Cherokees, Creeks, and Charlestonians: The Colonial World of James Grant, 1757-1771

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Abstract

The following study provides a revisionist interpretation of the career of James Grant, an officer in the British army during the French and Indian War (1754-1763), and subsequently governor of the new colony of East Florida (1763-1771). Grant's extant biography casts him as a tireless champion of British imperialism on the battlefield and in the council chamber; this analysis accentuates Grant's unabashed careerism and all-consuming ambition, which drove him to defy the direct orders of superiors and occasionally subordinate imperial priorities and objectives to his own. It also reconsiders Grant's command of an invasion of Cherokee country in 1761. Several historians have translated his sympathetic commentary on Cherokees as *prima facie* evidence of an unwillingness to prosecute the war with vigor; this study highlights the terror and destructive efficiency of the campaign. Moreover, this research examines Grant and the events of his colonial career through historiographic lenses other scholars have neglected to affix, including material culture, the history of war and society, postcolonialism, Atlantic World history, entangled history, environmental history, and, most prominently, ethnohistory. Grant's interactions with Native Americans – his defeats at their hands, his victories with their assistance, his devastation of their communities, and the fluency he acquired in their cultures – defined much of his trajectory as a colonial actor, and accordingly take center stage here. Though motifs swirl throughout, thematic organization was eschewed in favor of a more straightforward, chronological approach. The narrative tracks Grant's motions from his arrival in Charlestown on a recruiting mission in 1757 through his departure for London at the culmination of his gubernatorial tenure, unveiling a vast continental theater teaming with markets, tension, and diverse peoples.

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To Jerry and Susie, for begetting, to Kathryn and Donna, for inspiring, and to my darling Kari, for enduring.

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Chapter 1: Charlestown, Consumption, and the Possibilities of the Plantation

When James Grant's transport vessel slid into Charlestown Harbor in the waning days of August 1757, the acquisitive Scottish soldier encountered one of the premier hubs of the British transatlantic marketplace for the first time. During the 1750s, the rice and indigo which annually disembarked from the port he sailed into represented a slice of the aggregate colonial export market disproportionately larger than South Carolina's size relative to the rest of Britain's North American colonies. Research indicates that the colony's commodity export to its mother country exploded between 1720 and the late 1760s, comprising some 30 percent of export value for all North American colonies by the onset of the imperial crisis.[1] Extension of plantations into the hinterlands around Charlestown accounted for the massive growth of South Carolina's export share, which conversely allowed the colony's planters to import an abundance of goods. This surge of luxury commodities, from wrought silver epergnes to fine claret wine, which accompanied the profits yielded by such substantial export margins, rendered the colonial South's lone urban center the preserve of an elite famed for sumptuousness of lifestyle.[2] Despite the fact that their affluence allowed consumption on par with the English squirearchy's (or perhaps because of it), lowcountry planters were acutely aware of their peripheral position in the British Empire, and knew that the foundations of their socioeconomic order (plantation agriculture and African bondage) appeared retrograde and barbaric to metropolitan

[1] R.C. Nash, "The Organization of Trade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670-1775," in *Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina's Plantation Society*, Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute, and Randy J. Sparks, eds., (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 75-76.
[2] Robert M. Weir, *Colonial South Carolina: A History* (Millwood, New York: KTO Press, 1983), 141.

observers across the Atlantic.[3] Such discomfiting realizations and attendant identity crises compelled Carolina's planter class to embrace a conception of modernity in line with the capabilities of the colony's economic substructure – one rooted in the irrigation schema, tract development, and strategic deployment of slaves which defined control over nature and land management in the American colonies.[4] Though the internal tensions that tormented his new Charlestown associates were not immediately apparent to Grant, the prosperity of the Holy City certainly was. Despite his grousing about duty as a "Charles-Town Guard," to an associate back home a few weeks after arriving (complaints rooted in Carolina's location far from the glory and promotions achievable in the French and Indian War's northern theater), the city's genteel society and the remunerative prospects of agribusiness investment intrigued him in relatively short order.[5]

Charlestown's bounty surely appealed to the ambitious soldier, the second son of a Scottish laird whose professed *raison d'etre* was the acquisition of a London townhouse and establishment, complete with the dazzling accouterment, lavish table spread, and social conviviality such an operation enabled.[6] Grant's position within the family hierarchy as a younger son nudged him towards the professional classes so often populated by the little brothers of Britain's landed gentry. After a brief flirtation with law, Grant embraced a military career track. Though Grant's biographer, Paul David Nelson, focuses primarily on the Scot's martial advancement and career as a colonial administrator, which facilitated his

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[3] S. Max Edelson, *Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 166.
[4] Joyce E. Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 2-3, 108-110.
[5] Quoted in Paul David Nelson, *General James Grant: Scottish Soldier and Royal Governor of East Florida* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1993), 17.
[6] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 1.

pursuit of metropolitan refinement until two propitious deaths placed the family estate in his hands, he deemphasizes the motivations and means through which Grant pursued his fortune while a colonial actor. Nelson rather facilely weds Grant's military and administrative careerism to his commitment to the furtherance of British imperial objectives, presenting a neat package of a stereotypical eighteenth-century Scot on the make.[7] His characterization of Grant's accomplishments is largely accurate; Grant undoubtedly ascended Britain's military hierarchy and petitioned for positions within its imperial apparatus, advancing both national and personal aspirations. But the overarching objective that governed his behavior remained the posh London townhome, the bounteous larder, and the social clout one with both wielded in dealings with the English gentry and peerage. Nelson's assessment of Grant's simultaneous pursuit of personal and imperial goals does not constitute an error per se, but it does neglect the impetus of his ambition, and whitewashes the decidedly colonial means by which he fueled his epicurean dreams – those being utilizing his position and social connections to harness public and private sources of capital to bankroll an influx of African slaves and a nascent plantation order as governor of East Florida. Though he often disagreed with American colonists and privately considered many of them provincial social inferiors, Grant embraced the planter ethos while in the colonies, not due to some secular humanistic notion of personal uplift via mastery of land, but rather in the spirit of a Barbadian absentee tapping an inexhaustible vein of lucre to fund all manner of earthly delights, regardless of the human cost. His biographer dismissed frequent correspondent James Wemyss's portrayal of Grant as "a

[7] *Ibid*.

Gamester, a Glutton, and an Epicure" who "lived only for himself" as unfair, but the record bears Wemyss's take out.[8]

Grant's initial appearance on the colonial stage stemmed not from a desire to travel abroad to acquire and improve land, but from his affiliation with the British army and the grand strategy of the Great Commoner. Britain waged a war of immense proportions against its irreconcilable adversary France from 1754 to 1763, and the North American colonies represented both a major theater in the greater conflict and the tail that wagged the imperial dog: armed clashes between the respective powers' colonists and their Native American allies on indigenous ground in the Ohio Valley commenced the hostilities, drawing the ministries which headed the European states into global warfare.[9] In December 1756, William Henry Lyttelton, governor of South Carolina and brother-in-law of Secretary of State William Pitt, reported his colony's paltry defensive fortifications and personnel to the Board of Trade and Plantations, the bureaucratic body responsible for administering royal policy in His Majesty's colonies.[10] The Board of Trade relayed the vulnerable position of the Carolinas and Georgia contained in Lyttelton's report to Pitt, who determined to bolster the region's troop presence.[11] He accordingly created two new regiments exclusively composed of Highland Scots (James Grant's demographic) to serve in North America. The organization of the First Highland Regiment, commanded by Colonel Archibald Montgomery, represented a chance for quick professional advancement to Grant,

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[8] *Ibid*., 3.
[9] See Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 5-7, 50-73.
[10] Brother-in-law in Edward J. Cashin, *Governor Henry Ellis and the Transformation of British North America* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 132. Report to BOT in Jack P. Greene, "The South Carolina Quartering Dispute, 1757-1758," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Oct. 1959): 194-195.
[11] Greene, "Quartering Dispute," 195.

one the captain seized upon. He purchased a commission that elevated him to the rank of major and set about coaxing his countrymen to fill out the regiment, eagerly anticipating the prospects that martial success in America would afford him.[12]

Though the mutual ministerial and colonial concern about a French peril emanating from the Alabama fort deep in the backcountry represents the most readily apparent reason for Grant's deployment to South Carolina, the creation of a unit like the First Highland Regiment could only occur in the context of an eighteenth-century British identity that encompassed Scots' participation in empire building. Though Grant's father William eschewed Jacobitism during the 1715 uprising, many of his fellow Highlanders rebelled, and did so again during the '45 rebellion, the last insurrection aimed at toppling the established Protestant succession in favor of the deposed Catholic House of Stuart. Like his father, James backed the Hanoverian regime, serving on the continent under the man who would become the great scourge of his kinsmen, William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland, less than a year before the Butcher's punitive campaign in Scotland.[13] After Culloden, Jacobitism no longer represented a viable threat to Hanoverian monarchs, and successive ministries sought to cement Scottish loyalty through the dispensation of state offices, imperial governorships, and military commissions. Grant's service to the British state predated this bonanza of preferment, but his career prospects accelerated in the two decades following the rebellion. In 1751, Lord Barrington, Pitt's Secretary of War and the signatory of Grant's promotion from major to lieutenant colonel, espoused a preference for Highlander soldiers in the British army over enlistees "of any other country we can recruit

[12] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 16.
[13] *Ibid*., 5,9.

from," citing resilient physical constitutions and (somewhat paradoxically given the recent uprising) a distaste for mutiny as the reason for their desirability.[14] The coalescence of the First Highland Regiment and the opportunity it presented to Grant thus represented the erection of a British military complex reliant upon hardy, martial Highlanders, a demographic which one historian has dubbed "the arsenal of empire."[15] Grant and his cohort's presence in South Carolina during 1757-8 had as much to do with the enlargement of the British fiscal-military state as it did personal ambition or Anglo-French territorial jockeying.

Despite a few cameos of his voice that manifest in other collections, a paucity of correspondence penned by Grant himself appears in the collection that bears his name (The James Grant of Ballindalloch Papers) for the duration of his first stint in South Carolina (and, for that matter, his participation in General Forbes's campaign to seize Fort Duquesne from the French the following year). The officer is thus rendered a virtual mute subaltern, and the impact of his preliminary colonial encounter must be deduced largely from what we know of his personality, previous correspondence, accounts of events in which he was involved, and the letters of his commanding officers. Fortunately, letters sent and invoices accumulated in the Highlands while he prepared to depart reveal much about Grant's mentality on the eve of his voyage west. Grant coaxed enlistments from volunteers in his home county of Banffshire, and others from neighboring Moray and Nairnshire.[16] He made short work of procuring his portion of the regiment, filling his levy in about a month's

[14] Quoted in Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1832* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 120.
[15] Colley, *Britons*, 120.
[16] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 16.

time during February and March 1757, though he received significant help in this matter from extended family, particularly his young nephew William McPherson.[17]

Recruiting requirements fulfilled, Grant had nearly four months before the First's scheduled departure from Cork, so he spent it ensuring that he would cut an imposing figure in the New World and exude refinement when swigging madeira alongside the fellow British military brass stationed in the southern colonies. Itemized tailors' bills constitute a significant portion of the 1757 letterbox, providing a detailed account of the custom garments and furnishing ordered by the headstrong junior officer. Choice items include 17 yards of brilliant scarlet cloth and silver buttons and lace for regimental suits, a swanskin jacket, superfine linen tablecloths, and a beech bedframe, a "check flock mattress," and a chintz quilt for comfortable bedding.[18] Grant's desire to sport stylish threads abroad prompted him to request Captain James Masterton, a comrade in arms from the War of the Austrian Succession, to function as his purchasing agent at the retail stalls and tailor's workshops of Cheapside and Covent Garden. Masterton assured Grant of his astute taste in the correspondence, promising painstaking selections in line with "what I would have ordered myself."[19] Masterton refrained from bargain hunting during his shopping spree as Grant's proxy, only purchasing "everything the best of its kind." Grant's slumbers upon arriving in the semi-tropical zone would be sound, for his bedding would eclipse that of "any man on the expedition," and his chilled libations would slosh in a "noble" crystal punch bowl over which Masterton hoped Grant would "rejoice." In addition to the

[17] "Send the recruits you have raised for my company as soon as possible" in James Grant to William McPherson, February 16, 1757, "I shall be glad to hear how the recruiting business goes in Badenoch" in James Grant to William McPherson, March 5, 1757, *James Grant of Ballindalloch Papers* (hereafter *JGP*), Reel 30, Frames 112, 116, Microfilm, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[18] Various receipts appear in *JGP*, Reel 30, Frames 166-167, 176, and 181.
[19] James Masterton to James Grant, February 8, 1757, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frames 108-109.

aforementioned itemized list of clothing and bedding, Masterton secured leggings, footwear, and saddles for Grant from a hosier, a cobbler, and a tanner. The combined bill for Grant's sartorial haul totaled £105 within "a few shillings out or in," the equivalent of some $22,000 in 2019.[20] Such expenditure in the name of panache reeks of excess even for the scion of a well-heeled gentry family during an era of increased flamboyant consumption in Western Europe, and mark Grant as a dandy. Masterton's correspondence also alludes to the Scots officer's priorities as a gourmand. In addition to securing the clothes, Grant's agent had conveyed an unrecovered list of preferred provisions to both the quartermaster and cook of the regiment, who would locate the foodstuffs, preserve them in a hanger, and eventually place them on the First's transport ship. Grant would be pleased to learn that the chef "spoke French," and hopefully specialized in haute cuisine, rich roux, and other culinary delights. Masterton's purchases reveal Grant's strong desire to secure a favorable reception from his peers and senior officers as well as the obedience of his subordinates via a show of cultural sophistication; ostentatious attire and a refined palate facilitated not only high living in America for the junior officer, but also the dignified company of men who would determine his level of promotion.

Though excessive spending on regimental attire and the assurance of gustatory satisfaction in the colonies mark Grant as an epicure who sought to gratify his own culinary and sartorial sensibilities and those of his peers, correspondence from home divulges his more corporeal, private tastes. From 1752 to 1755, Grant served as the traveling

[20] *Ibid*., This extremely rough estimate is predicated upon the inflation index created by Alice Hanson Jones for her economic history *The Wealth of a Nation to Be: The American Colonies on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). See the 1774 to 1977 pound sterling to dollar conversion in Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 216 and Peter A. Coclanis, *The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and Death in the South Carolina Low Country 1670-1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 89. Jones' estimate applied to the colonies 17 years after Grant's shopping spree, so the figure is likely conservative.

companion of William Sutherland, the teenage grandnephew of General James St. Clair, Grant's commander during his tenure in the Royal Scots Regiment.[21] Grant accompanied the youth on his Kavalierstour throughout Europe before cohabiting with him after his matriculation to the University of Göttingen. Grand Tours typically involved immersion in antique civilization, but also frequently fostered libertinism, as surging testosterone, Italian vintages, and a lack of parental authority often combined to produce debauched continental jaunts. Though chaperones were expected to act as curb youthful impulses, it appears that Grant operated more along the lines of a facilitator. Reflecting on their travels in a missive sent after Grant's arrival in Carolina, Sutherland bemoaned Grant's recall to Ireland at the onset of the Seven Years' War. Grant's reassignment prevented him from continuing with his aristocratic associate into Italy, where he could enjoy "as much fucking as you please"; in the Campagna, "if a man could be all prick it would be so much the better."[22] The lusty peer-in-waiting's sexually charged correspondence imparted his deep affinity for the older Scot; Sunderland proposed visiting South Carolina, but preferred his former escort to come "home soon and don't stay in that damned place any longer," and assured Grant that he was his "forever and ever" in the valediction.[23] Such intimations tantalize the historian's imagination, but the documentary record only yields so much. All subtext aside, Sutherland's frank letter allows for at least one reasonable conclusion: Grant

[21] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 15. His young charge hailed from an aristocratic family (he later became the Earl of Sutherland), one whose patronage would secure Grant's election to the House of Commons as the representative of Tain Borough in 1773. See *Ibid*., 81.
[22] "Le Marquise" to James Grant, May 30, 1758, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frames 229-231.
[23] *Ibid*.

entered the British colonial world with strong visceral urges to match his ardor for food and finery.[24]

Grant's penchant for style and gastronomic gratification certainly sprang in part from a desire to please the senses, but his behavior also relates to a phenomenon historians of early modern material culture refer to as conspicuous consumption. A byproduct of individuation, flourishing markets and sheer human vanity, conspicuous consumption was one of the most tangible impacts of the consumer revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; it involved Europeans (and Euro-Americans) acquiring and displaying material goods not to satiate some need, but to compete with others.[25] Goods such as Grant's scarlet jacket and crystal punchbowl symbolized power, refinement, and the authority of the British army to any who observed them, and represent costly pieces of the self-constructed edifice that the officer used to secure social capital and economic advancement. Grant could not have entered a New World locale that better reflected these norms than his preliminary assignment. In Charlestown, Grant encountered a gentry class intimately familiar with mass expenditure in the name of affectation. The affluent he encountered on Charlestown's thoroughfares constantly strove to emulate what they understood to be London's fashion and style in attire, manners, and speech, as such distinctions elevated them to the status of gentlefolk and underpinned their authority to govern the lesser free and bound inhabitants of the colony.[26] Even the domestic slaves and

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[24] Grant's time in Charlestown yielded no evidence of sexual liaisons, but his gubernatorial tenure in East Florida is much more suggestive, despite the paucity of women in the colony.
[25] The most straightforward explanation of this sort of expenditure is found in Peter Burke, "*Res et Verba*: Conspicuous Consumption in the Early Modern World," John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., *Consumption and the World of Goods* (London: Routledge, 1993), 148-161.
[26] Robert Olwell, *Masters, Slaves, & Subjects: The Culture of Power in the South Carolina Low Country, 1740-1790* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 39.

artisans hired out by their owners to work in the city that streamed past the Scottish soldier as they went about their daily tasks showcased a flair for the modish; the clothing expenditures of favored domestics and skilled laborers who gamed the system by skimming some of the profit from the total owed their owners incensed elite municipal trendsetters to the point that sumptuary laws aimed at slaves were included in the 1740 Negro Act.[27] Planters certainly possessed the monetary wherewithal to spend on unnecessaries; by mid-century, white South Carolinians in the lowcountry benefitted from the highest per capita income and overall wealth of any region in the British North American colonies.[28] Carolinians conveyed status through the possession of staggering quantities of disposable income and the will to nonchalantly squander when they chronically partook in frivolous expenditure during leisure activities such as gambling.[29] Evidence of this ready money and its disposal in a manner befitting of the English upper classes presented itself to Grant upon his deployment in Charlestown, as his commander informed him of the spartan open-air accommodations that the men of his Royal American Regiment suffered through at New Market Race Course, two miles outside of Charlestown proper.[30] The Holy City's upper crust wagered heavily and casually there during the winter, as the venue functioned as the site of the climax of the city's social season, but Lt. Col.

[27] *Ibid*., 42.
[28] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 141. According to economic historian Peter A. Coclanis's calculations, the average total wealth of a white lowcountry wealth holder (or head of household) from 1757-1762 (the period during which Grant's deployment occurred) was £1,293.42 sterling. This figure amounts to roughly $272,000 per head of household in 2019 currency. Coclanis, *The Shadow of a Dream*, 89.
[29] Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 81.
[30] Henry Bouquet to John Stanwix, Charlestown, June 23, 1757, S.K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, Autumn L. Leonard, eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1* (Harrisburg, PA: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1972), 121-123.

Henry Bouquet's soldiers languished there in a rain-soaked mud hole, enduring malarial conditions during the summer and early fall of 1757.[31]

Grant's wholehearted embrace of the excesses of the marketplace should not overshadow another commonality he shared with most of Charlestown's ruling class: a mercantile ethos lurking behind a gentleman's veneer. Lowcountry historians have noted the curious manner in which Carolina rice magnates fused the Whiggish values that dominated the eighteenth-century British political economy with the façade of the Tory squire. Elite Carolinians cut fine figures of landed aristocrats, but, much to the chagrin of the proprietors, who wanted Carolina estates to function along the lines of those of the British peerage and to compel settlers to adopt their preferred crops regardless of profitability, the lowcountry planters embraced credit and state investment schemes to fuel the growth of commercial agriculture and improvement projects.[32] Banking, commerce, the national debt, and the rise of the British fiscal-military state, the program of post-Revolution Whig Party, gradually subsumed the quasi-feudal landlord-rentier model espoused by Tories as the eighteenth century wore on, eventually calcifying into an apolitical "perpetual reality of public life."[33] South Carolina's planter class thrived in the newly capitalized economy, translating ready credit into additional tidal swamplands and slaves, whose labor transformed the marshes into reservoirs for flooding their rice fields

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[31] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 238; Edward Pearson, "'Planters Full of Money,' The Self-Fashioning of the Eighteenth-Century South Carolina Elite," in Greene, Brana-Shute, Sparks, eds., *Money, Trade, and Power*, 307.
[32] Edelson, *Plantation Enterprise*, 8-9; Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 26-27.
[33] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 114-123; Such blanket statements about Tories and Whigs belied contemporary realities, as some Tories embraced a commercial ethic as practicing merchants, while some Whigs were exclusively landed men. Generally speaking, however, the former railed against the expansion of public finance and the rise of political power exerted by men with an abundance of liquid capital but little stake in England's land, while the latter actively sought to promote it. See Geoffrey Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne* (London: Hambledon, 1987), 148-182.

and filling their indigo vats. Though his Cherokee War era disputes with Carolina's elite have positioned him as an imperial official adversarial to their strong desire for local autonomy (which, admittedly, he was), Grant emulated the Whiggish mercantile ethic in most of his personal business dealings – after recognizing the exigency of slavery and commercial agriculture to personal enrichment in the lowcountry, he immediately sought to invest in it. As East Florida's governor, he initially harnessed public finance to shelter planned industries reliant upon indentured southern Europeans to produce exotic fare before abandoning such centrally managed endeavors and again using government funding to temporarily sustain staple monoculture on plantations. Grant also spearheaded large-scale improvement projects designed to increase Ballindalloch's agricultural yield after he came into his inheritance and returned to Scotland.[34] The late colonial era zeitgeist of projecting and improvement suffused the greater lowcountry, impacting the decisions of those in position to acquire land and slaves.[35] This spirit of improvement enveloped Grant during his time in the lower South, driving him towards investment alongside his Carolina associates. Refined gentry affectations concealed deeply ingrained commercial sensibilities, as Grant's ancestral loyalty to the House of Hanover represented just one facet of his Whiggism.

[34] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 79.

[35] A recent title which analyzes native conceptualizations of goods and gifts turns conventional wisdom regarding the Lower South's *laissez-faire* political economy on its head, however, claiming that planter anxieties over the consequences of unfettered backcountry commerce between colonial peddlers and Native Americans and an unwillingness to yield political power to these hardscrabble, wealth-generating Indian traders led directly to the adoption of monopolies to regulate that trade. Such exclusionary trade regulation policies and empowerment of landholders at the expense of merchants were lifted directly from the Tory political playbook. Perhaps divergent political economies dictated the terms by which the agricultural sector and the deerskin trade operated. See Jessica Yirush Stern, *The Lives in Objects: Native Americans, British Colonists, and Cultures of Labor and Exchange in the Southeast* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 5-7.

Despite the primitive patina that metropolitan outsiders like Grant detected when they initially observed the slavery, floral oddities, and semitropical humidity of the Carolina lowcountry, the planter class created a society that resembled England in its consumption patterns and standard of living. They did so through embracing an agricultural schema rooted in incessant alteration of the landscape and erecting a vibrant, staple driven market that yielded liquid capital to spend on British manufactures, country homes, and the imposition of order on an ever-expanding periphery of territory. Elites self-consciously obsessed over projecting their civility and Charlestown's legitimacy as a center of English high culture not only to one another, but to power brokers throughout the greater British Empire. West Indian émigré, staple crop diversifier, and dinner party hostess extraordinaire Eliza Lucas Pinckney channeled planter-class preoccupation with projecting English values when she framed contemporary life in Charlestown as "very much in the English taste."[36] This Anglicizing thrust revealed the South Carolina lowcountry's development to be in lockstep with the greater Barbadian cultural hearth that encompassed it and Britain's Caribbean possessions, a zone characterized by colonies with shared histories involving founding migrants from Barbados, plantation systems that required heavy initial capital outlay and created black majorities and tropical commodities, and an upper echelon with strong ties to Britain.[37] Though their absenteeism was never on the scale of Barbados or Jamaica, some Carolinians opted for a "home life" in Britain, while the scions of distinguished families sought education in the humanities, law, and medicine

[36] Quoted in Olwell, *Masters, Slaves, and Subjects*, 38.
[37] Matthew Mulcahy, *Hubs of Empire: The Southeastern Lowcountry and British Caribbean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2014), 1-8.

almost exclusively at English institutions, just like their Barbadian brethren.[38] Other than a brief and rather disastrous deployment to Pennsylvania, this hearth and its societal norms and developmental requirements would preoccupy Grant for the next fourteen years.

By the time of Grant's initial colonial service, agricultural innovators in South Carolina had already mastered the cultivation and processing techniques of the crop he would one day call his "Hobby Horse": indigo.[39] The crippling shipping and insurance rates that accompanied the conflicts of the 1740s left lowcountry planters scrambling to jettison the suddenly anemic rice monoculture that had proven so enormously lucrative during the preceding forty years. Indigo, a violet-colored dyestuff in high demand among English textile weavers, provided financial relief in the form of a viable secondary staple. The valuable tropical commodity proved a near-flawless response to the unique set of problems bedeviling those exclusively reliant on swamp rice cultivation during the 1740s; it flourished on high, dry land unsuited to rice plants, was not particularly labor intensive during periods that rice required additional attention, and proved demanding during the processing phase, a stark contrast to rice's taxing growth phase.[40] Most propitiously, indigo production yielded immense value in the form of tiny, rectangular cakes that proved the cost-per-unit counterpoint to rice, which nearly had to function as ship ballast when sent across the Atlantic in order to earn substantial profits. Indigo's value relative to its bulk, its consistent market in the British textile industry, and the bounty it enjoyed due to Parliamentary statute elevated the dye from experimental plots of land to the center of

[38] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 250-251; for elaboration on the strength of the island colonies' ties to Britain, see also Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 3-33.
[39] Quoted in Nelson, *General James Grant*, 72.
[40] Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 193.

plantation enterprise.[41] Skilled slaves knowledgeable of indigo vat boiling, plant beating, the timing of introducing lime upon the dye's oxidation, and the creation and preservation of the cakes found themselves elevated to managerial positions supervising the plant's manufacture, were usually exempt from field labor in perpetuity, and sold for three times the price of a reliable field hand.[42] Savvy plantation managers reconfigured the focus of their enterprises, quickly reassigning divisions of slave labor to indigo in order to salvage the year's return on investment.[43] When the First Highland Battalion came to Charlestown's defense, South Carolina exported over half a million pounds of indigo a year.[44] Conditions amenable to the production of high-quality indigo in East Florida would convince Grant to promote the crop's viability to prospective settlers, adopt the dye as the primary agri-commodity cultivated on his plantation, and ballyhoo the quality of his yield to competitors a mere seven years after he encountered the blue gold while defending Charlestown.

If the wharf planks creaking as stevedores loaded barrels of rice and casks of indigo and unloaded manufactured goods failed to tip Grant off to the massive capital accumulation occurring in Charlestown upon his arrival, the impressive exteriors of the town's single and double houses, crafted in the Georgian style so preferred by the contemporary English gentry, surely did.[45] While Grant's primary business in the colony during this period remained recruiting and defense, he crossed paths with the "planters full

[41] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 146; Mulcahy, *Hubs of Empire*, 103.
[42] For an example of a slave indigo manager, see Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 199; Mulcahy, *Hubs of Empire*, 103.
[43] Henry Laurens flipped his Mepkin Plantation's production from rice to indigo and back again during the 1760s as the market dictated. See Edelson, *Plantation Enterprise*, 213.
[44] Mulcahy, *Hubs of Empire*, 104.
[45] Coclanis, *The Shadow of a Dream*, 6.

of money" riding the current of a surging revenue stream. Provincial gentry housed the officers of Montgomery's First Highland Battalion and Bouquet's Royal American Regiment (Grant included) at the colony's expense for most of their deployment, and Grant attended many soirees in the dining halls of Charlestown luminaries.[46] At such daily rendezvous Grant found a willing audience for his finery, and the local gentry met a dapper gourmand upon whom they could shower their larders' bounty. The junior officer's palate surely savored the figs, peaches, and oranges grown in their hinterland orchards and the mutton, brisket, and turkey produced from pastureland ringing the perimeter of the city.[47] Despite a generational presence that designated them as creoles, by the late 1750s Charlestown's gentry had made significant progress towards Anglicizing their local institutions, society, and themselves; the colonial spreads devoured by Grant mimicked the notion of comfort and hospitality prevalent among eighteenth-century gentry in Britain.[48] This transatlantic discourse of taste allowed Grant and Charlestown's gentry to communicate their respective economic and cultural power with each other; the two spoke the same language.[49] A rapidly growing mid-century British colonial world accelerated the frequency of shared experiences centered around consuming and displaying fashionable goods that increasingly bound its gentlefolk together in a materialistic behavioral code regardless of their points of origin. Grant's dazzling accoutrements and his hosts' fig pies represented single phrases in what the don of early American material cultural studies has labeled an

[46] Greene, "Quartering Dispute," 198; One such home was Sophy Hall, a manor house on a plantation that Grant came to partially own during his first deployment in Charlestown. See Sophia Fesch to Henry Bouquet, Sophy Hall, May, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 407-408.
[47] For more on Charlestown hinterland plantations as "Kitchen-Gardens" of the town, see Edelson, *Plantation Enterprise*, 138.
[48] Olwell, *Masters, Slaves, & Subjects*, 13.
[49] For Charlestonian refinement and gentility as public performances designed to project power, see Pearson, "'Planters Full of Money," in Greene, Brana-Shute, Sparks, eds., *Money, Trade, and Power*, 299-316.

"ecumenical" system of social communication, one which allowed those far afield in the empire to "smooth their reception" abroad by the appropriate presentation of gentility.[50] Although Grant's history with the lowcountry planter class would be fraught with contentious episodes, he recognized the silhouette of a high society in keeping with the one he yearned to frequent in the imperial metropole and sought to understand and harness the mechanism by which his colonial peers created it.

The British army's deployment to Charlestown was partially attributable to anxieties wrought by this mechanism – human bondage. Concern over a potential Creek overland expedition inspired by the French stationed at Fort Toulouse, their citadel amongst the Upper Creeks at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers in modern-day central Alabama, prompted Lyttelton to request military assistance. This request motivated William Pitt and the Earl of Loudoun to order Bouquet and Montgomery to the colony, while the prospect of a French flotilla launched from Saint Domingue materializing in Charlestown Harbor also evoked a terrified response from the populace.[51] Grant himself noted the collective unease over French plans pervading Charlestown society in 1757, claiming that Charlestonians were "rich and were much alarmed for fear of a visit from the French," who would then confiscate their "rice and indigo at a low price, which brings large sums into the province."[52] Grant's commentary on frayed nerves in the capital implies that some planters feared losing the return on a harvest more than other consequences that could follow an overland Indian or amphibious French attack and occupation, though other

[50] Cary Carson, *Face Value: The Consumer Revolution and the Colonizing of America* (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 2017), 158.
[51] Greene, "Quartering Dispute," 194; Bouquet to Stanwix, Charlestown, June 23, 1757, in Stevens, Kent, and Leonard, eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 121-123.
[52] Quoted in Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 108.

byproducts of French pressure on the colony's periphery looked even more daunting. A letter from Loudoun to Lyttelton a few months after the governor raised the specter of a French attack reveals that the potential of a domestic insurrection within Carolina itself spooked lowcountry elites even more than the Gallic peril. South Carolina could field a substantial militia (some 7,000 men), but dared not install them to guard the colony's western periphery. These militiamen constituted no professional unit, and thus could not be assigned to Fort Prince George or Fort Moore hundreds of backcountry miles away because they were volunteers who derived daily sustenance from activities other than soldiering. Even if handsomely reimbursed as a new provincial regiment, however, this force would not coalesce to defend any portion of the colony but the vicinity of Charlestown without significant military aid from the British Empire. The South Carolinians quaked at the prospect of raising their own troops and beseeched the Board of Trade and the Earl of Loudoun, commander in chief of British North American forces, to send substantial reinforcements "on account of the great Number of Blacks, that they are afraid of their rising, if they shou'd move any of their White Men to their Frontiers."[53] Slavery as a productive labor regime mandated physical coercion, close supervision, and the specter of punitive violence; the font of the opulence and sociability taken in by Grant in the households of the well-heeled relied entirely upon the substantial presence of white men to deter slaves from rebelling via intimidation. Despite their reliance on slave labor and steady importation of bondspeople, Carolina's planter class considered the Africans a constant threat to social order throughout the lowcountry. The militiamen of the province,

[53] Loudoun to Lyttelton, New York, April 24, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 94-95.

many of them members of the gentry, comprised the slave patrol whose nightly rounds functioned to curb any real subversion; one historian claims that by the culmination of the colonial period that the South Carolina militia "had become little more than a giant patrol."[54] Loudoun assured Lyttelton of his "greatest attention to your Province" and felt that Bouquet's Royal Americans "additional force" would be "sufficient to keep them [the slaves] in awe," thus theoretically assuaging the anxieties of the owners and freeing up militiamen to serve for durations lengthier than a night. [55] Loudoun accordingly proposed the raising of a provincial unit of 500 Carolinians to garrison advanced posts and head off French-allied Indian raids "according to the Situation of the Country and where the danger may be apprehended," while the British regulars would remain in the urban center to quash prospective slave uprisings, for Charlestown was "the place of greatest importance."[56] Grant and his officer cohort thus commanded the force that undergirded planter wealth and authority during their time in the province, a position of which they were acutely aware.

Lowcountry planters enjoyed exceedingly prolific harvests during the late 1750s, but intense paranoia over rebellions tinged their prosperity. Their panic levels surged during wartime, when the empire's nemeses provided inspiration and opportunity for slave rebellions. Due to a growing reliance on the transatlantic slave market to satisfy the colony's labor needs, black residents of South Carolina exceeded white ones by 1708; over the following three decades, forced migrants from West Africa came to dominate the

[54] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 196.
[55] Loudoun to Lyttelton, New York, April 24, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 94-95.
[56] *Ibid*.

province's peoples, doubling the number of whites in the colony by the 1720s.[57] Euro-American colonists' horror over the destructive capacity of the potential fifth column incubating in their midst increased with every shipment of those bound to expand their fortunes, and reached a fever pitch in September 1739, when slaves rebelled west of Charlestown on the bank of the Stono River, killing 24 whites and setting plantations to the torch. Whether fueled by slaves' awareness of impending war between Britain and Spain and knowledge of immediate legal manumission upon arriving in Spanish Florida and embracing Catholicism, an overwhelming desire to punish the owner class and strike a blow against the institution, or, as Peter Charles Hoffer has recently argued, a series of contingencies that compelled the slaves into escalating violence and eventually open revolt, the Stono Rebellion lent tangible form to planters' fever dreams, and provoked policy-driven responses.[58] The Commons House of Assembly enacted a law requiring at least one white man's presence for every ten slaves present on a plantation. A more impactful law set a prohibitive duty on slaves imported from Africa or the West Indies. This tax stemmed the flow of saltwater slaves to a trickle of the torrent of the 1730s, as yearly imports plummeted from well over a thousand per year during that decade to roughly a hundred per year during the 1740s.[59] Freight rates and insurance premiums spiked during the 1740s, as the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War rendered transatlantic shipping perilous, cut off entire continental European markets for the Carolina-grown grain previously supplied by British merchants, and seriously eroded profit margins for rice

[57] Peter H. Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 Through the Stono Rebellion* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974), 142-152.
[58] Peter Charles Hoffer, *Cry Liberty: The Great Stono River Slave Rebellion of 1739* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 62-88.
[59] Wood, *Black Majority*, 324-325; Olwell, *Masters, Slaves, and Subjects*, 28.

planters; though they also spurred agricultural diversification, these developments and the levy on slave importation ended the exponential growth that had characterized South Carolina's rice economy during the first four decades of the eighteenth century.[60] War's end resulted in major reductions in shipping costs, a resurgence of rice's profitability, repeal of the duty on slave importation in 1752, and the import of tens of thousands of African slaves to slake growing labor demands.[61] Burgeoning arrivals and resumed conflict with France in the late 1750s stoked white Carolinians' phobia of slave revolt. An eighteenth-century ebb and flow of planter neurosis thus mirrored slavery's stagnation and growth across time in the colony, with tension most prevalent during periods of mass import and armed conflict. The presence of both conditions resulted in the colony's plea for a deployment of His Majesty's forces in 1757.

Three crises beset the British military while stationed in Charlestown from summer 1757 to spring 1758, one medical (harrowing outbreaks of yellow fever and malaria plaguing vulnerable Northern European constitutions upon their entry into the sweltering, boggy lowcountry environment), one economic (the abysmal failure of the recruiting mission due to insufficient enlistment incentives), and one political (the well-documented tripartite dispute between Lyttelton, the Commons House of Assembly, and the officer corps over the province's provision of quarters). All three beleaguered Bouquet's Royal Americans during the summer before the First Highland Regiment's arrival in Charlestown; each fed the others to render service in the colony decidedly unpleasant for the regimental rank and file. A crisis of pestilence beset the First Highland Regiment immediately upon

[60] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 145; Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 190.
[61] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 147.

entry into the environs of Charlestown. Coastal Carolina's notoriety as a fenland rife with maladies that disproportionately imperiled newcomers preceded Grant's association with the region; Lowcountry colonists long stressed the necessity of "seasoning" (or acclimating oneself to the inevitable fevers) as a prerequisite to societal assimilation, and viewed those who survived the winnowing imposed by endemic diseases like malaria and yellow fever as both physically and intellectually hale enough to operate in their environment.[62] Ironically, Charlestonian anxiety regarding the spread of another disease relegated the troops serving under Bouquet to a malarial bog during the late summer broil. While stationed briefly at Hampton Roads, awaiting a detachment of Virginia provincials who were to accompany them on the recruiting and defense mission to the south, some of Bouquet's Royal Americans had contracted smallpox before arriving in South Carolina. Panic arose over the epidemic that could have ensued had these men occupied the city proper, and the Commons House of Assembly beseeched the Swiss colonel to prohibit his men from coming to town for the time being.[63] Bouquet complied, even though he believed that the smallpox infection had run its course. Within a bare week of arrival, Bouquet saw his infirmary ward's occupancy increase tenfold, as the number of soldiers in the tented sickbay on the race course grounds grew from 5 to 50.[64] The German naturalist Johann David Schoepf's characterization of Carolina as "in the spring a paradise, in the summer a hell, and in the autumn a hospital" held true for the British newcomers stationed there under Bouquet.[65]

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[62] Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 93-108.
[63] Henry Bouquet to John Stanwix, Charlestown, June 23, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 121-123.
[64] *Ibid*.
[65] Quoted in Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 79.

The entre of Montgomery's regiment on the scene in September heralded more seasoning and misery. The race course, which the summer rains had rendered a bog, necessitated Bouquet's relocation to Charlestown proper a week before the Scots showed up.[66] Despite the move, Grant's cohort also found itself susceptible to the "quotidian ague" of malaria.[67] Bouquet first commented on their condition in mid-September, noting that the First was "healthy when they arrived, but grew extremely sickly"; by mid-October, the regiment's condition grew bleak, as more than 60 of the 1,113 that departed from Cork had perished.[68] The inability or unwillingness of Lyttelton, the Commons House of Assembly, and the property owners of Charlestown to proffer adequate housing for the entire imperial force in their midst exacerbated the plight of the Scottish regiment. Bouquet noted that in the shuffle to relocate the body of troops from the race course to the city, the Highlanders found themselves quartered in "a Half finished Church without Windows, in Damp Store-houses upon the Quay, and in empty Houses where most of the Men were obliged to ly upon the Ground without Straw or any sort of covering."[69] These untenable conditions compounded the impact of lowcountry disease vectors, assuring "Immediate Sickness" as the upshot "of such a reception after so long a Voyage." By September's close, distemper incapacitated a staggering 500 Highlanders, though Bouquet conceded that the generosity of some Charlestonians, who "out of Compassion received near 200 of them into

[66] Henry Bouquet to Daniel Webb, Charlestown, August 25, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 169-170.
[67] This characterization of the ailment (which afflicted coastal regions throughout the colonial South) as an everyday problem found in Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia: 1740-1790*, 2d. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 48.
[68] Henry Bouquet to Daniel Webb, Charlestown, September 10, 1757, Bouquet to Loudoun, Charlestown, October 16, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 196, 212-218.
[69] Representation of Field Officers Regarding Troops, Charlestown, December 2, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 196, 248-250.

their houses," prevented even more casualties. [70] For his part, Grant considered his prior exposure to Mediterranean climes while in the company of Sutherland adequate preparation for Charlestown's crucible, echoing prevailing local sentiments about endurance of environmental conditioning as the key to surviving seasoning. He believed that exposure to the temperatures in "the South of France" would allow him to "bear the heat" better than his fellows at arms.[71] Grant's musings revealed that he had already adopted (likely through interaction with South Carolina planters) provincial medical discourse, albeit misunderstanding the rules – Charlestonians believed that only perpetual residence within the lowcountry (not in similar climates elsewhere) could yield constitutions hearty enough to stave off the fevers.[72] Regardless of his imperfect comprehension of Charlestown medical mentalités, Grant observed firsthand the profound nature of the health crisis; an invoice for fourteen wooden coffins purchased by the officer as vessels for the eternal repose of his direct subordinates imparts the somberness of the regimental seasoning.[73]

An abysmal recruitment effort paralleled the debilitating infections and contributed significantly to the frustrations of Grant and the other British officers in Charlestown. Their inability to secure provincial enlistments from Carolinians in 1757 and the utter futility of that enterprise across colonies during the early stages of the war arose from deeply flawed ministerial and army policies which became synonymous with the North American commandership of the Earl of Loudoun, though he only deserves to shoulder part of the

[70] *Ibid*.
[71] Grant to Brodie, September 22, 1757, cited in Nelson, *General James Grant,* 17.
[72] Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit*, 100.
[73] Mary Watson, Receipt for Coffins, Major Grant's Company, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frames 277-278.

blame. The Crown expected Loudoun to cement the mass participation of provincial manpower during the war effort, but assumed that the colonial legislatures could be pressured into mutually subsidizing these units through a common fund and would willingly relinquish the authority to direct those troops to the commander in chief of the British army in North America.[74] These presumptions galled provincial powerbrokers long accustomed to oversight over such matters, and smacked of an arbitrary exercise of power. Moreover, fiscal restitution for soldiering was insultingly paltry when considered alongside the wages attainable by free white men in the labor-starved colonies.[75] Military service in eighteenth-century North America adhered to the guiding principle of local volunteerism and depended upon part-time contributions, and colonial men balked at the prospect of serving in the same capacity as the rank-and-file of the British army, who were expected to march and drill daily and subjected to an exceedingly harsh disciplinary regime. Such policies disregarded cultural and economic realities in the colonies.

At a Philadelphia meeting in March 1757, Loudoun provided the governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina with an outline of the musters he expected from each colony, a fraction of which would be used alongside Bouquet's 500 Royal Americans to provide South Carolina with 2,000 men to defend both Charlestown and its western periphery.[76] Lyttelton and Henry Ellis, the governor of Georgia, declined to participate in the meeting due to the long-distance travel required to attend, but Loudoun wrote to reassure Lyttelton that assistance was forthcoming and to inform him that South

[74] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 167-168.
[75] *Ibid*., 227-228.
[76] Minutes of a Meeting with the Southern Governors, March 15, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 196, 91-93.

Carolina bore responsibility for fielding 500 of the combined force.[77] Loudoun's recruiting projections would be dashed by every party expected to contribute to this intercolonial army; indeed, enlistment shortfalls led directly to the First Highland Regiment's deployment to Charlestown later in the year. While whitewashing his own failure to provide a regiment to defend his southern neighbors, North Carolina governor Arthur Dobbs leaked to Loudoun that the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly still depended wholly upon the militia for defense, and "had raised no troops or granted a supply," indicating that the lowcountry elites did not "apprehend their danger."[78] By August, Bouquet conveyed that recruiting efforts on the ground in both Carolinas had degenerated into a farce; South Carolina's proposed regiment of 500 "did not yet have a single man," and he no longer "expected anything of Virginia or Pennsylvania."[79] Two months in the province had convinced him that the Carolinians were "generally scarce" and "very averse to service"; Bouquet did not foresee any successful enlistment drive in the colonies short of legally mandated conscription.[80] The high wages attainable by all but the most penurious Carolinian caused the vast majority of them to "despise our Pay."[81] By January, Major John Tulleken, an officer in the Royal American Regiment of equivalent rank to Grant who had recently been reassigned to Pennsylvania, wrote Loudoun to disabuse him of the notion that there was any such thing as "getting men in South Carolina," as those

[77] Loudoun to Lyttelton, New York, April 24, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 196, 94-95.
[78] Arthur Dobbs to Loudoun, New Bern, NC, May 30, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 196, 111-112.
[79] Bouquet to Webb, Charlestown, August 25, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 169-170.
[80] Bouquet to Loudoun, Charlestown, August 25, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 172-177.
[81] Bouquet to Loudoun, Charlestown, October 16, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 212-218.

who answered the call lived in such a pitiable state that "they no sooner join the regiment and are Cloathd but they immediately desert."[82] Unsurprisingly given the prevailing conditions, the South Carolina recruiting efforts floundered, leaving the officers serving under Bouquet convinced that Carolinians lacked any sense of obligation to sacrifice on behalf of imperial exigencies. Such first impressions lingered, and would poison Grant's interactions with colonial military personnel in the wars to come.[83]

If the recruiting fiasco revealed Grant and his fellow officers' disgust with the Carolinians' refusal to contribute manpower to defend their own homes, the crisis over providing shelter for their troops prompted rage and threats. The British Mutiny Act outlined the legal obligation of subjects living in an area currently occupied by His Majesty's forces to provide the troops not only with housing and bedding, but also other necessities such as firewood, candles, salt, and beer.[84] Parliament, however, was not to apply these terms to the colonies until 1765 per the terms of the act, and the ambiguity regarding whether or not British troops deployed in America during the Seven Years' War could expect these accommodations resulted in unrest and the forced occupation of private dwellings in both Albany and Philadelphia.[85] The South Carolina Commons House of Assembly joined the chorus of colonial representative bodies condemning the quartering of British forces without its explicit approval during Grant's deployment in Charlestown, and the controversy raged for the entirety of the army's occupation of the city and its environs

[82] Maj. John Tulleken to Loudoun, Charlestown, Lancaster, January 29, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 282-284.
[83] Only after William Pitt decided to furnish all provincial troops with arms, munitions, and tents and to subsidize the soldiers' pay through direct grants to the colonial legislatures in March 1758 did the ministry witness the mass colonial enlistment that it expected at war's onset. See Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 225-227.
[84] Greene, "Quartering Dispute," 193.
[85] *Ibid*.; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 166-167.

during 1757-8. Lyttelton immediately informed Bouquet upon his mid-June arrival that he had only received Loudoun's missive informing him of the Royal Americans' mission days before, so the colony had no barracks prepared for their occupation or troops of their own to contribute to the levee.[86] While Bouquet's men languished in the aforementioned New Market Race Course, the Commons House allotted funds to repair old barracks and build new ones in late June. The First Highland Regiment's September arrival only compounded the housing problem; while officers like Grant and Montgomery were welcomed into private homes of Charlestown elites, common soldiers fell ill in uninsulated, half-finished structures.[87] The barracks approved by the Commons to house Bouquet's troops lacked the capacity to also accommodate the Highlanders, and funds for these quarters were not secured until October. While the officer corps appreciated the opportunity to experience Charlestown high society, they fulminated against the spartan conditions their subordinates were forced to endure. Bouquet noted with dismay that the first barrack slated for erection by legislative allocation lacked boarded flooring and chimneys; despite the Carolinians' assertions of their "favorable inclinations" for the "comfort of the soldiers," Bouquet remonstrated against the unsuitability of such damp, squalid quarters.[88]

The pressure introduced by the Highlanders' arrival on the scene exacerbated the frustration, as Bouquet commented to Ellis that he preferred "to make two Campaigns, than to settle the Quarters in any of our American Towns."[89] Bouquet begged Lyttelton and the

[86] Bouquet to Webb, Charlestown, June 23, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 119-121.
[87] Greene, "Quartering Dispute," 197.
[88] Bouquet to Lyttelton, Charlestown, July 20, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 150-151.
[89] Bouquet to Ellis, Charlestown, July 20, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 200-201.

Commons House for bedding, furniture, blankets, and other necessities in late October, and complained to his commander when they denied his request.[90] A contrite missive from provincial provisioner Daniel Doyley in early December begged Bouquet's pardon for his inability to allot additional cords of wood for the ill among the British regulars; his sheepish apology accentuated the colony's unwillingness to provide a baseline level of warmth to counter the ravages of winter.[91] Later that month, the grievance over firewood escalated. Colonial legislators issued a formal complaint to Lyttelton condemning a division of Royal Americans that had stripped a partially constructed shed "which was built to save them from the Weather" at Broughton's Battery to use the cedar posts of its frame as firewood.[92] Though Bouquet arrested the ringleader, this episode illustrates the harrowing Catch-22 of the British rank and file stationed in Charlestown that winter: foregoing the prospect of long-term shelter in the future for the kindling to mitigate the immediacy of a particularly frigid night. Loudoun assured Bouquet that his men had the right to quarters in South Carolina "without paying any Thing for it," and marveled at the gall of the Carolinians, who fearfully applied for troops to insulate them from the ravages of a potential Indian war and then, "as soon as they arrive… Deny them the Common Necessaries of Life, which they are by Law bound to furnish."[93] Loudoun ordered Bouquet to seize quarters by force rather than allowing "either the Rich Province of South Carolina to be given up to the enemy, nor the Troops sent for its Defence, to die for Want of

[90] Bouquet to Loudoun, Charlestown, October 21, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, .223-225.
[91] Daniel Doyley to Bouquet, Charlestown, December 2, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 246.
[92] Commissioners to Lyttelton: Complaint Regarding Troops, Charlestown, December 22, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 261-262.
[93] Loudoun to Bouquet, New York, December 25, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 267-269.

Quarters," but implored Bouquet to avoid any violent confrontation over housing with the Carolina subjects in a separate, private correspondence penned the same day.[94] For his part, Bouquet consistently expressed contempt for the Carolinians' parsimony with regards to quarters, denouncing the presence of "Private Interest[s]," which were "always the first point here, and Public Spirit is no more [than] Second."[95] A remonstrance issued to the Lyttelton by the British field officers in Charlestown (including Grant, who signed the document) echoed both Bouquet's and Loudoun's sentiments. The officer corps originally thought that the assemblymen "cou'd not think of suffering His Majesty's Troops to perish for Cold as they had been sent into the Province at Their request and for Their Protection," but had been too sanguine in this expectation.[96] Grant's cohort demanded that the governor petition the legislature for immediate increases in blanket and wood allotments. Winter had almost passed by the completion of the first barrack on February 19, just five weeks before the Royal Americans' departure for Pennsylvania; the First Highland Regiment would wait even longer for accommodations, and the officers continued protesting the unacceptable conditions until leaving the colony. Though a committee of Commons House luminaries (including future Grant ally Henry Laurens and foe Christopher Gadsden) jointly declared "that Officers and Soldiers cannot, legally or constitutionally, be quarter'd in private Houses" without express consent of the owners, the officers' declaration clearly

[94] *Ibid*.; Loudoun to Bouquet, New York, December 25, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 265.
[95] Bouquet to Loudoun, Charlestown, October 16, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 212-218.
[96] Representation of Field Officers Regarding Troops, Charlestown, December 2, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 248-250.

demonstrates that compromised objectives and haggard infantry represented the corollary to refusing to grant quarters either voluntarily or involuntarily.[97]

The officers' responses to the quartering crisis invoked Charlestown's racial and social order and assessed the position occupied by British military personnel within it in light of the legislature's actions. During the eighteenth century, the epistemological framework established by Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus's system of binomial nomenclature, which used sexual and physical characteristics to classify known organisms, became entangled with the Great Chain of Being, an antique natural philosophy which linked animals, humans, and the heavenly host in an uninterrupted linear continuum of ever-increasing intellect stretching up to God at the pinnacle.[98] Linnaean classification's stress on the physical characteristics of the species in question superimposed itself on contemporary scholars' longstanding recognition of the Great Chain; this fusion manifested itself in the practice of differentiating separate human groups' intellectual capacities by analyzing their physiognomic features.[99] By the time of the Charlestown quartering dispute, this cognitive scaffolding, alongside the evolution of the institution of slavery in the colonies, resulted in the vast majority of Europeans, geniuses and dullards alike, relegating Africans closest to the beasts at the bottom of their rankings of humanity. Such logic provided justification for the extreme material deprivation and inhumane treatment attendant to bondage. Conversely, Europeans, especially those in colonial slave societies, increasingly viewed the subjection of fellow Europeans to similar conditions as an outrage.

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[97] Quoted in Greene, "Quartering Dispute," 203.
[98] Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), 218-219.
[99] *Ibid*., 224-225.

Grant and his fellow field officers expressed indignation of this variety when describing the bedding provided by the colony to their troops in a memorial to the Commons House of Assembly. The legislature assigned one blanket for every two soldiers, forcing the rank and file to split the cover and lie in close proximity throughout the night. Half a blanket seemed unacceptable to Grant "in a Country where the most covetous Planter finds it his Interest to allow One to the most despicable Slave."[100] Lowcountry slaves (especially the overwhelming majority of them that labored on frontier plantations) undoubtedly endured spartan existences, but the ones in Charlestown generally lived in finished buildings, in rooms above warehouses and kitchens, and frequently sported finery that Euro-Americans considered above their station.[101]

Perhaps these local anomalies colored Grant's opinions, prompting him to believe that bondspeople he saw as naturally suited to bestial modes of life were spared of them due to the priorities of the planter elite, while his soldiers were forced to endure them. The inherent injustice of these conditions must have doubly galled he and the other officers due to their present mission of guarding the empire's most lucrative mainland plantation. Bouquet reflected these sentiments when he noted the Charlestown grandees' pleasure over having one of the world's premier militaries protect their plantations, but their unwillingness to "feel [any] inconveniences from them making no great difference between a soldier & a Negro."[102] Squalid living conditions attributable to sparse public expenditure on the comfort of His Majesty's army provided the fodder for Bouquet to condemn the

[100] Representation of Field Officers Regarding Troops, Charlestown, December 2, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 248-250.
[101] Philip D. Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 107, 601.
[102] Bouquet to Loudoun, Charlestown, August 25, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 172-177.

planter class's miserliness, regardless of their emergency succor to the desperately ill among his force. Charlestown served as a nexus for artisan slaves such as carpenters, brickmakers and blacksmiths whose talents could be deployed to erect structures and ships; owners regularly hired these skilled slaves out to contractors for wages.[103] The regiments stationed in town badly needed craftsmen's services to build not only barracks, but also fortifications at the edge of town. Despite offering owners seven shillings a day for skilled woodworkers, Bouquet could not secure "a Sufficient number of Negroes upon the Works" to realize expedient progress on the buildings he commissioned.[104] The exigencies of the rice and indigo economy made erecting proper fortifications impossible. These statements clearly demonstrate that during the course of their brief acquaintance with the lowcountry, Grant and his cohort recognized that the needs of private plantation enterprise and its constituent parts superseded any matter of public safety or protection there, to the point of inverting the established racial hierarchy if the pursuit of profits required it.

By the mid-eighteenth century, the quintessential American paradox had long governed the rhythms of life in slave societies like the South Carolina lowcountry. This tragic contradiction, the permanent legal enslavement of Africans and their children as a laboring underclass which simultaneously mirrored and bolstered the rise of egalitarian society among whites and the eventual repudiation of the monarchy, could yield alternative perspectives and hidden dimensions when considered from other vantage points.[105] To Grant and company, the mechanism enacting the collective political will of white

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[103] Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint,* 228-229.
[104] Bouquet to Loudoun, Charlestown, October 16, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 212-218.
[105] Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), 3-4.

Carolinians (the Commons House of Assembly) repeatedly assigned preeminence to individual property rights over the state's objective of defending the colony and defeating the French. A common dedication to the preservation of steady capital gains extracted from the backs of human property united South Carolina's polity in a manner that the continental conflict simply could not. The evasiveness of potential enlistees who chose yeomanry (and direct supervision of their bondspeople) and the militia over full-time provincial military service, the refusal to provide timely, acceptable living arrangements for Bouquet's personnel while some slaves were adequately housed in Charlestown, and the unwillingness of slaveowners to sacrifice any profit derived from hiring out skilled slaves all conveyed the institution's primacy over any imperial goal, however pressing: monetary gain through human bondage represented the central axiom of colonial South Carolina's political consensus. But if Americans could cast paying duties to a government in which they enjoyed only virtual representation as subjection to an arbitrary power and slavery in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, then British officials could draw a strikingly similar parallel when their authority to enact the ministry's will was subverted by local, private interests during the course of the war.

Perhaps recognition of the preeminence of plantation enterprise in the province and understanding of the near-insuperable challenges it posed to measures designed to fully engage Charlestonians in the war effort caused Grant, Bouquet, and other officers to despair of their mission while stationed in Charlestown and focus on their own self-aggrandizement. Maybe the colonists' use of the British army as underappreciated, poorly accommodated sentries to insulate their slave regime from internal and external threats while other officers received opportunities to achieve notoriety through conquest in

Canada made them believe they had a righteous claim to the colony's bounty. In Grant's case, perchance the overriding desire to secure the London townhome by any means necessary induced a quick assessment of the staggering wealth attainable through asserting control over the lowcountry's labor, land, and water. Regardless of the cause, Grant, Bouquet, and other Swiss officers jointly invested in two plantations during their deployment, the thousand-acre "Walnut Hill" in Beaufort, on the colony's frontier and ideally suited to produce rice for the Atlantic market, and the much smaller "Pickpocket," a core-zone Charlestown Neck establishment primed for delivering the diverse consumables craved by gourmands.[106] Sophia Faesch, the wife of Andrew Faesch, one of the Swiss partners, resided at Pickpocket while her husband managed both properties for the group. She regularly hosted Grant for dinner in Sophy Hall, the plantation's manor house, where they frequently "spoke of you [Bouquet]" and the progress of their joint ventures; though the plantation mistress neglected to "go into detail about the plantations," she was certain that "those gentlemen have no doubt already written to you about the probability of both being fine."[107] Her correspondence alluded to Grant's (and the entire First Highland Regiment's) May 21 departure for Philadelphia, a change of venue which soon immersed the brash Scot in a radically different colonial milieu. Grant's preliminary brush with the

[106] Lyttelton to Loudoun, Charlestown, December 10, 1757, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 254-257.
[107] Sophia Fesch to Bouquet, Sophy Hall, May 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 406-407. This investment led directly to Lyttelton requesting (and receiving) Loudoun's reassignment of Bouquet and the Royal Americans in South Carolina to Pennsylvania. Lyttelton came to despise the Swiss colonel, and likely beseeched Loudoun to remove him due to him badgering the legislature about the barracks and other matters, though the governor claimed that holding land in the colony had, ironically, diverted Bouquet's attention from military matters and towards his private interest. Little did Lyttelton know that Bouquet had frequently stated a desire for reassignment and was perfectly content as an absentee planter. Bouquet to Stanwix, Charlestown, October 18, 1757, Lyttelton to Loudoun, Charlestown, December 10, 1757, Lyttlelon to Loudoun, Charlestown, March 21, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 221-222, 254-256, 323-324.

lowcountry was brief, but the impact of observing the profusion of worldly goods and the dynamo that enabled their accumulation reverberated within him, governing his actions for years to come.

Chapter 2: Debacle at Duquesne

In early April 1758, as his soldiers fired a fifteen-gun salute atop the battery whose storage shed some of them had immolated for kindling three months earlier, James Grant observed a procession of the continent's first people for the first time in his life. Tasked by Lyttelton with providing an honor guard and a fitting level of fanfare for the Cherokee emissaries, who had traveled eastward over 500 miles from the Overhill region to address the governor, three companies of the First Highland Regiment awaited the delegation outside Charlestown's gates, at the upper end of Broad Street, and at the portal to the colony's state house.[1] Fittingly, the chief striding at the head of the group making its way up the promenade was Attakullakulla (also known as the Little Carpenter), the Cherokee Indian that historians have most frequently associated with Grant's career. Little Carpenter and his cohort arrived fresh off of a late winter campaign to Fort de L'Ascension, a bastion deep in the North American interior, where the Tennessee River's terminus flowed into the Ohio, and the First Man of Tomatley conspicuously displayed the scalps of two French soldiers affixed to the end of a staff for dramatic effect, proof of his valor and willingness to shed the blood of Britain's adversaries.[2] Despite his relative ease in the colonial capital and public presentation of a grisly symbol of loyalty, the headman sheepishly acknowledged a problem currently bothering the governor and his council: the Overhill town of Tellico. In 1730, when the eccentric land speculator Alexander Cuming approached the tribe proclaiming himself an agent of King George II authorized to broker an Anglo-Cherokee

[1] Conference of Governor Lyttelton and Council with Little Carpenter, April 10-11, 1758, W. Stitt Robinson, ed., *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789*, *Vol. XIV, North and South Carolina Treaties*, general ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2003), 45.
[2] *Ibid*., 46.

alliance, he arbitrarily named Moytoy of Tellico, a native who befriended him, "emperor of the Cherokees."[3] Though the title carried negligible weight with other Cherokees, Carolina's governors and legislature initially viewed the emperorship and Tellico as the focal points of legitimate political power in Cherokee country after Cuming's trip to the Appalachians. Carolina officials consistently feted Tellico's leadership, showering them with material largesse until practical experience taught them the emptiness of Cuming's designation. Hegemony of one town over the rest proved illusory, and Chota, not Tellico, evolved into the most influential town in the Overhill region by the mid-eighteenth century. [4] But preferential treatment and an inflated sense of its place in cross-cultural diplomacy bred an autonomous streak in the Tellicans. Attakullakulla and the other Cherokee headmen had only recently reined in the renegade village, which had sided with the French after sending a delegation to treat with Governor Kerlerec in New Orleans during the early stages of the Seven Years' War.[5] Acutely aware of the nation's reliance on manufactured goods and firearms provided by the British and France's inability to satiate that demand, Attakullakulla and other Overhill headmen entered into a cross-regional pact with Cherokees from the Lower, Middle, and Valley towns to curb Tellico's nascent partnership with the French and disgruntled Upper Creeks; they effectively severed the coalition by pulverizing Tellico's Shawnee allies, attacking France's network of fortifications, such as L'Ascension, and stemming the distribution of British provisions to the town.[6] In the

[3] Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 64.
[4] Tyler Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation Among Eighteenth-Century Cherokees* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 47; As of February 1757, Tellico suffered the indignity of having any Charlestown goods to be doled out to it as presents routed through Chota, see David H. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740-62* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 110.
[5] Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 99-101.
[6] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 89-90.

council room, Little Carpenter conceded Tellico's treachery, but reassured the South Carolina dignitaries that the Tellicans had "seen their error and were becoming good friends to the English."[7] He checked the Tellico leadership's push to translate their French connection into the broader influence that the town had aspired to decades ago, but provoked dangerous foes in doing so, and thus presented himself in Charlestown to request "such a supply of arms and ammunition, as shall be sufficient to enable the Cherokees to defend themselves" against the raids of France's indigenous friends: the Shawnees, Delawares, Mingos, and the tribes of the *pays d'en haut* that resided west of the Ohio River, south of the Great Lakes, and east of the Mississippi.[8] Though Lyttelton immediately complied with Attakullakulla's request while gushing over his fidelity to the English and ferocity in battle, he inwardly squirmed over the seminal chief's presence in Charlestown, wishing Little Carpenter and his entourage would soon relocate far north to Winchester, Virginia, where they were desperately needed by British forces preparing to advance on the loci of French power in the colonial backcountry – Fort Duquesne.[9] The gravitational pull of the coveted position at the Forks of the Ohio would soon dislodge both the Scottish dandy and the Cherokee power broker from southern environs, setting them careening towards the fort's orbit and separate but interconnected tribulations in the Ohio Valley.

Mere mention of Brigadier General John Forbes and his 1758 Pennsylvania campaign conjures romantic images of the invalid commander, deathly ill and splayed out

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[7] Conference of Governor Lyttelton, April 10-11, 1758, Robinson, ed., *North and South Carolina Treaties*, 48.
[8] *Ibid*.
[9] Winchester was the site of one of the three Fort Loudouns pertinent to Grant's service. This one was erected by Virginia provincial Colonel George Washington as a headquarters for his regiment and the citadel guarding the eastern pass of a road bisecting the Blue Ridge mountains. See Fred Anderson, "Introduction: Old Forts, New Perspectives – Thoughts on the Seven Years' War and Its Significance," Warren R. Hofstra, ed., *Cultures in Conflict: The Seven Years' War in North America* (Plymouth, UK: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 1.

on a litter hoisted at the head of a column closing in on Fort Duquesne, deftly navigating his army through a trackless woodland to realize a nearly impossible objective, obliterating French access to the Ohio River that November and serving as a harbinger for Britain's *Annus Mirabilis* and its clamor of victorious bellringing the following year. While such heroic imagery contains more than a grain of truth, its simplistic Manichean British/French dichotomy obfuscates the multifarious nature of his operation in the backcountry, which encompassed Cherokees, Catawbas, the Iroquois Confederacy, Delawares in both the Susquehanna and Ohio Valleys, Shawnees, and numerous peoples residing west of the Ohio. Chosen by William Pitt to spearhead the expedition against Duquesne, the brigadier general issued the orders that spirited Grant and the rest of the First Highland Regiment away from their dull recruiting mission to the action on the mid-Atlantic frontier that the Scottish major craved.[10] Forbes also initiated a slightly more successful (albeit more involved) recruiting mission in the Carolina backcountry, making the request for Cherokee assistance that resulted in Attakullakulla and hundreds of warriors relocating to the north to bolster his army in 1758. This was not the first time the Cherokees had assisted the British by traveling north for the campaigning season; the previous year, seeking to cultivate closer ties to Virginia and desirous of the increased opportunities for competitive commerce such a relationship would bring (South Carolina dominated the commercial deerskin trade with the Cherokee and its governor had traditionally directed Anglo-Cherokee affairs), warriors trudged hundreds of miles to serve as sentinels guarding Virginia's western peripheral settlements against the ravages of Delaware and Shawnee

[10] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 233.

raids that had decimated the colony's frontier in 1755 and 1756.[11] In 1757, some 230 Cherokees answered Virginia's plea for manpower, but a lack of compensatory presents and violent episodes ensnaring these warriors and the population they were tasked with defending stoked disillusionment and rage.[12] Material deprivation, linguistic differences, and cultural misunderstandings fueled the outbreak of serious crises in 1757 involving backcountry Virginia settlers and Cherokees. Most of the Cherokees who answered Virginia's call to arms that year hailed from the Lower Towns and rallied around Wawhatchee, a renowned war chief from that region. Provincial governor Robert Dinwiddie and the members of the Virginia House of Burgesses recognized the diplomatic imperative of presenting gifts to Indian allies in a ceremonial setting and the monetary value of those contributions to Native Americans, but the agents they charged with managing this process in the colony's western counties botched the protocol. When Wawhatchee's group arrived at the liaison point in Luneburg County, they discovered that the presents had been delivered to Winchester (some 200 miles to the north) and their guide nowhere to be found. Incensed, the war party roughed up the family of the local magistrate and forcefully requisitioned provisions from local plantations before being redirected northwestward to the colony's frontier by Edmund Atkin, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the southern colonies.[13] This incident presaged worse fiascos during the Forbes campaign that would rend asunder the thirty-year alliance between the English and Cherokees.

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[11] For 1757 assistance of Virginia, see Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 90, for South Carolina's near-monopoly on trade with the Cherokee, see Daniel J. Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis: Cherokees, Colonists, and Slaves in the American Southeast* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 16.
[12] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 44.
[13] John Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 38-41.

Forbes's need for native auxiliaries to act as scouts, rangers, and guards for his engineers while they carved a thoroughfare wide enough to transport artillery pieces out of the Pennsylvania forests led to a disjunct recruiting effort in Cherokee country conducted by various British officials and colonists that ultimately undercut the general's plans for the Cherokees. The Earl of Loudoun, still commander in chief of His Majesty's forces in North America for two weeks before Pitt demoted and recalled him, wrote Lyttelton in mid-February to request his complicity in recruitment. Loudoun also sent a letter to Atkin directing him to urge the Cherokees to accompany Forbes's expedition, and beseeched Lyttelton to take steps to induce their participation, including showering them with presents. Loudoun also recommended William Byrd III, the scion of one of Tidewater's most prominent tobacco families and a colonel in the Second Virginia Regiment as "a particular friend of mine" who could confer with the Cherokees on their turf and "Conduct them to Winchester" if Atkin proved unavailable (he did). Moreover, at Lyttelton's request, Loudoun ordered Captain Abraham Bosomworth, a soldier in John Stanwix's battalion of the Royal American Regiment who had been "much among the Cherokees" and acted as an Indian agent for South Carolina for twelve years, to leave Philadelphia and accompany interpreters bound for the Overhills.[14] Bosomworth, the brother-in-law of the Lower Creek *metis* interpreter and diplomat Mary Musgrove Bosomworth, secured a commission as Creek agent for the colony in 1747, and acquired copious experience as a conduit between indigenous and colonial peoples.[15] Notwithstanding the captain's regular occupancy of the liminal fringe overlapping native and European societies, his inclusion in the recruiting

[14] Bouquet to Loudoun, Philadelphia, April 28, 1757, Loudoun to Lyttelton, New York, February 13, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 102-103, 299-301.
[15] Steven C. Hahn, *The Life and Times of Mary Musgrove* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 168.

endeavor (and the management of the Cherokees once they arrived in the mid-Atlantic) introduced another cook into the kitchen, which boded ill for cohesion and clarity of communication.

The primary pitfall of the haphazard effort to mobilize the Cherokees was that it yielded a piecemeal torrent of small parties traveling in isolation through the southwestern Virginia counties where trouble had arisen the previous year and acrimony lingered. Paul Demeré, the commander of a different Fort Loudoun, welcomed a party of twenty youths from Chota who declared their collective intent to attack Duquesne and requested powder, shot, flint and war hatchets.[16] This exchange occurred in late February, weeks before Byrd or Bosomworth arrived on the scene, and Demeré relayed that 130 Cherokees had already left the Overhills by February 21 "to the assistance of Virginia."[17] On March 7, Demeré reported that the Little Carpenter (just before departing for Charlestown and encountering Grant's honor guard) and Oconostota, the Great Warrior of Chota, foiled a small raiding party of French-allied Mingos aiming to harvest Cherokee scalps; their far-ranging incursion from the Great Lakes region into the heart of Cherokee country inspired more departures northward.[18] That afternoon, a crowd of eighty Cherokees from the Valley Town of Hiwassee and assorted Middle Settlement towns approached the fort demanding the accoutrements of war to return the Mingos' favor; Demeré griped that equipping the

[16] This Fort Loudoun, erected in 1756 by the German engineer William Gerard de Brahm at the behest of former South Carolina Governor James Glen, served as the colony's garrison in the deepest recesses of Cherokee country, quickly evolving into a center of exchange, conflict resolution, and daily interaction between the soldiers and the denizens of the Overhill Towns. See Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, 90-104.
[17] Paul Demere to Bouquet, Fort Loudoun, February 21, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 306-308.
[18] Demere to Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, March 7, 1758, William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, 1754-1765*, Vol. 3 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 439-440.

multitudes of bands left him "so busy with the Indians that I don't know what to do."[19] Demere's counterpart Lachlan McIntosh, the commander of Fort Prince George, Carolina's military base among the Lower Towns (the Cherokee settlements nearest to Carolina's backcountry development), cited similar experiences with departing war parties of varying sizes.[20] The young men's adrenaline and the depredations associated with aggressive colonial expansion made for trouble before the bands even got clear of their own territory. The preceding November, a group of colonists living near Long Canes Creek in a white settlement that lay on the Cherokee side of the boundary established by the Treaty of Saluda (1755) murdered four residents of the Lower town of Estatoe, disemboweling a pregnant woman in the process.[21] In a reprisal mandated by Cherokee notions of criminal justice, which demanded the extermination of the life of one family member per death caused by the actions of any member of that clan, a war party of thirty Estatoes accosted and killed two white frontiersmen they encountered on the road to Winchester.[22] When Byrd finally arrived in early April with the intention of corralling the Cherokees into a substantial armed force that he would then march north to merge with Forbes's army, multitudes had already left; despite distributing over 100 firearms, thousands of pounds of powder and shot, and numerous kegs of rum throughout his April recruiting mission to the Lower, Middle, and Overhill regions, Byrd netted only around sixty Cherokees (presumably the excess guns went to Attakullakulla's party, which put off advancing until early fall due to Lyttelton's foot-dragging with gifts owed in recompense for the winter scalping foray to

[19] *Ibid*.
[20] Lachlan McIntosh to Lyttelton, Fort Prince George, March 4, 1758, McDowell, ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina*, 443-444.
[21] James Francis to Lyttelton, December 23, 1757, McDowell, ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina*., 425-426.
[22] Warriors of Estatoe to Lyttelton, Fort Prince George, March 20, 1758, McIntosh to Lyttelton, Fort Prince George, March 21, 1758, McDowell, ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina*, 449-451.

Fort de L'Ascension).[23] McIntosh opined that had Byrd arrived among the Cherokees in mid-February instead, he "would have got five Times more with him."[24] Contrary to the British command's wishes, hundreds of Cherokees divided into moderately-sized units intermittently passed through the Virginia communities that had been the witness to clashes the previous year.[25] Cherokee recruitment and the logistics of their deployment to the mid-Atlantic theater threatened to degenerate into a debacle, priming the Anglo-Cherokee coalition for a strained summer.

As alliances buckled under pressure imposed by expansion into the continent's frontier areas, Forbes's army prepared for entry into a contested space controlled by indigenous groups who had spent the preceding decades relocating to the Ohio River Valley, founding coalescent communities, and checking the designs of those intent on encroaching on their autonomy. Both European empires lay claim to their territory via legal constructs which appear dubious from a twenty-first century standpoint but were widely accepted in the eighteenth-century West: France asserted dominion over the Ohio River and its tributaries through La Salle's "discovery" of these bodies, while Britain proclaimed a vicarious right of conquest through their alliance with the Iroquois of western New York, who purportedly dominated the region. In reality, indigenous people arrived in the Ohio Valley millennia before Europeans settled in North America and the Covenant Chain's

[23] Goods Supplied to Indians by Colonel Byrd, April 4 – May 2, 1758, McDowell, ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina.*, 456-458; Colin G. Calloway, *The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, The First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 140; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 53.
[24] McIntosh to Lyttelton, Fort Prince George, April 10, 1758, McDowell, ed., *Documents Relating to Indian Affairs*, 454-455.
[25] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 54.

hegemony over the region proved titular.[26] As distended coastal enclaves and the growth of an attendant demand for real property prompted a land grab by Britain's colonists during the early 1750s, a significant portion of the local natives actively facilitated a reactionary increase in French presence, which in turn evoked overtures to the British rooted in neurosis over burgeoning French influence. Indeed, the very presence of the imperial forces skittishly eyeing one another across the expanse of modern-day Pennsylvania hinged almost entirely upon the Ohio Valley Indians' cycle of alternatively embracing and repudiating the British and French based on whichever European power currently seemed less apt to imperil their control over the land. Their shifts in allegiance and intermittent strategic neutrality consistently determined success or failure on the battlefield for the European belligerents throughout the war, including our protagonist. The diplomatic fluctuations would finally explode into three years of unabated frontier raiding on British settlements in Pennsylvania and Virginia, imposing conditions that endangered both colonies and drew Grant into the mid-Atlantic theater of the war.

The inchoate nature of the Ohio Valley Indians' nascent, multitribal polity occasionally made for difficulties in articulating clear diplomatic objectives or even establishing political leadership supported by a broad consensus, especially during the leadup to the Seven Years' War.[27] Populated in the third decade of the eighteenth century by displaced Delawares seeking refuge from the demographic maelstrom that ensued in their Delaware and Susquehanna Valley homelands after Pennsylvania's establishment as a

[26] Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 50-51.
[27] Eric Hinderaker, "Declaring Independence: The Ohio Indians and the Seven Years' War," in Hofstra, ed., *Cultures in Conflict*, 106-107.

British colony, the Ohio Valley also became home to other tribal groups.[28] Shawnees driven west by the dissolution of the eastern Delaware towns that hosted them and the Iroquois evicting them from the upper Susquehanna were joined in the Allegheny watershed by some of their former Iroquoian landlords. These Senecas, increasingly referred to as Mingos upon arriving in the Upper Ohio Valley, fled the social ills and cramped discomfort that ensued after the French established Fort Niagara and the British founded Fort Oswego in their territory south of Lake Ontario.[29] The forge of imperial backcountry warfare waged upon land they desperately wanted to retain gradually cast intertribal solidarity and a singularity of political focus among the Ohio Valley Indians. Disparate points of origin and alleged Iroquois sovereignty over the region belied the fact that these indigenous refugees cultivated an internal cohesion as the war progressed and regularly cooperated to resist external incursions into their domain, though they frequently fluctuated apropos to which European state they deigned the most advantageous ally.

By mid-century, a tragically unavoidable market driven calculus set in motion events that would irrevocably shatter the tranquility and intercultural goodwill of Penn's Woods. This simple equation held that the massive uptick in European immigration to Britain's mid-Atlantic colonies directly correlated with surging property values and increasingly feverish efforts to dispossess natives in order to slake the demand; an authority on the region's colonial history identifies this irresistible force as "the alchemy of property."[30] Agents of the Ohio Company of Virginia, a speculation venture established to

[28] Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples, 1724-1774* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 12-14.
[29] *Ibid*., 14-19.
[30] Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 34.

assess the arability of and prospects for acquiring land between the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Ohio River, encountered the spirit of local autonomy when they attempted at a 1752 conference in Logstown to secure the Ohio Valley Indians' approval for a British settlement and were flatly refused.[31] The Company duplicitously sought to subvert the will of the Ohio Valley Indians by appealing to Tanaghrisson, the Seneca "Half King" of the western Indians who represented the will of the Iroquois Council in the region and possessed a tentative authority to speak on behalf of all Indians living there; Tanaghrisson privately conceded the company's right to acquire Ohio Valley land via a treaty concession granted to Virginia by the Iroquois Confederacy during the preceding decade.[32] Disaffection amongst the Ohio Valley Indians exploded over the two years following the Logstown conference, as the company's agents lurked about the valley, attempting to map and survey it clandestinely. This budding resentment alienated many of the natives living in the Old Northwest from their British colonial neighbors and the Iroquois half-kings among them who stressed the need for a British alliance, and simultaneously reinforced their ties to New France.

This surge of anxiety over British land hunger among the Ohio Indians directly impacted the fortunes of the Ohio Company's best-known shareholder, twenty-one-year-old George Washington, who had only recently inherited his half-brother's stakes in the firm when he rode from Williamsburg to inform the French of George II's insistence they abandon any plan to found settlements or raise fortifications in the valley. He and company

[31] Several of the shareholders in the Ohio Company of Virginia, including George Washington, William Trent, George Mercer, and Thomas Creasp, and the agent representing the company at Logstown, Christopher Gist, served under Forbes during the Duquesne campaign.
[32] Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 136-139.

agent Christopher Gist beseeched an assembly of Shawnee, Delaware and Mingo headmen at Logstown to provide them with a substantial escort to parley with the French commandant at Fort LeBoeuf, at the head of French Creek; the chiefs rebuffed their request with a decided coolness, leaving only Tanaghrisson and a few Mingos to accompany Washington.[33] This miniscule Indian retinue failed to impress the French commandant, who sent the young colonel scurrying back to Robert Dinwiddie, the governor of Virginia, with assurances that he had no intentions of abandoning his position. After Washington's departure, a substantial French army descended from Niagara, erecting a constellation of fortifications aimed at denying their imperial rivals access to the Ohio Valley and designating the *trace italliene* edifice of Fort Duquesne at the Forks as the pole star. Washington's (and the British) reception among the Ohio Indians remained lukewarm the following year, when the callow officer led a ragtag Virginia regiment north to counter French progress. Their stark repudiation of British machinations in their territory became apparent when again only Tanaghrisson (and his tiny coterie of kinspeople and hangers on) coordinated militarily with Washington. The Half King, ostensibly the man with authority to direct the Ohio Indians on behalf of their Iroquois overlords, but in reality an increasingly marginalized figure on the political scene, revealed himself as the *de facto* leader of Washington's expedition. Desperate to reestablish his (and the Six Nations) authority over the Delawares and Shawnees who currently rejected an English alliance, Tanaghrisson intentionally assured French military retaliation and escalation into a broader conflict when he sank his tomahawk into the cranium of Ensign Joseph Couloun de Villiers de Jumonville, the emissary that the commander of the newly minted Fort

[33] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 43-44.

Duquesne sent to inform Washington to withdraw immediately.[34] When Washington regrouped at the Great Meadows and his men built the unimposing Fort Necessity, Tanaghrisson soon realized the folly of his gambit after an unsuccessful bid to urge Ohio Valley representatives to join Washington's force. After enduring eight miserable hours of French shelling from the higher ground that ringed the waterlogged, ill-conceived stockade, Washington's subordinates were shocked to discover some of their former Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo allies from Logstown among the gunmen who harried them.[35] Notwithstanding their active assistance in reducing Fort Necessity, the Ohio Indians remained committed to exercising control over the valley, and grew leery of the chain of French forts descending from the Great Lakes to Duquesne, in the heart of their territory. Though some Ohio Indians actively assisted the French expedition that raised the strongholds, the fortifications' redoubtable aura implied a permanent French military presence in the valley, a prospect nearly as daunting as British land jobbing and settlement schemes. This desire to maintain sovereignty over the Ohio Valley would render many natives in the vicinity amenable to British overtures well into 1755.

This tenuous balancing act between alternating British and French alliances ultimately imploded and undid the Ohio Indians' play to remain masters of the ground they occupied, but they cannot be blamed for attempting to preserve their society's viability through embracing what many historians have labeled a playoff system. To varying degrees, the policy of maintaining neutrality between European rivals and cultivating commercial links to both empowered the Creeks and Iroquois, until the Peace of Paris

[34] *Ibid*., 50-58.
[35] *Ibid*., 59-60.

removed the French from the field. The Ohio Indians' multilateral game, however, proved more volatile and dangerous in an immediate sense than the other Eastern Woodland tribes; its upshot saw them eventually dispossessed of their lands in the Ohio Valley. Their decision to embrace Onontio (the *pays d'en haut* Algonquians' title for the governor of New France) in late 1755 was not one taken lightly, and reflects these natives' thoroughgoing understanding of the overarching patterns of settlement embraced by the British and French. Comprehension of the general template for British and French colonialism, of what generally occurred when colonists from each country set up shop in the New World, gave Ohio Indians a historical frame of reference for what imposition of one or the other would ultimately mean for them. Historical geographer D.W. Meinig notes that, in general, British settlement precipitated the eviction of Native peoples from the settled region and the creation of a rigid border area between the two populations. The French model, which involved "benign articulation" at a frontier location between traders and natives at a "point of exchange," made for fewer demands on the land the French settled.[36] The light French demographic presence in North America, even in areas that fell within colonies like New France and Louisiana, reflected this softer imprint on the land; Native Americans living in and in the vicinity of French colonies fretted less about displacement than those nearer the British, and generally maintained ample space to hunt and engage in traditional usufruct land usage. French alliances, however, had their drawbacks; although the Gallic model of colonialism revolved around a limited presence and routine commercial interaction with the natives bolstered by gift-giving rituals of reciprocity, the quality and quantity of goods

[36] D. W. Meinig, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800*, vol. 1, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 70-72.

accessible through closer ties with a rapidly-industrializing Britain always trumped whatever goods the Indians could acquire from the French, especially after mid-century. Generations of experience with European colonization and its predominant patterns informed the Ohio Indians' debates over which hatchet to take up, but it ultimately took Edward Braddock's blunt candor regarding British intentions for western lands to come to a decision.

Though Braddock's imperious demeanor and utter contempt for the indigenous peoples of North America certainly undercut his ham-handed attempts at native diplomacy, it was his frankness about British designs that scotched any chance of rapprochement with the Ohio coalition. Despite commanding the largest British army the colonies had hosted to date, Braddock infamously faltered shortly after fording the Monongahela River some ten miles southeast of Duquesne, suffering massive casualties at the hands of a smaller force primarily composed of France's native allies from the *pays d'en haut*. His lack of artifice and inability to recognize that he needed to delegate Indian diplomacy to a deft, experienced subordinate doomed both his expedition and the thousands of backcountry colonists that would suffer from Ohio Indian raids for the subsequent three years; it would also indirectly necessitate the presence of Forbes (and Grant) attempting to reestablish British control of the Pennsylvania interior in 1758. When his force arrived at Fort Cumberland, a mountain pass stockade located in modern-day Maryland named for the warmongering aristocrat who had appointed him head of British forces in America, Braddock encountered a suitable liaison in the form of George Croghan, the rough-hewn Irish trader who served as a sub-deputy of Sir William Johnson, Britain's Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Iroquois and other northern tribes. Croghan, a veteran of backcountry negotiations with the Ohio

Indians for some three decades, had escorted the remnants of Tanaghrisson's Mingos with him to join Braddock's campaign.[37] Led by a new Half-King, the Oneida Scarouady (Tanagrhisson had fallen ill and perished after Washington's debacle the previous year), the Mingo party consisted of some fifty warriors and their families. A string of sexual assaults quickly led to the dissolution of this partnership, as officers and enlisted men alike defied an order against fraternizing with these Indians; the soldiers tempted some of the wives and daughters of the warriors into camp with rum and raped them.[38] Though Braddock administered the severest of punishments (a near-fatal nine hundred lashes) for plying liquor to the Indians against his explicit orders, a move born out of anger over insubordination instead of any desire to appease native allies, he mistakenly tried to solve the problem by removing the women from the scene. Braddock ordered the Mingos' families back to Croghan's outpost at Aughwick, a directive that incensed most of the warriors, who removed to Aughwick alongside their kin.[39] The British general had largely alienated the dwindling Ohio Iroquois faction who wanted local self-rule reestablished within the confines of the Covenant Chain that had traditionally governed Britain's relations with natives in the region; Only Scarouady and seven other Ohio Iroquois remained with his expedition.[40]

The Ohio Valley Delawares and Shawnees, who rejected Iroquois supremacy in the region, represented the more important potential alliance for Braddock, even though those tribes were less amenable to a British military presence in the region than the Mingos; the

[37] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 151-152.
[38] *Ibid*.
[39] Calloway, *Indian World of George Washington*, 105.
[40] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 96.

Delawares and Shawnees also sent a delegation to treat with him at Fort Cumberland. In attendance was Shingas, the war chief of Kittanning, a Delaware settlement about twenty-five miles above Fort Duquesne on the Allegheny River.[41] Despite his current ambivalence with regards to which European suitor to back, the Delaware headman provided Braddock with a tangible advantage during the audience: a detailed drawing of Duquesne's layout sketched by Robert Stobo, a provincial captain taken hostage after Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity.[42] Shingas had daringly trafficked the floor plan out of the French fort himself, and proffering it to Braddock qualified as an act of good faith designed to probe the viability of an Anglo-Delaware alliance, but the chief had some conditions. When he inquired as to what Braddock's intentions were regarding occupying the valley after expelling the French, the general ripped off the accommodationist mask that colonists and British personnel consistently presented to the Ohio Indians during the leadup to the war and revealed the rapacious imperialist visage beneath. Braddock assured Shingas that after defeating the French, the "English Should Inhabit and Inherit the Land"; when the Delaware chief protested, suggesting that surely the general would concede some hunting lands to their native cohort on which they could sustain themselves and harvest deerskins to trade with the British, Braddock tersely responded that "No Savage Should Inherit the Land." The general snubbed his nose at Shingas's olive branch, pocketing the diagram of the fort and refusing to offer the Delawares and Shawnees with any incentive to aid his campaign even though explicitly hearing that doing so would leave the Ohio Indians with "no where to Flee Too But into the Hands of the French." The following morning, after Braddock repeated his

[41] *Ibid*, 163
[42] *Ibid*., 95; Calloway, *Indian World of George Washington*, 96.

refusal to make a territorial concession, Shingas and the other headmen informed him that "if they might not have Liberty to Live on the Land they would not Fight for it," and withdrew to observe the oncoming clash from the sidelines, though a group of the Delawares and Shawnees present splintered off and joined the French as the chief had portended.[43] Braddock's words simply echoed the native assemblage's conceptualization of how British colonialism functioned. Contemporary historiography on Braddock's expedition stresses the general's dispensation of presents and ritual observance of wampum exchange at the Fort Cumberland summit in a rather convincing attempt to construe the general's refusal to support Delaware land claims on the Ohio as the reason for Shingas's defection; perhaps Croghan would have muted Braddock's imperialist message had he been tasked with allaying Shingas's concerns.[44] Braddock learned, as did his fellow Scottish officer James Grant three years later, that presents and adherence to diplomatic niceties alone could not convince Native Americans to commit manpower to a European military objective. Braddock failed to secure native participation in his expedition other than a token rump; the French, on the other hand, fielded a force consisting of a greater than four-to-one Indian-to-European ratio. This disparity proved the difference in the battle, as the British had no effective free-ranging division to engage the massive numbers of Algonquians that surrounded them in the woods. Firing muskets while intermittently emerging from behind the cover of vegetation to get a clear look, the French-allied Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Wyandots decimated Braddock's troops, who remained packed in tight formation on the road, over the course of three hours, fatally injuring the

[43] Previous quotes from Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 154-155.
[44] See Calloway, *Indian World of George Washington*, 106-107.

general and killing or capturing a full two-thirds of the British officers and regulars on the battlefield.[45] This multitribal victory tipped the balance of power in the Pennsylvania backcountry in favor of the French for the ensuing three years.[46]

Braddock's alienation of the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos and the resultant catastrophe on the Monongahela decidedly impacted the trajectory and tenor of Forbes's subsequent campaign, but it was not the only aspect of his expedition to do so. Indeed, the menacing specter of Braddock's debacle loomed over Forbes's expedition for its duration, determining the form and character of Grant's preliminary brush with frontier diplomacy and warfare. The architects of the latter were acutely aware of the shortcomings of the former, and sought to distinguish the new campaign from Braddock's in a few obvious ways, succeeding to varying degrees. Whether attributable to cultural arrogance, a foolhardy candor regarding British intentions for the Ohio territory after winning the war, or merely misfortune and the legacy of Virginia's speculation in the region, Braddock miscarried his attempt to enlist native participation in his campaign. Indeed, he squandered an opportunity to secure the services of the natives whose land his army was about to invade; had Braddock parleyed more adroitly with Shingas and the assembled

[45] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 102-103.

[46] In a recent thorough analysis of the impact of Braddock's campaign and defeat on both the Seven Years' War and the revolution that followed it, David Preston construes the oft-maligned general as a victim of misfortune during his campaign. Preston accentuates Braddock's generosity in funding his subordinates' budgets for Indian presents and disputes the prevailing characterization of him as eager to dispossess the Indians by pointing out directives he issued to Sir William Johnson that stressed his desire to expel the French to secure the Ohio Valley for the Indians and their heirs, not the British. He presents compelling evidence of Braddock's plainspoken diplomacy at Fort Cumberland, which promised "happy repossession" of the Ohio lands, and points out that historians who claim he actively sought to snub the Delawares have relied on a secondhand account of Shingas's meeting with Braddock delivered by a captive years after the summit. Regardless of whether Braddock alienated the Delawares by explicitly invoking their dispossession by his army or he actively sought to assuage Delaware anxiety over Britain's plans for the Forks, Shingas and the majority of the Ohio Valley Indians clearly conceived of the British as the greater threat to their sovereignty in 1755 and behaved accordingly. See David L. Preston, *Braddock's Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 81, 109-114,

Ohio Valley headmen at Fort Cumberland, he could have marched at the head of a column that included many natives desirous of reasserting unadulterated control over their home turf. These Ohio Valley chiefs would have at the very least viewed Braddock and the British as disposable allies who could facilitate their play at territorial autonomy. Instead, Braddock estranged Shingas and company, who watched from a distance as the *pays d'en haut* Indians surrounded and eviscerated his ranks with relative ease. Conversely, Forbes prioritized native diplomacy perhaps to a fault. He and the colonial officials responsible for ensuring the success of his campaign actively pursued coalitions with outsiders. By introducing Cherokees and Catawbas to the mid-Atlantic frontier in significant numbers, Forbes injected a foreign, unwelcome presence into the war-torn abattoir of the Ohio Valley, one composed of established military adversaries not only of the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingoes who called the region home, but also the Six Nations who claimed dominion over it via the Covenant Chain. This fragile triangulation was apt to disaffect one of the native blocs, and as we shall see, decisions regarding the dispensation of gifts, a lack of Indian officials on the scene with the authority to manage the Cherokees (partially attributable to Iroquois resentment of their presence), and Forbes's extremely deliberate pace in positioning his army in western Pennsylvania to attack Duquesne (interpreted by the Cherokees as foot dragging at their expense) gradually incensed Cherokee allies to the point that they abandoned the campaign and traded blows with Virginians as they returned south. Botched multipolar Indian policy in the mid-Atlantic theater thus directly fueled the onset of another sub-conflict of the French and Indian War, one in which Grant would come to play a pivotal role.

Though Forbes and his subordinates' mishandling of Cherokee friends would eventually result in bloodshed on the southern frontier, in a more immediate sense their diplomatic wrangling yielded the key to the French position at the Forks. This success related directly to Forbes's efforts to undercut France's alliance with the Ohio Valley Indians and thus neutralize their protective buffer. In 1755, Braddock, who had a crack at enticing native allies that hailed from the area he was poised to invade and faltered, had no chance of coaxing away the native entourage of Captain Contrecoeur (his French counterpart who commanded Fort Duquesne), as the Great Lakes peoples allied with Onontio lay far beyond the current sphere of British economic and political influence, and had developed thoroughgoing cultural and economic ties to the French. These natives' role in foiling Braddock's advance haunted Forbes, whose paranoia regarding Indian ambushes is well documented.[47] Forbes could not make inroads with the *pays d'en haut* Indians either, so he saw divorcing the Ohio Valley Indians from the French fold as imperative to the safety of his column as it progressed towards the Forks. As a result, he successfully petitioned his commander James Abercromby for permission to treat directly with the Delawares outside of the preapproved channel of Sir William Johnson (the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the North) and the Ohio Valley Indians' uncles at Onondaga, who had the right to speak for their Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo nephews in council. Forbes's willingness to collaborate with sources of colonial power outside of Pennsylvania's legislature, including the Quaker Israel Pemberton (a close friend of the Delawares) and the Moravian Christian Frederick Post (a missionary long utilized as an intermediary between the colony and the Delaware), directly led to the Easton Conference of October 1758, the

[47] Calloway, *Indian World of George Washington*, 140-141.

Ohio Valley Indians' abdication of the Forks, and the seizure of Fort Duquesne by the British.[48] While Braddock's imperious but honest admission to Shingas regarding British desires for sole proprietorship of the Ohio Valley rendered him a virtual pariah to the indigenous allies he desperately needed, after three years of frontier warfare, Forbes, his go-betweens, and the Pennsylvania Assembly proved more than willing to dissemble to conceal their intentions; despite averring that the British would abandon the position and the valley to the natives after expelling the French, Forbes harbored a small contingent of settlers within his army and left 200 troops at the Forks upon completion of his mission, a presence that would gradually facilitate the growth of permanent British settlements.[49] Forbes thus secured native abandonment of his imperial foe at the negotiating table through a canard which stripped the French of much of their defensive capacity by neutralizing their Indian auxiliaries. But these falsehoods could not save Grant, whose overzealousness for combat and its attendant glory, promotion, and remuneration directly gainsaid the general's preference for a cautious, plodding, pace.

Perhaps the most striking contrast between the campaigns of Braddock and Forbes, one which also proved central to the legacy of Grant's preliminary frontier experience, was the manner in which each expedition proceeded hacking its chosen course out of the dense mid-Atlantic forests. Both armies had "flying columns," or sizable detachments that forged ahead of the body of the main army. Braddock's embrace of the advanced unit (at Washington's suggestion) arose from an overreaction to the snail's pace at which his

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[48] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 374-404; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 267-285; James Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 242-249.
[49] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 411-412; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 144-150; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 159; For settlers accompanying Forbes's Army, see Form for Suttlers' Licenses, June 19, 1758, in Stevens, et. al., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 2: The Forbes Expedition* (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1951), 114.

combined force traveled for the first two weeks of the expedition, when it evenly leveled a broad path and bridged streams over the rugged, densely vegetated terrain it traversed.[50] Braddock thus divided his army out of frustration, and the advanced segment, which carried only eight artillery pieces, moved far westward of the main body, which hauled most of the ordnance and provisions.[51] Critically, the flying column left much of the road construction to the larger force, which resulted in many miles of nearly untraversable path between the two divisions, with no stockades or fortified positions strategically interspersed as waystations to fall back upon if needed. This precipitate advanced procession significantly contributed to both Braddock's defeat at the Monongahela and his force's inability to recover and mount a subsequent attack in its aftermath despite superior overall numbers to the French; a strong, fortified position much closer to Duquesne than Fort Cumberland (110 miles from the Forks) would have allowed Braddock to mass his force before advancing all the way to the Ohio. Because of these major faux pas, Forbes sought to proceed at a measured, calculated pace. Despite consciously avoiding Braddock's Road, his advanced column cut through similarly challenging terrain as it crossed the Allegheny Mountains, but Forbes's harbinger division functioned in a different manner than Braddock's. Its primary objective was not to speed ahead towards an expedited showdown at the Forks, but rather involved engineering a level, clear path which would allow for his army and supply line to proceed apace over shorter stretches and eventually consolidate in the vicinity of Duquesne – a much more time-consuming (and better conceived) strategy. Forbes's master plan hinged on proceeding from Carlisle, a German-

[50] Calloway, *Indian World of George Washington*, 109.
[51] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 96.

majority settlement some 120 miles west of Philadelphia, and called for erecting a "stockade camp, intermittent posts called block houses, and cover for the army's provisions at forty mile intervals."[52] This systematic procession and even distribution of reinforcement across space lessened the likelihood that any setback, even a substantial one akin to Braddock's, would prove catastrophic to the whole expedition. Events involving Grant would soon test the viability of Forbes's road. The brigadier general tapped Bouquet as his second-in-command before the Swiss colonel relocated from Charlestown to Philadelphia in late March 1758, and Bouquet arrived in Lancaster prepared to plan and execute the overland drive towards the Forks; indeed, perusal of Bouquet's personal papers reveal a plan that he penned in March 1757 to take Duquesne uncannily similar to the one he was to now bring to fruition.[53] By early June, Forbes's men pushed into terrain previously controlled by Francophile Indians. Bouquet's engineers and soldiers set about creating the road after departing Carlisle, the westernmost toehold of British power in 1758 due to the mass desertions of backcountry homesteads in the face of sustained Algonquian raids.

Braddock's defeat ushered in a torrent of Ohio Indian incursions which irrevocably altered both the landscape of central Pennsylvania and how the colonists there conceived of Native Americans. This series of unpredictably fatal and frequently emasculating attacks proceeded over the course of three years, and rendered the town Grant encountered when he reached Carlisle alongside Forbes and the main body of his army in late June 1758 a

[52] John Forbes to William Pitt, Philadelphia, June 17, 1758, in Alfred Proctor James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes: Relating to His Service in North America* (Menasha, WI: The Collegiate Press, 1938), 116-119.
[53] Bouquet: Detail of a Proposed Expedition to Fort Duquesne, Philadelphia, March 18, 1757, in Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 51-54.

refugee-distended powder keg of neurosis. Thomas Dunbar, the lone surviving colonel of the Monongahela debacle, had ignominiously absconded to Philadelphia and requested winter quarters for the remainder of Braddock's army some three years earlier, leaving the vast Pennsylvania frontier largely unguarded and the inhabitants of isolated hamlets and farmsteads on territory that Ohio Indians conceived of as theirs virtually undefended.[54] Recognition of Britain's unwavering desire to initiate colonial expansion into the Ohio Valley and the growing risk posed by continuing to defy France's request to take up the hatchet against the British left the Indians of the Ohio Valley with little choice but to attack Pennsylvania and Virginia; Shingas's brother Pisquetomen commenced the hostilities by leading warriors from Kittaning against the upper Susquehanna town of Penn's Creek and rendering it a smoldering heap of rubble in October 1755.[55] Virginians and Pennsylvanians responded by erecting a series of forts to counter the French network that ran from the Ohio to Lake Erie, including Fort Loudoun at Winchester and Fort Augusta near the old eastern Delaware town of Shamokin, but their lack of manpower severely hindered the effectiveness of their chain, and the raiding continued relatively unabated.[56] Pennsylvania regimental commander John Armstrong headed a set of provincials that orchestrated a cold-blooded retributive massacre against Kittaning in August 1756, but this foray proved an exception to the rule; from 1755 to 1758, the colonists absconded east and futilely strove to establish some semblance of a defensive perimeter on their rapidly diminishing

[54] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 105, 108.
[55] McConnell, *A Country Between*, 119-120; Fred Anderson argues that the Ohio Delawares had "little room to maneuver" after Braddock's loss, as the increased presence of France's western allies in the valley made punishment likely if they remained neutral. See Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 109; For Penn's Creek see Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads: Indians & Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 180-185.
[56] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 158-159.

frontier, while the Ohio Indians encroached virtually at will and beat their colonial counterparts ever closer to Philadelphia.[57] The Pennsylvania borderlands beyond Carlisle morphed into what Moravian missionary John Heckewelder characterized as the "howling wilderness," littered with copious "blackened ruins of houses and barns, and remnants of chimneys."[58] Roads which had previously connected German and Scots-Irish backcountry denizens to Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo neighbors and facilitated intercultural commerce now served as concourses of horrific violence, with each outburst progressively calcifying most Pennsylvanians' beliefs that Indians uniformly exhibited a racially inhered savagery and should be extirpated from colonial society.[59] While Bouquet and the advanced column pressed onward toward Duquesne, parrying Delaware scalping parties and scrambling to retain the Cherokees that had migrated north for the campaigning season, Grant followed behind with Forbes's main body into a country fractured both physically and psychologically.

The corporeal state of the campaign's conductor was no less physically fractured. Upon the First Highland Regiment's arrival in Philadelphia's port on June 6, Forbes's gastrointestinal malady (which some historians have speculated was stomach cancer) grew more acute, eventually resulting in severe excretory system complications characterized by

[57] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 200.
[58] Quoted in Paul A.W. Wallace, ed., *The Travels of John Heckewelder in Frontier America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 38.
[59] Merritt, *At the Crossroads*, 4-8. Anxiety over Indian raids on the Pennsylvania frontier during the Seven Years' War grew so intense that it yielded a new rhetorical mechanism, an "unanswerable," highly emotive racialized discourse referred to as "the anti-Indian sublime," which recast Pennsylvania's political scene into a reactionary milieu that increasingly marginalized anyone espousing coexistence with the Indians. See Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), *xviii-xx*.

"most excruciating pains in my Bowels."[60] Forbes's resilience became the stuff of legend during the campaign, as he directed troop movements, negotiated through proxy with the Ohio Valley Indians, planned, and penned abundant letters while gravely ill, securing his objective at the Forks in November before succumbing to his illness in March 1759. Notwithstanding this frenetic energy level, Forbes determined that he needed assistance in maintaining his correspondence, and subsequently tapped Major Francis Halkett (his *aide-de-camp*) and James Grant as conduits for official communication with his officers stationed closer to Duquesne.[61] The junior officer struck the proper balance of obsequiousness to authority and debonair to engender his commander's confidence, and thus became familiar with Forbes's strategy, eventually securing an integral assignment; the brigadier general considered Grant's "parts as a military man… inferior to few."[62] This glowing assessment would not survive the expedition, but Forbes's trust in him during the summer and his role as the general's scribe provided Grant with a thorough comprehension of his superior's plan for Indian diplomacy, as native affairs dominated Forbes's thoughts and words that summer and fall.

When Grant arrived in Philadelphia, Forbes found himself failing to maintain the balance of a two-pronged Indian diplomacy aimed at securing Duquesne which revolved around keeping allies from the southern tribes in the mid-Atlantic region and convincing the Ohio Valley Indians to abandon the French. Just as British peace overtures relayed by the Susquehanna Delaware chief Teedyuscung began to fall on receptive ears among his

[60] Forbes to Abercromby, Shippensburg, September 4, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 199-202; for cancer speculation, see Calloway, *Indian World of George Washington*, 139.
[61] Grant to Bouquet, Carlisle, July 11, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 143-145.
[62] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 19; Forbes to Bouquet, Shippensburg, August 28, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 188-190.

war-weary Ohio Valley brethren, Forbes's Cherokee alliance, seen by the general as integral to his army's military prospects against his French adversaries, began to unravel. Forbes conceived of many valuable services that Cherokee warriors would be uniquely equipped to offer (all of which they provided, despite the alliance souring over the course of the summer), including covering the flanks of Bouquet's column as they worked to clear a navigable road towards Duquesne, deterring the Ohio Indian raids that had terrorized the British backcountry settlements for the past three years via aggressive counterraiding aimed at intimidation, and deploying reconnaissance parties to the Forks to discern the relative strength of the French position there and seize prisoners to sweat for information.[63] In March and April, the parties that Demeré and McIntosh observed departing Cherokee country in February arrived on the scene and began providing some of these services. Though apprehensive about their restlessness and unpredictability as allies, Forbes projected confidence in the Cherokees' impact on the course of the conflict, exclaiming that "necessity will turn me a Cherokee" and predicting his seizure of Duquesne "at the head of them."[64] By early May, some 800 Cherokee warriors had arrived at Forts Loudoun and Cumberland, but a month later, that figure had dwindled to 186.[65] As the scouts and raiders he felt that he needed to win melted into the forests, the general's anxiety surged. Forbes's consternation over Cherokee defections peppered his correspondence during May and June 1758, and Grant surely received an earful of the

[63] For construction flanking, see Forbes to Bouquet, Philadelphia, May 20, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 347-348, for counter raiding, see Adam Stephen to Bouquet, Fort Loudoun, June 7, 1758, Stevens, et. al., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 2: The Forbes Expedition*, 52-53, for scouting and taking prisoners, see Forbes to Pitt, Philadelphia, May 1, 1758, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 76-78.
[64] Forbes to Loudoun, Philadelphia, April 23, 1758, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 70-71.
[65] Paul Kelton, "The British and Indian War: Cherokee Power and the Fate of Empire in North America," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (October 2012): 775-777.

general's woes regarding Indian allies. Forbes soon characterized the force that had traveled hundreds of miles to smite Britain's foes as "a very great plague," but his letters clearly reflect the nature of the grievances that sparked their desertion.

The parties that had arrived piecemeal at Winchester and other British forts that spring in front of Byrd's recruiting effort encountered conditions they found more insulting than Wawhatchee's band had the previous year. These conditions included a lack of provisions at the forts to sustain the Cherokees as they conducted raids to the west, mishaps surrounding present allotments that they deemed insufficient recompense for risking their lives on behalf of the British, arguments that arose from officers' inability to understand the nature of indigenous martial culture, an inept, Hydra-like corps of "Indian experts" who conveyed mixed messages to the Cherokees about what to expect from their British associates during the course of the campaign, and, most critically, unpreparedness to wage war upon the Cherokees' arrival. During April and May, Cherokees situated themselves not only at Fort Loudoun in Winchester and Fort Cumberland, but also at two outposts west of Shippensburg (Fort Lyttelton and yet another Fort Loudoun) that lay on the trajectory of Forbes's Road. The problem was that the road had not yet reached the fortifications. Bouquet and the flying column were still to the east at Carlisle, and the garrisons at the advanced posts lacked the provisions to sustain the Cherokees when they arrived on the scene. Upon learning that the Cherokees at Fort Lyttelton had been provided with "nothing but flour for two days," Bouquet ordered a shipment of rice from Carlisle, but found the town's inhabitants completely unwilling to provide wagons so that the army could transport food to be consumed by native allies into a country which they associated exclusively with Indian raids directed against them. Bouquet had issued press warrants for

the wagons and feared that the Cherokees would risk "going unfed due to the perversity" of locals who refused to assist the army.[66] Bouquet blamed the colonists for his inability to provide sustenance to his native associates, but the Cherokees likely held him and the other British military brass responsible for their gnawing hunger.

Dispensation of significant quantities of presents via appropriate diplomatic channels to cement pacts among native groups was a cultural phenomenon that predated European contact, and remained a fixture of any successful European attempt to secure indigenous allies; Forbes's 1758 courtship of the Cherokees proved no different. The dispensations during Forbes's campaigns, however, usually preceded a departure of the recipients southward towards home, and too often accompanied ugly episodes. For example, by early June, Cherokees who had been conducting raids on the Ohio and Allegheny for the previous two months from Fort Loudoun decided to depart the expedition, and asked the ranking British officer, Ohio Company agent William Trent, to present them with goods for the journey. When Trent beseeched them to remain for a few days longer so as to allow Bouquet time to arrive and hold a proper council with them, the Cherokees informed him that they would not wait and that if he failed to grant them substantial gifts, then they would pillage "all the English Houses they met with in their way home." The Cherokees also pressured Trent for a speedy dispensation by implying that failure to do so might induce them to switch sides, declaring that some of their "Young Men" had been at Duquesne the previous summer, and that they reckoned the French "good men." When Trent continued to refuse doling out the gifts, one warrior "pulled off his

[66] Bouquet to Forbes, Carlisle, May 29, 1758, in Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 386-390.

Shirt and throwed it at me," indicating that he wanted Trent to wash the garment and convey it to Bouquet. Several others followed his lead, depositing bundles of clothing in front of the perplexed officer, who finally discerned their gesture's intent when they voiced their desire to let Bouquet keep them "as you loved goods."[67] Though these Cherokees balked at carrying out their threats, opting instead for sarcasm, and stayed at Fort Loudoun to hear Bouquet out, others resorted to the use of force to acquire what they felt was just compensation for services already rendered. In Shippensburg the week before the incident involving Trent, a faction of Cherokees livid over the denial of presents and prepared to remove itself post haste from the vicinity of the smallpox outbreak afflicting Bouquet's troops "behaved very badly" and seized presents held in a storehouse there by force.[68]

Disaffection engendered by the lack of presents, food, and arms was compounded by mixed messages delivered to the Cherokees by multiple official mouthpieces. Croghan had initially invited the Cherokees to campaign in the north again the previous year, but Forbes had no clue of the extent of the "promises of rewards" made to the southern tribesmen by Johnson's deputy.[69] Now Johnson, concerned with the provision of Indians participating in his own campaign against Ticonderoga, sent his agent Ferrell Wade to Philadelphia to purchase goods that Forbes was scrambling to acquire for the Cherokees, directly undercutting his ability to equip and feed the southern Indians.[70] Forbes felt that Johnson, Atkin, or one of their subordinates should be on hand to manage communication, coordination of gift giving, and direction of scouting and raiding parties among the

[67] William Trent to Bouquet, Fort Loudoun, June 5, 1758, in Stevens, et. al., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 2: The Forbes Expedition*, 36-38.
[68] Bouquet to Forbes, Carlisle, May 25, 1758, in Stevens, et. al, *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 366-368.
[69] Forbes to Stanwix, Philadelphia, May 29, 1758, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 102-104.
[70] Forbes to William Johnson, Philadelphia, May 4, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 82.

Cherokees, and grew frustrated when that assistance failed to materialize.[71] Without the cooperation of the empire's official representatives to Native Americans, Forbes allowed his relations with the Cherokees to fall to William Byrd, whose late-May arrival in Winchester with a party of sixty Lower townsmen postdated the rise of major Cherokee grievances in the Pennsylvania backcountry, and Abraham Bosomworth, whom Forbes suspected of making exorbitant provision demands in order to skim profits off the top.[72] Forbes also sent his cousin, former South Carolina governor James Glen, to beseech his old colleagues amongst the Cherokee to remain in the field until the "Great Warrior" (Forbes) could arrive and treat with them.[73] This multipolar management effort proved a dismal failure, as each of Forbes's liaisons appear to have been habitually informing different groups of Cherokees about forthcoming dispensations of goods that varied appreciably from what the others were saying; Bouquet believed this misinformation a byproduct of "petty jealousies in the management of their affairs," and bemoaned the volatile nature of Cherokee relations, which arose directly from "too many people meddling in this, and they cannot agree among themselves."[74] Executing the general's objective of gaining custody of French prisoners to interrogate for accurate information about conditions and manpower at the Forks generated more friction, as it disregarded one of the primary reasons Native Americans engaged in warfare: captive seizure for the purpose of clan assimilation and societal reconstitution. Forbes encountered this phenomena in May when Cherokees and

[71] Forbes expressed amazement that neither superintendent or their personnel came to Pennsylvania to assuage matters with the Cherokees, though he made "repeated applications" to both. See Forbes to Stawnix, Philadelphia, May 29, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 102-104.
[72] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 50-57; Forbes to Bouquet, Carlisle, July 17, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 149-150.
[73] Forbes to Abercromby, Philadelphia, June 15, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 113-114.
[74] Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown, July 23, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 2: The Forbes Expedition*, 261-262.

Catawbas returned from a scouting mission to the Ohio with five prisoners and encountered "an immensity of trouble" trying to persuade the captors to part with them.[75] Moreover, Bouquet's expectations of his allies contradicted indigenous military norms. The colonel wanted to persuade warriors prepared to immediately decimate their foes with waves of raids to wait "without impatience" in the vicinity of Shippensburg until the army had been fully assembled to push to Duquesne.[76] In addition to this forbearance, which would deny the Cherokees chances to engage the Ohio Valley Indians on their terms, Bouquet wanted the authority to divide the body of their force in the manner he best saw fit, apportioning "their men to posts that we designate, and continually sending out parties to get news of the enemy," and informed his allies of the necessity of their cooperation in a public address at Fort Loudoun on June 16.[77] Bouquet and Forbes unreasonably expected a repudiation of native martial tendencies by pushing for Cherokees to remain stationary in barracks and to subject themselves to the stringencies attendant to a hierarchical chain of command. Such requests surely galled.

The primary factor exacerbating the exodus of hundreds of Cherokees from the Pennsylvania backcountry in June 1758, however, was Forbes's inability to demonstrate his readiness and willingness to strike against the Ohio Valley Indians and the French. Bosomworth first hinted at this disaffection in early May, when he relayed to Forbes that the Cherokees in Winchester were in "a tolerable humor; altho impatient to see our Army, Artillery, and their own presents."[78] They obviously wanted the campaign to ensue so it

[75] Forbes to Abercromby, May 4, 1758, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 84-86.
[76] Bouquet to Forbes, Carlisle, May 29, 1758, Stevens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 1*, 386-390.
[77] *Ibid*.; Bouquet: Speech to Cherokee and Catawba Indians, Fort Loudoun, c. June 16, 1758, Stephens, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 2: The Forbes Expedition*, 98-100.
[78] Forbes to Abercromby, Philadelphia, May 1, 1758, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 74-75.

would not interfere with hunting season, and expected prompt remuneration for participation. For his part, Forbes at least acknowledged that the Carolinians, and probably Byrd, misrepresented his army's level of preparedness during their recruiting pitches earlier in the year; when they arrived on the scene, the Cherokees fumed over the absence of his combined force and heavy ordnance "which I am afraid they had reason to expect."[79] Though the warriors had led some successful scouting forays, those in Winchester grew weary with life in the garrison quickly, and hankered "after their own homes, complaining that they see no appearance of our Army."[80] By early June, the majority of the Cherokee force had dissipated, as warriors that had traveled hundreds of miles increasingly interpreted the lack of cannon and the absence of British troops in the backcountry as unimpeachable evidence that they would be expected to contribute to the war effort disproportionately more than their allies. Forbes conceded the deleterious impact of this impression, claiming that the failure of the provincials and Montgomery's regiment to materialize for the push to Duquesne "did not afford us the show of any design to attack the enemy, or defend ourselves."[81] From the Cherokee perspective, it appeared that the British had summoned them northward under the pretense of a collaborative campaign, but expected them to function as proxies without providing adequate sustenance, equipment, or the gifts such an arrangement mandated. Though a small contingent remained with Forbes's army throughout the campaign, over three-fourths departed in disgust during early June; many likely echoing the Raven of Hiwassee's sentiments that the British were

[79] Forbes to Pitt, Philadelphia, May 1, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 76-78.
[80] Forbes to Pitt, Philadelphia, May 19, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 91-93.
[81] Forbes to Abercromby, Philadelphia, June 7, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 109-110.

"Cowards and Liars."[82] While dissatisfaction with British foot dragging certainly encouraged the Cherokees to return south, the departure's timing makes even more sense when considered alongside cultural priorities. Forbes wrote on July 10 that the "greatest part of them – went home three weeks ago," a timeframe which indicated their arrival back in southern Appalachia likely occurred in mid-July – just in time to participate in the central feature of Cherokee ceremonial life.[83] The Green Corn Ceremony, a multi-day event commemorating the ripening of the new corn harvest that simultaneously functioned as a vehicle of societal purgation, renewal, and reconciliation, occurred in either July or August in Cherokee country.[84] Nearly half of the entire tribe's fighting men had mobilized for Forbes's campaign, including numerous headmen whose communitarian obligations virtually mandated presence at their respective town's central fire to participate in the ceremony. The campaign's logistical needs could not compete with this cosmological tug in the Cherokees' hierarchy of responsibilities that summer.

Forbes could bloviate all he wanted about Cherokees "being but bad Judges of time" who arrived "too early in the year to our Assistance, and therefore had not patience to wait our time," who then decamped after "putting us to great expense and doing nothing for it" – the tribesmen clearly risked life and limb in service of his expedition, contributing in ways both mundane and extraordinary.[85] Cherokees had engaged in substantial counterraiding in 1757, which significantly curtailed the Ohio Valley Indians' ability to move unhindered

[82] Calloway, *Indian World of George Washington*, 142.
[83] Forbes to Pitt, July 10, 1758, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 140-142.
[84] For the Green Corn Ceremony in general among the southeastern tribes, see Charles Hudson, *The Southeastern Indians* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 365-375, for the timing of the festivity in Cherokee villages, see Theda Perdue, *Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 25-27.
[85] Forbes to Abercromby, Carlisle Camp, July 18, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, 150-152.

towards Virginia's outlying western settlements and execute unopposed strikes; during the course of Forbes's campaign the following year, they launched at least seventeen raids against Duquesne and the multitribal coalescent villages that had materialized in its vicinity, alleviating some pressure on the Pennsylvania back settlements in the Susquehanna Valley.[86] The correspondence of both Forbes and his subordinates belied his gripes about Cherokee inactivity. Parties of Cherokees provided surveillance not only of Duquesne, but also French positions as far north as Fort Presque Isle on the shore of Lake Erie.[87] The contingent that remained with Bouquet after the exodus of early June secured the perimeter of the camp daily, flanked and covered the engineers and soldiers as they cut the road west from the flying column's position at Raystown to Loyalhanna, an advanced post beyond Allegheny Mountain some 45 miles from Duquesne, and even augmented his army's supply of fresh meat through regular hunting.[88] While he surely considered hunting normative behavior for native men (as did all Europeans in the colonies), and thus a contribution in accordance with the cultural tendencies of the warriors accompanying his division, Bouquet marveled at the willingness of the Cherokees in his retinue to depart from his comprehension of indigenous labor tendencies. Most Europeans construed Indian women's responsibility for agricultural productivity (the duty of male peasants in Europe) and Indian men's hunting (the pastime of leisured European aristocrats rather than a legitimate mode of production) as proof of native female drudgery and male indolence and

[86] Kelton, "The British and Indian War," 769, 778.
[87] Adam Stephen to Bouquet, Fort Loudoun, June 7, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 52-53.
[88] Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown, June 28, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 142-144.

aversion to menial work.[89] In late June, he noted a development which deviated from his expectations of native warriors. The Cherokee men did "what I have never heard of any Indian doing before" – they assisted in erecting and roofing storehouses at Raystown.[90] Though such toil did not reflect the gendered labor division that Europeans so frequently criticized, the astonished Bouquet clearly thought such activities uncharacteristic of Cherokee societal norms and indicative of tangible sacrifice in order to achieve British imperial objectives – especially given the Virginia provincial troops' flat refusal to work in that capacity without immediate supplemental pay.[91] Ethnohistorian Paul Kelton's research indicates that the Cherokees that joined Forbes's campaign spearheaded trilateral negotiations between Onondaga and the Ohio Valley Indians, during which the Six Nations operated as the messaging channel and the Cherokees functioned as a peacekeeping force.[92] He argues that the pressure generated by this Cherokee-Iroquoian coalition, the Cherokee raids that summer, and the prospect of their renewal when Attakullakulla's band arrived on the scene in October was enough to convince the western Delawares to withdraw from the Forks, leaving an undermanned French garrison unable to resist Forbes's advance in its wake.[93] He frames Cherokee participation in the campaign as the critical contribution that intimidated the Ohioans enough to dislodge them from the French alliance, thus securing Forbes's ultimate objective.[94] Despite their substantial diplomatic

[89] William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 52-53.
[90] Bouquet to St. Clair, Raystown, June 30, 1758, in Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 148-151.
[91] *Ibid*.
[92] Kelton, "The British and Indian War," 777-782.
[93] *Ibid*., 784-792.
[94] This assertion is an oversell, as the difficulties in supplying and reinforcing Duquesne after the fall of Fort Frontenac in late August, the size of Forbes's army and the series of strong positions along his road upon which it could fall back in the case of defeat, and British canards at Easton about retaining the Ohio Valley as a

services, no aspect of the campaign accentuates the Cherokees' sacrifice in the name of British military objectives (or renders Forbes's commentary on gift filching and lack of assistance bogus) more than the losses they endured on the mid-Atlantic frontier. Cherokee scouting parties suffered casualties on forays to the Ohio and beyond.[95] By the time Grant began writing on Forbes's behalf, Cherokees had mobilized, traveled far to the north, treated with the enemy, died in combat, observed a marked hesitancy to engage on the part of the British, and received treatment out of step with their expectations of what alliances entailed; it is no wonder so many grew weary with the errand and detached themselves from Forbes's army to return home.

Grant's arrival among Forbes's troops coincided with this disjointed mass departure, providing the Scottish major with an eyewitness to Cherokee disaffection with the British alliance along with an introductory opportunity to engage in native diplomacy, though his interaction with them resembled a terse remunerative transaction more than a highly ritualized parley with a valued native ally. On August 8, 48 of the Cherokees that had remained with Bouquet despite the defection of most of their cohort in early June, the ones that had helped erect the supply depot, decided to quit the expedition and left Raystown for Fort Loudoun, where they expected a dispensation of presents.[96] Bouquet dreaded the prospect of violence between this detachment and the garrison at Fort Loudoun should the

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preserve for its current inhabitants after driving the French from the field all factored into Forbes's seizure of the position at the Forks in late November. Despite its borderline determinism, Kelton's research convincingly establishes Cherokee diplomacy during the campaign as a contributory factor in Duquesne's fall.

[95] One perished in an ambush while on a reconnoitering survey of Venango in June, and one of Wawhatchee's parties lost seven men in an engagement with the enemy. See Trent to Bouquet, Fort Loudoun, June 5, 1758 and Trent to Bouquet, Fort Loudoun, June 8, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 38-38, 54.

[96] Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown, August 8, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 335-339.

latter deny a disbursement, and furiously opined that their retreat was rooted in cowardice, noting that as the column neared Duquesne the Cherokees were "no longer of such great service."[97] The specter of further irruptions between Cherokee warriors and British colonists compelled Bouquet to advise an immediate transfer of the present cache at Loudoun to rule out "the consequences of a refusal."[98] Couching this exit in terms of a "revolt," an increasingly exasperated Forbes sent Grant at the head of two Highland companies to parley with the Cherokees, who demanded "presents laid up in store by the General, to have been given at the end of the campaign."[99] Forbes's directive to Grant emphasizes the powerlessness of British military officers to stem the Cherokees' withdrawal from the field. Upon arriving at Fort Loudoun, Grant was to convey to the Cherokees "in moderate terms, how Grosly they had abused and imposed upon us for so many months, and now to leave us at the only time they could be of service to us."[100] If this entreaty failed to move them, Grant must literally grovel in order to ensure their fidelity, and "beg" the Cherokees to remain in Pennsylvania, "but if they will not, caution them against all outrages and violence against the inhabitants of the country they may pass through," a nod to the horse rustling incidents and murders in Bedford County that marred the southern passage of war parties through Virginia earlier that summer.[101] Should shaming and pleading not elicit the desired response, Forbes authorized Grant to finally "give them their presents and they might return home."[102] Diplomatic bonds with native

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[97] *Ibid*.
[98] *Ibid*.
[99] Halkett to Bouquet, Carlisle, August 10, 1758, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 172.
[100] Forbes to Abercromby, Carlisle, August 11, 1758, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 172-174.
[101] *Ibid*.
[102] Forbes to Bouquet, Shippensburg, August 15, 1758, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 177-178.

groups hinged on reciprocity, and Forbes's disregard for this necessary exchange represented a direct threat to the economic viability of Cherokee families, who felt they deserved compensation commensurate to the season's worth of deerskins their warriors deferred while participating in the expedition.[103] Grant was tasked with providing both objects indicative of a reciprocal relationship and access to goods the Cherokees felt they had earned via exertions that spring and summer.

Conscious of the alliance's deterioration and anxious over the prospect of more retaliatory bloodshed, Grant and his entourage rode west, arriving at Fort Loudoun at dusk on the evening of August 11. There he encountered Louis Ourry, the relieved garrison commander, the Cherokee party led by Out Town headman Round O of Stecoe, who would die as Lyttelton's prisoner the following year, the influential Mohawk sachem Nichas, whom Grant referred to as "George," likely because Croghan was his son-in-law, and, most fortunately, a junior officer named Hugh Crawford whose linguistic fluency in Cherokee allowed Grant to communicate with the disgruntled assemblage.[104] The ensuing episode speaks to a historiographic debate regarding Native-European exchange. Joseph M. Hall construes gift exchange as a culturally durable phenomenon that persisted among the Southeastern Indians and their allies long after the introduction of western market dynamics to the interior.[105] He sees the circulation of gifted goods among native groups as

[103] James L. Hill, "New Systems, Established Traditions: Governor James Grant's Indian Diplomacy and the Evolution of British Colonial Policy, 1760-1771," *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 93 (Fall 2014): 134-135.
[104] Louis Ourry to Bouquet, Fort Loudoun, August 11, 1758, in Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 358-359; Grant to Forbes, Fort Loudoun, August 16, 1758, in *Headquarters Papers of Brigadier-General John Forbes Relating to the Expedition Against Fort Duquesne in 1758*, Accession #10034, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, VA, Box 6.
[105] Joseph M. Hall, Jr., *Zamumo's Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in the Colonial Southeast* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 5, 166-167.

the primary vehicle for the construction of multipolar alliances, and objects presented in the confines of diplomatic settings as reciprocal adhesive that simultaneously bound giver and recipient to mutual obligation and reconstituted the power of the leaders who brokered their transferal; moreover, Southeastern natives successfully compelled their European neighbors to accept the gift system of exchange as a precursor to commercial transaction, subordinating profit motives to indigenous diplomatic imperatives.[106] Twenty five years ago, Kathryn H. Braund clearly demonstrated that Creek Indians embraced something akin to a modern service economy that evolved from the receipt of presents in the course of diplomacy and the deerskin trade as a means to acquire coveted European goods; acting as couriers for colonial political figures who needed messages conveyed across backcountry expanses and volunteering for military service, as the Cherokees did during Forbes's campaign, regularly yielded large disbursements of trade goods which were called "presents" but for all practical purposes functioned like wages.[107] In a more recent offering, Jessica Yirush Stern stresses the precontact prevalence of market forces within Southeastern societies, that trade between Native Americans and Europeans predated the establishment of normalized relations or even personal connections, the longstanding native classification of certain transferable objects as commodities and others as gifts, and that their backcountry wrangling with colonial traders presaged the evolution of a largely deregulated early national American marketplace.[108] When Grant rode into Fort Loudoun, he noted the calm demeanors of Round O's Cherokees, who approached him in an

[106] *Ibid*., 1-5, 167-171.
[107] Kathryn E. Holland Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815*, 2d ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 72-74.
[108] Stern, *The Lives in Objects*, 1-16, 50, 92.

orderly fashion, made no request to be feted with rum (which the major clearly expected), and conveyed their impatience with the delay in receipt of "*their goods* as they were pleased to call them" (emphasis mine).[109] The Cherokees' familiarity with the commodities slated for disbursement among them extended to an individuated breakdown of how they would be divvied up, and "as every man knew his own Bundle, the Distribution was easily made."[110] Grant's late arrival in camp, the fatigue attendant to a days' ride, and in all likelihood coaching from Byrd, Bosomworth, or another of Forbes's intermediaries on the niceties of doling out presents to Indians caused the major to think that the distribution would accompany a required speech and symbolic diplomatic protocol the following morning, but again the Cherokees bucked his expectations. After he informed the Cherokees of his exhaustion and desire to perform the transfer in the morning after a night's rest, a subordinate approached him while he stripped into smallclothes in his quarters to relay that the Cherokees "were making themselves ready to go off without waiting for their presents."[111] Fearful of what this development would mean for the backcountry settlements that fell on the trajectory of their route to Cherokee country, Grant found himself "obliged to order them to be delivered."[112] Redressing and emerging from his tent, Grant requested the Cherokees' presence at a talk that he would deliver the following day (undoubtedly Forbes's jeremiad against disloyalty) and invited the entire party to sup at his table the subsequent evening; the elated Cherokees acquiesced, averring "they would hear everything which I had to say to them, as we were Friends and Brothers,"

[109] Grant to Forbes, Fort Loudoun, August 16, 1758, in *Headquarters Papers of Brigadier-General John Forbes*, Box 6.
[110] *Ibid*.
[111] *Ibid*.
[112] *Ibid*.

then promptly melted away into the night as the British garrison slumbered, commandeering "a few horses" to remedy whatever shortcomings they discerned in the present disbursement.[113] The Cherokees' behavior at Fort Loudoun resembles that of a contemporary wage laborer demanding reimbursement from an employer whose human resources department neglected to cut a check for hours worked weeks before rather than an ally bound to participate in tradition and diplomatic rigamarole to uphold principles of reciprocity. Their explicit denotation of the cloth, kettles, and gorgets they were to receive as *goods* further clarifies this transaction as a *quid pro quo* transfer of labor in the form of participating in Forbes's campaign for a set amount of commodities. The commercial resolution of this matter contradicted the flummoxed British major's suppositions regarding Cherokee labor valuation and expectations of just compensation; the whole affair smacks of Braund's service economy and Stern's paradigm of exchange. Indeed, the entire British officer corps' acute misunderstanding of the material outlay required to remunerate Cherokees for their services during Forbes's campaign planted seeds which would sow an excruciatingly bitter harvest on the southern colonial frontier.

After serving as paymaster general to the departing Cherokees, Grant waited for Montgomery's appearance at Fort Loudoun before marching westward to link up with Bouquet at Raystown. Grant could sense his proximity to the glory, notoriety and promotion that he had craved for over a year during his recruiting mission to Charlestown and tenure as Forbes's scribe with the main body of the army. Furthermore, he was passing from the direct command of a superior whose primary objective was to delay engagement with the French until the Ohio Valley Indians could be convinced to abandon them to one

[113] *Ibid*.

actively contemplating the sort of autonomous, aggressive actions that Grant craved. Forbes's grand strategy required not only the meticulous process of clearing a broad path and erecting intermittent stockades along it that enabled concentrated, quickly reinforceable pockets of British presence along the road, it also involved delaying a full-frontal assault on the French until the Ohio Valley Indians could be dislodged from their villages near the Forks through a protracted peace process. Grant was fully aware of Forbes's desire for relative restraint in the vicinity of the Ohio until this domino fell, as was Bouquet. Concerns over the Ohio Valley Indians' amenability towards reconciliation with the British dominated Forbes's musings for the second half of 1758, but he had appealed to Pennsylvania Governor William Denny to establish a channel with the western Delaware through the Susquehanna chieftain Teedyuscung in early spring.[114] By late June, when Forbes, Grant, and the main body of the army were relocating to Carlisle to prepare for its backcountry march, Teedyuscung's overtures had born fruit; Pisquetomen, the elder brother of Delaware war sachem Shingas, rendezvoused with Teedyuscung and Post, Pennsylvania's newly appointed attaché to the Ohio Indians, who convinced the Allegheny Delaware chief to meet with Denny in Philadelphia.[115] On July 12, Pennsylvania legislator Richard Peters mailed an account of the meeting between Pisquetomen, Post, and the governor to Forbes, who in turn forwarded it to Bouquet at Raystown.[116] At the summit, Denny beseeched Pisquetomen to convince his brethren to "return into their old friendship with us" and either relocate to the Wyoming Valley where he would erect a "Strong House"

[114] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 267.
[115] Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 242.
[116] Richard Peters to Forbes, July 12, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 197-199.

at Shamokin for their protection, or at the very least "remove quickly at a great Distance from our Enemy the French, that your legs may not be stained with Blood" by Forbes's column as it methodically pushed towards Duquesne.[117] Pisquetomin's retinue appeared "agreeable" to the proposed peace, and the chief and Post immediately embarked upon a perilous passage to disseminate Pennsylvania's wampum and entreaties to the French-allied Indians, arriving in the western Delaware town of Kuskuki by mid-August, around the time Grant parleyed with the Cherokees at Fort Loudoun.[118] Forbes informed Bouquet of Post's presence among the Allegheny Delaware chiefs on August 10, the day that Grant left Carlisle to dispense the presents.[119] For the next few months, Forbes fretted over prospective violence between either his troops or the Cherokees remaining with his force and the Ohio Valley Indians, and devised a scheme to head off friendly fire episodes – Ohio Indians who desired to abandon the French and return to the Wyoming Valley would tie bands of yellow shalloon around their arms to indicate their peaceable intentions as they moved past Bouquet's subordinates on their way east.[120] In early September, he sent word to Bouquet that even if his army was already ensconced at Raystown with enough supplies for the advance that he would consider a strike on the French fortress imprudent "yet for some time."[121] Post and Pisquetomen had concluded their appeal to the Delawares among the French, and a formal meeting between the belligerents would ensue at Easton as soon as the Western Delaware representatives could travel east. Forbes's sources indicated to

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[117] Indian Conference Held at the Pennsylvania State House with Teedyuscung and the Indians, July 11, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 187-193.
[118] *Ibid*.; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 270.
[119] Forbes to Bouquet, August 10, 1758, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 170-171.
[120] Forbes to Bouquet, July 17, 1758, in Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 224-225.
[121] Forbes to Bouquet, Shippensburg, September 2, 1758, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 193-196.

him that majority of the native protectorate at Fort Duquesne consisted of Indians from "Detroit and Westward of the Lakes," who were "now weary and must return by the latter end of September for taking care of their Hunting."[122] He desired his advanced column to hang back and adopt a defensive posture until the *pays d'en haut* residents left for their winter quarters and Easton could be formalized; these contingencies precluded belligerence on the part of his force at the moment, as "any stroke of ours at this criticall period, might be of very bad Consequence to us."[123] Grant, who joined Bouquet's advanced column on August 20, was by then intimately familiar with the commander of the expedition's orders regarding restraint and its association with prompting "The inactivity of the Indians," the *sine qua non* of his final push.[124]

Grant and Bouquet harbored other notions of how the campaign should proceed. Bouquet's longing for a more aggressive strategy manifested in his correspondence by the middle of July, when he requested Washington's opinion regarding sending "a Strong Party to the Indian Settlements on the Ohio," speculating that if the families of the defenders of Duquesne were under duress that they might flee the fort and leave the French to fend for themselves.[125] Bouquet's notions, which he and Grant would soon attempt to implement, were in lockstep with a strategic paradigm shift amongst the British officer corps during the Seven Years' War. Many redcoats began to call for the adoption of *petit guerre*, or the targeting of non-combatant civilians and other infrastructure that supported a belligerent's ability to maintain a viable force, in order to decimate France's indigenous allies and break

[122] *Ibid*.
[123] *Ibid*.
[124] Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown, August 20, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 395-399.
[125] Bouquet to Washington, Raystown, July 14, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 205-206.

their collective will to continue resisting His Majesty's military.[126] Bouquet made his preference for a hasty, muscular show of force abundantly clear three weeks later, when he beseeched Forbes to order his column to attack the French immediately, lest the infrastructure upon which it relied soon fail it. Bouquet reckoned his detachment's "subsistence… very precarious," as in a mere six weeks, he reckoned that frost would destroy the grass on which the army's horses and stock fed.[127] The flying column's supply of hogs was already severely limited, and Bouquet fretted that the army would starve without pork once the grass was wilted; as such he wanted to deal the French an immediate, decisive blow.[128] Bouquet repeated his estimation that the time to strike was ripe "before a Reinforcement can join them" on August 31.[129] By early September, the correspondence with his commander acquired an insubordinate tone, as Bouquet argued that his scouts indicated that the French no longer had "a large body of Indians; all the reports agree on this point, as very few are seen around the fort, and they have never bothered us very much."[130] With regards to scotching the pending Easton conference by attacking natives the British were currently wooing, Bouquet considered it the proper tack to chastise the natives that currently remained at the Ohio, and that the "attitude and location of those settled on the Ohio" indicated at that point that they would never desert the French.[131] In the same missive, Bouquet suggested that British public opinion, and its

[126] John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1, 115-118.
[127] Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown, August 8, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 335-339.
[128] *Ibid*.
[129] Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown, August 31, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 449-452.
[130] Bouquet to Forbes, September 4, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 471-474.
[131] *Ibid*.

most definitive mid-century embodiment (Minister Pitt) would judge Forbes unkindly should the procrastination persist. Bouquet argued that the inhabitants of the British transatlantic empire "have eyes fixed on you" and would not excuse "remaining inactive," which could destroy Forbes's reputation.[132] Bouquet's desire to expedite a strike, and the events of the subsequent two weeks, call into question who commanded the British army in the mid-Atlantic.

When Grant entered into Bouquet's service at Raystown on August 20, the Swiss colonel immediately ordered the Scot, Pennsylvania provincial Colonel James Burd, and 1500 soldiers to relocate to Loyalhanna, a position beyond Laurel Hill (some forty miles from Duquesne) that his reconnaissance parties deemed a suitable locale for the next British stockade on Forbes's road.[133] While troops under their direction dug an entrenchment and erected fortifications, two detachments of 300 men would be deployed – one to cut a serviceable path back towards Raystown, another under the command of the Scottish major to reconnoiter the site of a new post some nine miles to the west, ironically dubbed Grant's Paradise.[134] The proximity of Grant's Paradise to Duquesne (roughly thirty miles from the Forks) called for an intense level of discretion, and Bouquet explicitly forbade campfires at the site of the new stockade or even speaking in audible tones, as he feared that a visible puff of smoke appearing on the horizon or the *pays d'en haut* natives "acute hearing" would blow the army's cover.[135] Grant went about directing the establishment of a makeshift stockade and entrenchment of the post that bore his name,

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[132] *Ibid*.
[133] Bouquet to Forbes, Raystown, August 20, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 395-399.
[134] Bouquet to James Burd, Raystown, August 26, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 418-410.
[135] *Ibid*.

then returned to Loyalhanna to supervise the road's progress. Bouquet and the rest of the flying column moved to Loyalhanna on September 9, a few days before Forbes and the body of his army occupied his previous position at Raystown. Conditions that greeted Bouquet upon his arrival prompted him to issue orders in accordance with his aggressive designs. Two hunting parties, one consisting of Pennsylvanians and Highlanders, the other of Virginians, had just returned to camp after being ambushed by French Indians, who killed a member of the First Highland Regiment and took a provincial soldier captive.[136] Incensed and prepared "To check the boldness of this Indian rabble," Bouquet decided to "consent[ed] to the Major's request that I give him a large party to go straight to the source." Given that the ensuing catastrophe, rooted in an intelligence failure that drastically undershot the number of native allies still at Fort Duquesne and Grant's poor choices while implementing a flexible offensive plan, occurred three days after Bouquet mailed this letter to Forbes, it seems likely that Grant did in fact urge Bouquet to assign him a command whose mission was attacking Duquesne.[137] Bouquet characterized the 800 troops that he deployed under Grant as a reconnaissance mission, but close scrutiny of the colonel's papers reveal this mission to be rooted in retaliatory violence sparked by the raids at Loyalhanna. Grant's "secret orders" called for a stealth raid under the cover of night aimed at goading the French into an ambush the following day.[138] In the missive he sent explaining these orders to Forbes after Grant's force was routed by the French and their Great Lakes allies, Bouquet again attributed the idea of moving towards the fort with a

[136] Bouquet to Forbes, Loyalhanna, September 11, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 492-494.
[137] Had the letter been penned after the defeat, Bouquet would have stronger reasons to blame Grant for the decision than on the 11th.
[138] Bouquet to Forbes, Loyalhanna, September 11, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 492-494.

large party to Grant, and also claimed that he "raised some difficulties about letting him go," which appears disingenuous given his previous statements.[139] Bouquet had discussed the prospect of a night attack on the natives encamped in the shadows of Duquesne "several times" with Grant at Raystown, where they had hammered out its finer points: upon marching from Grant's Paradise, the Scot was to proceed towards the French fort, "regulating his marches so as to be five miles from the fort at the beginning of the night," proceed to Duquesne as the night progressed, alight the high ground a half a mile away upon arrival to survey the fires that would mark the locations of their native allies, deploy a detachment among the native camps for a close-quartered bayonet assault that would minimize the potential of alerting the garrison, and then before daybreak retreat some six miles from the fort to lie in concealment at a preestablished ambuscade and surprise the larger French force that would surely pursue his flight.[140]

The ensuing tragicomedy of errors left Grant disgraced and in French custody for over a year. This intricate scheme rested upon sequential completion of all of its constituent parts, and numerous contingencies to boot, the most important of which was Grant's column avoiding detection as it drew near Duquesne. Grant's orders to his subordinates indicate that the evening before his night march and defeat (which occurred on the night of September 13 and the morning of September 14), he authorized "one fire… to each column and no more upon any account."[141] Though he ordered their extinguishment upon the preparation of enough beef for two days' rations, a scouting

[139] Bouquet to Forbes, Loyalhanna, September 17, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*,517-521.
[140] *Ibid*.
[141] Orders, September 12, 1758, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frame 236.

party's discovery of just one of these campfires, which must have burned for an extended duration to roast provisions for 800 men between ten and fifteen miles from the French position, would alert the French of Grant's proximity and befoul his complex scheme. Despite Grant's profuse assertions to the contrary in his letter to Forbes after being seized, events that transpired the following night convey the likelihood that his presence was noted well before the attack. On the morning of the 13th, Grant ordered Virginia provincial Major Andrew Lewis and around 200 men to dig the ambuscade; after completing this task, the detachment rejoined Grant around 3:00 PM at a position he believed to be five miles from the fort, but subsequently determined to be at least double that after arriving on the hill above Duquesne at around 2:00 AM.[142] Whether attributable to the discovery of his campfires the previous evening or the embers of the Indians' camps expiring due to the advanced state of the current night, Grant observed no flicker in the valley below him to indicate the direction in which his assault should proceed.[143] Convinced that the misassessment of distance by his scouts rendered it "impossible to make the projected disposition of a party of Men for the Attack of each Fire," and believing his advance undetected, Grant convinced himself that there was "no time to be lost" because his presence would surely be uncovered the following day.[144] He then ordered 400 men under Lewis forward, bayonets affixed to rifles, and outfitted with white shirts to indicate their affiliation in the darkness, to attack "every thing that was found about the Fort."[145] As the first rays of sunshine began to illuminate the valley, Grant, who expected to hear the groans

[142] Grant to Forbes, Fort Duquesne, September 14, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 499-504.
[143] *Ibid*.
[144] *Ibid*.
[145] *Ibid*.

of skewered *pays d'en haut* natives, grew uneasy over the deafening silence. Suddenly, Lewis emerged at his side, informing him that the ambush had faltered due to the troops' inability to see and the terrible condition of the road, claiming "that it was a Mercy they had not fired upon one another."[146] Livid at what he considered rank incompetence that had foiled his "long projected Scheme," Grant took his own turn at idiocy; rather than quitting the field in the face of certain discovery, he dispatched Lewis and what he could corral of his command to form a rearguard, ordered another detachment of 100 men to attack and immolate an outlying building (which they found unoccupied), and, in order to convince his troops that they should not be afraid, charged his drummers to "beat the Reveille."[147] The palpable neuroses afflicting his command immediately proved justified. Assessments of French strength at Duquesne on the morning of the 14th varied, but a survivor of the defeat reckoned the force that poured out of the stockade in waves and surrounded the hapless Scot over the course of the thirty minutes that followed his drumroll numbered around 2,000.[148] The combined force of French regulars, *pays d'en haut* allies from the Great Lakes, and Ohio Valley natives made short order of Grant's flanks, as "100 Pennsylvanians who were posted on the right, farthest away from the advancing French, broke without orders and absconded without firing a shot."[149] Grant marshalled what segments of his rapidly deteriorating command he could, intending to fall back to Lewis's position and regroup; unfortunately, the Virginia provincial sallied forward upon hearing the initial French assault on a different route than Grant. The two missed one another, and Lewis's command

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[146] *Ibid*.
[147] *Ibid*.
[148] Adam Stephen to Bouquet, Col. Dagworthy's Camp, September 15, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 511-512.
[149] Grant to Forbes, Fort Duquesne, September 14, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 499-504.

quickly surrendered upon reaching the former front. After arriving at the rearguard where he expected to be reinforced by Lewis and 300 men and instead discovered a mere twenty, Grant despaired. His subordinate Captain Bullet allegedly observed Grant "sitting in the Field after the Action & begged him to come away, but he resolutely refused, saying his Heart was broken & he could not survive the Loss of that Day."[150] Expecting to be scalped in short order by one of the indigenous adversaries who had so effectively dispelled his force and sensing he "shall never outlive this day," Grant braced for the *coup de gras*; instead, a group of French officers who "called him by name" approached and offered him quarters should he surrender; Grant accepted and remanded himself into the custody of Francois Le Marchand de Ligneris, the commander of Fort Duquesne.[151]

During the aftermath of the debacle, in which Grant's command suffered 273 casualties, plausible deniability tinged Bouquet's commentary. Stressing the fluidity of the plan, which was designed to account for unforeseen circumstances, did not "oblige him to fight," and, above all, mandated that Grant "should think only of retreating" upon determining his advance found out, Bouquet made "no apology or the part I have in this affair," chalking up the catastrophe to his co-investor's poor judgement.[152] Bouquet's analysis of Grant's battlefield acumen largely rings true, as his refusal to quit the field upon discovery constituted a major error, but his deflective recantation of the mission and denial of any culpability seem disingenuous given his consistent advocacy for assault over the previous two months. Furthermore, it fails to account for the inaccurate scouting reports

[150] Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, Raystown, September 19, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 527-528.
[151] *Ibid*.; Bouquet to Forbes, Loyalhanna, September 17, 1758, Grant to Forbes, September, 14, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 499-504, 517-521.
[152] Bouquet to Forbes, Loyalhanna, September 17, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 517-521.

that he and Grant had received over the preceding few weeks, like the reconnaissance report provided by Ensign Colby Chew, which erroneously indicated that no more than 300 French troops occupied the fort, and claimed a mere fifty natives lingered in Duquesne's vicinity.[153] The Indians in Chew's scouting party also relayed that the fifty French allies were all Shawnees, which possibly led Grant to believe that the Ohio Delawares had already abandoned the French.[154] For his part, Forbes brooked no toleration for the escapade, and furiously lambasted Bouquet, expressing incredulity that an attack could be carried out "without my previous knowledge and concurrence" given his broadcast to both Grant and Bouquet of his "dread of the consequences… of the troops meeting with the smallest check" and the manner in which an assault would impact the "disposition of the Indians."[155] He patronizingly chided Bouquet, claiming that he need not repeat "good reasons against an attempt of this kind," or Bouquet's previous assurances of compliance with his "orders and directions."[156] Forbes considered the head of his army "well advanced" at a defensible post, and his road near completion, all "without any loss on our side, and our small army all ready to join and act in a collected body whenever we pleased," before Grant's "thirst for fame" prompted a maneuver that squandered his advantageous position, bringing about "his own perdition, and run[ning] a great risqué of ours."[157] A few weeks later, after processing the fiasco (and assessing the position of his force, which was still relatively strong), Forbes conceded that faulty reports of French weakness at Duquesne contributed

[153] Colby Chew: Report on Road, Raystown, August 21, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 400-404.
[154] *Ibid*.
[155] Forbes to Bouquet, Raystown, September 23, 1758, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 218-221.
[156] *Ibid*.
[157] *Ibid*.

to Grant's rashness, compelling "the major [to] run headlong to grasp at a name, and publick applause, forgetting the inevitable mischief he was bringing upon men, and the rest of us."[158] Unaware of his commander's irate response and clearly over the near-death experience, Grant whitewashed his catastrophe to Forbes, claiming he had merely been "unlucky" and asserting that he attempted to execute the orders that he received to the best of his abilities.[159] Though others might judge his defeat as a career-derailing offense, Grant audaciously doubted that Forbes would, going so far as to "flatter myself that my being a Prisoner will be no detriment to my promotion in case Vacancies happen in the Army."[160]

Despite his disgust over his subordinates' rashness and poor judgment and Grant's offensive display of temerity, Forbes longed to secure the major's liberation, and urged Abercromby to secure his release via ransom or prisoner exchange.[161] Ligneris declined to repatriate Grant, but assured Bouquet that he protected the officers' in Grant's command "from the savages, by the precautions I took," and averred that they would meet with "civil and humane treatment."[162] Ligneris, however, did pitch a potential exchange for Grant which would have proven invaluable to the British war effort in general and South Carolina in particular had Bouquet the wherewithal to secure the required bargaining chip. The French commander indicated that he was "personally interested" in the whereabouts of Captain Mary Picoté de Belestre, an officer who had been seized the previous year by

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[158] Forbes to Abercromby, October 8, 1758, Raystown, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 224-227.
[159] Grant to Forbes, Fort Duquesne, August 14, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 499-504.
[160] *Ibid*.
[161] Forbes to Abercromby, October 16, 1758, Raystown, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 231-234.
[162] De Ligneris to Bouquet, Fort Duquesne, September 22, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 534-535.

Wawhatchee's war party as it patrolled Virginia's frontier; Ligneris entreated Bouquet to do him "a great favor if you would… if possible, free him from the savages."[163] As an adult male assimilated into an indigenous family, Belestre's captivity defied the odds. As Grant was being transferred to Montreal, the French captain fomented anti-British sentiments among the warriors of Estatoe, the Lower Town that would prove most implacable to the Carolinians during the Cherokee War.[164] Grant, Lewis, and all of the other captive officers (save one) indeed received careful handling, and were dispatched in under a week to New France's capital of Montreal, but the rank and file that participated in his disastrous foray suffered far more harrowing fates.[165] These foot soldiers were not incarcerated within Duquesne, but rather were left at the mercy of their native associates. Though some stood a slight chance of servitude or absorption into Ottawa, Potawatomi, or Miami society upon arrival in the *pays d'en haut*, given their status as adult males, they in all likelihood endured beatings while compelled to run a gauntlet of hostile villagers, ritualized torture while bound to a post, and excruciating, protracted demises. A twelve-year-old British colonist who escaped Duquesne in November related that in the aftermath of Grant's debacle, the French-allied natives "carried a prodigious Quantity of Wood into the Fort," the implements of an indigenous bonfire which roasted five of the prisoners alive.[166] Others among Grant's rank-and-file injured and abandoned near the fort suffered equally ghastly treatment: their decapitated heads affixed to pikes at the fort's entrance served as gruesome sentinels when

[163] *Ibid*.; George Washington to John Stanwix, Fort Loudoun, June 15, 1757, in W.W. Abbott, ed., *The Papers of George Washington: Colonial Series 4* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 215-216; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 125.
[164] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 163, 171.
[165] The officer, one Ensign McDonald, had already been spirited away to the vicinity of Detroit by his Huron captors and de Ligneris indicated that it was impossible to retrieve him.
[166] Extract of Letter from Pittsburgh (Lately Fort Duquesne), *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 14, 1758, in Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 612-613.

Forbes, Washington, and the rest of the army took Duquesne after the French finally abandoned their position in late November.[167]

A month after Grant's disgrace, as Forbes's combined force coalesced for its final push, an associate of the young Scottish officer arrived in the brigadier general's camp at Raystown. On October 13, the long-anticipated Attakullakulla escorted a contingent of thirty Cherokees into Forbes's service.[168] The Little Carpenter lingered in the Overhills for months after Byrd's early-May departure, ostensibly waiting for remuneration for leading raids on western French forts, but in all likelihood to run damage control for the British among his disgruntled tribesmen returning from the mid-Atlantic front with axes to grind against the British officers who failed to provide adequate recompense and the Virginia colonists who reacted violently when the Cherokees augmented their lost wages via horse rustling. As tension mounted in Cherokee country in August, Attakullakulla departed to smooth things over with Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier in Williamsburg, but was convinced by emissaries sent by Forbes and James Glen to report to the army in Pennsylvania.[169] The Cherokee headman diplomatically prodded the Ohio Valley Indians via intimidation, which one historian deems the impetus for their repudiation of the French alliance and withdrawal from the Forks.[170] Oblivious of this service, Forbes, who had had his fill of Cherokee auxiliaries that he increasingly derided as thieves, declared Attakullakulla "as consummate a Dog as any of them, only seeing our distress, has made

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[167] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Europeans, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 252-253.
[168] Forbes to Bouquet, Raystown, October 15, 1758, Stephens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. II: The Forbes Expedition*, 561-563.
[169] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 154; Conference with Governor Lyttelton and Council with Little Carpenter About His Role Against the French, April 17, 18, and 21, 1759, South Carolina Commons Journal, 77-86, Robinson, ed., *North and South Carolina Treaties*, 60-62.
[170] Kelton, "British and Indian War," 788.

him exceed all the others in his most avaricious demands."[171] After relocating with the natives in his retinue to Loyalhanna and browbeating the Shawnees, Little Carpenter received their assurance that the French would abandon the fort, but Forbes "gave little credit to the information."[172] Considering the seizure of Fort Duquesne to be a fait accompli and recognizing that his "principal business" was now conferring with Fauquier on how to deescalate the cycle of retributive violence beget by Cherokee involvement in Forbes's campaign, Attakullakulla promptly headed south.[173] Forbes exploded in rage. Couching the departure as a "villainous desertion" by a recalcitrant subordinate rather than a valued peer, the general ordered a dispatch sent to Winchester and Fort Cumberland (which fell on the prospective routes Attakullakulla was currently taking) that "under the Cloak of Friendship" the Cherokees had robbed the British army "these several months"; since the Cherokees had revealed themselves as "our private Ennemies, and having turned the Arms, put in their hands by us, against his Majesty's Subjects," Forbes deemed that "prudence and self preservation" required them to forcibly confiscate the arms, ammunition, and horses given to Little Carpenter's party.[174] Unwittingly subjecting his nation's staunchest Cherokee ally, one currently scrambling to do Britain's bidding through diplomacy on multiple fronts, to the indignity of temporary incarceration and present requisition mortified Little Carpenter, who felt treated "like a child and no man."[175] Though Attakullakulla was soon released and remained among the most vocal proponents for a continued British alliance among the Cherokee chieftains, the incident boded ill for Anglo-Cherokee relations; indeed,

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[171] Forbes to Peters, October 16, 1758, Raystown, James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 234-237.
[172] "Conference with Governor Lyttelton," Robinson, ed., *North and South Carolina Treaties*, 60-62.
[173] *Ibid*.
[174] Forbes to James Burd, November 19, 1759, New Camp 20 Miles West of Loyal Hannan, in James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes*, 256-258.
[175] Quoted in Hatley, *The Dividing Paths*, 102.

it foreshadowed a more fateful imprisonment the following year, one which set into motion events that assured Grant's return to South Carolina, and his reintroduction to the Little Carpenter far from the pleasures of the lowcountry coast.

Though his campaign badly fractured Britain's alliance with the Cherokee, Forbes accomplished his primary objective of securing Fort Duquesne. Despite the brigadier general's unease over the prospective upshot of Grant's debacle, the cross-regional diplomacy finally bore fruit, as war-weary Ohio Valley natives, alarmed at the prospect of more Cherokee raids, accepted the blatant untruth spun at Easton that the British would withdraw from the region upon achieving their objective and expelling the French. They forsook the Forks, and in the process dissolved the indigenous buffer that had rendered the French position on the Ohio unassailable for the previous four years; realizing the untenability of his position, De Ligneris opted to retreat upriver and blow up the fort. Grant's embarrassing rout, an episode labeled "a small-scale reprise of Braddock's defeat" by the premier historian of the era, proved anything but with regards to long-term impact.[176] The infrastructure established by Forbes and Bouquet, the road and the fortifications along it, allowed the army to absorb the check to Grant, regroup, and establish an advanced post closer to Duquesne than Grant's Paradise within a month. In terms of reputational effect, Grant's disgrace proved short-lived (largely because his commander succeeded in spite of his blunders shortly after his defeat), while the Monongahela disaster lives on in infamy and Braddock's historians struggle to rehabilitate his image. But the real contrast between Braddock's and Grant's demonstrably similar episodes lay in their status as bookends to the Ohio Valley Indians' exercise of sovereignty over their own territory.

[176] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 272.

The 200 provincial troops that Forbes left at the Forks under Hugh Mercer in December were joined by increasing numbers of settlers and soldiers as 1759 progressed; by mid-September, engineers raised the walls of a fort ten times the scale of Duquesne, dubbed Pitt for the Secretary of State and a testament to budding British dominion over the region.[177] Braddock's defeat commenced an ascendant period during which the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos of the Ohio Valley asserted proprietorship of the region by force, and Grant's setback represented the last gasp of that coalition's capability to head off European imperial encroachment through strategically aligning with a rival power.

[177] *Ibid*., 327-329.

Chapter 3: Unsatisfactory Assignment: Montgomery's Campaign

A scarcity of sources render James Grant's fourteen-month interlude in Montreal murky, but trace evidence missed by historians who deigned to comment on this period of his life and contextual information about Canada in the late 1750s provides some leeway for reconstructing his experience there. When Grant and the other officers nabbed in the aftermath of his half-baked posturing in front of Fort Duquesne sailed up the St. Lawrence River in early October to become long-term houseguests of Pierre de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, the governor of New France, they arrived in the midst of a blighted harvest, the worst Canada produced during the Seven Years' War.[1] Moreover, the Canadian winter of 1758-1759 proved to be the coldest in living memory.[2] Provisions ferried across the Atlantic sustained the garrisons of France's massive colony that winter, albeit barely, and Grant likely endured significantly less bounteous tables than accustomed to in other European-controlled provincial locales that he had visited. The frigidity and sparse spreads of that winter notwithstanding, Grant's receipts indicate that he generated significant internal warmth that season, a comfort which undoubtedly extended to his incarcerated comrades and those he perceived to be social peers among Montreal society. Grant spent £96 on "wine and liqueurs at Montreal" (presumably for the duration of his captivity), and redistributed the liquid cheer to his subordinates, subtracting their monthly room, victuals and alcohol disbursement from their wages before discharging the remainder in French livres as "pocket money."[3] The allotments for quarters indicate the occupation of lodgings

[1] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 345.
[2] *Ibid*.
[3] Receipt, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frame 240; Ensign Jenkins Account, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frame 246.

far more comfortable than the squalid conditions encountered within the pens of interior stockades like Fort Duquesne or contemporary urban receptacles for petty criminals such as London's Newgate Prison. The Scottish major also lacked his wardrobe of posh clothing, as his trunks had been left behind at Loyalhanna due to a lack of serviceable carriage there in the aftermath of Forbes's campaign and eventually routed to Philadelphia.[4] The offense given by the major's shabby appearance proved easily rectifiable, as he purchased six shirts, six pairs of trousers, miscellaneous other sartorial accoutrements covered by an entry for "Montreal clothing," shoes, and stockings; Grant contracted with Canadian washerwomen to launder these garments, and regular shaves and powdering at a local barber further solidified the look of a prepossessing official poised to ascend the British chain of command.[5] If the experiences of other British officer prisoners in Canada are any guide, Vaudreuil probably treated Grant with prodigious liberality; Captain Robert Stobo, the Virginian who slipped a sketch of Duquesne's defenses to the Delaware war sachem Shingas, enjoyed virtual free reign over Quebec while in custody, hobnobbing with affluent Canadians and even striking a partnership with a Quebecois mercantile concern before the discovery of his reconnaissance interleaved with Braddock's other papers landed him in manacles.[6] Grant's verbal exchanges with his jailors and the residents of Montreal, while perhaps a bit stilted, allowed for easy comprehension, as perusal of Grant's papers reveal that Bouquet regularly sent him orders written in French and that the junior officer

[4] Lt. James Grant to Henry Bouquet, Camp at Lake George, July 18, 1759, in S.K. Stevens and Donald Kent, et al., eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. III* (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1976), 423-424.
[5] Receipt, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frame 242.
[6] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 352.

occasionally responded in kind.[7] Grant's financial records from this period impart a sense of material well-being, ease of motion within the confines of the city, and the empowerment attendant to the freedom to acquire consumer goods within the marketplace.

Though Grant managed to cut the appearance of an officer on the make and a man of scrutinous taste while in French custody, contemporaneous developments within New France and his distance from the field of battle surely inspired despair over the rapid promotion he fervently desired. 1759 proved the turning point of the British war effort, and Grant's sidelined condition left him in no position to capitalize on the laurels that accrued at the feet of Amherst and his subordinates currently in the field. Though his correspondence with Forbes after his surrender oozed cocksure certainty of advancement regardless of setbacks, doubt crept in as the months mounted in captivity with no word of repatriation and the accompanying fresh opportunities liberation would provide. News arrived in Montreal of British conquests in which he took no part. On September 18, 1759, a year and four days after Grant's seizure in the field, Quebec fell after an intense firefight on the Plains of Abraham followed by a brief siege, catapulting James Wolfe (albeit posthumously) into a military apotheosis and earning his subordinates Robert Monckton, James Murray, and Isaac Barré public plaudits; to have no hand in such a sublime triumph for the empire or its spoils proved frustrating.[8] Letters that found their way to Montreal left Grant to wonder if the fiasco at Duquesne had sullied his image at home; while his nephew William assured him from London that "everybody here approve[s] of your conduct and

[7] Bouquet to Grant, Philadelphia, May 18, 1758, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frames 205-209; Bouquet to Grant, Raystown Camp, August 24, 1758, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frames 216-218.
[8] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 354-366, 377-378.

courage and are sorry the success did not equal the bravery of the attempt," he also congratulated his uncle on "his narrow escape at Fort Du Quesne," indicating ignorance of the extent of his uncle's actions, their consequences and potential ramifications on public opinion.[9] Though the major left no trace of his concern for the progression of his military career during his captivity, other relations spoke for him. In July, Lt. James Grant, a cousin who also served in Montgomery's First Highland Battalion expressed fear that "we shall not see our poor Major [Grant] this campaign & what is more that he may suffer in his preferment by not being on the spot for his is the oldest major in the army."[10] Such "cruel circumstances" – languishing in French detention and seemingly outside the notice of the British military brass, being passed over at age thirty-nine while younger men secured lieutenancies – were "almost enough to make a man hang himself."[11] All the wine in Montreal's tippling houses failed to tranquilize Grant's foreboding sense of thwarted ambition.

As Grant drowned his sorrows, his old Cherokee allies from Forbes's campaign careened towards open hostilities with South Carolina and Virginia. Long-term causes of the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1759-1761 abound. The protracted cause which undoubtedly most unnerved both British settlers and colonial administrators was the Cherokees' increasing inclination towards dalliances with the French. Tellico's 1756 pursuit of a French alliance fueled by promises of abundant trade goods and presents, an arrangement which other Cherokee towns would attempt in the lead up to and during the war, greatly

[9] William Grant to James Grant, London, February 5, 1759, *JGP*, Reel 30, Frames 318-319.
[10] Grant to Bouquet, Lake George, July 18, 1759, in Stevens, *et. al.*, eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. III*, 422-424.
[11] *Ibid*.

alarmed Charlestown and Whitehall, but accorded with indigenous notions of successful foreign policy, which revolved around multipolar coalition systems that secured unfettered access to desired commodities.[12] A related issue was the regular shortages of cargoes hauled into the backcountry for exchange by the deerskin traders assigned to the Cherokees, and the increasingly unscrupulous practices of these agents as returns on skins dwindled during the 1750s. Foremost among the transgressors was Chota trader John Elliot, whose rigged scales sparked a controversy in July 1757 when Cherokees seized them and demonstrated to Fort Loudoun commander Paul Demeré that they recorded 12 pounds of hides at 10 pounds.[13] Meager hunting yields and overextension of credit to Cherokee clients stretched the resources available to traders, who grew progressively handicapped in their ability to facilitate the exchange, carting fewer goods to the nation as the decade waned; Cherokees in turn noted the dwindling recompense for their efforts and a shortfall in raw total of available goods, developments which drove overtures towards the French. Most ominous to the Cherokees of the long-term causes of conflict was the *de facto* dispossession occurring on their territory dangerously near the Lower Towns, fueled by settlers daily arriving from both the Carolina lowcountry via the trading path and from Virginia and Pennsylvania fleeing the depredations of the Ohio Valley Indians down the Great Wagon Road. The vicinity of Long Canes Creek, a tributary of the Savannah that had served as the official boundary between South Carolina and Cherokee country since 1747, proved the most troublesome locale, as interlopers established homesteads as far as forty

[12] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 32-33.
[13] *Ibid*., 36.

miles across the line during the late 1750s, steadily denuding Cherokee hunting grounds of the whitetail deer upon which they relied for exchange.[14]

These long-standing grievances exploded into warfare when lit by the tinder of Cherokee participation in Forbes's campaign. Grant witnessed firsthand the departure of disaffected allies from the front, but violence between Virginia's westernmost inhabitants and Cherokees traveling southward near their farms predated his August 1758 rendezvous with them on the Pennsylvania frontier. Weary of waiting for Forbes's army to engage the enemy and of risking their lives acting as proxies for an ally that appeared unwilling to fight and upset by paltry present allotments in recompense for their participation, the vast majority of Cherokees abandoned Forbes and his subordinates before early June 1758. Ugly episodes followed as the Cherokees, insulted by their material haul and the economic situation back home and desirous to acquire something to show for their participation, appropriated horses from backcountry settlers, which, to be fair to the Cherokees, "ran wild in the woods" of western Virginia, implying a lack of ownership.[15] In mid-May, Virginia backwoodsmen in Halifax County murdered five warriors from a band led by the Raven of Settico, removing their scalps to collect Virginia's handsome (and indiscriminate) bounty on native scalps and leaving their corpses along the path for subsequent war parties to see.[16] A summer of wanton assaults ensued, as Cherokees requisitioned horses and other property in response to British parsimony, and hostile settlers amassed in substantial mobs accosted and murdered warriors passing nearby, as a posse of eighty Bedford County

[14] *Ibid*., 17, 41; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 60.
[15] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 55.
[16] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 49.

Virginians did to men of Estatoe at Goose Creek on September 2.[17] Few Cherokee military units withstood the passage without casualties; suffering them at the hands of people who they originally trekked northward to protect only compounded their fury. Native American custom mandated that a clan respond in kind to violence that resulted in the death of a relative; reciprocal notions of criminal justice governed the outcome of indigenous murders. The clan of the party responsible for the death owed the life of one of their family members (not necessarily the perpetrator's) to the bereaved clan. Unwillingness to rectify the imbalance that proceeded from the wrongful death caused by a clansman invoked "crying blood," a cultural belief amongst Native Americans that the spirits of their deceased kin demanded vengeance; only inflicting retributive casualties on the murderer's clan or seizing captives from their ranks could quiet the wailing of the departed.[18] From the perspective of the clans who lost family members on their sojourn back from the mid-Atlantic front, the Virginians owed a debt repayable in spilled blood.

The official response of the British colonial governments revealed their disinclination to restore the balance in accordance with Cherokee notions of reciprocal justice, if not their utter ignorance of such cultural norms. Lyttelton and Fauquier's proposals in the face of Cherokee demands that they address these outrages proved insufficient to the clans of the fallen, who took matters into their own hands. Fauquier blamed the Cherokees for the episodes, claiming that the settlers acted in defense of their property, and urged Lyttelton to issue them a remonstrance; the governor of South Carolina in turn proposed a disbursement of presents to "wipe away the Tears from the

[17] *Ibid*., 53-54.
[18] Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 80.

Eyes" of the relatives of the slain Cherokees, but made it clear he would view any retaliatory act on the Virginians as one of war and would respond accordingly by subjecting the totality of Cherokee nation to an embargo and raising an army against them.[19] Though some Cherokees, notably Tistoe of Keowee, called off war parties bound for the Virginia piedmont and accepted a present bonanza from Lyttelton in mid-November, they lacked the authority to speak for all of the villages.[20] The governor's threat of severing commercial ties between South Carolina and the Cherokees and the specter of military invasion temporarily dissuaded the bereaved clansmen from reactive raids, but festering resentment resulted in irruptions the following year. The Mortar of Okchoy, the most prominent pro-French Abeika Creek headman, established a settlement in close proximity to the Overhills in early 1759 and repeatedly castigated the townspeople of Settico for their failure to appease the spirits of their deceased.[21] This heckling eventually hit home, and despite the desire of the vast majority of Cherokee headmen to remain at peace with the British in spring 1759, three Settico war parties headed by Moytoy marauded white settlements in North Carolina along the Yadkin and Catawba rivers, killing 22 settlers at the end of April.[22] Cooler heads like Attakullakulla and Oconostota scrambled to convince the governor that the raids reflected the addled behavior of a single town that had since sobered up, but Lyttelton refused to recognize inter- or even intra-regional policy

[19] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 62-65; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 55.
[20] *Ibid*., 58-59.
[21] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 163.
[22] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 72-73; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 168. Though it seems counterintuitive that the Setticos would attack the North Carolina frontier months after suffering losses at the hands of a gang of Virginians, historian Daniel Tortora discerns an ethnic thread between the geographically distant settlers. Both the Bedford County and Yadkin River communities consisted almost entirely of Germans, leading Tortora to assert that the Settico warriors probably saw their attacks as impacting the proper clan. See Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 63.

divergences among Cherokees, opting to view the nation in monolithic terms; moreover, he perceived a flourishing French clout in Cherokee country bolstered by reports that the Mortar had spoken with Moytoy at length the evening before he deployed his bands to North Carolina.[23] In June, warriors from Estatoe detached three scalps from settlers on South Carolina's Pacolet River, while in July raiding parties from the Overhills menaced the Virginia frontier.[24]

In the aftermath of these attacks, South Carolina commenced, in the words of trader James Adair, to compel "the Cheerake to become our bitterest enemies, by a long train of wrong measures."[25] Tensions reached fever pitch in July between the Lower Towns and the garrison at Fort Prince George, when the garrison's new commander, the vile, inhumane Lieutenant Richard Coytmore, alongside Ensign John Bell and an unidentified interpreter, gang raped an Estatoe woman; her husband's brother was Seroweh, the Young Warrior of Estatoe, who immediately thereafter adopted an implacable outlook on Anglo-Cherokee relations.[26] The degradation and unmitigated gall of the sexual assault galvanized Cherokee hostility towards the garrison for the remainder of Coytmore's tenure in charge. Less obscene but as influential in the drive towards conflict was Lyttelton's propensity to disregard evidence of legitimate Cherokee grievances (as he did when Tistoe of Keowee railed against Coytmore's pernicious act at a conference in October) and derive his conception of backcountry affairs solely from accounts relayed to him by his military commanders, Fort Loudoun's Paul Demeré and Coytmore; the paranoid, increasingly

[23] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 117; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 77.
[24] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 171; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 67.
[25] James Adair, *A History of the American Indians*, Kathryn E. Holland Braund, ed. (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 268.
[26] *Ibid*., 263; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 84-88; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 115.

desperate correspondence emanating from these circles as 1759 progressed convinced the governor that the entirety of Cherokee society supported war with Carolina when in reality numerous headmen sought a way out of the conflict.[27] Alarmist accounts from the colony's frontier outposts proliferated as summer ran its course, and indeed the backcountry dynamic warranted distress, as raiding parties materialized out of thickets to pick off the lone soldier foolhardy enough to forage for deadwood outside the fort and ransacked the westernmost outlying farms. When coupled with the substantial attacks on North Carolina in the spring and the less debilitating forays into South Carolina and Virginia that summer, indigenous hostility appeared pervasive and was construed as such in the capital. The neuroses of second-hand accounts hastily scribbled by individuals unwilling to consider their own roles in the escalating rupture and willfully ignorant of good-faith overtures by some headmen exerted undue influence on Lyttelton, who on August 14 opted to punish innocent and guilty alike by declaring an embargo on powder and shot to all of Cherokee Nation. Traders were expressly prohibited from procuring ammunition for the Cherokees (though a few renegades did so anyway), and the dispensations from frontier fortifications, commonplace in times of harmony, ceased immediately.[28] This fateful step drove the Cherokees into a furor of their own, as previously belligerent youths, now convinced that the Carolinians intended to emasculate, then obliterate, their society, vowed to strike again with renewed fervor. Conversely, many chieftains, envisioning the economic collapse that

[27] Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 109; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 179; Robinson, ed., *Early American Indian Documents Vol. XIV*, 111.
[28] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 91-92; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 68; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 174-175; Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 114.

would accompany a deer hunting season sans ammunition, desperately scrambled to convince the fort commanders and Lyttelton to abandon the moratorium.

By the time of the ammunition embargo, Cherokee raiders had slain 33 whites on the peripheries of three British colonies since fall 1758, and though the butcher's bill for that retributive violence fell short of the tribe's casualties at the hands of their allies' settlers the previous year, Lyttelton considered the Cherokees' delayed retaliation as unwarranted escalation; he believed this matter resolved when he covered the grave via a gift disbursement to Kewoee headmen the previous November.[29] Hoping to restore the regular provision of powder and shot after receiving none from Demeré , and viewing periodic receipt of it as a precondition for continued peace, a retinue of Overhill warriors headed by Oconostota and Osteneco departed for Fort Prince George in September.[30] Meanwhile, Lyttelton detached a regiment of South Carolina provincials under Captain John Stuart, a frontier intermediary noteworthy for warm relations with the Cherokee (he was rumored to have married a Cherokee woman), to reinforce Fort Loudoun.[31] When the Scottish officer arrived at Fort Prince George, he discovered his path to the Middle Settlements and beyond blocked by young Cherokees goaded into action by the embargo, and messengers sent back towards Charlestown quickly returned with word of Cherokee sentries obstructing that path; Stuart considered the nation at war with South Carolina, sending word to Lyttelton of the impediment to his mission and directing Oconostota's party to Charlestown when they arrived at the fort in late September demanding ammo.[32]

[29] The estimate of 33 is provided by Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 68.
[30] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 175; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 94-95.
[31] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 69; Alden, *John Stuart*, 169.
[32] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 97-99.

After learning that Wawhatchee had approached Governor Ellis of Georgia grousing about Carolinian encroachments beyond the boundary at Twelve Mile Creek, Lyttelton sent the Lower townsman a terse missive demanding that he take up the matter with his government, urging him to air out his grievances in Charlestown, and assuring "a safe conduct to such an embassy should the nation care to send one."[33] Wawhatchee, alongside Tistoe of Keowee and Seroweh of Estatoe, fell in with Oconostota's party, indicating that they likely considered Carolina's promise of diplomatic sanctuary applicable to the entire cross-regional delegation. They moved southeast in early October.[34]

The fiasco that ensued was potentially the most ignominious double-cross in a war noteworthy for blatant disregard of the established conventions of war and diplomacy. By the time Oconostota's company appeared in Charlestown, Lyttelton had already announced a general militia muster on September 30 and announced to the Commons House of Assembly his intent to invade Cherokee country at the head of an army on October 5.[35] The governor had read Stuart's account of Fort Prince George's encirclement along with a desperate letter from Coytmore declaring the Lower Towns to be in "absolute and open war" due to several traders absconding from their respective towns and making for the fort.[36] He had no desire to engage in conciliatory talks with the Cherokees he had invited down to air out grievances two months before. Intent on militarily imposing a resolution to the backcountry murders that aligned with the precepts of western criminal justice upon

[33] Quoted in Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 93.
[34] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 178.
[35] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 100; Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 114.
[36] Robinson, ed., *North and South Carolina Treaties*, 106-107. Stuart's correspondence directly contradicted Coytmore's assertion of uniform ill intent across the Lower Towns, as Keowee townspeople both escorted the captain's reinforcements to Fort Prince George and cautioned him to only allow armed parties outside the fort; Lyttelton was aware of this and chose to ignore it when he sprang his trap for the delegates. See Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 97.

which he believed British sovereignty in the colonies to depend, the governor refused to negotiate with spokesmen of a society that considered alternatives to trials by jury and military tribunals just. Lyttelton's dogmatic approach to jurisprudential questions can be boiled down to one word: satisfaction. It was this determination to secure satisfaction for the backcountry murders in the form of executions of the parties personally responsible, and his demand that headmen incapable of providing it from the powerful clans that refused to put their most prominent warriors to death that insured Lyttelton behaved in a way that made war unavoidable. This culturally hidebound conception of satisfaction cast a pall over negotiations as the war progressed, as British military personnel like James Grant (who was not yet on the scene but would soon familiarize himself with its causes and the terms for its cessation that Cherokees would and would not accept) found themselves pressured to prosecute the war in a manner that would assure execution of the Cherokees responsible. When the Great Warrior of Chota laid a deerskin at the governor's feet, a metaphorical gesture meant to evoke the decades of fruitful commerce between the nation and the colony that he wanted to reestablish post haste, Lyttelton contemptuously refused to accept the offering.[37] The governor then flatly ignored Tistoe and Seroweh's indignation over the troops' sexual abuses and demanded that the delegation agree to securing the apprehension and transfer of the warriors who murdered settlers at the Yadkin and Pacolet rivers earlier that year.[38] Oconostota demurred, asserting his sanction to request only powder and the resumption of trade, and knowing that the Cherokees would reject an

[37] Robinson, ed., *North and South Carolina Treaties*, 109-116.
[38] *Ibid*.

agreement that called for executions.[39] After a brief adjournment to confer with his council regarding the proper course of action, Lyttelton returned to chamber, accused Oconostota of feigning the authority to speak on Chota's behalf and of coming to the coast because Coytmore refused to give him ammunition. He informed the delegation that the murders of their kinsmen on their return from Forbes's campaign had been appeased by the conference and gift disbursement the previous November, that they bore no relation to the murders of settlers for which he expected satisfaction, and that they were to accompany his army to assure the safe conduct he promised as they ascended the trading path to impose his notion of justice.[40] As they departed from Charlestown under armed guard in late October, returning to their homeland as hostages, the captive headmen surely fumed over the governor's treachery in violating the terms of asylum which he proposed. Moreover, indigenous *mentalités* framed captivity as tantamount to slavery, an outlook which assured that the Cherokees would view Lyttelton's army as the agent of mass subjugation as it approached the Lower Towns with the hostage headmen, and that the Cherokees seized in this manner would bitterly resent it and turn on the British.[41] In a single duplicitous stroke, Lyttelton made manifest the oft-repeated French assertion that the British colonists intended to enslave the Cherokees and seize their territory.

As the Carolina force of roughly 1,300 provincial militiamen marched northwest in mid-November 1759, prisoner exchanges proceeded apace between the British and French armies in the northern theater.[42] Amherst struck a deal with Vaudreuil for the release of

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[39] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 103. This knowledge of the general will of Cherokee Nation proved prescient, as the war would rage for nearly two years before Charlestonian peace brokers finally dropped the unenforceable and offensive demand.
[40] Robinson, ed., *North and South Carolina Treaties*, 109-116.
[41] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 114-115.
[42] Troop figure in Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 109.

British military personnel and provincial soldiers seized during Grant's Duquesne debacle, including the Scottish officer himself. Grant and Major Andrew Lewis, among others, found themselves repatriated, arriving in the British North American commander in chief's camp at Crown Point on November 15.[43] After languishing in Montreal for over a year, Grant reunited with the main body of the British army. Due to Grant's lengthy stay in the bosom of enemy territory, Amherst immediately ordered the junior officer to pen a report on the nature and extent of defenses, provisioning, and civilian morale in the New French capitol and its hinterlands. Despite benefiting from a bountiful harvest in fall 1759, Grant reckoned the French regime in Montreal teetering on the brink of collapse.[44] Though he believed Vaudreuil would only capitulate when surrounded by a British army, the Scot's free discourse with French officers around the city revealed their position to be one in the "greatest distress."[45] British encirclement of the French position in Canada and the chokehold the army now exerted due to the relatively recent occupation of Frontenac on Lake Ontario to Montreal's west, Crown Point to its south, and Quebec to its east would prevent Vaudreuil from importing the extra food and materiel his regime desperately needed to mount an adequate defense and feed both his soldiers and the *habitants*; Grant estimated that even "if no stroke was to be made, Canada would fall, or the Inhabitants starve," and Amherst could either tighten the vise at his leisure or hold position until his adversary's implosion.[46] Amherst would not dally, for William Pitt's January orders

[43] Jeffery Amherst, *The Journal of Jeffery Amherst, Recording the Military Career of General Amherst in America from 1758 to 1763*, ed. John Clarence Webster (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 191.
[44] For harvest, see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 368.
[45] Amherst to Pitt, New York, December 16, 1759, eds. William Stanhope Taylor and John Henry Pringle, *Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, vol. 2 (London: J. Murray, 1838), 226.
[46] *Ibid*.

imparted a single objective: the reduction of Montreal.[47] Grant found himself placed to contribute to the final surge to secure North America for the British Empire with victory nearly a *fait accompli*, return to the scene of his captivity a conqueror, and satiate his careerist desires all at the same time.

A surfeit of optimism and widespread support for war notwithstanding, Carolina's prospects for a quick, decisive success against the Cherokees appeared much more remote.[48] Segments of Lyttelton's force evaporated in clumps of ten to twelve men at a time due to desertions that increased as the army neared the Lower Towns.[49] An outbreak of measles enervated the force in mid-November before it arrived at Ninety-Six, and a massive smallpox outbreak ravaging the neighboring village of Keowee led the governor to order a strict quarantine when the army encamped next to Fort Prince George in early December.[50] Large numbers of Cherokee warriors hovered in the vicinity, but could not capitalize on the Carolinians' misfortune during that campaign, as Lyttelton held a trump card that stayed their hands: the hostages in his custody were among the most seminal figures in Cherokee society. The governor recognized that his time to extract terms was severely limited due to the desertion of hundreds, attrition via illness, and the forthcoming lapse in funding to pay the troops that would take effect at the end of December.[51] Blustering that he would put Estatoe to the torch if the Cherokees refrained from treating and demanding the presence of the conciliatory Attakullakulla, whom he fantasized about

[47] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 384.
[48] For the conflict's popularity with the general public, see Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 101; for enthusiastic posturing on the part of the gentlemen leading the army on its march up the trading path, see Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 121.
[49] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 76.
[50] Paul Kelton, *Cherokee Medicine, Colonial Germs: An Indigenous Nation's Fight Against Smallpox, 1518-1824* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 115-117.
[51] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 78.

tapping as the nation's central authority in defiance of the realities of consensual Cherokee politics, Lyttelton grew anxious for an agreement. After the Little Carpenter's arrival on December 19, Lyttelton bluntly demanded that the murderers be remanded into his custody before he would release the headmen, and while the encaged Oconostota tersely pointed out to the governor that securing the culpable parties would be highly improbable due to their absence from the nation while hunting, Attakullakulla vowed to urge his fellow headmen to comply.[52] Two days later, Lyttelton released Seroweh and Tistoe in exchange for two of the Lower Town murderers (or those their clans deemed expendable as proxies), and the following morning Little Carpenter convinced the governor to discharge Oconostota and three other captives to equal the number of hostages and murderers not in custody.[53] Heartened by these submissions and believing they portended compliance to his demands for satisfaction, Lyttelton presented a treaty outlining that the trade embargo would stand and the prisoners remain in the custody of the roundly despised Coytmore until the other twenty-two murderers were delivered; no mention was made of the persistent trade abuses and land encroachments that so incensed the Cherokees in the leadup to the conflict.[54] Attakullakulla and other headmen signed to neutralize the threat posed to the Lower Towns by the army, which could sack villages or inflict casualties as a disease vector the longer it lingered in the vicinity, but surely knew that the treaty was unenforceable and that attempts would follow to liberate the hostages and requisition the substantial quantity of shot and trade goods that Lyttelton left at Fort Prince George for delivery to the Cherokees upon fulfilment of his terms. Upon encountering them in January

[52] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 187; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 109.
[53] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 188-189.
[54] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 109-110; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 80.

at Fort Loudoun, Stuart noted that both Oconostota and Attakullakulla "exclaimed against the articles of the treaty as Extorted from them," and if either had any inclination to proceed with the hostage exchange as stipulated, neither dared "attempt to seize the Guilty persons here."[55] Lyttelton's beleaguered force disintegrated, beating a pell-mell path back to Charlestown *en masse*. Though the provincial press and prominent citizens festooned the governor and his army upon their return, the moment proved ephemeral.[56] The governor refused pragmatic offers to resolve the crisis in a manner better aligned with Cherokee cultural norms and British military objectives when he balked at offers to procure French scalps equal to the number of settlers killed by Oconostota's retinue in Charlestown and Attakullakulla at Fort Prince George.[57] Lyttelton's insistence on imposing the dictates of western criminal law onto the Cherokees assured that a detachment of professional troops would be required to clean up his mess, and the role his rigidity in the face of cultural divergence played in the conflict's escalation made an indelible impact on James Grant, the second-in-command of that expedition; Grant's responses to red-on-white murders would prove more malleable during his time in the field against the Cherokees and throughout the course of his own governorship.

The whirlwind ensued in January and February, preceding a formal request by Lyttelton to Amherst for military assistance. Vengeful Cherokees killed some of the licensed traders still in the nation, among them the notorious Elliot, while the other traders speedily absconded to fortified positions.[58] Oconostota stooped to Lyttelton's level of treachery on

[55] John Stuart to Allen Stuart, Fort Loudoun, May 15, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 22.
[56] Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 124.
[57] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 107.
[58] *Ibid*., 110.

February 16, when he executed a scheme to draw out some of Fort Prince George's most reviled officers and simultaneously liberate the detained headmen. Approaching the fort expressing a desire to treat with Lyttelton in Charlestown and requesting an escort from the fort, the headman baited Coytmore and two others to emerge from its protective walls to speak with him. He then gave a signal to Cherokee gunmen hidden below the riverbank, who emerged and delivered a mortal wound to the sex crime perpetrator.[59] As Coytmore bled out, the prospects of achieving Oconostota's second objective unraveled in tragic fashion. Though the principals' accounts differed over what provoked the ensuing massacre of the hostages (the new commander Alexander Miln claimed the Cherokees attacked with previously concealed tomahawks when the British soldiers entered their cell to place them in irons), Adair and contemporary historians concur that the garrison, enraged over Coytmore's death, slaughtered the captives by opening fire while they were confined in a pen.[60] What little clout the Little Carpenter's peace faction still clung to dissipated in the aftermath of the massacre, as embittered Cherokees united across regions to ravage the Carolina frontier as one.[61] The Long Canes bore the brunt of this onslaught, as a large party of mounted Cherokees attacked a convoy of settlers in the process of abandoning the region, killing over fifty and capturing thirteen.[62] Panicked colonists fled their isolated farmsteads and even established communities well on the Carolina side of the borderline, making for forts and townships closer to the coast; this stream of refugees strained conditions in those locales in a manner reminiscent of the Pennsylvania back

[59] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 98-99; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 195.
[60] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 100; Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 126, Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 111; Adair, *History of the American Indians*, 267.
[61] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 118.
[62] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 105.

settlements during the unchecked Indian raiding before Forbes's campaign, as marauding Cherokees flipped the script on British colonialism, rolling back the frontier by a hundred miles.[63]

The commander in chief received Lyttelton's plea in late February, and in response ordered Montgomery to prepare the First Highland Regiment for deployment to the colony.[64] Named second in command to Montgomery, Grant received the longed-for promotion (albeit temporarily) to lieutenant colonel by brevet in order to assure that he would outrank any provincial officer he encountered during the campaign.[65] Any sense of accomplishment derived from his provisional elevation in the British military pecking order was offset by dissatisfaction with the venue of service and the nature of his mission. The Scot's first trip to South Carolina, though instructive in the opportunities afforded by lowcountry capital investment, had proven achingly uneventful from a martial standpoint, consisting of dull city garrison duty and frustrating quarrels with Charlestonians unwilling to compromise bottom lines to accommodate His Majesty's forces. Grant's biographer construes him as a passionate imperialist, altruistically promoting Britain's interests abroad while simultaneously furthering his own.[66] Service in Carolina, however, represented a subordination of Grant's ambition to the dictates of British imperial exigency, and his and Montgomery's behavior during the campaign, alongside subtextual consideration of their correspondence with the colony's leadership, imparts their ardent wish to depart the province post haste. A proliferation of military communication during

[63] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 111.
[64] Amherst to Montgomery, New York, February 24, 1760, Edith Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers 1756-1763, The Southern Sector: Dispatches from South Carolina, Virginia and His Majesty's Superintendent of Indian Affairs* (Westminster, MD: Heritage Books, 2006), 79-80.
[65] Amherst to Grant, New York, March 8, 1760, *Ibid.*, 87.
[66] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 1.

the Anglo-Cherokee War better clarifies Grant's perspective during those events in comparison to his first stint in South Carolina, but these missives' accounts of conditions and engagements conceal as much as they reveal. The young officer could never explicitly state his discontent with this assignment, for to do so would belie the dutiful, agreeable impression that he sought to project onto his superiors like Amherst. Grant's disappointment in his new station stemmed from a couple of problems he perceived as inherent to his regiment's mission in South Carolina and developments on other North American fronts. The assignment required backwoods maneuvering not against a fortified French position, like the one with which Grant forced a risky engagement the previous year, but clusters of indigenous villages. Recent research on Scottish Highlanders' roles in erecting the first British Empire accentuates the disdain with which Highland soldiers viewed waging war against Native Americans.[67] Such opinions sprang not from a sense of camaraderie with Natives inspired by the recognition of clan systems as foundational constructs common to both societies, but from ethnocentric notions that American Indians fell beyond the pale of the world's civilized peoples, a stigma which many Highland Scots soldiers were desperately seeking to shed themselves as they participated in the British imperial project for the first time.[68] Most Highland soldiers conceived of the *petit guerre* requisite to subdue native populations as dishonorable and undignified when compared to conventional warfare waged against European foes; certainly chances at glory and concomitant advancement flowed more frequently from the latter encounters.[69]

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[67] Matthew P. Dziennik, *The Fatal Land: War, Empire, and the Highland Soldier in British America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 106-108, 115.
[68] *Ibid*., 96-98. For the similarities between the clan systems of Highland Scots and the Southeastern Indians, see Edward J. Cashin, *Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Shaping of the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1992), 65-66.
[69] Dziennik, *The Fatal Land*, 115.

Unfortunately for Grant and other Highland Scots desirous of expedited ascents, high-ranking British military and civilian officials frequently viewed Highlanders as exceptionally hardy, and uniquely suited to function as light infantry in irregular operations on mountainous terrain against Amerindian foes; Lyttelton's predecessor James Glen certainly did, and it stands to reason that the same preconceived notions colored Amherst's calculus when he contemplated which portion of the army he should dispatch to counter the Cherokee push against Carolina.[70] Equally frustrating to the newly minted lieutenant colonel as his transport vessel skated down the Atlantic littoral was how the ship's passage carried him away from what the best-known contemporary chronicle of the Seven Years' War dubs the conflict's "climactic campaign."[71] The prospect of participating in a surge to expel Britain's ancient enemy from its largest colony that he personally reckoned highly likely to succeed appeared far more attractive to a climber like James Grant than war against the Cherokees.

It was these prevailing concerns, disgust with the task of conducting operations solely against native foes due to a belief that such duties were beneath their dignity and the prospect of striking a blow in the war's decisive operation if they could escape such an ignominious assignment in time, which prompted Grant and Montgomery's hasty departure from the colony before securing the frontier, and certainly not some sentimental attachment to the Cherokees or conviction "that their own cause was unjust" as historian John Oliphant suggests.[72] The letter of Amherst's orders to Montgomery before the duo's

[70] *Ibid*., 71.
[71] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 390.
[72] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 132. To be fair to Oliphant, both officers made sympathetic statements regarding the Cherokees' role in the conflict, but they also ruthlessly administered *petit guerre* in the Lower Towns, exterminating the most vulnerable members of Cherokee society.

deployment later provided cover for them as they extricated themselves from the colony despite the vehement protests of the provincial legislature and Lieutenant Governor William Bull II, who assumed executive authority in April 1760 after Lyttelton's appointment to the governorship of Jamaica. Amherst conceived of Montgomery's campaign as a quick hit operation designed to issue the Cherokees a painful reprimand for their assault on the Carolina backcountry followed by a return to the Canadian theater in a timely manner. Amherst intended the regiment to move against Cherokee country "as soon as possible" upon arrival in the colony so as "to punish them for this infamous breach of peace."[73] Partly to assure the utmost haste but also to avoid the incapacitating effects of seasoning, Amherst suggested the Highlanders spend minimal time in Charlestown, while ordering the transport captains to remain docked in the harbor so as to allow for the detachment's reboarding at a moment's notice, for augmenting the main army "is of the greatest consequence for my pursuing the operations of the campaign" against Montreal.[74] The commander explicitly prohibited Montgomery's force from engaging in "any defensive operations," yet issued no specific directives regarding how the army should proceed against the Cherokees other than a general instruction to act "offensively by destroying their towns and cutting up their settlements" in the manner which "shall occur best to You for the future protection of the Colony"[75] – in other words, Montgomery and Grant should enact brutal vengeance on behalf of the Carolinians by decimating the Cherokee home front, unleashing lethal violence against the most vulnerable of the tribe's noncombatants. Amherst did, however, allow some latitude in garrisoning a fort should an emergency

[73] Amherst to Montgomery, New York, March 6, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 81.
[74] *Ibid*., 83.
[75] *Ibid*.

require it, and vested Montgomery with discretion to determine if such a move was "necessary for the good of His Majesty's Service," a proviso which the duo ignored at a key point during the ensuing campaign.[76] A provision of six months, to last until October 24, seemingly placed finite parameters on the duration of the mission; Amherst expected rapid rebuke and a prompt withdrawal barring unforeseeable extenuating circumstances.

Upon arriving in the harbor on April 1 and learning of the smallpox epidemic raging within the city, Montgomery opted to prevent the majority of his command from setting foot in the "sickly town"; he directed the vessels up the Cooper River some seven miles to Samuel Brisford's plantation at Strawberry Ferry; there Grant and 1200 of the 1300 men disembarked "all in good Health and high Spirits" and marched to Monck's Corner to await the arrival of land transport and provisions to be provided by the colony.[77] As Grant and the regiment surveyed the frontier village and awaited the provincial government's compliance, the officer had time to observe one of the colony's loci of economic activity; easily navigable riverine access to Charlestown allowed Monck's Corner to serve as an entrepot for both the tidal rice plantations lining the southern bank of the Santee River connected to it by a fan-shaped nexus of roads and the mass quantity of wheat and other agricultural produce imported from the backcountry settlements linked to the town by the Cherokee Trading Path.[78] Under normal circumstances, wagons regularly streamed to and from the town ferrying foodstuffs bound for consumption in the capital and European manufactures to furnish farmstead dwellings, but Cherokee raids had sent the frontier

[76] *Ibid*., 84.
[77] "CHARLES-TOWN April 5," in *The South Carolina Gazette*, April 7, 1760, Accessible Archives, https://www.accessible-archives.com/collections/south-carolina-newspapers/; Montgomery to Amherst, April 12, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 91.
[78] Edelson, *Plantation Enterprise*, 132-133, 204-205, 259.

denizens scurrying for shelter in forts or downcountry. Only the plantations to the north functioned ordinarily that spring, and Grant gradually discerned that (just as during the quartering dispute three years before) the proprietors of those lucrative estates neglected to expeditiously meet the needs of the imperial army summoned to its defense. The body that represented their collective will, the Commons House of Assembly, failed to provide enough wagons to form a supply chain for Montgomery's army despite a reasonable supposition that Amherst would respond to the colony's request by sending an army to quell the backcountry violence. After reuniting with Grant at Monck's Corner, Montgomery, incensed by the legislative inactivity and Bull's unwillingness to push for carriage deployment before Lyttelton departed for Jamaica, ordered his second-in-command to venture to Charlestown to pressure the lieutenant governor and the commissary, the Charlestown mercantile firm of Smith and Nutt, to secure cattle and wagons before his force was infected with smallpox and returned to New York without chastising the Cherokees.[79] Grant tersely informed the provisioners and the lieutenant governor that the Highlanders "were determined not to loiter away the summer" hovering near the colony's periphery.[80] He and Montgomery wanted to move soon, and any "delay must be imputed" to the colonial actors responsible for beef and overland provision conveyance.[81] As a result of Grant's browbeating, Bull issued an impressment ordinance which the assembly quickly passed into law, but a lack of immediate response and anxiety over miasmic exposure prompted Montgomery to march for the Congarees (near modern-day Columbia) on April

[79] Montgomery to Amherst, April 12, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 92, Montgomery to Amherst, April 22, 1760, *ibid*., 96.
[80] Grant to Amherst, Charlestown, April 17, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 94.
[81] *Ibid*.

23 before any wagons arrived.[82] An abashed Bull reported little response to the impressment order, then attempted to reassure Grant that the makings of the supply line lay before him among the yeomanry inhabiting the "land of wagons" between the Congaree and Wateree rivers, without explaining how those farmers (currently cowed refugees) could deliver the vehicles.[83] These problems lingered well into May, impeding the army's progress and reducing an intended lightning strike to a lumbering plod, while simultaneously resurrecting Grant's bitterness towards a significant portion of the colonial elite, whose parsimony and foot-dragging inhibited Montgomery's force from arriving in Cherokee country to strike a decisive blow as quickly as he would have liked.

Though Amherst's orders betrayed no hint of the Carolinians' role in the conflict's escalation, laying the blame for the rupture in peace squarely on the "barbarous and inhumane savages" without providing specifics on the atrocities in question, Grant and Montgomery cobbled together a working understanding of the events that preceded the hostilities over the course of April and May.[84] Bull, who as a council member protested Lyttelton's decision to disregard the protections customarily afforded to foreign diplomats, filled Grant in on his predecessor's treachery in mid-May.[85] Bull recounted the pangs of regret he endured when Lyttelton "very unfortunately for this Province, detained" the entire delegation; the lieutenant governor claimed he opposed committing to the expedition "till we had heard the Proposals for Satisfaction, which the Indians then in Town

[82] Montgomery to Amherst, Monck's Corner, April 22, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 96, For a copy of the ordinance, see An Ordinance to Authorize Impressment, April 19, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 8-10.
[83] Bull to Grant, April 24, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 12-24.
[84] Amherst to Montgomery, February 24, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 80.
[85] Kinloch Bull, Jr., *The Oligarchs in Colonial and Revolutionary Charleston: Lieutenant Governor William Bull II and His Family* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 54.

were contriving to propose."[86] If Bull construed his dealings with the Cherokees as more savory than Lyttelton's to Grant, the terms he floated at them through the Scottish officers appeared even less sensitive to Cherokee cultural mores and no likelier to bring them to the table. In late May, Bull and his council proposed the execution of fifteen of the chief troublemakers (most prominently Seroweh) and the yearly rotating detention of five adult sons of principal headmen across regions in order to assure complaisance throughout Cherokee society; proposals that called for additional hostages were a non-starter among a people already leery of British intentions to reduce them to bondage.[87] Bull's biographer considers it likely that the lieutenant governor knew the Cherokees would reject such stringent terms, and intended them as a malleable starting point for a more evenhanded agreement to be implemented when the headmen came down to negotiate with him; in reality, punitive zeal permeated the popular mood in Charlestown in the wake of the raids during the first quarter of 1760, and Bull's council and legislature demanded severity.[88] Stuart, a shrewd observer of indigenous modes of thought, filled Grant in on Cherokee conceptualization of incarceration from his besieged position at Fort Loudoun: hostages were analogous to slaves, death preferable to captivity, and "it is impossible to give them an idea of any confinement that is not ignominious."[89] The future superintendent clearly considered Lyttelton to have botched the summit out of sheer ignorance of dynamics within the neighboring society, as he expressed incredulity that the governor seized some hostages from the Middle Settlements, "that part of the Nation, which had been remarkable

[86] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, May 15, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 26-28.
[87] Robinson, ed., *North and South Carolina Treaties*, 140-141.
[88] Bull, *The Oligarchs*, 70; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 120-121.
[89] Stuart to Grant, Fort Loudoun, May 2, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 18-19.

for their attachment to us."[90] Successive missives from parties in the know revealed fragments of the truth behind the war's causes to Grant and Montgomery.

Even before hearing his correspondents' assessments of the colony's role in the souring of Anglo-Cherokee relations, Grant felt inclined to consider the Cherokees' amenability to treat within two weeks of the campaign's commencement, informing Amherst that he believed much of Cherokee society "sorry for what has happened" and optimistically projecting that the presence of Montgomery's army would intimidate them into suing for peace.[91] The spring in fact did carry the prospect of a truce, albeit not due to Cherokee panic inspired by the imposing Highland force. Having satiated "the kindred duty of retaliation," the crying blood which necessitated equilibrium only achievable through purgative violence or societal reconstitution via captive absorption (the raids had provided plenty of both), April and May found many (but not all) Cherokees willing to clear the path.[92] Given the regimental leadership's complimentary mindfulness of the inherent futility of trying to make a name in the British army by fighting Indians and ardor for French adversaries, it would seize the first available opportunity to treat and march back to the transport vessels. Grant implied awareness of the headmen's alternative offer of equivalent French scalps to Lyttelton, noting that the peace he believed the Cherokees currently wanted rested on "a measure which would by no means be acceptable to the greatest part of this Province," accentuating the popular furor for bloodlust among Carolinians and leaving it open to Amherst's interpretation whether or not the junior

[90] *Ibid*.
[91] Grant to Amherst, Charlestown, April 17, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 95.
[92] Adair, *A History of the American Indians*, 186; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 102-116.

officer considered that resolution satisfactory.[93] After another protracted delay at the Congarees waiting for the few wagons in the army's custody to convey the entire flour supply via multiple trips back to Monck's Corner, the army encamped at Robert Goudey's trading post, Ninety Six, a facility distended to saturation with refugees that Montgomery derisively labeled a "sort of fort."[94] There Montgomery dispensed a scathing invective on other shortcomings in the colony's preparedness for the campaign and behavior that he considered risible machismo on the part of a colonial society that lacked the martial prowess to back up its swaggering genocidal talk. The provincial regiment that accompanied the First, which was supposed to consist of 1,000 men at arms, numbered a scant eighty, and "half of those good for nothing."[95] Though a considerable contingent of 400 rangers were stationed at Ninety Six to reinforce the army, Montgomery doubted his ability to prevent their defection, "as they are under no sort of discipline"; a vacuum in provincial military leadership attributable to colonial underfunding afflicted these units, as two of its captains deserted over lack of pay.[96] Montgomery and Grant's indignation over the colony's paltry contribution to the campaign its behavior necessitated was only compounded by bravado they considered preposterous. The commander poked fun at the absurdity of their bellicose rhetoric about "putting all the Cherokees to death or making slaves of them," for in his estimation "a dozen" native gunmen could sack Charlestown but for the presence of His Majesty's forces.[97] Montgomery's evaluation of the pending invasion of Cherokee country as a cakewalk, however, echoed Grant's optimism and revealed plenty

[93] Grant to Amherst, Charlestown, April 17, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 95.
[94] Montgomery to Amherst, Ninety Six, May 24, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*., 105.
[95] *Ibid*.
[96] *Ibid*.
[97] *Ibid.*

of false confidence to go around. He predicted (correctly) that the army would approach Fort Prince George with little opposition, but severely underestimated Cherokee resolve when he opined they would "be very desirous to come into terms" after "one or two of their principal towns are burnt."[98] Historians have framed Grant's and Montgomery's musings on natives during this phase of the Anglo-Cherokee War as overly sympathetic, but they can just as easily be construed as contempt for an adversary unworthy of the minimal exertion needed to subdue it. Though Montgomery believed that the colonists occasionally treated the Cherokees harshly and doubted that the tribe bore sole responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities as the Carolinians held, he considered the Indians "rogues" to a man.[99] Carolina could have countered such innocuous charlatans with appropriate effort, precluding the deployment of his regiment during a critical juncture of the war, but the wagon delays and underfunded regiments clearly indicated their unwillingness "to risk or contribute anything to carry on the services which they are so anxious about."[100] Moreover, correspondence which reached Montgomery's camp around this time relayed the return of an Overhills delegation from Fort Toulouse emptyhanded; their solicitation of French and Creek military assistance was rebuffed, as the French "provided no Encouragement to expect assistance" and even "Dismissed them without presents."[101] This revelation further solidified Grant and Montgomery's shared notion about the undignified nature of their mission, which offered only the prospect of skirmishing with Native Americans, not the opportunity to achieve notoriety through triumph over Europeans considered more or less

[98] *Ibid*.
[99] *Ibid*.
[100] *Ibid*., 106.
[101] John Stuart to Allen Stuart, Fort Loudoun, May 15, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 23. Allen served as a surgeon for the First Highland Regiment during Montgomery's campaign against the Cherokees.

their martial peers. Tasked with pacifying an isolated trickster foe ostensibly beneath their regiment's honor and burdened again by provincial allies willing to impute responsibility for their violent impulses onto British regulars, it is no wonder the Highland officers longed "to return to the northward where all of us wish to be most heartily."[102]

Grant's resounding defeat at the hands of Ohio Valley and *pays d'en haut* tribesmen at the Forks should have perpetually disabused him of underestimating indigenous foes, and also prompted him to mitigate his commander's overconfidence, but the correspondence of both before the invasion oozes cocksure optimism. Perhaps Grant's conviction that he had been "unlucky" at Duquesne's threshold implies a corollary, that the assembled natives prevailed due to a stroke of good fortune, or that the French were the true architects of his defeat. He and Montgomery, however, predicted Cherokee capitulation would precede engagement or occur after they unleashed *petit guerre* on a couple of hapless villages. Events to the northwest as Montgomery's army inched closer, however, galvanized Cherokee ardor for the war, rendering swift conciliation far less likely. But for the machinations of Alexander Miln, Grant and Montgomery might have convinced the Cherokees to negotiate with Bull before a punitive invasion became necessary to achieve that end. Overtures from the Overhills before Montgomery's arrival reinforced their hope that further bloodshed could be averted and they could soon return to Canada to fight in the real war; Standing Turkey, the new headman of Chota, sent a white flag affixed to a sapling via courier to place in front of Ninety Six, along with a speech advocating conciliation and a string of white wampum capped by one black bead, symbolic of Seroweh,

[102] Montgomery to Amherst, May 24, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 105.

the bellicose Estatoe warrior upon whom he sought to fasten blame for the conflict.[103] Coytmore's replacement as garrison commander at Fort Prince George, the rash, callow Miln, proved only slightly less detestable to the Lower townspeople, as he executed a coup under the guise of hospitality worthy of Lyttleton. On May 8, as Overhill and Middle Settlement Cherokees streamed down the path to congregate at Sugar Town, Tistoe emerged in front of the fort, professing a renewed desire for friendship and promising the release of a young male British colonist the following day.[104] The influx of Cherokees from other regions convinced Miln that Tistoe's gesture was artificial; indeed, the Kewoee headman failed to materialize the following day, but 210 mounted Cherokees eyed Fort Prince George from across the river. A coterie of leaders beseeched Miln to confer with them before the gate if they agreed to leave their weaponry with the larger group, and the commander conceded. These leaders represented a mosaic of Cherokee society; in addition to the recent arrivals from the Middle Settlements and Overhills, Tistoe's fellow townsman the Raven of Keowee accompanied the entourage. Miln bemoaned the ongoing conflict, which he complained was fueled by "Trifles," but vowed to rectify these trivialities should the assembled headmen agree to dine on "plenty of good Beef, Flour, and Bread" at his table. As the Raven approached the marquee tent that Miln ordered erected for the occasion, British Indian trader Cornelius Dougherty noted a quiver of arrows on his back; commenting on how cumbersome the arrows must be; Dougherty then offered to disburden him, grabbing the quiver with one hand and the warrior's arm with the other.[105] In the subsequent donnybrook, the eight dinner guests found themselves shuffled by Miln's

[103] "CHARLES-TOWN, May 3," *The South Carolina Gazette*, May 3, 1760.
[104] "CHARLES-TOWN, May 24," *The South Carolina Gazette*, May 24, 1760.
[105] *Ibid*.

troops into Fort Prince George, which hosted a new set of Cherokee hostages three months after its garrison had slaughtered the last. Miln sent word of his gambit to Montgomery and Grant, and released one of the prisoners to demand that Standing Turkey release an equal number of white hostages (many of whom were now considered members of Cherokee clans) or he would execute his new houseguests.[106]

The Highlanders fulminated, recognizing that Miln's seizure of a delegation likely sent to lay the preliminary groundwork for peace would necessitate further violence and delay their departure for more glorious environs.[107] Bull's response to the new hostage crisis surely disappointed the duo. Invoking Hugo Grotius's *The Rights of War and Peace* (1625), the colonial official waxed philosophical on the obligation of just societies to keep public faith with their enemies during truces, for abrogation of this diplomatic norm would render peace impossible "but by compleat victories."[108] Notwithstanding his stated reverence for the principles of international law, Bull refused to censure Miln, probably because his reactionary polity heartily approved of taking Cherokee hostages, a position of which the garrison commander, who thought "he has shown a very meritorious reach in Politicks," was well aware.[109] Instead the lieutenant governor excused the duplicity, citing Miln's youth, inexperience, and daily bombardment with accounts of frontier atrocities committed by Cherokees. He felt certain that the Scottish veterans could manipulate the hostage crisis "to the advantage of the English name" via "prudent management."[110] Two weeks later, Stuart imparted the upshot of the dinner party betrayal to Grant. "Irritated to

[106] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 206; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 118.
[107] *Ibid*., 119.
[108] Bull to Montgomery, Charlestown, May 23, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 29-33.
[109] *Ibid*.
[110] *Ibid*.

the highest degree" by Miln's seizure of Tistoe and the other headmen, the Overhill villagers surrounding Fort Loudoun determined to "be avenged on us."[111] Concealing themselves amidst the copses around the fort, they surfaced to scalp and mutilate a soldier and a packhorseman foraging for firewood 150 yards from the gate. Fifty soldiers "sallied out" to administer a check, but recognized unfavorable odds and speedily retreated when faced with a "very numerous" Cherokee band led by Oconostota.[112] Renewed belligerence represented the cost of Miln's perfidy, a fact Grant and Montgomery recognized and accepted. Sensing the inevitability of invasion and recognizing that the campaign would not proceed as bloodlessly and swiftly as they predicted, the Scottish officers prepared to lead an incursion in late May.

The day before moving against the Lower Towns, Grant encountered one of the Cherokee War's most celebrated figures: Samuel Benn's slave Abram, who secured his manumission by repeatedly braving the five hundred miles which separated Fort Loudoun from Charlestown (and all British outposts in between) to deliver correspondence "with surprising dispatch, in the midst of so much danger."[113] Abram's derring-do and the manifest examples of his exercise of agency on behalf of the colony's established order and his own prospect of freedom that pepper the written record have led a contemporary historian of the conflict to place him at the center of a narrative about the war's liberative, though limited, prospects for South Carolina's African-Americans.[114] Though Abram

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[111] Stuart to Grant, Fort Loudoun, June 6, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 39-40.
[112] *Ibid*.
[113] Robert Wells to [ ], Camp at Ninety Six, May 27, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations on the Two Campaigns Against the Cherokee Indians, in 1760 and 1761* (Charlestown: Peter Timothy, 1762), 76, Early American Imprints, Readex.
[114] In particular, see Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 96, 98, 121, 128-129, 145, 186. Tortora also highlights the myriad opportunities that the frontier violence, which drew white manpower and supervision away from the

acquired legally-recognized autonomy via conduct directly in accordance with the interests of the planter class, his story proved exceptional; other black colonists took advantage of the chaos wrought by the conflict to actively resist the regime by absconding to the colony's interior, and maroonage proliferated during the Anglo-Cherokee War.[115] Runaway advertisements published in the *South Carolina Gazette* suggest that an improbable vehicle subverted lowcountry mastery and abetted the disappearance of bound peoples longing to pass into the wartime fissures eroding the colony's racial order: Montgomery's army itself. In mid-July, Dorchester planter John Channing beseeched the *Gazette's* readership to assist in the apprehension of "a tall thin mustee fellow, named JAMES."[116] Channing's descriptor for James, forged in the alchemic smithy of Carolina racecraft, disclosed the urgency with which he viewed James's capture, a need which outstripped merely recouping a personal investment. Terminology fabricated to denote a category of mixed-race people, mustees were defined by Carolinians as the products of African and Native American parentage.[117] Maroonage in and of itself, the process of slaves slipping away from European-controlled New World territory and eking out a backcountry existence among or in close proximity to indigenous peoples, horrified whites under normal circumstances, but overt hostilities with Indians always compounded their fears of an unholy pact. James's racial identity, his status as an African and a Native American, was bound to raise the hackles of *Gazette* subscribers in the midst of an Indian war as surely as his progress from Dorchester to Orangeburg, the frontier German township where he was last seen masquerading as a free

coast, presented for Charlestown slaves, and stresses the manner in which peripheral conflict deeply impacted the day-to-day function of the institution in the colonial core. *Ibid*., 1-9.

[115] *Ibid*., 119.

[116] "Run Away from the Subscriber, Near Dorchester, a Tall Thin Mustee," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 19, 1760.

[117] Jordan, *White Over Black*, 168-169; Wood, *Black Majority*, 99.

black.[118] As a skilled cooper, James could perform basic carpentry and any woodworking task that might arise at a frontier fortification, which explains why Channing's source in Orangeburg overheard him inquiring about the whereabouts of Montgomery's army.[119] Containing more souls than most settlements in the colony, the force carving its way into Cherokee territory looked a more promising prospect for blending in to James than laying low in another township. Moreover, Carolina slaves were aware of the transport ships docked in Charlestown harbor awaiting the force's return, and knew that risking concealment in a cargo hold after tagging along with the army could result in permanent alienation from their owners. Consider the circumstances of a different Abram, the property of Algernon Wilson, the proprietor of a Stono River plantation.[120] Wilson willingly sent Abram northwest with his late neighbor, Joseph Williamson, during Lyttelton's Cherokee campaign, presumably as a footman or valet to gentleman before Williamson in all likelihood succumbed to smallpox while serving in the "wild, ridiculous parade" of Charlestown's upper crust described by Adair.[121] Wilson supposed Abram remanded to the care of one of the regimental doctors, and rapidly approaching the capitol as Montgomery and Grant beat a hasty retreat. Threatening prosecution "with the utmost severity," Wilson explicitly forbade any ship captain from carrying Abram "off the province."[122] It is no small irony that a body of troops summoned to South Carolina by representatives of the colony's slaveholding elite apprehensive of overcommitting too much of its own white manpower to frontier operations due to fear of slave insurrections served, however inadvertently or

[118] "Tall Thin Mustee," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 19, 1760.
[119] *Ibid*.
[120] Misidentified as the Abram who acted as courier for both Lyttelton and Bull in Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 136.
[121] "Stono, August 12," *South Carolina Gazette*, August 30, 1760.; Adair, *History of the American Indians*, 267.
[122] Stono, August 12," *South Carolina Gazette*, August 30, 1760.

potentially, as a countervailing current capable of dissolving the institution's grip on enterprising individuals.

On May 28, accompanied by roughly 300 rangers, forty of the least mediocre provincials, and fifty Catawbas eager to lash out at their more numerous western rivals, Montgomery's 1,300 departed Ninety Six and marched for the Lower Towns.[123] Four days of marching brought the column to Twelve Mile River, a branch of the Keowee and the final ford to cross before accessing Cherokee communities. The sheer banks of the Twelve Mile posed a daunting natural barrier for the wagons carrying the army's provisions; the horses, spent from hard driving the previous four days, could not drag the carriages up the rocky embankment, and groups of soldiers spent five hours providing the biopower required to propel the carriage up the slopes.[124] According to Thomas Mante, one of the light infantrymen in the First, Montgomery expressed disbelief that no Cherokee force sought to ambush them at the demanding crossing, a development which persuaded him of their ignorance of his motions; Historian David Corkran thinks that the prospect of another retaliatory hostage execution best clarifies this absence of opposition, and the prominent Keowee and Estatoe headmen among the detainees makes this explanation more plausible than Montgomery's force catching the Lower Towns completely off guard.[125] Reconnaissance, however, reveals only so much of a commander's intent, and Montgomery's next move surely surprised the Cherokees. Instead of moving due west twelve miles to reinforce the long-beleaguered Fort Prince George that afternoon, the

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[123] Montgomery to Amherst, Camp Near Fort Prince George, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 121; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 208.
[124] Thomas Mante, *A History of the Late War in North-America, and the Islands of the West-Indies, Including the Campaigns of MDCCLXIII and MDCCLXIV Against His Majesty's Indian Enemies* (London: W. Strahan, 1772), 286-287. Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale Group.
[125] *Ibid*., 287; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 208.

column paused for a few hours respite, then lurched into a night march on a northwesterly arc aimed at Estatoe, the oldest and most populous town in the region, twenty-five miles away from their camp at the ford.[126] The traders who doubled as guides for Montgomery's expedition neglected to inform Grant that the less substantial village of Little Keowee lay on their trajectory, until the regiment was a quarter of a mile away and barking dogs roused some slumbering Cherokees and potentially alerted the townspeople of their presence.[127] Hoping to prevent word of the march from proceeding the army ("To prevent any inconvenience from those houses," as Grant euphemistically put it), Montgomery ordered a detachment of light infantry to surround Little Keowee immediately and put all but women and children to the sword.[128] Some scouts on the edge of town foiled the objective, if not the ends, of this detachment, when they opened fire on the advancing redcoats. This cacophony saved the lives of an indeterminate number of Estatoe villagers, for several Cherokees escaped the ensuing bloodbath at Little Keowee, as Grant observed "most of those who were without the houses, and all who were in them, were put to death with bayonets, except the women and children, according to the orders that had been given."[129] As the army passed through the outskirts of Estatoe, Grant noted the freshly deserted abodes; arriving in the town proper by daybreak, the officer assessed a handsome community of over 200 houses "well provided with ammunition, corn, and in short all the necessaries of life" abandoned within the last thirty minutes.[130] Quickly dispatching a

[126] Mante, *A History of the Late War*, 287; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 11.
[127] Grant to Bull, June 4, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 78.
[128] *Ibid*.; Alexander Hewatt, *An Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Colonies of Georgia and South Carolina*, Vol 2 (London: Alexander Donaldson, 1779), 230, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale Group.
[129] Grant to Bull, June 4, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 78.
[130] *Ibid*.

dozen or so stragglers lingering in front of the council house, Montgomery's force went about immolating the town. The "tolerably well built" sixteen by sixty foot summer dwellings that lined Estatoe's thoroughfares, walled by twigs intertwined using the same method that Cherokee women used to craft basketry and overlaid with a brilliant white clay plaster, were consumed by flames and reduced to ashes.[131] The early June invasion meant the Busk and the annual harvest lay at least two months in the future, and until then the sustenance of Estatoe's inhabitants depended primarily on the beans and corn stored within the elevated cribs that adjoined each residence.[132] Channeling the improvisational, rapine, yet entirely practical impulse that has sustained armed forces across time and space, Montgomery's force "plundered" the crib's contents, commencing forage war, the scavenging of personal residences characteristic of warfare targeting civilian populations which became a defining feature of the Anglo-Cherokee War.[133] Significantly, Montgomery and Grant prohibited their troops from enacting full-blown *chevauchée* (the ruin of an enemy people via destruction of agricultural capacity) at Estatoe and other Cherokee towns during the campaign of 1760 in accordance with Bull's request to refrain from "cut[ting] up their corn, until there remain no hopes of coming to accommodation."[134] This concession allowed the Cherokees to better weather the pressure that Lower Town refugees absconding in the face of Montgomery's force placed on their kin farther inland that fall.

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[131] Sarah Hill, *Weaving New Worlds: Southeastern Cherokee Women and Their Basketry* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 69-70; Henry Timberlake, *The Memoirs of Henry Timberlake* (London: J. Ridley, 1765), 59-60, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale Group.
[132] For a description of the corn cribs, see Hill, *Weaving New Worlds*, 70.
[133] Grant to Bull, June 4, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 78; for more on the impact of foraging a force's prospects for victory, albeit during the Revolutionary War, see David Hackett Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 346-362.
[134] Bull to Montgomery, May 23, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 29-33.

A smallpox outbreak had already rendered many in Estatoe bedridden before the British army annihilated the town, and as the homes smoldered, the shrieks accompanying the roasting flesh of convalescing townspeople conveyed the fates of "doubtless numbers" who perished in the flames; Grant could "not help" slightly pitying the residents of the Lower Towns, whose "greatest abundance of everything" he relentlessly eliminated. The Scot sanitized the gruesome effects of the pyres his subordinates created out of occupied Cherokee homes in his letter to Bull, reporting merely that he had "reason to believe" that "many of the inhabitants who endeavored to conceal themselves" succumbed to the fire.[135] After reducing Estatoe to an ash heap, Montgomery's destructive trek bent to the southwest, dealing Qualatchee and Toxaway identical fates. Crossing another tributary of the Keowee River, the column ran headlong into Wawhatchee's hometown, Coonasatchee, or Sugar Town, a settlement Grant reckoned similar in scope to Estatoe.[136] There Grant noted "astonishing magazines of corn" which his men set ablaze, and the aftermath of a panicked flight into the mountains; recognizing the tangible prospect of imminent destruction, the majority of Sugar Town's denizens fled so suddenly that some left "their seppan [supper] warm upon the table and in their kettles."[137] Again, Montgomery's force obliterated agricultural yield without targeting current productive capacity. Montgomery and Grant intended to spare Sugar Town the ravages inflicted on the other four villages due to its relative proximity to Fort Prince George and the presence of a small stockade fort in the settlement; sentries were placed in the fortification, but the discovery of the mutilated

[135] "CHARLES-TOWN, June 14," *South Carolina Gazette*, June 14, 1760; Grant to Bull, June 4, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 78-79.
[136] Grant to Bull, June 4, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 79; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 19.
[137] Grant to Bull, June 4, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 79.

remains of a Carolina captive eradicated any vestige of restraint. "It was no longer possible to think of mercy" relayed Grant, whose men put Sugar Town to the torch.[138] Leaving five piles of embers on the former sites of Cherokee communities, the army concluded its twenty-hour, sixty-mile rampage when it arrived at Fort Prince George at 4:00 PM on June 2. Grant coolly tallied a comparative butcher's bill; in his estimation, the British army killed between sixty and eighty Cherokees and took forty prisoners while suffering only four casualties of its own.[139] In the aftermath of the carnage, Montgomery saluted Grant as its primary architect in his report to Amherst, lauding the junior officer's "great abilities" and meticulous "attention in carrying on every part of the service."[140] This glowing assessment suggests that despite the explicit commiseration seized on by Oliphant as evidence of how Grant's humanity mitigated the conflict's destructive impact on the Cherokees, the Scot meted out devastation with a surgical precision during the first leg of Montgomery's campaign.[141] Montgomery also informed Amherst that he reckoned this staggering blow enough to compel the Cherokees to the negotiating table, and he certainly hoped so, for he feared "it almost impossible to proceed over the mountains" to the Middle Settlements and discerned "no great advantage in continuing a war against those savages"; the Lower Townsmen, in his estimation the party most culpable for the escalation "have been sufficiently corrected for their insolence," leaving Montgomery encouraged that "a peace can be made with the whole."[142]

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[138] *Ibid*.
[139] *Ibid*.
[140] Montgomery to Amherst, Camp Near Fort Prince George, June 4, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 123.
[141] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 115, 125, 132.
[142] Montgomery to Amherst, Camp Near Fort Prince George, June 4, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 123.

But unsurprisingly, the nascent hostage fiasco, the eradication of five communities, and the mass flight of Lower Cherokees to other parts of the nation aroused intense bitterness and a strengthened resolve to expel the intruders. Montgomery thought that releasing the captives "improperly confined" by Miln in a series of waves, beginning with Tistoe and the Old Warrior of Estatoe, would mitigate tensions; he set those two loose bearing a carrot-and-whip message to their comrades: though the Cherokees could now "see we can extirpate them, yet they may still have peace, as they were formerly our friends and allies."[143] Operating under the erroneous assumptions about the Little Carpenter that poisoned Lyttelton and Bull's conceptualization of Cherokee politics (primarily that the headman could render politically binding decisions for the rest of the nation without a broad consensus), Montgomery instructed the Lower chiefs that he liberated to summon Attakullakulla from Fort Loudoun so preliminary negotiations could commence.[144] Both he and Grant were quite eager for a resolution to avoid more campaigning at this point, and not solely due to a desire to join the final push against Montreal. Montgomery admitted that his threat to commence further depredations "could hardly [be] put in execution" to Amherst, while Grant further reinforced the notion that his regimental commander was bluffing in his missive to Bull, in which he parroted Montgomery, declaring a procession over the mountains and into the Middle Settlements "next to impossible"; if the First Highland Regiment's leadership did not completely jettison the arrogant manner with which it dismissed the Cherokees' capacity to resist, the duo definitely now held the defensibility of Cherokee country in loftier estimation.[145] Three tense weeks passed as the

[143] *Ibid*; Mante, *A History of the Late War*, 290.
[144] *Ibid*.
[145] *Ibid*; Grant to Bull, June 4, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 79.

army languished at the fort, but the threat produced "little to no effect" as a combined force of Cherokees used the respite to coalesce in the Middle Towns and mount a defense of the demographic core of its society.[146] Tistoe was supposed to return with a response by June 14, but instead sent a courier to the Highlanders complaining that the dispersed position of the other headmen warranted the extension of "six more sleeps" to execute his commission.[147] On the 16th, in a show of what he hoped would be interpreted as good faith, Montgomery released two more hostages, and the Catawbas returned home with the plunder and scalps acquired during the action in the Lower Towns.[148] Tistoe's window expired (in fact, the Keowee chief assumed partial command of the Cherokee host amassing to the north), and word arrived at Fort Prince George that Overhills warriors encircled Fort Loudoun, clearly indicating Little Carpenter's conciliatory position out of step with the majority of his peers.[149] Frank commentary apropos to the Cherokees' level of distrust for the British conveyed to Grant and Montgomery that while some would prefer to come to terms, the garrison's hostage massacre in February and Miln's seizure of more prisoners during a truce "prevents the peace being made, and obliges me to march farther into their Country."[150] Despite some apprehension, Grant and Montgomery prepared the column for another foray.

On June 24, the army sallied forth from Fort Prince George, forded the Keowee River, and made for the Dividing Path's fork at the site of modern-day Clayton, Georgia, preparing to initiate a "second irruption."[151] At trail's divergence, Montgomery and Grant

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[146] Mante, *A History of the Late War*, 290.
[147] "CHARLES-TOWN, July 5," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 5, 1760.
[148] *Ibid*.
[149] *Ibid*.
[150] Montgomery to Amherst, Camp at Keowee Town, June 23, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 125-126.
[151] Mante, *A History of the Late War*, 290-291; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 11.

opted to move northward into the Middle Settlements which represented the heart of Cherokee country rather than westward towards the Valley Towns.[152] The mother town of Etchoe lay closest to Fort Prince George, and was the first settlement in Montgomery's path.[153] Awash with giddy expectations of a quick capitulation fueled by the expedition's speedy dispatch of the Lower Towns and mistakenly assuming the Highlanders bound for the Valley settlements, Bull speculated that his letter would find Grant in the "sublime regions of Unicoy, where hills peep o'er hills" and wondered if "Hiawasee resemble[d] Turin" before instructing the lieutenant colonel to demand the executions of the Mortar's pro-French Creeks as a condition for a lasting peace, one which he wanted solidified in a manner which would set the Cherokees against the Creeks and leave the "balance of power" between both tribes in Carolina's possession, "As by dividing we govern them."[154] At the moment, such optimism seemed lost on Grant, who was not preoccupied with how he would orchestrate post-war regional politics in a manner favorable to the colony or recollecting romantic Italian holidays with the Earl of Sutherland, but rather focused on how his regiment could navigate the formidable landscape before it to arrive in the Middle

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[152] Though eighteenth-century Cherokee demographic figures remain murky, research on the era clearly demonstrates that the Middle Settlements were the most populous. Peter Wood's research indicates that in 1715, the Middle Settlements contained approximately half of the villages in Cherokee territory, three times the number of residents in the Lower Towns and more than double the people in the Overhills. Though war and epidemics reconfigured these proportions somewhat over the subsequent 45 years, the Middle Towns benefited from a high degree of insulation, as the Lower Towns were most vulnerable to Carolina backcountry squatters and Creek adversaries to the south, while the Overhills lay closest to the frequently belligerent Shawnee, who raided often during the Seven Years' War. Applying Russell Thornton's estimate of 6,000 Cherokees in 1760 alongside Wood's ratio yields a figure of roughly 3,000 in the Middle Settlements, a substantial figure even at the tribe's demographic nadir. Distension due to the refugee crisis initiated by Montgomery's invasion surely added to this total as well. See Peter H. Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region, 1685-1790," in Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and Tom Hatley, eds., *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast*, 2nd ed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 87; Russell Thornton, *The Cherokees: A Population History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 31.

[153] For Etchoe as a mother town, or one of the original seven Cherokee communities, see Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 126.

[154] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, July 8, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 45-47.

Settlements. Near-vertical inclines and breakneck declines combined with "passes innumerable" bordered by sheer drops off mountainsides to produce "the strongest and most difficult" country Grant had ever traversed.[155] Montgomery echoed this sentiment, conveying to Amherst the unique difficulties presented by the interior Appalachian terrain, which he claimed was capable of nullifying a ten-to-one troop advantage should the minority force mount their defense at the proper choke point.[156] As the troops inched northward, marching over "ugly dangerous ground" littered with narrow defiles and gaps, they passed a man-made structure which would have appeared just as foreboding had they comprehended its nature; the evening of the 25th, while camping beside War Woman's Creek, the Highlanders observed a massive pile of stones which, according to Adair, "served as a monument for the Cherokee fallen."[157] Eastern Woodland Indians frequently utilized stone heaps to memorialize the sites of military victories, and Cherokees habitually honored deceased warriors by tossing stones atop their graves as they walked by; the pile at War Woman's Creek could have been a testament to collective or individual valor, but either way, it symbolized the Cherokees' proud martial tradition and their ability to inscribe this history onto the land itself by erecting triggers of communal reflection.[158] Ominous tributes to resistance of foreign incursions thus greeted Montgomery's army as it wound its way towards the demographic and ceremonial center of Cherokee society.

On the morning of June 27, Montgomery's troops commenced marching on schedule at 4:00 AM with a palpable sense of foreboding; reckoning themselves roughly eighteen

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[155] Grant to Bull, July 3, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 86.
[156] Montgomery to Amherst, Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 127.
[157] "Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760," *Weekly Gazette*, July 16, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 81; Adair, *History of the American Indians*, 214.
[158] Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 27-30.

miles from the target of Etchoe and on the lookout for an attack, the army "prepared accordingly" by positioning regulars at the front of the column and deploying "platoons of grenadiers and light infantry" to survey any dense vegetation or "other places of ambuscade" that it encountered.[159] After twelve miles, one of these scouting parties came across four Cherokees conducting reconnaissance of their own; taken into captivity, the small party's leader underhandedly informed Grant that they "did not expect us so soon," an assertion which the second-in-command, convinced that the Cherokees "have seen us every day of our march," judiciously ignored.[160] A mile later, the force descended into a valley characterized as "an ugly kind of plain," "a swamp," and "very advantageous ground" by both Grant and Montgomery.[161] Here the Little Tennessee River (which Adair refers to as Crow's Creek) bent sharply and ran through the center of the narrow valley, bisecting to the west the base of a sheer mountain and to the east a "hilly uneven ground"; densely overgrown scrub brush covered the entire area, limiting visibility to "scarce three yards distance in some areas."[162] Beyond the river's ford the pathway narrowed even further to a defile that required single-file passage.[163] Concealed in the thicket lay "a very considerable body of Indians" led by Seroweh and Tistoe, which conflicting accounts numbered between 500 and 630, a cross-regional force peppered with a few pro-French Creeks for good

[159] "Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760," *Weekly Gazette*, July 16, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 82.
[160] *Ibid*.
[161] *Ibid*.; "CHARLES-TOWN, July 12," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 12, 1760; Grant to Bull, July 3, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 86; Montgomery to Amherst, Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 127.
[162] Adair, *History of the American Indians*, 268; "Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760," *Weekly Gazette*, July 16, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 82.
[163] Mante, *A History of the Late War*, 291.

measure.[164] Captain John Morrison led a party of light infantry to survey the valley, completely unaware of the "invisible enemy" concealed beneath the dense thicket.[165] Only the thunderclap of the Cherokees' firearms alerted the British army of their presence; fired on "from all quarters," Morrison perished immediately, though one account claimed that Tistoe's weapon unleashed the fatal shot.[166] As the firefight ensued, the Cherokees' rifles provided them with a distinct early advantage, as they far outstripped the range of the Highlanders' Brown Bess muskets.[167] Seroweh's wrathful bellow pealed out intermittently throughout the skirmish, his resolute exhortation of his cohort to "fight strong" rising above the din of battle.[168] Sporadic chirping in the Muskogean tongue amongst their adversaries horrified some of the provincials in the field, arousing anxieties that they faced the entire Creek nation alongside the Cherokees instead of just Mortar's clique (though they were the only Creeks present at Etchoe fight).[169] Several British troops fell almost immediately, imparting to Montgomery and Grant that only decisive, responsive action would save this ambush from degenerating into a general rout. Montgomery quickly ordered Grant to lead the Highlanders to the west side of the valley to dislodge the Cherokees from the mountainside, while he took the Royals east in an attempt to repel the majority of the Cherokees back across the hills.[170] After significant casualties on both sides,

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[164] *Ibid*; Montgomery to Amherst, Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 127; "CHARLES-TOWN, August 23," *South Carolina Gazette*, August 23, 1760; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 119.
[165] Hewatt, *An Historical Account*, 232.
[166] "Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760," *Weekly Gazette*, July 16, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 83; "CHARLES-TOWN, July 19," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 19, 1760.
[167] *Ibid*.
[168] *Ibid*.
[169] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 127; "CHARLES-TOWN, October 18," *South Carolina Gazette*, October 18, 1760.
[170] Mante, *History of the Late War*, 291; "Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760," *Weekly Gazette*, July 16, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 83.

Montgomery succeeded in scattering some of the Cherokees over the hills and corralling the others back towards the defile across the river; successfully wedging his regiment between the Cherokees on the other side and the mountain, Grant's contingent used the elevated position to its advantage, shelling the other side of the river as Montgomery pushed towards the ford.[171] Compelling the native force to remove at a considerable distance, both regiments forded the Little Tennessee, ascended its steep, muddy banks, and began the painstaking process of moving down the defile one by one towards the village. After lingering out of range for a time, the Cherokees doubled back and opened fire at the army's rear, wounding several, but "retired hastily" upon a line turning and massing fire against them.[172] Recognizing that they could not prevent Montgomery's force from occupying the town, Seroweh's warriors dispatched runners through the hilly area to advise the residents to flee post haste; Etchoe was abandoned by the time the head of the column entered the town in the late afternoon, refraining from burning the wattle and daub structures it encountered so as to preserve sanctuary for the wounded.[173] Cognizant of the invading army's dependence upon its supply line, and observing the cattle train lagging at its rear, effectively isolated from the majority of the regulars straggling into the town, Seroweh ordered another strike, which materialized behind the supply line at the pinch point of the defile; only the adroit parry of a small party of Royals led by Captain Peter Gordon spared the provisions, and 200 regulars were sent back up the pass to reinforce

[171] *Ibid*.
[172] Mante, *History of the Late War*, 291.
[173] "Camp at Fort Prince George, July 2, 1760," *Weekly Gazette*, July 16, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 84; "CHARLES-TOWN, July 12, 1760," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 12, 1760.

them.[174] The last of the troops limped into camp on the outskirts of the mother town at dawn on the 28th.[175]

That day, as Cherokee war bands just beyond range of accurate fire took potshots at the army while it recuperated amid bivouacs and repurposed Cherokee homes, Grant and Montgomery took stock of their losses and came to a controversial decision. The regulars suffered seventeen deaths and sixty-six wounded due to the hostilities the day before; Grant estimated that the Cherokees lost fifty warriors but reckoned the provincials suffered only fourteen casualties total.[176] The scope of the provincials remaining with the army at that point seems indefinite; while 400 rangers accompanied Montgomery from Ninety Six, waves of desertions, including fifty the day before the march on the Middle Settlements, watered this figure down.[177] Half of the original provincial accompaniment, or 200, provides a conservative estimate of the remainder, while Montgomery still commanded at least 1,100 Highlanders worthy of taking the field (albeit currently exhausted) in addition to the seventy plus incapacitated men. Pleading a succession of excuses ranging from the impossibility of mounting a successful invasion of the Middle Towns without a line of forts in the vein of Forbes's Road to guilt pangs over the "inhumanity" of leaving their wounded on a "remote frontier" far from the relative safety of Fort Prince George to lacking adequate facilities to accommodate the injured, Grant and Montgomery blustered along, providing what they hoped read as a sound, benign rationale to Amherst and Bull for their decision to leave for Fort Prince George late on the night of June 29th, then quit the backcountry

[174] *Ibid*.
[175] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 127.
[176] Montgomery to Amherst, July 2, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 130; Grant to Bull, July 3, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 86.
[177] *Ibid*.

entirely.[178] Most historians have accepted Grant and Montgomery's protestations (and those of the soldiers among them anxious to make a hasty exit) at face value. David Corkran agrees with Montgomery's choice to retreat, stressing the unique challenge posed by the mountainous environment, the undesirable option of dividing his force, and the prospective gambit of another pitched battle far from the cover of a fortification, where defeat "meant to lose all."[179] Though clearly demonstrating the profundity of the Cherokee victory solidified by the duo's abandonment of the frontier, Daniel Tortora provides no assessment of their judgment, merely noting that neither considered erecting a post in the Middle Settlements.[180] Robert Weir hints at the cause when noting that Montgomery's abortion of the invasion represented a move "for which he had been seeking an excuse since coming to South Carolina," while Oliphant assesses the impetus for that excuse to be feelings of camaraderie towards the Cherokee, contrary to the glut of evidence suggesting another reason.[181] Amherst's directive to return to New York as soon as possible after issuing a reprimand to the Cherokees offered the Scots' decision the veneer of official sanction which somewhat cloaked the discretion they exercised in leaving. Circumstances on the ground in Etchoe after the clash in the valley indicate other paths open to Grant and Montgomery, ones eventually trod down in the subsequent year's campaign. With at least 1,300 hale men left in his command, Montgomery certainly possessed the manpower to divide his force and lead the more martially able portion on a destructive rampage through the heart of Cherokee country while posting sentinels and a defensive unit to protect the

[178] Montgomery to Amherst, July 2, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 128; Grant to Bull, July 3, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 86-87; "CHARLES-TOWN, July 19," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 19, 1760.
[179] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 214.
[180] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 127.
[181] Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 270; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 132.

wounded in Etchoe, as Grant would do the following year when he left Henry Laurens in command of a hastily erected hospital at Nequassee.[182] As a mother town and the site of Alexander Cuming's 1730 coronation of Moytoy of Tellico as emperor, Nequassee served as a ceremonial and political nexus among the Middle Towns, but it was not among the largest settlements in that region, and Etchoe was; as such, Etchoe almost certainly boasted a large, circular townhouse into which Montgomery and Grant could have packed their infirm had they been so inclined.[183] Although the Cherokee riflemen who emerged behind the pack train during the battle killed a fair number of horses and punctured bags of flour, spilling their contents onto the boggy valley floor, the army discovered 500 bushels of maize in Etchoe after seizing the town; moreover, Montgomery opted to dump excess flour (and the recently requisitioned corn) into the river before absconding to convert some of the remaining pack animals to medical transport, drawing the injured soldiers' makeshift gurneys back to Fort Prince George in their wake.[184] Montgomery and Grant thus possessed the means to levy additional penal devastation on Cherokee society while preserving the safety of their army's invalids – they simply lacked the willpower, primarily because of their motives.

Careerism and a keen desire to return to the Canadian front and reap the glory and preferment due to the officers who dealt the French colonial empire a potentially crippling blow ranked foremost among those motivations. Such crass ambitions and the desire to abjure current duties could not be explicitly stated to superiors like Amherst or colonial

[182] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 152.
[183] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 47-49; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 11. For a description of Cherokee townhouse rotundas, see Hill, *Weaving New Worlds*, 72-74.
[184] "CHARLES-TOWN, July 12," *South Carolina Gazette*, July 12, 1760; Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 131.

officials that their decisions left in the lurch like Bull, but subtextual analysis of the pair's statements upon their departure and the responses they received reveal the impetus for their actions. Though failing to submit a reason why, Montgomery baldly stated to Amherst his longing "to get out of this Indian War, & to return to the Army."[185] Grant cited the hopelessness of attempting to extirpate an Indian nation, claiming the Cherokees had "suffered much, but they will not treat," primarily because "those savages cannot be convinced a white man is honest."[186] Lyttelton and Miln's actions entrenched this distrust, inhibiting the prospects of diplomatic discourse, but recognition of this stumbling block should have increased the resolve of commanders tasked with pummeling an adversary into submission to pound a bit harder, especially when possessed of the means to do so. Bull's increasingly panicked pleas as the army descended out of the piedmont clearly indicate that he thought Grant and Montgomery were returning north to feather their own caps. He noted that their "quick departure" to rejoin Amherst's direct command was rooted in "a laudable desire of going into actual Service, into more open, tho' more dangerous Fields of Glory," he wished that they had remained at Fort Prince George longer to continue to intimidate the Cherokees.[187] Bull's words demonstrate that he thought Montgomery and Grant considered fighting Cherokees in the backcountry something inferior to actual military service, a throwaway assignment delegated to men who wanted nothing more than to be rid of it and free to acquire garlands in combat against adversaries that they (and British society at large) considered worthy of opposition. Later in the same missive, Bull evoked Amherst's orders to Montgomery, which he felt certain contained "discretionary

[185] Montgomery to Amherst, Camp at Keowee Town, June 23, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 126.
[186] Grant to Bull, July 3, 1760, reprinted in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 87.
[187] Bull to Montgomery, Charlestown, July 12, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 51.

powers" that allowed his army to remain in Carolina should "Circumstances" require; remaining to face the "apparent dangers" afflicting the province would "be understood in Great Britain, and America, to be the most important Service, that could ever be performed by your Detachment."[188] Bull implied that the military glory and reputational enhancement for which the duo strived could be attained by continuing to prosecute the war in South Carolina. In a subsequent letter, Bull oozed satisfaction over France's failure to besiege the recently acquired Quebec, issuing a tongue-in-cheek congratulation to Montgomery and Grant and a none-too-subtle acknowledgement that they would arrive northward too late to participate in the fall of New France; the French army beat a hasty retreat to Montreal, and now Amherst and Murray wedged them in a vise.[189] Tempers flared as Bull questioned the underlying reasons behind decisions made in the backcountry and stated his concerns that the Scots were leaving for dubious reasons.

Bull's (and the Commons House of Assembly's) exhortations for Montgomery's army to remain in the field resounded with conspiratorial rhetoric about pan-Indian alliances which historians have generally associated with a later era. The lieutenant governor rather ludicrously claimed that Montgomery's withdrawal would provide the French with the leverage necessary to coordinate the formation of a multi-tribal southern coalition consisting of the Cherokees ("who will doubtless boast to all the neighboring Indians, that they obliged the Army to retreat"), the Creeks ("eager for war already"), and the Choctaws ("always at their disposal").[190] Bull thought that their unfavorable situation northward

[188] *Ibid*., Frames 51-52.
[189] Bull to Montgomery, Charlestown, July 24, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 61. For the Second Battle of Quebec, see Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 391-396.
[190] Bull to Montgomery, Charlestown, July 12, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 52.

would soon compel French colonial interests to reassert themselves in his colony's vicinity, utilizing the vehicle of a pact between tribes traditionally hostile to one another to create a "vast machine of Two thousand Creeks, Two thousand Cherokees, and five thousand Choctaws."[191] This redoubtable automaton would inevitably overwhelm the colony and breathe new life into France's American fortunes, and the Scottish officers' failure to decimate the Cherokees' agricultural surplus while deployed in their country would enhance the feasibility of the operation to boot, as "the Invaders will come into a Country abounding in Grain, and the Harvest is soon approaching."[192] For its part, the provincial assembly submitted a petition to Montgomery (enclosed with Bull's letter) rife with millennialist panic over the red wave that was soon to engulf the colony, claiming the Upper Creeks' recent murder of several British traders and the tribe's refusal to grant immediate satisfaction as proof that the grand alliance of southern tribes had already been cemented; Montgomery's departure under such "pernicious" circumstances would yield depredations "better imagined than described."[193] Historical analysis of fears inspired by the specter of cross-tribal collusion and the dreaded general Indian war identifies Pontiac's War as a crystalizing agent for such anxieties; Bull's musings and the petition demonstrate the maturation of this sort of eschatological thought in South Carolina three years before the uprising.[194] Montgomery and Grant deeply resented the characterization of the province as worse off in July than it was before their deployment and scoffed at the notion

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[191] *Ibid*.
[192] *Ibid*.
[193] "Petition," July 11, 1760, Terry W. Lipscomb, ed., *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: The Journal of the Commons House of Assembly* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1996), https://sites.rootsweb.com/~scroots/m_195.html.
[194] Robert M. Owens, *Red Dreams, White Nightmares: Pan-Indian Alliances in the Anglo-American Mind, 1763-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 3-30.

of garrisoning his army in Carolina (a direct violation of his orders to refrain from engaging in any defensive operations) on "a supposition that a Creek War may happen."[195] Montgomery reckoned the danger emanating from Mobile and New Orleans quite remote, noting that "unless things changed greatly within this Twelve Months," the French were "not in a situation to the Southward to think of making Conquests," and in fact could barely defend themselves in the event of an attack.[196] As for the neurotic speculation about a coalition of southern tribes doing their bidding, if Kerlerec even possessed this sort of clout and attempted to unleash it, the combined force would "Perish before they could possibly get near your frontier"; some stragglers in tiny bands might subsist off of forage long enough to "take a few scalps," but an army nearly ten thousand strong "must be Subsisted" like any other substantial force, through a coordinated supply line, regardless of its racial composition.[197] Montgomery's assessment of French weakness in the South proved prescient, though alarmism about their influence among the Cherokee would play a role in the return of the British army the following year. His appraisal of the Cherokees' collective will to persist, however, proved far less accurate. Montgomery reckoned the loss that the tribe suffered "would soon make them Sick of the War," but the headmen conceived of his retreat as capitulation.[198] On August 8, a week before the Scots sailed to return to New York, a revitalized Cherokee force rejoiced as Demeré's garrison finally submitted to their siege and formally surrendered Fort Loudoun on the promise of safe passage to either Charlestown or Williamsburg.[199] Two days later at daybreak, as Demeré's party broke

[195] Montgomery to Bull, July 19, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 59.
[196] *Ibid*.
[197] *Ibid*.
[198] *Ibid*., Frame 57.
[199] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 137.

camp at Ball Play Creek, a brook which ran just east of Little Carpenter's town of Tomatley, an enormous party of Cherokees concealed in the canebrakes opened fire, killing twenty-six (including Captain Demeré) and taking the remainder captive.[200] Thus the seeds of Grant's redeployment in South Carolina the following year, a direct response to the outrage which sprang from this betrayal under armistice, were sown before Montgomery's campaign even ended. To compound Grant's frustration, Vaudreuil surrendered Montreal on September 9, the day before his transport slid into the mouth of the Hudson River.[201] His designs on "actual service" and the attendant ascension of the British military hierarchy dashed, Grant found himself unceremoniously ordered to take winter quarters in New Jersey.[202]

[200] *Ibid*.; Timberlake, *Memoirs of Henry Timberlake*, 2.
[201] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 408; Amherst to Montgomery, Camp at Montreal, September 10, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 133.
[202] *Ibid*.

Chapter 4: Selu's Blight

During the autumn of 1760, as the foliage of the South Carolina piedmont segued from deep verdure to russet and amber, the colony's backcountry communities remained noticeably light on inhabitants; the "tourrant" of evacuees that hightailed it out of the region in the spring for less perilous locales downcountry or quaked behind the palisades of frontier fortifications had not returned to their farms.[1] The back settlers who remained lay "under such dreadful apprehensions" that many were departing north up the Great Wagon Road for the decidedly more tranquil Pennsylvania frontier.[2] When word of the fate of the Fort Loudoun garrison reached the refugee-distended metropole, the Charlestonians directed white-hot acrimony towards Cherokees in its vehicles of popular opinion. Peter Timothy, the pugnacious anti-Cherokee publisher of the *South Carolina Gazette*, stoked this hostility by editorializing the reports of soldiers stationed at Fort Prince George, drawing a direct corollary between Montgomery's retreat and Demeré's surrender and construing the Cherokees as utterly implacable towards the colony regardless of their behavior. Though several prominent Cherokees made conciliatory overtures in the aftermath of Loudoun's reduction, the publisher and provincial military personnel openly doubted their sincerity. In late August, before word of the Loudoun debacle even reached Charlestown, the Mankiller of Nequassee sent Bull a mollifying talk which declared the Middle Settlements "desirous of peace" and duplicitously pinned sole responsibility for the armed resistance at Etchoe on the Lower Towns; Mankiller exhorted Bull to absolve the Middle Town warriors

[1] John Pearson to Lyttelton, February 8, 1760, McDowell, ed., *Documents Related to Indian Affairs*, Vol. 3, 495-496.
[2] "CHARLES-TOWN August 13," *South Carolina Gazette*, August 13, 1760.

of culpability for "what blood was spilled there" of Montgomery's detachment.[3] Seroweh, the Young Warrior of Estatoe to whom the Mankiller sought to affix the stigma of chief agitator, surprisingly sent his own peace feeler, owning his instrumental role in the spring raids and the battle at Etchoe while disavowing a "desire to shed more English blood."[4] Seroweh's proposed terms, which demanded the abandonment of Fort Prince George, the allowance of no Britons but traders in the nation, and British abstention from destroying Cherokee "corn and other effects" proved a non-starter with the Assembly; Timothy pronounced these terms a smokescreen aimed "at saving provisions" to prepare for the recommencement of violence.[5]

Indeed, much of the criticism leveled at Montgomery's campaign and angst over Cherokee operations permeating Charlestown that fall related to foodstuffs that the Highlanders neglected to destroy during the summer. Additional supplications from the Lower and Middle Towns beseeching the English to recommence the deerskin trade and refrain from tampering with the current crop aroused Timothy's ire; he denounced such proposals as an affront to Carolinians' martial pride and proof that the Cherokees believed the colonists would "supply them with everything they want rather than continue the war."[6] In September, Oconostota escorted scores of Cherokees to the Lower Settlement of Sugar Town, ostensibly as a base from which to conduct prisoner exchange and diplomacy (he did bring some prisoners in tow and deployed Corn Tassel of Toqua to treat with Bull), but also to glean any remaining grain from Lower Town fields.[7] Though trader Samuel

[3] "CHARLES-TOWN August 23," *South Carolina Gazette*, August 23, 1760.
[4] *Ibid*.
[5] *Ibid*.
[6] "CHARLES-TOWN August 16," *South Carolina Gazette*., August 16, 1760.
[7] "CHARLES-TOWN October 18," *South Carolina Gazette*, October 18, 1760; "CHARLES-TOWN October 25," in *South Carolina Gazette*, October 25, 1760.

Terron reckoned that even with this haul "there was likely only enough [corn] in the nation to feed everyone for three months, dispatches from Fort Prince George reflected the command's conviction "of the impolicy of not destroying the growing corn about the Lower-Towns."[8] Ensign Miln believed the still-erect cornstalks and Montgomery's refusal to leave a substantive force at Ninety-Six bore joint responsibility for his bastion's beleaguered condition; Fort Prince George was presently reduced to "nearly as wretched a condition as the garrison of Fort Loudoun," as horses were being slaughtered for rations, and Oconostota's retinue (Miln claimed) had blockaded the routes to and from the fort and "pent us up like a parcel of cattle for slaughter."[9] Seroweh approached the fort and told Miln that he would "consent to whatever Chota proposed" regarding a cessation of hostilities, which aroused the commander's skepticism; he reckoned the Young Warrior of Estatoe would still attempt to reduce the fort despite avowing to respect a consensus for peace, as he believed the Cherokees had a "particular spleen" against the garrison's soldiers that "neither time, nor treaties, nor presents will eradicate."[10] The Cherokees congregating to harvest maize in Sugar Town represented a sterling opportunity to Miln, who lobbied Bull to send reinforcements immediately and "strike a blow of consequence" before they could draw off sustenance from the ruins of the Lower Towns to the other regions.[11]

Concern over Cherokee society's capacity to nourish itself and maintain a force proven capable of besting (or, at the very least, matching) British regulars and provincial troops suffused not only Carolina, but the entire southern colonial frontier. Montgomery

[8] *Ibid*.; "CHARLES-TOWN September 20," *South Carolina Gazette.*, September 27, 1760.
[9] *Ibid*.
[10] "CHARLES-TOWN September 27," *South Carolina Gazette*, September 27, 1760.
[11] *Ibid*.

and Grant's abrupt withdrawal from the field, the manner in which the vast majority of Lower townspeople rapidly relocated elsewhere in the Nation, and, above all, the tens of thousands of ripening stalks still standing along the army's route elicited panicked responses from the Virginians. On September 16, after learning of Loudoun's surrender, their commander William Byrd sought to convince the Cherokees that he could eradicate their food supply via a threatening talk. After assuring Oconostota and the other headmen that he could easily augment his detachment with Iroquois auxiliaries sent courtesy of William Johnson or British regulars freed up by the conquest of Canada, Byrd promised starvation should they refuse to repatriate the captive garrison. After removing their French allies from the continent's interior, the Virginians, "as numerous as the fish in the sea," would make a habitual autumn pilgrimage to the Appalachians; if the Cherokees absconded as they did in the face of Montgomery's army as it marched through the Lower Towns, the Virginians would "destroy your corn in your granaries, and will build forts in your hunting grounds; and at last drive you into the South Sea."[12] Byrd's menacing rhetoric accentuated the recent offensive's shortcomings and foreshadowed tangible home front perils during wars to come. His undermanned unit, however, which plodded towards the Overhills at a leisurely pace for much of the campaigning season in 1760, would deliver no such fearsome strike; his attempt to intimidate the Cherokees into accepting his stipulations was merely a bluff, as he intimated to Bull that a lapse in legislative appropriations ensured that "his troops are to be disbanded in a few weeks."[13]

[12] Robinson, ed., *Early American Indian Documents Vol. XIV*, 148.
[13] *Ibid*., 150-151.

Pangs of vengeance wrought by the defeat at Loudoun and the Cherokees' capture of "near Three Hundred Souls" from that sack plus previous frontier raiding virtually assured that the Carolinians and Virginians would push for retaliatory measures. The Cherokee stance towards sustained conflict during fall 1760 appears much more ambivalent. In addition to the aforementioned overtures on the part of some of the chief belligerents, socio-economic conditions in Cherokee country militated against the resumption of full-blown war. Chief among these was the paucity of the necessities of life which followed from over a year of the deerskin trade's suspension. Some Cherokee hunters creatively sought to circumvent the embargo by erecting a backcountry black market which funneled skins through a Creek fence (undoubtedly for a fee) and unloaded them on traders at Augusta for "supplies of whatever kind they want," but such measures could only account for so much comfort.[14] The protracted exclusive trading partnership with France yielded meager returns. The British consistently fielded exponentially more traders equipped with a broader array of commodities at lower price points, and acute shortages of ammunition and cloth made the resumption of normalized Anglo-Cherokee commerce appear not only desirable, but also imperative. Moreover, as Seroweh's entreaty and Byrd's threat imparted, a palpable collective fear that a subsequent brush with the British military would result in the deprivation of basic staple foodstuffs began to pervade Cherokee country. Cultural norms also elevated a desire for peace among the Cherokees at this point. The principle of reciprocity, which underpinned Cherokee conceptions of proper order, made it likely that most Cherokees considered killing Loudoun garrison troops post-surrender tit for the Fort Prince George jailhouse massacre's tat. Little Carpenter and Standing Turkey

[14] "CHARLES-TOWN January 31," *South Carolina Gazette*, January 31, 1761.

hinted as much early the following year in a joint address to Lachlan McIntosh at Fort Prince George. Standing Turkey conceded that it was "true we have given the blow" at Ball Play Creek, but hoped "it will be forgotten," because now the Cherokees could "forget our friends and family lost" to Carolinian treachery.[15] The sought-after defense pact with greater Creek nation never materialized. Two Okfuskees rendezvoused with Cherokee emissaries to discuss an alliance, but ambushed the delegation as it slumbered later that night, killing one; the only external indigenous military aid the Cherokees could count on came from the Mortar and his war band of fourteen.[16] Though a September scalping at Ninety Six and intermittent random gunfire peppering the walls of Fort Prince George heightened discomfiture in the garrison, whose soldiers fanned the flames of Indian hatred in Charlestown via their panicky dispatches, conditions on the ground in Cherokee country favored peace.[17]

Despite the anti-Cherokee zeal percolating in his city, Bull jumped at the opportunity to swap prisoners presented by Corn Tassel's arrival. On October 11, the eleven women and seventeen children seized by Montgomery's forces at Little Keowee, a man taken at Sugar Town, and the scout captured before Etchoe fight were sent to Ninety Six to exchange for Long Canes settlers and Fort Loudoun soldiers.[18] This move, however, was merely a strategic measure designed to recover as many hostages from Cherokee country as possible rather than a step towards genuine reconciliation. Word of the Cherokees' violation of established (albeit European) conventions of warfare by attacking

[15] Talk from Littler Carpenter, Standing Turkey, and Judge's Friend to Lachlan McIntosh, March 12, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 69.
[16] "CHARLES-TOWN October 18," *South Carolina Gazette*, October 18, 1760.
[17] For these incidents, see Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 227-231.
[18] "CHARLES-TOWN October 11," *South Carolina Gazette*, October 11, 1760.

the Loudoun garrison post-surrender convinced Bull that another armed invasion was necessary. He informed Amherst that upon hearing this news he issued "orders for raising the new regiment immediately" and conceived of the substantial number of Cherokees present in the Lower Towns solely as a besieging force with designs on reducing Fort Prince George and seizing the mass quantities of powder, shot, and Indian presents left there by Lyttelton.[19] Amherst concurred with Bull's assessment of the exigency of another campaign. The general believed that their recent attestations of conciliatory intent masked malicious designs; to Amherst and Bull, the violent behavior of a persistent but minority faction damned the lot of the Cherokees to endure another British invasion. Any promise or agreement that the Cherokee leadership entered into before the issuance of this brutal corrective was judged immaterial by Amherst, for his experience clearly indicated that the Cherokees agreed to terms "only for Convenience, and break again whenever the opportunity favors their rapacious and hostile inclinations"; only a fresh offensive, which would subject "these Barbarians" to "the weight of His Majesty's Displeasure" could "reduce them to Reason."[20] Both imperial and colonial leadership felt severe penal consequences appropriate.

Though circumstances in Cherokee country that fall favored a general peace had the Carolinians and Virginians opted to negotiate, the decentralized nature of Cherokee society ensured that the bellicose minority could continue to wage war on the colony, and evidence from late October and November shows this faction growing more trenchant. On October 17, rangers returning to Ninety Six after escorting provisions to Fort Prince George were

[19] Bull to Amherst, Charlestown, October 19, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 68-70.
[20] Amherst to Bull, New York, November 27, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 88.

ambushed by what was likely one of Seroweh's raiding parties; the Cherokees killed two rangers, then subsequently abducted a woman and two children loitering outside a minor fortification some thirty miles northeast of Ninety Six.[21] November brought more foreboding news. Antoine Adhémar de Lantagnac, a former officer of the South Carolina Independents who had also served as a trader in the Overhills before defecting to the French at Fort Toulouse when the Seven Years' War began, escorted ten French soldiers and a few Shawnees to Chota near the end of October. After distributing some presents, Lantagnac exhorted the Chotans to "take up the War Hatchet" against the British and promised to return soon with heavy artillery and reinforcements that would assist them in the leveling of Fort Prince George and the expulsion of the British from their territory – a promise which the Frenchman failed to keep.[22] Though prominent Overhills headmen didn't bite, Seroweh did, dramatically dislodging the axe Lantagnac had driven into a log and declaring his ardor for spilling more British blood before leading a war dance of likeminded Cherokees.[23] Word of Lantagnac's envoy and the assistance he proposed resounded like a thunderclap to nervous colonial officials who had no way of knowing the hollowness of his proposals. French cultivation of the Cherokees' sense of grievance towards the British and occasional powder disbursements from Fort Toulouse were nothing new, but assurances of cannon and men infused the conflict with a novel urgency. The prospect of material and martial aid from the French and a powerful interior tribe directed by a reinvigorated war faction alarmed Bull, who aborted the prisoner exchange and proposed sending a Yuletide corps of provincial rangers to conduct *petit guerre* via

[21] Bull to Amherst, Charlestown, October 19, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 72.
[22] Bull to Amherst, Charlestown, November 18, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 85.
[23] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 232-233; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 136-137.

lightning raids on Cherokee settlements; the lieutenant governor thought this move could occupy the Cherokees and imagined French reinforcements until a more substantive force could take the field in the spring.[24] Superintendent Atkin breathlessly predicted that Lantagnac's aid would embolden more Creeks to align themselves with the Cherokees, French, and Shawnees "for the sake of acquiring War Names"; the French officer's arrival thus signified escalation on multiple fronts and rendered "the long flattering hopes" of peace "entirely vanished."[25] Lantagnac's machinations made less of an impression on Amherst, who adjudged the presents he distributed likely inconsiderable and his impact on the Cherokees easily reversible, for "whenever these Barbarians see our Superiority, they will soon forget these Benefactors."[26] To overawe the Cherokees and forcibly extract "that tranquility" which he "so much wish[ed]" the Carolinians, Amherst deployed 1,200 regulars to South Carolina, and tapped James Grant, an officer of "merit, experience… and known abilities" to command them.[27]

Grant's 1761 campaign has been dissected and analyzed by several historians. David Corkran provided a straightforward narrative of the expedition to accentuate how the specter of Grant's redoubtable force allowed the Little Carpenter to outmaneuver his political rivals and steer the Nation towards the negotiating table and back into a British alliance.[28] Corkran also highlights the confidence of youthful Cherokee warriors who coalesced in a "war faction" around Seroweh, an assuredness bolstered by the belief that they had expelled Montgomery's force the year before and could repel a British army

[24] Bull to Amherst, Charlestown, November 18, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frames 85-86.
[25] Atkin to Amherst, Charlestown, November 20, 1760, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 146.
[26] Amherst to Bull, New York, December 12, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 103.
[27] *Ibid*.; Amherst to Bull, New York, November 27, 1760, *JGP*, Reel 31, Frame 89.
[28] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 236-255.

again.[29] Despite his explicit descriptions of these diametrically opposed segments of Cherokee society, Corkran curiously assesses the campaign as superfluous to the ensuing concord, asserting that "The same peace which eventuated could have been had without it."[30] He characterizes Grant as "a humane man" who inflicted penal violence on the Cherokees due to Amherst's orders rather than any spite for Indians.[31] Grant's biographer Paul David Nelson goes farther than Corkran in depicting Grant as sympathetic towards the Cherokees. He depicts Grant as less bellicose towards the tribe than his Carolinian hosts, whom he resented for demanding that His Majesty's army prosecute a war to which they were unwilling to contribute.[32] Nelson construes the Scot as a dutiful soldier prosecuting a war about which he felt ethically conflicted, detailing his concerns over issuing terms that he deemed too exacting of the Cherokees which could unnecessarily prolong the backcountry carnage.[33] The lieutenant colonel, like so many soldiers who preceded and succeeded him, held his nose when faced with "a morally embarrassing situation," and prosecuted the orders of his superiors.[34] Nelson also stresses Grant's conflicts with different actors who attempted to infringe on his prerogative to command during the campaign, in particular Lt. Gov. Bull ordering rangers to the colony's southwestern frontier without his consent and his feud with the mission's ranking provincial officer, Lt. Col. Thomas Middleton, over Grant's alleged lack of consultation with the colonial troops and Middleton's abandonment of the service.[35] Nelson frames Grant's self-conceptualization in

[29] *Ibid*., 215.
[30] *Ibid*., 254.
[31] *Ibid*., 245.
[32] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 31.
[33] *Ibid*., 34.
[34] *Ibid*., 31.
[35] *Ibid*., 33, 37.

the context of the campaign as one of a "disinterested third party to the dispute" between the Cherokees and the South Carolinians.[36]

John Oliphant portrays the Scottish lieutenant colonel in a manner most appealing to a modern liberal audience, who would likely see a reflection of their own core values of racial toleration, acceptance of cultural diversity, and multilateralism in the British journalist's Grant. Oliphant relies on a nuanced, inference-heavy analysis of Amherst's and Grant's papers to argue that Grant and Attakullakulla functioned as collaborators in an intersocietal peacekeeping mission instead of the representatives of belligerent nations. He incorporates a subtextual reading of sources to recreate Grant's circumvention of Amherst's orders to leave the particulars of the treaty to the Carolinians.[37] Oliphant argues that as the lone purveyor of British imperial force on the southern frontier, Grant realized the war would persist without a mitigation of terms and recognized his ability to act as a "supracolonial official" in order to compel a reconfiguration of the Assembly's harsh treaty to one which the Cherokees could readily accept.[38] He explicitly states that Grant would have treated without fighting or shedding Cherokee blood if he could have gotten away with it.[39] Grant's motive for behaving in such a fashion was certitude that "the Cherokees had the greater justice on their side."[40] Grant thus intentionally leveled a glancing blow towards the Cherokees, applying "just enough force to discredit the war faction."[41]

Robin F. A. Fabel reconstructs the Cherokee War in a triad of Anglo-Native crises occurring in the 1760s and 1770s; the other two are conflicts with the Louisiana *petit*

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[36] *Ibid*., 34.
[37] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 140-168.
[38] Terminology on *ibid*., 48; process by which Grant seized control of peacemaking outlined on *ibid*., 169-190.
[39] *Ibid*., 141.
[40] *Ibid*., 140.
[41] *Ibid*.

nations after France's expulsion from the continent and a war with the black Caribs of the island of St. Vincent. Fabel stresses Grant's misgivings over the strategy of burning towns and agricultural fields as a viable mechanism to compel the Cherokees to the bargaining table.[42] He also accentuates the minimal impact that corn destruction had on Cherokee society's ability to sustain itself, arguing that diverse traditional means of subsistence including hunting, gathering, and fishing allowed the Cherokees to weather any food shortage incurred by Grant's immolation of crops.[43] In doing so, Fabel invokes some rather spotty evidence, including Cherokee women trafficking in informal produce exchange with the soldiers of Fort Prince George in February 1761, four months *before* Grant's push into the Middle Settlements (and trading the yield of the 1760 harvest to boot), to argue that the Cherokees were not starving later that fall.[44] Fabel also insists that Amherst's orders provided the impetus for Grant torching the Cherokees' agricultural fields, while the written record indicates that Grant initially mentioned the strategy in correspondence between the two (though many Carolinians, like the *Gazette* commentator mentioned above, advocated such a move before either and in all likelihood put the notion in Grant's head).[45] Fabel more accurately interprets Grant as an ambitious young officer desirous of

[42] Robin F.A. Fabel, *Colonial Challenges: Britons, Native Americans, and Caribs, 1759-1775* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 71. Indeed, Grant expressed these sentiments in a private letter to Bull during Montgomery's hasty retreat to Charlestown; its contents were later published in Christopher Gadsden's attempt to belittle the impact of Grant's campaign by making light of the commander's own musings: "Destroying an Indian town may be creditable, but 'tis in fact a matter of no great consequence, when the savages have time to carry off their effects… The Cherokees have suffered much, but will not treat, and 'tis impossible to force them to come to terms; that must be a work of time, and you know that no body of troops can extirpate an Indian nation." See Grant to Bull, July 3, 1760, in Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 87.
[43] Fabel, *Colonial Challenges*, 75.
[44] *Ibid*.
[45] *Ibid*., 71. Much general discussion of wreaking havoc in the Cherokee settlements preceded it, but the first explicit mention of corn between the British military brass was Grant to Amherst, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1760, in Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 266.

implementing orders and securing recognition and promotion by selling himself as a victor to his superiors.[46]

In a magisterial recent survey of the Cherokee War, Daniel Tortora argues that the conflict signified a rupture in the colony of South Carolina's concern over the niceties of Indian affairs and a shift towards the intertwined goals of expansion, Cherokee dispossession, and eradication.[47] Tortora also highlights Grant's recognition of legitimate Cherokee grievances, particularly his belief that the Fort Prince George officers' (Coytmore, Miln and Bell) history of rape, murder, and treachery fueled much of the tribe's disaffection with Carolina during the era. He emphasizes Grant's divided mind towards the conflict, accentuating his sympathy towards the Cherokees, while also exposing his ruthlessness.[48] Moreover, Tortora provides the most holistic analysis of the composition and behavior of the colony's Indian allies who served in Captain Quentin Kennedy's regiment; he hints at the impression that this coalition made on the Cherokees without fully analyzing the collective psychological ramifications of squaring off against a multi-tribal front.[49] He also intriguingly blames Grant's ignorance with regards to indigenous cultural norms, specifically his lack of knowledge of the decentralized nature of power distribution and leadership, for missteps during the campaign; Grant wanted to negotiate with select warriors whom he considered the fonts of influence in Cherokee society, failing to recognize that some of these headmen avoided in person discourse with British authorities

[46] Fabel, *Colonial Challenges*, 72, 77.
[47] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 7.
[48] *Ibid*., 140-142.
[49] *Ibid*., 142-145, 152.

at all costs due to Lyttelton and Miln's seizure of them under the pretense of diplomatic sanctuary, and blinding him to alternative routes of consensus building.[50]

Though historians of the Cherokee War have acknowledged Grant's moniker of Cornpuller, bequeathed to him by Attakullakulla after the campaign's culmination, they have neglected to investigate thoroughly the broad impact of the acts which earned him that distinction – the communal shock inflicted by his army's decimation of the Middle Settlements' food supply and the strain that the ensuing displacement and paucity placed on other regions. Corkran's claim about the prospects of peace notwithstanding, the terms demanded by Grant via the Carolinians, ones which Grant refused to consider attempting to alter before the invasion, assured the sustained noncompliance of the Cherokee war faction, making the campaign itself inevitable. Grant's campaign proved absolutely decisive in bringing the entire spectrum of Cherokee society to the notion of surrender; the assault on their agro-ecological system (albeit one that only temporarily disabled a segment of it rather than irrevocably damaging its substructure) imperiled the nourishment of all Cherokees in 1761 and 1762. This tactic – compromising the fabric of Cherokee village life by undermining the Cherokees' mastery over their environment – witnessed the decimation of controlled ecological features like communal corn fields, private vegetable patches, and vast orchards; moreover, the approach Grant pursued represented a particularly debilitating permutation of the *petit guerre*, one which wracked the entirety of Cherokee nation with hunger pangs months after the flora was uprooted. Historians have taken Philopatrios's critique of the expedition, which characterized Grant as inept and pusillanimous, his prosecution of the war as decidedly benign, and the Cherokees as

[50] *Ibid*., 155.

borderline triumphant, far too literally.[51] Regardless of the compassion and humanity which emanated from Grant's commentary on the Cherokees to Amherst in the early stages of his deployment, the Scot's conduct directly before and during the campaign can only be described as harsh; the soldier's obliviousness of Cherokee cultural norms skewed his responses to their behavior before the invasion, and his pubic avowals to Cherokee headmen before moving on the Middle Settlements make his actions during the campaign look like those of an oathbreaker.

Equally deleterious as the environmental impact of Grant's campaign on the Cherokees, and likewise overlooked by historians, was the presence of a multi-tribal enemy coalition fused with a notorious corps of frontier rangers. By 1761, Major Robert Rogers' rangers, an elite team of raiders, had achieved notoriety in the greater British Atlantic world for (among other bloodlettings) the October 1759 mission against the Abenakis of the village of Odanak; Rogers' black flag tactics earned him the designation of "White Devil," the most visible scourge of French-allied natives during the Seven Years' War.[52] Though Amherst initially intended to send Rogers himself to command a regiment under Grant, a financial dispute detained the major in Albany until later in the year, and he arrived in South Carolina after the campaign's culmination.[53] In Rogers' stead, his understudy Captain Quentin Kennedy, a Scottish officer with an abundance of experience leading forays against native settlements, headed the regiment. In addition to these grim veterans of the war's northern theater, Senecas, Mohawks, Stockbridges, Catawbas, Chickasaws, and Yuchis (the

[51] Philopatrios was Christopher Gadsden's pen name.
[52] For an in-depth look at Rogers and the sack of Odanak, see Stephen Brumwell, *White Devil: A True Story of War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colonial America* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004).
[53] Amherst to Grant, New York, February 12, 1761 and Amherst to Grant, New York, March 17, 1761 in Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 201-202, 215-216.

first three of which traveled south alongside the rangers) served under Kennedy's command, forming a choice unit that performed much of the expedition's reconnaissance, vanguard duties, and ambush operations. This crack team, which executed numerous terroristic acts during the course of the invasion, elevated Cherokee anxieties during the spring and summer of 1761. The composition of the indigenous portion of Kennedy's regiment also contributed to the surge in Cherokee panic. In a seminal recent essay, ethnohistorian Paul Kelton suggests how pressure via intimidation applied by a cross-regional coalition of Cherokees and Iroquois browbeat the Ohio Valley Indians into accepting the British terms proposed at the Treaty of Easton and abandoning the French position at Fort Duquesne in November 1758.[54] Less than three years later, in an ironic twist that neatly inverted the geopolitical order which secured the success of Forbes's push to the Forks, Cherokees found themselves pressed by Six Nations gunmen fighting alongside their bitter rivals within the region at the head of a British army. The fact that this adversarial composite involved a military pact between the Catawbas and the Iroquois, parties acrimonious to one another for the better part of a century, proved even more troubling to the Cherokees.[55] Most of the above-mentioned historiographic contributions introduce Kennedy's regiment of Indians and rangers, but none analyze the psychological impact of this particular regiment's reputation for mercilessness or the notions of encirclement engendered by the native coalition.

[54] Kelton, "The British and Indian War," 263-292.
[55] For an overview of the history of slave-raiding and violence between the Catawbas and Iroquois, see James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact Through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 118-121, 135, 154.

Too many historians have invoked the respectful and sympathetic statements which occasionally appeared in Grant's correspondence and his insistence on altering treaty terms later as prima facie evidence that he conducted his campaign in the vein of a twentieth-century U.N. peacekeeping operation; other utterances reflected his conviction that invasion and the attendant destruction of the Middle Settlements was an inevitability. Henry Laurens, a provincial colonel who befriended Grant and infiltrated the dinner party set which coalesced around the Scottish commander, claimed that his force marched into Cherokee country bearing "the Olive branch in once hand & the [torn] of cruel War in the other," and left the decision as to which instrument would be utilized to "That perfidious race," who opted for conflict.[56] Scrutinous examination of Grant's directives to the Cherokees before marching from Fort Prince George and awareness of indigenous captivity practices reveal this choice to be a chimera, but there is much merit to the remainder of Laurens' characterization of the campaign. Much historiographic analysis seems to be better informed by Laurens' great polemical rival, Christopher Gadsden, who depicted Grant's push as near-bloodless and overly gentle towards the Cherokees; this characterization is erroneous and was fueled by Gadsden's desire for hostilities against the Cherokees to resume the following year. Grant's prosecution of the war constituted a severe check, but failed to satisfy the Gadsden faction's unappeasable bloodlust. Gadsden and likeminded assemblymen slipped their own double-agent into Grant's army to circumvent his will, undercut his authority, and assure the campaign proved more

[56] Henry Laurens to John Ettewin, Camp of Keowee, July 11, 1761, Philip M. Hamer and George C. Rogers, Jr., eds., *The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume Three: Jan. 1, 1759 – Aug. 31, 1763* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Historical Society, 1972), 74. Hereafter *PHL III*. One can only assume the obscured implement of "cruel War" a mace, sword, flintlock musket, or something equally menacing.

extirpative than he envisioned. Middleton has been interpreted as an excessively prideful provincial officer who took umbrage with Grant's imperious attitude towards the colonial contingent of the army, then took advantage of a preapproved release granted by Bull (whose first cousin was married to Middleton) to abandon the campaign; historians have framed this episode in terms of broader acrimony between colonists and imperial officials.[57] After retiring downcountry, Middleton served as the rallying point for the hawkish Gadsden faction in Charlestown, smearing Grant in his personal correspondence and via proxies in print, and ultimately the two dueled (with neither party injured) before Grant's departure from the colony in December. Middleton, however, pushed for the complete eradication of the Cherokees throughout the campaign itself, up to and including subverting Grant's direct orders, and departed service the moment he recognized his prospects of guiding the force towards extermination had slipped away. His return to Charlestown coincided with a concerted initiative to gainsay the prospects of peace. In doing so, Middleton served as an extension of an arm of the Carolina planter elite desirous of frontier expansion and ethnic cleansing, or at the very least driving the powerful and numerous Cherokee tribe hundreds of miles farther into the interior. Grant's campaign failed to accomplish this party's objectives in an immediate sense, but the flood of settlers returning to Long Canes and other backcountry settlements in its aftermath encountered a weakened tribe resigned to acquiescence despite alarming and accelerating demographic pressure on its border. By enervating and malnourishing the Cherokees, Grant's campaign rendered them war-weary and enabled a renewed Anglo-American surge in Carolina's

[57] See Nelson, *General James Grant*, 37 for the dispute rooted in a personality clash and Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 156-160, 167-168 for a more nuanced take on its embodiment of imperial-colonial tension. For Bull and Middleton's family ties, see Bull, *The Oligarchs*, 10, 38.

piedmont, thus serving as a catalyst for the process of dispossession so craved by Middleton and his allies – a process that would result in renewed war and displacement during the American Revolution and ultimately Federal Removal during the 1830s.

Amherst certainly did not envision or promote expulsion upon ordering companies of the 17th and 22nd Regiments to depart with Grant to the colony, but he considered the double cross after Loudoun's surrender justification for the Cherokees' reduction "to the absolute necessity of suing for pardon" and effectually rendering them powerless to "interrupt the peace."[58] He essentially wanted the Cherokees, whom he characterized as "perfidious savages," pacified through a show of extreme force, and expressed confidence in Grant's abilities to overawe and quell them.[59] Amherst's orders to secure a decisive submission provided no wiggle room for Grant as did the previous year's directives to Montgomery, which included a prohibition on executing any defensive operations (i.e. garrisoning a fort during treaty negotiations); Grant could only quit the colony after "putting it out of their power of renewing hostilities with any degree of imminent danger to the Province," if Bull or the Assembly failed to provide "ready & cheerful aid and assistance," or if authorized to do so in subsequent instructions.[60] New France's fall ushered in a sense of relief amongst both the ministry and the military brass in North America; though still prosecuting war on a global scale against the French and Spanish, Britain had just secured the heart of its colonial empire. Though the Caribbean theatre heated up as 1761 progressed, Amherst had some divisions to spare at year's commencement, and accordingly diverted Grant's detachment with the intent of it

[58] Amherst to Grant, New York, December 15, 1760, in Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 150.
[59] *Ibid*.
[60] *Ibid*., 151-153.

remaining until it rendered the Cherokees a defeated people and the colony secured an accord with them on its terms. As to the particulars of the corrective stroke, other than acting "offensively by destroying their towns," Amherst left it open to Grant's interpretation as to "cutting up their settlements as shall best occur to you for the future protection of the colony."[61] Amherst didn't expect the deployment to last long, and only arranged for six months provisions to accompany the army initially; he overoptimistically believed Grant could proceed to the backcountry in the dead of winter, while the absence of vegetation to serve as ground forage for the expedition's transport and livestock precluded this possibility.

Eight days after Amherst issued these orders, Grant sailed from New York to Sandy Hook, and after a week's delay, departed that port for Charlestown, reaching in the harbor on January 10.[62] During his transit, an anonymous correspondent in New York City listened attentively to discourse between Amherst and a new arrival, former Georgia governor Henry Ellis, regarding the southern frontier's security and Grant's prospects of success, before reporting the conversation to Grant.[63] Unsurprisingly, Ellis expressed concern about Georgia's vulnerability to the commander in chief, and also complained "of the inadequate" nature of the "force under your command," which included too few "Indians to assist."[64] Ellis reported the sorry state of the provincial militia, predicting they would be "rather a burden than useful" to Grant, and moreover that his force would "never see an Indian

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[61] *Ibid*., 153.
[62] Grant to Amherst, Charlestown, January 17, 1761, in Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 174-175.
[63] Oliphant opines that this anonymous writer was Amherst's personal secretary John Appy, but a subsequent missive from the same correspondent (with identical handwriting, and this one signed, but in indecipherable scrawl) in Grant's papers that Oliphant overlooked mentioned attending a dinner party at Appy's. See Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 142-143 and Anonymous to Grant, New York, January 19, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 33, Frames 3-5.
[64] Anonymous to Grant, New York, January 1, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 22-27.

unless they are able to beat" him.[65] The informant bore ill tidings for the prospective climber, because an official considered an expert on the southern Indians predicted that "his reputation would suffer by all this" and that "Col. Grant would gain no honour, for he has not the means to defend himself."[66] Ellis pointed out how long France's Algonquian allies held a superior British force at bay in Canada, and suggested that Grant's army would meet more success if it had three or four hundred natives at its disposal to hunt Cherokees who would surely abscond for the cover of dense forests and mountains as his army drew near. Ellis's commentary proved devastatingly accurate with regards to the relatively modest casualties the Cherokees endured during Grant's campaign, and the lack of laurels, at least with regards to the colonial polity's reaction to his initiative, but his notion of the futility of "reduce[ing] them to famine" via crop immolation could not have been more off base.[67] Though operating with a fraction of the native allies than Ellis suggested, Grant apparently heeded his assessment of their integrality to his prospects of success, utilizing his multitribal unit to ferret out Cherokees hiding among the Middle Towns and inspire terror in those observing his progress from the adjoining woods. More curiously, Ellis conveyed to Amherst the presence of two factions operating within Charlestown, the machinations of which already concerned Grant and could potentially "do harm to the service."[68] In a subsequent letter, the shadow observer delineated the contours of this rivalry; one was "Scotch" and the other "Carolina," the pretense of their schism was rooted in "national divisions."[69] The Carolina group (which can be safely assumed to be the

[65] *Ibid*.
[66] *Ibid*.
[67] *Ibid*.
[68] *Ibid*.
[69] Anonymous to Grant, New York, January 19, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 33, Frames 3-5.

Middleton-Gadsden circle) expressed Anglophilic leanings, and demanded "upon having a gentleman of their nation sent to command the troops destined to assist them."[70] Due to this group's prominence in local governance, Grant's appointment as the expedition's commander would "have a worse effect than if a stranger (presumably, an English one) had been sent."[71] The enigmatic penman assured Ellis that Grant's identity as a Briton outstripped his Scottish sympathies, because his "national partiality was by no means so great as is too often observable in your countrymen."[72] The Carolina clique, however, had already assumed the worst of Grant, raging that he "was the sole actor in Col. Montgomery's detachment" who "occasioned the departure of those forces from the Colonie, to its apparent ruin."[73] The "fear, prejudice and resentment" which festered "after your departure from thence last season" boiled over among the anti-Scotch faction upon the announcement "you were to command," as Middleton apparently resigned before Grant's arrival, then reconsidered when pressed by others to serve.[74] The materialization of a Scotophobic faction among the Carolinians in late 1760 reflected deep-seeded bitterness emanating from the imperial metropole. George III's succession to the throne accompanied the meteoric rise of his childhood tutor, John Stuart, the Scottish Earl of Bute, whose control of royal patronage aroused the suspicions of parties accustomed to English dispensation and acquisition of those plums.[75] Word of George II's death had only been

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[70] *Ibid*.
[71] Anonymous to Grant, New York, January 1, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 22-27.
[72] *Ibid*.
[73] Anonymous to Grant, New York, January 19, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 33, Frames 3-5.
[74] *Ibid*.
[75] For Bute's elevation to power as a political favorite, see Peter D.G.A. Thomas, *George III: King and Politicians, 1760-1770* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 27-31. His subsequent appointment as Chief Minister in 1762 witnessed antipathy towards Scots on the grandest scale, as pamphleteer John Wilkes channeled this xenophobic sentiment into journalistic sabotage of his ministry. See Colley, *Britons*, 120-122.

received in the colonies late in the year, but excessive handwringing over Scottish access to patronage traditionally monopolized by an English clientage predated his demise. Regardless of the existence of a direct corollary between the ministerial changes and the coalescence of an anti-Scotch pressure group in the colony, Grant arrived in South Carolina fully aware of a pointed skepticism about his ardor for the British cause, assertions of his personal responsibility for the previous year's ignominious withdrawal, and the knowledge that only a spirited assault could dispel both narratives.

Despite the prevalent conception among redcoats that fighting non-European combatants represented a less virtuous, honorable endeavor than squaring off against adversaries perceived as civilized, circumstantial and direct evidence suggest that Grant was more amenable to doing so during the 1761 campaign than the 1760 one. Most evidently, the conquest of Canada limited a dwindling French presence to a few southwestern posts like Toulouse and de L'Ascension, and the opportunity to wrest laurels from conventional operations evaporated. Moreover, the Lantagnac's emergence in the Overhills as an arms procurator at least draped the façade of French participation over what long ago degenerated into a blood feud between Cherokee and Carolinian; the pretense of French involvement made the mission more pressing and the stakes seem higher than they actually were. As Seven Years' War veteran Thomas Mante recalled in his *History of the Late War*, the Cherokee offensive represented the only "warlike expedition" on the continent for the entire year of 1761.[76] Grant thus surely recognized that his was the only game in town, and the collective gaze of the British military apparatus and state fell squarely upon operations at his direction; the resolution of this Cherokee mission meant

[76] Mante, *A History of the Late War*, 347.

more to its commander than the offensive last year. Apprehensive of a repeat of the previous hasty departure and hoping to mitigate Grant's disdain for again waging Indian war, Bull reassured him that regardless of "whatever contemptible idea the European Warrior may form of your campaign, sure I am that true glory is acquired in surmounting difficulties," and "a savage country and a savage enemy" surely afforded challenges to overcome.[77] Bull need not have fretted, as Grant confided to him the operation's import; he claimed that his personal "Reputation, Character, Honor, and everything that is dear to me are engaged in the success of the Campaign."[78] Recognizing his sole responsibility for pacifying the Cherokees and bringing the Carolina quagmire to an effective resolution, Grant's enthusiasm for this process corresponded with increased prospects for the satiation of his burning ambition and need for promotion.

A lack of grass for stock forage, the provincial forces' unpreparedness to take the field, inadequately sized grain and flour magazines at the Congarees and Ninety Six, the two substantial forts along the Cherokee Path before crossing into tribal territory , and another sickly seasoning period for the British regulars delayed the army's departure from Charlestown until March 20.[79] As provincials serving under John Moultrie and Thomas Middleton gradually erected the prerequisite granaries and commissioned wagons deposited enough flour, the main body of the army proceeded incrementally, arriving at the Congarees on April 22 and Ninety Six on May 14.[80] Progress reports from farther up the

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[77] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, June 19, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 179.
[78] Grant to Bull, Monck's Corner, April 3, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 401.
[79] Grant to Amherst, Charlestown, January 17, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 174-180; John Moultrie to Grant, March 17, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 77-78; Grant to Smith and Nutt, Charlestown, February 9, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 385-386; Hewatt, *An Historical Account*, 244-245.
[80] Grant to Amherst, Congarees, April 25, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*. 242-243; Christopher French, "Journal of an Expedition to South Carolina," Duane H. King and E. Raymond Evans, eds., *Journal of Cherokee Studies*, Vol. II, No. 3 (Summer 1977): 279.

path and in person meetings provided Grant an opportunity to gauge the quality of the men serving under him. The discipline of the provincial regiments duly impressed the lieutenant colonel, who conveyed to Amherst that he fancied they "will turn out well," and he considered their officers "very diligent" fellows who qualified as "Gentlemen."[81] Ironically, given the bitter nature of the feud which was to come and Grant's knowledge of Middleton's disaffection with his appointment, he singled out Middleton's regiment for praise, reporting his pleasure with its soldierly appearance and deportment.[82] Alexander Monypenny, Grant's second-in-command, concurred, reckoning Middleton's regiment consisted of "250 stout able men" led by an officer corps comprised of "Men of very considerable Property" who "give great application to their Military Profession."[83] Perhaps in an attempt to win over the men of stature who objected to his presence, or maybe because he craved social (and, eventually, economic) connections with these "gentlemen of Fashion & Esteem," Grant ordered their integration into his body of redcoats. This unprecedented step, which Monypenny claimed placed them "on a higher Footing that Provincial Regts. had ever been on the continent," saw the colonists "form & encamp in the Line, & do ev'ry Duty, with the Regulars."[84] Laurens recollected after the war that before marching to the Congarees, Grant ordered the regulars to "observe such decorum & behavior toward the Provincials as should effectually unite them."[85] In stark contrast, Grant

[81] Grant to Amherst, Congarees, April 25, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*. 242-243.
[82] Grant to Bull, May 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 407-408.
[83] Alexander Monypenny, "Diary of Alexander Moneypenny," Duane H. King and E. Raymond Evans, eds., *Journal of Cherokee Studies*, Vol. II, No. 3 (Summer 1977): 323.
[84] *Ibid*.
[85] Henry Laurens, "A Letter Signed Philotheles," March 2, 1763, *PHL III*, 326.

oozed derision for what he construed as the martial ineptitude of the provincial ranger regiments, whom he considered "good for nothing," and unfit to guard even cattle.[86]

As Grant inched towards Fort Prince George, gradually cobbling together a force of some 2,800, panicked Cherokees frantically attempted to conform to the terms demanded by the colony and simultaneously prepare for the pending invasion as best they could. Though the Carolinians demanded conformity to other stipulations in recompense for Grant staying his blow (most offensively to the Cherokees, one requiring the prompt delivery of eight headmen to Grant's camp for execution), Bull prioritized the release of the 300 colonists currently held in Cherokee custody. A personnel shift facilitated this goal, as the widely despised Miln was sacked as commandant of Fort Prince George, and on February 20 replaced by former commander Lachlan McIntosh, an individual much more palatable to the Cherokees.[87] A couple of weeks later, at McIntosh's summons, Attakullakulla approached the fort at the head of a party of 500 Cherokees, delivered a conciliatory talk, and transferred twenty prisoners to British custody; the following day, six more were procured.[88] Chiding the Overhills leadership for aborting the prearranged prisoner exchange the previous year while simultaneously assuring them of the safety and comfort of the Cherokee prisoners held in Charlestown, Bull exhorted the sober elements of Cherokee society to prove that "their mad young men" did not "rule their Nation" by performing "what they promised": the prompt submission of the remaining colonists detained amongst them.[89] Though unstated explicitly to the Cherokees until May, Bull and

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[86] Grant to Amherst, Congarees, April 25, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*. 242-243.
[87] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 139.
[88] McIntosh to Grant, Fort Prince George, March 15, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 73-74; "CHARLES-TOWN March 23," *South Carolina Gazette*, March 23, 1761.
[89] Lt. Gov. Bull's Talk to the Little Carpenter, Charlestown, March 30, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 226-227.

Grant had radically altered the previous arrangement from – the Cherokees were responsible for releasing all prisoners before Carolina would reciprocate. After Lyttelton's invasion and Loudoun's fall, both prisoner exchange settlements operated at a one-to-one ratio. Bull placed the onus for resumed conflict or lasting rapprochement on the Cherokees, promising the punctual performance of war should they prevaricate or fail to comply.[90] Bull urged Grant to relay to Little Carpenter, Osteneco, and Standing Turkey that because they had delivered some captives and promised to liberate the rest, he would keep their proffered string of wampum "before me near my hand, to see whether they keep hold of one end of it" by following through.[91] In reality, this choice between peace and war was an illusion and its presentation a ploy designed to browbeat the Cherokees into releasing as many captives as possible before Grant invaded; the lieutenant governor and the lieutenant colonel had already settled on the necessity of retaliatory force, and Bull submitted terms for Grant to relay to the natives "after you have inflicted due chastisement on the Cherokees by some smart blow, if they sue for peace."[92] The duplicitous gambit worked, as the Cherokees repatriated prisoners in a piecemeal fashion from March to May.

Sufficiently intimidated, the Overhills headmen secured the release of several waves of detainees. Two days after reading Bull's talk to them, McIntosh reported that sixty-seven white prisoners had been redeemed to Fort Prince George, and he expected twenty more within the week.[93] By late April, 113 prisoners had been delivered into McIntosh's custody, seventy of which were soldiers from the independents and provincials who would augment

[90] *Ibid*.
[91] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, March 30, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 84-85.
[92] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, April 14, 1761, *JGP.*, Reel 32, Frames 120-122.
[93] McIntosh to Grant, April 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 100-101.

Grant's army upon his appearance in the Lower Towns.[94] Moultrie received word that every town in the Nation submitted white wampum belts to McIntosh begging for peace, and even inveterate hardliners like Seroweh made nice while preparing for war.[95] After setting off with his entourage to appropriate what little corn he could glean from the Long Canes and drive all the cattle and hogs he could find upcountry, the Young Warrior made the garrison of Fort Prince George a present of thirteen bullocks, disavowed any responsibility for recent scalpings, and blamed "ill usage" by Miln and others for his role in spearheading "the mischief."[96] For his part, McIntosh thought Seroweh unlikely to relent until "a bullet makes him do it."[97] As Grant approached the fort in late May, Little Carpenter beseeched him to be merciful and "not have our whole Nation destroyed," playing for time to coax more released captives out of his peers.[98] Grant's polite but clipped reply relayed his trust of Attakullakulla, but skepticism of his cohort; he demanded "strong proofs" of genuine penitence before acceptance that "their hearts are good."[99] Authentic repentance mandated an immediate release of the Fort Loudoun prisoners (and, presumably, all of those seized during the border raiding in early 1760), for the Cherokees had not acquired those detainees via "just war capture," but rather through "treachery, and had no right to hold them."[100] Grant cited his release of Tistoe and the other headmen who endured surprise incarceration at the hands of Miln while supping under his banner the previous year as proof of his capacity to respect established conventions of captive seizure. He made

[94] McIntosh to Grant, Fort Prince George, April 28, 1761, *JGP*., Reel 32, Frames 139-140.
[95] Moultrie to Grant, Ninety-Six, April 10, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 117-119.
[96] Grant to Amherst, Monck's Corner, April 12, 1761, Seroweh's Talk to McIntosh, Fort Prince George, April 8, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 238-240.
[97] McIntosh to Grant, Fort Prince George, March 15, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 73-74.
[98] Carpenter's Talk to Grant, May 23, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 260-262.
[99] Grant's Talk to Carpenter, May 23, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 262-263.
[100] *Ibid*.

it abundantly clear that he would hear "no proposal" until the Cherokees liberated all of the hostages, an unambiguous indication that the hammer would fall should this demand go unmet.[101] Grant's demands indicate ignorance of both the ends of indigenous warfare and the nature of power diffusion in Cherokee country, and also a lack of awareness of the staggering scope of repatriation on the part of the Cherokees up to that point. Native warfare's very function, other than inflicting retaliatory violence, was securing captives who would then be tortured and killed to satiate the vengeance required by the death of kin, or assimilated into a clan to reconstitute it after losing a member.[102] The Cherokees conceived of the women and children seized in the Long Canes raids and duly integrated into their society via ritual as full-fledged clan members; the Fort Loudoun soldiers spared being bludgeoned or burned to death fetched water and chopped woods as slaves. To Cherokees, slaves captured in the course of warfare represented prestige goods and symbolized the valor of the captor; they could be bartered away, and were possessed of tangible value. Securing the transfer of over a third of them without any recompense was a minor miracle; though Amherst accurately observed that fear of Grant's army prompted their surrender, Attakullakulla successfully influencing the members of multiple clans to liberate as many as they did seems more a diplomatic coup than proof of Cherokee obstinance.[103] Grant's characterization of the attack on the garrison post-surrender as "treachery" neatly fits into the Western martial paradigm, but an ethnohistorian has demonstrated that a disagreement between Cherokee warriors over the disposition of the

[101] Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 418-419.
[102] Hudson, *The Southeastern Indians*, 239-240, 253-255; Another possibility for captives was to remain on the fringe of native society as a kinless slave, relegated to drudgery and a marginal existence. For the best discussion of the fate of captives in the southeast, see Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 1-12, 80-83, 101-103.
[103] Amherst to Grant, New York, May 12, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 258-259.

fort's goods fueled the attack, which was executed solely to secure captives as war spoils.[104] Grant's ultimatum to procure all of the prisoners immediately also indicates that he expected Little Carpenter to serve as the font of executive authority in Cherokee Nation, when in reality the coercive power to issue such an order did not exist.[105] Had the Scottish officer desired to truly collaborate with the Cherokees in the way some have argued that he did, he could have stalled at Fort Prince George and offered goods as compensation for captive exchange (he groused about McIntosh doing this before his arrival), but he had other plans.[106]

Grant's correspondence during his northwestern trek imparts an unequivocal intent to invade, kill Cherokees, decimate settlements, and forcibly compel the entire tribe to embrace a pact as the only option to avoid complete annihilation. Duped by reflective commentary, such as his observation to Amherst that both sides bore responsibility for the conflict and he "fancies the Indians were the worst used" or his recognition that Seroweh's hardheartedness towards the Carolinians was rooted in "bad treatment he received," historians have presented Grant as reticent to attack them.[107] The aspiring senior military official, however, completely divorced his empathetic acknowledgement of Cherokee grievance from both Amherst's orders to punish them and his recognition that scrupulous adherence to those directives dovetailed with the realization of his self-interest. Grant's

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[104] Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 91-92.
[105] For the collaborative nature of power in the native South and the necessity of building consensus through persuasion, see Claudio Saunt, *A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 11-37. If Grant was not yet aware of the lack of coercive state authority in Cherokee country, he should have been, as his direct subordinate Monypenny wrote months before the invasion that the Cherokees "have no coercive Laws, the whole body can never act on, one plan." Monypenny, "Diary," 322.
[106] Grant to Bull, Monck's Corner, March 23, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 391.
[107] Grant to Amherst, Charlestown, January 17, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 174-180; Grant to Bull, Monck's Corner, April 11, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 404-405.

interplay with Bull reveals that the plan was always to attack regardless of engaging in the motions of conciliation at Fort Prince George with Little Carpenter. In late March, Grant noted the necessity of forging a lasting peace, but stressed that the British could not "appear too anxious to bring it about"; matters had "gone too far" and the Cherokees needed "to be corrected and should, in some measure, be in our power" before negotiating any formal treaty.[108] Bull concurred, sending Grant the colony's terms in mid-April to present to the Cherokees "after you have inflicted due chastisement… by some smart blow, if they sue for peace"; only a "spirited and successful action" could "terrify them into compliance" and the Cherokees should not be allowed to "flatter themselves with an expectation" of a cessation of hostilities "without any more further sufferings."[109] Much has been made of Grant's demands to alter the initial terms hammered out by Bull and the Assembly, particularly his immediate objection to placing the proposed boundary at Twenty-Six Mile River and desire to retain the *status quo antebellum* line seventy miles farther east because he believed that South Carolina already had "too great an extent of country which is not settled and which they have not the people to inhabit" and his furor over the Assembly reinserting the original boundary article in September.[110] Coupled with the eventual discard of the article demanding Cherokee executions, the boundary dispute has been invoked to argue that Grant intended a lenient treaty from the onset of his arrival in Charlestown in 1761.[111] The Scottish officer surely pushed for these article alterations to present Cherokees with terms they could accept, but this does not alter the fact that Grant

[108] Grant to Bull, Monck's Corner, March 23, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 391.
[109] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, April 14, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 120-125.
[110] See Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 176-180; Grant to Amherst, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 266-269.
[111] Oliphant, *Peace and War*, 140.

doggedly insisted on strict compliance to the articles *before* he invaded, particularly the prisoner article and the executions clause, which he did not propose to drop until early September.[112] Attakullakulla proved powerless to secure swift transfer of all the prisoners and eight Cherokee headmen for execution in front of Grant's army; he begged Grant to delay his march, assuring him that satisfaction would be provided and "some of our rogues put to death" after he spoke to the Nation.[113] Grant gave Attakullakulla no indication that he would dawdle at the fort, but he did provide Little Carpenter with instructions as to how any pacifistically inclined Cherokees could avoid violent deaths at the hands of his army. Those who "delivered themselves up" or remained "in towns" would escape harm, but Cherokees found "in woods and mountains" would be treated as enemies.[114] With that, the lieutenant colonel prepared to march for the Middle Settlements.

Alongside Grant's regulars and provincial regiments hurriedly readying themselves to kill Cherokees, a multi-tribal composite force, numbering between an estimated seventy to ninety natives and thirty veteran rangers of the northern colonies, stood poised to prosecute the campaign's irregular warfare.[115] More than any other unit in Grant's command, this corps bore responsibility for frightening the war faction to submission, as its ambushes, borderline terroristic tactics and (most integrally) its composition connoted an incessant torrent of debilitating raids from all directions which would continue should resistance persist. The looming menace that Kennedy's regiment represented in the

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[112] After the campaign, Grant felt that the severe correction inflicted on the nation and the attendant loss of life rendered the execution article "hard"; indeed, he thought the article would have been necessary "had peace been achieved without striking a blow." Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, September 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 28, Frames 16-18.
[113] Carpenter's Talk to Grant, Fort Prince George, May 23, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 260-262.
[114] *Ibid*; Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 418-419.
[115] Grant to Amherst, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 266-269; Hewatt, *An Historical Account*, 247-250.

Cherokee psyche, however, preceded the June invasion. Its very presence, and the actions of other tribes in the months before Grant's campaign, underscored the Cherokees lack of substantial allies and surfeit of indigenous foes in its conflict with the British. In November 1760, before Grant's force even left Charlestown, Iroquois raiders descended on the Overhills from the north, slaughtering two young men and carting off a Cherokee woman into captivity.[116] A hostile visit from their ancient enemy, who had recently collaborated with the Cherokees to alienate the Ohio Valley Indians, appeared foreboding, and served as a harbinger for the Cherokees' treatment by other tribes throughout North America during 1761. In early February, the colonial press excitedly reported the rumor that Grant's army would soon be augmented by "the famous major Rogers, with some other partisans of merit, and as many Indians as can be procured."[117] By 1761, largely due to the eradication of Odanak, a substantial Abenaki village which served as the launchpad for multiple deadly forays into the countryside of western New York, colonists throughout British North America lionized Rogers as a war hero; moreover, his name was synonymous with massacring the inhabitants of French-allied native towns.[118] Recent historiography has articulated the contours of a colonial information nexus which effectively relayed news through oral channels traversing indigenous trading paths.[119] The demonstrable efficacy of such networks suggests that the Cherokees had reason to fear the name Robert Rogers, even though members of his posse participated in Grant's campaign, and not the notorious ranger himself.

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[116] "CHARLES-TOWN January 24, *South Carolina Gazette*, January 31, 1761.
[117] "CHARLES-TOWN February 7, *South Carolina Gazette*, February 7, 1761.
[118] Brumwell, *White Devil*, 14; Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 66.
[119] Alejandra Dubcovsky, *Informed Power: Communication in the Early American South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

Bull adroitly utilized the specter of fearsome native adversaries who would accompany Grant's entourage to intimidate the Overhills headmen, and through them, all of Cherokee Nation. Learning of the arrival of a substantial British army and its pending procession towards their heartland, many Cherokee women and children relocated to Hiwassee Old Fields, a remote ghost town seventy miles west of the Valley Settlements, with hopes of insulating themselves from the coming onslaught.[120] In a late March talk to Attakullakulla, amidst demands for prisoner exchange and exhortations for other prominent Overhills headmen to join Attakullakulla in negotiating with the colony, Bull issued a threat to those Cherokees who thought they could relocate beyond Britain's punitive reach. Refugees in the Valley Towns would not be spared fire and sword, for "we and our friends the Mohawks can find them out there."[121] Only scrupulous adherence to the stringent peace terms proposed by Carolina would allow Cherokee women to cultivate maize and men to "hunt in safety without fear of Molestation from us or the Mohawks."[122] Though Bull's threat was likely intended to reach the ears of the Mortar, the Abeika Creek who established a settlement between the Valley and Overhill Towns to facilitate his goal of promoting a Franco-Cherokee alliance, it had the dual effect of engendering fear of retributive violence impacting the most vulnerable members of Cherokee society.[123] On the ides of March, the day the army departed Charlestown for Monck's Corner, a Chickasaw brought in a Cherokee scalp to collect the bounty offered by the colony, then immediately joined Kennedy's regiment in order to acquire more.[124] On March 17, Amherst sent word

[120] Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 236.
[121] Bull to Attakullakulla, Charlestown, March 30, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 88-90.
[122] *Ibid*.
[123] For the location of the Mortar's settlement, see Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 225; Corkran, *Cherokee Froniter*, 165.
[124] French, "Journal of an Expedition," 277.

that he needed Rogers in Albany, but that he was sending nine additional Iroquois and five more rangers to augment Kennedy's regiment; they disembarked at Charlestown Harbor a month later, and hurried inland to catch up with the main body of the army.[125]

As Grant's force trudged westward, Kennedy's corps perpetuated atrocities long before reaching Cherokee lands, victimizing natives who had never violently taken up arms against Carolina. Silver Heels, an irascible Seneca warrior with a penchant for ferocity, decided (seemingly at random) to tomahawk three settlement Indians laboring on a plantation (likely Cusaboes) while the column halted at Monck's Corner; perhaps Silver Heels thought that the Assembly's disbursement agent would not discriminate between allied and enemy scalps when he returned to Charlestown and applied for the bounty.[126] Grant expressed a "great uneasiness" over Silver Heels's "barbarity" (whom he sarcastically dubbed "our favorite Indian"), but refused to discipline the Seneca though "a soldier who did the same should not have lived an hour," conceding that he would have ordered an execution if he had native auxiliaries to spare.[127] As allied Chickasaws and Catawbas poured into camp to bolster Kennedy's regiment, they initiated communal rituals to symbolically fuse the warriors of disparate tribal origins into a cohesive war party; as they neared the Lower Towns, the Chickasaws arranged a war dance, using an interpreter to breach the language barrier with Silver Heels and invite the northerners to participate.[128] Unfortunately for peace faction Cherokees seeking succor in the face of homelessness and an invading army, the natives serving in Kennedy's corps either did not know a group of

[125] Amherst to Grant, New York, March 17, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 215-216; Bull to Grant, Charlestown, April 16, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 1127-127.
[126] Monypenny, "Diary," 322.
[127] Grant to Bull, Monck's Corner, April 17, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32 Frames 406-407; Grant to Amherst, Congarees, April 25, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 242-243.
[128] French, "Journal," 279.

Cherokees who had surrendered to Fort Prince George were living in its shadows, or did not care. In mid-March, Tistoe of Keowee approached the bastion with 50 other Cherokees begging McIntosh for "protection," and Grant approved of their resettlement and safeguarding, noting that this placed Tistoe's group "entirely in our power."[129] While Tistoe and the adult males in his entourage foraged for corn in the Middle Settlements, Chickasaws in reconnaissance parties scouting in the vicinity of the Lower Towns encountered an old woman and a boy supposedly under McIntosh's aegis, promptly removed their scalps, and hurried back to Ninety Six to present them to Grant.[130] The Scottish commander nonchalantly shrugged at the friendly fire catastrophe, expressing regret over the deaths of Cherokees who his subordinate was charged with protecting, he felt compelled to "put up with the good and bad" from his native allies.[131] When the entire army arrived at Fort Prince George on May 27, the thirty Cherokees milling about the fort that morning unsurprisingly absconded to the woods in terror of Kennedy's company.[132] These indigenous shock troops' influence over the campaign's procession manifested itself in other ways than Grant's lenience in the face of their attacks on allied Indians. After arriving at Fort Prince George and observing the parley during which Little Carpenter begged Grant for time to comply with the terms, the Chickasaws and Catawbas began grumbling that the conflict had ended, and with it their opportunity to secure scalps, presents, and prestige.[133] Though a headman in Kennedy's corps pointed out to the

[129] McIntosh to Grant, Fort Prince George, March 15, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 73-74; Grant to Bull, Monck's Corner, March 23, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 391.
[130] McIntosh to Grant, Fort Prince George, April 28, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 139-140; Grant to Bull, Ninety Six, May 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 407-408.
[131] Grant to Bull, Twenty-Two Mile Creek, May 5, 1761, *JGP*, Frames 408-409.
[132] "CHARLES-TOWN June 20," *South Carolina Gazette*, June 20, 1761.
[133] Monypenny, "Diary," 329.

malcontents that the pack animals were currently being burdened with provisions for the foray into the Middle Towns (and thus the war was still on), native allies tended to dissipate when convinced that European allies wanted to delay operations or send them on interminable raids against an enemy position. Grant knew this from experience, as he observed firsthand a mass Cherokee defection from Forbes's campaign three years before. Already convinced of the necessity of attacking the Middle Settlements, Grant hastened his invasion so as to retain his most valuable, and violent, regiment. Kennedy's corps, a kaleidoscope of indigenous warriors and grizzled woodsmen drawn from all corners of the colonial world, facilitated the swift prosecution of the war, unnerved the Cherokees with their brutality, and contributed to the sense that they were being choked by an ever-constricting periphery.

As the army prepared for the third invasion of Cherokee territory in as many years, the minds of the military brass and colonial officials responsible for the incursion focused squarely on the mission's objective: breaking the collective will of any remaining Cherokee belligerents by destroying the Nation's food supply. The byproduct of an annual cycle of communal planning and field clearing, countless hours of Cherokee women's labor, and a harvest laden with ritual and symbolic import, the maize crop sustained Cherokee society both bodily and spiritually. It also served as the most tangible representation of the Cherokees' ability to physically control their environment; it was this ability to manipulate nature that Grant sought to compromise. Though the trade embargo imposed by Lyttelton and the French's inability to provide all but a token smattering of firearms and munitions handicapped the Cherokee warriors' ability to wage war, the Cherokees' agricultural bounty (alongside the yield of the winter hunts and seasonal forage for berries and nuts)

afforded their settlements something approaching autarky and kept healthy adult male bodies in the field of battle; imperiling the function of the Cherokees' agroecosystem would cause a major pillar of their sustenance to evaporate and render them incapable of further resistance.[134] Laurens thought that the Little Carpenter's appeal for Grant to wait while he convinced the war party to turn over prisoners and principal instigators a smokescreen to protect the tribe's crops; Attakullakulla's play at treating "had no other intention than to amuse us here until our provision was consumed, & their own secured by perfecting their Crops of Corn."[135] When reflecting on the torrential rains and lack of grass which delayed his expedition just before marching from Fort Prince George, Grant posited that the intermission could actually prove advantageous, because "if Indian corn is to be destroyed, it can be done more effectually at present than it could have been a fortnight ago."[136] Grant had a point, as the severe winter of 1760-1761, which featured four inches of snow and late frosts, surely inhibited the Cherokees from planting as early as they intended just as it impeded his ability to transport draft animals; indeed, amid the strings of wampum sent to Grant in late April during the march was an exhortation to relent because the Cherokees would be "totally ruined" if prevented from planting this season.[137] Unseasonably cool temperatures delayed the annual sowing until April, and ensuring that the cornstalks

[134] An agroecosystem is literally "an ecosystem reorganized for agricultural purposes." Though the 1761 campaign definitely did not match the destructive scale of the last two years of the American Civil War, which saw Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phillip Sheridan (among others) unleash the Federal industrial war machine against the South's agroecosystem to break the Confederacy's resolve, Grant's campaign strategy utilized similar techniques to achieve nearly identical goals. For the above quote and an impressive consideration of the environmental dimensions of warfare, see Lisa M. Brady, *War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes During the American Civil War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012).
[135] Laurens to John Ettewin, Keowee, July 11, 1761, *PHL III*, 74.
[136] Grant to Amherst, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 266-269.
[137] "CHARLES-TOWN, April 11," *South Carolina Gazette*, April 11, 1761; "CHARLES-TOWN, April 25," *South Carolina Gazette*, April 25, 1761.

would be too underdeveloped to harvest and provide any meaningful sustenance during the June invasion. General Amherst concurred on the fortuitous aspects of delay, opining that the stoppage would "bring you nearer to the most proper season for destroying the corn of the enemy."[138] Only crop eradication could bring the Cherokees not only to reason and the negotiating table, but "to that due subjection" which Amherst sought.[139] Portions of Cherokee society had already been cowed into submission, as thirty from the Middle Settlements came in on June 5 (two days before the campaign) to join Tistoe's sixty Lower townspeople who already hunkered in the vicinity of Fort Prince George.[140] Grant pitied these "poor creatures," who currently subsisted "on acorns chiefly," and provided them with some peas and two bushels of corn to plant, but forbade them to hunt or relocate anywhere outside of the eyeshot of the fort's garrison.[141] Bull wholeheartedly approved of Grant feeding the Cherokees who had surrendered, for it could provide those still resisting "strong proof that we do not desire to extirpate them" entirely; in an assessment rife with agricultural metaphor, Bull reckoned that granting some foodstuffs to properly subdued Cherokees would function by "planting a hope from whence they will expect a harvest of Peace and Friendship in due time."[142] Those who continued to struggle would be reduced to hunger and, eventually, dependency by an action that would undercut the Cherokees' ability to mold the natural world of the riverine Appalachian valleys they inhabited to their liking.

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[138] Amherst to Grant, Albany, July 13, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*., 281-283.
[139] *Ibid*.
[140] "CHARLES-TOWN, June 20," *South Carolina Gazette*, June 20, 1761.
[141] Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 418-419.
[142] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, June 19, 1761, *JGP*., Reel 32, Frames 179-181.

Though Grant, Amherst, and Bull grasped the import of hampering the Cherokees' ability to influence nature from a military perspective, they probably had no notion that an assault on the tribe's agroecological organization would also speak to the Cherokees' sense of self-conceptualization. The corn whose destruction Grant saw as the *sine qua non* of his campaign figured heavily into Cherokee cosmology. Selu, also known as Corn Mother and revered as the first female Cherokee in the tribal creation story, yielded nourishment by ascending the steps of her corncrib storehouse, squatting in front of a basket, and rubbing her navel and breasts to produce corn and beans.[143] Murdered by her two sons who reckoned her a malevolent sorceress, Selu's corpse was dragged through cleared ground, her spilled blood insuring the continued fertility of the land and an annual harvest of maize and beans for all Cherokees.[144] Cherokee understanding of gender and proper balance, particularly the sexual division of labor, which delineated men as hunters and women as cultivators, sprang from Selu's example.[145] Moreover, Cherokee ceremonial life hinged upon the yearly production of a viable corn crop. The Green Corn Ceremony, which usually proceeded in late July or early August (but would likely occur later in an uncommonly frigid year like 1761), signified cyclical renewal, the ignition of a new council fire, the disposal of the excess foodstuffs of the previous year, and the opportunity for absolution for all but the gravest offenses.[146] An attack on Cherokee cornfields would not only threaten the tribespeople's bodies, but also disrupt the rituals which purified and

[143] Charles M. Hudson, *Conversations with the High Priest of Coosa* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 53-54.
[144] *Ibid*., 61-63.
[145] Perdue, *Cherokee Women*, 17-18.
[146] Hudson, *The Southeastern Indians*, 365-375.

revitalized society as a whole and disturb the cosmic order which governed the rhythms of their existence.

On June 7, with a commander hellbent on rendering Cherokee agricultural labor fruitless and Kennedy's formidable rangers and Indians marching in front to "scour the woods," a two-mile column moved up the Great Trading Path towards the Middle Settlements.[147] The six hundred horses loaded with flour bags indicated that Grant intended to sustain his force in the field on provisions transported upcountry rather than extensive foraging; this operation would proceed as a crippling *chevauchée* which debilitated Cherokee agricultural productivity by carting the means of its own subsistence with it.[148] After fording the Keowee River and marching fifteen miles, the army "encamp'd, or rather wigwam'd" at Oconee Old Town, a settlement destroyed during the Cherokee-Creek War.[149] After grueling uphill marches through "dangerous defiles" the following two days, the army encamped at Estatoe Old Town, and observed a menacing tree carving depicting Cherokee warriors seizing a British soldier, which Captain Christopher French interpreted as either a threat or an indication that they held a soldier who had been missing for a few days prisoner.[150] As they drew nearer to Etchoe on June 10, vigilance and anticipation coursed through the army, as its proximity to the Middle Towns convinced the troops that if the Cherokees were to mount a defense of their territory, it would surely be on that day. As the column progressed, Cherokee warriors flitted about the woods around

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[147] Hewatt, *An Historical Account*, 247; Duane H. King, "A Powder Horn Commemorating the Grant Expedition Against the Cherokees," Duane H. King and E. Raymond Evans, eds., *Journal of Cherokee Studies*, Vol. I, No. 1 (Summer 1976): 30.
[148] Grant, "Journal of the March and Operations of the Troops Under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Grant of the 40th Regiment Upon an Expedition from Fort Prince George Against the Cherokees," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 8.
[149] French, "Journal," 281.
[150] *Ibid*., 283.

them, raising their hackles. A smattering of shots were fired at the pack train bringing up the rear, indicating the Cherokees also prioritized depriving the army of its means of sustenance, "as their first act of hostility seemed to point at our provisions."[151] At 8:30 AM, roughly six miles from the previous night's camp, Kennedy's vanguard encountered a "very narrow Pass with a mountain upon our right" and the swift-flowing Cowhowee River on the left.[152] There the rangers espied a substantial party of Cherokees perched on the side of the mountain at their right flank; this body rushed farther down the mountain to open fire on the advanced guard.[153] Meanwhile, suddenly the scattershot which had intermittently afflicted the supply line earlier in the morning became more sustained, as the Cherokees' threat to the rearguard threatened to disrupt the campaign's logistics; Grant accordingly ordered a detachment towards the rear to counterfire and deter the shelling.[154] The Scottish officer then ordered the line to proceed forward, as "stopping and forming in disadvantageous ground against an invisible enemy could answer no good end."[155] During the excruciating push forward, Cherokees lofted "pretty smart" fire into the column from the mountain and some hills across the river, until the army advanced to a fordable portion of the river half a mile from the initial firefight and sent a platoon across to harry the native force on the other side.[156] At about noon, the Cherokees' frequency of fire significantly dropped off, a sure indicator that they were exhausting their available ammunition; later, trader James Adair speculated that if "the Cheerake been sufficiently supplied with

[151] Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 9.
[152] French, "Journal," 283.
[153] Hewatt, *An Historical Account*, 248.
[154] *Ibid*.
[155] Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 11.
[156] *Ibid*.; French, "Journal," 283.

ammunition, twice the number of troops could not have defeated them."[157] Noticing the slackening of fire, Grant ordered the forty-nine wounded men dressed and transferred to horse-drawn litters as the army provided cover by pouring volleys of fire towards the mountain; eventually the Cherokees faded away and the march towards Etchoe resumed at 3:00 PM.[158] Arriving in town at 9:00 PM, Grant took stock of the losses, which he assessed as "inconsiderable"; Ensign Munro and ten British regulars had perished in the melee.[159] The army immediately "tore to pieces and set fire to" the wattle-and-daub structures and large communal field in Etchoe.[160] Leaving Middleton with about a thousand men to guard the wounded and the prisoners, Grant led the rest of his army on a night march hoping to catch the towns of Tassee and Nequassee by surprise; though French received orders to "put every soul" he encountered "to Death," the Cherokees had deserted these settlements.[161] After converting the rotunda of Nequassee into a hospital to house the wounded the following day, the army immolated all vestiges of the native staff of life from both Tassee and Nequassee while it waited for Middleton's detachment to catch up.[162]

As Grant's force poured into the Middle Settlements, Kennedy's rangers and diverse assemblage of warriors scouted ahead of the primary column, then fanned out to ambush unsuspecting villagers lingering in their towns too long before accepting a refugee's fate. This regiment continued the spree of terror it waged during the march upcountry, providing Cherokees with a taste of the grisly consequences attendant to continued resistance of a British state consolidating its control over colonial North America. The

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[157] Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 11; Adair, *History*, 269.
[158] Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 11-12.
[159] *Ibid*., Frame 12; Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, July 10, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 28, Frames 2-3.
[160] French, "Journal," 284.
[161] *Ibid*.; Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 12.
[162] French, "Journal," 284.

atrocities resumed directly after the battle south of Etchoe. As the force readied litters for the wounded and began moving towards the southernmost Middle Settlement, one of Kennedy's reconnaissance parties escorted a Cherokee warrior in under guard, who was immediately confronted, "unluckily for him… by a relation of a Catawba Indian who was kill'd in the Action."[163] This aggrieved relation immediately "scalp'd him, then blew out his Brains, cut open his Breast, & Belly, & cut off his privy parts," leaving the mutilated corpse as a testament to the satisfaction of his kinsman's crying blood.[164] A Cherokee woman seized by a scouting detachment and brought into Nequassee fatalistically embodied the essence of the indigenous warrior ethos as she faced her scalping grinning "at us even when she must have expected to be put to Death every Instant."[165] While the army's artery of havoc pierced the Middle Settlements, capillaries of carnage ranged out in all directions, torching minor villages and dismembering straggling Cherokees.[166] Waves of Iroquois, Catawbas, and Chickasaws intermittently departed on raids, returning with fresh scalps, including the forehead of the Kituwah headman Okayula.[167] Another elderly Cherokee seized on the outskirts of Tessante suffered more brutal mortification designed to shock, as the war band inserted "a large stick down his Throat, stuck an Arrow into each of his sides, one into his Neck & left a Tomahawk sticking in his head."[168] Each passage of violence inscribed on a Cherokee body belied Grant's pre-campaign promise to Attakullakulla that he would "not think of harming" Cherokees who "remain[ed] quiet in their towns, and give

[163] *Ibid*., 283-284
[164] *Ibid*., 284.
[165] *Ibid*.
[166] *Ibid*., 285.
[167] *Ibid*., 288.
[168] *Ibid*.

us no trouble."[169] The targeting of civilians who remained in the Middle Settlements demonstrated Grant's disregard for his proclamations to a peace faction whose growth his words before the invasion actively promoted. Though he did take some prisoners, Grant apparently believed that the resistance staged below Etchoe rendered the eradication of any Cherokees found among the Middle Settlements just. Afterwards, Grant marveled at his entire army's capacity for ruthlessness, recalling that "even our Packhorse men thought nothing of hunting [down] an Indian."[170]

The rest of the campaign proceeded as a series of operations designed to eradicate the fruits of the Cherokees' meticulous reorganization of their ecosystem. Between June 13th and 25th, moving north from town to town like a methodical automaton, Grant's army uprooted the agricultural lifeblood and leveled the man-made constructs in, successively, Neowee and Camonga (themselves recently established composite refugee communities), Watauga, Joree, Ussinnah, Coweechee, and Cowee, though at this last town Grant temporarily spared buildings to serve as a headquarters for the rest of the expedition.[171] Cowee and Watauga also featured sprawling apple orchards, which Grant's soldiers felled with axes and added to the flames consuming those towns' cornfields.[172] Leaving a thousand men at arms to guard the wounded at Cowee under Laurens, the army proceeded into a terrain of treacherous, craggy peaks, which Grant deemed a more challenging passage than the Alps, to access the Out Settlements.[173] Though the force incinerated more cultivated acreage there, it also unwittingly laid waste to the symbolic heart of Cherokee

[169] Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, June 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 418-419.
[170] Grant to Byrd, Fort Prince George, July 11, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 28, Frames 4-5.
[171] Grant, "Journal," *ibid*., Reel 32, Frames 13-15.
[172] French, "Journal," 285.
[173] *Ibid*., 288.

nation; Cherokee creation stories designated the mother town of Kituwah as the site of the tribe's genesis.[174] At Stecoe, the population hub of the Out Towns, the army felled the "finest corn we had yet met with"; French reckoned that his contingent alone accounted for a hundred acres.[175] When reducing the structural and agricultural features of the Middle and Out Towns to ashes, Grant's legion deracinated secondary sources of Cherokee nourishment, such as the kitchen garden plots attached to most dwellings. They also set ablaze the corn cribs, the allegorical sites of Selu's sorcerous fecundity and the repositories of any edible corn left from the previous harvest that had not been spirited away in the Middle townspeople's frantic retreat. After sweeping away all vestiges of Cherokee farming in Tuckareechee and Tessante, the column exited the Out Settlements and bore down on Ellijay, the only Middle Town which avoided annihilation earlier in the procession; its fields and buildings suffered the same fate as the other villages.[176] At this point, nearly three weeks of grueling forced marches and sleeping on the ground caught up with the army, as "immense fatigue" seized hold; the number of troops physically incapable of proceeding due to illness mushroomed, as worn-out moccasin soles and mangled feet increasingly relegated provincial and regular alike to either horseback or litters drawn by horses.[177] Trudging back on the path to the Lower Towns, Grant's bedraggled crew arrived at Fort Prince George on July 9.[178] In their wake, they left a swath of environmental degradation expertly scheduled to leave the Cherokees with no time to replenish the breadbasket of their population hub before the weather turned cold, pockmarked by parcels of scorched

[174] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 152.
[175] Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 17; French, "Journal," 287.
[176] *Ibid*., 288.
[177] Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 19.
[178] *Ibid*., Frame 21.

earth which severely compromised indigenous control over the land's output. Bull marveled at the scope of agroecological devastation, which included over 1,400 acres of "Corn, beans, peas, etc."; a modest assessment of the productive capacity of the tracts in question placed the loss of maize at 50,000 bushels, or "subsistence for 5,000 Indians, not much less than half the number of the whole nation."[179] Grant opined that if the Cherokees failed to come to terms "they must starve," and "if a peace was made tomorrow, I hardly think that it is in the power of the province to save them."[180] Amherst concurred, adjudging peace preferable to paucity, but failing to see how "under present conditions" the Cherokees could survive the winter.[181] Targeting the agrarian world of the Middle Towns indeed severely strained the resources of sustenance which remained in Cherokee country, rendering the entire nation amenable to an immediate cessation of hostilities. The agroecological assault also earned Grant the sobriquet Cornpuller among the Cherokees, a nod to the devastating war that he waged against their means of subsistence.[182]

Grant's strategic refusal to dole out any provisions to his beleaguered foes until a formal ceremony at Fort Prince George in late August, even after many Cherokee headmen relayed their desire to surrender, represents another punitive dimension of his campaign and provides a stark contrast to his previous brush with gift giving on the Pennsylvania frontier. Grant expressed dissatisfaction with McIntosh's liberal dispensation of goods to Attakullakulla, Britain's staunchest ally among the Cherokees and their best hope for peace, before invading the Middle Towns, and he effectively leveraged the tribe's desperation for

[179] Bull to Grant, Charlestown, July 17, 1761, *JPG*, Reel 32, Frames 206-207.
[180] Grant to Byrd, Fort Prince George, July 11, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 28, Frames 4-5.
[181] Amherst to Grant, Albany, August 1, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 286-289.
[182] Talk from Little Carpenter to McIntosh, November 15, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 355-356.

the goods in Fort Prince George into a mass capitulation after the campaign.[183] When waves of starving Cherokees approached Grant (after the headmen initially tried to treat with William Byrd's Virginia army stationed northeast of the Overhills), the Scottish officer flatly informed them "that altho they had been taught to expect presents from him, he would give them none, until their Country Men came in & behaved as they ought."[184] Oconostota, who neglected to participate in the parley because he feared seizure under truce, thought appealing to past camaraderie would weaken Grant's resolve; he sent a missive via an emissary who had served under Forbes during the Duquesne campaign touting his fidelity and desire to adhere to whatever was "agreed to between Col. Grant and Atta-kulla-kulla."[185] Grant, however, refused to proffer "one Rag of presents" to them or any other Cherokees until cementing a preliminary peace with Little Carpenter on September 1, and "then he gave them no more than a Dinner & one Bottle of Rum."[186] One officer was severely upbraided by Grant for giving some of the "Neutral Cherokees a Little Flour, altho he urged that the Flour was damag'd & the Indians were our friends."[187] Hundreds of miles, three years, and a radically altered balance of power removed from the livid Cherokees at Shippensburg who demanded gifts as just recompense for their reconnaissance, Grant clearly understood wedding the prospect of presents with privation to yield amenable diplomatic resolutions.

Despite the harsh consequences the campaign imposed on the Cherokees, rumblings of dissent over its efficacy and lethality emanated almost immediately from Charlestown,

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[183] Grant to Bull, Monck's Corner, March 23, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 391
[184] Byrd to Grant, Stalnaker's July 19, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 213-214; Laurens, "A Letter Signed Philolethes," March 2, 1763, *PHL III*, 340.
[185] "CHARLES-TOWN, October 10, 1761," *South Carolina Gazette*, October 10, 1761.
[186] Laurens, "A Letter Signed Philolethes," March 2, 1763, *PHL III*, 340-341.
[187] *Ibid*., 341.

sullying both Grant's reputation and the prospects of peace during the ensuing negotiations. The ensuing dispute, known as the Grant-Middleton feud, exposed a cleavage within Charlestown's polity over Indian policy and the prosecution of the war. Though often framed as a personal squabble between two egotistical, powerful men vying for control over the campaign, the quarrel actually functioned as a front for the agendas of the rival blocs that Grant's anonymous correspondent outlined in January. These competing visions of the fate of South Carolina's western margins embroiled the colony in factionalism which long outlived Grant's deployment there; it spawned the pamphlet war between the competing pseudonyms Philopatrios (Gadsden), who deemed the campaign insufficiently destructive and fatal, the resultant peace too lenient and dishonorable to the colony, and Grant incompetent and cowardly, and Philolethes (Laurens), who defended the campaign's efficacy and the ensuing treaty, and praised Grant's conduct as commendable and in the best interests of the province. At core, all of the jockeying between these two was rooted in a fundamental disagreement between members of Carolina's planter class over the Cherokees' role in the post-war order. Philolethes envisioned a severe reduction in the tribe's autonomy, which would be compromised by a surge in European settlement in the piedmont; the demographic flux and fostering amicable, regular trade would eventually render the Cherokee Nation dependent and docile. In a scant few years, the reformed, "domestic" Cherokees could "be made an excellent barrier," insulating South Carolina from threats posed by more formidable tribes farther west.[188] Philopatrios advocated a much darker fate for the Cherokees. Gadsden erroneously categorized the Cherokees as still belligerent in the aftermath of treaty negotiations, and promoted an immediate resumption

[188] *Ibid*., 306.

of hostilities to head off an expected double-cross which never came; by feigning conciliation, the Cherokees made "us their dupes," and certainty of a pending sneak attack warranted preemptive measures.[189] As Grant crouched at Fort Prince George, waiting for the word of the pact's finalization so he could march straight to the harbor and embark on a brief deployment in the West Indies, the clamor from the Middleton-Gadsden faction in the Assembly to "extirpate them, extirpate them" rose to fever pitch.[190]

Careful analysis of the written record reveals Thomas Middleton's role in the campaign was not merely that of a disgruntled provincial officer spurning an imperious redcoat and abandoning the army. Middleton was also a double-agent, a plant working on behalf of the hawkish faction that wanted to assure the Cherokees' eradication and removal by any means necessary. His covert operations included attempts to influence the nature of communications with Attakullakulla, demanding that the force invade the Valley Towns, abandoning the regiment under his command to return to Charlestown and gin up support for renewed escalation the moment he recognized that Grant intended on sparing the Valley, and contravening Grant's direct orders to seize prisoners by directing the expedition's native allies to take none. In the litany of grievances he mailed Grant to justify his departure, Middleton bemoaned Grant's unwillingness to "acquaint me with a single plan you had formed," as he "frequently heard officers of inferior rank speak of them before I had heard of them."[191] As an equal in rank, Middleton expected Grant to act in "concert" with him, and deeply resented Grant showing him the talk that he sent Little Carpenter

[189] Philopatrios, "Some Observations," 65-66.
[190] John Rattray to Grant, Charlestown, August 16, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 255-257.
[191] Middleton to Grant, Charlestown, July 19, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 215-217.

before the army's arrival at Fort Prince George, but not allowing him any input.[192] This proposal was the one in which Grant informed Attakullakulla that he would invade if the Cherokees did not immediately release all of the prisoners and urged them to surrender to Fort Prince George or remain in their villages to avoid harm; Middleton wanted to alter the message to circumvent any chance of the Cherokees meeting those terms (though there was none). Philopatrios hinted at Middleton's objection towards the conveyance of any opportunity to evade invasion, however remote, in his description of Grant's conduct in late May; the Scot's failure to "complete the mission" was entirely attributable to a pause to "negotiate with the Cherokees, which no one thought he had any business with."[193] Minutiae pertaining to the army's movements indicates the impetus for Middleton's withdrawal. In Joree on July 2, Grant feinted towards the Valley Settlements, intending to trick the Cherokees into believing that he would invade that region via the Ioa Conara Road, a path over which "pack horses can [not] be drove."[194] Grant's subterfuge was likely designed to throw the Cherokees off of his plan to retreat through several narrow defiles southwards towards Fort Prince George, movements which he sought to execute unopposed. Middleton, however, immediately recognized that his window for effecting another invasion had closed. Grant later recalled that he planned on approaching Middleton to speak while in Joree, but the provincial officer then "turned short and walked to your camp"; he and Middleton "never met after that time" until their duel in December.[195] The timing of Middleton's departure surely exceeded mere coincidence, and

[192] Grant "showed me the Talk sent to Carpenter, but you and only you drew it up." *JGP*, Reel 32, Frames 258-263.
[193] Philopatrios, *Some Observations*, 65.
[194] Grant, "Journal," *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 19; Anonymous, December 1760, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 126.
[195] Grant to Middleton, Fort Prince George, July 30, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 28, Frame 14.

in two short weeks, Grant's sources within the Assembly reported a proliferation of "whispers" among the legislators questioning his decision to defer a march to the Valley and deriding the number of Indians killed by his army.[196] Grant only became aware of the depth of Middleton's scheming when a provincial officer contacted him a year and a half after the campaign. In a missive from the Georgia backcountry, John Dunne recalled a chance encounter with Captain Colbert, a Chickasaw sachem that Grant considered of "great merit" due to his magnanimity towards subordinates.[197] On his recent visit to Fort Augusta, Captain Colbert filled Dunne in on a secret – he had been subject to the "persuasion of others in opposition to your strict orders."[198] Grant deployed Captain Colbert to head a party composed of Kennedy's native auxiliaries with orders to seize a prisoner from the Middle Settlements to bleed for information; catching wind of the directives, Middleton and Kennedy "determined that no such thing should happen."[199] Citing Middleton's immense fortune and disposition to grease the palms of those who enacted his will, Kennedy requested that "if he [Colbert] should see an enemy Indian, that nothing but his scalp should be brought in."[200] The timing of Middleton's departure, his intrigues in the colonial legislature, and his subversion of the chain of command to render the expedition as indiscriminately lethal as possible all point towards surreptitious collusion on the part of colonial actors desirous of making war against the Cherokees until the tribe either ceased to exist or abandoned the Carolina piedmont and Appalachian Ridge and Valley entirely.

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[196] Rattray to Grant, July 18, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 32, Frame 208.
[197] Colbert redistributed his commission liberally among the Chickasaw war party, as Grant did "not believe that he saves a Shilling." Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, July 15, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 28, Frames 10-11.
[198] John Dunne to Grant, Fort Augusta, December 4, 1762, *JGP*, Reel 33, Frames 97-99.
[199] *Ibid*.
[200] *Ibid*.

Most historians of the Anglo-Cherokee War have implicitly accepted Gadsden's assessment of the campaign as tame and Grant as a soft touch, stressing the relatively marginal scope of immediate fatality. Particularly, Robin F.A. Fabel stresses the diverse means of sustenance readily accessible to indigenous southerners, most prominently an abundance of game, as self-evident proof of the Cherokees' ability to survive the lean winter of 1760-1761.[201] Though the existence of multifarious food sources in Cherokee country is indisputable, Fabel's characterization ignores implicit and explicit evidence that many tribespeople, particularly the most susceptible to the ravages of hunger, starved during a catastrophic cold season. The ammunition shortage after Grant's campaign did not preclude the Cherokees from hunting that winter, as they still possessed bows and quivers of arrows, but encirclement by adversaries severely limited the range in which they could track game, and rendered other grounds hazardous. The presence of Grant's army in the field until its late December voyage to the Caribbean surely limited the prospective haul east of the Lower Towns, and excursions south of the Valley would land Cherokee hunters in the Chattahoochee watershed, the traditional preserve of the Creeks. Northern hunts appeared more feasible, but lay open to Iroquois and Shawnee raiders, plus William Byrd's army of Virginians (now under the command of Adam Stephen), which never invaded the Overhills, loomed at the Great Island of the Holston River until late in the year.[202] At his late August parley with Grant before going downcountry to negotiate with Bull and the Commons House of Assembly, Attakullakulla stressed the hopeless state of the Middle Towns refugees, who arrived in the Overhills "dying, naked, and starving."[203] By early

[201] See Fabel, *Colonial Challenges*, 75.
[202] Adam Stephen to Amherst, Great Island, October 24, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 323-324.
[203] Attakullakulla's Talk to Col. Grant, Fort Prince George, August 29, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 294.

September, the Cherokees were begging Grant "for peace in the most submissive manner" and were resorting to filching horses from one another in a famine-induced panic; Laurens later noted the same pitiable condition alongside a rebuttal to Philopatrios that "'tis not common for 'conquerors' to eat up their Horses!"[204] Many Cherokees gravitated back towards the Lower Towns after Attakullakulla departed for Charlestown to negotiate, and their abysmal lot required living "for a considerable time upon old-Acorns a food that we know will barely keep Hogs alive."[205] A desperate late-summer effort to replant succumbed to acute hunger pangs, as some of the Cherokees "grabbled up the grains of Corn & beans after they were planted" in Keowee.[206] Old Caesar of Chatuga approached the Fort on July 21 to discuss the "extreme distress" of his people, reporting that several elderly Cherokees and children had perished of famine and deprivation.[207] Caesar's revelation, which came a few weeks after Grant incinerated the nation's breadbasket, boded ill for all but the hardiest Cherokees as the year progressed. Reports indicated that the refugee crisis which followed the invasion overstrained the resources of the Valley and Overhills regions, as "the Middle Settlements people were too numerous to be supported during the winter season by the other part of the nation."[208] Grant's campaign inflicted undeniably deadly, long-lasting harm on his Cherokee adversaries by temporarily hindering their ability to alter the ecosystem to their advantage; this damage has escaped scrutiny due to a vocal minority of Charlestown warmongers whose designs on the Cherokees were far worse, and

[204] Grant to Bull, Fort Prince George, September 2, 1761, *JGP*, Reel 28, Frames 16-18; Laurens, "A Letter Signed Philolethes," March 2, 1763, *HLP III*, 287.
[205] *Ibid*., 286.
[206] *Ibid*.
[207] *Ibid*., 342.
[208] "CHARLES-TOWN, October 17," *South Carolina Gazette*, October 17, 1761.

historians' perplexing penchant for portraying Grant as a benevolent defender of native autonomy.

Until late December 1761, Grant waited in Charlestown for tidal swells capable of carrying his heavy transport above the sandbar at the mouth of the harbor and on to the Lesser Antilles, undoubtedly exposed to the colonial polity's derogation of his campaign as inept and toothless.[209] Notwithstanding this popular uproar and the Cherokees' persistence as a viable autonomous people, Grant's prosecution of the war left Cherokee society defeated, malnourished, and incapable of maintaining its prewar boundaries. A month after Grant's departure for the Caribbean, the *South Carolina Gazette* reported an accommodating shift in Cherokee conduct; the natives did "not behave amiss" as settlers streamed back into the Long Canes settlement on the northern bank of the Savannah River, the problematic area which proved so instrumental in provoking the conflict.[210] And stream back the Euro-Americans did, returning en masse to South Carolina's borderlands, undeterred by the late frontier abattoir, reaching a figure of 35,000 by the middle of the 1760s.[211] As clusters of white backcountry communities exploded along the colony's northwestern periphery, the same hunting ground trespasses, roving livestock grievances, and unrestrained disregard for legal boundaries returned to the ever-narrowing strip of land separating Carolinian from Cherokee. The Cherokees ultimately wilted and relocated in the face of this demographic onslaught, as the Lower Towns and Out Towns failed to recover as population hubs during the 1760s; the Cherokees never rebuilt Keowee, and the

[209] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 40.
[210] "CHARLES-TOWN, January 30, 1762," *South Carolina Gazette*, January 30, 1762.
[211] Rachel N. Klein, *Unification of a Slave State: The Rise of the Planter Class in the South Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 9.

Out Towns, a regional seat of power by mid-century, faded into obscurity as the remaining two towns merged with the Middle Settlements.[212] Nequassee and Tassee remained ghost towns after Grant's column ravaged them.[213] Though the Cherokees' total and permanent displacement from their core territories (the Lower Towns, Middle Towns, Out Towns, and Overhills) would not transpire until the American Revolution, Grant's campaign destabilized Cherokee country and left it vulnerable to the boundless morass of yeomen engulfing its eastern perimeter. Despite the fulminations of Middleton, Gadsden, and their ilk, or Grant's musings about the Cherokees being "worse used" by the Carolinians than vice-versa, the Scottish officer's legacy for the Cherokees was as a catalyst for forces which ultimately deprived them of their ancestral homeland.[214]

[212] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation*, 129; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis*, 174.
[213] *Ibid*.
[214] Grant to Amherst, Charlestown, January 17, 1761, Mays, ed., *Amherst Papers*, 176.

Chapter 5: Parleys and Perception Plays – Grant's Safe Neighborhood and the East Florida Indians

The year 1762 proved another disappointing one for Grant's professional ambitions. After narrowly missing the glory of the Montreal campaign and securing Amherst's approbation for bringing the Cherokee War to a resolution, the Scots officer, overtaken by middle age and an unslaked yearning for the fruits of high office, surely sensed an opportunity when his seasoned veterans arrived in the West Indies. British territorial acquisitions on the North American continent, which had proceeded apace from 1758-1760, hit a lull during 1761. In late 1761 and throughout the following year, an aggressive island-hopping campaign was envisioned by Pitt and executed by Major General Robert Monckton, as Spain's imprudent, belated entry into the war on France's side facilitated the British navy's seizure of a substantial proportion of their Catholic rivals' Caribbean maritime empires.[1] Intrigued by the flurry of amphibious operations in the Lesser Antilles, Grant arrived at Port Royal, Martinique, on February 9, to find the French sugar island already reduced and Monckton's fleet rapidly deploying the army for mop up duty on St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent.[2] Anxious for recognition in London newspapers and among the War Department brass, Grant fumed over his recall to Amherst's headquarters in New York City in early March, and must have cringed when he learned of his next assignment: another recruiting mission in Charlestown.[3] Grant's uneventful summer in the Holy City, spent maintaining a low profile and retelling war stories over supper with his comrades among the provincial officer corps, diverged significantly from the seismic developments in

[1] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 490.
[2] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 41.
[3] *Ibid*., 41-42.

the Caribbean. George Keppel, the Earl of Albemarle, arrived with four additional regular regiments to relieve Monckton in April; after trapping the Spanish flotilla in Havana's harbor, Albemarle placed the city under siege for two months, an action which culminated after the dramatic detonation of a mine under Morro castle.[4] The Queen of the Indies, for centuries the linchpin of Spain's overseas empire, lay in British hands. Thwarted by Amherst's troop shuffle, Grant returned to the Caribbean in October, again too late to see action or bolster his case for promotion through valorous distinction or coolheaded leadership.[5] In February 1763, amid reports that negotiations between the Duke of Bedford and the Duc de Choiseul would soon terminate the global conflict, Grant boarded a ship bound for London.[6]

The 1763 Peace of Paris fundamentally reconfigured the colonial landscape of the first British empire, ushering in an era of territorial consolidation and retrenchment while introducing a set of new provinces to govern. Britain secured hegemony over eastern North America, subsuming the vast former French province of Canada in exchange for returning the immensely profitable sugar islands of Martinique, St. Lucia, and Guadeloupe; this move evoked paroxysms of patriotic indignation from the recently-dismissed Pitt's faction in the House of Commons and the London mob, who denounced the transfer as a betrayal of British interests.[7] Havana, which the British had reduced at the cost of thousands of lives (mainly to yellow fever and malaria), was relinquished for *La Florida*, Spain's oldest North American colony, which extended from southern Georgia to the Mississippi River.[8] Eager to

[4] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 497-502.
[5] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 43.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 503-505.
[8] Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8-9.

bail on an underdeveloped territory that now found itself wedged between a rapidly burgeoning British North American empire and the northern quarter of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, France also conceded the entirety of Louisiana to Spain in the separate Treaty of San Ildefonso.[9] The dissolution of France's official presence in the continental interior proved catastrophic for most Eastern Woodland Indians (especially those of the *pays d'en haut*), who relied on their French Father for regular, alliance-cementing dispensations of gifts and to act as a deterrent to British expansionist impulses. Eager to enact retrenchment in the waning days of a conflict of unprecedented cost, ignorant of the obligations which alliances with Native Americans entailed, and utterly contemptuous of indigenous people in general, Amherst incited a firestorm by curbing gift giving at diplomatic ceremonies and prohibiting outlays of ammunition to the Indians of the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes regions.[10] The resultant violence, dubbed Pontiac's Rebellion, saw the rise of a diverse intertribal coalition fueled by a nativist rejection of European culture and presence in the backcountry; the native coalition seized the majority of the British forts west of Pennsylvania in 1763, then lost momentum over the next few years as imperial authorities ordered substantial increases in budgets for presents.[11] The multi-tribal uprising frustrated the war-weary British government, which thenceforth committed its colonial officials to dealing with the Indians as allies, restored gift giving as standard protocol in Native diplomacy, and devoted itself to avoiding another costly Indian war.[12] Pontiac's Rebellion

[9] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 505.
[10] Gregory Evans Dowd, *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 54-89.
[11] In doing so, the British assumed the role previously performed by the French governor of Canada, or *Onontio*, to the Algonquian tribes of the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, restoring peaceable economic exchange and cultural accommodation to the region. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 305-314.
[12] Kathryn E. Holland Braund, "'Like a Stone Wall Never to Be Broke': The British-Indian Boundary Line with the Creek Indians, 1763-1773," *Britain and the American South: From Colonialism to Rock and Roll*, ed. Joseph

also placed British officials on edge over the prospective spread of collaborative tribal aggression; no region induced more anxiety of this variety than the southeast. Particularly troublesome were the Creeks, which had remained guardedly neutral throughout the French and Indian War, but harbored a rather vocal anti-British minority. This set, headed by the Francophile war mico Mortar, had pushed the Cherokee war faction towards violence, and now could serve as the conduit for nativist disaffection throughout a tribe experiencing acute diplomatic isolation due to the withdrawal of the Spanish and French.

Native reactions to the imperial shuffle necessitated major paradigm shifts in British Indian policy. In October 1763, George III issued a decree designed to relieve pressure on indigenous land and assuage native nerves rankled by the deluge of backcountry settlers. This Proclamation of 1763 prohibited any private purchase or transfer of Indian territory to all parties but the monarchy by delineating the Appalachian Mountains as the boundary between British settlements and native land; it also opened the Indian trade to any British subject willing to acquire a license and post a modest bond vouchsafing good behavior.[13] Though the Proclamation effectively curtailed legal speculation and alienated coastal colonial elites who viewed profitable partition of western lands as just compensation for their contributions to Britain's imperial victory, it failed to stem the tide of European newcomers, who squatted with impunity en masse beyond the proposed boundary.[14]

P. Ward (Oxford: University of Mississippi Press, 2003), 62-3; John T. Juricek, *Endgame for Empire: British Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015), 13-4; Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen*, 76.

[13] Calloway, *Scratch of a Pen*, 92; Louis de Vorsey, Jr., *The Indian Boundary in the Southern Colonies, 1763-1775* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 34-35.

[14] The ban on speculation inspired a litany of schemes designed to secure long-term tenancies of native tracts in exchange for commercial concessions, and ultimately proved an irreconcilable grievance against the mother country, especially in the South. See Allan Gallay, *The Formation of a Planter Elite: Jonathan Byran and the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 139-145 and Merrell, *The Indians' New World*, 200-202 for examples and Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves & the Making*

Moreover, the Proclamation's mass deregulation of the intersocietal marketplace introduced a bevy of inexperienced traders to the backcountry; these "runagadoes" brought more competitive prices to Indian consumers, but ignored the cultural niceties which had become second nature to their long-tenured predecessors. Trade grievances proliferated as these unscrupulous traders exploited their clients in the novel *laissez-faire* economic milieu using faulty weights and watered down rum.[15] These abuses became so pronounced that the imperial agents responsible for Indian relations in the colonies quickly petitioned the ministry and Board of Trade to articulate a solution. Their official response, the Plan of 1764, called for consolidating and transferring control of Indian affairs and meetings to the superintendents, prohibited the issuance of general licenses which allowed traders to operate anywhere in Indian country and linked the permits to specific towns, outlawed the rum trade, severely constrained terms of credit, and introduced a standardized price schedule for most Indian goods.[16] The Plan of 1764, however, was never codified by Parliament, colonial legislature, or royal proclamation, and merely served as general guidelines, though the superintendents tried to exert oversight along its lines in their respective regions; in the South, this position fell to Attakullakulla's old friend John Stuart, who succeeded the deceased Edmond Atkin in 1762.[17] Upon assuming direction of Indian affairs, Stuart received a generous budget, the lack of which had compelled his predecessor to rely on the colonial governments to finance Indian summits.[18] To head off

of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 6-9 for the Proclamation as a contributing factor to the Revolution.
[15] Kathryn E. Holland Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels*, 100-107.
[16] *Ibid*., 111-112.
[17] *Ibid*., John Richard Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier: A Study of Indian Relations, War, Trade, and Land Problems in the Southern Wilderness, 1754-1775* (New York: Gordian Press, 1966), 139-140.
[18] Juricek, *Endgame for Empire*, 18.

the surge of hostility among the Creeks and other southern tribes apprehensive about British encirclement, and to secure the post-war spatial dimensions and commercial agreements between the southern colonies and the tribes, Stuart scheduled a series of conferences which kept him occupied for the better part of two years. Though the first, the 1763 Congress of Augusta, proved the most pivotal and well attended, three of them occurred in the nascent provinces of East and West Florida. Carved out of the former territorial expanse of *La Florida*, the new colonies' demarcation along the Apalachicola River assigned to East Florida the entirety of the Florida peninsula and the old *presidio* at St. Augustine, and to West Florida Pensacola, Mobile, and the east bank of the Mississippi River.[19]

Colonial governorships had always been cherished patronage plums, doggedly petitioned for by courtiers, placemen, and military officers, and the provinces secured by the Peace of Paris proved no different. Xenophobic Wilkite broadsides targeting Scottish monopolization of the state clientage network notwithstanding, Scots' appointments to civil service positions spiked in the mid-eighteenth century. Before succumbing to the humiliation inflicted by Wilkes' excoriating pen and resigning his post as chief minister, the Earl of Bute pulled strings to insure that many of the civil appointments in East and West Florida went to his countrymen.[20] Touting his ample experience with southeastern Indians and familiarity with the region's climate and frontier, Grant petitioned the Board of Trade for assignment to the governorship of one of the Floridas; he preferred West Florida, but

[19] *Presidios* were Spanish New World fortresses. The Proclamation of 1763 divided the former Spanish province into two administrative subunits. See Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen*, 152.
[20] Wilkes repeatedly maligned Bute for capitulating to France at the negotiating table, allegedly bedding the Dowager Queen, and rewarding a disproportionate number of Scots with coveted positions. See Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 507-510; Colley, *Britons*, 128.

the organ of colonial administration tapped him to oversee East Florida on June 8, 1763.[21] Territory which Grant (and many others) reckoned prime for the cultivation of semi-tropical staples like rice, indigo, and sugar beckoned to him from across the Atlantic. His prior experience with joint plantation investment and the personal ties he developed with Charlestown rice grandees who served in provincial regiments during the Cherokee War surely reinforced Grant's confidence in the endeavor's success, given that he had access to local planting expertise, preestablished agribusiness networks, and regional and transatlantic contacts he could woo to relocate. Immediately sensing a threat to his colony's economic viability from adjacent Georgia in the form of a boundary placed too far south for comfort, Grant successfully petitioned the Secretary of State, the Earl of Halifax, for the relocation of East Florida's border from the St. John's River some 21 miles north to the St. Mary's River. Speculating that the expanse between the rivers contained rich, alluvial soils and invoking the specter of the publicly criticized decision to swap Cuba for the peninsula, Grant "humbly conceived [the boundary line] to be too confined," because it would allow the "most valuable Part of Florida" to be absorbed by Georgia.[22] Allowing that tract's alienation from East Florida would render the fledgling province "Invisible to the Eyes of the World," and, most damningly, cause it to "be considered as an inadequate Equivalent for the Havana, & remain that Barren, Broken Sand Bank which it has been erroneously deem'd by the uninform'd Puclick."[23] Satisfied with the territorial division, Grant put his

[21] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 44.
[22] Grant to Halifax, September 13, 1763, CO 5/548, 19-20, *Colonial America*, colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.
[23] *Ibid*. Grant's petition to Halifax resulted in long-term ramifications, as the St. Mary's serves as the easternmost portion of the Florida-Georgia border to this day.

affairs in order, boarded the sloop *Ferret* at Spithead, and disembarked in St. Augustine after a ten-week voyage on August 29, 1764.[24]

Before Grant's arrival, Major Francis Ogilvie, the ranking officer of the Ninth British Regiment, had been sent to take possession of St. Augustine and its environs, and his garrison, some gentlemen sizing up the colony's arable land, and a few Spaniards who refused to relocate to Havana were the only souls in the capital when the *Ferret* docked in the harbor.[25] Upon surveying the most recent addition to Britain's vast continental empire, Grant made a face value assessment of his current capacity to project enough imperial power into East Florida to facilitate settlement, and found it lacking. Grant's conceptualization of proper order within the British state was molded directly by his identity as an army officer, and he tended to conflate the disparities in military manpower between neighboring societies with the relative level of security enjoyed by the inhabitants of each. East Florida was not South Carolina during the Cherokee War, occupied by nearly 3,000 grizzled British regulars and native allies, and a burgeoning demographic core of some 40,000 European colonists who collectively dwarfed the Cherokees' 8,000 at most.[26] He reported the meager figure cut by Ogilvie's Ninth Regiment to General Thomas Gage, who replaced Amherst as commander in chief in 1764. Grant deemed the Ninth "very weak," as Ogilvie's muster rolls indicated less than 190 troops fit "for duty in this place and the neighboring posts"; Florida contained another *presidio*, San Marcos de Apalachee, located due south of modern-day Tallahassee, which Ogilvie's divided force also occupied.[27]

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[24] Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, August 31, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 269-270.
[25] Charles Loch Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province, 1763-1784* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), 7-9, 14.
[26] Population estimates in Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 205-206; Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial South," 90.
[27] Mowat, *East Florida*, 9-10; Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, August 31, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 269-270.

Prior to assuming the mantle of authority in the province, Grant beseeched William Knox, East Florida's crown agent, to secure a constant stream of goods for the British troops garrisoned in the colony; Knox responded by contracting with a Charlestown merchant to provide wares for 1,200 soldiers, a figure indicative of the troop levels the governor expected to defend East Florida.[28] Disappointed and eager to present the prospective investors already in town with the trappings of British military order in the face of what they surely perceived to be a foreboding, untamed wilderness, Grant beseeched Gage to dispatch additional troops.[29] This request marked the advent of a tripartite calculus which suffused the freshman governor's words and actions for the duration of his tenure in office. Grant recognized that the number of British soldiers in East Florida inversely correlated with the level of accommodation that his government must seek with the Lower Creek Indians who lived on the peninsula and to the north, and that the fate of capital investment and development in the colony hinged upon a balance between two. Without at least the façade of a safe neighborhood, which depended on the perception that martial order, quiescent Indians, or both existed in East Florida, the metropolitan mercantile elite and previously established Carolina planters which Grant sought to attract to the colony would decline his overtures.

Though perhaps an abstruse point, establishing Grant's rationale is important because historians have mischaracterized the governor's Indian policy as merely a desire to conform to changes embraced by the ministry and Board of Trade in the aftermath of Pontiac's Rebellion instead of a pragmatic consideration of the facts on the ground. Grant's

[28] *Ibid*.
[29] *Ibid*.

biographer points out that the government's volte-face on Indian policy aligned well with his conceptions of diplomacy, as he preferred conciliatory overtures to threats and coercion.[30] In a recent article, James L. Hill has probed the contours of Grant's personal Indian policy, particularly his dissemination of presents and observance of indigenous protocol and ritual at meetings with the Creeks; Hill assesses Grant's Indian policy, which the governor touted as an entirely "new system," as successful in promoting pacific Anglo-Creek relations in East Florida.[31] Nelson and Hill's analyses of Grant and the Creeks are technically correct; the governor did want to comply with the policy directives of his London superiors, he understood native societal norms better than most in the American colonies, and he certainly aimed to avoid the outbreak of Indian war at all costs. But neither considers the excessiveness of Grant's gift-giving, which flew in the face of what Superintendent Stuart considered prudent, his incessant requests for additional deployments, or the role that Indian diplomacy played in his correspondence with investors. Escalating in scope and frequency over time, Grant's present dispensations indeed represented a "new system," at least for the British colonies, as they increasingly came to resemble tribute designed to conciliate the actual hegemonic empire dominating the Florida peninsula: the Creek Confederacy. Navigating the occasionally bloody realities of intercultural contact at the colony's periphery and the investors' desire for a well-ordered economic incubator required more than a few fibs on Grant's part; he whitewashed Creek violence against settlers and took extreme care to obfuscate the extent of his tract allocations from the Creeks. Moreover, Grant virtually salivated over the

[30] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 55.
[31] James L. Hill, "New Systems, Established Traditions," 133, 165-166.

prospect of securing more land in the peninsular interior via an additional cession after the initial one at the Picolata Congress – an objective he concealed from his Lower Creek associates.[32] The governor knew from anecdotal observation during his military career that the only way to generate the external pressure required to prompt a transfer of more Indian land was rapid development of British territory and the attendant influx of Africans and Europeans. A more holistic look at Grant's correspondence and Indian policy provides a window into both the official's personal agenda and the nature of the imperial power dynamic on the peninsula during his gubernatorial tenure.

Analysis of James Grant's Indian policy and responses to Anglo-Creek diplomatic ruptures during his term as governor reveal a beleaguered civil official who gradually became aware of the impotence of his colonial regime vis-à-vis the local Creek Indians. Despite this realization, the Scot never stopped scheming to channel public and private monies, established and aspiring planters, and African slaves into the colony. Grant's attempts to influence the Board of Trade to sanction his Indian policy – one rooted in excessive gift giving to the Creeks to render them less likely to disturb the peace – directly reflect the governor's desire to make East Florida appear a safe bet for investment and colonization. His failure to impose resolutions to violent episodes in East Florida in accordance with English notions of jurisprudence, his overly conciliatory policy regarding gift giving, and his steadfast insistence on the maintenance of trade with Florida's Indian population as a deterrent to conflict were the acts of a pragmatist aware of the relative weakness of his government and desperate to entice European settlement to bolster his fledgling regime. Grant's frustrations regarding his mere *de jure* authority reflect the

[32] Grant to Earl of Egmont, St. Augustine, December 23, 1767, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 338-340.

British empire's predicament on its attenuated southernmost North American flank: in the face of a vibrant, resilient Creek empire, East Floridians inhabited a zone of compromised sovereignty at best.

The Lower Creeks' occupation of Florida represented the culmination of a seventy-year process. Creek migration patterns throughout Florida during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reflect their *de facto* control of the vast majority of territory on the peninsula by the 1760s. In 1686, the natives occupying the Apalachicola province fell out with their former Spanish clients at St. Augustine and the mighty Apalachee paramount chieftaincy which occupied the hilly, rich soils in the vicinity of modern-day Tallahassee.[33] The arrival of Carolina traders among the cluster of towns in the Chattahoochee Valley the previous year alarmed the Spanish, who sent an army of 250 men to forcibly dissuade these towns from trading with the British colonists; this force spared Apalachicola province, but met with resistance just north in the towns of Coweta and Cusseta, which it then razed and burned.[34] Alienated by the attack and enticed by the potential empowerment that a steady flow of firearms represented, the Apalachicolas and other natives of the Chattahoochee Valley emigrated by 1691 to the site of a defunct chieftaincy on the Ocmulgee River near contemporary Macon, Georgia; here their Carolina procurators dubbed them the Ochese Creeks, increasingly referring to them simply as Creek Indians.[35] Replicating the cycle of exchanging indigenous war captives for guns which had dominated native market

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[33] For the Apalachicola Province, which was located in the Chattahoochee Valley of present-day southwest Georgia, see Robbie Ethridge, *Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 27-28, for the Apalachee's location, see David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 43.

[34] Steven C. Hahn, *The Invention of the Creek Nation*, *1670-1763* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 48-50; David H. Corkran, *The Creek Frontier: 1540-1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 50-51.

[35] Etheridge, *Creek Country*, 28; Hahn, *Invention*, 48-50.

interactions with the southern British colonies since the foundation of Virginia, the better-equipped Creeks commenced a twenty-year raiding spree in Florida.[36] Unremitting raiding took its toll on the Apalachee and other Florida Indians, but the outbreak of Queen Anne's War in 1702 sounded their death knell. Ironically, an English-led foray into Spanish Florida facilitated Creek hegemony there by mid-century. In 1704, a force of over a thousand Creek warriors and a few white raiders titularly commanded by former Carolina governor James Moore annihilated the Spanish mission system in the middle of Florida's panhandle.[37] The Ochese slavers carried over a thousand Apalachees north, and relegated Spanish power bases in *La Florida* to shrunken hinterlands around the forts at St. Augustine, Pensacola, and St. Marks.[38] Notwithstanding token British participation in their decades-long conflict with the Apalachee and other Spanish-allied natives, the Ochese Creeks conceived of Florida as theirs by conquest and exploited it accordingly. Throughout the rest of the first decade of the eighteenth century, scouring raids conducted by Creek slavers continued to severely depopulate the region, leaving it virtually "uninhabited" by 1715.[39] Desiring more space between their society and the Carolinians in the aftermath of the Yamasee War, the Ocheses gradually left Ocmulgee and returned to the Chattahoochee Valley, where they formed the core of Lower Creek country.[40]

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[36] Hahn, *Invention*, 48-50; For examples of the British Indian slave trade that preceded the better-known Carolinian exchange, see Allan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 41-42.
[37] Corkran, *The Creek Frontier*, 55-56.
[38] *Ibid*; James Axtell, *The Indians' New South: Cultural Change in the Colonial Southeast* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 37.
[39] James W. Covington ed., *The British Meet the Seminoles: Negotiations Between British Authorities in East Florida and the Indians: 1763-68*, Contributions of the Florida State Museum, Social Sciences, No. 7 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1961), 3; Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 246.
[40] Etheridge, *Creek Country*, 28.

As the eighteenth century progressed, the Creek Nation stretched its northeastern and southwestern peripheries at the expense of its Cherokee and Choctaw neighbors. Both of these expansions were facilitated by violent conquest, but the jewel of the Creeks' eighteenth-century territorial haul was Florida. After sweeping the peninsula of its aboriginal inhabitants, the Lower Creeks annually scoured their newly won hunting preserve for game, and eventually parties of them trickled southward to establish villages. During the 1750s and the 1760s, a group of Lower Creeks living near the confluence of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers near modern-day Columbus, Georgia relocated to the Alachua plains of northeastern Florida, roughly seventy miles west of St. Augustine.[41] Consisting of about 130 Creek families, this group splintered from several of the Lower Creek *italwas* and established a semi-autonomous village at Alachua, which largely managed its own affairs but deferred to Creek Nation in matters of territorial sovereignty.[42] Led by the headman Ahayé (better known by the British as The Cowkeeper), this faction would splinter again to create other peninsular *italwa* like Talahasochte on the Sewanee River.[43] Other Lower Creeks emerged farther west in the vicinity of Apalachee Old Fields above St. Mark's, founding settlements like Tonaby's Town, Mikasuki, Tomatly, and Chescataleufa.[44] By the end of the eighteenth century, these peninsular Creeks, referred to

[41] Saunt, *A New Order of Things*, 34-36; J. Russell Snapp, *John Stuart and the Struggle for Empire on the Southern Frontier* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 44. Creeks, like other Native peoples, migrated before and after European colonization for reasons unrelated to any European catalyst such as disease or forced relocation. See Neal Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July, 1996), 435-458.
[42] *Italwa* is Muskogean for "town." Saunt, *A New Order of Things*, 34-37; Snapp, *John Stuart and the Struggle for Empire*, 44; Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 247.
[43] Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 249; Gregory A. Waselkov and Kathryn E. Holland Braund, eds., *William Bartram and the Southeastern Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 58-60.
[44] John T. Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties, 1763-1776*, Alden T. Vaughn, gen. ed., *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789*, Vol. XII (Bethseda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002), 445.

as Seminoles by Britons, Americans, and Spaniards, constituted an entirely separate power base from their northern brethren. During the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the peninsular Creeks were still affiliated with the Lower Creeks.[45] The Lower Creeks saw themselves as colonizers of all of their recently acquired territories, and viewed the future Seminoles as colonists.

Raw demographic totals in Grant's new colony favored the Lower Creek inhabitants. William Gerard de Brahm, the royal surveyor of East Florida, included a list of Florida's male inhabitants from 1764 to 1771 in a report on the land in Britain's southern colonies, a date range that corresponds neatly with Grant's term as governor. According to the surveyor, only 291 white adult males permanently resided in East Florida for seven years.[46] Though their households surely accounted for significantly more people, and settlements coalesced and disbanded during that time period, de Brahm's assessment imparts the limited scope of the colony's European population during this time period. Historians and contemporaries could only estimate the Native population of East Florida in the 1760s and 1770s. Ogilvie believed that the Seminoles had only "a few hundred men."[47] Placing Ogilvie's estimate at three hundred Seminole warriors, the lowest total possible per his description, still places the peninsular Natives at a slight military advantage numerically.[48] On a visit to Alachua a few years after Grant's departure, the naturalist William Bartram considered the Seminoles "a weak people, with respect to numbers," and thought that the

[45] Saunt, *A New Order of Things*, 35-36.
[46] William Gerard de Brahm, *De Brahm's Report of the General Survey in the Southern District of North* America, ed. Louis de Vorsey, Jr. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), 178-186.
[47] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 45, 47; Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier*, 10.
[48] This total, however, fluctuated as East Florida's Native population swelled during the winter months due to the presence of seasonal Creek hunting parties on the peninsula. See Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 246.

lot of them "would not be sufficient to people one of the towns of the Muscogulge [his term for the Lower Creeks]."[49] Some Lower Creek towns, however, topped two thousand inhabitants, and it seems likely that the 130 Creek families that originally migrated to the Alachua prairie (not to mention the other *italwa*) outnumbered the European colonists during the period in question. Though his efforts resulted in settlements at New Smyrna and Rollestown that outlasted his tenure as governor, Grant's colonization schemes often resulted in plans for settlements that were never executed, as was the case with New Bermuda. At the end of his governorship, his efforts to populate East Florida had obviously yielded scant results, as the colony could only tout 288 white inhabitants and 900 African slaves in 1771. [50] Though the prospect of hostilities with Alachua gunmen unnerved Grant, far more daunting was the aggregate of Creek Nation to the north, whose warrior total he placed at "near four thousand men"; if a spat with the local satellites provoked the parent empire, Grant knew that East Florida would inevitably implode.[51]

Any hint of Indian war would spook the powerbrokers who received 227 land grants from the Privy Council for over 2.8 million acres during the speculative "Florida fever" which infected a good portion of the British polity early during Grant's governorship.[52] The majority of these titleholders aimed at absenteeism of the Barbadian variety and planned on managing their East Florida estates through proxies and factors, and picked their tracts by studying a map.[53] Others visited in person to assess the quality of

[49] Quoted in Waselkov and Braund, eds., *William Bartram and the Southeastern Indians*, 57.
[50] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 65.
[51] Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, August 31, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 269-270.
[52] Bernard Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 433-440.
[53] On the prevalence of absentee planting in Barbados and the other islands of the British West Indies, see O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided*, 3-17.

plots for themselves, as Lord Adam Gordon did in November 1764. After settling on a prime tract bordering the St. John's River and penning an exaggerative journal entry hyping the colony's suitability for "Sugar, Coffee, Pimento, and all the West India productions," Gordon returned to England and promptly founded the East Florida Society of London, an organization which promoted entrepreneurial endeavors in the province.[54] High profile visitors like Lord Gordon who desired to lay eyes on their gambles required safe passage while they surveyed tracts, which proved problematic, because the colony had no broad causeways leading northward to the St. John's and beyond or to the Mosquito Inlet south of St. Augustine. Accessing these regions required passage through dense, snake-infested vegetation, and the prospect of wandering into a native ambuscade weighed heavily on the sojourner. To assuage their nerves, Grant deliberately tried to make the Lower Creeks and traveling around East Florida look as innocuous as possible. He beseeched Gage to send two troops of Georgia rangers to the province, reasoning that East Florida wanted them more than "that Province, which now ceases to a be a Frontier with regards to Indians"; the country in Georgia was "cultivated and habituated" by the 1760s, and commandeering their experts in frontier tracking and combat would allow Grant and potential suitors to "go all over the province" without fear of being waylaid.[55] The governor implicitly raised the specter of a Lower Creek attack disrupting his landscape presentations, remarking that "without an escort, though we are seemingly on good terms with the Indians, it will not be

[54] Adam Gordon, "Journal of Lord Adam Gordon," Newton D. Mereness, ed., *Travels in the American Colonies* (New York: Antiquarian Press, 1961), 393; George C. Rogers, Jr., "The East Florida Society of London, 1766-1767," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 54 (1976): 479-480.
[55] Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, August 31, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 269-270. Grant also sent a missive to the Earl of Halifax, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, requesting troop augmentation in St. Augustine, noting the garrison as presently constructed was insufficient to keep the Creeks "in order." Grant to Halifax, St. Augustine, September 2, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frame 268.

very prudent to go to any great distance into the woods."[56] Gage balked at reassigning Georgia rangers to East Florida, and Grant continued angling to no avail, blaming the failures of two surveying expeditions to the Mosquito Inlet "20 leagues away" on the lack of armed accompaniment.[57]

Though overall retrenchment and abandonment of American frontier posts likely played a role, perhaps Gage's refusal of Grant's ranger request was driven by the governor's presumption that he could circumvent Sir Thomas's control of the Ninth Regiment immediately upon his arrival. Long accustomed to military command (and bypassing established pecking orders if it suited his interests), Grant requested that Ogilvie send him an officer on parole the day after setting foot on Florida soil.[58] Gage disabused Grant of the notion that he would have any leeway in ordering His Majesty's troops stationed in the colony by late September.[59] Grant knew that the civil governors' command of the military in their provinces had been suspended during the Seven Years' War for the purpose of prosecuting the conflict under a central command, but believed war's culmination warranted reimplementation of the antebellum policy.[60] Expressing misgivings about the upshot of his inability to personally direct civil and martial affairs in East Florida, Grant sought an override from the Board of Trade and Whitehall. He considered the combination of circumstances unique to East Florida and his distinguished military career justifiable grounds for a commission to order the troops stationed at St. Augustine and St. Mark's Apalachee. Lamenting the policy that tied his hands, Grant informed the Earl of

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[56] Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, August 31, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 269-270
[57] Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, December 1, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 273-274.
[58] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 51; Mowat, *East Florida*, 28.
[59] Grant to Shelburne, St. Augustine, December 6, 1764, CO5/548, 34, *Colonial America*, colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.
[60] Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, December 1, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 273-274.

Shelburne that while the "governors of established colonies will feel no inconvenience from this regulation," in his "infant colony [the case] is extremely different" and required a fighting force "united in the same Person, to facilitate the establishment of so new a Country."[61] The governor thus drew a clear parallel between a personal prerogative to command British troops, rapid response to threats to the colony, and his ability to populate East Florida with settlers. Assuming military control would be no burden to the governor, and he assured Shelburne that "this sort of Local Command cannot be supposed to weigh much with me, as I had the honor to Command a considerable Body of His Majesty's Troops in the Southern Provinces of America, during the War."[62] Desperate to secure sanction for the right to direct East Florida's soldiers and overly concerned about projecting the image of British order onto the colony, Grant wrote friends in even higher places. In a missive to Sir Gilbert Elliot, the royal household's Treasurer of the Chamber and an intimate of the Earl of Bute, Grant attempted another end around of Gage.[63] He begged Elliot to "speak to some of your friends about it," for in "this infant colony, the settling of the country" was so entwined with directing troops that "it seems to be necessary that those powers should be vested in the same person."[64] Belaboring the impact that a larger garrison directly responsive to his immediate command would have on the local Creeks, Grant opined that the natives could "not be kept in order but by an appearance of force," though their current

[61] Shelburne served as the President of the Board of Trade in late 1764. In this letter, Grant also raised the issue of the abortive trips to the Mosquitos, which lacked a military escort due to his inability to command Ogilvie's regiment. Immediate access of this area was imperative, for "according to a Spanish report, [it would] make one of the best settlements in the Province." Grant to the Earl of Shelburne, St. Augustine, December 6, 1764, CO5/548, 34, *Colonial America*, colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.
[62] *Ibid*.
[63] Elliot's biographical note at "Elliot, Gilbert (1722-77), of Minto, Roxburgh," *The History of Parliament: British Political, Social, and Local History*, http://www/historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1754-1790/member/elliot-gilbert-1722-77.
[64] Grant to Gilbert Elliot, St. Augustine, December 8, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 109-110.

disposition appeared pacific.[65] Grant's exhortations to Gage, the Board of Trade, and the throne yielded no policy change elevating his powers to that of a viceroy, but they demonstrate his willingness to try and bend the British imperial apparatus to his will.

Additional commentary reveals that Grant did not really value command or the modest augmentation of East Florida's troops and military infrastructure that he requested as a legitimate equalizer between his regime and the Creeks; he recognized that in the event of full-fledged war between Britain and the tribe, victory would require thousands of troops.[66] Instead, the trappings of British authority and institutions were necessary to suppress the neuroses of transatlantic investors and colonists alike. Early in his tenure, Grant asked Secretary of State Halifax's permission to erect a small fortification and barracks on the Mosquito Coast to house a garrison of fifty; he emphasized that the post would provide "no real security" to the settlers he soon expected in that vicinity, but would "make them easy in their own minds."[67] In a later elaboration on his entreaty to Halifax's successor, Grant revealed that the tactics employed in Indian warfare were why forts would only provide the veneer safety to settlers bound for the Mosquito Inlet or anywhere else in his colony. Willfully ignoring his experience in western Pennsylvania, when nearly two thousand native warriors flanked his command on both sides and forced his

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[65] *Ibid*.

[66] When Governor George Johnstone of West Florida pushed for war with the Creeks in 1766 over unresolved murders of British traders, Grant elaborated on the logistics he thought necessary to restore peace, much less win; Grant believed a Creek war would run Britain at least £200,000, would require 3,000 troops and at least as many horses and bullocks, and would inevitably end up "tedious and destructive to us." Hostilities would ultimately run the Crown "more money, than would keep the Indians in humor for twenty years, of properly laid out presents." Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, August 21, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 245-247; Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, December 15, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 17-19. For Johnstone's escalation, see Robin F.A. Fabel, *Bombast and Broadsides: The Lives of George Johnstone* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 54-56.

[67] Grant to Halifax, St. Augustine, May 8, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frame 283.

capitulation in an encircling vice, Grant accurately generalized that enemy Indians nearly always attacked enemy settlements in "small bodies" which made it "nearly impossible to be informed of their Approach."[68] Fortifications could never protect those working in the village or outlying farms from such stealth operations, because they were inevitably in an exposed condition when the raid commenced. A small fort at the Mosquito Inlet could not provide "absolute security to the inhabitants settled around it," but its presence could prevent total desertion of the burgeoning plantation economy there should the raiding he clearly considered a strong possibility occur.[69] Observing the fate of the Long Canes during "the course of the late war" showed Grant what to expect should raids target a frontier hamlet with no fort; the settlers, "in place of acting in Concert for their Mutual Safety, [would] abandon their Plantations upon the first Alarm, and retire with their Families to a more distant and better Settled Country."[70] Though the fort would not insulate the Mosquito Inlet colonists from the ravages of a surprise attack, it would "effectually prevent the Inhabitants [from] abandoning their Plantations, & giving up their All at once, upon a Stroke being Struck."[71] In the event of a Lower Creek assault, "their first idea would be to crowd the Fort," a demonstrably less detrimental outcome than absconding to St. Augustine a hundred miles to the north; Grant realized that full-scale flight to the capital could permanently damage the viability of both the settlement and a key prong of East Florida's fledgling economy, as settlers who left the scene were less likely to return than those who ran to a nearby fort to "recollect themselves."[72] Fortifications near East Florida settlements,

[68] Grant to Henry Conway, St. Augustine, January 26, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 290-291.
[69] *Ibid*.
[70] *Ibid*.
[71] *Ibid*.
[72] *Ibid*.

then, were a state expenditure designed to dupe the public into a false sense of well-being; Grant conceded to senior officials that the forts would not in all likelihood prevent any fatalities, but they would improve the prospects of a pliable, stationary agricultural sector.

Perception plays also figured into Grant's discourse with those taking financial risks in his colony. Grant's correspondence about Denys Rolle's search for a suitable tract directed the investor to soft pedal the nature of his errand to any Creeks he encountered.[73] Before any official meeting with the Lower Creeks, investors trekked far afield in East Florida searching for a plot to suit their purposes; Rolle was one of the first to do so. Rolle initially keyed on territory far west of the capital, in the vicinity of St. Mark's Apalachee.[74] Leery at the local *italwas'* potential reaction to Rolle (who had about a dozen settlers already in tow) poking around their land before any cession took place, the governor urged the grantee to proceed "with great delicacy."[75] He instructed Rolle to seek "the protection of the garrison, where [the settlers] could raise as much Indian Corn, and such other things as will be necessary for their present advantage," but under no circumstances could he "attempt to form any Plantation, at a distance from the Fort" until he heard that the boundary between the Creek hunting preserve and East Florida had been definitively settled.[76] Taking additional care, Grant wrote Stuart, who was in the midst of a marathon of parleys with the Southeastern Indian nations, informing him of Rolle's survey and asking

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[73] Rolle, an eccentric MP from Devon, eventually established a settlement near the contemporary site of Palatka, FL. Designed as a restorative experiment for London vagabonds, Rollestown was populated with "shoe blacks, cheminy sweepers, sinkboys… cinder wenches, whores and pickpockets." See Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West*, 447-451.

[74] This fertile bottomland, and the entire central portion of the peninsula, which once served as the breadbasket of the Apalachee chieftaincy, would eventually form the nexus of Florida's antebellum Cotton Kingdom. See Edward E. Baptist, *Creating an Old South: Middle Florida's Plantation Frontier Before the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

[75] Grant to Rolle, St. Augustine, September 14, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 80-82.

[76] *Ibid*.

him to send word to the St. Mark's *italwas* "not to be alarmed upon their arrival, as they would not settle there without their consent."[77] In his letter to Stuart, Grant requested that the superintendent reassure the natives of Apalachee that "the white people have only come to look at the Country," and that they had to give consent to sanction any permanent occupation.[78] Grant knew that any European encroachment so deep in Lower Creek territory could prove combustible, and took precautions accordingly. When the mercurial Rolle, who changed his mind about his preferred plot, settled on one closer to St. Augustine, Grant felt more comfortable instructing him to start clearing and sowing land, even though a cession had not yet transpired. Grant could not issue an order to survey until the royally appointed surveyor for East Florida (de Brahm) arrived or the boundary was settled with the Creeks, but he assured Rolle that if he settled on this land, which bordered the eastern bank of the St. John's, that he should "profit from the Fruits of [his] Labour" and that "Warrants of Survey should be issued as soon as possible."[79] Six months later, Grant mollified a frantic Rolle, horrified that word of his community had provoked the hostility of the nearby Alachuas. Grant begged Rolle to disregard the "reports from Latchowa about your settlement," for those villagers "have no vote, and are not even allowed to assist at the Councils of their Nation."[80] Grant clearly believed that the Alachua would lack a say at the negotiating table when he and Stuart hashed out the terms of the cession with the Lower Creeks, and that Rolle's tract fell within the parameters of what would be transferred. Grant had likely heard from Stuart that the Chattahoochee headmen considered the decision

[77] *Ibid*.
[78] Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, September 14, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 83-85.
[79] Grant to Rolle, St. Augustine, January 16, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 115-116.
[80] Grant to Rolle, St. Augustine, July 8, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 162-163.

regarding East Florida territory to be theirs alone to make; Grant's understanding of the political dynamic between the Lower and peninsular Creeks indicated that despite their origins, the Alachuas (referred to as *cimarrones*, or runaways, by the Spaniards) were now considered outsiders who occupied Creek lands, and were bound by the Lower Creek Council's decisions regarding land disposition.[81] Inside knowledge about the pending cession notwithstanding, Grant advised Rolle to remain discreet, and "be as civil to them [the Alachua villagers] as you please, but say nothing about Settlements."[82] The governor remained mum about how the parliamentarian was to accomplish this while going about planting within a few days' journey of the Alachua savannah. Grant's management of colonial expansion in the months before the official cession clearly involved deception, soothing consciences on both sides, sanctioning development without the approval of all indigenous parties concerned, and hoping for the best.[83]

If Grant's early attempts at directing land occupancy for the stakeholders in his colony required obfuscating his objectives from the Creeks, they also required the whitewashing of *bona fide* frontier violence. A close reading of Grant's personal papers reveal that historians have been fooled by the sources in bound manuscripts, which nearly uniformly chronicle his parrot call to imperial authorities that the colony's relations with local Indians were always warm and tranquil. Some have construed his gubernatorial

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[81] Saunt, *A New Order of Things*, 35; For the rules governing outsiders who settled within the Confederacy, see Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels*, 6-7.
[82] Grant to Rolle, St. Augustine, July 8, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 162-163.
[83] Despite his reputation as a defender of aboriginal land rights, Grant continued to play loose and fast with the boundary even after the cession. In a letter to Stuart towards the end of his governorship, Grant conceded that the backs of some of the tracts on the west side of the St. John's exceeded the boundary. Certain that the owners of these tracts would not exercise the uninhibited right of use enjoyed by all propertied Britons, the governor predicted that his illegal grants "would give no great offense" to Florida's Indians because settlements would remain confined to the riverbank. Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, February 4, 1769, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 171-174.

tenure as decidedly less bloody than it actually was.[84] Grant wrung his hands over an intercultural murder in 1765, but refused to take proactive measures and offered little but placation to those closer to the action. Before departing St. Mark's Apalachee on a schooner to locate a fertile tract on the St. John's, Rolle's voyage was delayed while waiting for a passenger who never materialized: "Simpson the trader from Pensacola"; Rolle heard that Simpson had been "killed… two days" from the fort by unidentified hostile Indians.[85] St. Mark's Apalachee lay nearly sixty miles east of the Apalachicola River, the line of demarcation between East and West Florida, a journey which in all likelihood exceeded two days. Grant responded that even though fellow trader James Spalding corroborated the story of Simpson's demise, he had "received no certain information of it."[86] Grant asserted that his hands were tied, for "even if the Report of the Murder is founded, it will fall under the consideration of the Governor of West Florida and the Superintendent."[87] Grant would not raise the issue to the Alachua Indians near him, for "my sending to Latchowa could have answered no end, but to make them believe that I considered them as parties, in a thing with which they have not the most distant connexion."[88] Grant simply prevaricated when faced with Rolle's concerns over an intercultural slaying, positing that the speculator suggested he point the finger at Cowkeeper's town when the villagers of Chescataleufa and the other *italwa* surrounding St. Marks seemed the more likely culprits. Moreover, he ignored the projected timeframe for the alleged incident, which placed the bloodshed on

[84] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 57; Hill, "New Systems, Established Traditions," 166. Admittedly, the scope of intercultural violence in East Florida never approached that of the chaotic abattoir just to the north in Georgia.
[85] Rolle to Grant, The Narrows of the St. John's River, June 6, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 7, Frames 240-241.
[86] Grant to Rolle, St. Augustine, July 8, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 162-163.
[87] *Ibid*.
[88] *Ibid*.

his side of the Florida partition. So eager to expand the colony's peripheries on the Board of Trade's map before sailing to East Florida, Grant erred on the side of dwindling parameters and passing the buck when faced with carnage perpetrated by the hegemonic power in his province. It would not be the last time that he declined to execute the King's justice in his southernmost North American possession.[89]

The pivotal diplomatic summit which officially settled the terms of commerce and the boundary between the Lower Creeks and British East Florida was held at the old Spanish watchtower at Picolata due west of St. Augustine between November 15th and 20th, 1765.[90] Picolata was the last of Stuart's original boundary conferences (1763-1765) designed to secure consent for relatively modest land cessions and ameliorate relations with all of the southeastern tribes, who had soured over the withdrawal of their French and Spanish foils to British imperialism; Grant accordingly had plenty of time to secure presents and strategize.[91] Cognizant of native diplomatic procedure due to his experiences prosecuting imperial war and aware that his position as East Florida's executive would require him to secure territorial concessions from a state that he explicitly denoted a "Creek Empire," Grant's preparation for Picolata began before even arriving in the colony, when he secured a £1,500 parliamentary subsidy for purchasing Indian presents; less than two months after his arrival, Grant informed Stuart of the "vast assortment of Indian

[89] Grant engaged in more subtle behavior to dissuade his correspondents from thinking that the specter of mayhem hung over East Florida. He frequently utilized euphemisms such as "accidents" and "playing tricks" to refer to murders, beatings, horse rustling, and other violent episodes. See Grant to Board of Trade, St. Augustine, June 13, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frame 289.
[90] Kathryn E. Holland Braund, "'The Congress Held in a Pavilion': John Bartram and the Indian Congress at Fort Picolata, East Florida," in *America's Curious Botanist: A Tercentennial Reappraisal of John Bartram, 1699-1777*, eds. Nancy E. Hoffman and John C. Van Horne (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 2004), 79; Mowat, *East Florida*, 21.
[91] The others occurred at Augusta (Nov 1763), Mobile (March 1764), and Pensacola (May 1765). See Alden, *John Stuart*, 176-214.

presents sent to this place from England" to foster "our Neighbours favorable Opinion of us, and to prevail upon them to permit us to settle quietly in their Country."[92] Although familiar with the Creeks' undeniable position as the preeminent indigenous power in the mid-eighteenth-century Southeast, Grant's invitation requests reveal that he did not yet discern the existence of separate spheres of regional interests between the Upper and Lower Towns. During Montgomery's campaign and his own, the primary Creek agitator encouraging Cherokee resistance had been the Mortar, a resident of the Abeika Upper Creek *italwa* Oakchoy and a likely participant at the battles of Etchoe and Cowhowee River. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as the leading civil authority in a colony adjacent to Creek country, Grant sought to head off any lingering animosity the headman might feel, and informed Stuart that with regards to the congress "of all things, I wish to see the Mortar, give him a particular salutation, and tell him I wish to be acquainted with him as a brother."[93] Anxious over the prospect of populating a strip of land virtually devoid of Europeans while being viewed as the inveterate foe of a man who had once sent his army packing and helped clear the backcountry of a much better established colony, Grant wanted the Mortar assured that he would "no more think of the difference he has with other colonies" than he would of "his having fired oftener than once" at his soldiers.[94] Grant was unaware that the Mortar's town had no say in the validation of British claims to territory in East Florida; the Okefenokee Swamp and the panhandle of east-central Florida was the Lower Creeks' hunting preserve, and they alone could authorize a cession. When Stuart informed Grant of the culmination of

[92] Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, October 3, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 8-9; Mowat, *East Florida*, 35; Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, October 17, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 92-95.
[93] *Ibid*.
[94] Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, September 14, 1764, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 83-85.

his West Florida conferences and his preparation for Picolata, he clarified this point, relaying that "the Mortar will not be with you as he returns to the Settlement which he built near the Cherokee Nation, but he will acquiesce in anything whatever may be agreed between you and the Lower Creeks."[95] Stuart, however, had promising news from a Lower Creek who would serve as one of the two primary delegates at Picolata, Captain Alleck, headman of the war town of Cusseta. Captain Alleck guaranteed Stuart that he would secure Grant "an Enlargement of Territory, but we must be content with a little at a time."[96] Exhilarated by the prospect of adding fertile lands west of the St. John's to the territory east of the river he already expected to receive, Grant anticipated the additional swell of capital flowing into East Florida.

Other correspondence reflected significantly less ardor for hobnobbing with the Creeks at the conference. In a missive to his northern counterpart, Grant expressed satisfaction at the headmen's decision to rendezvous in uninhabited country in lieu of his provincial capital, as in the wilderness he would not have to worry himself over their "Drunkenness from other People's Rum."[97] Sole control over the supply of *tafia* at the congress would spare Grant the mortification of hosting an event overrun by inebriates with an bottomless jug.[98] The governor, a daily partaker of claret and madeira, obviously considered Creek consumption of alcohol to be of the coarse, uninhibited variety, a stark contrast to the staid dignity and refinement of his table. The remote location of Picolata would allow Grant to "get rid of the great men sooner, and on much easier terms than if

[95] Stuart to Grant, Mobile, June 1, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 7, Frames 232-233.
[96] *Ibid*.
[97] Grant to Wright, St. Augustine, August 29, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 190-191.
[98] *Tafia* was cheap rum distilled from the byproducts of brown sugar production. See Braund, *Deerskins*, 105.

they were in town."[99] Furthermore, during the summit Grant would "live on board the Schooner East Florida by which means I'll be free of them at night"; temporarily converting provincial watercraft into a houseboat would also afford Grant the "power to say bon voyage when I please."[100] However much Grant gushed about the amicable relations between he and the Lower Creeks to his superiors at the Board of Trade when recounting numerous impromptu visits to St. Augustine before and after the congress, he would always conceive of hosting them a bothersome chore; a healthy fear of Creek military prowess did not translate to respect for headmen as social equals.

On November 15, 1765, in the company of Stuart and several soldiers of the Ninth Regiment, Grant positioned himself in a pine-thatched pavilion before addressing the roughly fifty Lower Creeks seated in a semicircle before him.[101] The natives proffered some forty dressed deerskins as an offering to the governor, while Grant's schooner was loaded with hundreds of pounds worth of guns, kettles, blankets, linen, and rum. Grant's sole objective was a generous cession which he hoped would allow him to extend the arc of rice and indigo plantations running southward along the Atlantic coast from the Georgetown District of South Carolina; the Creeks desired the establishment of regular commerce with the nascent province as well as the cornucopia of trade goods to be bequeathed to them as presents upon the conference's resolution.[102] Grant rose and delivered a meandering speech that accentuated his monarch's goodwill towards Native Americans, predisposition towards magnanimity, and desire for a cession of cultivatable land for his subjects to

[99] Grant to Wright, St. Augustine, August 29, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 190-191.
[100] *Ibid*; Grant to Knox, October 16, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 199-201.
[101] Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties,* 446.
[102] Braund, "The Congress Held in a Pavilion," 93.

inhabit. The governor concluded his preliminary address by notifying the Creeks that the parameters of the anticipated land deal were entirely at their discretion, but beseeched them to remember "that the peninsula of Florida was conquered by white and red people jointly together."[103] Such an assertion likely affronted the headmen, who perceived Florida as their hunting territory by right of conquest. Like their British imperial counterparts, the Creek Nation saw 1763 as the conclusion of a lengthy war that resulted in significant expansion, expulsion of their native and Spanish enemies, and control of the Florida peninsula.[104] Touting his protection of Lower Town territory in the aftermath of his Cherokee campaign and avoiding a mention of his eradication of their food supply, Grant assured his audience that his aim was not alienation of their hunting grounds.[105] Sempoyaffe of Coweta arose and apologized to Grant for the absence of his kinsman Escotchaby, who had "sent his son in his stead and desired him not to give away land," then conveyed his outrage over Georgians settling beyond the line determined at Augusta two years before.[106] After a swift rebuke from Stuart, the Congress awkwardly adjourned for the day. The following morning, Tallachea of Ocmulgee, the Lower Creek's other spokesman, made the cession offer: a line running from St. Sevilla on the Altamaha River south to Picolata; the speaker's proposal would confine British settlement to the east of the St. John's River and was considerably less than Grant had expected (or had already

[103] Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties*, 455-456.
[104] Braund, "The Congress Held in a Pavilion," 82.
[105] Covington, ed. *The British Meet the Seminoles*, 24.
[106] *Ibid*., 26. Grant later referred to Sempoyaffe as "a most troublesome, hardy strong-mouthed Dog," who the governor claimed he successfully cowed into submission taking "little notice" of his words, which were "sulky and cross as the Devil." Grant considered his air of utter contempt for the Coweta *mico*, and not the pressure on him to cement a trade deal, as the reason for Sempoyaffe's subsequent volte-face. Grant "made Brothers with him," and asked that the Creek headman keep "things quiet to the Southward of the St. Mary's," a request that he was unable to satisfy. Grant to Knox, St. Augustine, December 9, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 203-205.

informed investors was a *fait accompli*), especially given Captain Alleck's previous statement.[107] Grant and Stuart became visibly perturbed as Alleck seconded Tallachea's motion, then downright irate when the Wioffke, the Long Warrior of Alachua, begged Grant "to mark the line now settled and to order the people who are gone beyond it to draw back."[108] The apprehension expressed by Rolle a few months earlier proved founded, as the Alachuas objected to settlements which extended up to and across the river. Furthermore, the Long Warrior clarified that the peninsular Creeks did have a bearing on the conference proceedings despite Grant's construal of them as politically voiceless; The Alachua *mico* had tapped Tallachea to speak in his stead because he was "not accustomed to speak in public himself."[109] Wioffke tinged his request for prompt withdrawal with the specter of reprisal, observing that "accidents may happen as their young men are very mad people."[110] Seeing markets and prestige among his London associates evaporating, Grant cornered Tallachea and Alleck after the talks recessed that evening, claimed that Wioffke was lying about Europeans settling beyond the St. John's, and angrily threatened to scotch the negotiations and withdraw without doling out presents.[111] Grant and Stuart then pitched a counteroffer – their line ran west of the St. John's, from the mouth of Oklawaugh Creek on a slight northwestwardly trajectory, past Spalding's Upper Store and on to the St. Mary's.[112] Moving on to private conversations with other headmen, Grant and Stuart

[107] Covington, ed., *The British Meet the Seminoles*, 28. Grant later wrote that the territory preliminarily offered at Picolata contained "not room for a single good Plantation, and if they had persisted there must have been a total stop put to the settling of the Province for a time." Grant to Knox, St. Augustine, December 9, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 203-205.
[108] Covington, ed., *The British Meet the Seminoles*., 29.
[109] *Ibid*.
[110] *Ibid*.
[111] *Ibid*., 32-33.
[112] *Ibid*., 37.

received more blowback; Grant's account of the evening of November 16th gives the impression that these conversations escalated into a suppertime conference for which there is scant written record.[113] After hours of heated negotiations, "a Young fellow of some note" claimed that he was at a loss to explain "why they had come so far, if they intended to differ with the White People about a little land, which they had in Plenty, and could well spare."[114] This unnamed warrior, who evidently hailed from a Lower Creek town significantly north of Florida, broke the impasse, and convinced the majority of the headmen to support Grant's new line. The following morning, Tallachea promptly rose and expressed that the alteration "would answer very well" as long as no encroachments occurred beyond the boundary; Grant in turn promised that any "white people should be removed who had passed the line."[115] In a concession which both compromised East Florida's sovereignty in the territory just secured and exponentially increased the prospect of frontier encounters and violence between colonists and Creeks, Grant agreed that "the red people were now welcome to hunt upon these grounds as they were before they agreed to give them up."[116] The parties signed the treaty, a present bonanza ensued, and Grant sailed back to St. Augustine. Grant's recognition that the terms he demanded defied the wishes of some of his closest neighbors, however, made him leery that Alachua's "young men should play tricks amongst the Inhabitants."[117] Grant braced his Board of Trade superiors for violent flareups, "which at times must be expected of such near neighbors who have no coercive power to keep them in order."[118] His prediction proved prescient, but

[113] Grant to Knox, St. Augustine, December 9, 1765, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 203-205.
[114] *Ibid*.
[115] Covington, ed., *The British Meet the Seminoles*, 34.
[116] *Ibid*.
[117] Grant to Board of Trade, St. Augustine, January 13, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frame 289.
[118] *Ibid*.

Grant had a plan that he thought would ensure the peninsular Creeks' overall quiescence and provision of satisfaction should any trick playing transpire.

As a legally binding agreement between the British state and the Creek Indians, the Treaty of Picolata provides a framework for comprehending the protocol for resolving incidents of intercultural murder established by the signatories. The articles of the Treaty of Picolata thus represent the norms which theoretically determined the outcomes of violent interactions between East Floridians and Creeks; accounts of those encounters and their resolutions after its adoption reflect not only the efficacy of the treaty, but also the extent of British order and governance in the colony. The parties at the Congress of Picolata plainly articulated the expected behaviors of the respective societies in cases of intercultural murder. Two of the treaty's five articles established standard protocol for such incidents, which both sides recognized could escalate into war if unchecked. The third article outlined the Creek response should one of their number murder a white man: "if any Indian or Indians whatever shall hereafter Murder or kill a White Man, The offender or Offenders shall without delay, Excuse or pretence whatever be immediately put to Death in a public manner in the Presence of at least Two of the English."[119] Conversely, should a colonist kill a Native, article four delineated that "such White man shall be tried for the Offence in the same manner as if he had Murdered a White Man and if found Guilty shall be Executed accordingly in the presence of some of the Relations of the Indian who has been killed."[120] These *lex talionis* stipulations mirror those adumbrated in the Augusta Treaty of 1763 and reflect the legal realities of Britain's utter lack of jurisdiction over Creeks and an

[119] Covington, ed., *The British Meet the Seminoles*, 36-37.
[120] *Ibid*.

official recognition of native sovereignty in the lands beyond the cession.[121] Indians could not be tried for crimes in colonial courts, nor could they provide sworn testimony to aid the prosecution of violent offenders.[122] Under these agreements, each respective society bore the responsibility of providing satisfaction for the murder of a member of the other. But Grant's underlying attitude towards these incidents, coupled with his goal of directing liquid capital, migrants, and agricultural development, insured that the Lower Creeks would not have to live up to their end of the agreement, though the British would (and did). Colonial history is frequently conceived in terms of European disregard for formal treaties with Amerindian groups, but the agreement at Picolata and events in its wake depict Native Americans' ability to flout the obligations of such agreements.[123]

In a remarkable letter to Stuart discussing West Florida's official reaction to the murder of two traders, Grant outlined no less than his manifesto for Indian management in East Florida. Decrying West Florida's recent "impolitick" pugnaciousness and legal dogmatism when responding to the murders of white colonists, the governor opined that when transacting business with Indians, "The Dignity of a powerful Nation is by no means concerned."[124] When faced with the ultimate challenge to a subject's liberties, the deprivation of life, "the interest, not the Honor of Great Britain and its colonies is to be

[121] Juricek, *Endgame for Empire*, 62-63.
[122] *Ibid.*, 8-9.
[123] In form and function, Grant's experience with the Lower Creeks bears a marked likeness to French and Spanish interactions with the Quapaw and Osage of the Arkansas River Valley in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There, in the distant interior, "Indians were more often able to determine the form and content of intercultural relations with their would-be European colonizers," and indigenes incorporated Europeans into preexisting political and sociocultural systems of their crafting. See Kathleen DuVal, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 1-12.
[124] Grant to John Stuart, St. Augustine, December 15, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 17-19.

considered."[125] Grant then harkened back to his yearlong imprisonment in Montreal, where he encountered "Canadian officers… well versed in the management of them"; these French liaisons possessed familial connections to their Algonquian allies which lent their wishes "Weight," and ease of communication sprang from their ability to "Speak their Language as fluently as their own."[126] Despite the advantages cultural literacy afforded Vaudreuil's lieutenants (none of which anyone in East Florida possessed), they could not "prevent their Voyaguers being frequently murdered" by the natives who lived among them as close kin.[127] Grant considered the manner in which the French Father dealt with the inevitable intercultural killing genius; the French would explicitly "demand satisfaction" and "if the opportunity was favorable, they insisted on it," but much more frequently "they postponed their resentment."[128] Never under any circumstances would Onontio allow resentment over isolated frontier slayings drive the French to "commence hostilities with a whole Nation, because a few Individuals deserved Punishment."[129] Instead, Vaudreuil would bide his time, nurse the grievance, and attempt to secure satisfaction much later, when "the offending Nation found it in their Interest to pay Court to them."[130] Such opportunities seldom arose, but Grant did recall once instance of satisfaction for the slaughter of Voyaguers. Three Algonquian murderers from an unnamed *pays d'en haut* tribe were remanded to Vaudreuil's custody; the French Father only executed one of the offenders,

[125] *Ibid*.
[126] *Ibid*.
[127] *Ibid*., Voyageurs were French fur traders seasonally laden with dry goods to exchange for peltry by Montreal factors before being sent into the deepest recesses of the *pays d'en haut* to commerce with the Algonquians. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 108.
[128] Grant to John Stuart, St. Augustine, December 15, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 17-19.
[129] *Ibid*.
[130] *Ibid*.

sending the other two back to their nation.[131] In contrast to Johnstone's foolhardy bellicosity, which failed to take into account the continental balance of power and needlessly imperiled Britain's emerging markets, the French had been "too politick to lose the trade of an Indian Nation, or to expose their Settlements to Indian attacks, in order to revenge the Death of a few wandering Woodsmen."[132] Here Grant disclosed to his fellow bureaucrat the difference between his public and private positions on intercultural murders; officially, Grant would seek redress according to the Picolata Treaty's stipulations and bluster demands to Lower Creek headmen for satisfaction in accordance with British criminal law, but in reality these demands were merely suggestions, and he would sacrifice the British denizens of the frontier to the exigencies of native diplomacy. Incidents like these were an inevitability in zones where Europeans rubbed elbows with natives; no more exceptional than "Robberys upon the high way" and just as unpreventable, Grant advised preparation and planning for Indian violence the colony could not avoid: "we should not be alarmed when [accidents] happen, and we should expect them to happen at times."[133] Formulated over the course of a year's scrutiny of his captors' Indian management techniques – methods responsible for the nadir of his military career – Grant's position conceded that squabbles between Florida smallholders unaffectionately referred to as "crackers" and Creeks on the frontier (and *all* of East Florida qualified as frontier) would be resolved according to indigenous notions of reciprocal violence. Grant had learned from Lyttelton's folly, knowing full well the consequences that attempting to impose British law on indigenous populations would hold for East Florida, which could not weather sustained

[131] *Ibid*.
[132] *Ibid*.
[133] *Ibid*.

Creek raiding. Grant lacked Lyttelton's substantial demographic core and the wartime specter of the French which could be invoked to summon regiments of redcoats. So the governor would pay lip service to justice for the slayings of replaceable crackers, allow intercultural violence anywhere in his colony to be sorted out by native custom, and keep the end game, the "£60,000 sterling [to] be laid out next year by the English Grantees" for East Florida's development, squarely in his sights.[134]

Analysis of the articles of the Picolata Treaty and subsequent violent episodes in East Florida reflect Grant's inability and unwillingness to push for enforcement of the treaty's provisions and administration of the British law throughout his colonial jurisdiction. In a 1766 letter to the Board of Trade, after asserting the generally cordial tenor of Indian relations, Grant recounted an episode in which a party of marooned Frenchmen fell in with a group of local Creeks who then "most barbarously murdered some of them to get plunder." [135] Far from the coast and the peninsular perpetrators, Tallachea fretted that "some of the King's subjects had been killed."[136] After an inquiry into the affair, Tallechea determined that "there were no white men killed," and thus concluded that the murders required no satisfaction.[137] He then deployed a messenger to explain the matter to Grant, claiming that he discovered that the French party killed two women and a boy in a Creek village to prompt the reprisals. Apparently, some of the French survivors of the attack were imprisoned by their Indian assailants, but escaped, straggled into St. Augustine,

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[134] *Ibid*. Grant also conditioned the Board of Trade to expect Creek murders of crackers to go unavenged, arguing that "Satisfaction for the Injuries the Creeks have done, or may do, is only to be demanded not insisted upon, so as either to oblige those Indians to give it or go to War with us." See Grant, "State of Indian Affairs in the Southern Provinces of America from 1758 to 1766," August 21, 1766, St. Augustine, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 300-302.
[135] Grant to Board of Trade, August 5, 1766, CO5/548, 103, *Colonial America*, colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.
[136] *Ibid*.
[137] *Ibid*.

and informed Grant that the attack was entirely unprovoked. Grant clearly believed the French version of the bloody encounter, as he informed his Board of Trade contact that the Indians were "pretend[ing]."[138] The governor subsidized the remainder of the French party's passage to New York from the colonial contingent account, but he merely chided Tallechea in his response, informing the Ocmulgee headman that the "Great King is at Peace with the French and the Spaniards, and that he will be very angry at his Indian Children if they kill any of them."[139]

Grant's scolding reflects not only his inability to demand a proactive resolution to the French murders, but also Tallechea's. The Ocmulgee headman's predicament accentuates the loose and decentralized nature of mid-eighteenth-century Creek political power.[140] Other than decisions that committed the nation to war or affected territorial boundaries (both of which required the establishment of consensus in a general council), individual *italwa* conducted their own foreign and domestic policy. Towns and communities represented the focal points of Creek life, were the building blocks of Creek polities, and figured heavily in diplomacy and the resolution of conflicts with outsiders. [141] As the headman of Ocmulgee (a Chattahoochee River village), one of Tallachea's responsibilities involved convincing the inhabitants of his *talwa* to conform to the guidelines set up at Picolata. This episode, which occurred in East Florida, could have involved Ocmulgees hunting far afield, but local East Florida Creeks are the more likely culprits. In addition to highlighting the semi-autonomous nature of the peninsular *italwa*,

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[138] *Ibid*.
[139] *Ibid*.
[140] Andrew K. Frank, "Taking the State Out: Seminoles and Creeks in Late-Eighteenth-Century Florida," *The Florida Historical Quarterly,* Vol. 84, No. 1 (Summer 2005): 12.
[141] Joshua Piker, *Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, 1-12.

this episode reveals the difficulties associated with enforcing the third article of the treaty. In Creek country during the eighteenth century, the political system revolved around a leader's ability to persuade rather than a monopoly on coercive force.[142] Clan-driven retributive justice and the belief that taking the life of any clan member would satisfy the penal requirement for murder governed the judicial outcomes of violent deaths in Creek country.[143] To secure the satisfaction in the manner required by the treaty, Tallechea needed to convince the members of another clan who almost certainly resided in a different village of two things: that the clan member was not enacting a just reprisal for the murder of his kin and that the perpetrator's execution represented a more favorable course of action for the clan than the execution of any other clan member.

Even the vaunted elocution of the "flame of the tongue" (the English translation of Tallechea's namesake) lacked the persuasive skills to secure the execution of the perpetrators.[144] Tallechea could not coerce Creeks from other towns to turn themselves in; he needed to persuade the offenders' clans to do so. Fabricating a loophole rooted in Native conceptions of race by asserting that the Frenchmen lacked the prerequisite whiteness (an opinion adverse to eighteenth-century British notions of race, regardless of long-standing animosity towards the French) to be subjected to the treaty's articles seemed a much easier way of washing his hands of the problem.[145] Although the violence definitely targeted white people, Grant lacked the capacity to enforce the treaty and protect Europeans in East Florida; he certainly would not clamor for justice for itinerant non-residents if he would

[142] Saunt, *A New Order of Things*, 1, 14.
[143] Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 80-81.
[144] Braund, "The Congress Held in a Pavilion," 85.
[145] Grant to Board of Trade, August 6, 1766, CO5/548, 103, *Colonial America*, colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.

not do so for George III's own subjects. Tallechea equivocated over the Creeks' understanding of the formal pact between the societies, and the governor accepted the Beloved Man's manipulation of the treaty's language. Tallechea assured Grant that "if it had happened to white people satisfaction should have been given," and the Scot chose to stress the Creeks' pliability in transferring the shipwreck captives "the moment they were demanded" instead of his disinclination to object to their disregard for the treaty.[146] Grant lamented the violence, but declined to push for the resolution mandated by the treaty, thus setting a precedent for future behavior.

On September 18, 1767, a direr imbroglio than the French affair threatened East Florida's relations with the peninsular Indians. Some peninsular Creeks, sons of the Alachua headman Philoki, who Grant erroneously characterized as "wandering Indians who are detested by their nation and do not properly belong to any Town" pilfered some horses from settlers living on the British side of the cession on the east bank of the St. Mary's River.[147] The aggrieved colonists tracked down the Natives, bound them to a tree, whipped them, and dispensed excruciating retribution by rubbing salt in the Creeks' open wounds. The following day, the Alachuas extricated themselves from their bonds and returned to the isolated homestead. They lay in wait and ambushed a group of the settlers, including Jerry Wilder ("one of the principal actors") while they drove cattle into a pen, killing two.[148] Instead of furiously requesting a detachment from Gage, Grant immediately sought to explain away the murders as an isolated incident that did not reflect a general

[146] Grant to Knox, St. Augustine, September 2, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 261-264.
[147] Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, November 10, 1767, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frame 83. For the murderers' lineage, see Laurens to Grant, Charlestown, October 1, 1768, Philip M. Hamer and George C. Rogers, Jr., eds., *The Papers of Henry Laurens: Volume Six: Aug 1, 1768 – July 31, 1769* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Historical Society, 1978), 120.
[148] Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, November 10, 1767, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frame 83.

Creek hostility towards his regime or colony. Though Philoki's sons immolated Wilder's house, they did not detach the scalps of their cracker victims, behavior which convinced Grant that the warriors believed that the "Nation would not approve of their conduct."[149] Furthermore, the duo "did not touch an old man who lived there, nor did they hurt the women and children," restraint indicative "that it was not their intention to quarrel with His Majesty's subjects in general."[150] Comfortable with relegating resolution of the affair to the Creeks, Grant conformed to the French model he outlined to Stuart; he would remind the Creeks of their obligation to provide satisfaction, abstain from adamant demands, and allow them to punish their wrongdoers, but at their leisure, as "in our present circumstances, it would be imprudent to hurry them in point of time."[151] Most critically, the Europeans and Africans dwelling south of the St. Mary's, who "were alarmed at first" quickly "got the better of their fears and remain quietly where they are" engaged in productive field labor.[152]

In an invitation to the Second Congress of Picolata which transpired a few months later, Grant enclosed a personal talk to the Cowkeeper outlining his position on the double murder. The governor informed the Alachua headman of the reciprocal nature of the treaty's articles, promising that "if your white brothers hurt a red man they shall be punished for it," and imparted that he thought no worse of the chief over the acts of the "rogues" from his town culpable for the killings.[153] Grant expressed a confidence that his correspondent would "be angry with them" and "give me the satisfaction I deserve when

[149] *Ibid*.
[150] Grant to Shelburne, St. Augustine, October 31, 1767, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 334-335.
[151] *Ibid*.
[152] Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, November 10, 1767, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frame 83.
[153] Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties*, 469-470.

we meet."[154] He then related that Grey Eyes, an Alachua Creek, as well as three others ("some of your people"), were present in St. Augustine in the direct aftermath of the killings, but enjoyed the aegis of the governor's office, for he "knew they were not to blame."[155] Moreover, some of the murdered settlers' relatives appeared in town shortly after word of the St. Mary's attacks arrived, but "knew that their four red brothers had no hand in what happened and therefore would not strike them."[156] Grant relayed this talk to assure Cowkeeper of his continued goodwill towards Alachua, but invoked his rationale regarding Grey Eyes' group to urge the *mico* to provide a resolution to the St. Mary's murders in accordance with British notions of justice. In the British court system, when an individual stood accused of a crime, that person and no other endured the punishment if convicted by a jury of peers. Creek notions of justice operated on a principle of reciprocity, and the life of any clan member could be taken to satisfy the punishment required by the violent acts of another clan member. Native Americans believed that the souls of relatives killed by violence demanded reprisal in kind against the clan responsible for their deaths, a concept referred to as "crying blood" by ethnohistorians.[157] These notions of criminal justice often sparked blood feuds between the clans that escalated into larger conflicts. [158] Fully aware of these divergent perspectives of jurisprudence, Grant pointed to the third article of the Picolata Treaty (rooted in the Western notion that the criminal suffers the punishment) as an outline for the way that Cowkeeper should prosecute the murderers.

[154] *Ibid*.
[155] *Ibid*.
[156] *Ibid*.
[157] Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 80-81.
[158] Saunt, *A New Order of* Things, 91.

Two months later, at the Second Congress of Picolata, Grant framed the incident as an "accident" and hoped to convince the headmen of his desire to punish the "wild young men" responsible rather than penalizing the entire Creek nation.[159] The governor requested satisfaction as defined by the treaty, asserting that "White rogues should be punished in the presence of some red people; and I expect satisfaction in like manner from my red brothers when a white man is killed."[160] He assured the Creek headmen that had the "red men complained to me" about the whippings, he would have administered justice, and insisted that the Creek community punish the vigilantes.[161] In a response to Grant's demands, Pumpkin King of Oussitche expressed sorrow over the "mischief [that] happens on the Sea Coast" and agreed that "coming to talk to the Governor was the only way to prevent mischief and keep up peace." He promised Grant that the murders happened when he was en route to the congress, and that upon "[his] return into the Nation he will endeavor to get satisfaction."[162] Perhaps the murderers were clansmen of the Pumpkin King, but they resided in Cowkeeper's *talwa*, hundreds of miles from Oussitche, which lay on the banks of the Chattahoochee. Grant did not provide a deadline for justice, but expected word to be sent "from the Nation acquainting him when it is done."[163]

The Creek headmen proceeded to provide satisfaction in accordance with the tenants of reciprocity rather than the Picolata Treaty. Tallechea paid a personal call to Grant soon after the Second Congress, bearing a white eagle's tail to symbolize "that their hearts were straight and the path from them to their White Brothers was clear."[164] The

[159] Covington, ed., *The British Meet the Seminoles*, 53.
[160] *Ibid*., 55.
[161] *Ibid*.
[162] *Ibid*., 56.
[163] *Ibid*.
[164] Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties*, 476-477.

Ocmulgee Beloved Man informed Grant that Bonaichée, a town headman and the uncle of the duo responsible for the St. Mary's murders, had been killed, and Tallachea considered "his Death sufficient Satisfaction for what had been done."[165] Grant responded that he considered Bonaichée's life insufficient recompense for the St. Mary's murders, and that he believed that the two nephews had killed their uncle to protect their own skins. The governor, however, sensing a tidy resolution, swiftly made a concession to Native retributive justice. Because he "loved the Red Men, and do not wish to be hard upon them, I shall admit that Bonaichée has suffered on account of the Murder at St. Marys."[166] He then proposed that he would consider the issue resolved if the Creeks put one of the pair responsible to death. Tallechea vowed to capture one of the nephews and execute him before he departed.[167]

Grant scoffed at indigenous notions of justice when recounting Tallechea's visit to the Earl of Hillsborough, in a letter a few weeks later, but conceded that he would likely fail to secure a resolution that aligned with British criminal law, stating that he was "in great hopes of carrying the point but if I should fail in it, I must endeavor to save appearances and explain it away without quarreling with them."[168] He again conditioned his ministerial employers to expect the issue to remain unresolved, professing that "Indians for many years, have seldom done so much" as swapping an uncle's life for a perpetrator's.[169] In the

[165] *Ibid*.
[166] *Ibid*.
[167] *Ibid*.
[168] Grant to Hillsborough, St. Augustine, June 20, 1768, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frame 354.
[169] *Ibid*. Earlier in 1768, Grant conceded to the commander of St. Mark's Apalachee that he would be pleased with the Creeks having only "one [perpetrator] put to death to prevent such accidents in the future, as they really met with great provocation, and of course were not so much to blame for resolving bad treatment, but the revenge was too violent." Grant to Ensign Wright, St. Augustine, February 23, 1768, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 108-109.

subsequent months, Grant tried to shame the Lower Creek headmen into providing satisfaction by demonstrating his commitment to providing the Creeks with the justice outlined by the Picolata Treaty.[170] More backcountry violence provided Grant with a chance to galvanize the Creeks to surrender one of the St. Mary's killers. In a talk directed to the Lower Creek headmen, Grant relayed that he had reason to believe that some white cattle herders killed a Creek man near the St. John's River. Nipké, the father of the murdered Creek and "a warrior of some note among the Uchees," relayed his suspicions that the settlers killed his son, and Grant "immediately sent to the Woods to apprehend the people who were suspected."[171] Moreover, Grant provisioned a reconnaissance party headed by Nipké to survey the cattle herders' property in search of "Bones, Clothes, Gun, Sadle, or any thing which belonged to the Indian who is missing."[172] Though Nipké could not provide legal testimony in East Florida's criminal court, Grant would consider evidence recovered at the crime scene in his adjudication of the matter. Grant closed his talk by avowing an expedient sentence should the two men be proven to have committed the murders, an example that he wished the Creek headmen to follow with regards to the St. Mary's affair.[173] After apprehending the suspects, Grant summoned Nipké, who upon seeing the prisoners left town in "as good humor as could be expected after losing his son," and

[170] This strategy conformed with the manner in which Grant outlined his French policy of Indian management to the Board of Trade. Grant believed that the social pressure of ignominy could potentially coax satisfaction for murders from natives, and avowed to reiterate the contents of "their Treatys, and of the ill consequences of not observing them, and being considered as a faithless Nation." Grant, "State of Indian Affairs in the Southern Provinces of America from 1758 to 1766," August 21, 1766, St. Augustine, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 300-302.
[171] Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties*, 479-480; Grant to Stuart, St. Augustine, December 22, 1768, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 159-160.
[172] Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties*, 479-480.
[173] *Ibid*.

thoroughly convinced of Grant's intent to provide satisfaction.[174] Swift mollification of the grieving father facilitated Grant's priority of insulating the nascent settlements, as Nipké disseminated word of a pending satisfactory resolution to the rest of Creek Nation, which headed off pursuit of bloodlust in the pine barrens "according to their Custom"; the governor thought the taking of "a single Scalp" in retaliation would precipitate the flight of all the colony's agricultural labor "from their Plantations, and I shall find it a difficult matter to prevail upon them to return."[175]

The following year, Grant reported to General Gage the delivery of prompt justice to the murderer of Nipké's son, as "the Cracker was tryed, found guilty, condemned and hanged in the Presence of the murdered Indian's Father and a number of other Indians, within three Weeks from the Day he committed the Murder."[176] The colony's woodsmen and cattle drovers resented the penal consequences, considering it outrageous "that a white man should suffer for killing an Indian"; some attempted a jailbreak under the cover of night, which Grant foiled by stationing "double sentries" on guard duty and expediting the execution.[177] Railroading his suspect to justice in order to provide the Creeks with an example of East Florida's strict observance of the treaty's stipulations at the expense of alienating the colony's yeomen, however, brought Grant no closer to execution of the St. Mary's murderers. Nearly three years after the episode, Grant was still begging the Creeks for satisfaction. By 1770, Grant was proposing alternate courses of action which reflected anxiety about a matter he considered far graver than intercultural murder. The governor

[174] Grant to Hillsborough, St. Augustine, December 22, 1768, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 376-377.
[175] *Ibid*.
[176] Grant to Gage, St. Augustine, March 5, 1769, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 377-378.
[177] Grant to Hillsborough, St. Augustine, January 14, 1769, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 382-383.

proposed that the Creeks, "for the Murders committed three years ago upon the St. Marys River," accede to "sending back a few Negroes who have run away from their Masters, and now live in the Indian Country."[178] An exasperated Grant had abandoned all hope of securing the king's justice for the murdered settlers, and he informed Hillsborough "If they send back the Negroes, I shall waive the satisfaction, which it is difficult for them to give."[179] This option represented a complete abrogation of British jurisprudence, as returning the maroons would nullify the death of one perpetrator as demanded in his previous compromise. It would, however, augment the productivity of East Florida's nascent plantation belt. This proposal represents perhaps the strongest evidence of Grant's willingness to play loose and fast with imperial law in the name of agricultural yield and personal interest.

In an account of the final recorded fracas between the East Floridians and the Lower Creeks during Grant's gubernatorial tenure, surveyor general de Brahm related the impotence of Britain's imperial regime in East Florida vis-à-vis the Creeks. In New Smyrna, a Mosquito Inlet settlement of Greeks and Minorcans founded by Dr. James Turnbull (a member of the East Florida Society of London), the German-born engineer bore witness to a tense scene that threatened to degenerate into violence during a 1770 surveying trip. According to the surveyor, the southern line of the cession at Picolata ran "from the mouth of the Oklywahaw, to the Atlantic Ocean" – significantly north of the settlements and surrounding plantations on the Mosquito Inlet.[180] In retaliation, a band of peninsular Creeks descended upon the white settlement painted in black, aiming to take "violent

[178] Grant to Hillsborough, St. Augustine, July 10, 1770, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 409-410.
[179] *Ibid*.
[180] De Brahm, *De Brahm's Report*, 257.

possession of their reserved lands."[181] To avert the pending attack, Turnbull promptly "emptied the contents of his magazine, dispensing it to this war party as a present."[182] Proffering the town's powder, ammunition, and provisions defused the situation, but left New Smyrna defenseless until more could be acquired. De Brahm openly wondered whether such practices would evolve into a regular tribute "to be paid to them by the Inhabitants" and feared that such a scenario would circumvent the colony's ability to treat with the Creeks through the normal diplomatic channels.[183] He thought that Turnbull's "gifts" might set a precedent by which the Creeks would refuse a summons to attend a congress and stop listening to the governor's talks, instead preferring to frequently seek redress for trespasses from private parties and individuals whose gifts were "not binding" rather than colonial officials whose presents cemented diplomatic ties.[184]

De Brahm attributed the show of force at New Smyrna to the Creeks' "boldness, which is become unbounded ever since the cruel murders by them committed anno 1767 upon the Saint Mary's settlers."[185] The engineer thus explicitly related the Creeks' temerity to Grant's (and everyone else's) inability to bring the murderers to justice. One historian's account of life in New Smyrna identifies Turnbull's merciless labor regime, the broiling heat, and the proximity of malarial swamps as causes of the settlement's 1777 demise.[186] De Brahm's observations potentially imply another contributing factor. Grant's responses to violence in East Florida suggest that the imperial order exerted in the colony emanated from Creek country. The European colonists strictly adhered to the Picolata Treaty's

[181] *Ibid*.
[182] *Ibid*.
[183] *Ibid*.
[184] *Ibid*.
[185] *Ibid*.
[186] Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West*, 451-461.

articles or succumbed to the local *italwa's* coercion, Creek leaders prevaricated when asked to adhere to the document's clear stance regarding intercultural murder, and Creek warriors could openly flout the treaty's stipulations.

When shaming the peninsular Creeks into surrendering the murderers failed, Grant attempted to bribe them into compliance. As a land cession with hunting privileges exchanged for a gift-giving spree and regular trade with British merchants, the First Congress of Picolata represented a clear *quid pro quo* between the East Floridians and the Creeks. Exchanges between the two parties after that congress appear far more lopsided. Grant's correspondence reveals that he regularly oversaw the transferal of the British empire's wealth to the Chattahoochee and peninsular Creeks with no discernable recompense. The Second Congress of Picolata qualified as such a show of largesse. Even before the congress, local Creeks would drop in expecting distributions of dry goods, shot, and rum; when the Cowkeeper's entourage showed up unexpected in St. Augustine, Grant informed them that presents were "for people who were sent invitations," then promptly delivered two kegs of ammunition and powder, two kegs of rum, a barrel of flour, 200 pounds of rice, tobacco, shirts, and assorted trinkets anyway.[187] Planned before the St. Mary's crisis and soon after its onset, the congress was conceived as a mechanism to woo the Creeks in a manner befitting Onontio; in his invitations to the event, he imparted that the British monarch "like a good Father, he thinks of you at a Distance on the other side of the Great Lake."[188] Grant hoped the attendees would "be agreeably surprised to receive large Presents without any thing being asked from them in return. I thought such a step

[187] Grant to Stuart, October 3, 1766, *JGP*, Reel 2, Frames 8-9.
[188] Grant to Ensign Wright, St. Augustine, July 21, 1767, *JGP*, Frame 2, Reels 55-57.

necessary to keep up a good understanding with them in this New Country."[189] Unsurprisingly, the governor masked ulterior motives; he thought he could suppress Creek violence through regular present dispensations. After the St. Mary's murders, he doubled down, informing Shelburne that when natives visited and requested provisions, he would "give them in plenty," as they uniformly "assure me that I may get satisfaction."[190] These strategies proved rooted in delusion and futile. Gift giving in diplomatic exchanges was expected by Native Americans as a sign of hospitality and good faith, and the practice was also a prerequisite to establishing regular trade with the Indians. Stuart recognized gift giving as the key to initiating the commerce that he viewed as the "original great tie between the Indians and Europeans."[191] Grant's profligacy, however, broadcasted his weak position to local Creeks. In reality, annual largesse and intermittent private gift giving when the Creeks came to St. Augustine looked remarkably like the tributary relationship that de Brahm feared, and very well could have fostered the notion amongst them that such imperial doles were compulsory. Incidents like the one at New Smyrna illustrate the Creeks' willingness to use the specter of violence to secure material concessions from settlers who appeared vulnerable. Grant thought that largesse could render East Florida the colony of his fancy: a tranquil terrestrial paradise to showcase for investors like Lord Adam Gordon. In reality, the regular bestowal of mass quantities of goods with no recompense other than continued peaceful relations probably made the colonial governor look like a cipher to the Creeks.

[189] Juricek, ed., *Georgia and Florida Treaties*, 468.
[190] Grant to Shelburne, St. Augustine, March 12, 1768, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 347-348.
[191] Quoted in Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels*, 26.

The success of Grant's gubernatorial regime in East Florida hinged on the creation of lasting settlements and convincing British capitalists to deliver a steady influx of European and African emigres to the colony. Immediate recognition of the power imbalance between his colony and the Creek Confederacy indicated that pursuit of these ends required either a substantial troop reinforcement or an unwavering commitment to culturally accommodating indigenous neighbors, or both; when the former never materialized, Grant settled on the latter. In doing so, he demonstrated a remarkable degree of adaptability and pragmatism in pursuit of self-aggrandizement: when dealt a weakling's hand not long after terrorizing the Cherokees and leaving them to starve, Grant virtually kowtowed to a hegemonic indigenous empire. To slake his material ambitions, Grant actively manipulated how people conceived of East Florida: he deceived investors by construing their tracts as safe, within the bounds of the cession, and unlikely to arouse the ire of local natives, settlers by erecting fortifications to instill a false sense of security, and Creeks by encouraging growth and development beyond the border which he agreed to with them. Embracing as inexorable the violent upshot of the scenario wrought by these machinations, Grant, equipped with observations of an empire's operation on native ground, proceeded to willfully abandon the very foundation of the British overseas empire: the imperial law which governed the persons and property of His Majesty's global dominions. Grant's subordination of the fundamental characteristics and functionality of the British imperial state to his personal enrichment were undeniably partially involuntary, as he could not control the power imbalance between the Creeks and East Florida which he encountered upon arrival in the colony. Decisions he made as governor, however, compromised the very sovereignty of his regime, and should firmly discredit the depiction of him as a man "as

passionately devoted to promoting the interests of the British Empire in the last half of the eighteenth century as he was to promoting his own advancement."[192] Moreover, his embrace of France's accommodationist *pays d'en haut* policy and his profligate and increasingly frequent present dispensations to the Creeks, which strikingly resembled the tributary dole extracted from his Spanish predecessors by the Apalachee, Timucuan, and other Florida Indians, speak to a transimperial, entangled history of how European empires functioned in peripheral areas in general and in Florida in particular.[193] Such were the shifting sands and heat-induced mirages of power and wealth that Grant grappled with, harnessed, and molded to his will in East Florida.

[192] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 1.

[193] For Spain's distributary regime and shared sovereignty with Florida Indians, see Amy Turner Bushnell, "Ruling 'the Republic of Indians' in Seventeenth-Century Florida," Waselkov, et. al., eds., *Powhatan's Mantle*, 195-213 and John Jay Tepaske, *The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964), 209-214. For Anglo-Spanish entangled history, see Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 112, No. 3 (June 2007): 764-786.

Epilogue

In July of 1770, while he tried to convince the peninsular Creeks to return runaway bondspeople in lieu of conforming to the terms set at Picolata, James Grant instantaneously attained all of his heart's desires.[1] The country manor, the posh London townhome, a series of rank-elevating commissions, the seat in Parliament, and half a lifetime of sumptuous spreads with the most powerful gentlemen in Britain, were all had the old-fashioned way: through inheritance. The new Laird of Ballindalloch's childless, wastrel nephew, William, had succumbed to a pox adjudged by his kinfolk to be syphilis or some other venereal disease.[2] Grant learned from family members that his nephew had provided his widow (a woman who hailed from much more meager circumstances) with a portion the estate's rents.[3] True to his priorities, Grant desired to legally contest her bequest from his estate, and thus petitioned his old commander Albemarle to apply directly to Hillsborough on his behalf for leave to depart the province; by early November, Grant received sanction to return home.[4] Though the majority of planters who attempted to wrestle profits from the colony's sandy soils failed and departed (indeed, many never heeded his call in the first place), Grant happily reported a tidy return of fifteen percent on his North River plantation's indigo to Laurens later that winter.[5] Elated at the prospect of the yearly dividends which overseers would intimidate and beat out of his slaves augmenting the

[1] Grant to Hillsborough, St. Augustine, July 10, 1770, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frames 409-410.
[2] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 73-74.
[3] *Ibid*., 74.
[4] Grant to Albemarle, St. Augustine, November 5, 1770, *JGP*, Reel 1, Frame 420.
[5] Grant to Laurens, St. Augustine, December 14, 1770, Philip M. Hamer and George C. Rogers, Jr., eds., *The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume Seven: Aug. 1, 1769 – October 9, 1771* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Historical Society, 1979), 411-413.

capital generated by his estate, Grant boarded a sloop and sailed off into absenteeism on May 9, 1771.[6]

He left behind a checkered tenure as a military officer and administrator who careened through multiple colonial venues. In his initial experience, once he endured the seasoning and absorbed the exoticism, sweltering environment, and self-indulgence of mid-eighteenth-century Charlestown, he saw much to admire; the process of transforming credit into land and human property, and from thence into the material symbols of gentry power greatly intrigued him. He invested accordingly, and fantasized about the savory mutton chops, claret wine, and social capital to follow; this experience rendered him amenable to the risks and rewards of colonial development. He nearly irrevocably squandered his reputation (and life) outside Fort Duquesne defying general directives in the pursuit of glory, but the gambit he lost landed Grant comfortably among an officer corps whose interaction with the Algonquians of the *pays d'en haut* provided him with a template for how to arrange a European colony when heavily outnumbered by Native Americans. In successive campaigns against the Cherokees, Grant gained confidence in his ability to manage, manipulate, order, and wage war against the indigenous peoples of the continental interior. In the Carolina backcountry, Grant acquired through his interactions with the Cherokees a cultural fluency which, while short of the exhaustive knowledge possessed by some liminal figures on the frontier, certainly better positioned him to manage native relations than most colonial officials. Ditching the stigma of Indian warfare during 1760 in a fruitless attempt to arrive in Canada before Amherst took Montreal, Grant was assigned to clean up his own mess the following year. As the sole spotlight of the North

[6] Nelson, *General James Grant*, 76.

American war shone on him, Grant demonstrated that cultural comprehension and even respect would not stand in the way of the realization of his desire to advance; a brutal, debilitating assault on Cherokee bodies and systems of sustenance decisively brought the war to a close. His colonial experiences seem to have uniquely prepared him for the governorship of a peripheral marchland like East Florida – an assignment which demanded ardor for intensive agricultural development, the social graces to attract fellow investors, and the requisite pragmatism and cultural awareness to navigate the course of a flyspeck imperial outpost skirting the shadow of the day's premier southeastern power. There Grant pulled levers, blew smoke, and disregarded his own boundary, setting Creeks hunting on East Florida's side of the partition, Europeans investing in settlements beyond it, and accepting the inevitable violence and unraveling of British order as the price of province building – and in the process redefining what constituted a British colony. The Scottish gourmand's careerism and unquenchable ambition to secure the means to the good life at any cost were the prevailing factors that shaped his impact on the events of the Seven Years' War, the Anglo-Cherokee War, and Britain's colonial occupation of East Florida.

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