that made Mather a very wealthy man.

In collaboration with Thomas Thorkildsen, a manager who had been working with in the borax company’s Chicago office, he cofounded a rival firm. Serving as vice-president from 1903 to 1914, Mather went toe to toe with his old boss and poached many customers from him. Building the new enterprise was the culmination of Mather’s education as a promoter and manager. Working with Thorkildsen, he eventually managed three companies that mined, processed, and sold borax products around the world. The skills he acquired in the process eventually served him in good stead when he helped found and popularize the National Park Service in 1915 and 1916.

In most national park histories, authors do not write much about Mather’s business prior to entering government service. It is hard to say exactly why that is, but one reason might be a lack of information on that period in his life. In the seven linear feet of material his daughter donated to the University of California, almost all the documents relate to his work in the National Park Service and his subsequent lionization by it. The finding aid for the collection says “for the most part... [the papers] relate to Mather’s later years as Director of the National Park Service.” While “the Papers contain some early correspondence concerning Mather’s work with F.M. Smith and the borax companies”, these are restricted to a small number of folders in one of the seven boxes.

Considering Mather’s lineage from, and stated pride in being a part of, one of America’s oldest and best-known families, this seems odd. He even left instructions that, though he was born, educated, and made much of his fortune in California, he wanted his body buried at the family’s traditional plot in Darien, Connecticut. Why would a man who celebrated his connection to some of the most researched
early Americans make it so difficult for succeeding generations to research him? A possible explanation might be the stigma he and his heirs feared would go along with discovery that he had spent time in sanitariums following several bouts of what was apparently deep depression, or perhaps from some belief that his business dealings would sully the family name. In the history they wrote on the founding years of the National Park Service, Horace Albright said through his daughter that the papers he kept “contained sensitive material about Mather and other matters.” Albright “wavered over whether he should destroy these records for the sake of the Mather descendants.”

Even though Mather’s early years in business are opaque, it is, nonetheless, important to acknowledge that his experience as a promoter of borax influenced the later course of his career in the national parks. By manufacturing demand for borax, he learned how to commodify and promote a product for profit. He also learned how to create a favorable public perception for a product that most urban consumers had not known they “needed” before he introduced them to it.

Learning that part of the salesman’s art was probably the most valuable skill that Mather later brought to his work in the government. He designed advertisements and sales campaigns that catered to consumers’ “common sense” and appealed to their desire to purchase products they really needed. These campaigns acknowledged, and took advantage of, customers’ desire to acquire truly valuable and useful products. The Twenty-Mule Team brand he successfully launched contributed to the perception that borax was a valuable product that was worth expending great effort to get. It contributed to the cachet that convinced hundreds of thousands of consumers across the United States to buy something that they had probably not known existed before he introduced them to it.

In short, he traded on consumers’ desire for authenticity by graphically showing them that borax really was a valuable product and then followed up on its value by writing about how useful it was in the home and to industry. In the process, he also literally sold Death Valley to households across the United States. By establishing a ubiquitous brand that consumers associated with the Valley, he accentuated
the branding Walter Scott had begun and helped make it ever better known to tourists. Mather’s work was also responsible for creating the need to keep workers in Death Valley employed. In order to support them, his employer, the Pacific Coast Borax Company established a Ranch there to grow food for the twenty-mule teams and serve as the nexus for their desert mining empire. The Ranch was central to the infrastructural developments that set the precedents for how tourists should experience the Valley and for inaugurating weather observations that further accentuated its notoriety to the outside world.
3.3 The Pacific Coast Borax Company – Profiting from the valley of death

In the first volume of *The National Drug Clerk*, an unnamed author wrote, “the consumer needs no introduction to ‘Twenty Mule Team Borax’ as it is within the distinctive class which means purity and reliability.” The product was so ubiquitous and demonstrably reliable that druggists throughout the United States used and sold it. The writer held the product’s manufacturer, the Pacific Coast Borax Company, in equally high esteem.\(^7\)

The company’s success at selling borax, a commodity well known for its usefulness in industry but not in homes prior to the twentieth century, grew from its geographic pedigree.\(^7\) Stephen Mather and his coworkers used the mule teams’ association with Death Valley to sell borax to consumers. The marketing campaign did not share any information about how the company prepared it for shipment. The systems that supported the mining and purification of the borax-bearing ores defined the built environment in the Valley from the 1880s onward. They also reflected the company’s perception of that place solely as a repository of potentially valuable minerals.

Understanding the way the Pacific Coast Borax Company perceived the Valley is important because the company was also eventually responsible for turning it into a tourist attraction and for managing its transition to becoming a unit of the National Park Service. In this chapter, I explain how company employees approached their operations in the Valley, how important they were to making it legible to the outside world, and how they contributed to shaping its popular identity in order to sell the minerals they mined there.

**Paydirt – Running the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s mines in Death Valley**

The Pacific Coast Borax Company and its predecessors started mining the borate deposits that prospectors discovered in Death Valley in the late 1881.\(^7\) The company’s land holdings and mining operations centered on Furnace Creek Wash and Ryan Camp. The company also operated a farm it
referred to as the Greenland, Death Valley, and Furnace Creek Ranch (referred to generically as “the Ranch” hereafter for simplicity’s sake). Staff at the Ranch farmed alfalfa and other crops to feed the twenty-mule teams that, famously, moved borax ore out of the valley beginning in 1882. The Ranch was at the terminus of a 165-mile trail that led to the Atchison-Topeka & Santa Fe rail station at Mojave, California. The Pacific Coast Borax Company built the Ranch at the bottom of the Furnace Creek Wash to take advantage of two large, flowing springs that produced over 2 million gallons of fresh water per day. The company hired workers to build irrigation pipes and ditches that diverted the water for use at the ranch. The company’s corporate history states that “several crops per season were cut from 60 acres of alfalfa” and that “90 to 120 head of cattle were fed on the place or on the surrounding range.” Since the Ranch was so isolated, operating it was expensive. When the Tidewater & Tonopah Railroad built a spur line near the Valley to carry borax out in 1894, the mule teams stopped running, and the company reassessed whether it needed the Ranch anymore. In the process of assessing its relevance, borax company employees wrote a great deal about its appearance, inventory, and usefulness supporting operations in the region.

In their history of operations in the Valley, the borax company assessed the value of land and water rights at the Ranch around $300,000 in 1907, $400,000 in 1913, and then showed a slow decline back to around $300,000 in 1927. The Ranch’s value ebbed and flowed with the borax company’s ability to profit from operating there. During the years from 1907-1927, the company experimented with a variety of strategies to improve the Ranch’s profitability. In this section, I profile one of those strategies to explore how the executives who would eventually advocate National Park Service management of Death Valley perceived that place in the years before 1927. These strategies share a basic continuity with later interpretations of the Valley because, whether serving as a source of food, as a source of borates, or later as a unique and intimidating scenic attraction, executives of the Pacific Coast Borax Company always interpreted Death Valley as a profit engine.
This merits consideration here because of how the company managed the Ranch and the water resources that made human life there possible. The company’s managers used the Ranch to support life in a place they viewed as desolate and inhospitable. In the process, they perpetuated the Valley’s existing identity as a forsaken and dangerous place, but they also built the systems that made it possible for tourists to visit there comfortably and safely. The decisions they made in the pursuit of profit set precedents, shaped the landscape, and popularized an identity for the Valley that influenced how politicians, environmental preservationists, and the National Park Service eventually approached it.

**Supplying the Miners – Supporting miner’s work from the Ranch**

Beginning in 1907 with the development of the Lila C. Mine (also known as Old Ryan Camp), Pacific Coast Borax Company executives began to consider improving the Ranch. When John Ryan, new superintendent of the mine that would shortly bear his name, visited the Ranch for the first time around 1910, the fields’ fertility surprised him. Ryan said the agricultural fields were “looking very well, the wheat hay has been cut and harvested [along with] a crop of alfalfa.” Ryan might have been surprised to find such a productive farm in an otherwise desolate area. He also wrote about how important he thought it was for the borax company to protect its assets there. Ryan may also have encouraged (or directed) the Ranch’s caretaker, Mr. Muncey, to take on more projects because there was a flurry of changes at the Ranch in the months that followed his visit.

A year and a half after his first visit, a supervisor at the Lila C. Mine named F.W. Corkill wrote Locke that “during the last year Mr. Muncey made many improvements on the ranch at a very small cost.” Corkill wrote that “we now have fifteen additional acres of ground under cultivation, the entire fencing around the ranch has all been repaired,” and that “one new building [was] moved down...[from] the old Borax works.” The result was that the whole place had a better appearance and additional building space available for employees there to use. Furthermore, there were more cattle than there
had been the year before in spite of the fact that employees had butchered 20 to supply beef for the company’s assessment camp workers.721

W.L. Locke, working in the company’s Oakland, California office, forwarded the inventory to the Pacific Coast Borax’s parent company, Borax Consolidated Ltd. in London. Locke did not explain why he sent the inventory. In fact, in his letter to London he wrote, “this information is sent simply for your files, and for no other purpose.” He did not provide a justification and did not seem to be trying to answer any particular questions. It might seem strange that Locke would go out of his way to send what amounted to a laundry list of possessions in the Mojave Desert to London, but his action makes more sense in the context of other letters between the company’s main office in the US and the field operation in California.722

Locke seems to have been concerned about justifying the Ranch’s continued operation, because in another letter he worried that auditors in London might give special scrutiny to debits that supported its operation. He wrote that “London looks at this thing and says – ‘Here there is a loss of $4,000.00, which is too much, are you going to charge that to us?’ and we say – ‘yes’, but we do so without a full knowledge that it is correct.” He goes on to explain that “now, we tell London, and we tell you, that we want Greenland Ranch to make a charge for all the beef they furnish, all the hay and grain they furnish and all the meals they furnish.” By keeping a more complete account of where Ranch supplies were going, Locke wanted to prove what he already believed, that it was worth supporting.

These letters show how Corkill and Locke saw Death Valley as a place to mine minerals, but not a place to profit from tourists. Company employees were open to using the Ranch to improve the efficiency of their existing operations in the Valley, but he did not think they would see much potential in selling products for cash except maybe to a small number of prospectors. The productivity and profitability of the Pacific Borax Company’s mines provided the only substantive justification for supporting the Ranch’s operation and improvement.
Arguments about the Ranch’s exceptional character, which in later years helped justify making Death Valley a national park unit, are conspicuously absent here. Locke and Corkill succeeded at convincing their supervisors to invest in the Ranch only because they succeeded at improving its legibility within the overall Pacific Coast and Borax Company Ltd. enterprise. In subsequent letters, Locke and Corkill continued to use their knowledge of the Valley to express optimism about the Ranch’s prospects and planned more improvements for it.

In order to put their improvements on a scientific footing, the pair decided to seek out expert advice on how they should proceed with the project. Since they were miners and not farmers by trade, Corkill and Locke had to inform their decisions using outside sources. The sources they eventually settled on did not initially change the Ranch’s reason for being, but their actions had far-reaching consequences by providing information that helped shape Death Valley’s popular perception.

Today, the National Park Service describes Death Valley as the “hottest, driest, lowest place in North America.” This is true and lends the Valley an unmistakable air of authenticity. Hundreds of authors described Death Valley as being on one level or another of Dante’s Inferno in the fifty years after the first Euroamericans visited in 1849, but none of them produced a reputable dataset to prove their claims. Therefore, while Death Valley had the reputation of being a hot, dry, low place for many years before employees from the Pacific Coast Borax Company started working there, and while those employees themselves agreed that it was a miserable place to be in summer, peoples’ descriptions of the Valley were based on hearsay. It took involvement from an executive agency of the US government to give official sanction to the fact that Death Valley is, in fact, the hottest place on earth.

The thermometer is an unassuming technology, but it is central to interpretations of the Valley. It made the place seem near to people half-worlds away and helped corroborate otherwise fantastic stories that led most people to believe that the first Euroamericans to see it had stumbled into a “veritable pit of hell.” As it turned out, the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s operation of the Ranch
provided the means and a reason for the US Weather Bureau to set up a cooperative weather station there. The borax company suggested setting the station up to help identify crops that would grow well at the Ranch. The collateral result was that the US Weather Bureau recorded, for the first time, what the Valley’s climate was like in terms that were legible not only to scientists, but to everyone in the United States and world. They generated a new dataset that both reinforced perceptions of the Valley as an inhospitable place and opened the door to considering its potential as a tourist attraction.

When the idea for the weather station and changing the agricultural activity at the Ranch was in its infancy, not everyone in Death Valley thought it would actually be fruitful. John Ryan argued that the Ranch should focus on producing the staples he and his workers depended on at the Lila C. Mine. He cautioned against being too innovative because in the past “we experimented in the growing of fruits in the Greenland Valley Ranch, but with very poor success.” He did not see many reasons why the new operation would be more successful, but granted that the past failures might have resulted from lack of interest among employees at the Ranch. Ryan hoped that the changes Corkill proposed would at least go forward on a sound footing and with energetic management.

With that in mind, Locke and Corkill both agreed that trees that bore fruits containing little water would be best to try first. Locke wrote, “I believe you have tried figs, and possibly pears and peaches, but these fruit contain too much water and the heat dries them up.” As alternatives, he suggested coffee, walnuts, pecans, almonds, and peanuts. In a nod to previous attempts to bring the Valley under cultivation, Locke joked, “I know vegetables will grow and that while we would like fruits, it may be that there won’t anything [sic] grow there but dried fruit.”

In order to pick plants that would thrive in the hot, dry climate, Locke decided to collect information on just how hot and how dry Death Valley actually was. Locke wrote, “we have recently got the appointment for Mr. Muncey from the US Weather Bureau [to serve as a] cooperative Observer, and the Government are to furnish instruments so that we can keep track of the weather, for a little later on
we may find this information of value.”726  Professor Alexander G. McAdie, local agent of the
Department of Agriculture’s Weather Bureau in San Francisco, approved the company’s request to
establish a weather reporting station at the Ranch.

McAdie wrote, “we ought to have reliable data and I will be glad to recommend the
establishment of a co-operative station; i.e. one where temperatures and rainfalls are recorded,
provided you will give aid as you generously offer, to look after the instruments.”  McAdie said the only
thing stopping him from shipping an instrument shelter, thermometers, and a rain gauge was that he did
not know where to address them. He hoped a Borax Company representative would send an address to
him soon.727

When the equipment finally arrived, Ranch employees complained that it was not adequate to
record Death Valley’s weather. Fred Corkill wrote, “I note the maximum thermometer registers to 125
degrees ONLY.”  He claimed that scale was insufficient, saying “at times during the Summer months the
thermometers which hang on the South poarch [sic] at the ranch register as high as 135 degrees and
over. Therefore I do not think we will be able to get very accurate results with these instruments, unless
they are different from the ordinary kind.”728

In response, McAdie wrote that someone in Washington, DC, had made a mistake when they
sent the equipment west, but that they were going to send new thermometers soon with scales up to
134 degrees Fahrenheit. McAdie said, “I certainly hope it will not get any warmer than that at Greenland
Ranch.”  An unsigned letter, probably from Locke to Fred Corkill said that

Professor McAdie says…the new thermometers that are being sent will register 134°, and he hopes it will not get any warmer at Greenland Ranch, and as do we, but if it should get warmer, we have told Professor that we fear the mercury will be somewhat cramped in the thermometer, if it does not register any more than 134°, but that is his look-out.729

These letters show how Borax company employees struggled to translate their lived knowledge
of the environment in the Valley into official knowledge. Simply saying, “it is hot” was different from
saying “it’s 125 degrees” or “it’s 134 degrees.” Getting a new thermometer, even if the mercury ended up being “cramped,” allowed the company to share information about the Valley with outsiders. Even though authors, prospectors, and other miners had claimed for decades that the Valley’s heat was oppressive, no one had anything other than anecdotal evidence to describe the climate there.

Once they were able to explain the climate to agricultural professionals outside of Death Valley, Locke and Corkill seemed confident that they would identify crops to grow there. In a letter, Locke wrote, “God never made anything for nothing, and Death Valley is the best place on earth for something, and it only requires a little study to find out what that something is. Once found we can go on indefinitely; the heat is right, the atmosphere is right, to operate well there, but the question is – what is the thing?”

Locke’s statement shows how he believed in humans’ ability to perfect and harness their surroundings. Locke’s utilitarian faith that providence dictated there was some crop destined to thrive in Death Valley also evinces the other side of a logical dualism that led policy-makers to designate national parks in land that would supposedly be “wasted” if it were not used for recreation. Even though there was nothing useful that grew in Death Valley at that time, that did not mean there never would or could be. To Locke, it was only a matter of time until someone solved the riddle of what “the thing” for Death Valley was. In order to solve it, he and other borax company employees supported Fred Corkill’s continued work to understand the Valley’s climate.

In his annual report (which contains the highlights of monthly reports) on climate in California, McAdie wrote that the station’s data “…would appear to uphold the belief that the dreaded terrors of heat and dryness of Death Valley have been somewhat exaggerated.” He believed it was “quite possible if proper care be taken in the manor [sic] of supplies and provision for physical comfort, to live and work in this section” just like anywhere else in the United States. McAdie’s observations show scientists’ familiarity with the Valley’s morbid reputation. It also show how he was trying to argue against the
(incorrect) consensus that the Valley was not a place anyone would be able, let alone want, to live or work.

In the popular press, reporters still presented Death Valley as a terrible place to be. In a newspaper clipping that someone pasted on a page filed with Pacific Coast Borax Company correspondence, a journalist characterized the region unfavorably with the headline “No Picture Can Show It – Death Valley Too Horrible.” The writer claimed, “moisture is unknown” in the Valley, and said that its “heat cracks the lips, pinches the face until the blood flows, swells the tongue and seems to suck the moisture from the body. Then comes madness, and upon the heels of madness treads the grim specter of death.”

In the face of these contradictory assessments, and knowing that the Valley was not only survivable but that the Pacific Coast Borax Company had had a presence there for more than thirty years, company managers started to draw their own conclusions from the weather data. In a letter to Fred Corkill, an unnamed author at the company’s Oakland headquarters said that McAdie’s reports on the Valley contained comparisons with other, less morbid places around the United States. The comparisons made it clear that, while Death Valley’s climate was extreme, it might not be as odious as outsiders believed. Transferring climate data out of the Valley helped emphasize another of its attributes -- its isolation.

*Fifty miles from nowhere – Sharing information about the Valley with the outside world*

In the report to Professor McAdie for the month of July 1913, W.L. Locke noted, “there was only one day when the thermometer was below 120 maximum, and on July 9th the minimum was 93, which we believe you must consider very warm.” Most notably, they wrote, “July 10th was the hottest day recorded since the government instruments have been installed at the ranch – maximum being 134.”
With the thermometer’s mercury “crammed” at the instrument’s top, the Pacific Coast Borax Company asked for new equipment to suit the Ranch’s peculiar, climatic situation. In October, they wrote to the Weather Bureau in San Francisco to ask for a new thermometer. They jokingly suggested that “a little piece to screw on the end” would do the job fine. Staff from the Weather Bureau expressed frustration at the slow pace reports on the weather reached them.

In a letter to Fred Corkill written several days later, Locke said he too had heard that the Weather Bureau was missing two months’ reports from the Ranch. Locke wrote, “the next opportunity you have to reach the desert please get this report that we may send it to Mr. Willson. He probably does not realize what [sic] Greenland Ranch is [not] right on the railroad and in communication with the Post Office, and that we can [not] get reports when we want them.” To the contrary, Locke wrote, “The facts are – Greenland Ranch is FIFTY MILES FROM NOWHERE, and you can only reach it when you make trips to the desert.”

G.H Willson tried to convince the borax company to make getting that information out more of a priority by writing about how exceptional the records proved Death Valley to be. He wrote, “it may be interesting to you to know that the maximum temperature of 134° recorded at Greenland Ranch in July 1913 is the highest we have any record of in the country. He could not have known it at the time, but this high would turn out to be the highest recorded at an official station in that or any other year. That information helped set Death Valley apart from other desert locales as unique and reinforced its macabre reputation, even though a great deal of the climatological data showed that it was actually less exceptional than most outsiders had believed.

With its reputation as the hottest place on earth acknowledged by the US government, operations in Death Valley settled into a familiar pattern for the next decade. The Company continued to excavate borates at the Lila C. Mine at what came to be known as (old) Ryan Camp until they were exhausted in 1914. After that, the Pacific Coast Borax Company consummated its plans to mine closer
to the Ranch and moved operations to a New Ryan Camp (about ten miles closer to the Ranch).\textsuperscript{737} A
railroad followed the mine and miners into the Valley.

Beginning in 1905, Francis Marion Smith (also known as “Borax” Smith) built the Tonopah and
Tidewater Railroad (T & T), which would connect the desert mines just east of Death Valley with
industrial markets. In 1907, the railroad reached the Lila C. Mine, and, when the borax company
relocated operations to New Ryan Camp in 1914, it incorporated the Death Valley Railroad as a T & T
subsidiary to carry traffic to the new mine there.\textsuperscript{738} A few years later, that rail line ended up being one
of the reasons the Pacific Coast Borax Company reinterpreted the Valley as a tourist attraction.
3.4 – Mysterious and colorful grandeur in complete comfort – Mining Tourists

Until the 1920s, the most reliable way to make money in Death Valley had been to take minerals from it to someplace else. Beginning in 1927, a private hotel owner and the Pacific Coast Borax Company started courting visitors who would bring wealth into the Valley. The change hinged on a series of events that were almost all beyond the company’s control, but through which the Company’s employees managed to ensure the Valley would remain a profit engine. In the process, tourist promoters reframed it as a thrilling but safe place. Promoters used the Valley’s macabre mythology, the climatic data Ranch employees collected, and the romantic, pioneer past conjured by Death Valley Scotty and Stephen Mather’s Twenty Mule Team advertising campaign to make Death Valley fit the national park paradigm.

The executives who ran the Borax Company knew from first-hand experience at Ryan and the Ranch that Death Valley was a difficult place to live, but they also understood it had the potential to be something more than the sum of its mineral parts. In this chapter, I explain the process of reinterpreting Death Valley as a tourist destination. It involved assimilating users, ideas, and practices from across the National Park System into Death Valley’s landscape. Nature enthusiasts, National Park Service officials, and tourist business owners who supported making Death Valley a national park unit succeeded at arguing it displayed the abstract qualities (including isolation, unconfined opportunities for immersion in nature, the capability to provide comfortable leisure, and sublime landscapes) that users associated with the park paradigm. Their success was not the result of a grand, master plan or conspiracy but sprang from a simple letter about some muddy water in the desert.
In the fall of 1925, the new superintendent of the mine at Ryan, Major Julian Boyd, wrote, “we are not getting all the water [available in the Valley] by any means.” He proposed taking action to bring every spring he could find into use for the Company. He thought it was important for the company to move quickly because California law respected first users’ rights to determine how they wanted to use water sources.

Boyd’s supervisors at the company’s main office responded enthusiastically to the idea. They said that he should “go over the situation at the earliest time it is convenient and determine approximately what work and expense would be involved in either extending our ditch up...or in running a pipe line to our present ditch from the springs.” That way, the company could legitimately claim to be using all of the water there.

Even though the company did not have any especially pressing need for more water, it made sense because water was and is so dear in Death Valley. By controlling water sources, the Pacific Coast Borax Company would have proxy control of all future development there. In order to establish a defensible claim, company employees knew that they had to get title to the land with the springs on it and then use the water for a “beneficial use.” Those uses included agriculture, industry, or household applications. Since the company already had a large farm at the Ranch, its employees knew that they could use the water they diverted there.

These employees’ decision to establish their right to use all of the water around Furnace Creek implies they believed it was in their best interest to solidify the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s already substantial presence there. It seems like agriculture was the only use the Company employees considered for the water because that was the only one they included in their letters. The only change this involved from past attempts to grow produce at the Ranch was that the company intended to sell their dates, which were a high-value product, to consumers outside of the Mojave Desert.
Other than periodic suggestions by Frank Jenifer that he thought tourists might be interested in visiting Death Valley, no one had made any serious move to accommodate tourists there. Even though Pacific Coast Borax Company employees probably knew Death Valley better than just about anyone else, the first person who approached it as a possible destination for tourists was not a borax company employee, but a promoter with experience in the hotel business on the California coast.

When he graduated from the University of West Virginia, Death Valley was probably the last place on Herman Eichbaum’s mind, but, after working briefly in the East, the allure of adventure in the West brought him to the boomtown of Rhyolite, Nevada, to work as a mining engineer. After designing the city’s first electrical plant in 1906, he worked mine prospects near Ubehebe Crater and Goldbelt, Nevada, before moving to the coast and starting a new business on Catalina Island.744

Unlike the rough and tumble of the mines he had so recently come from, Santa Catalina Island was a veritable paradise. When Eichbaum arrived there, William Wrigley Jr. was bringing the island into his business empire. Eichbaum watched as hundreds of thousands of tourists began to visit places that had, not long before, been pastures, farms, and anglers’ camps through a combination of rapid infrastructural development and savvy promotion (that Wrigley had himself modeled on the development at Yellowstone National Park).745  Eichbaum took advantage of the tourists Wrigley attracted to the island by opening a goat-cart ride business there. His success proved to him that tourism was big business. Inspired by Wrigley’s empire on Santa Catalina, he set his sights on developing a resort of his own.

In a prospectus he wrote for the commissioners of Inyo County, he said that Death Valley “with its beauty, its mystery and history” was ripe to become America’s next great tourist attraction. Looking back on his time near the Valley, he wrote that its vistas, alien landscape, macabre associations, and well-known pioneer history would make it a popular destination for tourists from around the world. In order to capitalize on those attributes, he wanted the county to build a road to Furnace Creek Ranch,
Badwater Basin, Mesquite Springs, and Stovepipe Wells. According to newspaper reports from the time, the commissioners initially rebuffed him because spending tax money to develop the Valley for tourists seemed like a waste. They eventually relented when Eichbaum agreed to assume the expense of construction himself and recover the cost with a road toll. In spite of the commissioners’ dim view of the whole business’s attractiveness to tourists, they were hopeful that the road would draw tourists who would drive through the Owens Valley to get to Death Valley.746

Along with a small work crew, Eichbaum surveyed a route over mud, through washes and on the side of steep cliffs that would carry tourists to the resort he planned to build overlooking the Mesquite Flat Sand Dunes. Eichbaum planned to build a grand hotel overlooking the dunes and the rest of the Valley from high ground on its east side. He envisioned constructing an impressive structure complete with sunken gardens and a sweeping view that he hoped would make it a wonder in its own right.747 Even before he finished building the road, he realized he would not have enough money to build that kind of hotel.

Eichbaum was running his project on a shoestring. It took most of his capital just to build the road, which was no mean feat. Rather than blasting or making cuts to keep the road at grade, one worker described how they “kinda [sic] detoured around” the roughest sections that they had to traverse.748 When they reached the sand dunes, Eichbaum and his employees realized that building a permanent road anywhere nearby would be very challenging. Since he did not have enough money to pay to reroute the road away from the dunes (which would have required additional miles of construction), Eichbaum simply changed his destination.749

According to Harry Gower, a longtime employee of the Pacific Coast Borax Company who worked in and around the Valley, the actual site where Eichbaum built the hotel had as much to do with kismet as forethought. When the first trucks with lumber for the buildings arrived, Gower claimed “one day six trucks of lumber for the new development were reported arriving at the sand dunes; though we
didn’t believe it we drove up there to see what it was all about.” Since “the proposed route to the wells [hotel site] lay north of the big dunes” where trucks could not drive “one truck was out there sunk deep in the sand as the others waited cautiously on firm ground for Eichbaum’s arrival.” When the entrepreneur arrived at the site, he took “a long look and then told the drivers to dump their loads where they stood.” Since he realized that driving across the dunes was impossible, he decided, “one place [for the hotel] was as good as another.” This choice had important implications for Eichbaum’s operation in the Valley and is telling for what it says about the way he interpreted the scenery there.

Eichbaum was the first businessperson who took Death Valley seriously as a potential leisure destination. He decided to build a hotel there at a time when most EuroAmericans either went there exclusively to work or avoided it altogether. He was one of the first to interpret its expansive open spaces, low scrub, and hot temperatures as potentially interesting natural curiosities. His actions shaped Pacific Coast Borax and National Park Service operations significantly not only because placing his hotel near the Mesquite Flat Sand Dunes helped make them a major destination, but also because putting his hotel in an otherwise inhospitable place opened the door to reframing every part of the supposed wasteland as a wonderland.

Eichbaum’s plan was to offer trips to and from Los Angeles with overnight stops in the Owens Valley, the city of Lone Pine, and at his hotel in the Valley. He framed the trips around the possibility of visiting both the lowest spot in the Continental United States, Badwater Basin in Death Valley, and the highest point, Mount Whitney near Lone Pine, in the same trip. While they were in the Valley, Eichbaum promised his guests would enjoy the comfort and convenience afforded by electric lights, running water and scenic tours to all the Valley’s most interesting sites.

Eichbaum was trying to capitalize on the cachet of superlative places. He designed his tours around taking tourists to places that were singular and novel. In short, he was reshaping Death Valley to make it more like the places tourists were already accustomed to visiting which were national parks. He
wanted to reframe Death Valley by emphasizing its uniqueness and downplaying its supposed lethality. He did that by installing technological systems to accommodate tourists who were accustomed to visiting national park lodges in comfort. When Eichbaum opened his resort the next year, it was not as impressive as he had originally planned, but it was set up to comfortably host tourists in the desert.

The resort opened with as much fanfare as Eichbaum could afford (which is to say, not much) in November of 1926. Rather than the grand hotel he had originally planned, he built what reporters described as a “Bungalow or Bungalette City” of canvas and screen. The twenty or so tents that greeted visitors did not have the impressive aura he had originally hoped it would have, but Eichbaum benefited from the association between the tents and real, frontier living.754

With the help of friends he had made working on Catalina Island, Eichbaum set about promoting the resort through newspaper articles and partnerships with travel agencies throughout Southern California. Eichbaum’s venture met with curious amusement by the old timers at the Pacific Coast Borax Company. Initially, letters exchanged between the company’s field staff and central office showed that they thought the project might help publicize their work establishing a brand for the agricultural goods they planned to ship out of the Valley. They did not approach it as a model for development of their own until it started to get traction with the traveling public in 1927. Therefore, while the company maintained an active interest in Eichbaum’s progress, his project was more of a distraction for engineers who believed that the path to prosperity ran through a new date grove at the Ranch. They certainly did not see Eichbaum as an interloper or possible competitor755

The company even directed Harry Gower, a mid-level manager for the company at Ryan Camp, to explore the possibility of selling an option he had acquired on land and about three miles from the Ranch to help Eichbaum establish his hotel. In a letter about the hotel’s progress, Frank Jenifer said he thought “it should be of direct benefit to us” for Eichbaum to develop a successful resort near Stovepipe Wells. There is no evidence to suggest that Eichbaum ever broached the idea of a partnership with
William Wrigley, but Jenifer also speculated that the new resort would bring much needed publicity to the Valley “especially if backed by Mr. Wrigley, who is always very liberal in his advertising expenditures.”

The borax company executive’s understanding of good publicity’s centrality to the success of any attempt to attract tourists to the Valley might be the first sign that he and his peers had begun to consider establishing their own hotel in the Valley. Though the company’s business had always been in borates, once its managers realized that Eichbaum was succeeding at drawing tourists to his resort, they began to consider how the company could one up him. However, for the time being, they did not take any action at all. To the contrary, they continued investing in farming at the Ranch and acquiring water rights throughout the Valley.

In 1925, when Eichbaum was first trying to build a road into Death Valley, Frank Jenifer wrote a letter to Harry Gower, who was working for the Pacific Coast Borax Company at Ryan Camp then. Jenifer wrote that while the company might consider getting into the tourist trade at some point, it might be more profitable to farm high-value crops there. He wrote that it looked like Bob Eichbaum had successfully highlighted the “tourist and sightseeing attractions of Death Valley,” and suggested they could make a lot of money by doing something similar. Since any road to Stovepipe Wells would be rougher than the ones most drivers had become accustomed to driving on in cities, Jenifer speculated that rich tourists might be willing to pay a premium to travel in comfort to a resort at Furnace Creek. Jenifer wrote, “regardless of the character of the road built [by Eichbaum] the trip by auto from Lone Pine to Stovepipe will be tiresome and a large proportion of the travel will unquestionably seek the most comfortable route which is the T&T Railroad of course.”

Nonetheless, the company continued its campaign to buy up land with an eye toward agricultural development. Jenifer directed Harry Gower to continue to buy up springs and water rights. In a letter about buying land owned by Adolph Nevares, Jenifer said Gower should “also make whatever
determination possible as to the area of tillable land which can be served by the springs and their location with respect of the water sources.” Rather than developing the water to provide for tourists needs, Gower was to “consult with Mr. Drummond to see what crops, if any, are susceptible of production on such lands, particularly as to what dates will do at the elevation of any such lands.” If the land near the spring was not good for farming, Jenifer said Gower should redirect the water to the Ranch so that the company established their right to it. If the company did not need the water at the Ranch, then Jenifer said Gower should see whether he could sell the rights to use it.

Jenifer wrote that if the Company could not use the water immediately, then Gower should see whether Eichbaum had any interest in using the water “for strictly hotel purposes.” With the company retaining the right to dispose of any excess for farming. The reason Jenifer supported selling the water to Eichbaum was that it would be “a helpful advertising scheme.” It would also “prevent any detrimental usage.” Jenifer did not explain what kinds of uses would be “detrimental,” but said he hoped “the Borax Company, working in conjunction with the government, [would] keep whatever date gardens or trees which are planted in Death Valley absolutely pest free.”

Jenifer’s letter shows how he, and by proxy employees at the borax company, viewed Death Valley as late as 1925. The Company was not concerned at having to compete with Bob Eichbaum’s Stovepipe Wells Hotel and even considered collaborating with him because they thought it would raise Death Valley’s profile and provide a possible customer who would buy their water. They were only concerned about possible threats to their new, agricultural development. In the absence of a business incentive to find another use for the land in the Valley, the Borax Company planned to use it the same way they for decades – as a source of valuable commodities.

*End of the line – Repurposing the Death Valley Railroad*
When Dr. J.K. Suckow arrived there in 1913, Kern County, California, was one of the least developed and only recently accessible places in the United States. The combination of new transportation links that made it accessible to the outside world and its climate made it perfect for the physician’s plans to build a facility where patients with respiratory ailments could convalesce. Before he could build a hospital, he had to find a potable source of water. In order to find it, he brought a drilling rig to the desert and began boring a series of holes that all came up dry, but yielded the same, white chalky mineral.761

When he took samples to a geologist for assay, and then to the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s engineer, Clarence Rasor, he found out that he had stumbled on one of the richest borax deposits anyone had ever found. After filing claims on the area with the General Land Office, Suckow offered them for sale to the Pacific Coast Borax Company. On Rasor’s recommendation, the company bought them, started mining, and began searching the area to see if there were other deposits nearby; they found nothing.

A few years later, two prospectors who wanted to reprise the doctor’s good fortune started sinking test wells of their own about a mile and a half from Suckow’s old prospect. In the spring of 1925, William Dowsing and J.L. Hannan found what turned out to be the largest borax deposit anyone had found until that time. They kept the deposit secret until its extent had been proven, and then they sold out to the Pacific Coast Borax Company in 1926.762 With a new, richer, and more accessible mine in production, the Company knew that its production would rise and prices for borax would fall.763 Now that it looked like they would have to carry the unprofitable (but still relatively rich) claims they held around the Valley as well as its infrastructure on their balance sheet, company executives reconsidered how they managed the land there.764

While various parties had suggested the Company should construct a hotel in the Valley over the years, its executives had never taken any action to build one. To most officials, apparently any place
that was “fifty miles from nowhere” and whose name evoked mortality must have seemed like it had poor prospects as a tourist destination. Nonetheless, now they took those suggestions seriously.

This was a significant departure from past precedent. Only a year before, the company declined to build a resort to compete with Bob Eichbaum’s. In fact, they opted to help him by offering the option to use company water rights (aiding their competition, in effect). The evidence suggests that they still believed agriculture would be more profitable than setting up a resort.

The change in circumstance brought on by the discovery of borates that were cheaper to mine elsewhere in California seems to have totally changed the company’s calculus because it made significant changes to the way that it managed operations in Death Valley. Less than a month after perfecting title to the last of the known springs around Furnace Creek, someone from the Pacific Coast Borax Company sent a letter to the Los Angeles firm of Albert C. Martin, Architect. While that letter is not in the Company’s papers, Martin’s response is.

Martin wrote back with plans “for the proposed Inn near the Furnace Creek Ranch.” He gave a brief description of the building’s floor plan, exterior and interior finishes, and construction plans for a twelve-bedroom building that would also have a living room, dining room, and kitchen. With an eye toward the future, Martin also included descriptions of possible additions to expand the hotel. The letter belies only tentative commitment to the project on the part of Pacific Coast Borax. Martin ended by saying “that you will confer with us on Thursday, October 28th [1926], giving definite instructions as to procedure, but the above outline is presented for your approval or criticism in the event you order us to proceed with the execution of this work.”

There are no minutes from that meeting in the archives, but the Pacific Coast Borax Company retained Martin and asked him to oversee the construction of the hotel he planned. When he started construction work, Martin had the company’s full support and a very tight schedule to meet. The Company proposed to have the first guests staying in the hotel by the first week of 1927, just two
months in the future. In order to meet the deadline, the company promised there would be “no shortage of materials and labor” but did not propose how Martin should actually do the work.768

Martin brought workers aboard quickly, and less than two weeks later they were preparing the site. Most of the actual work was supervised by Pacific Coast Borax Company employees, and Frank Jenifer wrote that by November 10 “about two thousand adobe bricks have been made; and we started two men building a road up to the site of the Inn last Thursday, the 4th instant.” At the same time, they prepared drawings of the site so that Martin could finish planning the hotel’s design.769

The way the company’s corporate officers wrote about the operation in the Valley makes it seem like they were there witnessing the work at first-hand even though many of them were far away in different states or countries. Their descriptions of the work also connote the fundamental continuity between their old profit-driven enterprises in the Valley and this new one. Christian Zabriskie, who wrote about the project from his office in New York, said that the new company would “be run as an enterprise entirely distinct from the other operations of the Borax Company. The hotel company will be incorporated, the stock of which will be owned by the Borax Consolidated Limited and in due course you will be fully advised of the name of the hotel and all details connected with its incorporation.”770 This method of organization matched the pattern Company managers set when they established the Tonopah and Tidewater and Death Valley Railroads when they required workers at the Ranch to document the goods and services provided there better. The letters company managers wrote about work on the Inn were similar to the ones they had written for decades about the expenses associated with operations in Death Valley. The relationship between the mining and hotel business would have long-lasting implications for Death Valley because it shaped the way company managers influenced policy, and how the Valley’s identity evolved as a tourist destination.

Construction deadlines made and missed
By mid-November, managers at the construction site wrote that the building would not be completed by the end of 1926. They said the supervisor thought “it will be physically impossible to complete the hotel before February,” but that “Mr. Martin’s office is doing everything possible to rush.” Work continued at a fast pace and Martin wrote that orders for supplies went out of the Valley daily. Workers were also stockpiling cement and adobe bricks in anticipation of construction. When they found out about the delays building, company executives expressed disappointment and a little frustration.

Frank Jenifer joked, after receiving a letter with the news that construction would take longer than he had initially thought it would, that he hoped Martin’s letter “means February 1927.” To further expedite the work, Jenifer said workers in the Valley should start ordering furnishings “since it is apparent that Mr. Martin has to be prodded somewhat.” All of the rush seems odd when taken in light of the fact that only a year before Jenifer had been writing that the company should try to corner the water in Death Valley on a purely speculative basis, but makes more sense in light of a partnership company employees in the corporate office were apparently trying to establish.

In the same letter, Jenifer wrote “we must take up immediately and decide upon…the date of completion of the building, in order that that Union Pacific advertising may be adjusted accordingly.” Later on he wrote that he needed to know “whether to postpone the effective date of the tours [to be managed by the Union Pacific] until the Hotel is opened or to take care of the travel at Ryan pending the time the Hotel is completed.” The Pacific Coast Borax Company was going in to the hotel business in partnership with the same company that was responsible for carrying tourists to the Grand Canyon, Zion, Bryce Canyon, and Yellowstone National Parks.

The hurry to establish a relationship with the Union Pacific and to build a hotel in Death Valley was a definite change from only a year before. It had not been that long since Jenifer had suggested “a large proportion of the travel will unquestionably seek the most comfortable route which is the T&T
Railroad of course [emphasis in original]” but no one in the company took any action to take advantage of that opportunity. Now that the Tonopah and Tidewater Railroad would not have any valuable commodities to haul out of Death Valley, the Pacific Coast Borax Company decided to use it to haul a new commodity in. Company executives hoped tourists would provide a new and substantial source of income for the line.

The Company’s motives for wanting to establish a hotel near the Furnace Creek Ranch were consistent with the ones that got them to build up all their other interests there over the preceding forty years. The company had always taken action to privatize possible profits from mining, farming, and possessing water rights in the Valley. The company’s commodity based, utilitarian approach to managing their capital had important implications for the kind of national park unit Death Valley ultimately became. It also led company executives to acquire more property there because, just like the water that company employees had been trying to monopolize a few years before, they realized that getting control of more of the Valley - specifically the area around the hotel that was under construction - might pay significant dividends.

Owning the Earth – The Pacific Coast Borax Company acquires more land in Death Valley

On November 19, 1926, the company hired a lawyer to file a patent for 160 acres around the Inn site with the General Land Office at a cost of eleven dollars per acre. The company executives who initiated that process might have considered it a formality because, even though they were exchanging letters and telegrams daily about details concerning the construction of the hotel, they did not write about the land again for almost a month.

Writing to Christian Zabriskie in New York, Jenifer explained, “the hotel building operations appeared quite satisfactory although the progress had been retarded somewhat through the delay in getting started on the excavating.” It was undesirable for the work to proceed slowly, but Jenifer said
the delay was not all bad because he took the opportunity “to change the position of the hotel on the
hill somewhat.” The change would have been more expensive if the work had already started and were
going on even though the Company did not have any definite knowledge of whether they actually
owned the land they were working on.

On November 27, the General Land Office declined the company’s petition to patent the land
beneath the already partially constructed hotel. A letter from the agency’s local commissioner stated
that the land was “withdrawn as Public Water Reserve No. 13 and is not open to entry.” This was an
important piece of information, but no one shared it with staff in the Valley or at the Company’s main
offices for about a month. Telegrams and letters between various company officials show that building
at the hotel site continued without any change or let up for several weeks after the Office issued its
decision.

The Company’s decision to begin construction before they perfected title on the hotel site is
indicative of how its staff viewed Death Valley. For more than forty years, no one had much of an
interest in developing Death Valley except for the Pacific Coast Borax Company. Other than small claims
owned by individual prospectors like Adolph Nevares, the Company owned most of the land that was
not in the public domain there. The company’s decision to start building before they knew whether
they owned the land or not seems to show its employees took for granted that the General Land Office
would list it for sale.

This action implies that company employees assumed no one else would think the land was
worth owning. This assumption is consistent with the company’s consistent approach to Death Valley as
a remote, uncomfortable, and isolated place to be. So while the hotel represented a departure from
some past Company practices, its foundations rested on the assumption that Death Valley was still the
same as it had always been – a “leftover,” largely infertile place that most outsiders thought of as
worthless.
When Jenifer learned that the company was not able to buy the land beneath the new hotel on December 18, 1926, he wrote to Rasor in a telegram to stop work immediately.\textsuperscript{779} The Company executives knew that the only way they would be able to complete the hotel would be to negotiate with the federal government. In order to justify their claim, the company needed to address the reasons that led the government to reserve the land in the first place. To do that, they needed to confront a legacy of enthusiasm that influenced how eastern politicians, civil servants, and business owners managed and allocated land west of the 100\textsuperscript{th} meridian.

\textit{The Inn at Public Water Reserve No. 13}

As early as the 1850s, some Euroamerican settlers placed faith in the (misguided) belief that “rain follows the plow,” and started to develop the dry region as farmland. The most successful were probably the Mormon settlements in modern Utah. They constructed large irrigation works to channel water from distant streams or mountains to lowland farms. These kinds of projects were out of reach for most western settlers. The high cost and tremendous amount of labor required for that work made it impossible for them to build them.

Using the surveys completed by Clarence King, Ferdinand Hayden, George Wheeler, and, most importantly, John Wesley Powell, Americans “discovered” that millions of acres of arid western land could be brought under cultivation. Under the coordinated management of Powell and the newly formed United States Geological Survey, western boosters succeeded at influencing American public opinion to fund a comprehensive inventory of sites where the US Army Corps of Engineers, and later the US Bureau of Reclamation, could build dams impounding water for commercial and agricultural development.\textsuperscript{780}

In order to rationalize that development, Powell oversaw crews that surveyed, evaluated, and enumerated all the sites that might be suited to dam construction in the west. While some of those sites later became famous as the seats of some of the most famous structures in the western
hemisphere, a far larger number of them were destined to molder in obscurity on the shelves of US Geological Survey engineers and General Land Office Surveyors in Washington, DC. By sheer happenstance, one of those sites turned out to be in the heart of the hottest, driest, lowest place in North America.\textsuperscript{781}

Since they produced over two million gallons of water per day in total, the springs above Furnace Creek must have appealed to federal engineers for the same reason they had appealed to the Pacific Coast Borax Company. Just as the mining company had planned to expand their farm in order to take advantage of the water, Powell’s engineers apparently recognized that that much water meant it might be possible to reclaim part of the Valley by constructing a dam above it. Now that they were planning a hotel for the same site, the company was in an awkward position.

After he learned the Inn was on land reserved for the construction of a dam and reservoir, Jenifer wrote an urgent letter explaining the difficulty to Christian Zabriskie at the company’s office in New York City. Jenifer lamented that even if they could get the land released, it would be open for a special period of 90 days when Army or Navy Veterans would have the opportunity to file for it.\textsuperscript{782} Telegramming again later the same day, Jenifer wrote that he and other staff in California hoped Zabriskie would make a trip to the capital to negotiate on behalf of the company at the Department of the Interior.\textsuperscript{783}

Jenifer wrote “I strongly urge that you go Washington Monday to lay this matter before [Commissioner of the General Land Office, William] SPRY.” Jenifer hoped that Zabriskie would persuade staff at the Department of Interior to invoke a law that enabled the Secretary to release the land unilaterally. Jenifer said the law would “provide an outlet” because the company could show that the land did not conform to the purpose proposed for it as a Public Water Reserve. He claimed the property must have been included in the reserve because of a “technical error” because there were no “open
power resources there,” and the Pacific Coast Borax Company had already appropriated all of the available water there. In response, Zabriskie said he would go to Washington that night. To prepare for the meetings he wanted to arrange, Zabriskie asked Jenifer to telegraph a description of the land the inn stood on to the Willard Hotel in Washington, DC. Jenifer promised he would send the description and wrote that if Zabriskie failed to get Spry to take action, they might need an attorney’s help to reach a “positive decision.”

When Zabriskie arrived in Washington the next day, he prepared an argument based on Jenifer’s knowledge of the federal law governing dam construction and reservations. Zabriskie prepared to argue for Spry to release the land under the hotel because it was completely barren. He claimed that it “never entered the minds of any of us...knowing as we do, the arid nature of the country,” that anyone would want to build a dam there. To the contrary, they believed that anyone who knew the area would say, “such a thing seems ridiculous.”

Putting aside the fact that this approach never mentioned the springs around Furnace Creek Wash that produce more than two million gallons of water per day, Zabriskie’s appeal shows how willing he was to use Death Valley’s reputation to the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s advantage. Zabriskie’s rhetorical approach implicitly invoked the utilitarian logic that, since the land would never be useful as a reservoir, it made sense to let the Company build a hotel on it. Even though Commissioner Spry was a Westerner (and former Governor of Utah) from Salt Lake City who would have been familiar with dry land farming, this approach apparently resonated with him.

After their meeting, Zabriskie telegraphed west that he had had a “very satisfactory interview,” with the commissioner. Spry told Zabriskie that he should “go out and spend Christmas with your family [in California] and don’t stop work on the hotel.” He promised that the General Land Office would help the company perfect its title to the land by “immediately [taking] it up with [the] proper parties.” As
it turned out, one of those parties was Zabriskie’s friend and erstwhile mentor, the Director of the National Park Service, Stephen Tyng Mather.

**Such a Thing Seems Ridiculous**

After arriving in Washington, but before meeting with Spry, Zabriskie said he went to see Stephen Mather for breakfast. The National Park Service Director and former Pacific Coast Borax Company employee “assured me that there was nothing to worry about.” Mather thought that while there was a possibility “the authority would be with the Federal Power Commission, consisting of Secretary of War Davis, Secretary Work, Department of the Interior (Spry and Mather are both in this Department) and the Secretary of Agriculture.” Since Mather knew or had access to all of those people, he said there was no reason to believe anything but “the whole matter will be arranged to our satisfaction.”

Zabriskie said that while he was talking with Mather, Spry called Mather on his personal phone “in regard to some social matter.” During their conversation, Mather mentioned “Chris Zabriskie was taking breakfast with him” and explained that he hoped the commissioner “would fix [everything] up the way we wanted it.” Then Zabriskie took the phone and promised a car to pick Spry up later that morning (it was Sunday).

When they met in the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s Washington, DC, offices later that morning, Zabriskie explained to Spry how employees at the Company did not think, “any of that ground could have been withdrawn for any purpose whatever.” In fact, he said it “had never been dreamed of by any of us.” The land was, after all, worthless.

Zabriskie argued that the flow of the stream running down from the springs in Furnace Creek Wash would never have been able to fill a reservoir anyway. He claimed the spring flow was so small “the amount of hydro-electric power that could be developed was certainly a very small amount.” He
also claimed that the company’s existing operations would not prevent the construction of a dam if were practical to build one.  

Zabriskie also admitted the underlying reason he wanted the land was to drive tourist traffic to the company-owned railroad lines there. He said, “we were interested in the fact that it might put our railroads on at least a self-sustaining basis instead of a constant deficit.” Since he was sure the hotel would generate a steady flow of visitors, he also claimed that it would be a better use of the land than a reservoir.

He concluded that even if the government were to build a reservoir (if such a thing were possible), “this tourist movement and its early inauguration would mean a great deal to that entire part of the country.” Commenting from his perspective as the former governor of Utah, Spry compared the company’s work to national park development in the west, saying “that he well knew from the developments at Bryce Canyon and other National Parks; how much money had been bought into that section of the country developed on account of tourist travel and that something of this kind was sorely need in Death Valley.”

Spry apparently thought these arguments were compelling because he told Zabriskie “he would at once take it up with the proper parties and have it straightened out.” He said Zabriskie should write a letter explaining the company’s position that would state, “as briefly as possible, the facts as you have related them to me.” Spry said to make it “a personal letter” and reiterated that he would “get this matter straightened out and don’t worry.”

In the letter Zabriskie wrote to Spry, he said, “I have spoken to you of Death Valley lying below the level of the sea, and surrounded by picturesque mountains rising to a height of eleven thousand feet and over.” Zabriskie explained how he hoped to harness the mountains’ intangible values in a very real way. “At our invitation, officials of the Union Pacific Railroad Company visited this section and were at once enthusiastic about its magnificent scenery and its possibilities as an attraction for tourists,
especially during the winter months.” Zabriskie wrote that both groups were hoping to begin the service soon. He concluded, “the opening of the hotel and beginning of train service is scheduled to start February 1, 1927, and in order to do this we have to rush all construction on the ‘Furnace Creek Inn’ the name of the proposed hotel in Death Valley.” 790

Not long after this, a General Land Office employee wrote that because “the owner of the land upon which the spring is located and has legally appropriated all of the waters of the spring, and has been putting to beneficial use all of said waters,” he approved the company’s application to patent the land. After receiving the patent application, the General Land Office the employee would forward the request to “the Geological Survey with appropriate recommendation.” 791 The Pacific Coast Borax Company had the land for its hotel.

It is impossible to attribute Zabriskie’s success at influencing Spry to his association with Mather, the commissioner’s sympathy for a fellow westerner, the merits of Zabriskie’s arguments, or any combination of those factors because there are no letters from him in the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s files. It is nonetheless relevant that Zabriskie decided to base his appeal on the utilitarian argument that a hotel would yield greater benefits than a reservoir in the same spot. Even though Death Valley was not part of the National Park System, this conversation inaugurated framing tourism not only as a productive use of Death Valley, but also as the most productive use for it.

Zabriskie started the same conversation Ferdinand Hayden had half a century before to frame the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem as ripe for reclamation. 792 Zabriskie’s only change on Hayden’s approach was that he wrote with the knowledge that, unlike the apparently fertile land in Yellowstone, most outsiders already assumed land in Death Valley was arid and worthless. Since he represented the only company that ever tried to make serious inroads developing the Valley, Spry might have been convinced that the company’s proposal was, in fact, the most productive way to use the land.
Besides Spry’s assurances that he would make sure the Company got title to the land it wanted, Zabriskie left with another promise. In his letter to Pacific Coast Borax Company employees, Jenifer called “special attention to that portion referring to the visit of Messers. Mather and Albright will pay Death Valley and the possibility that we will get Governor Spry up there.” He said he hoped they would actually visit because it would be a “great advantage to us in any land or mining patent matters that may come up or that are pending” in the Department of Interior. Their participation in the creation of the Furnace Creek Inn helped set Death Valley on the road toward fitting the park paradigm and gave at least one reporter the opportunity to address how.

Newspaper Coverage of Death Valley – Stephen Mather, the National Park Service, and Death Valley’s identity

Stephen Mather and Horace Albright’s commitment to visit Death Valley was a significant development for the Pacific Coast Borax Company. The company’s partnership with the Union Pacific gave the first intimation that they wanted to make their hotel like one of the existing national park lodges. Mather and Albright’s involvement ensured that the Borax Company would get authoritative input about how the National Park Service shaped places for tourists across the country. It is not clear how Mather’s involvement in the project got out, but his promise to travel west appeared in at least one news story before he arrived.

The Washington correspondent for the Stockton Record wrote, “the story of this latest addition to the world’s playgrounds was given here today by Stephen T. Mather, director of the national parks, who is leaving Washington tomorrow for Los Angeles, where he will join a party of railroad men and others interested in the Death Valley resort project.” In the rest of his article, the reporter highlighted both Death Valley’s reputation and its potential as a tourist destination. In the process, he showed how tourist development affected his perception of the Valley’s identity.
The reporter claimed the Pacific Coast Borax Company was changing Death Valley’s character by building a hotel there. Even though “Death Valley has become virtually an international synonym for intolerable summer heat” and was a “land of terrible thirst,” tourist development there was going to change it. He wrote about how Death Valley was “about to lose its distinction as one of the few remaining regions of the globe known only to the adventuring trail breaker, the hardy prospector and the perspiring borax worker.” Tourist development would give casual visitors the ability to “view with unconcern the legendary terrors and gaze in perfect comfort and safety upon its grim wonders. Civilization again extends its frontier and—the goodly company of adventure lose one more of the rapidly vanishing ‘far places of the earth.”

The reporter simultaneously framed the hotel’s construction and Mather and Albright’s imminent arrival as evidence of loss and evidence of progress. Paradoxically, the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s decision to repurpose their railroad for tourist travel, which made it far less formidable and foreboding, did not seem to influence the way he saw its extreme climate. It was also going to allow tourists to “view with unconcern” a place that they knew could be lethal, but it was not going to make it any less lethal. The reporter apparently did not believe that this change would compromise the Valley’s authenticity. One of the reasons why was Stephen Mather’s involvement.

The reporter wrote, “although the national-park service [sic] is not officially interested in the new project, it is understood that the valley resort will be operated on virtually the same base as the system in vogue in the various Federal playgrounds.” The reporter claimed that because the National Park Service was peripherally involved in the project to create a resort in Death Valley, it was going to be like a national park lodge. The implication was that Death Valley, like the Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, or Crater Lake National Parks, was going to be a place where tourists could go to have unique, superlative, sublime experiences. In other words, it would live up to the park paradigm.
The reporter used the park’s climate, elevation, and proximity to other geological features to prove his point. He highlighted the (incorrect) fact that visitors to Death Valley could stand in “the lowest depression in this country and gaze at the highest mountain peak in the United States—Mt. Whitney, whose lofty summit rises 14,501 feet above sea level.” Just like the deepest canyon, largest thermal area, and highest volcanic lake, the reporter claimed that Death Valley was unique.

The way he framed that uniqueness integrated the technological systems that would enable tourists to visit Death Valley in comfort. He juxtaposed the Valley’s harsh climate with a new, more scenic aspect that most outsiders had not known or talked about before. The change was important because it allowed potential tourists, travel authors, and tourist business owners to assimilate the most superlative and potentially uncomfortable parts of the Valley with their desire to experience them in comfort. The Pacific Coast Borax Company facilitated the change using modern, technological systems.

He wrote about how “the sightseer will be taken for many miles over the ‘baby gauge’ railroad heretofore maintained for the purpose of hauling the product of the borax imines to the Tonopah and Tidewater spur. Trips to various places of the valley also will be made by motor bus.” These changes were consistent with changes made in national parks across the US where business owners, political officials, and rangers in the National Park Service had taken action to make parks more accessible using trains, busses, and cars.

Workers were on a tight schedule to make significant changes to the landscape. By early January, Jenifer believed the project was back on track and that nothing should “interfere with the completion of the job on schedule.” Finishing on time was important because the Union Pacific was going to bring paying visitors who expected to have a room there and because Mather and Albright were going to pay a visit soon. So long as everything went according to plan, Bliss wrote, “the hotel will open on February 1st.”
Mather arrived in Death Valley in the middle of January 1927. Years later, Horace Albright reminisced about the visit, explaining that “early in 1927, Mather and I made a visit to Death Valley, that starkly beautiful piece of desert, lowest spot in the western hemisphere, yet practically in the shadow of the continental United States’ highest peak, Mount Whitney.” He explained, “we had gone to Death Valley at the urging of the Pacific Coast Borax Company, which had just closed a mine there.” The company was “planning to build a hotel near the site, and wanted our advice on the tourist value of the area. I had seen Death Valley once as a youth and had often thought of its potential as a national park.” Mather and Albright’s accounts of Death Valley did not leave any question that they saw it as a place with high recreational potential and aesthetic merit. 801

According to Jenifer, the result of their visit was that many more tourists were interested in coming to Death Valley. Writing in the weeks after Mather and Albright’s visit, Jenifer said, “there is a persistent and growing interest in Death Valley which has been stimulated by the recent articles quoting Stephen Mather and others.” Jenifer was so optimistic about the response to these articles that he said, “it may be that we will be doing business before we know it.” 802

Jenifer also used Mather and Albrights’ endorsement of the Valley in a letter he wrote to the manager of the Old Faithful Inn, Beulah Brown. He said Mather and Albright left Death Valley impressed with the inn and “highly enthusiastic over the possibilities” for tourism there. Jenifer said both of the men were “very frank in their prediction that our only trouble will be to keep up with the procession.” 803 Jenifer wanted to take advantage of Brown’s expertise to make sure that “the procession” would have experiences that comported to the expectations tourists developed traveling to national parks across the US.

Since Beulah Brown was responsible for managing one of the best known and most visited hotels in Yellowstone, Jenifer said he was sure that she would be up to the job. In anticipation of the inn’s opening, he was also interested in getting Brown’s input on how to make the Inn look like a
national park lodge. Jenifer gave Brown a free hand decorating the Inn’s interior. In fact, he said, “we have left for your doing and judgment [selecting] hangings and any such interior embellishments.”

The reason Jenifer wanted Brown’s input was that he expected her to make the Furnace Creek Inn more like the lodges tourists associated with national parks. Jenifer knew that getting the furnishings Brown wanted in time for the hotel’s opening would be difficult, but he said the Company would pay “for those [companies] furnishing such supplies to get out rush orders.” In other words, even though Brown’s involvement was going to entail greater expense to the Company, Jenifer believed that her input was worth it.

The building was ready to be furnished less than a week after Jenifer wrote to Brown. Harry Gower wrote another similar letter five days later to report that he was making significant progress identifying and developing attractions tourists would get to see during their visits to the Valley. The places he described show how he followed precedents set in national parks around the United States.

In order to provide epic views like the ones tourists traveled to experience in national parks, Gower and Jenifer identified places where the Pacific Coast Borax Company could build roads and overlooks around the Valley. One of the spots they picked was more than a mile above the Valley floor. Gower and Jenifer had wondered what name they should give the ridge and decided that they would invoke the opening lines of the *Inferno*.

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We entered now the upper pass that girts this vast abyss.
Thence nought [sic] was heard but sighs.
Heavy, the melancholy throes of mind,
By both the sexes of all ages heav’d [sic]:-
The air kept ever trembling with their weight
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They named the overlook Dante’s View. By associating the Valley not only with the pit of hell, but also with a literary classic, they consciously evoked exoticism, foreboding, and intellect. They also identified Badwater Basin (the lowest spot in North America), the Devil’s Golf Course, Devil’s Cornfield, and
Burned Wagons Point (associated with the ‘49ers) for tourists’ enjoyment. Now all that remained was to see whether tourists would actually want to visit to see them.

   Even though Jenifer was optimistic about attracting large numbers of tourists thanks to the publicity from Stephen Mather’s visit to Death Valley, he wanted to attract the “right kind” of visitors to inaugurate operations at the Furnace Creek Inn. In a series of letters, he told rich Californians that while they might not have thought of the Valley as a tourist attraction, the company was ready to prove it was. In one letter, he wrote, “since enjoying all the delights of Eastern travel and sightseeing, you possibly have dropped from your memory and thoughts all such common places as Death Valley, but we do not propose that you shall forget us nor your very generous promise to spend an extended time at the Furnace Creek Inn.”

   In this and other letters, Jenifer was trying to reframe Death Valley more like a national park. He claimed it was a unique place where visitors would experience the pioneer past. He was trying to convince tourists that they would find Death Valley unusual and interesting. He was also trying to convince them that they would be able to satisfy expectations and tastes that they developed traveling and sightseeing in other places, like national parks. Jenifer was apparently successful at convincing tourists Death Valley would be park-like, because the visitors who got there just a few weeks later were excited about what they saw.

   The Furnace Creek Inn’s first guests arrived on February 16, 1927. Even though the group had to take meals in the hall outside the Inn’s unfinished dining room and had to put up with “general disorder,” Jenifer wrote they “were entirely satisfied and very enthusiastic in their statements that the appointments service were better than that obtained at the Biltmore.” While Jenifer admitted, “this is...stretching it a bit,” he believed they enjoyed their visit very much. He said, “I think [their delight] can properly be assumed as due in no small measure to the scenic and climatic attractions.” He said they “went away praising the accommodations, service and scenery.”
The only thing that disappointed Jenifer about the first week of operations was that it rained. He said the rain “interferes with the views and rather belies our representation that Death Valley is almost as dry as a bone, but at that the tourists don’t seem to object.” The Inn’s managers also had to contend with another unexpected problem in the form of the western motorists who had come to visit the Valley by car.

Jenifer also wrote about how he had apparently overlooked that auto drivers would want to visit the inn. He wrote about frequent calls requesting to buy gas or oil and said the company would start to haul gas from Ryan to the hotel. To accommodate the unforeseen auto tourists, he said that the workers were “also installing at the Inn a building which will accommodate three or four cars such as we have at Ryan, these to be rented to car owners who want shelter for their machines.” Jenifer concluded with a promise to send photographs of the finished work and to make a report on how much the structure cost to build.

The Company’s decision to embrace the automobile would turn out to be one of the most significant ones they made about how they accommodated tourists in the Valley. Auto travel ultimately superseded the railroad the Pacific Coast Borax Company built the Inn to save and required them to install other buildings and equipment that they had not initially planned to build there. The reason the infrastructure was necessary was that drivers wanted to be able to drive in to Death Valley the same way they drove to national parks. This shows how tourists affected the built landscape of Death Valley and, thanks to the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s suggestion that they make a trip there, and helped reshape it as a leisurescape. They succeeded precisely because they physically changed the Valley to make it more accessible and seemingly safe.

News articles about Death Valley from 1927 suggest that the Company succeeded at this. For example, one reporter wrote in the *Los Angeles Examiner* that, “thanks to the Pacific Coast Borax Co. and the Union Pacific Railroad, another great California tourist magnet has been hooked up with the outside
world.” The reporter explained how the company reinterpreted the Valley’s terrors as tourist attractions. The article is a succinct exposition of how the Company succeeded at changing outsiders’ perception of Death Valley. The article shows how the Pacific Coast Borax Company accomplished that was by using new technological systems that made it more accessible and safe to visit. It shows how the popular press picked up the idea that the company transformed Death Valley from a wasteland to a wonderland. 

The reclamation of previously forbidding environs for use by tourists on vacation promised to be a boon to the company, California, and the many visitors it would draw for both. By connecting the Valley’s superlative climate, attractions, and scenic beauty to the outside world, the Company endowed them with greater value. The Company succeeded at this because they were able to combine their business interest in the Valley with the tourist trade of California. By providing visitors with experiences that would be consistent with the ones they might have at other sites throughout the state (such as Yosemite or Mount Whitney), they accrued value to it and turned Death Valley into an asset for the state’s economy, identity, and the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s balance sheet.

When the 1927 winter season ended, the Company considered the hotel such a big success that they decided to expand it. In order to get direction on how they would shape the expansion, Jenifer went to “Yellowstone to see Miss Brown...in connection with the organization and plans for the ensuing season.” He took drawings from Albert Martin with him to ask for input on whether they would improve the inn.

Martin’s plans added new water heaters, a lounge building, and even an improved sewage system to accommodate a stream of visitors the company expected to arrive at the Valley in the years ahead. Besides planning for new buildings, they also wanted to improve the availability of food in the Valley. The company made plans to supply the inn with fresh milk from the Ranch. With the help of the Ranch supervisor, L. Beaty, visitors would get fresh “poultry, eggs, and vegetables,” along with dairy
products. In order to facilitate it, workers were directed to plant “alfalfa on as much of the new ground as possible.”

\[\text{Death Valley for Sale – Debits, credits, and pricing}\]

Employees of the Pacific Coast Borax Company were careful accounting for property in Death Valley. Even though the company owned both the hotel company and the Tonopah and Tidewater railroad, they kept scrupulous track of debits and credits between all of its subsidiaries. The result was to shuttle money between each of the companies to make sure Company managers understood what the profit centers of its operations were.

In the end, the inn cost Pacific Coast Borax $88,674.88 to build. While that number was relatively easy to tabulate, deciding how to credit those expenses on the company’s books was a little more complicated. In correspondence from Ryan Camp to Jenifer, someone queried whether to bill the cost of installing new pipes to the hotel or to the borax company. Furthermore, there was question as to whether “the charge of $554.95 for roads, rest rooms, etc. should not be applied to the Hotel” in light of its recent separation from the books of Ryan Camp. Since it would be impossible to understand the actual profit margin of operations there until they had resolved all the outstanding expenses associated with its construction, it was important that the hotel staff figure out where to credit them. The company also had to decide how to credit the use of water from all of its operations around the Valley.

Since the hotel company did not take title to any of the springs the Pacific Coast Borax Company owned around Death Valley, it paid the borax company for the privilege of using their water. The expense was set around $11,000, but that did not account for “the 160 acres of land and the good will which is carried by the water (apart from a charge for the latter) to be considered.” Zabriskie wrote that he had begun to investigate a fair rate for water in that part of California, and argued that “we should make a contract between the Borax Company, owners of the water and the Hotel Co., as to the rate we
should charge them for water.” The Pacific Coast Borax Company planned to monetize not only the water it provided the inn, but also the attractions tourists would want to visit around it.  

Zabriskie thought “the value of this land in connection with the goodwill [tourists seeing it will have toward the company] should be very valuable. Part of the good will is the privilege of opening up Gold Canyon and other points of interest that are the property of the Borax Company.” Figuring out how much those concessions were worth was a complicated problem. Perhaps anticipating a day when the company might want to divest itself of the hotel company, he thought, “a good value should be given this land in making this transfer.” Zabriskie also argued that the company’s interest in the Tonopah & Tidewater and Death Valley Railroad could be profitably sold to either the Union Pacific or Santa Fe Railroad.

What had once been a source of commodities for sale was now an aesthetic commodity in its own right. The company’s desire to monopolize tourism in their part of the Valley demonstrates how it had reinterpreted what made it valuable. They still used the language of profit to explain their interest in the region, but placed value in its intrinsic, aesthetic meaning and potential usefulness as a public relations tool to generate good will. The company’s successful tourist development in the Valley drove that reinterpretation. It also drove up the value of their land.

As I previously explained, in their history of operations in the Valley, the borax company assessed the land and water rights at the Ranch around $300,000 in 1907, $400,000 in 1913, and $300,000 in 1927. In 1929, the Company invited professional assessors to the Inn to determine its value. The assessors considered the value of the rockwork, walls, walks and steps around the hotel, as well as the inn and support buildings and the land they were built on. They concluded that the Death Valley Hotel Company’s assets were worth about $300,000. The assessors wrote, “Death Valley is all the term implies, and were this not true, it would be of little interest to anyone. It is a natural wonder which man may view, and nothing more. In this respect
it is unique.” They described the 160 acres of the hotel site as having “an intrinsic value of no mean proportion” but thought that the land around the hotel was desolate. The assessors thought the ranch and inn together created “a feeling of wonderment that is a pleasure to experience” because of all the improvements the Pacific Coast Borax Company had made there since 1926.

The assessor described the inn as the only place they knew where people could enjoy “city comforts at a point where desolation and waste are in plain view.” Those city comforts had become quite substantial by 1929. There were eleven permanent structures, a swimming pool, powerhouse, and automobile service station, besides the main hotel building.

The assessor’s report shows how successful the borax company was at commodifying the scenery around Death Valley after their mines closed. Since the assessment only included Death Valley Hotel Company assets and the Ranch was on the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s books, the company effectively doubled the value of their property around Furnace Creek by building the Inn there. The old valuation of $300,000 only included borax company assets and predated hotel construction. By reframing the Valley as a tourist destination, the Company succeeded at improving its bottom line and overall profitability. The assessor’s description of the property also shows how the company was apparently succeeding at providing safe, comfortable access to a unique and picturesque place. The Company continued to enhance the inn’s attractiveness to tourists by adding new amenities around the Inn.

In order to use “excess” water that was flowing from the Ranch after the borax company built new pipes and ditches to carry water from springs around the Ranch to its agricultural fields, Frank Jenifer decided to open a golf course there in 1929. The Company contracted with Jack Malley, a golf course architect from Los Angeles, to design the links and a botanical garden next to the Ranch. The Company built the golf course on land they had formerly been planning to farm.
The company’s decision to use the arable land for a golf course shows to things. First, the company’s priorities had shifted away from using the Valley as a source of commodities for sale elsewhere. Second, company staff apparently thought they could make more money from the land with a golf course than by farming it. Rather than serving as an agricultural storehouse to supply the prospectors and miners who were trying to get the Valley’s treasure out, the golf course was intended to draw a crop of tourists who would pay to use it.

The Pacific Coast Borax Company’s desire to profit from Death Valley drove its transition from work- to leisure-scape. The company’s willingness to reinterpret its longstanding view of the ranch as “50 miles from nowhere” resulted from the effectiveness of increasingly intrusive technological systems at simplifying tourists’ access to it. The Valley only became “somewhere” when the Tonopah and Tidewater Railroad extended a line to it. Then it moved the water that had formerly sustained plants and animals native to the Valley in order to grow exotic crops and then irrigate a golf course. In both cases, the result was that the Valley changed. Those changes made it less like the isolated wasteland borax company advertisements claimed visitors would get to experience and more like the developed places the mostly rich visitors called home.

The borax company made those changes in order to make Death Valley comport to the standard Mather, Albright, Brown, and the Union Pacific suggested based on their experience managing tourist operations in national parks. The Pacific Coast Borax Company reshaped Death Valley to make it more like the existing units of the National Park System. The result raised the Valley’s profile with lawmakers, members of the traveling public, and the National Park Service itself. Those groups worked to formalize Death Valley’s park status by bringing it into the system as a National Memorial.

*The National Park Service Eyes the Valley*
After taking over the National Park Service directorship in 1930, and recalling his visit there in 1927, Horace Albright advocated the creation of a national park in Death Valley. Albright faced an uphill battle getting Congress to approve the creation of a desert National Park. He kept arguing for it because he thought it was in the National Park Service’s interest to bring Death Valley into the system. Albright broadened the definition of national park to include representative examples of every American landscape. This meant that, even though Death Valley was very different from the existing National Parks, as the preeminent example of Mojave Desert land, it was worthy of inclusion.825

Albright’s support was one of the reasons that President Herbert Hoover withdrew over one million acres in and around the Valley from eligibility for sale or settlement in 1931. He set the land aside to give officials from the Department of Interior the opportunity to assess whether it ought to be part of a national park. Hoover apparently took the action without consulting staff from the Pacific Coast Borax Company.

In a letter addressed to Frank Jenifer, Acting Director Arno Cammerer (who later became Director of the National Park Service) said that “the temporary withdrawal of these lands in Death Valley (under Executive Order signed by the President on July 25th)...was made for the purpose of determining the advisability of including the lands in a national monument.” He said Hoover decided to make the withdrawal to protect superlative features in the Valley from commercial development. He singled out Ubehebe Crater, Telescope Peak, and Badwater Basin as important to protect. Cammerer also explained that the National Park Service recognized the importance of protecting the land before anyone else made claims on the land under the Homestead or Desert Lands Acts.826

Jenifer’s reaction to Cammerer’s letter encapsulates the reaction of individuals or groups across the United States who believed they would profit from the creation of a new unit of the National Park System. Jenifer said, “if the area in question is made a national monument, I think there is no doubt of such action being of immense value to our hotel project.” In fact, he thought it might even stimulate
additional investment. He claimed the Union Pacific Railroad Company was worried about letting
competitors into the Valley and that making it a national park would encourage them to make
investments to make sure they maintained their monopoly on advertising it. In spite of all of that, no
one knew whether Hoover would codify his withdrawal by formally designating a national monument in
Death Valley.

The Pacific Coast Borax Company decided to lobby to create a National Monument in Death
Valley. Since “Mr. Albright is I know thoroughly sold upon the advisability of making Death Valley a
national monument,” the company already had a powerful advocate, but thought, “It is probable that
some outside influence may be necessary to put it over.” Jenifer decided to use his influence with the
California Parks board to make sure that they would also advocate the creation of a monument in the
Valley. He also hoped that “Mr. Albright is in the West now and if I happen to have the opportunity
of seeing him, will ask what if any assistance we can be to him.” Before the president took any action
on the issue, the National Park Service sent an agency representative to assess its potential and sent a
report to Washington to give an independent assessment of the Valley’s suitability to be a national park.
3.5 - The National Park Service Arrives in Death Valley

After Hoover withdrew Death Valley from entry for homestead or desert land claims in 1931, the National Park Service sent John White, the superintendent of Sequoia National Park, to assess it. Even though Director Albright supported making Death Valley a national park, White wrote a report that explained the possibilities and difficulties that he thought might attend the formal creation of a park unit there. In the report, White admitted that he was skeptical of the region’s potential when he arrived, but quickly changed his mind. He said, “my first impression of Death Valley...was that the whole area is merely an amplification of the typical desert scenery of the Mojave region; that is to say, that although Death Valley seemed bigger than similar areas, it did not seem to me so much more scenic.” He had not been in there long before it began to impress him.

White enumerated the features that set the Valley apart from other parts of the Mojave. These included its scale: at over 150 miles long and 10 miles wide, and it was geologically unique. He thought it was picturesque and that it was comparable to other places in the National Park System. In fact, he thought it was “equal to almost anything we have in the national parks” and that visitors would think it was as impressive as “the Grand Canyon, Bryce or Zion [as] the scenic attractions grow upon one in the same way...or perhaps even in a more intensive manner.” While the Valley’s practical similarities (size, geology, and scenic colors) to other park units might have qualified it for White’s endorsement, he thought it had more important attributes in common with national parks.

White said that because the US Weather Bureau listed Death Valley as the hottest place in North America (and maybe the world) it ought to be part of the National Park System. While he conceded that “there is so little moisture in the air that heat kills in the summer unless special precautions are taken,” he did not to interpret the heat primarily as dangerous. He considered it an asset. It justified adding Death Valley to the National Park System. In fact, White thought Death Valley was just as superlative as Yellowstone, the Grand Canyon, and Glacier National Parks.
Just like Yellowstone, which he described as having the most geysers in the United States, the Grand Canyon, which was the deepest canyon, and Glacier, which had the largest glacier fields, White said that being the hottest place in the country made Death Valley perfect for the park system. His assessment showed how important the precedents set in other places were to justifying Death Valley’s accession to national park status. It also shows how the land’s newly superlative reputation helped justify adding it to the park system. White also wrote about how the Valley’s association with America’s pioneer and prehistoric past made it a good candidate for being a national park unit.832

White singled out the lost ‘49ers association with the Valley as an important link to the pioneer past. He described how they were part of “some of the greatest epics of conquest of the West,” and wanted to bring their story to the forefront if the National Park Service established a presence there. Furthermore, the Valley’s prehistoric occupants had left artifacts that “will be soon damaged by the increasing number of visitors.” He worried that “their hieroglyphics are found upon the rocks, and there are many caves and cliff dwellings which have not been explored.” He thought that the prehistoric sites would give a lot of work to National Park Service archaeologists and that the artifacts they found would provide unique opportunities for tourists to experience their culture.833

All of these things had ample precedent in other parts of the National Park System. Later in his letter, White argued that the miners who lived and worked in Death Valley would help tourists access the pioneer past. He said, “the so-called ‘desert rats’ or prospectors...add a great deal of color to the locality.” He argued that the National Park Service should consider allowing them to stay in the park since “it would be a great pity if prospecting and mining were forbidden in that region, except where they may damage high scenic views, as the prohibition of such activities would detract from the interest of the country.”

While, at first blush, White’s assessment of the pioneer and Indian history of the valley is unsurprising, it seems strange that he also characterized the miners then working there as integral to its
identity. An important part of the park paradigm was that park units should appear unpeopled. In parks like the Great Smoky Mountains and Shenandoah, the National Park Service evicted residents from them so that they would appear natural and empty. White’s celebration of the miners’ way of life seems misplaced in a report otherwise focused on the Valley’s natural wonders, but he may have said what he did for a number of reasons.

First, he may have thought the miners’ way of life was so different from that of prospective visitors to the Valley that they were interpreted as unique attractions in their own right. Second, unlike the visitors who would travel to see the Valley, these men were artifacts of another time. They deserved notice as evidence of a way of life that had passed away elsewhere in the American West. Third, and more practically, the Park Service had determined that gaining independent prospectors’ and the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s support for the monument would require a guarantee that the Valley’s minerals would not be “locked up.” White’s willingness to allow for the continued development of mineral interests in the Valley would have long-term implications for it and for the park paradigm.

White’s acquaintance with Walter Scott might also have influenced his willingness to accept prospectors in the monument. Scott had cultivated an image as the embodiment of the hard-bitten, western prospector and the sometimes miner, sometimes con man, apparently charmed the National Park Service superintendent. White was so taken when he met Scott that he wrote “Death Valley Scotty deserves a short paragraph [in this report] himself.” White wrote, “there is no doubt that Death Valley Scotty is one of the great attractions of this region. The man is a mystery, and there are so many conflicting stories, that it is impossible to arrive at the truth.”

In fact, Scott had fashioned himself a legend before his time. Through a combination of bravado, storytelling, and lies, Scott established himself as a fixture of Death Valley in spite of the fact that he had no steady job, had never successfully developed a mine, and had almost no money to his name by the 1930s. And yet, when White met Scott, he could proudly present “a two million dollar
castle almost exceeding in grandeur anything in Spain...a swimming pool in course of construction which is 300 feet long and 175 feet wide...curtains which cost $27,000, and rugs which cost $9,000...a carillon tower...pipe organ equal to that to be found in any cathedral or moving picture palace...Spanish furniture and tapestries...and massive doors which cost $10,000.” White gushed that “the whole thing is done in excellent taste, yet [Scott] goes around in the roughest clothes and wears his callouses [sic] on the outside.”

Given his altogether positive characterization of Scott, White seemed disappointed to report that work on the castle was winding down. He said Scott was discharging his construction staff and suspending construction work until further notice. The General Land Office informed Scott (and his patron Albert Johnson) that, through a surveying error, the castle was on land owned by the United States.835

White recommended that the Director look into Scott’s case and included a nostalgic reminder that “I remember driving up the Owens Valley with Director Albright, when he pointed out a certain oasis in the foothills on which a pioneer had established a beautiful home site, and which he lost when the Forest Reserves [today National Forests] were first created.” White thought the Department of Interior should work to accommodate Scott in the park.836 In the event that efforts to keep Scott there failed, he joked that the castle “would make an excellent national park headquarters.”837

White’s positive characterization of Scott demonstrates one of the most significant reasons that mining might have been interpreted as consonant with the park project. As White experienced him, Scott was the embodiment of the west. He was hardened by honest toil. He was a living testament to residents’ ability to bring life out of the dusty desert. He was also an enigma who embodied mysteries that are sometimes associated with the West. Scott was the Valley in a pair of suspenders.

In this light, White’s accommodation of mining becomes less paradoxical and begins to seem an important element in developing Death Valley as a park. The park service’s relationship with the
Valley’s miners would be complicated, and at times fraught, but would always be defined by their potential to live up to the standard set by men like Scott whose perceived individualism, fortitude, and persistence seemed to have made the desert bloom. White also wrote about the hotel owner Bob Eichbaum and singled him out as one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Death Valley becoming a national park.

White singled Eichbaum out as a high-class businessperson who was “something of an idealist.” White said Eichbaum was “anxious to see Death Valley become a national park,” because he thought park status would confer protection for the unique scenic attractions there. After a single visit, White had apparently concluded that Death Valley was not only worthy of national park recognition, but also would be destroyed if that status and the protection that came with it were not soon conferred.

If the federal government opted to create a national park unit in Death Valley, White cautioned that the National Park Service would have to be careful planning infrastructural development there. He said the desert’s openness meant that building new roads there without considering how they would affect the Valley’s appearance would constitute a “landscape crime.” That said, new roads would be important parts of the park’s development if the National Park Service ultimately took on responsibility for the area.

White juxtaposed the need to avoid committing a “landscape crime” with the fact that the roads in Death Valley were in poor condition. In fact, he said the route he followed from Stovepipe Wells to Scotty’s Castle “can scarcely be called a road” and said the National Park Service would have to rebuild it. This shows how he believed roads were compatible with the park paradigm so long as they did not change the park’s appearance. White predicated his understanding of a “good road” on maintaining the scenery as well as serving as a transportation link.

White ended his letter by advocating that the Valley be designated a monument soon, so that it would have some level of federal protection, and then be made a national park later. He thought that,
for the time being, a park custodian (or a small staff) would be able to protect it. With President Hoover’s term about to end, he found a receptive advocate for Death Valley in the White House.

Death Valley Enters the Park System

White’s description of that scenery must have been compelling, because his report, in combination with positive assessments of the area by Roger W. Toll, superintendent of Yellowstone, and Charles Goff Thomson, superintendent of Yosemite, convinced Albright to lobby President Hoover to take action on making Death Valley a national monument. On February 11, 1933, the lame duck President formally established Death Valley National Monument. Not long after, John White was on the road to Death Valley again.

White conducted a second reconnaissance during a visit from March 27 to April 2, 1933. Besides describing the landscape, this letter included recommendations on how the new unit ought to be managed. He argued the new monument had definite scenic merit, saying “I am more than ever convinced that it is national park caliber; indeed, that it will be in the front rank of the parks with Grand Canyon, Yosemite, Yellowstone – and Sequoia.” He singled out features including Ubehebe Crater, which “contains some of the colored carving of Bryce Canyon,” and “Titus Canyon and the Leadfield district” for “color and magnificence of [the] Grand Canyon.” He went so far as to say, “motoring down Titus Canyon is like motoring up one of the side canyons of Grand Canyon – if there were roads there.”

He argued that providing automotive access to the Valley ought to be the park service’s primary goal, but he repeated his caution that “careful study should be given to the location of any road within the Valley,” otherwise they would create unpleasant visual distractions from its natural appearance. White conceded that maintaining inconspicuous but effective roads would to be a challenge, because some of the monument’s most popular attractions would be panoramic viewpoints of the Valley floor. Nonetheless, he wanted to make sure tourists would be able to drive to notable viewpoints like the Chloride Cliffs, Dante’s View, and Augerberry Point.
To accommodate the visitors White anticipated coming to see the new monument, he proposed the park service establish public auto camping areas in areas near popular attractions. Those places included Eagle Borax, which was near a historic mining area, Bennett Wells, where the Bennett Arcane party camped waiting for Manly and Rogers to return from Los Angeles, and Mesquite Spring, which was isolated in the northern part of the park because of its easy access to water.

He criticized the way residents were managing that water. Near Eagle Borax an Indian had been grazing horses on the salt grass. The result was that “a beautiful camping spot was ruined by grazing and fouling.” This demonstrates that White saw development not as complicating or diminishing the naturality of the Valley, but as necessary to safeguard its wildness. White thought that the National Park Service would play an important role in saving the scenery in Death Valley from some of its inhabitants.

White thought there were as many as a hundred and fifty Indians who lived in or near the Monument. He said other residents reported that they migrated from the Valley’s floor to mountainous areas seasonally and relied on pinion pines for some of their food in the summer and fall. He thought the Indians presented “the same problem here as exists in Yosemite” where the National Park Service had a complicated relationship with them. Nonetheless, he resisted calls to remove the Indians from Death Valley.

Inyo County Officials and the Pacific Coast Borax Company thought the Indians would have a negative impact on hotel visitors, so they sought removal of Death Valley Shoshones. National Park Service officials thought that moving the Shoshone might be improper and be legally difficult. The Indians were in an awkward position because they did not have official standing as an organized tribe with the Bureau of Indian affairs and they did not want to leave the Valley. They would go back and forth with the National Park Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and other federal agencies for more than fifty years to figure out the most appropriate action to take with them. For the time being, the
agency decided to take action ensuring the Indians and other monument residents did not damage its appearance or functioning.\textsuperscript{847}

White criticized the way Indians and prospectors treated the monument’s plants and wildlife and said the National Park Service should work to protect it. He wrote about the urgency protecting roadside cactus and desert flowers. He also thought that even though there were “evidently quite a number of mountain sheep” there, he was sure the “prospectors and Indians take their toll” on them.

White’s characterization of the Valley’s residents as an unnatural imposition on the land around them demonstrates that he thought most of them interpreted it improperly. This complicates White’s romantic characterization of the old, western prospector. He did not interpret Death Valley National Monument as a place where humans should live without supervision, as the Shoshone and prospectors did, but as a natural preserve under close federal management. The relationship between this view and his previous interpretation shows that, while the prospector added to the character of the Valley, it was what they \textit{had done} rather than what they \textit{were doing} that White found consonant with the national park idea.

To prevent the Valley’s residents from damaging it, White wanted to establish a temporary headquarters for Death Valley National Monument as soon as possible. He wanted park rangers to patrol so that they could enforce National Park Service regulations and protect the plants and animals from depredation. He also thought rangers would arbitrate disagreements between the tourist business owners, like the Pacific Coast Borax Company and Bob Eichbaum, and its residents, like Albert Johnson, Death Valley Scotty, and the Timbisha Shoshone. He thought, “an outsider should be appointed to avoid further jealousies” between them with respect to land management and business concerns.\textsuperscript{848}

He was advocating for the National Park Service to assert its authority and to exercise its expertise in park management for the benefit of the residents and tourists. For the time being, he planned to detail staff from Sequoia National Park to do the work. White noted that sending a ranger
from Sequoia would be ideal because it would help his staff learn about Death Valley and allow them to share information about their home park with the “right class” of tourists who might go on to Sequoia National Park from there. An essential part of this ranger’s duties would also be to “allay the feelings of old-timers that there are going to be violent changes and immediate development.”

In order to assuage residents’ concerns about how the National Park Service would change Death Valley, he said the ranger would only take actions to protect the park for the time being. He would also explain the benefits of changes and development that everyone would realize thanks to the Valley’s incorporation into the National Park System. The ranger would need to be someone who would inspire confidence in the agency’s ability to improve Death Valley for tourists, business owners, and residents alike. One of the ways he wanted to accomplish that was to make Death Valley more like other national parks by taking action to demonstrate his agency’s competence and assert the National Park Service’s authority there. 849

After returning to Sequoia, White recommended that the National Park Service spend $500 to post travel signs and to secure wells and camping places from vandalism or contamination by animals. He also wanted to establish and staff a checking station to document who was entering and leaving the Valley. Once the monument had a staff, he wanted them to mark the monument’s boundary and investigate whether other areas nearby should be added to it. 850

In short, he wanted to make Death Valley like other units of the National Park System. He wanted to make it legible so that the National Park Service would be able to assert its control over the land and the residents who lived there. The reason why was to take advantage of its superlative scenery for the tourists who he was confident would begin to travel there in large numbers as soon as they found out about the National Park Service’s presence.

3.6 Conclusion – Cooperation in creating Death Valley
In a formal report to the National Park Service Director, White made other comments on the scenic merit of the Valley, writing it “was literally given a bad name; but there is a fascination in badness – of the Death Valley type.” In fact, he thought, “Death Valley contains everything to make a first class national park except streams and lakes for fishing.” He believed “the lack of these is offset by an almost perfect winter climate.” He was even optimistic that the summer heat would one day be an attraction.

The time will come when Death Valley will be a tourist attraction even in summer; for resorts may be placed thousands of feet up in the surrounding mountains, and good roads would make it possible to motor into and out of the inferno in a few minutes. The novelty of motoring below sea-level in mid-summer in temperature of from 120 to 135 in the shade would attract many people if no risks to life or health were involved.851

White predicted that the Valley would be so popular that it would see an ever-increasing stream of tourists in the near future. He predicted cooperation between the National Park Service and the states of California and Nevada to help tourists access the “logical and necessary route from Boulder Dam, Las Vegas, Death Valley Junction, [and] Death Valley across to Mount Whitney” in the near future. He predicted, “there is no doubt that Boulder Dam will be linked up with Death Valley as a scenic attraction.” The park was also close to large cities, which he was sure would have many tourists who would want to visit.

He wrote, “it is only three hours by present poor roads off the main transcontinental route from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles. With good roads it will be more easily reached and visited from a transcontinental high-way than is Grand Canyon.” Since it was so easy to drive there, White thought, “it is certain that travel will rapidly increase. Apart from road improvements much publicity is being given Death Valley by reason of the creation of the monument and by the operating companies.” White’s interpretation of the Valley’s tourist prospects in relation to its accessibility also raises questions about how access influences perception of a place.

This was not lost on White, who thought the National Park Service needed to take action to protect the Valley from damage by tourists. He wrote,
while great care must be exercised not to develop too hastily in Death Valley and above all to guard against such development as may spoil the atmosphere and charm of the region, yet the rapid increase of tourist travel in the past five years and the prospective greater increase, make it necessary to take steps to protect and serve the public and protect the natural scenery, flora and fauna.

Specifically, he thought the agency needed to protect all the Valley’s water sources from contamination by packrats, horses, burros, or tourists by building “sanitary conveniences” that would prevent destructive forms of access to them. He was disappointed that there was only one public campground in the Valley and said it was “in very poor condition compared with national park standards.”

He called for “maintenance and improvement of the present desert roads pending a thorough survey of the road possibilities and a general plan for development of the monument.” For the “improvement of roads and trails to existing side canyons and viewpoints on the rim. Development of additional short roads and trails to interesting points.” The work was funded by an appropriation for the Public Works Program for construction of ranger quarters and information building, and a campground. Additional work was to be planned by a landscape architect permanently based in Washington DC, Thomas Vint. White concluded that the officers and employees of the Pacific Coast Borax Company, Furnace Creek Inn, and Eichbaum’s Stovepipe Wells Hotel deserved recognition for preserving the Valley until that time. “There is something big and colorful about Death Valley and its surroundings; and the bigness of it all is reflected in the hospitable and helpful attitude of those who have made it part of their lives. In the initial development we cannot do better than confer frequently with the oldtimers.” The collaboration between the park service and “oldtimers” demonstrates how important their points of view were to defining a place that was ostensibly managed as a national park unit.

Rather than unilaterally dictating the terms that would define Death Valley’s operation, the park service adopted many of its residents’ points of view on the place. It integrated the “oldtimers” perspective along with other members of its staff, like Vint and White, who applied skills they had
developed in other parks’ development in Death Valley. In that way, they arbitrated those decisions with other groups’ input.

Their work resulted in creating a place that many tourists wanted to visit. The stream of visitors to the park continued to rise in the months and years that followed Death Valley’s designation as a national monument. Just a few years after it came into the National Park System, it went from having less than 10,000 visitors a year in the early 1930s to over 100,000 by the start of World War II. The reason for the order of magnitude increase in less than 10 years was that park status made Death Valley more attractive to tourists who probably would not have traveled there except because of its association with other well-known and well-liked parks, like the nearby Yosemite, Sequoia, and Kings Canyon National Parks. The park owed a great deal of its popularity to its inclusion in the already popular National Park System.

The National Park Service also managed to exert its influence over the still present miners who wanted to work in the Valley. They instituted regulations that required mine owners to submit plans to them before they began any new construction of roads, buildings, or mines on the land that they owned. The National Park Service exercised de jure influence over them in deciding when and where they could mine, but, probably more importantly, by deciding where the agency would support mining activity by improving or maintaining access roads.

In letters they exchanged with miners, park administrators made it clear that, while they would permit mining to continue in accordance with the executive order that facilitated Death Valley’s addition to the National Park System, they would manage it so that the visual impact of any new activity would be slight. In another case, John White emphasized that, while he was not opposed to road construction, anyone who wanted to build a new road needed to consult with the National Park Service engineer and landscape architect there. They would be responsible for making a recommendation about whether the work would have a significant visual impact. If it did, they would recommend that White should reject
the plans. He also mentioned that, if the agency approved their plans for new construction, the company should coordinate with them on future projects in the area.\textsuperscript{857}

Attempts at coordinating with the National Park Service did not always result in fruitful outcomes for the miners. In a letter from 1937, a representative of the Inyo Consolidated Mines asked whether the National Park Service would work with them to improve the road into Echo Canyon that workers used to access a mine. In his response, T.R. Goodwin wrote that the agency would not improve any private roads in the park, but that they might improve the tourist road to a lookout point in that area when they had resources available.

In marginalia at the end of the type written letter, someone (possibly White, as the passage ends with “W”) wrote that this was a common problem. In fact, he recommended that staff in the Valley should look at a letter he had written to another mining company that operated near Skidoo (on the west side of the monument) and use it as a model for a form letter to deal with requests like these. Using a “sample letter” would ensure that they enforced the policy uniformly and were able to respond to miners quickly. The need for a form letter implies that the monument received many requests for assistance with road construction. It is unclear how many of those requests they fulfilled.\textsuperscript{858}

The correspondence makes it clear, that no matter how many requests they accommodated, they made decisions on a case-by-case basis based on whether the proposed construction would benefit the agency and the visitors it wanted to please. The upshot of the policy was for the National Park Service to assert its authority over the monument land. The miners who had formerly had free reign sometimes chafed under National Park Service regulations. In the years before World War II, they tried to exercise influence over park priorities using contacts through a number of different channels.

There are many letters of introduction and requests from mine owners throughout Death Valley directed to the National Park Service engineer, T.R. Goodwin, and John White, de facto superintendent of the monument in its early days, requesting road-building services there. Some of the letters allude to
political and social connections in California and throughout the United States in attempting to convince the National Park Service staff to support their work. They justified asking for help with the road work using economic and moral arguments that claimed the park had an obligation to help them realize profits from their mines in the Valley. The National Park Service, for its part, was only willing to provide support insofar as it was beneficial to park visitors and operations.859

This decision demonstrates how the National Park Service acted to arbitrate the kinds of uses appropriate to Death Valley. They decided to allow some activities while taking action either to make it more difficult or at least not to aid non-compliant uses such as highly visible mines there. Their actions helped set the precedents that ensured the Monument’s continued inclusion in the National Park System even when it came under extraordinary pressure just a few years later.
Conclusion – Achieving Closure and Stabilization

Shenandoah and Death Valley were both non-traditional national parks in that they did not conform to the traditional shape of the park paradigm when nature enthusiasts, tourist business owners, National Park Service or political policymakers suggested bringing them into the National Park System. Land in both parks was intensively used by humans and lacked the traditionally spectacular scenery that early park boosters singled out as worthy of national park designation elsewhere. One of the reasons Shenandoah and Death Valley successfully entered the National Park System was that different groups worked to achieve their own goals by advocating infrastructural changes that they believed made the sites worthy of addition.860

In Shenandoah, George Pollock advocated adding Skyland to the National Park System because he hoped its addition to it would increase the popularity of his resort there. He justified the addition by arguing for the construction of Skyline Drive. National Park Service director Stephen Mather and his lieutenant Horace Albright wanted to add it to the system so that they would have a national park closer to most of the United States’ eastern population. They justified the addition on the grounds that adding a park, scenic drive, and hiking trails would provide valuable recreational opportunities for easterners. Nature enthusiasts who supported preserving pristine landscapes, like Robert Sterling Yard, supported protecting a place they initially believed was full of first-growth trees and provided a model opportunity for re-wilding. They justified the addition by arguing the National Park Service should remove mountaineers and the buildings they used to live. Political policymakers wanted to use a park as an outlet for federal relief dollars. They approached construction in the park as an opportunity to accomplish that goal.

Even though residents of the Blue Ridge usually did not support creating a park there, the National Park Service and local tourist business owners appropriated parts of their identities to connect
land there with the frontier epoch. The result was to create a new natural preserve within a day’s drive of the nation’s capital.

In Death Valley, employees of the Pacific Coast Borax Company followed national park precedents in order to reshape the area around their Ranch as a park-worthy tourist resort. National park rangers like John White supported bringing the Valley into the National park in order to preserve a representative part of the Great American Desert and because of its low elevation and association with the frontier epoch. He advocated building roads in the park to improve visitors’ access. Miners were skeptical about the monument’s creation, but eventually acceded to it in order to benefit from the new roads and other infrastructure that the National Park Service built there. They benefited from some of the same infrastructure as tourists. Early tourists like Edna Brush Perkins started the process of reframing the Valley’s fearsome landscape as a leisurescape where tourists could go to rest and recreate. Together they all succeeded at reinterpreting the Valley’s supposedly forbidding landscape as one where they could enjoy unique, natural leisure.

Both parks’ accession to the National Park System resulted from their supporters’ success at rhetorically and physically reshaping them to fit the park paradigm. Their promoter’s actions demonstrate the currency of thinking of the parks as constituents of a paradigmatic unit and reinforce the value conferred by achieving inclusion in the National Park System. Shenandoah and Death Valley’s management after 1940 demonstrates how significant park status was in determining the ways Americans perceived them.

At the start of the Second World War, the United States government portrayed the conflict as an existential fight to preserve democracy. Given the tenor of appeals to everyday Americans and the substantial needs of industry, it is unsurprising that policymakers and manufacturers argued national parks should be opened for grazing, mining, and logging at least temporarily. The Department of Interior and National Park Service argued against opening the parks to development on the grounds that
the damage they sustained from those activities might be irreversible. Rather than use the parks as sources for raw materials, they worked to identify alternative sources of raw materials when possible and to closely managed development when alternatives were unavailable. The result was, with a few exceptions, the national parks emerged after the Second World War basically unscathed.861

The country’s willingness to set these lands aside shows how valuable Americans perceived them as being. This stood in stark contrast to the fact that, less than a decade before, some parks, like Shenandoah and Death Valley had been open to almost unregulated development. After only a few years in the National Park System, the public and policymakers reinterpreted them through the lens of the park paradigm and decided to leave them “unused” so they would remain available for recreational use after the war ended. Shenandoah and Death Valley’s preservation and ongoing popularity after the end of hostilities also set the stage for a massive expansion of the National Park System beginning in the mid-1950s.

The success of national park development in places like Shenandoah and Death Valley proved to policymakers, National Park Service rangers, and tourist business owners it was possible to reshape ostensibly non-park-like places to live up to the park paradigm. Those park’s rapidly expanding visitation proved that changing the land to accentuate or create unique, isolated, or authentically wild experiences did not dissuade tourist from traveling for visits. The popularity of Shenandoah’s Skyline Drive and of the Furnace Creek Inn and Ranch proved that tourists were willing to invest time and money to visit them. Those parks’ managers’ success at applying technological systems to rectify the parks’ paradigmatic “shortcomings” by making Shenandoah appear unpeopled and forested and making Death Valley more comfortable to visit, encouraged similar development in pre-existing and aspirant national parks across the United States.862 That work reached its fastest pace following the end of the Second World War.
With millions of Americans ready to take a vacation after more than a decade of Depression and war, visitation to national parks after World War II boomed. Visitors quickly realized the park’s infrastructure was not adequate to provide the kinds of experiences park promoters had led them to expect. Lodges, campgrounds, and roads first filled and then began to crumble under the heavy weight of increased visitation.

Visitors reported long waits to use picnic areas. Campgrounds and comfort stations were filled over-capacity. Lodge operators turned away customers for lack of rooms. In an article published in Harper’s in 1953, the journalist Bernard DeVoto wrote, “so much of the priceless heritage which the Service [sic] must safeguard...is beginning to go to hell.” DeVoto described the situation as a crisis and argued Congress should take action either to shrink the National Park System or adequately fund it. Until then, he believed the parks would only end up in worse and worse shape.  

DeVoto’s article and others like it set the stage for the modernist apogee of the park paradigm. In order to provide access to the paradigmatic experiences tourists had come to expect, the National Park Service developed a plan for comprehensive redevelopment of park lands and infrastructure. The $1 billion construction program, master-minded by the National Park Service director Conrad Wirth, built thousands of miles of new roads, constructed new lodges and campgrounds, and even invented a new type of building, the visitor center. This crash construction program was supposed to accommodate the millions of new car driving families who wanted to spend their vacations in America’s “Wonderlands.”

The decision to expand park infrastructure in order to accommodate more tourists was the logical outgrowth of expectations set before the Second World War. It also reflects America’s mid-century auto-enthusiasm. With many Americans assimilating the automobile as an essential part of their lives, park planners worked to provide drivers access to paradigmatically important experiences that exposed them to natural immersion, unique attractions, and authentic wilderness.
The thousands of miles of roads, hundreds of parking lots, and numerous service stations built or authorized as part of Mission 66 show how automobiles became larger and larger parts of national park experiences. The large amount of development eventually gave auto critics (many of whom were nature enthusiasts) the opportunity to argue against the construction program and to begin the process of redefining the problem national parks were meant to address. That process of redefinition began in earnest at the end of the Second World War.

The war set the stage for this process by demonstrating the solidity of parameters on the kinds of use that were acceptable within the park paradigm. When park managers succeeded at preventing extensive mineral extraction, logging, or military use in national parks for the duration of the Second World War it was because the system had reached a point of interpretive stability. Parks’ pre-war popularity helps explain why they were spared the full weight of mobilization that affected so many other parts of American life.

Worth Fighting For – The Park Paradigm survives World War II

At the onset of hostilities in Asia and Europe beginning in the 1930s, American industries started ramping up production of war materiel. The growth of armament manufacturing helped revive depressed industries like iron, steel, and timber production that were still suffering from low demand in the wake of the Great Depression. The increase in demand for manufactured goods led to a corresponding increase in demand for raw materials. As early as 1940, industrialists began to suggest that national parks might be the best places to find materials for war-related production.

These calls intensified after the United States entered the war. The attack on Pearl Harbor raised demands for defense production to the highest national priority. Many manufacturers argued that the national parks could provide materials that the war had made scarce, such as imported timber and rare earth minerals.
Pressure to use the parks for defense purposes began in 1940 with the institution of the draft. The army eyed national parks as potential training and staging areas for recruits and equipment. Harold Ickes voiced his department’s view that this was shortsighted and illegal. While the military received permission to make substantial changes to some park land, the military did not have carte blanche in parks.

In one famous case, when Harold Ickes informed President Roosevelt that the army’s proposal to establish a new bombing range would endanger the breeding grounds of a rare trumpeter swan, Roosevelt prevented it with a note saying, “the verdict is for the Trumpeter Swan and against the Army...The Army must find a different nesting place!” After the United States entered hostilities in 1941, the Department of Interior largely abdicated its role influencing policy in Washington as its staff moved out of Washington to make room for war related workers in the Department of Interior Building. The fact that the war workers who replaced them largely left the parks alone speaks to the fact that they found ways to use the parks within the paradigm.

Across the US, the National Park Service faced calls to make the parks more accessible to military personnel for recreation. The US Army collaborated with the National Park Service to generate recreational prospectuses for places GIs might go to get rest and relaxation while they were away from the front. The army eventually completed surveys that stretched from the southeast gulf coast to the mountains of Alaska. The National Park Service collaborated with the War Department to construct camps that accommodated GIs in parks across the US. The army and navy also turned some parks to direct military uses as training sites, but even those uses took advantage of park specific values and were not nearly as destructive as other uses might have been.

The military used nearly every national park and monument located on America’s coasts for training, placing aircraft detection equipment, or for other defense installations. They also set up specialized training facilities in places like Mount Rainier National Park, where the 10th Mountain
Division trained to fight in Europe. Besides that, the Department of Interior opened up vast swaths of desert land for tank training and air target practice. The pressure to engage national parks in the war effort extended from the precedent-setting parks like Yellowstone, Mount Rainier, and Yosemite to newer, less established units like Shenandoah and Death Valley.

In Shenandoah, the army sent thousands of soldiers on rotating assignments who tested military clothing. The Army Corps of Engineers also assembled water lines, built bridges on fire roads, and built trails. However, neither they nor the many lumber companies that operated elsewhere along the Blue Ridge cut any timber in the park. In fact, the National Park Service even proscribed taking dead or downed timber from the park because they said it would harm the land’s natural functioning. In Death Valley, the National Park Service had to approach war needs in a different way because of how President Hoover had established the national monument there.

In Death Valley, where the government allowed mining, war production became an essential part of daily life around the Monument. The annual report for 1942 contains information about how the work affected the area and acknowledged that Federal law allowed for mining there. The document’s author wrote about how they believed the work was in keeping with the “historical cycle” of mining activities in the park and that he suspected modern miners would do a lot of work to extract rare minerals to support war production.

Workers attempted to mine rare-earth minerals at a number of undeveloped sites. The government also halted non-essential mining to free up resources for more productive war work. In the park’s annual report for 1946, though, the Superintendent’s report focused on the ways park rangers managed the work, and how nature was not harmed by the work.

Park staff wrote about how miners worked to take talc, salt, and lead out of the Valley during the war. They singled out one company’s removal of 18,000 tons of salt from the Valley floor, but said, “restoration of the area was done under the direction of the Superintendent and nature is removing the
scar with remarkable rapidity.” Since miners took all the other minerals from remote parts of the park using shaft mines, he said there was “little visible damage...apparent.” The relative lack of damage also extended to the uses Death Valley was not subjected to.

Immediately south of Death Valley was the Desert Training Center. The Desert Training Center was the largest military training ground in American history. It covered more than 18,000 square miles and was the primary training site for troops who eventually fought around the world. Next to Death Valley is the China Lake Naval Ordinance Test Center and the Mojave Antiaircraft Range (today called Fort Irwin). The government designated these places for military use because they were far from large population centers, mostly in the public domain, and because they were available. Even though Death Valley was adjacent to these large military reservations, no one seriously discussed including it in them.

This activity shows how different groups negotiated the park paradigm’s limits. While park rangers succeeded at preventing tree cutting for war production in Shenandoah, they assisted with extractive activities in Death Valley by maintaining roads for miners. They also succeeded at preventing Death Valley’s use as a military training ground. This was no mean feat.

Death Valley’s use as a mining site within the park paradigm also demonstrates how the concept had reached a state of stasis. Even though mining was not a conforming use for places that were supposed to be compatible with the paradigm, Death Valley still became a national park unit. Its inclusion shows how the concept of a national park was flexible and shaped by place-based constituencies who worked within the basic set of guidelines about what parks ought to be and how they should be managed, but improvised based on local conditions to make the concept accomplish their goals.

In both of these cases, the parks had been open to unrestricted development less than a decade earlier. Their preservation and continued inclusion in the National Park System shows the park
paradigm reached a point of interpretive closure in the years before the conflict started. Policymakers might have decided they should fight the war with the parks instead of for the scenic places they protected. They did not because park administrators and nature enthusiasts succeeded at leveraging the park paradigm to convince them the parks were worth fighting for.

The United States’ Second World War experience posed an existential threat to the country. In the face of that threat, policymakers identified resources they could have used for the war effort in parks. In the end, they left millions of board feet of lumber, thousands of tons of minerals, and massive areas they thought were ideal for military training untouched.

In 1946, when he testified to Congress concerning the transition back to peacetime management, National Park Service Director Newton Drury said the parks “have justified their existence if for no other reason than that since Pearl Harbor they have been a source of inspiration and pleasure.” This testimony encapsulated the park paradigm. Drury argued that the national parks were utilitarian leisurescapes that served as testimonies of American greatness by virtue of their exceptional ability to provide meaningful experiences.

His remarks and the parks’ survival through World War II show how much Americans valued them by the 1940s. Americans valued national parks because they were unique, awe inspiring, and superlative. The paradigm reached a point of interpretive closure in the years before World War II that helped Americans (especially tourists) reach a general consensus about what the parks were supposed to be like and why they existed.

The consensus that parks were worth protecting sprang from different groups’ justifications for creating them in the first place. After the war ended and tourists began to travel again, park managers significantly expanded infrastructure into order to accommodate more tourists in them.
After the end of World War II, Americans began traveling as they had not in more than a decade. As hostilities came to a close and rationing ended, millions of tourists planned trips. Some of their most popular destinations turned out to be national parks.877

In response to this growing wave of visitation, and with the encouragement of authors like Bernard DeVoto, tourist business owners, and political policymakers, National Park Service staff and Director Conrad Wirth embarked on an unprecedented program for centrally managed infrastructure development and expansion across the United States. With the help of engineers, architects, and landscape architects in two new National Park Service design centers, Director Wirth planned new development for almost every unit in the National Park System. These designers worked on new roads, buildings, and infrastructural plants to accommodate visitors in facilities that would help them have paradigmatically orthodox experiences.878

According to the National Park Service landscape architect Thomas Vint, the new development was supposed to help “preserve and protect [some] of the great works of nature.” He characterized the new construction plans as providing facilities that would allow visitors to enjoy natural areas without compromising their authenticity. Vint and Wirth approached the increased development they planned as preservation tool and that would ultimately benefit those parts of the parks that were most unique, most scenically attractive, and most authentically wild.879

The National Park Service’s previous success at using infrastructural systems to both attract and accommodate large numbers of visitors in previously untouristed areas, like Shenandoah or Death Valley, supported this approach. Roads like Skyline Drive that accommodated visitors and created a unique scenic attraction and large water handling systems like those that allowed increasing numbers of visitors to travel comfortably in Death Valley helped build faith in the National Park Service’s ability to
make new areas more paradigmatically park-like. Over time, technological systems became harder and harder to separate from the attractions they supposedly protected.

Writing on the significance of Mission 66, Wirth argued the program was “supporting the ideals and the vision of the pioneers of the national park movement.” He framed the agency’s work as contributing to its mission to preserve and provide access to national parks across the United States. Wirth rejected the argument that the National Park Service should limit use on the grounds “that the parks belong to the people, and they have a right to use them.” The unstated judgement in Wirth’s assessment of park use was that it had to involve travel by families in their automobiles.\(^8\)

Wirth’s conclusions about the appropriate responses to increased visitation reflected the central problem Mission 66 prepared park lands to solve: to provide systems that allowed comfortable access to tourists and their cars. Wirth took for granted that the most important problem the National Park Service ought to work to solve was how to accommodate more drivers. Based on the support tourist business owners who developed new facilities in parks, political policy makers who funded their construction, and neighboring residents who also began to profit from increased travel, they also agreed that Wirth was working to solve the most important problem facing national parks. In contrast, some nature enthusiasts began to argue it was time to reorient the National Park System to solve a different problem.

Nature enthusiasts argued the most important problem parks ought to solve was how to preserve increasingly scarce “islands of untouched nature.” Beginning as early as the 1920s, an increasing number of nature enthusiasts rallied around preserving roadless areas on undeveloped land across the United States. They were disappointed that land management agencies, including the National Park Service, continued to build roads in ecologically sensitive and unique areas. Under the leadership of Aldo Leopold, Robert Sterling Yard, Bob Marshall, and Benton MacKaye, they formed the
Wilderness Society in 1935. The Wilderness Society advocated for *de jure* protection for remaining roadless areas in the public domain.⁸⁸¹

By the 1960s, in conjunction with the emerging environmentalist movement, their moment had come to reshape the national park paradigm. Their work culminated with passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964. After the law’s passage, the National Park Service decelerated its remaining plans for Mission 66 development and eventually abandoned many of them altogether. The combination of pressure from nature enthusiasts who wanted to preserve roadless areas and the increased activism of urban environmentalists, many of whom were also tourists in national parks, resulted in a fundamental shift in policy to prioritize natural preservation over accommodating large numbers of drivers.⁸⁸² This shift in policy did not on its own lead to a radical change in the ways existing parks are managed.

Rather than leading the wholesale removal of roads from parks, passage of the Wilderness Act and the change in sensibility with respect to the park paradigm led to limited new road development.⁸⁸³ It did not result in large scale restructuring of the roads visitors had come to rely to access parks. The reason for this was that removing roads would have been technically difficult, politically and financially expensive, and generally unpopular.

The stabilization and subsequent reorientation of park development in the post-war era signals the maturity of the National Park System. It also points to how technological momentum propelled and continues to influence park development. The many systems our predecessors installed in parks constrain the choices available to us to reimagine them.

The technological systems that support national park experiences would be difficult to change. It would require a large investment of money and political will to reshape the ways visitors access parks today. Since most visitors rely on infrastructural systems including park road networks, lodges, and electrical or water plants to access and enjoy parks, it seems unlikely that we will change them radically anytime soon.
As we look to the future, our heirs will almost certainly find new ways of accessing meaning in the national parks. They will almost certainly criticize us for the ways we accessed them, and, hopefully, they will figure out how to change them to match their own expectations so that they remain relevant for years to come.
Deep in the backcountry of Glacier National Park, two stone structures have hosted hardy hikers for more than a century. Originally constructed by the Northern Pacific Railroad, the Sperry and Granite Chalets accommodated about 12,000 visitors annually until park managers closed them in 1992. When asked why the National Park Service closed them, a spokesperson responded that a complaint from the Wilderness Society in concert with the Sierra Club alleged the buildings’ sewage systems discharged untreated waste in violation of the Clean Water Act. The park admitted the allegation was true and had been for a long time. They went on to say that updating the buildings’ waste treatment infrastructure would be prohibitively expensive. Since neither organization was willing to drop their threat of a lawsuit, the park ordered the private businesspeople who operated the chalets to close them permanently at the end of the 1992 summer season. The following year, thanks to a grass-roots campaign, Montana’s Congressional delegation got a $3.3 million federal appropriation to allow the buildings to reopen. All the money was for one project: the construction of outhouses to compost human waste.

When queried on the propriety of using taxpayers’ money to construct two $1.6 million outhouses, officials at Glacier said, “we have greater needs.” A park spokesperson said they would complete the project because Congress “handed us $3.3 million and said, ‘put it here.’” So, after more than 300 helicopter trips ferrying construction material into the backcountry, the chalets’ new outhouses opened in 1994 and 1995. Less than a decade later, when it was apparent that the summer season was not long enough for the privies to compost all of the waste before fall freeze-up, the park started to use vaults to store it until the end of the summer season. To prevent the vaults from overflowing, the National Park Service shipped their contents to the park’s sewage plant for treatment. In order to accomplish the move, the park service contracted with a private company to have the waste flown out by helicopter.
To some, the fact that the buildings were almost closed after a century of popular and largely uncontroversial service had seemed strange, but the fact that the park intended to spend tens of thousands of dollars to fly sewage out of a backcountry area that only a few thousand people a year got to visit seemed absurd. They dismissed the episode as a radical environmentalist farce that out-of-touch judges in far-away courts foisted on the park. Even a former superintendent of Glacier remarked that “I can only conclude that closure was for the Park’s perceived convenience or fear of the Sierra Club” and complained that he thought it was ridiculous that “the ‘fix’ will go for a Cadillac job rather than simple adequacy...thus putting the cost out of reason.”

In the face of criticism, park staff argued that they had to modify the chalets so that they would comply with federal and state statutes. Superintendent Gil Lusk wrote that much of the public’s criticism showed “a total disregard of the NPS’ responsibilities.” He said he regretted that the chalets would have to stay closed, but promised the National Park Service would work to find a solution so that it could reopen them in the future.

In spite of criticism, the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society refused to back down from their legal challenge. Representatives from both groups said that they also regretted the chalet’s closure, but felt they could not ignore the effect waste from them was having on the environment. Environmentalists promised they would move to prevent reopening the chalets as long as they illegally discharged ecologically harmful sewage.

The reason different groups came to different conclusions about the chalet issue was that they had different values and priorities. The decision to fly waste out of the backcountry seemed more reasonable to people who worried that leaving it in the park would adversely affect its ecology and appearance. It seemed less reasonable to people who did not think that leaving it there would have much of an influence on it (or that it would affect a very small proportion of the two million or so people who visited Glacier every year). The Sierra Club and Wilderness Society’s success at forcing the
chalet’s closure, and the National Park Service, elected officials, and a large number of park visitors’ work to reopen the chalets, is one small example of how people have negotiated what kinds of things and practices should be allowed in places that are called national parks. In this case, it also reflects how the national park paradigm has evolved over time.

When the Great Northern Railroad Company built the chalets, park users either thought they belonged or they did not have enough power to prevent their construction. Several decades later, park users who thought the chalets were incompatible with the national park experience had enough influence to compel their closure. The change shows how perceptions of what national parks ought to be have changed over time.

Today, park users and managers continue to disagree about whether some of the things people have built in parks are natural or unnatural, whether parks should be managed as discrete bureaucratic units or parts of more expansive ecosystems, and whether parks are worth protecting because of their intrinsic or market value. Each group has its own practical motivations, but, in the abstract, they are all trying accomplish the same goal. All the groups fundamentally agree that parks deserve special recognition. The differences between them are based on why they believe national parks deserve recognition. The change in how visitors and park advocates interpreted the chalets reflects the reorientation of the park paradigm toward preservation and ecosystem management and away from the ethos of progress and mechanization that preceded it in the early twentieth century. Beginning with the popular
environmental movement after World War II, Americans, especially nascent environmentalists, moved away from their consensus that parks ought to be managed with natural facades and instead argued they should be managed to sustain their ecosystems in toto. This shift, and the consequent changes in policy away from using national parks as they had been in the past, shows how technologies change to suit society, and how those changes continue to shape America’s national parks.
Notes

Introduction


5 Mark Barringer, *Selling Yellowstone: Capitalism and the Construction of Nature* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2002), 44.


9 Tsing explained how her research led her to look for unusual connections instead of seamless generalizations to explain the interconnections between groups of people. As an example, Tsing began with the context of her study on lumbering in Indonesia’s rain forest. She explained that her work began during the era when large multinational corporations first began operations there. She wanted to avoid the often-told story of how those companies were destroying the homes and livelihoods of the forest’s human and non-human residents. She also felt a duty to correct the simplifications in those accounts that minimized or ignored the benefits some of the same residents enjoyed from the mining and plantation booms in logged areas. As a result, she told both of their stories from their adherents’ perspective and then explained the interconnections between their experiences. This approach allowed her to address the power imbalance between the groups who were planning and being displaced by the work.


Practitioners create a tradition with recognizable boundaries within which all users implicitly agree to stay.

John M. Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers, Reweaving the Human Fabric Cambridge, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1985), 65.

Donald MacKenzie, Wajcman, Judy eds. The social shaping of technology (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1999), 14-16.


This is a nod to Dean MacCannell’s The Tourist. See: Miles Orvell, The Real Thing: Imitation and Authenticity in American Culture, 1880-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), xxxvi and 31-34.


Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University, 2014), 188. See also:


Nash lists these justifications in the last five pages of an article he wrote on the subject. While he also includes descriptions, the overall categories include using wilderness as a reservoir of normal ecological processes, a sustainer of biological diversity, as a remnant of the land that had a formative influence on the national character,
as a nourisher of American arts and letters, as a sacred space or church, as a guardian of mental health, a sustainer
of human diversity, and as an educational asset in developing environmental responsibility.


30 Cronon questions whether visitors to national parks devalue or ignore productive work and reduces the
stakeholders in wilderness debates to “human” and “nonhuman” groups.

William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting back to the Wrong Nature” in Uncommon Ground:

31 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting back to the Wrong Nature” in Uncommon Ground:
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 69-71, 78-
80.

32 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting back to the Wrong Nature” in Uncommon Ground:

33 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting back to the Wrong Nature” in Uncommon Ground:

34 The EPA ranked third to last, only ahead of the Veteran’s Administration and Internal Revenue Service in a Gallup
poll on the popularity of government agencies conducted in December 2017. The National Park Service is
consistently listed as one of Americans’ favorite agencies and receives broad public support. See

Another agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, a bureau of the Department of Interior, is also so unpopular that
extremists in Oregon went so far as to “liberate” a National Wildlife Refuge there in 2016. Historians have not
written extensively about the occupation. Learn more by reading:

Phil Taylor, “Federal Land? Some Westerners say there’s no such thing” Greenwire (Washington, DC), March 2,
2016.

Char Miller, “Malheur occupation in Oregon: whose land is it really?” The Conversation (Boston, MA), January 6,
2016.

35 In a survey conducted by the Center for American Progress conducted in 2016, questioners found 77% of
respondents believed the National Park System benefited the United Sates a great deal or a fair amount. They also
found only 5% of respondents believed the country was doing too much to protect or strengthen the National Park
System and its protectors, the National Park Service. Furthermore, 83% said they would look favorably or very
favorably on candidates who promised to take a strong stand in support of National Parks. See:

Hart Research, “Public Opinion on National Parks: Key findings from a nationwide survey among registered voters
Conducted January 11-17, 2016 for the Center for American Progress” viewed on January 14, 2018 at
Parks2.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjHhZSWju7AhUPx1kKhbuCDSQQFjAAegQi4BRAB&usg=AOvVaww2wZC3rDA_jSycisjeuX4

36 I agree with and seek to build on Cronon’s conclusion in his essay, which reads, “Wilderness gets us into trouble
only if we imagine that this experience of wonder and otherness is limited to the remote corners of the planet, or
that it somehow depends on pristine landscapes we ourselves do not inhabit.” He argues that we need to learn
“to honor the wild—learning to remember and acknowledge the autonomy of the other—means striving for critical
self-consciousness in all our actions. It means that deep reflection and respect must accompany each act of use, and means too that we must always consider the possibility of non-use. It means looking at the part of nature we intend to turn toward our own ends and asking whether we can use it again and again and again-sustainably-without its being diminished in the process. It means never imagining that we can flee into a mythical wilderness to escape history and the obligation to take responsibility for our own actions that history inescapably entails”


38 White seeks to address the power dynamic between evenly matched adversaries who have a mutual interest in cooperation. White explains the conflict and collaboration between American Indians and French and British fur trappers in the upper Great Lakes in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. He explains how creative misunderstandings between them led to the creation of a set of mutually understandable practices, a paradigm for commercial and social exchange.


45 Elected officials often advocated for policies that had little or nothing to do with landscape or ecosystem preservation in order to achieve political goals. When those policies achieved landscape preservation (which means preserving a natural façade sometimes at the expense of ecosystem function) or ecosystem preservation (which means putting policies and systems in place that tend to protect and promote natural processes even at the expense of lands’ aesthetic appeal), the preservation benefits were sometimes accidental.


46 Authenticity was one of the values that made “natural” aspects of the landscape attractive. Juliann Sivulka, Soap, Sex, and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising (Boston: Wadsworth, 2012), 50.
Alfred Runte, *Allies of the Earth: Railroads and the Soul of Preservation* (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University, 2006), 1-12. The railroads gave the parks their rustic style and helped associate national park experiences with naturality. They effectively defined authenticity in the parks for their first fifty years.

The parks were not and are not truly democratic. Compared to the resorts that preceded them as the most popular tourist destinations in the country, they represented a move toward guaranteed public access to leisure spaces. The involvement of the federal government meant that, unlike the resorts that had been defined by the pursuit of profit, the national parks would, at least by intention, be designed to provide liberty and justice for all. See John Jakle, *The Tourist: Travel in Twentieth Century America*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1985) 53, 67-68. The dispossession and attendant dislocation that attended park creation alienated them from many of the people they had ostensibly been created for. See this chapter’s section on residents in the parks.

The line between rangers and administrators was not clear when the National Park Service was created and it is still not clear now. During his confirmation hearings, the Trump Administration’s first Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, once quipped, “who wouldn’t want to be a park ranger?” Being a ranger is an appealing identity. Being a ranger is a draw for many people who serve in the National Park Service. Many National Park Service employees started working for the agency to adopt the ranger identity and continue to espouse “ranger values” throughout their careers. Sometimes, I also refer to National Park Service employees as administrators or managers, but I use the term ranger to apply to any member of the National Park Service because I think the term is pervasive in the agency. View Ryan Zinke’s confirmation hearings at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdMtktNCA05U](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdMtktNCA05U) accessed on May 9, 2018.

It is easy to find evidence that the public believes park rangers are experts. People lionize National Park Service culture and the “thin green line” that protects wild places. For an example of the kind of hagiography that resulted from park ranger’s claims that they held special expertise, just look at popular literature. For one small example, read about how “When it comes to public property, heed the advice of the ‘man with the badge’-the park ranger, forest ranger, or game warden. Follow the regulations for the use of the area.” See: Bjoyn Kjellstrom, *Be Expert with Map and Compass* accessed online (without page numbers) at [https://books.google.com/books?id=5h89CgAAQBAJ&pg=PT110&dq=park+ranger+expert&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjWq6z0-_naAhXhc98KHaZnCvgQ6AElPzAE#v=onepage&q=park%20ranger%20expert&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=5h89CgAAQBAJ&pg=PT110&dq=park+ranger+expert&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjWq6z0-_naAhXhc98KHaZnCvgQ6AElPzAE#v=onepage&q=park%20ranger%20expert&f=false) on May 9, 2018.

Establishing the threshold for where human intervention influences the earth is a point of contention. It is safe to say that people have changed their points of view as human impacts on the earth have continued to become more evident. For information on the ways peoples’ understanding of environmental causation have changed over time, see:


Ruth Schwartz Cowan presents the automobile as a run-away technology and compares it to the magician’s apprentice’s mop when she argues that “just when most Americans had become completely dependent on their automobiles, the nation began to discover that auto dependency had unintended, unexpected and unpleasant
consequences.” As Americans realized that the automobile simplified transportation at the expense of environmental degradation, unsightly roadside development, and the increased likelihood of accidental death, they began to reconsider whether the automobile was actually as effective a technology as they had once thought it to be. Cowan, 239-247.


58 It would be impossible to break each of these groups down into all of their constituent parts. In the case of tourists, for example, some wanted to disappear into the wilderness on long-term packing trips. Others wanted to stay in five-star hotels, and still others wanted nothing but to drive through the parks on their way to destinations beyond. After 1918, the one thing almost all of them had in common was the automobile. I focus on the automobile and the technologies that attended its use to explain how tourists’ common interest in it fundamentally shaped the parks.

59 Rachel Maines describes the divide between the same technologies’ leisure and work applications. Rachel P. Maines, Hedonizing Technologies: Paths to Pleasure in Hobbies and Leisure (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2009) 1-18

60 Rachel Maines describes the divide between the same technologies’ leisure and work applications. Rachel P. Maines, Hedonizing Technologies: Paths to Pleasure in Hobbies and Leisure (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2009) 1-18

61 Having water in one place meant taking it from another. Los Angeles growth was largely at the expense of farmers in the Owens Valley, whose water LA bought for its own use.


62 Businesspeople built water treatment systems, power plants, and roads to ensure that people would have access to sanitary facilities, comfortable accommodations, and convenient transportation, just like in cities. They set a precedent of providing access to those services at a small number of sites interspersed between undeveloped areas. Businesspeople did that to reduce the expense of providing those services and concentrate visitation in relatively small areas of parks. It allowed them to maximize their profits by designating a small number of attractions that large numbers of visitors would travel to see. In the years that followed, park managers recognized that that arrangement also had the benefit of reducing maintenance costs for publicly owned facilities. People who wanted to use the parks to preserve natural spaces and natural functions generally also supported that because it localized visitors’ impacts on fragile, scenic lands. For the residents who lived in or around parks, that infrastructure was a source of frustration.


65 Work’s letter reflects the consensus in government, business, and National Park Service about what a national park is and ought to be. See:


See Mark Daniel Barringer, *Selling Yellowstone: Capitalism and the Construction of Nature* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2002) 1-22 and 109. Barringer argues that business interests laid the groundwork for the park that visitors experience today through developments intended not to improve the park’s ecology, but its accessibility and marketability as a faux-natural commodity. See also Alice Wondrak Biel, *Do (not) Feed the Bears: The Fitful History of Wildlife and Tourists in Yellowstone,* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006) 148. Biel argues that bear encounters were one of the most popular attractions in Yellowstone until the Park Service, in reaction to well publicized mailings/deaths, and changed their bear management policies after almost half a century of inaction.

See the accounts of promoters, such as George Pollock, who took people into the Blue Ridge to convince them that establishing a park was a good idea. George Freeman Pollock, *Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park* (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960), 247-248.


Sociologists who visited the hollows of the Blue Ridge claimed the residents there were backward, inbred, and generally unintelligent. They described them as lacking the moderating influence of both church and state and derided their lifestyle as “loosely organized.” They implied and sometimes directly argued that the only way to improve their lives would be to leave the backcountry and assimilate to mainstream society.


The US Bureau of Land Management was the successor to the General Land Office. That agency manages the 700 million acres of the public estate open to mineral exploration under the Mining Act of 1872. They explain that mining claims rights’ “are restricted to the development and extraction of a mineral deposit.” This was already policy when the General Land Office adjudicated this dispute in Death Valley. The agency’s judgement against the miners did not result from collusion between bureaus of the Department of Interior. See: US Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, *Mining Claims and Sites on Federal Lands* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Land Management, 2016), 7.


For example, see the people who have, thus far, failed to encourage adoption of hydrogen as a fuel source for vehicles. The problems associated with creating a completely new industry that could compete with entrenched interests in the petroleum, automotive, and electrical industries is very daunting. While many scientists agree that it might be possible to develop a fuel-cell based mass-production car, many people argue that the advantages of actually doing it would be outweighed by the cost of setting up the infrastructure to make it work.


Alfred Runte, *Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1993), 202-210

This dissertation does not address the questions surrounding technological determinism as such. It uses the concept of momentum, which Hughes used to try and reconcile social construction and determinism, for its approach to the development of the United States’ National Park System.


1.1 - Federal Parks – National Parks as instruments of the State


81 W.P. Whaley, “Immigration and the South,” *Nashville Christian Advocate*, May 10, 1907, 10. This article connects the church’s spiritual goals with cultural evangelism by encouraging the conversion of millions of immigrants to Methodism.

82 Americans’ faith in progress is one of the characteristics that historians have often claimed distinguish the United States from the rest of the world. I argue that the federal government embedded a spirit of exceptionalism in the National Park Paradigm by memorializing the places, events, and people who supposedly embodied the singular spirit that defined the United States. The National Park Service took on this role as part of its mission to use the national parks as classrooms where citizens could learn about the benefits of civic engagement and the democratic spirit of the nation.

Ferdinand Hayden, whose testimony was at least partially responsible for Congress’s creation of Yellowstone National Park, wrote about the civic benefit he thought the park would give as a memorial to Americans’ faith in science and progress to create a better country and world.


83 When one of those syntheses seems to align with a majority of the ideologies and interests of the people it governs, that is what we call justice.


85 State power was central to the process of creating parks because they are federal reserves. Other historians discuss the centrality of state power to land (and people management). See: James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University, 1999), 1-8.

86 The politicization of conservation is far from being a uniquely American phenomenon. Decisions about how to manage natural spaces are sometimes are products of political expediency, nepotism, or intragovernmental negotiation around the world. For a more comprehensive study on that idea see:


To see this demonstrated specifically in the case of Yellowstone see: Aubrey Haines, *Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration and Establishment* (Washington DC: US Department of the Interior, 1974) Part III, <https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/haines1/iee3a.htm> (accessed on March 26, 2016). In the end, Haines characterizes the decision to reserve Yellowstone as the result of a confluence of interests that built to a critical mass within the US Government. Hayden, at the encouragement of the Nettleson/Kelley, used his connection with Representative Davus to reserve the land in the public interest. Langford came to Washington on behalf of his brother-in-law for Jay Cooke and the Northern Pacific. Delegate Clagett, Montana’s Congressional representative, wanted to advance the interest of his territory. It was only their actions in toto that lead to the park’s designation by Congress in 1872.

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90 One of the politicians who profited most by shaping federal land policy was Andrew Jackson. His land acquisitions in the American Southeast netted him thousands of dollars in profit.


91 One of the politicians who profited most by shaping federal land policy was Andrew Jackson. His land acquisitions in the American Southeast netted him thousands of dollars in profit. Steve Inskeep, *Jacksonland: President Andrew Jackson, Cherokee Chief John Ross, and a Great American Land Grab* (New York: Penguin, 2016), 83-91.


93 The federal government granted Yosemite Valley to the State of California in 1864. The state later transferred the park back to the United States for inclusion in a national park.


This term was a popular descriptor for Yellowstone well into the twentieth century. One of the first popular appearances I noted for the term was in an advertisement from six years following the park’s founding: “Rambles in Wonderland,” *Nashville Christian Advocate*, December 21, 1878, 16.


One of the things that I find most frustrating as a historian is that many people criticize me for being a “revisionist.” What they actually mean when they say that is, “Why are you taking something I like and identify with and telling me I should feel guilty about it?” I think that frame of mind takes for granted that affirmation and rebukes are mutually exclusive. I do not think that is the case. It is true that the soldiers who fought in the Indian Wars were brave and believed in fighting to improve the United States. It is also true that they were, by any objective measure, parties to genocide. It is too easy to lose sight of one or the other of these truths when studying the past. It is the historians’ job to try to present both of these truths without prejudice. Many historians are criticized for being shrill or condescending…and they should be! What they’re saying shrilly is true, but they don’t need to be so high-handed about it. It’s time to make people feel good about the past again. That doesn’t mean giving short shrift to the dirty parts of our past. It means reminding people that facing the ugly parts of the past empowers us to change the present. Rather than feeling bad about a legacy of hate, prejudice, and violence, we should change our discourse to focus on the positive impact our consciousness of those things can have on our day to day lives. We should also take the opportunity to understand why the people who decided to be hateful, prejudiced, and violent thought they were good people and doing the best they could for themselves, their families, and posterity. The flip side of that is trying to understand the effect that hate had on the people they persecuted. If we go to the trouble of understanding why people did what they did, we can leave a record that will make posterity proud of us, even though they’ll probably also say we were wrongheaded.

Theodore Roosevelt set aside more than 230 million acres of public lands for conservation purposes. He set the tone and precedents for every future use of the Antiquities Act and acted on the belief that the federal government was uniquely positioned to protect the United States’ natural heritage.


Those who shepherded the National Park Service Organic Act through Congress had also been deeply involved in the fight over Hetch Hetchy.


Stephen Mather and Horace Albright consciously pursued a funding strategy for the National Park Service that used park visitors to justify requests for increased appropriations from Congress. They promised to pursue park designations in specific representative’s districts in exchange for support for appropriations.

Horace M. Albright and Marian Albright Schenck *Creating the National Park Service: The Missing Years* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, 1999), 123-125 and 270.


The American example at Yellowstone set an important precedent for wildland conservation, but it was far from unique. American efforts to preserve and conserve wild land moved ahead in concert with efforts in other industrialized nations, most notably Germany in the nineteenth century, to sustainably manage natural lands. American use of the land as a place to exercise national identity also happened in concert with similar movements around the world. Though some European states, like Britain, did not designate national parks of their own until after the Second World War, many smaller European nations designated national parks as expressions of national identity in the years after Yellowstone’s designation.


I first referenced a quotation in: Phoebe Cutler *The Public Landscape of the New Deal* (New Haven: Yale University, 1985), 90.


Cohen goes into depth exploring the nature of the Depression and explains how it both made and unmade social institutions. Most significantly, she argues it unmade workers’ expectation that their employers or immediate neighbors or communities were capable of taking care of them in times of misfortune. She relates those institutions’ failure and Franklin Roosevelt’s political savvy, to the emergence of an activist, federal state in the 1930s. For a more extensive history of Roosevelt’s history as a conservationist, see: E.B. Nixon ed. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation, 1911-1945* (Washington D.C.: General Services Administration, 1957) 1-23.

110 The New Deal was not universally popular. Many large business owners especially hated the program. They inaugurated a new kind of political thought that eventually flowered years later in the resurgent conservative movement of the 1970s and 1980s. Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 265-269.


113 While “the west” has morphed over time, it remains a popular facet of America’s cultural identity.


115 This imperative was actually officially recorded in the Leopold Report, a document on national park management, and followed as National Park Service policy for several decades. See: Richard Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History* (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1997), 214-218.
Turner avoided giving the frontier a rigid definition. He wrote, “The most significant thing about the American frontier is, that it lies at the hither edge of free land. In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes does not need sharp definition. We shall consider the whole frontier belt including the Indian country and the outer margin of the "settled area" of the census reports. This paper will make no attempt to treat the subject exhaustively; its aim is simply to call attention to the frontier as a fertile field for investigation, and to suggest some of the problems which arise in connection with it.” See: Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1921), 3.

As early as 1940, “Park designers began to question the principles and practices that were shaping facilities in national and state parks. Although all agreed that development was to be in harmony with nature, a trend was emerging against the picturesque and Arts and Crafts-inspired” structures in the parks. Landscape architects thought that “the precedent of the past decade [1930s] may be already outmoded, unnatural, and inappropriate to modern man” and that park buildings should be “modern buildings [and] milestones in the progress of architecture.” Linda McClelland, *Building the National Parks: Historic Landscape Design and Construction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 2.

Cutler writes about “The myths and symbols that had for generations covered the land did not altogether disintegrate. The landscape and buildings of the national parks and forests invoked the spirit of democracy and pioneer strength. Landscape architect and laborer alike toiled in the name of these values. Today no such unanimity could unite a national conservation and works program. The giant preserves are now seen either as the ultimate wilderness adventure, or as so inviolate and sacrosanct as almost to forbid entry. Adherents of these contemporary attitudes would regard with horror the glee with which their 1930s counterparts toted up miles of truck trails, roads, piping, and wiring.”

This particular criticism was directed at a project to document the Oneida language. The person who uttered it described its subjects as “fat, lazy Indians’ and marveled at their useless make-work at taxpayer expense. ‘Can you tell me who wants to learn the Indian Language?’” he said incredulously. See: David A. Taylor, *Soul of a People: The WPA Writers’ Project Uncovers Depression America* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2009), 10.
That said, the exact nature of that subtext was the subject of intense debate. When Congressional critics petitioned to have the organization defunded beginning in 1938, they alleged its authors to be communist sympathizers (many of them were) attempting to subvert the same government that was paying them. In their defense, forty-four publishers contradicted that the Project was guilty of waste, inefficiency, or spreading red propaganda by endorsing their work as “a genuine, valuable and objective contribution to the understanding of American life.” And that they believed “that these books contain far less personal bias than is usually found in books dealing with the American scene.” They thought the books contributed to capitalism and, far from being the product of an organization hell-bent on destroying the “American way of life” they were contributing to the nation’s fabric. See: Jerre Mangione *The Dream and the Deal: The Federal Writers’ Project, 1935-1943* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 1996), 15.

And yet, it was also a place where “people came – in rickety automobiles piled high with all their belongings, people asking nothing but a chance to work in a country where the weaker might be gentle enough to let them live.”

The aggressive energy of the Yankees, against which the leisure-loving ways of the easy-going Californios could not prevail (with some few exceptions in the south) still moves a people who have built aqueducts from faraway mountains to reclaim whole deserts, strung power lines from mighty dams across inaccessible wilderness to distant cities, dredged one of the Nation’s great harbors from mud flats and flung the world’s greatest bridges across a bay. The wild wastes of a century ago are dotted now with lumber mills, mine shafts and smelters, power plants and factories. The valleys are squared off in grin field and pasture, vegetable patch, vineyard and fruit orchard, watered with a labyrinth of irrigation ditches and crisscrossed with highways and railroads. Mountain streams have been dammed for electric power; plans and slopes drilled for oil. Under the earth extends a network of pipelines for oil and natural gas and above it, a network of high tension wires for electric current. The canneries and packing houses, oil refineries, aircraft factories and movie studios ship their products to every corner of the Nation and beyond. The Californian of today feels a personal pride in the State’s gargantuan public works: highways, bridges, dams, and aqueducts. And most of all, of course, he exults in the region’s ‘happy future’.”

The authors implicitly invested each of these sites with meaning by virtue of their proximity to the park’s road. They even directed people to “bear hill” (a concrete slab on which garbage was dumped) where bears were fed daily at 2:30pm and a ranger naturalist delivered a talk at 3pm.

Historians agree that the Federal Writers Program drove tourism within the United States. In his history on Gene Autry and public diplomacy, Michael Ducheimin argues, “The Federal Writers Project set out to redefine tourism from the viewpoint of the American state...To stimulate the economy and help bring an end to the Depression the [United States Travel Bureau] reshaped the role of the federal government in tourism promotion by imitating foreign competitors.”


134 Many authors write with enthusiastic support for National Parks and seem to laud the fact that they exist as evidence of the good intentions that must have created them. The point I am trying to make is that the results these people are happy about did not necessarily result from altruism. I do not want to argue that because I get any kind of pleasure out of iconoclasm as an end in itself. I argue it because considering the other forces that influenced park development helps explain why they are the way they are today. To see a few laudatory histories, see: Dayton Duncan, *The National Parks: America’s Best Idea: An Illustrated History* (New York: Random House, 2009), xv-1.


**1.2 Selling Scenery – Businesspeople in National Parks**


Whitney was a prominent advocate for the construction of a federally subsidized transcontinental railway. He proposed a novel funding structure for the venture that was not radically different from the land-grant system eventually adopted by Congress to subsidize the railroad’s construction. “He asked that government grant him 60-mile strips of land along the length of his route. Sale of this land to settlers would finance construction of the road. As settlement increased so would progress westward.” In return for his genius structuring the funding scheme “Whitney asked only those lands left unsettled upon completion. Excess profits would maintain the road or finance public education.” See WGBH Boston, *Asa Whitney (1791-1874) and Early Plans for a Transcontinental Railroad,* (Boston: WGBH) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/tcrr-whitney/> (accessed March 26, 2016).

Hayden’s expedition had been sent west, in part, to confirm the seemingly outlandish description contained in the previous expedition’s report on “the Wonderland.” In a book on Gustavus Cheyney Doane, Kim Allen Scott explains the Lieutenant’s interest and involvement in the Washburn Expedition to the region in 1870. She characterizes Doane as a tragi-comic figure who recognized that authoring a definitive report on the Yellowstone region was his best chance at lasting fame. He managed to succeed at writing the account in spite of a wound to his thumb, the abandonment of a member of his party, and unintentionally kindling a fire that destroyed many acres of forest in and around Yellowstone. See: Kim Allen Scott, *Yellowstone Denied: The Life of Gustavus Cheyney Doane* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, 2007) 72-84.


A number of historians explain the centrality of tourism to national parks’ creation. Some of them include Mark Barringer, Alfred Runte, Marguerite Shaffer, Phoebe S.K. Young, Hal Rothman, and Richard Sellars.

Aubrey Haines, *Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration and Establishment* (Washington DC: US Department of the Interior, 1974) Part III, <https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/haines1/lee3a.htm> (accessed on March 26, 2016). Paul Schullery and Lee Whittlesey made a point of debunking what “might be called the ‘greed-driven park’ story in which there is no altruism at all: the only thing that made national parks happen was the sordid commercial appetite of early railroad barons and concessioners; visitors were just walking dollar signs; and the entire experience was a trivial and thoroughly engineer parody of a ‘real’ experience of nature. Anything good that came of it happened just by accident.” In reality, they argued, the truth of Yellowstone’s creation is more complicated than either being a story of business or of aesthetics. I heartily agree. Paul Schullery and Lee Whittlesey, *Myth and History in the Creation of Yellowstone National Park* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2003), 95.

The National Park Service’s seeming blindness to these associations is documented in the Organization of American Historian’s report on the “Imperiled Promise: The State of History in the National Park Service.” It is also documented at length by Paul Schullery and Lee Whittlesey in *Myth and History in the Creation of Yellowstone National Park*.


Mark Barringer explains how the federal government viewed business owners as “partners” in park management and explains how their close relationship with the National Park Service and especially how Mather and Albright worked “tirelessly” to improve their circumstances. This helps emphasize the centrality of businesses to the park paradigm.


Mather’s biographer described Child as “a huge and impetuous young man who was general manager of the companies that ran the park’s hotel and transportation facilities,”


Child “had bought an interest in the park stores, and the soldiers were his star customers.” He explained, “that he personally would stand no loose play with the status quo.” Mather decided to assert the new agency’s authority in the park by threatening that “if Child made any more trouble...the government [would] take over the Yellowstone concessions.”


“All these things this people wants and must have, but it does not want them at the expense of the United States Treasury.”


164 Enos Mills, “What We Owe Our National Parks,” The Nation’s Business 4 (1916): 5. Mills was better known as an advocate for preservation, but, in this case, threw his credibility behind an appeal for businessmen to advocate tourist development in the national parks. Appended to the end of the article, his bio takes advantage of his bona fide credentials as a naturalist. “Mr. Mills is often referred to as the ‘Father of the National Parks.’ Traveler, nature lover, lecturer, he has devoted many years to the advocacy of the protection for birds and wild flowers and to the development of the National Parks.”


172 Cammerer wrote that “besides being attractive to look upon, [buildings and roads] must appear to belong to and be a part of their settings.”


173 Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks (New York: Knopf, 1951), 312.

174 Yard wrote the United States contained “an empire of grandeur and beauty which it scarcely has heard of.”

Robert Sterling Yard, The National Parks Portfolio (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1917) 5. Yard actually went so far as to include a list of large railroads in the back of the Portfolio along with addresses where interested parties could inquire for travel information. A map included provided information on what lines ran to which parks and encouraged its readers to engage. See page 32.


Union Pacific Railway. *My Vacation in Yellowstone and Rocky Mountain National Parks 1924*, (Chicago, Pool Bros). A souvenir booklet issued by the Union Pacific Railroad for the 1924 tour season contains detailed timetables and itineraries for tourists who paid for a tour package in the west.

Kenneth Jackson addresses the origin of this phenomenon with streetcar commuting. See:


Paul Sutter addresses the rise of automobility in national park travel in *Driven Wild*. He explains how the popularization of driving led preservationists to lobby against increased auto access to national parks and helped forge the coalition that supported passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964.


Benson Ford Research Center, Dearborn, MI. Assembled Collections. Advertising Collection. Accession 19, Box 4, Automobiles-Ford-1925--J-L.

The ads demonstrate Ford’s use of a textbook advertising technique; namely, to sell the product’s use and not sell the product itself.


In his history of technology and the American pastoral experience, Leo Marx quotes the famous literary realist Henry James who said in that, in the face of the railroad, “the ‘common man’ and ‘common woman,’ ….are defenseless. ‘The bullying railway orders them off their own decent avenue without a fear that they will ‘stand up to it.’” Marx argues that James’ characterization showed that “there is nothing in the visible landscape – no tradition, no standard, no institution- capable of standing up to the forces of which the railroad is the symbol.” If the railroad advertisers shared the same sensibility as Marx, and it seems likely that they did, that might account for the fact that cars could be part of the real nature they wanted to sell to passengers, but trains could not. See: Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 352-353.

Part of the reason for this might be that people who sell travel sell destinations and not products. Capital equipment like trains or planes are incidental parts in systems designed to provide a service for payment. In other words, selling services is fundamentally different from selling products. That said, the fact that railroad executives avoided showing the archetypical “machine in the garden” juxtaposed with their willingness to feature cars and busses in their advertisements shows how they saw those machines differently and how they integrated both in to the park paradigm differently.

Marc Mancini, Selling Destinations: Geography for the Travel Professional (Clifton Park, NY: Delmar, 2010), 1-6.


Donald MacKenzie, Wajcman, Judy eds. The social shaping of technology (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1999), 11.


Shields Camping, 63.

Even the naturalist John Burroughs approved of what was then recognized as the importance of “killing of the ‘varmints,’ bears, cougars, and bobcats.” Like most naturalists of his day, Burroughs believed that by minimizing the impact of “varmints,” the park could be made “better for the useful and beautiful game.” See: John Burroughs, Camping and Tramping with Roosevelt, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1907), 7.

Mobility was central to the idea of autocamping. In his history of camping, Charlie Hailey discusses the ways that mobility affects peoples’ sense of place and its inherent association with the automobile.


Francis H. Buzzacott, The Complete Campers Manual, (Chicago, Francis H. Buzzacott, 1903), 107. Shields was also kind enough to include some advice on firearm etiquette: “Don’t point a gun toward your companion simply because it isn’t loaded. If you do, he will be perfectly justifiable in breaking your neck with a club.” See: George O. Shields, Camping and Camp Outfits, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1890), 107.


This prohibition did not continue after the beginning of the twentieth century. Many park units now allow hunting and some have it enshrined in their enabling legislation. The shift toward new styles of management and the acceptance of new recreational and subsistence uses shows how the park paradigm continues to evolve.

That precedent shifted in later years when some park units (particularly those in Alaska) had hunting included as a reason for creating parks in their enabling legislation. In the early years, keeping hunters out of the parks was


218 (1) Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Miscellanies* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), 35. (2) An oft quoted line from Aldo Leopold’s *Sand County Almanac* that he attributed to *Walden*, but was actually from Thoreau’s essay “Walking.” The actual quote is “the West of which I speak is but another name for the Wild; and what I have been preparing to say is, that in Wilderness is the preservation of the world.” (3) This quote is often changed to read “the forest is calling...” or “the desert is calling...” and was included in John Muir’s *My First Summer in the Sierra Nevada*.


220 John Muir, Robert Sterling Yard, and supporters who wrote about specific parks had an important role in setting the tone for talking about national parks in American literature. They contributed news articles, authored special books, and led political campaigns to designate and support national parks across the United States. They argued parks deserved federal protection because of the exceptional, unique, and, therefore, authentic landscapes they contained. See:


Read about how the National Park Service complies with the Wilderness Act online for more information. See “Frequently Asked Questions” Wilderness: Gateway to the National Park Service Wilderness. Accessed on September 23, 2017 <https://wilderness.nps.gov/faqnew.cfm>

221 This way of thinking continued to be relevant at the turn of the 20th century when Gifford Pinchot said that “the first duty of the human race is to control the earth it lives upon.” His point of view was vindicated with the creation of the U.S. forest Service in 1905. It also tipped off a symbolic struggle for power in the conservation movement. See: Harvey H. Kaiser, Landmarks in the Landscape: Historic Architecture in the National Parks of the West (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1997), 4.


224 Modern day environmentalists have taken that characterization to its logical conclusion by arguing that nature has its own standing morally and legally. They have effectively embodied its essence in doctrine and law. Ed. Tong, Benson, Regan A. Lutz, The Human Tradition in the American West (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 164-168.


229 As part of that movement, George Catlin argued that an important element of that wilderness were its non-white natives, but his advocacy of their inclusion in national parks represents a path not taken. No other park advocates wanted to keep Indians in the parks, so they were ultimately removed. See: Mark David Spence Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the making of the National Parks (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000), 2-7.


231 Marsh made observations on the character of land across Europe in Man and Nature. He wrote not only about the disappearance of native plants in Europe, but also Asia. Marsh mused that nature had been “subdued by long cultivation” in Europe. See: Andrea Wulf, The Invention of Nature: Alexander von Humboldt’s New World (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2015), loc xxix on google books.


George Perkins Marsh *Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1864), 5.

George Perkins Marsh *Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1864), 6-9. In a footnote, Marsh made a point to mention that some scientists believed humans were not just changing the landscape, but also the earth’s climate. To buttress his belief, he cited the theories of scientists from Germany, France, and the United States. He elaborates further on this theory in the body of the text on page 14.

George Perkins Marsh *Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1864), 27.


Marsh claimed that, if we wanted to keep the planet fit to live in, we would have to aid it “in reclothing the mountain slopes with forest and vegetable mould [sic].” He said so that, on the one hand, they would “create new reservoirs, and, on the other, remove mischievous accumulations of moisture,” thereby restoring the landscape to its former form and function. Doing that was the only way he thought people would be able to support civilization on the earth. See: George Perkins Marsh *Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1864), 35.

Marsh wrote that if “new physical comforts for classes of the people that have now become too much enlightened and have imbibed too much culture to submit to the deprivation of a share in the material enjoyments which the privileged ranks have hitherto monopolized” remained disfranchised from them. See: George Perkins Marsh *Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1864), 26.


Marsh thought that Europeans were racially superior to Indians and that their displacement of Indians was inevitable.


Indians’ expulsion from national parks like Yosemite and Glacier was justified by conservationists’ (admittedly true) belief that they would continue to hunt and collect wood if they were allowed to stay in them. David Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 90.


250 More specifically, the author wrote about how “the plant which grows may not be useful per se—that is, as we consider it—but by its death at least and decomposition the earth remains fruitful, or the perfect balance is kept up.” See: THE FLIGHT OF THE SEEDS.” New York Times (1857-1922), Dec 08, 1895. http://spot.lib.auburn.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/95267207?accountid=8421.


William Cronon addresses how important humans are to understanding the supposedly natural world order when he writes about the tree in the garden as unnatural (fallen and unreal) and the tree in wilderness as natural (pristine and wild). He explains, “we are responsible for both, even though we can claim credit for neither.”


254 Reducing the people who thought natural places deserved protection to two groups belies the more complicated relationships all of them had with wild places, but, for the purposes of this project, it reducing them to two groups is descriptive and accurate. The contradictions inherent in their philosophies are embedded in the histories and landscapes of the places they fought to manage.


261 Muir’s work in defense of Hetch Hetchy is well known. More information about his work to protect that valley can be found in: Alfred Runte, *Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1993), 80-83.

262 John Muir “A Plan to Save the Forests” *Century Magazine* 49 (1895), 631.


264 Another result of the conflict over whether conservation or preservation should be the policy in national parks was an ongoing turf battle with another federal agency, the U.S. Forest Service. The USFS was organized as an expressly conservationist agency under Gifford Pinchot. His dictum to provide “the greatest good for the greatest number for the longest time” sometimes contradicted the National Park Service’s attempts to preserve the land unimpaired. Mather needed to codify the National Park Service’s role in land management to avoid its being absorbed by the USFS or some other federal agency.


265 Muir’s experience with nature was also intensely personal. While other nature enthusiasts also had very deep connections to wild places, Muir’s background meant they functioned as religious spaces for him. His fervor for nature suffused all of his writing. It influenced his approach to preservation and, since his writing became foundational to preservationists around the world, ultimately deeply influenced generations of preservationists.


266 The major exception to this was during the First World War and, to some extent, during the Second World War when conservationists succeeded in getting dispensation for extractive development in parks. That said, the fact that it took existential crises for conservationists to gain even moderate success at establishing extractive or infrastructural footholds in parks shows how the national park paradigm had largely codified around proscribing that kind of development in parks.


267 In a history on the rise and fall of the progressive ethos among park advocates, Robert Sellars wrote, “the interaction of bureaucratic management with the flora, fauna, and other natural elements in parks of scenic grandeur” had “most often not been scientifically informed.” He argued that the central problem of national park management boiled down to what in a park actually deserved to be preserved. He asked, “is it the scenery….or is it the integrity of each park’s entire natural system, including not just the biological and scenic superstars, but also the vast array of less compelling species, such as grasses, lichens, and mice?”


1.4 – Following the Holiday Road – Tourists in National Parks


272 These groups succeeded with various types of what amounted to advertising. Its messages were political, commercial, or intended to safeguard natural places, but its intent was all the same: to keep places called national parks under federal protection and to encourage Americans to visit them. Miles Orvell addresses the currency of advertising in his book about authenticity.


273 Writing on tourism in the Soviet Union, one historian writes about how some scholars of mass tourism described it negatively as a passive, prefabricated "pseudo-vent." More recently, tourism has been seen more positively as an active search for authenticity; as a potentially mind-opening experience with the possibility to reaffirm or alter the traveler’s sense of self in unpredictable ways.


296 This also raised questions about what it meant to camp as people changed from staying near their horses to staying in motels, camps, or their cars themselves. Paul Sutter *Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2009), 30-41.

297 Some people questioned whether this orthodoxy was actually appropriate for park experiences. Their criticism of construction in parks would have important consequence’s for the way the National Park Service managed them in the future and eventually even resulted in passage of the Wilderness Act. Paul Sutter *Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2009), 245.


302 Harold F. Blanchard “Gypsying de Luxe: Whole Nation is a Playground for Summer Tourists; How to Make the Auto Trip Successful” Popular Science, Vol 123, 1, July 1923, p. 69.


309 Paine, Yellowstone Diary, 26.

310 Paine, Yellowstone Diary, 36-37.

311 Paine, Yellowstone Diary, 36-37.

312 Printed tour guides about the park from the turn of the twentieth century all mention Old Faithful and many mention Handkerchief Pool. They also usually describe a few of the geysers around the lower geyser basin (where Old Faithful is). The road to access Old Faithful ran past at least a dozen other thermal features at the time Paine and his group visited the park. The fact that they did not take the time to write about any of them (and may not even have stopped at them), show how important “name brand” attractions became to peoples’ expectations for the park in the years to come. See; ed. Lee H. Whittlesey, Elizabeth A. Watry, Yellowstone National Park: Images of America (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2008), 93.


315 “One hundred years ago, one of the most famous attractions in Yellowstone was a small spring called Handkerchief Pool. Visitors threw dirty handkerchiefs into the water. The cloths were sucked into the depths, only to emerge a few minutes later, considerably cleaner. Other objects were also thrown into the hot spring, including coins, broken bottles, rocks, hair pins, and a small horseshoe. The plumbing system of Handkerchief Pool was damaged and eventually the spring became dormant. Today this hot spring has nearly been forgotten.” See: National Park Service, “Handkerchief Pool” Old Faithful Virtual Visitor Center: An Official Web Feature of
1.5 - Not Just another Government Bureau – The National Park Service


325 Quoted in Michael Frome, Regreening the National Parks (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1992), 53


328 Robert H Keller and Michael F. Turek American Indians and the National Parks (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1998) 24-26 where they comment on the Park Service’s need to establish a place for itself among established federal bureaucracies like the Forest Service and Bureau of Reclamation. They argue that the founders successfully developed “a ‘founder’s myth’ necessary for spirit de corps. More than most federal agencies, it pursued an idealistic mission that led to exceptional public trust.”


In reality, Lane and Mather were not acquainted during their time at the University of California and only became friends after the latter moved to Washington. While it may be true that Mather wrote a complaint to the Department prior to his entry into public service, it is just as likely that his actual classmate, Adolph Miller, was aware of Mather’s involvement with the Sierra Club and solicited his involvement in order to disentangle himself from work at Interior. See: Horace M. Albright and Marian Albright Schenck *Creating the National Park Service: The Missing Years* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, 1999), 20-37.

Horace M. Albright and Marian Albright Schenck *Creating the National Park Service: The Missing Years* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, 1999), 32-37. Mather’s aura as architect of the park system was, in large part, the creation of Albright. It is hard to separate his obvious admiration from Mather’s actual personality. In this book’s foreword, he says explicitly that he had abstained from writing a book on the early years of park management because he worried it would compromise Mather’s standing as founder of the park system. In the book’s foreword, Robert Utley wrote that “So solicitous was he of Mather’s significance and reputation that he blurred or withheld vital information. In his last years, however, his daughter persuaded him that he owed posterity a true accounting of the missing years.” (xii). Albright’s intense, personal loyalty to Mather was common among early rangers of the Park Service. Mather liked to hire men cut from his own, intense and public minded, cloth.


The park service routinely ranks in the bottom third of federal agencies to work for. Employees complain that it is impossible to build a career in the agency, and women especially complain that they are subjected to hostility in the workplace. Superintendents at Grand Canyon and Yosemite have both been dismissed or effectively forced to retire by allegations of sexual harassment and hostile work environments. The service admits that some of those problems stem from a “man’s club environment.” The agency is grappling with how to reconcile its masculine, but very popular, legacy with a more inclusive future. High Country News Lyndsey Gilpin, “How the National Park Service is failing women” *High Country News* December 12, 2016. Accessed electronically on July 17, 2017 <www.hcn.org/issues/48.21/how-the-national-park-service-is-failing-women>
Yard was an old friend of Mather’s. The two were first acquainted in the 1890s while employed as reporters for the New York Sun. He was Mather’s best man when he wed Jane Thacker Floy in 1893. See Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks (New York: Knopf, 1951), 21.

The Park portfolio was integral in the creation of the Parks’ image not only as exceptional natural spaces, but as the collective inheritance of all Americans. See Robert Sterling Yard, The National Parks Portfolio, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1917), 1-4. See also Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1979), 1-28.

In this, Yard and the National Park Service also operated in an international sphere where other nations took similar actions to associate wilderness preserves with nationalistic ideas. One place to read about ideas decentering American national parks from the received land management narrative that often describes them as global models is one subject of an edited volume titled Civilizing Nature: National Parks in Global Historical Perspective. See that book for more information on the relationship between conservation actions taken outside of the United States.


Alfred Runte discusses the centrality of monumentalism to the national park idea extensively. For that idea applied to Shenandoah specifically, see: Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1999), 117-118.


Alice Wondrak Biel, Do (Not) Feed the Bears: The Fitful History of Wildlife and Tourists in Yellowstone (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 86-133.

Robert Sterling Yard, The National Parks Portfolio, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1917), 25. Park biologists today have commented extensively on the impact of feeding programs and their relationship to the predator control programs that were responsible for the extirpation of wolves in Yellowstone and other national parks. When feeding programs were in place, park managers argued that they were necessary to preserve wildlife for visitors to view and to prevent the unsightly deaths of thousands of animals by starvation. The biologist Adolph Murie argued that these problems could be solved if the park service terminated its management program and


358 These advocates included Robert Sterling Yard and Harvey Broome, but wilderness preservation advocates did not all condemn lower class visitation in the National Parks. Bob Marshall argued that the numerous lower class tourists who were driving to parks beginning in the 1920s might be powerful allies in wilderness preservationists’ efforts to stop construction of new roads in national parks. See:


367 Mather’s methods may have been why he succeeded in making the transition to leading the National Park Service under multiple presidential administrations. Within in the National Park Service, staff feared the Harding Administration’s selection for Interior, the later notorious Albert Fall, was hostile to the agency but he surprised everyone there by not taking much of an interest in the agency. Mather succeeded at convincing him not to change the park service’s upper management or fill park jobs with political appointees.


A number of popular books on ranger life highlight the sacrifices park employees make to accomplish their agency’s work. They also highlight the feelings of dejection that they sometimes feel when they feel like those sacrifices are not paying off. For an example, see:


378 Grant’s appointment was the result intercession by two directors of the park service with the Secretary of the Interior and seven years spent developing skills, writing letters, and securing employment on his own account. He confirms the axiom recorded in the National Park Service’s 75th anniversary prospectus *The Vail Agenda* that noted the agency might not have the most qualified employees in the federal government, but it certainly had some of the most persistent.


380 Ren Davis and Helen Davis, *Landscapes for the People: George Alexander Grant, First Chief Photographer of the National Park Service* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia, 2015), 24-25.


382 Ren Davis and Helen Davis, *Landscapes for the People: George Alexander Grant, First Chief Photographer of the National Park Service* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia, 2015), 42.

383 Miles Orvell addresses this concept in a chapter titled “The Camera and the Verification of Fact” in his book on authenticity.’


384 The stamps have been reproduced several times and became one of the most prized sets ever produced by the US Post Office. Ren Davis and Helen Davis, *Landscapes for the People: George Alexander Grant, First Chief Photographer of the National Park Service* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia, 2015), 41.
1.6 – Home on the Range


American Indians were the most frequently displaced people. Robert H Keller and Michael F. Turek American Indians and the National Parks (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1998) xiv-xv.

Keller and Turek ask deep questions about for whom the national parks were designated, in whose interest they are managed, and how “morality and holding power affect environmental tactics, and obligations.” They ask when the National Park Service faces inherent conflicts of interest. Specifically, “in what areas are Indians and the general public in agreement over common interests?” They argue that it is impossible to disentangle the agency from the government from the people and that it is reasonable to assume that the American system of national park development “carries implicit meanings, political mandates, and management objectives that do not always fit” America’s park’s circumstances. Keller and Turek imply that, by devaluing Indian perspectives at their inception, the parks became invested with meanings rooted in prejudice and inequality that, even if we try to rectify, we cannot entirely erase. The parks are, to some extent, permanent testaments to the inequity that enabled their creation. Acknowledging those values can begin to disentangle them from the injustice that attended them, but cannot ultimately cleanse them. I argue that acknowledgement is the first step toward absolution. When we acknowledge a problem, we obligate ourselves to try to fix it. The resistance that historians often experience when they raise intractable issues related to social justice is, in my opinion, a product of peoples’ inner knowledge that, if they admit a problem exists, they are reasonably obligated to at least try to rectify it.

Local residents often objected to construction that did not serve their interests. They sometimes felt the National Park Service and federal government were betraying them by constructing roads for out of towners who would neither spend much money nor offer much benefit to them. They also objected to spending so much

385 Ren Davis and Helen Davis, Landscapes for the People: George Alexander Grant, First Chief Photographer of the National Park Service (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia, 2015), 41.

386 Roger Daniels, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Road to the New Deal, 1882-1939 (Champaign: University of Illinois, 343-345.


394 American Indians were the most frequently displaced people. Robert H Keller and Michael F. Turek American Indians and the National Parks (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1998) xiv-xv.
money on roads that were not even built to accommodate trucks, which could at least have brought commercial products local residents wanted to buy.


Hal Rothman, *Devil’s Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth Century American West*, (Lawrence: Kansas, 1998), 10-11. Though Rothman succeeds in presenting an excellent treatment of tourism’s “back of the pipe” consequences for western attractions, but fails to account for the fact that tourists’ frame of mind must have differed from resident westerners, or they would not have played the part of the Devil in negotiating their travel.

Mark David Spence *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal in the National Parks* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999) 4-5 and Robert H Keller and Michael F. Turek *American Indians and the National Parks* (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1998) 33-35. Keller and Turek explain specifically how the Ute Indians had more than 200,000 acres from their reservation unilaterally transferred to the National Park Service.


This is not the case in national parks around the world. In British national parks, for example, farming is seen as a perfectly legitimate use of natural space. Rather than changing the land to appear uninhabited, British parks celebrate the land’s use and seek to preserve its pastoral appearance, rather than wild, unpeopled nature. See: David Harmon “National Park Residency in Developed Countries: The Example of Great Britain” *Resident Peoples and the National Parks: Social Dilemmas and Strategies in International Conservation* (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1991) 33-39.


This history is a standard text on Death Valley. It is a common reference of park rangers, and the author drew heavily on resources compiled in the park archive. They did not have much information on Native Americans in the Valley, so the book does not either. In fact, its narrative focuses almost exclusively on the period after 1849. See:


For information on how Indians were portrayed in the parks see: Hal Rothman, *Devil’s Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth Century American West*, (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1998) 70-80.

See histories written by Turner, Roosevelt, and Bancroft to substantiate this claim. Especially: Theodore Roosevelt *The Winning of the West* (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1899) 1-17.
Some park residents also used these activities to resist park development. In Shenandoah and the Great Smoky Mountains, and Grand Teton National Park, residents resisted park development through willful trespass, arson, and physical violence. See: ed. Katrina M. Powell, Answer at Once: Letters of Mountain Families in Shenandoah National Park, 1934-1938 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2009), 4-20.

European American residents who did the same things were subject to official censure and, in extreme cases, institutionalization. See: Stephen Fender Nature, Class, and New Deal Literature: The Country Poor in the Great Depression, (New York, Routledge, 2012), 90-96.

Some of the people who lived in what became Shenandoah National Park were institutionalized when they demonstrated reluctance to leave their “substandard” homes for “better” ones.

That process is also addressed in the sections on conservation and tourists.


Euroamericans have variously coexisted with and conquered native groups across the United States. The relationship between these two groups is complex and evolved over time. When they had the power, Euroamericans often disfranchised, subjugated, or killed native people who seemed to be in their way. A number of historians explore the relationships between Euroamericans and Indians, but one of historians who did that most at length was Richard White in books including The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 and It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West.


This is quoted in Richard White’s essay on modern environmentalism’s relationship with physical work. See Richard White, “Are you an Environmentalist or do you work for a living?” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 176-177.


While it may seem obvious to observe that anyone on a vacation would avoid productive labor, this paper will demonstrate that the paradigm limited tourists’ perceptions of their actual impact on western landscapes. Since they didn’t see themselves as active agents in the land’s development, they overlooked side effects of their travel
through the region. Richard White addresses the difference between these perspectives in his paper “Are you an environmentalist or do you work for a living?”


421 In his history of Methodism, David Hempton complicates the view that the church was ever defined by itinerant preaching by arguing that it was largely “confined to the realm of nostalgic reminiscences and wrapped in condescension” but nevertheless admitted that it was a defining part of the movement that succeeded in establishing the Methodist Church around the world. David Hempton, *Methodism: Empire of the Spirit*, (New Haven: Yale University, 2005), 124-128.


430 While highlighting the church’s success at establishing permanent houses of worship, Renfro also notes that “with many church facilities [available] for the people…they do not think camp meetings are necessary now as in the days when churches and schoolhouses were scarce. Protracted meetings and regular services take the place of old time meetings.”

Since revivals had defined the Methodist Church since its earliest days, this letter demonstrates that western parishioners’ expectations had begun to influence institutional priorities. The church’s imperative to satisfy the preference for built churches demonstrates that living up to parishioners’ expectations could affect the church’s most established practices. The influence of parishioners on the church parallels tourists’ effect on western development in the century ahead. Though they acted as passive agents (evaluating their experience based on the satisfaction of preconceived expectations), Renfro’s article demonstrates that seemingly inconsequential decisions, such as holding meetings in permanent buildings instead of outdoors, led to changes in Methodism’s character, if not its doctrine. As early as the 1880s, westerners had advocated ideas that would have changed the very identity of the church.

431 In order to forestall such a problem, the author claimed a Nebraska farmer was able to get all the wood he needed from 45 acres of trees. Rather than clear cutting the wood for a quick profit, the author praised the property owner for cutting what he needed and then allowing new trees to grow in place of the old. The author goes on to say that not only had the farmer maximized his long-term return on the trees, but “in December, 1899, it contains more sound and thrifty trees than it did in December, 1855.” See: “Tree Culture,” *Nashville Christian Advocate*, January 25, 1900, 2.
Section 2
Shenandoah

Section 2 – An Eastern Park in the Western Tradition – Reshaping Shenandoah to fit the park paradigm


George Freeman Pollock, Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960), 10-11

George Freeman Pollock, Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960), 4-5

In fact, when he and his guide, Mr. Printz, had spent more time in the area, he concluded that “the rattlesnakes were not as plentiful as pictured for we encountered only one and its unexciting death at the hands of Mr. Printz was most disappointing.” George Freeman Pollock, Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960) 7. Though he belied its immediate development potential when he “said very little about the primitive conditions.” He opened a summer resort there in 1889. George Freeman Pollock, Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960), 11

446 All of these features were eventually acquired for inclusion in Shenandoah National Park. George Freeman Pollock, Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960), 11.


448 Page 11 for quotation on paradise. After an initial failure to establish what he referred to as Stony Man Camp, Pollock retreated to Washington and found employment managing a tract development in the Washington suburb of Glen Echo working for the Baltzley Brothers. As an employee, he learned to manage a large scale construction and, according to Pollock’s telling, learned how to profit from it, too. 21-52.


451 One of the reasons Pollock chose to talk about this episode was probably that a member of the Sisk Family, Charles, was a well-known worker at Skyland who was responsible for, among other things, setting the stone in Pollock’s house there. By featuring his family prominently, he endowed everything that Charlie touched with an air of authenticity by dint of his unimpeachable credentials as a true mountain resident. Darwin Lambert, The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001), loc. 3229.

452 In his administrative history of the park, Darwin Lambert wrote that “Charlie Sisk killed a man and was imprisoned but would go far out of his way to help others; he was an excellent stone mason and still handsome in his seventies when I knew him.” This shows how Lambert and other people with an intimate knowledge of the region saw Sisk and other residents differently from outsiders or businesspeople (like Pollock) who wanted to profit from their association with Shenandoah. Darwin Lambert, Shenandoah National Park: Administrative History, 1924-1976, (Luray, VA: Shenandoah National Park, 1976), 220.


454 Pollock’s work was no different from Buffalo Bill’s ability to trade on the disappearing west through his Wild West show. Joy S. Kasson, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West: Celebrity, Memory, and Popular History (New York: Hill & Wang, 2000), 6-7.

455 Part of the reason he made the trip was that the hollow was “scattered along the Hughes River, most of which were located on the Stony Man Tract.” Pollock probably wanted to see who was squatting on land he had bought out from under them. George Freeman Pollock, Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960), 12.

456 George Freeman Pollock, Skyland: The Heart of Shenandoah National Park (Richmond: Virginia Book Company, 1960), 13

457 Pollock’s attitude toward the people who called the hills home was typical of his era and would resurface when negotiations for the establishment of Shenandoah National Park began in the late 1920s. He classed others among the mountaineers, whether they considered themselves to be or not. For example, he “was also thrown constantly
with the people who did not call themselves mountaineers because they lived in the Old Rag Valley and had a road which, although traveled, was in terrible condition and barely wide enough for a wagon.” Pollock’s perception of the people at Old Rag (a mountain on the other side of the Blue Ridge Mountains from Skyland) shows that he did not hold any of his neighbors in high esteem. He saw them as dependent on him for support and backward.


458 Social scientists documented the squalid condition of people living Appalachia starting at the turn of the twentieth century. By the time Franklin Roosevelt was elected president, policymakers were using reports like the ones they had written to justify federal spending on a variety of programs to educate and resettle people across the region. One of the best known books on the people of Appalachia was *Hollow Folk* by Mandel Sherman and Thomas Henry. Though it is largely dismissed as prejudiced by researchers today, it was typical of the literature that influenced policy around the time that Shenandoah was designated as a national park.


465 Pollock claimed “and that, whereas, I handled many thousands of dollars every summer, many of the dollars were turned over in one manner or other to the employees, so that in the fall of each season poor Pollock generally had nothing left except the improvements which had been made to Skyland and its surroundings.”


466 When the Depression was at its deepest in the early 1930s, Pollock laid off a number of people he had formerly employed and threw them into dire financial straits. Since their work at Skyland had forced many of them to give up the fields they had farmed, they were not able to quickly adjust to the changing economic situation. See: Marcello-Andrea Canuto, Jason Yeager, *Archaeology of Communities: A New World Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2000) 219-220.


They wrote about how a small part of the group “spent three days inspecting the area in the immediate vicinity of Skyland” and was so impressed that “they postponed further investigation until arrangements could be made for the whole committee to visit with them.”

Report of the Southern Appalachian National Park Commission, pages 4-5, 1931

Report of the Southern Appalachian National Park Commission, pages 6-7, 1931

See also: Carie C. Campbell, *Birth of a National Park in the Great Smoky Mountains* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1993), 60-62.

The National Park Service tried hard to satisfy this need because Stephen Mather believed that creating a large constituency of eastern national park goers would ensure visitors’ representatives support for funding in other parks across the American West. See:

Horace Albright and Marian Albright Schenck, *Creating the National Park Service: The Missing Years* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1999), 180 and 332.


Report of the Southern Appalachian National Park Commission, pages 6-7, 1931

In the bills they passed to bring those places into the National Park System, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to protect exceptional natural resources from destruction. Read enabling legislation for several

486 Report of the Southern Appalachian National Park Commission, pages 7-8, 1931


488 Report of the Southern Appalachian National Park Commission, page 7, 1931

489 Report of the Southern Appalachian National Park Commission, page 8, 1931

2.1 - Negotiating the Borders – Giving Shenandoah Its Shape

Different conceptions of leisure impact applying the park paradigm to the Blue Ridge


2.2 - An Eastern Park in the Western Tradition – Shenandoah as a marketing tool


508 Darwin Lambert attributes Mather’s planning to conversations he first had in 1919. The first time that he discussed his plans with an eye toward developing them appears to have been in 1923 in his report on National Parks to the Secretary of the Interior. Darwin Lambert, *The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park* (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001) loc. 3218.
509 This had not always been Mather’s attitude. When he was new to Washington, Albright claimed he had once suggested creating parks there only to be rebuked by Mather who said that eastern parks were “‘Nonsense! The wonderlands are in the West. Once people hear about them and more roads are improved, they’ll make the trip.’” It took dealing with a stingy Congress and being immersed in the eastern landscape to change Mather’s mind. Horace Albright and Marian Albright Schenck, Creating the National Park Service: The Missing Years (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1999), 180 and 332.

510 Alfred Runte discusses the centrality of monumentalism to the national park idea extensively. For that idea applied to Shenandoah specifically, see: Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1999), 117-118.

511 Some people argued that parks like the Everglades were not up the high standard set by parks in the west. It was a swamp, after all. Paul Sutter Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement (Seattle: University of Washington, 2002), 133.


513 As will be mentioned later, residents used exactly that justification to argue that their land was not suitable for use in a national park. See: “Letter, Alfred Ackerman to Norman Ewing,” Library of Virginia, accessed December 12, 2017, http://lva.omeka.net/items/show/131.


519 Commonwealth of Virginia, An Act Providing for the Condemnation of Lands and Buildings for use as a Public Park or for Public Park Purposes (Richmond: Commonwealth of Virginia, 1928), 1-40.

520 Commonwealth of Virginia, An Act Providing for the Condemnation of Lands and Buildings for use as a Public Park or for Public Park Purposes (Richmond: Commonwealth of Virginia, 1928), 9-10.


Report of the Southern Appalachian National Park Commission, page 30, 1931. At this point, the Commission was dissolved. Effective on June 30, 1931, it ceased to exist and its records were remanded to the National Park Service.

Darwin Lambert, The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park, (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart Books in Cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001), Kindle Location 1200-1248

1548. Lambert also echoes George Freeman Pollock’s conclusion that “The name Furnace Spring was given to the spring where the smelting plant was located. To this day considerable slag and other materials can be found there...The ore was carried on mule-back from the mine around back of the peak...This copper mine proved to be worthless.” 1569. Lambert provides some perspective on other old mineral developments in the park at Dark Hollow Mine – on Rose River Loop Trail east of Fishers Gap where “Remnants of the old workings include a caved adit, several partially filled open pits or trenches, and a dump, well overgrown with brush and trees...Concrete bases for mine equipment such as draw works and boiler are present.” Furthermore, the Stony Man and Dark Hollow mines are near trails and findable still. Several similar mines outside the park boundary, such as on Hightop in Greene County, might also be found with determined effort. I’m not sure anybody now could find the Mount Marshall Mine (“Indian Copper Mine”) that’s inside the park, but it was on the 6,666 acre John J. Miller tract in Rappahannock County in 1907. 1598. Lambert also noted that evidence of mineral development can be found easily from Skyline Drive at Crimora Lake Overlook where a lake that was created to supply water for washing clay and other dirt off of the ore is visible. “About a mile to its left are other ‘lakes’ –powdery green-which are flooded pits once mined.” He said that “the richest deposit was about 3,000 feet long, 500 feet wide, and 200 feet deep. Waste is pile about-yellow-red-white-brown clay, shale, sandstone, and quartzite, long inhospitable to vegetative cover.


2.3 - Calling the Mountains Home – A prelude to dispossession


Darwin Lambert, The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001), loc. 496.

Darwin Lambert, The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001), loc. 496.

While Indian and European people were both ravaged by disease and conflict, Europeans had the advantage of a constant stream of new settlers taking the places of those who died. Indians, on the other hand, had to rely on the constantly declining population to replace itself. It was a losing battle. Darwin Lambert, *The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park* (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001), loc. 718.


Appalachian culture has become a treasured part of America’s social fabric. While they are the subject of criticism as often as they are celebrated, the people who lived (and live) in the mountain country that served as the border of Britain’s colonial holdings their lifeways have become well known and cherished as part of our national life. For the popular perception of life in the blue ridge, see John Alexander Williams, *Appalachia: A History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 1-18.

There are several books that reference the impacts of residents on the landscape and their sense of rootedness in it. Some were written by academic historians and others by amateur enthusiasts. One of the most illustrative with respect to the built environment settlers left behind was published by the Potomac Appalachian Trail Club. See Carolyn Reeder and Jack Reeder, *Shenandoah Vestiges: What the Mountain People Left Behind* (Washington, DC: Potomac Appalachian Trail Club, 1980), 11-13.


The “Iron Farm” was a fixture of industrial life along the eastern seaboard until the advent of large scale puddling operations and Bessemer process. It was highly environmentally impactful. Read more about the process on the Saugus Natoinal Historic Site’s webpage. See: “How Iron was Made” Saugus National Historic Site, accessed December 18, 2017, [https://www.nps.gov/sair/learn/historyculture/how-iron-was-made.htm](https://www.nps.gov/sair/learn/historyculture/how-iron-was-made.htm).

The boundaries of many national parks reflect an appreciation for real politick. Park boosters frequently subjected their ultimate goal of preservation or encouraging tourism to the powerful constituencies that were entrenched in and near parks prior to their creation. Alfred Runte describes this concept in depth when he argues that most parks had boundaries that were purposely drawn to leave out potentially valuable mineral deposits near them. See: Alfred Runte, *National Parks: The American Experience* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2010) 59.
People who lived in the mountains made furniture, split rails, shingles, and tool handles for sale in small quantities. They supplemented their otherwise meager incomes or traded these objects for manufactured goods. Darwin Lambert, *The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park* (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001) loc. 2719.

This use was actually repeated by CCC enrollees when they started work on park facilities. Reed Engle, former Shenandoah National Park Historian wrote that “To accomplish these objectives, by 1935 the CCC had in place a sawmill that produced the materials to construct park buildings (most often from chestnut cut from trees killed over a decade earlier by the blight), a shingle mill to produce the characteristic hand-made concrete tiles simulating wood shingles used on many of Shenandoah's buildings, a blacksmith shop turning out hinges, latches, sign brackets, and tools, and a sign shop producing the hand-routed chestnut signboards emulating the standards established for the western parks.” See: “Shenandoah: Not Without the CCC,” National Park Service, accessed December 18, 2017, https://www.nps.gov/shen/learn/historyculture/ccc.htm.

One person who expressed concern was Robert Sterling Yard. In articles published in the 1920s, Yard had claimed that there were many first growth trees remaining in the Blue Ridge. When the information he received turned out to be faulty, he published new articles that changed his position on creating the park. In his administrative history of the park, Darwin Lambert wrote that “Yard seemed to have wanted to rectify his error reporting vast virgin forests in Shenandoah without confessing it and without actually hampering” the park project. See: Darwin Lambert, *Shenandoah National Park: Administrative History, 1924-1976*, (Luray, VA: Shenandoah National Park, 1976), 66-67.

See also: Darwin Lambert, *The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park* (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001) loc. 2765.
This said, people in the eighteenth century also had contempt for their tenants. According to David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly, William Byrd (ancestor to the governor of Virginia in the 1920s) once described his tenants as “a race of ‘indolent wretches.’” See: David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly, Bound Away: Virginia and the Westward Movement (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 86-89.

It is hard to say exactly how he drew this conclusion, but this seems like a reasonable conclusion given that tenants might just as easily have moved to another farmstead in search of a better life if they did not enjoy decent relations with their landlords. See: Darwin Lambert, The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001), kindle loc. 2950.

While it is tempting to look back at the relations between tenants and landlords as having originated in an era defined by honesty and integrity, it is not reasonable to presume that they lived in a time that was free of avarice and greed. Rather, it makes more sense to acknowledge that their time was, compared to our own, simpler in many ways that made it not only harder to lie or cheat, but harder to be cheated. While people along the Blue Ridge could go where they pleased, when they pleased, and disappear into the ether if they wanted, they lacked access to the technologies that simultaneously make it impossible for us to do those things to the same degree and improve our lives by giving us access to unprecedented voices and opinions we have known before.

Darwin Lambert, The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001), loc. 3004-3124.


2.4 – Hollow Folk – Popular perceptions of residents of the Blue Ridge

“they were amused by the city folks’ unsophisticated reactions to them and to wild nature, and they were pulled toward taking advantage.”

David Hackett Fishcher wrote extensively about this phenomenon with respect to English, Welsch, Scottish, and Irish settler groups in British North America. See: David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1-22.

This speech is quoted along with a clipping of the article in a personal letter that is in the library of the State of Virginia. You can see the letter and clipping online at: “Letter from George O. Gillingham to Alfred Ackerman,” Library of Virginia, accessed December 12, 2017, http://lva.omeka.net/items/show/132.


584 This part of Lambert’s history addresses the perception that the Blue Ridge had been considered impassable by Europeans until around the turn of the 18th century, but was routinely traversed and started to be settled not long after. See: Darwin Lambert, *The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park* (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001) loc. 752.

585 Michael Montgomery, “The Idea of Appalachian Isolation” *Appalachian Heritage* 28.2 (2000) 20-31. See the first page for more information on the study commissioned in 1937 by staff in the Smokies that sent Joseph Sargent Hall, a graduate student from Columbia University, into the coves and homesteads of the North Carolina and Tennessee mountains.


587 Marcello-Andrea Canuto, Jason Yeager, *Archaeology of Communities: A New World Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 221.

588 Marcello-Andrea Canuto, Jason Yeager, *Archaeology of Communities: A New World Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 211.

2.5 – Shenandoah as an instrument of federal policy- Using the park as an outlet for relief by creating a natural preserve


- Neither interviews nor the letters of the displaced mountaineers are not readily available to the public, but Katrina M. Powell has produced two books that contain first hand accounts of the mountaineers’ displacement. They are: *Answer at Once: Letters of Mountain Families in Shenandoah National Park, 1934-1938* and *The Anguish of Displacement: The Politics of Literacy in the Letters of Mountain Families in Shenandoah National Park.*


2.3 - Federal Funding and Park Service Know How

All the records cited hereafter are drawn from the archive at Shenandoah National Park (SNP). These were organized according to two filing systems. One based on the Dewey Decimal System and the other using Park Service classifiers from the 1950s. In order to simplify citation, I will not include this information, but instead feature box and folder numbers for all documents. Since the SNP archive is organized with sequentially numbered boxes (i.e. 1-130) with non-repeating box numbers (different collections do not restart their box count), anyone wishing to retrace my work would need to request the box and find the file folder I cite in order to view the same documents. The documents cited here can are letters found in Box 12, Folder 4. The citation for these documents will read in the format {Repository, [author (if any)], [recipient], date, box, folder}, hereafter.
SNP, Oliver G. Taylor, James Lassiter, June 24, 1933, Box 12, Folder 4.

SNP, Oliver G. Taylor, Letter to James Lassiter, June 24, 1933, Box 12, Folder 4.


This directive made clear that the Park Service intended to establish Shenandoah on the model of the western national parks, where withdrawal from the public domain meant that superintendents ruled with broad power. The vitality of Shenandoah’s administrative relationship with its western forbears also demonstrates how significant precedents set there were for it. See: Richard Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 11-27.

Part of their interest in the process originated from title problems the service was experiencing with other units of the system in the west. There are extensive reports on the state of projects to assess and perfect park service water rights claims in the Grand Canyon, Sequoia, and other parks across the west. Archives II, RG 79, Parks General: Water Supply Systems: Water Rights General, Parks General: Lands, Buildings, Roads & Trails – Water Power, Letter to George Moskey, Box 532.

Information on Carson is found in Darwin Lambert, *The Undying Past of Shenandoah National Park* (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart in cooperation with Shenandoah Natural History Association, 2001) loc. 3344 and 3506. Archives II, RG 79, Copy of original decision, Judgement from Condemnation Proceedings initiated by the Commission on Conservation and Development of the State of Virginia, Box 532.


SNP, James Lassiter, Letter to Oliver G. Taylor, April 6, 1937, Box 23, Folder 4.

SNP, Box 23, Folder1. This letter contains flow figures from many of the Park springs. Data was collected in 1938 and 1941 as a result of sustained dry spells that impacted Shenandoah’s supply of drinking water.


SNP, Roland W. Rogers, Letter to J.J. Dirzulaitis, Box 23, Folder 10

SNP, James Lassiter, Letter to Oliver G. Taylor, April 6, 1937, Box 23, Folder 4. Indeed, when 40% of Shenandoah’s area was designated to be managed as wilderness following adoption of the Wilderness Act, the north district constituted a large portion of the available undeveloped acreage.
Juxtaposing the case of Shenandoah with Yosemite can be especially instructive as it shows how people at the turn of the century saw water development as consonant with the Park idea. To resurrect the tired subject of Hetch Hetchy and the O’Shaunessy Reservoir, it is readily apparent that many people (or at least those with the power to implement their ideas) thought National Parks to be eligible candidates for material as well as aesthetic exploitation. The fact that the preservationists and developmental boosters competed for access to Yosemite’s water resources shows that human action was vital to that site’s development as a site for public enjoyment. By demonstrating the centrality of human decisions to Yosemite’s regime of water use, it can be demonstrated that there was no pre-determined vision that the Parks were shaped to fulfill. They were the products of competing visions that have still not been completely reconciled.

2.6 - Shenandoah’s Accession to the Park Paradigm

One of the guidebook’s primary sponsors was the Virginia Conservation Commission. They apparently helped underwrite the book’s publication after the federal government withdrew full support from printing the guides. See: Works Progress Administration, *Virginia: A Guide to the Old Dominion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 414-415.


Section 3 - Mojave’s White Heart

3.1 – An Introduction to Death Valley


3.2 – Residents of Death Valley – Visible and Invisible


Coville apparently did not think a second look would give a different impression because he wrote “nor does a closer inspection affect one more pleasantly, for all the shrubbery is either woody and indigestible, or resinous and rank both in smell and taste...The very first necessaries of life appear to be absolutely wanting, and this state of affairs exists not for one mile only, nor for ten miles, but for hundreds.”

649 This was similar to the way sociologists characterized the ways people lived in the Blue Ridge Mountains in and near Shenandoah National Park when they claimed that the mountain people were degenerate.


657 The Death Valley ‘49ers are a supporting organization of Death Valley National Park that hosts an annual encampment featuring historians, musicians, and park rangers who talk about various aspects of its past. Their stated goal is to give “special recognition...to the California bound pioneer wagon parties of 1849-50. Their indomitable will to survive and persevere through the ordeal of that winter serves as an enduring example of the hardy spirit of all Americans who traveled far searching for new and better lives.” See: “The Death Valley ‘49ers,” Death Valley ‘49ers Inc., accessed January 14, 2018, http://www.deathvalley49ers.org/death-valley-49ers/.


659 As the group succumbed to “camp in exhaustion and despair” they faced the fact that their food, which might otherwise have been replenished along the trail, was almost exhausted and their scanty water was bitter. See: Writer’s Program, *Death Valley: A Guide Written and Compiled by the Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress administration of Northern California; Sponsored by Bret Harte Associates* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1930), 15.

660 Some authors dedicated considerable effort to following the trails followed by the ‘49ers. Since they split and rejoined groups several times, this required a certain amount of dedication on their part. Reading of the Jayhawkers, Bugmashers, and Mississippians over and over, readers can do little but conclude that the party was indeed full of people endowed with “a bravery born of total ignorance.” John Southworth *Death Valley in 1849: The Luck of the Gold Rush Emigrants* (Burbank: Pegleg Books, 1978), 25.


662 One described it as “a chronicle of death and disaster, survival and heroism, distinguished by narrative power, specific event, and precise observation.”


666 Psalm 23, Ezekiel 37, Revelation 20: 4-5


668 In order to economize, in his early travels he walked almost everywhere he went. See Orin S. Merrill *Mysterious Scott: The Monte Cristo of Death Valley* (Chicago: Orin S. Merrill, 1906), 68-69.

669 In order to economize, in his early travels he walked almost everywhere he went. See Orin S. Merrill *Mysterious Scott: The Monte Cristo of Death Valley* (Chicago: Orin S. Merrill, 1906), 68-69.


Many historians write about what it was like to work in the Mojave. The describe the landscape as unforgiving and dangerous. Merrill’s experience there was not uncommon. See:


The mountain Morrill wrote about was in the process of being deposited as tailings in symmetrical tailings piles. In the shrinking shadow of the mountain they had formerly constituted, the tailings eventually weathered to seem like part of the landscape, but the terraced hillside they left behind still serves as a stark testament to peoples’ power to alter their environment.


It was not very common for people to become fabulously wealthy by moving to the west, but it happened often enough that the idea was very attractive to people around the United States and world.


The story ran through the Associated Press in a number of papers in the winter of 1940. Its appearance in large and small papers across the United States demonstrates just how much of a celebrity Walter Scott was. See, for example, "Death Valley Scotty Admits He Has Great Gold Hoard in Hiding" The Evening Independent, St. Petersburg, Florida. Accessed electronically at https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=950&dat=19400126&id=bflPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=4VQDAAAIBAJ&pg=3961,6067328&hl=en on August 14, 2016.

Dayton Duncan, *Miles from Nowhere: Tales from America’s Contemporary Frontier* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000), 149.


686 Marketers say the point of establishing a brand is to help consumers identify particular products and prevent imitators from falsely claiming the same qualities as the branded product.


688 The judge “denounced Scotty today for ‘defrauding’ Mr. Gerard with a series of what he termed ‘come-on’ letters in which he described the wealth he was about to discover in Death Valley.”


689 The judge said, “the claims had no value but he was turning them over to Mr. Gerard as the only tangible asset [of Scott’s] that could be discovered.”


690 Scott’s success at achieving a leisure lifestyle without doing the work as a western miner to earn it raises questions about when and how authenticity really matters.

691 Edna Perkins Marsh White Heart of the Mojave: An Adventure with the outdoors of the Desert (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001), 9-11.


697 Edna Perkins Marsh White Heart of the Mojave: An Adventure with the outdoors of the Desert (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001), 19.
3.3 The Pacific Coast Borax Company – Profiting from the valley of death


One of the stories that rangers at Death Valley National Park tell is about borax’s discovery by Aaron and Rosie Winters. Their discovery set off a small-scale rush of prospectors who wanted to cash in on the mineral wealth of the Valley. See: Richard Lingenfelter, Death Valley and the Amargosa: A Land of Illusion (Berkeley: University of California, 1986), 174.
People apparently assumed that operations at Ryan would slowly migrate down the Furnace Creek Wash back toward the ranch in the years to come. “History of Furnace Creek Ranch and Water Rights” File folder page 1-2, “History of Furnace Creek Ranch and Water Rights,” Box “DEVA 02558.” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

More specifically, Ryan wrote “that mining prospectors in the Valley, [sic] have been taking lumber from the old Coleman Borax Works” and that he thought Corkill should put an end to that by taking a building from there to the Ranch. Ryan directed “Mr. Muncey [caretaker of the ranch] to bring the house from the Borax Works and install it for the kitchen at the Ranch.”

Corkill wrote “he has also made many improvements around the house, and barn-yard, which gives the place a much better appearance.”

He also wrote about how there were “a few more cattle this year,” even after “about 20 head were butchered last winter to supply the Assessment Camp and LilaC [sic] with beef.”


Locke wrote “You have nothing whatever to do with it, as I understand it, but if you should ever want to know what there is at the Ranch or at Ludlow, this data may come in handy.”

723 John R. Spears, *Illustrated Sketches of Death Valley and other Borax Deserts of the Pacific Coast* (Chicago: Rand McNally Co. 1892) 46. Spears writes in the book’s introduction that one S.T. Mather recommended that he head west while on the staff of the New York Sun to “Let me tell you where to go to get another lot of sketches; go out among the borax deserts of the Pacific Coast.” S.T. would go on to create the 20 Mule Team Borax Brand and later became the first director of the National Park Service.

724 Ryan said, “the parties at that time managing the ranch having very little interest in it.”


725 Letter from Pacific Coast Borax (W.L. Locke) to Fred Corkill, File folder page 25-27, May 19, 1911, Folder “Metrological Records and Climate in Death Valley 1911-1914.” Box “DEVA 02538.” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

726 Letter from W.L. Locke to F.M. Smith (Oakland, CA) copies to John Ryan (at Ryan Camp), F.W. Corkill (at Lila C. Mine), and W.A. Kirby (Borax Consolidated Ltd.), April 10, 1911, File folder page 44-45, Folder “Records Relating to Furnace Creek Water – Not Privileged.” Box “DEVA 02538.” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

727 In subsequent correspondence between Ryan, McAdie, and the Pacific Coast Borax Company’s Oakland office, the station got special attention because of its scientific and agricultural research potential. In its letter endorsing the venture to McAdie, Pacific Coast Borax Company executives wrote that “at this point we have a very intelligent man, and have some 40 head of cattle, and raise vegetables, some fruits when the weather is not too hot, and in fact a regular farm, regulated more or less by climatic conditions on the valley floor.” They also offered to “take any paraphernalia there in a buggy along with the drum of water that we usually carry, and we could instruct the man in charge, or deliver such instructions as you might request.” Corkill also wrote a letter directing John Ryan to cooperate in the establishment of the station when that freight reached him.

Letter from Professor Alexander G McAdie to the Pacific Coast borax Company, File folder page 4-5, March 18, 1911, Folder “Metrological Records and Climate in Death Valley 1911-1914.” Box “DEVA 02538.” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

Subsequent correspondence indicates that executives of the borax company were frustrated, but unsurprised by how slowly the government responded to their request for equipment (see letter to Ryan from Pacific Coast Borax, File folder page 15, March 31, 1911, location same as following citation). Letter to John Ryan from Pacific Coast Borax Company, March 22, 1911, Folder “Metrological Records and Climate in Death Valley 1911-1914.” Box “DEVA 02538.” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

728 Letter to W.L. Locke, Oakland, California from Fred Corkill, May 4, 1911, File folder page 17, Folder “Metrological Records and Climate in Death Valley 1911-1914.” Box “DEVA 02538.” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

729 McAdie wrote, “a mistake was made in sending the thermometers from Washington; but was discovered and new instruments are already on the way. Will you please write to Mr. Corkill at Ryan Mines and say that the rain gage and shelter are on the way to him; also thermometers with scales reading to 134°.”
Letter to W.L. Lock [sic] of the Pacific Coast Borax Company from Professor Alexander McAdie, May 10, 1911, File folder page 20, Folder “Metrological Records and Climate in Death Valley 1911-1914.” Box “DEVA 02538.” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

730 Letter from W.L. Locke to Fred Corkill, June 1, 1911, File folder page 76-77, “Records Relating to the Furnace Creek Water – Not Privileged – 1921 through 1930, 1908-1913,” Box “DEVA 02538,” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

731 Including places like Yellowstone where Ferdinand V. Hayden claimed in a hearing in the US House that the land there would never be useful to settlers except if there were minerals there, which he did not believe there were. See: Runte, *National Parks*, 50-51.


733 Someone filed the article with letters in the U.S. Borax Company’s papers about the Ranch. It was printed in the same year that McAdie published on Death Valley’s climate being less extreme than he had thought it would be. Newspaper Article by Jack Remington. Quoted from *The World’s Curious Corners*. Newspaper title redacted. Printed on May 26, 1910. File folder page 15, “Records Relating to the Furnace Creek Water – Not Privileged – 1921 through 1930, 1908-1913,” Box “DEVA 02538,” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 01 2558/01-0001, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

734 Letter to Professor McAdie from Pacific Coast Borax Company, September 4, 1913, file folder page 77, “Meteorological Records and Climate in Death Valley, 1911-1914,” Box “DEVA 01,” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 1 2558/01-001 and 2558/01-0044, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

735 Correspondence shifts to G.W. Willson. McAdie departed to assume a professorship at Harvard earlier in the year. See letter from Pacific Coast Borax Company to Fred Corkill, September 11, 1913, file folder page 81, “Meteorological Records and Climate in Death Valley, 1911-1914,” Box “DEVA 01,” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 1 2558/01-001 and 2558/01-0044, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

736 Letter to Fred Corkill from Pacific Coast Borax, February 17, 1914, file folder page 100, “Meteorological Records and Climate in Death Valley, 1911-1914,” Box “DEVA 01,” US Borax Company Collection Series I Box 1 2558/01-001 and 2558/01-0044, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.


3.4 – Mysterious and colorful grandeur in complete comfort –
Mining Tourists

Lawyers refer to this doctrine as the right of prior appropriation. For information on the right of prior appropriation, see: Mark Kanazawa *Golden Rules: The Origins of California Water Law in the Gold Rush* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2015) 1-20.

This letter also makes clear that development at the ranch had become less utilitarian by virtue of mention given to a swimming pool at the ranch. “The waters from the springs in this canyon sink before reaching Furnace Creek wash and it is the assumption of Mr. Rasor and Mr. Gower that such water rises again on the West side of the was opposite the swimming pool in springs which are connected with our main ditch, but this is only theory and of course it would be difficult to establish same as a fact.” The construction of a pool might indicate a number of things. Perhaps executives of PCBCo recognized the recreational potential of such a structure, or regarded it primarily as a reservoir. It is impossible to say, but worth noting that the ranch had “matured” since its last mention in company correspondence.

This letter’s author argued that due caution be exercised in establishing claim to the water because “years ago the Southern Pacific piped water from what was known as the New Boston Spring down to a water tank, which was known as New Boston. This was a point a little North or a little South of Luning, but I think it was North. After using this water for a number of years, a sharper came along, filed on the springs and took up a mining claim on the west side of the track and Mr. Yerrington had to pay him several thousand dollars to clear the title. The R.R. Co. had neglected to file on the spring.”

Wrigley singled out Yellowstone’s transportation infrastructure as one of the most appealing elements of the park and went to great expense to import stagecoaches modeled on the ones used in the park to Santa Catalina Island. Lawrence Culver, *The Frontier of Leisure: Southern California and the Shaping of Modern America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 119.


After inspecting the finished road, the county set tolls at $2 per car or motorcycle, $0.50 per occupant of trucks, trailers, wagons, autos, and motorcycles, $1 per head for every animal whether driven or led over the road, and rates for trucks, wagons, and trailers set by their weight. The money would be used to pay for road maintenance. Linda W. Greene, *Historic Resource Study: A History of Mining in Death Valley National Monument Volume I of II Part 2 of 2*, (Denver: Historic Preservation Branch of National Park Service, US Department of Interior, 1981) 900.


Frank Jenifer apparently made periodic suggestions to the management of Pacific Coast Borax that they should open a resort at the Ranch, but they consistently rebuffed him.


More specifically, Jenifer wrote to Gower that the Company should “have disposition of any excess which could be turned to irrigation of agricultural purposes.”

Jenifer wrote, “at the same time the water [would] so controlled as to prevent any detrimental usage.”


764 I have not been able to find a source to corroborate this theory, but think one of the reasons the company did not simply walk away from Death Valley was that they knew the borax deposits around it to be considerable and wanted to prevent any competitor from preempting them there in the event that prices climbed or some new technology made mining there profitable again. In 1927, they also did not know the entire extent of the deposit they were developing near Boron. While subsequent events have show that it will probably continue to produce at high levels for as long as a century, as far as anyone knew at the time, it was possible that mine there might play out in a decade or two. Since it would have been imprudent to leave their established mining and water claims, the company had to find some way of profiting from their holdings in the interim between their suspension of mining and what they assumed its eventual continuation. If that this theory is correct, the reality is that the hotel they built, and the mythology they built around it, was only an extension of their view of the Valley as a mineral profit engine; albeit an idle one.

765 Lingenfelter claims that prospectors including Francis Marion Smith (popularly known as Borax Smith) had suggested building a hotel and that Frank Jenifer had periodically advocated its construction as well. See: Richard Lingenfelter, Death Valley and the Amargosa: A Land of Illusion (Berkeley: University of California, 1986) 452.


767 As subsequent events would show, the work was executed, but, even from the point of view of the project’s architect, its beginnings were tentative, at best. Martin wrote that “there are considerable difficulties involved in placing the building at the new location on the knoll [above the Furnace Creek Ranch, because]...where it is proposed to set this building seems to be about 115 feet long, whereas our building is about 150 feet.” So in order to build the hotel, the Company had to pay for a great deal of earth moving


768 They said “the rest is up to you, and assuming that the man that you are to have on the ground is of the caliber of Mr. Patton, there is no question but what he will get the work done in time.”
“We also made a contour survey map last week, and Mr. Gower sent [it] off to Mr. Miller to hand to Mr. Martin last Sunday.”

Taking full advantage of their supervisors’ promise to make sure they had “no shortage of...labor” They wrote that “This morning we picked up another Mexican and Mr. Gower has taken him to the ranch to help make the bricks. To complete the cycle of the operation of brick making really requires two more men, so Mr. Gower will try to pick up another man down at the ranch. We are glad to have the authority to increase the force on construction as becomes necessary.”

Three days before sending this letter, Martin said that workers had 3000 bricks on hand, but that “we should have at least 4000 by now.” And happily stated that “The brick will be ready before the cement foundation is in.” The plan’s drawings also made their way to the desert along with copies to the main Borax Company’s Office.

With that need in mind, he emphasized that it would be necessary to “impress on Mr. Martin the necessity of knowing definitely as soon as possible when, in his opinion, the Hotel with be ready for occupancy and wire me care of Mr. Basinger [of the Union Pacific] at Omaha Tuesday night.”


779 Telegram to C.M. Rasor from F.M. Jenifer, December 18, 1926, file folder page 61, “Furnace Creek and Death Valley Hotel Company Property Appraisal 1924-1930,” US Borax Collection, Series I, Box 01, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

780 The politics that surrounded dam construction in the west were very contentious. Powell and the Geological Survey were both lionized and vilified in the west for managing valuable survey work and advocating that massive swaths of the public domain be withdrawn from settlement as potential dam sites. Powell’s attempt to develop a coordinated plan for the development of dam sites that tied homestead and community sizes to water allotments proved so unpopular that it resulted in his departure from the Geological Survey. The story of Powell’s unsuccessful attempt to manage development in the west is eloquently chronicled in: Wallace Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West (New York: Penguin, 1992) 1-25.


784 “technical error inclusion these lands in water power withdrawals as no open power resources there and only water on such premises is appropriated and ditched across for use by owner.” “Will remain here for Robertsons [sic] return tomorrow and await word from you. My Home telephone Washington four five nine seven.”

785 “go [to] Washington [on the] midnight train [where he would] endeavor [to] see Spry with Jones...and [then] return [to New York by the] midnight train Sunday so as to go west as already arranged leaving Jones to carry on work telegram me Willard Hotel Washington Description of land on which hotel stands.”


Telegram C.B. Zabriskie to F.M. Jenifer, December 19, 1926, File Folder page 69, “Furnace Creek and Death Valley Hotel Company Property Appraisal 1924-1930,” US Borax Collection, Series I, Box 01, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

Zabriskie claimed that “our hotel and farming operations would in no way interfere with any such development on the part of the Government, if at any time such a project would be seriously considered.”

“Just write me a letter today, so I will have it in hand tomorrow when I take this matter up. Merely state in the letter, as briefly as possible, the facts as you have related them to me and make it a personal letter. I will get this matter straightened out and don’t worry.” Before the company could continue, though “I told him that on account of the amount of expenses involved and the investment we would have to make, that we would like some assurance, either of title or unmolested occupancy before we proceeded further.” Zabriskie justified the request for a formal endorsement of the hotel when he gave Spry “copies of Mr. Jenifer’s telegrams and called his attention to the fact that under present conditions, that by Wednesday, when it came time to put up the super-structure on the foundations, we feel we should stop the work.” Spry was deferential, though and replied: ‘Don’t you do any such thing. You go ahead and continue the work. Complete your hotel and do not stop until such time as somebody tells you to, which will not occur.’” To which Zabriskie replied “Well, this is a great relief to have you tell me that Governor, but I think I had better remain here until this matter is decided.” To which Spry immediately replied “go out and celebrate Christmas with your grandchildren just as you proposed. It is not necessary for you to remain here. Just write me a letter today, so I will have it in hand tomorrow when I take this matter up. Merely state in the letter, as briefly as possible, the facts as you have related them to me and make it a personal letter. I will get this matter straightened out and don’t worry.”

This last statement apparently satisfied Zabriskie, because he felt “sure governor spry would not make any such positive statement unless he knew just what he could do.” The conversation then became social, relating to matters of “early experiences in Utah, its history, experiences, etc., until it came time for the Governor to leave us to meet his daughter.” He concluded with instructions to go “ahead with the building operations, as the risk of our being interfered with I consider extremely slight” and alluded to the area’s future management.

This was propitious because “development of winter travel is something they greatly need. The project of their developing such tourist traffic, installation of passenger services, etc., including advertising on a large scale, they commented [sic] to furnish, if we would build, furnish, equip and run the proper hotel service, all of which was agreed to by both parties.”


Alfred Runte National Parks: The American Experience (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1997), 63.

This may a myth that must have been inaugurated by the Borax Company that had tremendous staying power. It is in fact impossible to see the highest and lowest points simultaneously except from the top of high peaks in the Panamint Range; most notably the highest peak in present day Death Valley National Park, Telescope Peak.


Jenifer wrote a few days later that “the progress of the hotel is very satisfactory. It will be completed by the first of February, but naturally some little time will elapse before the finishing touches are all complete, the paint...
thoroughly dry, etc. etc., so it will probably be the 10th or the 15th of the month before we can consider the house in order and things running properly.”

Bliss even took the opportunity to make a joke about his planning for future work. Writing about the roof, he commented, “Main roof will be started tomorrow morning. Rafters all out for north end. (Don’t have heart failure, plastered before roof is on Ha! Ha!!)” He then concluded by saying “Everything going O.K. Too busy to write much.” Letter from Harry S. Bliss to F.M. Jenifer, January 15, 1927, File Folder page 95, “Furnace Creek and Death Valley Hotel Company Property Appraisal 1924-1930,” US Borax Collection, Series I, Box 01, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

“went up to Dante’s View this morning, and it begins to look as if we would be able to drive to the ridge by the first of the month.”


Jenifer freely admitted that that kind of arrangement was not very efficient and that it would be cheaper to handle the purchase and shipment of gas and oil in bulk, rather than their ad hoc basis in drums.”


“for two generations Death Valley, California has been one of the best known and least visited spots in the world. Discovered by accident with disastrous results when a gold rush party were hunting a short cut to California, it was late found to contain some of the greatest mineral deposits in the world. Everyone has heard of the twenty-mule teams which hauled borax from the floor of the valley, 300 feet below sea level, over the rim, which rises 6000 feet on every side. Modern engineering takes ore directly from the mine mouth to the refining plants at Los Angeles Harbor for distribution throughout the world. Last month the Borax Company opened a tourist hotel overlooking the famous valley, which is reached with comfort and safety by Pullman cars and motor stages. The scenic beauty and healthful surroundings are entirely different from the splendors of the Grand Canyon and Yosemite Valley. From one of the points on the tour, which has now been made available to the traveling world, one can see the entire valley, which is 150 miles long and 20 miles wide-looking down at the lowest point in America and from the same position looking up at the snow capped summit of Mt. Whitney, which is the highest point in the continental United States. While the heat of Death Valley closes it to civilization in the midsummer months, its climate for at least eight months in the year is agreeable and invigorating. The color effects are delightful to the eye. Californians who visit this unique and awe-inspiring work of nature will have something new and interesting to describe to their eastern friends having added another ‘Wonder of the World.’”


“Jenifer wrote the plans for the hotel extension are just about completed and the architects have certainly worked out a very attractive arrangement which I know you will be pleased with.” The work would “unquestionably be the most feasible and practical manner of providing the requisite extensions. These will be in readiness for you to see and use for the purpose of getting up specifications, etc. when you arrive.”
Letter to H.P. Gower from F.M. Jenifer, July 9, 1927, File Folder pages 141-142, “Furnace Creek and Death Valley Hotel Company Property Appraisal 1924-1930,” US Borax Collection, Series I, Box 01, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

813 Work order authored by Albert C. Martin delivered to Pacific Coast Borax Company, July 19, 1927, File Folder page 143, “Furnace Creek and Death Valley Hotel Company Property Appraisal 1924-1930,” US Borax Collection, Series I, Box 01, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.


817 Jenifer commented on the assessment that the “figure at which the hotel properties are to be transferred to the Hotel Company by the B.C.Ltd.” It also established that “the charges for water are not intended to mean particular profit to the Borax Company based on an intangible asset value of a constant water supply and is only intended to protect the Borax Company in its investment in water facilities to serve the hotel.”


819 Letter from F.M. Jenifer to C.B. Zabriskie, October 30, 1928, File Folder pages 157-158, “Furnace Creek and Death Valley Hotel Company Property Appraisal 1924-1930,” US Borax Collection, Series I, Box 01, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California


821 “Mr. J.P. Kennedy made his survey of the Death Valley Hotel Company properties and is now preparing his report. In conversation with him yesterday he said that the valuation he shows will be in excess of $300,000.00. He states that in his valuation for Corporation Commission purposes he can also reflect cost valuation for future extension if we will supply him with drawings, estimates, etc., but inasmuch as present values will be more than equal our capitalization, rather investments and valuation can in my opinion be disregarded until later.”


Which is specifically described as containing “a power plant, including water wheel and generator” indicating that the plans to install a Pelton Wheel were actually carried out. John P. Kennedy, “Appraisal: Property of Death Valley Hotel Company of California,” February 25, 1929, File Folder pages 171-178, “Furnace Creek and Death Valley Hotel Company Property Appraisal 1924-1930,” US Borax Collection, Series I, Box 01, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

Harry Gower wrote to Frank Jenifer with an assessment of “fields available for golf.” He apparently found a spot that he thought would Jenifer wrote “Jack Malley the golf architect is leaving” Los Angeles bound for Death Valley. When he arrived, he laid out a course and took advantage of the new water system that Gower had improved just a couple of months before. The architect also collaborated with Gower to set up a botanical garden and park between Texas and Furnace Creek (Travertine) Springs.


3.4 - The National Park Service Arrives in Death Valley


“the Union Pacific Passenger Department is showing new life since they heard of this possibility and I think are regretting that they have left the field open for others.”


“Mr. Rasor to suggest to Mr. Colby that he, as chairman of the California Parks Board, write the Secretary of the Interior urging that the dedication be made.”


White said the Valley was “perhaps 150 miles in length and from 5 to 10 in width,”

Letter from John White to Horace Albright, February 24, 1931, File Folder pages 1-7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

3.5 - The National Park Service Arrives in Death Valley

White said the Valley was “perhaps 150 miles in length and from 5 to 10 in width,”

Letter from John White to Horace Albright, February 24, 1931, File Folder pages 1-7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.
The climatic interest of Death Valley is, of course, unique. It is undoubtedly the hottest place in the United States in the summer.

Letter from John White to Horace Albright, February 24, 1931, File Folder pages 1-7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

It appears the rays of the sun have some remarkable effect in preserving or restoring virility; for men who have lived there for many years, like Death Valley Scotty and Johnnie Mills, look 20 or even 30 years younger than they are.

White said that Death Valley had a restorative quality because people who lived there seemed to look younger than they were. He claimed people at Furnace Creek and Stovepipe Wells traveled there to take advantage of the Valley’s climate’s curative effect and singled out acquaintances of his who proved the desert’s health benefits.

He “saw a remarkable example of the quick restoration of health possible at Death Valley when we met Ralph and Mrs. Merritt at Furnace Creek Inn. The Merritts had been to lunch with us less than two weeks before in Sequoia National Park, and Ralph Merritt was quite tottering and frail after his recent attack of pneumonia [when we saw him]. Yet at Furnace Creek Inn, two weeks later, we found him fatter and as healthy and full of spirits as might be.” White predicted that Merritt’s quick recovery demonstrated that Death Valley would soon “become one of the great health resorts of the United States.

Letter from John White to Horace Albright, February 24, 1931, File Folder pages 1-7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

In short, White wrote, “there is a vast field for the archaeologists in Death Valley country.”

White thought, “Some of the greatest epics of the conquest of the West have been written there in the trials and tribulations of such parties as the Jay Hawkers and the Manlys [early white visitors].”


White wrote “we arrived the day after work had been suspended on the castle, 75 workmen being discharged and the place apparently to be closed entirely to visitors.” And was perhaps chagrined to learn that while a lack of funds had contributed to the termination of construction, “the fact that a national park was to be created to include Scotty’s Castle” had made Scott decide to end the project. “A General Land Office survey had shown that certain parts of the lands which Scotty thought were his did not belong to him [but to the people of the United States].”

White wrote, “a similar injustice would be done if a Land Office survey showed Scotty had not perfected title to the exact areas he thought were his.”

White thought, “Walter Scott is one of the great characters of the west, and many old-timers say that he has done more for Death Valley and the whole Western region than any other man.”

While White apparently learned a great deal more about Scott, he ended what had turned in to a page and a half characterization saying “we learned a tremendous amount of facts and gossip about Death Valley Scotty’s backing and plans, which are of great interest but which are outside the scope of this letter.”

Letter from John White to Horace Albright, February 21, 1931, File folder pages 5-7 Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.
White wrote that Eichbaum “apparently realizes better than any other man the danger to the formations and historical records if no protection is given.”

“It would be a landscape crime to put a paved road, or several paved roads, over the floor of Death Valley where there are now meandering desert roads. Any scheme of development should include careful landscaping of the roads.”

Letter from John White to Horace Albright, February 21, 1931, File Folder pages 5 and 7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

White bemoaned his drive, “from that point [Stovepipe Wells] north towards the Death Valley Ranch, or Scotty’s, the track, for it can scarcely be called a road, is one of the great alluvial fans which characterize the Mojave region. It is about 40 miles from Stovepipe Wells to Scotty’s, and 20 miles of that are about as bad as any roads I have driven over in the West”

Letter from John White to Horace Albright, February 21, 1931, File Folder pages 5 and 7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

White said “for the present, and perhaps for several years, fairly good protection could be given by a custodian with one or two assistants during the season.”


“in order that it might not show up in the landscape. The present desert roads, if rough, have the virtue that they are practically invisible.”

Letter from John White to Director Horace Albright, April 7, 1933, File Folder pages 3-8, “D18 Death Valley Files Misc. 1933-'41,” Box RG 1-7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

White characterized “improvement of the roads to such notable viewpoints as Chloride Cliffs, Dante’s View and Augerberry Point, as well as the roads up some of the more colorful side canyons” as one of the new unit’s most urgent needs.

Letter from John White to Director Horace Albright, April 7, 1933, File Folder pages 3-8, “D18 Death Valley Files Misc. 1933-'41,” Box RG 1-7, Concession Contracts Planning Programs, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

With an eye toward the area’s potential development in the future, he argued that “the boundaries at present established for the Monument and even the areas of the temporary withdrawal [which was larger], do not by any means embrace all the area of Death Valley which should ultimately be within the Monument.” He observed that “it seems a pity not to have these additional areas placed under the Monument while there is comparatively little development.”

The areas that White argued ought to be included, Saratoga Springs, Sand Spring, Last Chance Spring, and Old Confidence Mill being “places which are equal in interest and scenic attractions to the areas embraced within the Monument” would eventually be added in 1994 when the Monument was upgraded to a National Park by the California Desert Protection Act. See: California Desert Protection Act of 1994, 1994, Pub.L. 103-433, Learn more https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/s21/text accessed July 22, 2018.
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White wrote about how “public camp areas at such points as Eagle Borax, Bennett Wells, Mesquite Spring and elsewhere” would be good for tourists. These sites were attractive because “The water supply at these places is open to contamination, and at Bennett Wells we found three dead rats which had recently been taken out of the well. The water which we were compelled to use at Eagle Borax was open to all sorts of contamination, and near the well on the finest salt grass pasture an Indian had thirty or forty head of horses which were feeding there preparatory to driving out for sale to a San Bernardino fox farm.” To his way of looking at it, “a beautiful camping spot was ruined by this grazing and fouling.”

The federal government relocated Indians of Yosemite en masse except for a token population that stayed in a native village in the Valley there until the 1950s. Park staff there interpreted their syncretic adoption of non-native lifeways as having compromised their claim to live in the Valley. Because they were no longer lived “traditional” lives, they had forfeited whatever claim they once might have had to land managed by the Park Service. The Timbisha Shoshone would endure half a century of inconsistent and arbitrary administration before their claim to land there was officially recognized in 2000. See: Mark David Spence Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the making of the National Parks (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000), 101-103


“it is undoubtedly desirable to establish some form of temporary headquarters in the Valley as soon as possible, and to have some man there the year round who can represent the government and enforce regulations, chiefly as protection measures.” But noted that animosity between the Valley’s northern residents, namely Death Valley Scotty, Albert Johnson, and the Eichbaums and its southern residents, the Pacific Coast Borax Company and Timbisha Shoshone, meant that none of them would make good of the Park Service. Instead, he argued that “an outsider should be appointed in order to avoid further jealousies.”

“there seemed to be from fifty to one hundred fifty Indians who live within the Monument or its immediate neighborhood.” He noted that they migrated from the Valley’s floor to more mountainous regions around it seasonally and relied on the pinion pines for most of their summer and fall forage. With respect to their place in the Monument, he said “there seems to be much the same problem here as exists in the Yosemite.” Though he made no recommendations about how the Indians ought to be managed, or by what agency.

White argued that “our first measures will be protective only, that no hasty changes may be feared, and that any changes or development are bound to result in benefit to all those now in the Valley” and was pleased to report that he “found a fine attitude on the part of all, even of Death Valley Scotty, with whom I had several hours conversation at Stovepipe Well.” He even enjoyed a “hearty invitation to go back with him to the Castle and to make a trip with him on mule back to some of the more remote parts of Death Valley country.” White declined, but explored other areas extensively on his own.

White alludes to a previous visit to the Valley in 1931 and says that “Incidentally, work has practically been suspended on the Death Valley ranch or castle for nineteen months; there has been practically no work done there since my visit there two years ago, and the general impression seems to be that the depression has hit the Johnson-Scott outfit, and that the ranch and castle will not be further developed.” It was true that the depression had impacted Johnson’s finances, but his suspension of work on the ranch was due to a combination of that issue and a surveying error. Johnson found out in 1933 that he had built his castle on land managed by the federal government and included in the Monument withdrawal. He suspended construction indefinitely until title could be resolved.

White wrote “travel, signs, and some slight protection work for the various wells and camping places” as “these steps will result in the protection of vegetation and the improvement of public camping areas.” Further, he advocated that visitors be registered at a check station, the boundary be marked, and a study be begun to investigate the addition of nearby areas of interest to the monument.
3.6 Conclusion – Cooperation in creating Death Valley

White’s prediction has held true. I can say from personal experience that rangers in the park today often meet visitors who are disappointed when the temperature fails to top 120 on hot days.

“protection and development of the many wells and springs nearly all of which are now fouled by packrats and small mammals and by horses or burros as well as by human beings. Camping places must be provided with sanitary conveniences.”


Conclusion – Achieving Closure and Stabilization

Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2010), 10-16.
One of the largest programs for national park development was co-managed by the National Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation near dams across the American West. Using reservoirs as their central attractions, the National Park Service developed new park areas in cooperation with the Bureau of Reclamation. At the same time, the agency worked to prevent dam development inside any existing national parks. The contradiction between these two programs shows the complexity involved in simultaneously working to spread and protect aspects of the park paradigm.


Janet A. McDonnell, “Far Reaching Effects: The United States Military and the National Parks during World War II.” *The George Wright Forum* 32 (2015): 89-110. The National Park Service resisted expanding park facilities beyond the scope they were at for tourists in the parks. Even though they used cooperation with the army and navy in testimony to congress, the agency’s director, Newton Drury actively worked to prevent the military from expanding the developed footprint inside national parks.


Annual Report 1942, Annual Reports, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

Annual Report 1942, Annual Reports, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.

Annual Report 1946, Annual Reports, National Park Service Record, Death Valley National Park Archive, Furnace Creek, California.
Epilogue


885 The Park Service completed an environmental impact statement (EIS) to document why they intended to allow helicopter overflights in the backcountry of Glacier. In the document, the park service explains how many flights were necessary, where they would go, and what they would be used to move.


886 Articles in Montana Papers cover this subject at some length, and rangers at Glacier National Park made several press releases on their views of the project. All of these are available online. See: Michael Jamison “Renovation of Sperry Chalet, high in Glacier Park, nearly done” *The Missoulian* July 25, 1998; Associated Press “$1M park toilet won’t work right” *Billings Gazette* October 2, 2005; “The Tale of the Million-Dollar Toilet”; Edward T. Pound, “Costly Outhouses Monuments to Red Tape,” USA TODAY, December 15, 1997.

887 This is not to say that the lodges were totally uncontroversial. When several hikers were killed by bears in the backcountry in the 1960s, biologists were quick to blame the trash that attracted them to highly populated areas like the lodges. The fact that there was not a successful push to close the lodges then shows that the consensus understanding of what a park ought to be had not shifted enough to force action on them.


890 Glacier’s visitation in 2007 (the last year reported on their park fact sheet online) was 2,083,326 people. See: National Park Service, “Fact Sheet” accessed on February 20, 2017 at <https://www.nps.gov/glac/learn/news/fact-sheet.htm>
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