Wisdom: A Virtue or a Vice? Examining Wisdom's Role in Moral Reasoning and Behavior in Organizations

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Auburn University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Auburn, Alabama
August 5, 2023

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Abstract

Research has demonstrated personality traits' capacity to predict moral thinking and workplace behavior. This research has predominantly focused on traits contained within the Big Five and HEXACO frameworks. However, research on commonly labeled virtue traits, such as wisdom, has typically been relegated to the field of positive psychology and has received little attention in organizational psychology and related fields. This study sought to bridge that gap by examining wisdom's role in moral cognition and workplace behavior. In the first sample of undergraduate students ($N = 136$), wisdom predicted moral imagination and moral disengagement and did so above and beyond other relevant personality traits (i.e., Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Honesty-humility, and dispositional creativity). In the undergraduate sample, moral disengagement predicted unethical behavior, as measured via a self-reported scale and an in-basket exercise. However, moral imagination failed to predict unethical behavior. The second study examined U.S. working adults across three time points ($N = 417$). In this sample, wisdom again predicted moral imagination and moral disengagement and demonstrated incremental validity above and beyond the personality traits described above. Wisdom also predicted counterproductive work behavior and unethical pro-organizational behavior through moral disengagement in Study 2. Wisdom's indirect effect on counterproductive work behavior through moral imagination also received some support in Study 2. Moral identity, formalist orientation, and power were also examined as moderators of wisdom's influence on moral cognition (i.e., moral disengagement and moral imagination). However, none of the moderating hypotheses received support in either sample.

Acknowledgments

To my loving wife, Aline, thank you for everything you do. I know that supporting me in graduate school was not always easy. You packed up and moved with me to Auburn, Alabama, leaving family and loved ones behind, to embark on this four-year adventure and never looked back. You graduated with your master's degree in social work, got your license, landed a full-time job, and made some great friends along the way. I am so proud of the amazing social worker you have become and will always be grateful for your support, through the happy and sad times. To my parents, thank you so much for your continued support, encouragement, and prayers throughout my time at Auburn, even if you still don't know exactly what it is that I do. To my predecessors (Julia, Hayden, Michael, Rachel, Nicole, Taylor, Alissa, Josh, Teng, Jiayi, etc.), thank you for welcoming to the Auburn I/O program. The people really do make the place. You showed me what the culture of an I/O graduate program should look like: full of people who are looking out for the best interest of other students and always happy and willing to lend a hand to someone in need. To Ana, Kate, and Austin (i.e., the "Best IO Cohort"), I can't believe we made it to the close. Kate, unsurprising, made it before all of us. (Kate, if you ever write an autobiography, I will probably be the first in line to buy a copy. I want to learn how to become successful like you.) We became friends and survived all our classes and a pandemic together. I can't imagine nor would I have wanted to go through this program with anyone else. To the rest of the I/O program (Kendall, Peter, Jingyi, Lauren, Jonah, Isabelle, Lilah, Faith, Kyle, Brielle, Julia, Soon, DuBois, etc.), I am so glad I had the opportunity to meet and become friends with you. I wish you all the best in your continued studies and can't wait to see you all again. Last, but not least, to Dan, thank you for giving me the opportunity to pursue my PhD at Auburn University and supporting me throughout my time in the program. I hope you can retire soon so you can spend more time with the grandkids and go to Europe.

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Behavior in Organizations

Long-term organizational functioning requires ethical decision making. Internally, unethical behavior in the form of employee theft costs United States organizations billions of dollars annually (Statistic Brain Research Institute, 2018). Externally, consumers and investors demand that businesses not only offer high-quality products and services but also conduct themselves ethically. One survey conducted by Aflac in 2019 found that 73% of investors reported considering a business's social and environmental efforts in their investment decision (Aflac Incorporated, 2019). Another survey conducted by Cone Communications in 2017 found that 63% of American consumers desired businesses to take the lead on social and environmental progress, 78% desired businesses to address social justice issues, and 76% endorsed that they would not do business with an organization that opposed their beliefs (Cone Communications, 2017).

The ever-increasing globalized business environment (UNCTAD, 2010) has enhanced the complexity of not only the financial but also the ethical challenges that businesses face (Finkelman & Lopez, 2012). Legal and cultural differences across countries regarding practices such as compensation, working conditions, discrimination, harassment, etc., pose ethical challenges for many transnational firms (Finkelman & Lopez, 2012).

The ethical challenges that confront businesses internally and externally necessitate that businesses select, develop, and retain ethical individuals. Additionally, the complexity of many of these current ethical challenges may require the leaders and employees of these organizations to reconceptualize their typical approach to business decisions, consider alternate perspectives, and generate solutions to these dilemmas in a process known as moral

imagination (Werhane, 1999). Although scholars have noted the potential benefits of moral imagination for business leaders, employees, and organizations (Werhane, 1999; Wicks & Glezen, 1998), researchers have conducted relatively little research on the topic of moral imagination in organizations. Some studies have examined individual difference antecedents of moral imagination, such as dispositional creativity (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013; Keem et al., 2018), moral identity (Keem et al., 2018), and moral attentiveness (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013). However, this study contributes to the moral imagination literature by examining the independent and interactive effects of several individual differences and contextual perceptions through the lens of social cognitive theory (SCT) and Dedeke's (2015) cognitive-intuitionist model of moral judgment (CIM). This study also contributes to the literature on the role of individual differences in unethical organizational behavior by examining the impact of traits often ignored in this literature (e.g., wisdom), which often focuses on the Big Five and HEXACO frameworks (e.g., Lee et al., 2019; Pletzer et al., 2019).

Literature Review

Moral Decision Making: The Cognitive-Intuitionist Model

This study adopts the perspective of Dedeke's (2015) cognitive-intuitionist model of moral judgment (CIM). (See Figure 1 below.) The CIM is like Rest's (1986) four-stage ethical decision-making model, which is frequently utilized in the moral imagination literature (e.g., Moberg & Seabright, 2000; Roca, 2010; Whitaker & Godwin, 2013). Rest's (1986) model consists of four stages: 1) moral awareness (i.e., recognizing that a situation contains a moral issue), 2) moral judgment (i.e., determining the right course of action based on knowledge of concepts, ethical principles, etc.), 3) moral intention (i.e., deciding

on an appropriate course of action), and 4) moral action (i.e., performing a moral action). The CIM differs from Rest's (1986) model in that it specifies the cognitive and affective elements, both intuitive and deliberate, that impact moral judgment and adds moral issue framing as the initial stage in the moral decision-making process. The CIM consists of five stages: 1) moral issue framing (i.e., interpreting and assigning meaning to contextual stimuli in a moral situation), 2) pre-processing (i.e., automatic cognitions and emotions), 3) moral judgment, 4) moral reflection, and 5) moral intent (Dedeke, 2015).

Moral Imagination, Moral Disengagement, and the CIM

According to the CIM, moral judgments can result from automatic emotions and cognitions, moral reflection (i.e., effortful, controlled reasoning about a moral problem), or a combination of both processes (Dedeke, 2015). In support of automatic emotions' role in moral judgment, Greene et al.'s (2001) fMRI research found that areas of the brain associated with emotion and social cognition showed elevated activity levels when people contemplated personal moral dilemmas. Additionally, they found that participants took longer when they judged a personal moral violation to be acceptable rather than unacceptable (Greene et al., 2001). Greene et al. (2004) argued in their dual-process theory of moral judgment (DPT) that these findings indicate that initial emotions drive moral judgments unless slower, controlled cognition interferes.

Research has also supported the roles of automatic and effortful cognition in moral judgment (Cameron et al., 2017). For example, Cameron et al. (2017) found evidence supporting the roles of intentional and unintentional judgment in moral evaluation using their Moral Categorization Task. On the task, participants viewed a morally wrong or morally neutral prime word followed by a morally wrong or morally neutral target word (Cameron et al., 2017).

Cameron et al. (2017) instructed participants to categorize the target word as morally wrong or morally neutral independent of the prime word. Cameron et al. (2017) posited that performance on the task results from intentional judgment (i.e., controlled reasoning and capacity to follow instructions), unintentional judgment (i.e., a tendency to judge target actions consistent with primes), and response bias (i.e., a tendency to judge target actions as morally wrong or morally neutral independent of the prime) and modelled these parameters in a multinomial processing tree model. In support of their propositions, speeded response deadlines reduced the strength of the intentional judgment parameter on moral evaluation but not the strength of the unintentional judgment parameter (Cameron et al., 2017). Additionally, the intentional judgment parameter related positively to error-rated negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral control, while the unintentional judgment parameter was associated with personality traits expected to impact implicit moral cognition (e.g., moral identity, guilt proneness, psychopathic tendencies) (Cameron et al., 2017).

Dedeke (2015) suggested that multiple factors (e.g., emotional regulation and perceived moral intensity) determine whether intuition or reflection primarily influences moral judgment. This study views moral disengagement and moral imagination as processes occurring in the moral reflection stage of the CIM. Both processes involve effortful cognition and the transformation of information. This study examines the impact of several individual differences (i.e., wisdom, moral identity, and formalist orientation) and context (i.e., power) on these processes and subsequent unethical behavior.

Figure 1

Dedeke's Cognitive Intuitionist Model (CIM) of Moral Judgment

Note. This figure is taken from Dedeke (2015).

Delineating the Place of Moral Imagination and Moral Disengagement in Moral Reasoning and Action

Defining Moral Action

This study relies on Gray et al.'s (2012) dyadic actor—patient model of morality to define (im)moral behavior. The dyadic actor—patient model proposes that a cognitive template consisting of an intentional actor causing harm or suffering (e.g., physical violence, emotional abuse) to a patient (i.e., an entity perceived to possess a mind) can generally represent a moral action (Gray et al., 2012). Research has supported the centrality of perceived harm and intentionality in moral judgment. Gray and Ward (2011), for example, presented conservative American and Indian participants with transgressions on each of the five main moral foundations from moral foundations theory (i.e., Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) and asked the participants whether each transgression harmed a victim. In support of the dyadic agent— patient model, Gray and Ward (2011) found that judgments of immorality were associated with perceptions of victimhood, even for objectively victimless transgressions (e.g., masturbation).

Gray and colleagues' (2014) studies further supported that people perceive victims in objectively victimless transgressions and that this perception of harm to victims, even in objectively victimless situations, occurs rapidly. Regarding intentionality, research has demonstrated that people across cultures perceive actions to be more immoral when they view the actions as intentional (Barrett et al., 2016; Ohtsubo, 2007).

Moral Imagination and Moral Disengagement as Moral Reasoning and Self-regulatory Processes of Moral Behavior

The terms moral reasoning and moral reflection (the term used by Dedeke (2015) in the CIM) are used interchangeably in this study. This study adopts the definition of moral reasoning utilized by Haidt (2001) in the social intuitionist model (SIM) and Greene et al. (2001) in the DPT as conscious, controlled, and effortful cognition that involves transforming information regarding people and situations to arrive at a moral judgment.

Based on this definition, the current study classifies moral imagination and moral disengagement as examples of moral reasoning or as processes occurring in the moral reflection stage of the CIM.

Moral imagination involves using one's faculties to determine the morally relevant characteristics of a situation, anticipate how others might experience a situation, and envision various alternatives to a moral dilemma (Johnson, 1994). Werhane (1999) proposed a three-stage model of moral imagination consisting of 1) reproductive imagination, 2) productive imagination, and 3) free reflection. In reproductive imagination, an actor becomes aware of the demands of the current situation and the potential shortcomings of their prototypical approach to solving moral problems (Werhane, 1999). In productive imagination, an actor adopts the perspective of a third-party observer and evaluates their own and alternative perspectives on the current ethical issue (Werhane, 1999). Lastly, an actor in the free reflection stage generates ethically defensible resolutions to the current problem and considers the potential

consequences associated with each course of action (Werhane, 1999).

Some researchers have adopted a social cognitive theory lens when examining moral imagination (e.g., Whitaker & Godwin, 2013; Keem et al., 2018). According to social cognitive theory (SCT), individuals possess internal mechanisms that guide their moral behavior (Bandura, 2001). Inhibitive mechanisms prevent individuals from behaving unethically. Conversely, proactive mechanisms prompt individuals to engage in moral behavior despite high personal costs (Bandura, 2001). Keem et al. (2018) proposed that moral imagination is a proactive mechanism that leads individuals to avoid unethical transgressions.

Moral imagination may not lead individuals to choose the most moral course of action in every situation (i.e., the course of action that leads to the least perceived harm according to the dyadic agent—patient model). However, the perspective-taking component of moral imagination should enhance the likelihood that an actor endorses the most moral option. Research has shown that perceived intentionality and harm and, therefore, perceived morality, varies across cultures (e.g., An & Trafimow, 2014; Schäfer et al., 2015; van der Toorn et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2014) and ideologies (Cohen, 2015; Federico et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009). Therefore, adopting differing perspectives in moral imagination should enable an individual to better identify the course of action that will result in the least perceived harm among diverse groups. Moral imagination should also operate in everyday moral decisions rather than simply in infrequent, complex ones. Though some models posit that moral reasoning or reflection should occur infrequently (e.g., the SIM), research has illustrated that individuals spend a substantial portion of their time reflecting on moral and relational issues (Klinger et al., 1980). Additionally, research has demonstrated that moral imagination negatively predicts immoral behavior, even in everyday situations (e.g., CWB; Keem et al., 2018).

Keem et al. (2018) argued in their dual-process model that moral disengagement parallels moral imagination. Moral disengagement refers to a process in SCT whereby an individual frames an immoral action in a way that removes the self-sanctions (e.g., shame, guilt) that typically result from acting contrary to one's moral standards (Bandura et al., 1996). Individuals may utilize various strategies to morally disengage (e.g., moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic labeling, and dehumanization of the victim) (Bandura et al., 1996). These strategies enable individuals to perform unethical behavior by obstructing the operation of self-regulatory mechanisms (Bandura, 1999). Consistent with SCT, previous research has found that moral disengagement positively predicts engagement in various unethical behaviors (Fida et al., 2014; Fida et al., 2018; Hadlington et al., 2021; Treviño et al., 2006). Like moral imagination, research has shown that moral disengagement (positively) predicts immoral behavior in everyday life (e.g., CWB; Fida et al., 2014). Based on the theoretical reasoning and evidence provided, Hypothesis 1 is as follows:

> *Hypothesis 1: (a) Moral disengagement will positively relate to engagement in*
> *unethical behavior, and (b) moral imagination will negatively relate to engagement in*
> *unethical behavior.*

Wisdom as an Antecedent of Moral Reflection

Wisdom as a Construct

Scholars have defined wisdom in many ways. In their review of wisdom measures, Glück et al. (2013) grouped the content of wisdom measures into three categories: general wisdom, personal wisdom, and other-related wisdom. General wisdom pertains to ways in which people think about complex problems (Glück et al., 2013). Personal and other-related wisdom have greater relevance for social behavior than general wisdom (Glück et al., 2013). Personal wisdom refers to individuals' knowledge regarding themselves, others, and the world that they have

acquired through personal experience, while other-related wisdom denotes an empathy-based concern for others (Glück et al., 2013).

This study adopts Webster's (2003) conceptualization of wisdom. Webster (2003) defined wisdom as "the *competence* in, *intention* to, and *application* of critical life experiences to facilitate the *optimal development* of self and others" (Webster, 2007, p. 164). Webster (2003) conceptualized wisdom as a personality trait consisting of experience (critical life experience), emotional regulation, reminiscence and reflectiveness, openness, and humor. Glück et al. (2013) found that Webster's (2003) Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS) positively correlated with both other-related wisdom (e.g., empathy, other-related emotional regulation) and personal wisdom variables (e.g., self-efficacy, personal growth). The SAWS' relations with personal and other-related variables make it an appropriate measure of wisdom in considering the trait's role in moral behavior.

Wisdom as an Antecedent of Moral Imagination

From a CIM perspective (Dedeke, 2015), wisdom may represent an individual characteristic that enhances the role of moral reflection in moral judgment. As mentioned, the current study views moral imagination as a process in the moral reflection stage of Dedeke's (2015) CIM. Wisdom may positively influence moral imagination by impacting all three stages of Werhane's (1999) model. Specifically, four of wisdom's facets may influence the moral imagination process at one or more stages in Werhane's (1999) model. Overcoming challenging situations in life (i.e., the experience component of wisdom) may aid the wise person in devising solutions to moral dilemmas, which operates in the free reflection stage of Werhane's (1999) model. Previous research has found that adaptive experience positively predicts adaptive performance (Griffin & Hesketh, 2003; Pulakos et al., 2002). Similarly, prior experience requiring adaptation to and overcoming complex, morally challenging

situations (a part of the experience component of wisdom) may enable the wise person to devise solutions to novel moral challenges in moral imagination.

Self-reflection may be vital to self-knowledge (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995). According to SCT, self-observation serves as one subfunction in the exercise of self- regulation (Bandura, 1991). Through self-observation, people can recognize their cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns (Bandura, 1991). Therefore, evaluative reflection on one's life (i.e., the reflectiveness and reminiscence component of wisdom) may help the wise person to identify personal strengths and weaknesses. Recognizing one's limitations and understanding one's mental models function as essential components of reproductive imagination in Werhane's (1999) model.

The emotional regulation facet of wisdom may facilitate ethical sensemaking in the reproductive imagination stage of Werhane's (1999) model. Emotional regulation refers to the processes that monitor, evaluate, and modify emotional states to control their occurrence, experience, and expression (Artino, 2011). Dedeke's (2015) CIM proposes that emotional regulation impacts the degree to which moral reflection influences moral decision-making. Consistent with this proposition, research has found that emotional regulation attenuates the   adverse effects of anger on ethical sensemaking and ethical decision-making (Kligyte et al., 2013).

Lastly, openness to experience may help the wise person adopt alternate viewpoints in productive imagination and generate solutions in the free reflection stage in Werhane's (1999) model. Openness to experience positively correlates with cultural and interpersonal perspective taking (Sparkman & Blanchar, 2017) and positively relates to creativity and divergent thinking (George & Zhou, 2001; McCrae, 1987; Xu et al., 2014). In support of the role of creativity in moral imagination, Keem et al. (2018) found a positive relation between dispositional creativity and moral imagination.

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Wisdom as an Antecedent of Moral Disengagement

Some aspects of wisdom that enable moral imagination may reduce moral disengagement. From a SCT perspective, wisdom could reflect a well-developed and properly functioning self-regulatory system that prevents the removal of self-sanctions on immoral behavior. As mentioned, the reflectiveness and reminiscence facet of wisdom could aid in individuals' understanding of their cognitive, emotional, and behavioral tendencies (Bandura, 1991). Understanding one's biases and emotional tendencies could reduce moral disengagement. Evidence supports that certain cognitive and emotional tendencies drive the desire to act unethically, prompting cognitive distortions in the form of moral disengagement (Caprara et al., 2014; Rubio-Garay et al., 2016). Therefore, a person who understands their tendencies through self-reflection may have a greater capacity to recognize the presence and role of these tendencies and prevent them from leading to moral disengagement. In line with this proposition, Paciello et al. (2022) found a negative association between the self-reflective component of moral self-efficacy and moral disengagement. The openness facet of wisdom may also encourage less moral disengagement. Openness is positively associated with perspective taking (Sparkman & Blanchar, 2017) and with understanding and relating to others' emotional states (Hogan, 1969; Song & Shi, 2017). Therefore, those high in the openness facet of wisdom may be less inclined to use moral disengagement mechanisms, such as dehumanizing and blaming the victim. Lastly, the emotional regulation facet of wisdom may reduce moral

disengagement. Research has shown that negative emotions, such as anger and anxiety, promote

moral disengagement processes (Chugh et al., 2014; Rubio-Garay et al., 2016). Therefore, having a

greater ability to regulate one's emotions could inhibit forms of negative affect from facilitating

moral disengagement. Based on the theoretical reasoning and empirical findings provided,

Hypotheses 2a-3b are as follows:

> *H2: a) Wisdom will negatively relate to a) moral disengagement and b) will positively relate*
> *to moral imagination.*

> *H3: a) Moral disengagement and b) moral imagination will mediate the negative relation*
> *between wisdom and unethical behavior.*

Moral Identity as a Moderator

Moral identity refers to structuring one's sense of self around moral traits (Aquino & Reed,

2002) or to possessing a set of chronically accessible moral schema (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Moral

identity conceptualized latterly may hold relevance for the initial framing stage of Dedeke's (2015)

CIM. Those with a strong moral identity may be inclined to recognize the morally relevant

characteristics of a situation (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds, 2008) and, therefore, may be more

likely to frame a situation as moral and act accordingly. Also, according to identity theory,

individuals desire to act in line with their valued identities (Stets & Burke, 2000). Failure to verify

one's identity reduces self-esteem (Stets & Burke, 2014). Research has found a negative relation

between moral identity and unethical behavior, supporting these contentions (Hertz & Krettenauer,

2016; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007).

Moral identity may also moderate the impact of wisdom on moral reasoning. Wise

individuals with strong moral identities should strive to maintain their self-concept by acting morally

and should have a greater capacity to devise ways to avoid acting immorally.

Conversely, wise individuals with weaker moral identities may fail to utilize their attributes in the

service of finding moral solutions. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is as follows:

H4: Wisdom and moral identity will interact to influence moral reasoning such that wisdom (a) will have a stronger negative relation with moral disengagement when moral identity is high and (b) will have a stronger positive relation with moral imagination when moral identity is high.

Based on the theoretical reasoning provided, Hypothesis 5 is as follows:

H5: Moral identity will moderate the effect of wisdom on unethical behavior through (a) moral disengagement and (b) moral imagination.

Formalist Orientation as an Antecedent and Moderator

The current study examines the impact of a formalist orientation on moral reasoning. From a CIM perspective, a formalist orientation could represent an individual characteristic that mitigates moral reflection (Dedeke, 2015). Those with a formalist orientation adhere to deontological principles when making moral judgments (Brady & Wheeler, 1996). Deontologists, or formalists, follow a rule-based moral framework and believe that an action's (im)propriety stems from the action itself rather than its consequences (Brady, 1990). Heavy reliance on a formalist moral structure may prevent individuals from considering alternatives in moral imagination because formalists reject options that violate conventional moral rules (Werhane, 1999). This logic comports with Dewey's (1908) argument that an overreliance on rigid rules prevents moral effectiveness. Therefore, possessing a formalist moral orientation may hinder individuals from engaging in moral imagination.

H6: A formalist orientation will negatively relate to moral imagination.

In addition to exerting a direct effect, this study proposes that formalist orientation will interact with wisdom to influence moral imagination. A strong formalist orientation

may hinder wise individuals from engaging in moral imagination. Strict adherence to a rule- based moral framework may preclude wise individuals from utilizing their attributes to locate moral alternatives to unethical behavior. Hypothesis 7 is as follows:

> *H7: Wisdom and formalist orientation will interact to influence moral imagination such that wisdom will have a weaker positive relationship with moral imagination when formalist orientation is high.*

Based on the theoretical reasoning provided, Hypotheses 8 is as follows:

> *H8: Formalist orientation will moderate the effect of wisdom on unethical behavior through moral imagination.*

Power as an Antecedent and Moderator

Power refers to control over resources, both one's own and others' resources (Galinsky et al., 2003). While some have posited that power leads to corruption and unethical behavior (Kipnis, 1972), Lammers and Stapel (2009) sought to examine how power influences individuals' reasoning about a moral problem. Contrary to research indicating that power leads to more flexible (Guinote, 2007) and less conventional thinking (Galinsky et al., 2008) in non- moral contexts, Lammers and Stapel (2009) proposed and found evidence that power increases the likelihood that people make deontological, or rule-based, moral judgments across multiple experiments. They proposed that this effect occurs due to the desire of those in power to maintain the status quo (Lammers & Stapel, 2009). Making decisions that align with tradition and convention enhances the probability that the status quo will remain in place and that those in power will retain control over resources (Lammers & Stapel, 2009). Therefore, those in power have an incentive to make judgments that align with established rules (e.g., deontological moral judgments) (Lammers & Stapel, 2009). Power's effect on the cognitive style adopted by moral actors may reduce moral imagination for the same reason a formalist orientation may reduce it; those relying on a rule-based framework to make moral

judgments may not consider unconventional alternatives, which is critical to moral imagination.

Therefore, Hypothesis 9 is as follows:

H9: Power will negatively relate to moral imagination.

Power may also influence the extent that wisdom influences moral reasoning and subsequent behavior. Power may inhibit wise individuals from utilizing their attributes to consider alternatives in moral imagination. Hypotheses 10 and 11 are as follows:

H10: Wisdom and power will interact to influence moral imagination such that wisdom will have a weaker positive relationship with moral imagination when power is high.

H11: Power will moderate the effect of wisdom on unethical behavior through moral imagination.

Figure 2 displays the theoretical model.

Incremental Validity of Wisdom Above and Beyond Other Personality Traits

When examining the predictive capacity of a personality trait not contained in commonly used frameworks in the field of personality psychology (e.g., the HEXACO), it is of interest to examine the trait's incremental validity in predicting outcomes above and beyond the traits in these frameworks. Regarding the topic of morality, the HEXACO traits of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Honesty-humility have been shown to relate most strongly with moral behavior and moral character (Anglim et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2014; Pletzer et al., 2019). Additionally, dispositional creativity, most strongly associated with Openness (McCrae, 1987), has been found to positively predict moral imagination (Keem et al., 2018). Therefore, the current study sought to investigate the incremental validity of wisdom in predicting moral disengagement and moral imagination above and beyond Conscientiousness, Honesty- humility, Agreeableness, and dispositional creativity. Due to lack of theoretical reasoning and previous evidence, the incremental validity of wisdom beyond these traits was proposed as a research question.

RQ1: Does wisdom predict a) moral disengagement and b) moral imagination above and beyond Conscientiousness, Honesty-humility, Agreeableness, and dispositional creativity?

Figure 2

Theoretical Model

Study 1 Design

Method

Participants and Procedures

Study 1 tested Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 and Research Question 1 in a survey design utilizing undergraduate students. Study 1's procedures followed those submitted to and approved by a university's Institutional Review Board (Protocol #22-493 EX 2211). Participants completed surveys at two time points, completing the second survey three weeks after completing the first. Participants were recruited through their university's SONA system and participated for 1.5 hours of extra credit in one of their psychology courses. They completed both waves online. In the first wave, participants provided demographic information (i.e., gender, age, paid work experience in an organizational setting, and ethnicity), completed the control variable measures, and then answered the wisdom, formalist orientation, and moral identity scales. Lastly, they read a vignette describing an ethical dilemma developed by Whitaker and Godwin (2013) and completed the moral imagination and moral disengagement scales. The presentation of these two scales was

counterbalanced to prevent the possibility of order effects. In the second wave, participants completed demographic questions and two in-baskets (one on risk preference and one on ethical behavior). They then completed a survey about their unethical behavior in the last six months. After reading another of Whitaker and Godwin's (2013) ethical dilemma vignettes, which differed from the vignette used at Time 1, they again completed the moral disengagement and moral imagination measures. The presentation of the moral imagination and moral disengagement scales was counterbalanced again. (Refer to Appendix A to see the study measures.)

136 participants completed the study at Time 1. These participants were predominantly White/Caucasian (89.71% White/Caucasian, 2.94% Asian or Asian American/Pacific Islander, 1.47% Black/African American, 3.68% Hispanic/Latino/a/x, and 2.21% Other) and female (77.21% female, 22.06% male, 0.74% Other). Participants were, on average, roughly 20 years old ($M = 19.68$, $MED = 19.00$, $SD = 1.85$) and had, on average, roughly two years of paid work experience in an organizational setting ($M = 1.89$, $MED = 2.00$, $SD = 1.69$).

Approximately 76% of participants had at least one year of paid work experience in an organizational setting. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables for the Time 1 sample.

69 participants completed the study at Time 2. These individuals were primarily White/Caucasian (91.30% White/Caucasian, 2.90% Black/African American, 4.35% Asian or Asian American/Pacific Islander, and 1.45% Other), predominantly female (75.36% female, 24.64% male), on average, roughly 20 years old ($M = 19.61$, $MED = 19$, $SD = 1.91$), and had an average of roughly two years of paid work experience in an organizational setting ($M = 1.83$, $MED = 2$, $SD = 1.64$). Approximately 80% of these participants had at least one year of work experience in an organizational setting. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables for the Time 2 sample.

Measures

Wisdom. Wisdom was measured using Webster's (2003) 40-item Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS) (e.g., "Now I find that I can really appreciate life's little ironies."). Items on this scale used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree*. ($\alpha = 0.91$, $\omega = 0.93$).

Moral Identity. Moral identity was measured using Aquino and Reed's (2002) 10-item scale for assessing moral identity. This measure presented participants with adjectives (i.e., caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind) and asked them to imagine a person with these characteristics. Participants then responded to the items (e.g., "It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.") on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree* ($\alpha = 0.85$, $\omega = 0.91$).

Formalist Orientation. Formalist orientation was measured using the 6-item formalism subscale of Love et al.'s (2020) Ethical Standards of Judgment Questionnaire (e.g., "Solutions to ethical problems are usually black and white."). This scale contained a 5-point Likert scale ranging from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree* ($\alpha = 0.64$, $\omega = 0.76$).

Moral Disengagement. Moral disengagement was measured using Moore et al.'s (2012) 8-item scale for assessing moral disengagement (e.g., "It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about."). Items on this scale contained a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree* ($\alpha_{Time1} = 0.79$, $\omega_{Time1} = 0.85$, $\alpha_{Time2} = 0.90$, $\omega_{Time2} = 0.93$).

Moral Imagination. Moral imagination was measured using an 8-item version of Yurtsever's (2006) scale for moral imagination adapted by Keem et al. (2018) to fit Whitaker and Godwin's (2013) vignette (e.g., "I imagined similarities and differences between the situation at hand and other situations where a certain rule proved to be applicable."). For this measure, participants read a vignette describing an ethical dilemma in the workplace. (See Appendix A.) They then read the question, "To what extent do the following statements describe your thought

processes when reading the vignette?" and responded to the items on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *not at all* to *very much* ($\alpha_{Time1} = 0.72$, $\omega_{Time1} = 0.81$, $\alpha_{Time2} = 0.67$, $\omega_{Time2} = 0.82$).

Unethical Behavior. Unethical behavior was measured using Detert et al.'s (2008) 13- item lie-cheat scale developed to assess the unethical behavior of college students and an adaptation of Bailey and Alexander's (1993) 7-question ethical in-basket. Detert et al.'s (2008) lie-cheat scale requested that participants indicate their tendency to participate in the following behaviors (e.g., "Using a false excuse to delay taking an exam or turning in an assignment.") on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from *never* (1) to *many times* (5) ($\alpha = 0.92$, $\omega = 0.94$). Bailey and Alexander's (1993) in-basket placed participants in the role of a general manager and asked them to respond to seven dilemmas concerning the organization. Participants responded to the dilemma by selecting one of two courses of action and indicating how confident they are about their decision on a 7-point Likert scale from *I am NOT very confident I would choose this option* (1) to *I am very confident I would choose this option* (7). Six of the seven dilemmas included in Bailey and Alexander's (1993) in-basket are ethical, so only responses to these six dilemmas were used to score the participants' unethical behavior.

Participants' scores on each dilemma or item were determined by combining their scores on the ethical choice decision and their confidence decision. If a participant selected the ethical option, their score on the item could range from eight (i.e., selecting the ethical option (7) but selecting the lowest level of confidence for their decision (1)) to 14 (i.e., selecting the ethical option (7) and selecting the highest level of confidence for the decision (7)). Participants selecting the unethical option could score between one (i.e., selecting the unethical option and selecting the highest level of confidence for their decision) and seven (i.e., selecting the unethical option and selecting the lowest level of confidence for their decision). Total scores were calculated by averaging participants' scores on all six ethical dilemmas so that scores could range from one to 14.

Including both the ethical in-basket and the self-reported unethical behavior measure served to enhance the generalizability of the study's results. Some have noted that moral psychology research often focuses on complex moral decisions while neglecting moral behavior in everyday life (e.g., Cohen et al., 2014). Though some have noted moral imagination's role in complex moral decisions (Rocha, 2010), as mentioned previously, there is some evidence that moral imagination predicts unethical behavior in everyday life (Keem et al., 2018). Therefore, this study examined both moral behavior in complex situations (i.e., Bailey and Alexander's (1993) ethical in-basket) and moral behavior in everyday life (i.e., Detert et al.'s (2008) lie-cheat scale). The responses to Bailey and Alexander's (1993) ethical in-basket may also enhance Study 1's generalizability to organizational settings because the questions place the participant in the role of a manager making decisions within an organization.

Risk-taking In-basket. An additional in-basket, an adaptation of MacCrimmon and Wehrung's (1984) 4-scenario Risk In-Basket, was used in conjunction with Bailey and Alexander's (1993) ethical in-basket. MacCrimmon and Wehrung's (1984) Risk In-Basket assesses risk-taking propensity in management situations. This measure provides two scores of risk-taking propensity: a score indicating the likelihood that the individual will pursue the riskier option on a scale from one to nine and an equivalence probability score indicating the lowest probability of success at which point the individual will pursue the riskier option. Probabilities ranged from 0% to 100% and were provided in 10% increments between the two extremes (i.e., 0% and 100%). Scores on the equivalence probability items were reverse scored, so a higher score indicated a higher risk-taking propensity and could range from one to 12.

The risk-taking in-basket served to prevent participants from ascertaining the in-basket's intention to measure unethical behavior and provided evidence of the ethical in-basket's validity, as responses to Bailey and Alexander's (1993) ethical in-basket should correlate more strongly with

responses to the self-reported measure of unethical behavior (i.e., Detert et al.'s (2008) lie-cheat scale) than responses to the risk in-basket should.

Control Variables in Hypothesis Tests

Gender. Gender was controlled for due to research indicating that it significantly predicts unethical behavior (Betz et al., 1989; Buckley et al., 1998; Cohen et al., 2014) and differentiates individuals on moral character, with women tending to be of higher moral character than men (Cohen et al., 2014). Women also tend to score higher on wisdom than men (Webster, 2003; 2007). Therefore, gender could confound the relations between wisdom and moral reasoning and wisdom and unethical behavior.

Social Desirability. Social desirability was controlled for due to the possibility of it impacting self-reported moral reasoning (e.g., moral disengagement; Jones et al., 2017), self-reported unethical behavior (Randall & Fernandes, 1991), and self-reported personality (i.e., wisdom). To the extent that social desirability bias leads to the underreporting of self- reported unethical behavior, inflation on moral reasoning, and inflation on the desirable characteristics of wisdom, it could confound the relations among these variables. Social desirability was measured using Reynolds' (1982) 13-item Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale--Short Form (e.g., "On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability.") (KR-$20 = 0.64$, $\alpha = 0.61$, $\omega = 0.67$). Participants were instructed to answer the items as *true* if the statement pertained to them or *false* if the statement did not pertain to them.

Cognitive Ability. Cognitive ability was controlled for due to its potential impact on moral imagination and moral disengagement and relation to wisdom. Research has shown that cognitive ability is positively associated with openness to experience (Rammstedt et al., 2016) and emotional regulation (Optiz et al., 2014), two facets of wisdom, and with the wisdom measure used in this study (i.e., SAWS; Glück et al., 2013) Additionally, individuals high in cognitive ability may

be better able to devise solutions to moral problems, enhancing their capacity for moral imagination and moral disengagement. Research has shown that cognitive ability positively predicts complex problem-solving (Süβ & Kretzschmar, 2018).

Cognitive ability was measured using one of the 10-item short forms of the Sandia matrices developed by Harris et al. (2020). Each item of the measure displayed an incomplete pattern of objects and gave participants four object options to select from, requesting that participants select the object that completed the pattern.

Control Variables in Research Question Analyses

Dispositional Creativity. Dispositional creativity was controlled for due to previous research indicating that creativity and a creative personality positively relate to moral imagination (Keem et al., 2018), moral disengagement (Keem et al., 2018), and unethical behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012; Storme et al., 2020). Dispositional creativity was measured using Gough's (1979) scale (KR-20 = 0.52). This scale listed 30 adjectives related to creative personality and asked participants to select the adjectives that describe themselves (e.g., "Clever," "Conventional"). Participants received a score of one (1) for each adjective positively related to creativity they selected (e.g., Inventive) and a score of negative one (-1) for each adjective negatively related to creativity they selected (e.g., Conventional). Participants' total scores could range from -12 to 18.

Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness was controlled for due to previous research indicating that it differentiates individuals on moral character (Cohen et al., 2014) and negatively relates to moral disengagement (Ogunfowora et al., 2022). Conscientiousness was measured using the 10-item Conscientiousness subscale from Ashton and Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60 measure (e.g., "When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details."). This scale contained a 5-point Likert scale ranging from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree* ($\alpha = 0.84$, $\omega = 0.88$).

Honesty-Humility. Honesty-humility was controlled for due to research indicating that it

differentiates individuals on moral character (Cohen et al., 2014) and negatively relates to moral disengagement (Ogunfowora et al., 2022). Honesty-humility was measured by the 10-item Honesty-humility subscale from Ashton and Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60 measure (e.g., "I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large."). This scale contained a 5-point Likert scale from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree* ($\alpha = 0.73$, $\omega = 0.78$).

Agreeableness. Agreeableness was controlled for due to research indicating its link with morality, showing a negative association with moral disengagement (Alessandri et al., 2020) and unethical behaviors, such as CWBs ($r = -0.23$; Anglim et al., 2018). Agreeableness was measured by the 10-item Agreeableness subscale from Ashton and Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60 measure (e.g., "My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget."). This scale contained a 5-point Likert scale ranging from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree* ($\alpha = 0.76$, $\omega = 0.83$).

Analyses

The hypotheses and research question were tested in R. Beta weights were calculated using the *QuantPsyc* package in R (Fletcher, 2022). Due to a small, linked sample size across time points (i.e., $N = 62$), Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 and Research Question 1 were tested using cross-sectional data. *A priori* power analyses conducted in G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) determined that a minimum sample size of 113 would be needed to detect a small effect size (i.e., $f^2 = 0.15$) with 80% power in the analyses for Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 7 and a minimum of 91 for the analyses testing Research Question 1. Another *a priori* power analysis conducted in G*Power determined that a minimum sample size of 67 would be needed to detect a small effect size (i.e., $f^2 = 0.15$) with 80% power in a multiple regression with two predictor variables (i.e., Hypothesis 1). Therefore, Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 7 and Research Question 1 were tested using the data collected at Time 1 ($N = 136$), and Hypothesis 1 was tested using the data collected at Time 2 ($N = 69$).

Hypothesis 1 was tested using two multiple regressions, one for each of the unethical behavior measures used. Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 7 were tested using hierarchical regression in R. Hierarchical regressions were conducted for each dependent variable of interest (i.e., moral imagination and moral disengagement). For these regressions, all predictors were mean-centered before being added to the models to avoid multicollinearity concerns (Iacobucci et al., 2017). The mean-centered wisdom, moral identity, formalist orientation, and control variables from Time 1 were entered into the first model. In the second model, the interaction terms were added. The first and second models were compared via an ANOVA. A significant F-test indicated that adding the interaction terms significantly improved model fit.

Lastly, Research Question 1 was tested using hierarchical regression in R. Two hierarchical regressions were conducted for each dependent variable examined (i.e., moral imagination and moral disengagement). Moral imagination and moral disengagement at Time 1 served as the dependent variables. Honesty-Humility, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and dispositional creativity at Time 1 were entered as predictors into the first model, and wisdom was added to the equation in the second model. The two models were then compared via the same process described above for testing Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 7.

Results

Validity of the Ethical In-basket

The validity of the ethical in-basket was checked by comparing the correlation between participants' ethical in-basket score and their lie-cheat score to the correlations between participants' risk-taking in-basket scores and their lie-cheat score. As expected, the correlation between the ethical in-basket score and the lie-cheat score ($r = -0.26$, $p = 0.03$) was stronger than the correlations between the risk-taking in-basket scores (i.e., the risk-taking likelihood score and the equivalence probability score) and the lie-cheat score ($r = 0.09$-0.12, $p = 0.33$- 0.46).

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations among Study Variables for Time 1 Student Sample

	M	*SD*	*MED*	Age	Gender	Tenure	CA	SD	W	DC	MI	FO	HH	C	A	MIM	MD
Age	19.68	1.85	19.00	1.00	-0.17	**0.18**	-0.02	-0.11	0.16	**0.23***	-0.04	**-0.23***	0.07	-0.15	-0.14	-0.03	-0.07
Gender[a]	0.78	0.42	1.00	-0.17	1.00	0.06	-0.11	-0.06	0.06	0.01	**0.25***	0.07	0.11	**0.25***	-0.09	0.13	-0.16
Experience[b]	1.89	1.69	2.00	**0.18**	0.06	1.00	-0.12	**-0.18**	0.08	0.04	-0.07	0.08	0.13	0.06	-0.02	0.01	-0.07
CA	0.57	0.16	0.60	-0.02	-0.11	-0.12	1.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.10	0.02	-0.01	0.07	0.01	-0.05
SD	0.50	0.21	0.46	-0.11	-0.06	**-0.18**	-0.03	1.00	0.06	-0.04	**0.17**	0.06	**0.30***	**0.17**	**0.46***	-0.02	**-0.18**
W	4.44	0.55	4.41	0.16	0.06	0.08	-0.01	0.06	1.00	**0.39***	**0.41***	**-0.23***	0.16	**0.25***	0.08	**0.37***	**-0.40***
DC	2.99	3.01	3.00	**0.23***	0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.04	**0.39***	1.00	0.01	**-0.30***	-0.15	0.09	-0.05	0.15	0.03
MI	5.60	0.81	5.70	-0.04	**0.25***	-0.07	-0.04	**0.17**	**0.41***	0.01	1.00	0.13	**0.29***	**0.35***	**0.21**	**0.23***	**-0.48***
FO	2.87	0.56	3.00	**-0.23***	0.07	0.08	-0.10	0.06	**-0.23***	**-0.30***	0.13	1.00	0.12	0.10	0.13	-0.16	0.01
HH	3.48	0.61	3.50	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.02	**0.30***	0.16	-0.15	**0.29***	0.12	1.00	**0.36***	**0.27***	0.04	**-0.49***
C	3.83	0.66	3.90	-0.15	**0.25***	0.06	-0.01	**0.17**	**0.25***	0.09	**0.35***	0.10	**0.36***	1.00	0.15	0.04	**-0.39***
A	3.27	0.61	3.30	-0.14	-0.09	-0.02	0.07	0.46	0.08	-0.05	**0.21**	0.13	**0.27***	0.15	1.00	0.11	-0.17
MIM	4.61	0.78	4.63	-0.03	0.13	0.01	0.01	-0.02	**0.37***	0.15	**0.23***	-0.16	0.04	0.04	0.11	1.00	**-0.18**
MD	2.36	0.79	2.31	-0.07	-0.16	-0.07	-0.05	**-0.18**	**-0.40***	0.03	**-0.48***	0.01	-0.49	-0.39	-0.17	**-0.18**	1.00

Note. N = 135-136. aMale = 0, Female = 1. bOrganizational experience is in years. CA = cognitive ability. SD = Social desirability. W = Wisdom. DC = Dispositional creativity. MI = Moral identity. FO = Formalist orientation. HH = Honesty-humility. C = Conscientiousness. A = Agreeableness. MIM = Moral imagination. MD = Moral disengagement. ***p* < 0.05**. *p < 0.01.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations among Study Variables for Time 2 Student Sample

	M	*SD*	*MED*	Age	Gender	EXP	EP	RiskDECN	ETHDECN	MIM	LC	MD
Age	19.61	1.91	19.00	1.00	-0.14	**0.31**	**0.27**	0.21	-0.12	-0.05	0.03	-0.03
Gender[a]	0.75	0.43	1.00	-0.14	1.00	**0.29**	-0.04	-0.12	-0.01	0.14	-0.17	**-0.34***
Experience[b]	1.83	1.64	2.00	**0.31**	**0.29**	1.00	0.11	0.20	-0.09	0.02	0.06	-0.18
RiskEP	5.87	1.56	6.00	**0.27**	-0.04	0.11	1.00	0.06	-0.10	-0.11	0.09	0.03
RiskDECN	4.67	1.07	4.50	0.21	-0.12	0.20	0.06	1.00	-0.10	0.19	0.12	0.19
ETHDECN	9.47	2.39	9.67	-0.12	-0.01	-0.09	-0.10	-0.10	1.00	0.06	**-0.26**	**-0.44***
MIM	4.69	0.75	4.63	-0.05	0.14	0.02	-0.11	0.19	0.06	1.00	-0.03	-0.17
LC	1.59	0.52	1.46	0.03	-0.17	0.06	0.09	0.12	**-0.26**	-0.03	1.00	**0.49***
MD	2.27	0.91	2.25	-0.03	**-0.34***	-0.18	0.03	0.19	**-0.44***	-0.17	**0.49***	1.00

Note. $N = 69$. [a]Female = 1. Male = 0. [b]Organizational experience is in years. RiskEP = Equivalence probability score. RiskDECN = Risk decision score. ETHDECN = ethical in-basket decision score. MIM = Moral imagination. LC = Lie-cheat score. MD = Moral disengagement. **$p < 0.05$**. *****$p < 0.01$.**

Hypothesis 1 Test Results

Hypotheses 1a and 1b predicted that moral disengagement and moral imagination would be positively and negatively related to unethical behavior, respectively. Table 3 displays the results of the multiple regressions. The results indicated that moral disengagement significantly predicted unethical behavior measured by the in-basket ($b = -1.16$, $\beta = -0.44$, $p < 0.001$) and self-reported measure ($b = 0.28$, $\beta = 0.50$, $p < 0.001$). Therefore, Hypothesis 1a received full support. However, moral imagination failed to significantly predict unethical behavior as assessed by either measure. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b did not receive support.

Table 3

Multiple Regression Results for Hypothesis 1

	DV = self-reported unethical behavior (Lie-cheat score)				DV = Ethical in-basket score			
Independent Variables	β	b	SE	p	β	b	SE	p
Moral imagination	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.60	-0.01	-0.03	0.36	0.92
Moral disengagement	0.50	0.28	0.06	**<0.001***	-0.44	-1.16	0.30	**<0.001***
R^2	0.24				0.19			
F (df)	10.64 (2, 66)				7.83 (2, 66)			

*Notes. N = 69. **$p < 0.05$. $p < 0.01$***.*

Hypothesis 2 Test Results

Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted that wisdom would be negatively related to moral disengagement and positively related to moral imagination, respectively. As expected, wisdom positively predicted moral imagination ($b = 0.45$, $\beta = 0.32$, $p < 0.001$) and negatively predicted moral disengagement ($b = -0.33$, $\beta = -0.23$, $p < 0.001$) in the multiple regressions. (See Tables 4 and 5 below.) Therefore, Hypotheses 2a and 2b received support.

Hypothesis 4 Test Results

Hypothesis 4 proposed that moral identity would moderate the relations between wisdom and moral disengagement and between wisdom and moral imagination, such that the relations between wisdom and these variables would be stronger at higher levels of moral identity. The addition of the interaction between wisdom and moral identity failed to significantly improve model fit in both hierarchical regressions ($F = 0.03$, $p = 0.86$ for moral disengagement and $F = 0.77$, $p = 0.47$ for moral imagination), and the interactions were nonsignificant in both regressions. (See Tables 4 and 5 below.) Therefore, Hypotheses 4a and 4b did not receive support.

Hypothesis 6 Test Results

Hypothesis 6 proposed that formalist orientation would negatively relate to moral imagination. Though in the expected direction, the relation was nonsignificant ($b = -0.14$, $\beta = -0.11$, $p = 0.24$) in the multiple regression. (See Table 4.) Therefore, Hypothesis 6 did not receive support.

Hypothesis 7 Test Results

Hypothesis 7 proposed that formalist orientation would moderate the relation between wisdom and moral imagination, such that the relation would be weaker at higher levels of formalist orientation. The addition of the interaction term failed to significantly improve model fit ($F = 0.77$, $p = 0.47$), and the interaction was nonsignificant in the multiple regression. (See Table 4). Therefore, Hypothesis 7 did not receive support.

Table 4

Hierarchical Results for Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 7 (Moral Imagination as the Outcome)

DV = Moral imagination

Independent Variables	Model 1				Model 2			
	β	b	SE	p	β	b	SE	p
Age	-0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.66	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.74
Gender	0.08	0.15	0.16	0.34	0.09	0.17	0.16	0.29
Cognitive Ability	0.02	0.11	0.41	0.78	0.03	0.13	0.41	0.75
Social desirability	-0.05	-0.18	0.31	0.58	-0.04	-0.15	0.31	0.64
Moral identity	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.28	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.30
Formalist Orientation	-0.11	-0.14	0.12	0.24	-0.09	-0.13	0.13	0.32
Wisdom	0.32	0.45	0.13	**<0.001***	0.30	0.43	0.14	**0.002***
WisdomXMoral identity					-0.10	-0.14	0.12	0.23
WisdomXFormalist Orientation					-0.05	-0.02	0.22	0.92
R^2	0.17				0.18			
F (df)	3.83 (7, 127)				3.14 (9, 125)			
ΔR^2					0.01			
ΔF					-0.69			

Note. $N = 135$. *$p < 0.05$. **$p < 0.01$**.

Table 5

Hierarchical Results for Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 7 (Moral Disengagement as the Outcome)

DV = Moral disengagement								
	Model 1				Model 2			
Independent Variables	β	b	SE	p	β	b	SE	p
Age	-0.06	-0.03	0.04	0.43	-0.06	-0.03	0.04	0.42
Gender	-0.09	-0.17	0.15	0.26	-0.09	-0.17	0.15	0.26
Cognitive Ability	-0.08	-0.38	0.37	0.31	-0.08	-0.38	0.38	0.31
Social desirability	-0.13	-0.48	0.29	0.10	-0.13	-0.49	0.29	0.10
Moral identity	-0.35	-0.34	0.08	**<0.001***	-0.35	-0.34	0.08	**<0.001***
Wisdom	-0.23	-0.33	0.12	**0.007***	-0.22	-0.32	0.12	**<0.001***
WisdomXMoral identity					0.01	0.02	0.11	0.86
R^2	0.30				0.30			
F (df)	9.15 (6, 128)				7.79 (7, 127)			
ΔR^2					0.00			
ΔF					-1.36			

*Note. N = 135. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01.**

Research Question 1 Results

Research Questions 1a and 1b asked if wisdom explains variance in moral disengagement and moral imagination, respectively, above and beyond Conscientiousness, Honesty-humility, Agreeableness, and dispositional creativity. Tables 6 and 7 display the results of the hierarchical regressions. The addition of wisdom to the regression equation in both cases significantly improved model fit ($F = 16.92, p < 0.001$ for moral imagination and $F = 18.81, p < 0.001$ for moral disengagement). Wisdom had a significant positive relation with moral imagination ($b = 0.54, \beta = 0.38, p < 0.001$) and a significant negative relation with moral disengagement ($b = -0.49, \beta = -0.34, p < 0.001$) when controlling for the other personality variables. Therefore, Research Questions 1a and 1b were answered in the affirmative.

Table 6

Hierarchical Regression Results for Research Question 1a

DV = Moral disengagement								
	Model 1				Model 2			
Independent Variables	β	*b*	*SE*	*p*	β	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Dispositional Creativity	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.83	0.12	0.03	0.02	0.12
Agreeableness	-0.03	-0.03	0.10	0.73	-0.01	-0.02	0.09	0.84
Conscientiousness	-0.24	-0.28	0.10	**0.004***	-0.19	-0.22	0.09	0.02*
Honesty-humility	-0.41	-0.52	0.11	**<0.001***	-0.35	-0.45	0.10	**<0.001***
Wisdom					-0.34	-0.49	0.11	**<0.001***
R^2	0.30				0.39			
F(df)	13.78 (4, 131)				16.28 (5, 130)			
ΔR^2					0.09			
ΔF					2.50			

*Note. N = 136. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01**.

Table 7

Hierarchical Regression Results for Research Question 1b

DV = Moral imagination								
	Model 1				Model 2			
Independent Variables	β	*b*	*SE*	*p*	β	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Dispositional Creativity	0.17	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.89
Agreeableness	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.22	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.25
Conscientiousness	-0.01	-0.01	0.11	0.93	-0.06	-0.08	0.11	0.47
Honesty-humility	0.04	0.05	0.12	0.67	-0.02	-0.03	0.12	0.83
Wisdom					0.38	0.54	0.13	**<0.001***
R^2	0.04				0.15			
F (df)	1.34 (4, 131)				4.59 (5, 130)			
ΔR^2					0.11			
ΔF					3.25			

Note. $N = 136$. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01**.

Study 1 Discussion

Study 1's results supported Hypothesis 2, showing that wisdom significantly predicted moral imagination and moral disengagement. The results also demonstrated that wisdom predicted these outcomes above and beyond other personality traits shown to relate to moral reasoning and behavior. Additionally, none of the moderation hypotheses were supported. Overall, these results show a robust relation between wisdom and moral cognition. Formalist orientation, conversely, did not have a very strong relation with moral imagination, despite the relation being in the expected negative direction. This finding may suggest that possessing deontological moral tendencies does not preclude individuals from engaging in moral imagination.

Study 1's results showed that moral disengagement significantly predicted unethical behavior measured by a self-report scale and an in-basket exercise. This finding comports with previous research on moral disengagement (Fida et al., 2014; Fida et al., 2018; Hadlington et al., 2021; Treviño et al., 2006). Conversely, moral imagination failed to significantly predict either measure of unethical behavior. This nonsignificant finding could have resulted from the moral imagination measure used. The measure used requested that participants consider a hypothetical scenario in an organizational setting. The scenario's lack of personal relevance to participants may have led to an inactivation of moral imagination processes that would occur in their everyday lives. Study 2 sought to overcome this limitation by using a moral imagination measure that asked participants about their moral imagination experiences at work.

Study 2

Study 2 served to generalize Study 1's results in a population of working adults, test the mediation and moderated mediation hypotheses (Hypotheses 3, 5, 8, and 11) in a three-wave

design, and test the hypotheses regarding the influence of power on moral reasoning and behavior (i.e., Hypotheses 9 and 10). As mentioned, Study 2 used a different measure of moral imagination, which asked participants about their moral imagination at work. Study 2 also included measures of unethical behavior in an organizational setting reflecting actual behaviors performed by participants (i.e., self-reported counterproductive work behavior and unethical pro-organizational behavior). These measures of unethical behavior differed from those used in Study 1, which involved unethical behaviors relevant to students and decisions about hypothetical situations in an organizational setting.

Study 2 Design

Method

      Participants and Procedures. Study 2 utilized a three-wave design consisting of a sample of U.S. working adults recruited through Amazon's CloudResearch platform. Procedures adhered to those submitted to and approved by a university Institutional Review Board (Protocol #22-477 EX 2210). Individuals participated in exchange for monetary compensation, receiving $2.00 for completing the first wave, $2.25 for completing the second wave, and $2.50 for completing the third wave. At Time 1, participants first provided demographic information (i.e., industry, age, gender, ethnicity, and organizational tenure) and then completed the measures of wisdom, power, moral identity, and formalist orientation. At Time 2, participants completed the moral imagination and moral disengagement measures. At Time 3, participants completed the counterproductive work behavior (CWB) and unethical pro- organizational behavior (UPB) measures. The presentation of the study measures at each time point was counterbalanced to reduce the possibility of order effects emerging. The time points were separated by one month to avoid potential issues arising from common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Similar length time lags have also been used to study the effects of moral imagination and moral disengagement on unethical behavior (e.g., Keem et

al., 2018).

The sample at the first wave consisted of 609 U.S. adults working at least 26 hours per week ($M = 38.47$, $MED = 40.00$, $SD = 9.83$), according to CloudResearch's records. All participants were CloudResearch-approved, and suspicious geocodes were blocked to ensure the capture of high-quality data. The sample was, on average, roughly 41 years of age ($M = 40.95$, $MED = 40.00$, $SD = 11.14$), 47.35% male, had an organizational tenure of approximately eight years ($M = 7.95$, $MED = 6.00$, $SD = 7.32$), were 72.09% White (7.22% Asian or Asian American/Pacific Islander, 11.33% Black/African American, 6.24% Latinx/Latino/Latina/Hispanic, 0.99% Native American, 0.49% Middle Eastern, 1.64% Multiracial/Other), and represented all 20 of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) sectors. 468 participants completed the survey at Time 2, and 424 completed the survey at all the time points. After removing multivariate outliers identified by a Mahalanobis distance test using a cutoff value of $p < 0.001$ (i.e., 7), the final sample size for analyses was 417. These individuals were, on average, 42 years of age ($M = 42.08$, $MED = 40.00$, $SD = 11.46$), 47% male, had an organizational tenure of approximately eight years ($M = 8.19$, $MED = 7.00$, $SD = 0.69$), were 71.46% White (8.39% Asian or Asian American/Pacific Islander, 10.55% Black/African American, 6.24% Latinx/Latino/Latina/Hispanic, 0.48% Middle Eastern, 0.96% Native American, and 1.92% Other/Multiracial), and represented all 20 of the NAICS sectors. Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables.

Measures

Moral Identity, Formalist Orientation, Moral Disengagement, and Control Variables.
Moral identity, formalist moral orientation, moral disengagement, and the control variables were measured using the same scales as those used in Study 1. (See Appendix B for the internal consistency reliabilities for these measures from the Study 2 sample.)

Wisdom. Wisdom was measured using Fung et al.'s (2020) 9-item Brief Self- Assessed Wisdom Scale (BSAWS) (e.g., "I have had to make many important life decisions."). This scale contained a 6-point Likert scale ranging from *strongly agree* to *strongly disagree* ($\alpha = 0.77$, $\omega = 0.82$).

Power. Power was measured using Anderson et al.'s (2012) 8-item Personal Sense of Power Scale adapted to an organizational setting (e.g., "In my organization, I have a large amount of power."). This scale contained items on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *not at all* to *very much* ($\alpha = 0.93$, $\omega = 0.96$).

Moral Imagination. Moral imagination was measured using Yurtsever's (2006) 29- item scale for moral imagination (e.g., "I tried to recognize which ideas were morally worth pursuing and which were not."). This scale contained a 7-point Likert scale ranging from *not at all* to *very much* ($\alpha = 0.86$, $\omega = 0.89$).

Unethical Behavior. Unethical behavior was measured using scales for CWB and UPB. CWB was measured using Spector et al.'s (2010) short version of the Counterproductive Work Behavior Checklist (CWB-C) (e.g., "Came to work late without permission."). The scale asked participants how often they have done each of the following behaviors at their job and contained a 5-point Likert scale ranging from *Never* to *Every day* ($\alpha = 0.89$, $\omega = 0.92$). UPB was measured using Matherne and Litchfield's (2012) 5-item scale for unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB). The scale requested that participants indicate how often they engage in the following behaviors at work (e.g., "Provide false or misleading information about your organization to protect its standings.") and contained a 5- point Likert scale ranging from *Never* to *Always* ($\alpha = 0.92$, $\omega = 0.93$).

Analyses

All hypotheses were tested via path analysis in R using the *lavaan* package (Rosseel, 2012). 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals (CIs) adjusted for bias (BCa) were generated around the

indirect effects using 10,000 iterations, above the recommended minimum of 5,000 (Hayes, 2009).

Research Question 1 was tested in R via two relative weights analyses (RWAs), one for each

dependent variable (i.e., moral imagination and moral disengagement). 95% BCa bootstrapped CIs

were generated around the relative weights to test for statistical significance with 50,000 iterations,

well above the recommendation of 10,000 (Tonidandel et al., 2009).

Discriminant Validity of Morally Relevant Variables

The discriminant validity of the morally relevant study variables (i.e., formalist orientation,

moral identity, moral imagination, moral disengagement, counterproductive work behavior, and

unethical pro-organizational behavior) was examined via a series of confirmatory factor analyses

(CFAs). Item parceling was used for the CFAs to prevent nonconvergence issues and enhance

indicators' reliability (Hirst et al., 2011; Nasser & Wisenbaker, 2003; Takeuchi et al., 2015). Three

parcels were created for each of the six morally relevant constructs, in line with Matsunaga's

(2008) recommendation. The content-based approach (Landis et al., 2000) was used for the

parceling of the moral imagination construct, with each of the item parcels corresponding to one of the

stages in Werhane's (1999) model. This approach was used because Yurtsever's (2006) scale

assesses moral imagination at the facet level, allowing for theory-based item parcel creation (i.e.,

grouping items of the same facet together). The parcels for the other constructs were created via the

factorial algorithm (Rogers & Schmitt, 2004) because the scales used for these constructs only

measure them at the global level. This approach involves running initial factor analyses and

building parcels by combining items based on their factor loadings. In the factorial algorithm,

parcels are formed by sequentially taking the items with the highest to the lowest factor loadings and

alternating the direction of item selection through the parcels (Rogers & Schmitt, 2004). Table 5

displays the model fit indices of the CFAs run. A model consisting of six separate factors had

adequate model fit ($\chi^2(120) = 448.52$, CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.08), falling slightly

outside of Hu and Bentler's (1999) criteria for good model fit (i.e., CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.95,

RMSEA = 0.06). This six-factor model also fit the data significantly better than the best-fitting

five-factor model tested (i.e., the five-factor model combining UPB and CWB) according to a

likelihood ratio test ($\Delta\chi^2(5)$ = 271.04, $p < 0.001$, ΔCFI = 0.05, ΔTLI = 0.06, ΔRMSEA = 0.03)).

These results supported the discriminant validity of the measures used.

Table 8

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations among Study Variables for Study 2

	M	SD	MED	Age	Gender	Tenure	FO	HH	C	A	SD	DC	CA	MI	W	PSP	MIM	MD	CWB	UPB
Age	42.08	11.46	40.00	**1.00**	0.04	**0.44**	0.08	**0.27***	**0.19***	0.04	0.00	0.09	**0.12**	0.00	0.07	0.06	0.02	**-0.19***	**-0.15***	**-0.15***
Gender[a]	0.53	0.50	1.00	0.04	**1.00**	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.09	-0.06	0.05	**-0.12**	**-0.12**	**0.16***	0.02	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0.02	0.00
Tenure[b]	8.19	6.29	7.00	**0.44***	0.03	**1.00**	0.07	0.07	**0.13***	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.04	0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04
FO	3.14	0.70	3.17	0.08	0.02	0.07	**1.00**	0.03	**0.13**	0.02	**0.21***	**-0.14***	**-0.13***	**0.20***	0.07	0.03	-0.01	**0.15***	0.01	0.09
HH	3.59	0.76	3.60	**0.27***	0.09	0.07	0.03	**1.00**	**0.34***	**0.34***	**0.35***	-0.05	**0.13***	**0.15***	**0.17***	0.04	**0.24***	**-0.49***	**-0.44***	**-0.37***
C	3.96	0.66	4.10	**0.19***	0.09	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.34***	**1.00**	**0.23***	**0.22***	**0.17***	**0.17***	**0.31***	**0.49***	**0.31***	**0.47***	**-0.48***	**-0.43***	**-0.42***
A	3.37	0.74	3.40	0.04	-0.06	0.01	0.02	**0.34***	**0.23***	**1.00**	**0.47***	**0.10**	0.08	**0.25***	**0.28***	**0.27***	**0.28***	**-0.26***	**-0.37***	**-0.16***
SD	0.48	0.27	0.46	0.00	0.05	0.03	**0.21***	**0.35***	**0.22***	**0.47***	**1.00**	0.08	-0.10	0.09	0.10	**0.18***	**0.11**	-0.10	**-0.31***	-0.07
DC	3.46	3.41	4.00	0.09	**-0.12**	0.09	**-0.14***	-0.05	**0.17***	**0.10**	0.08	**1.00**	0.03	0.10	**0.32***	**0.33***	**0.26***	-0.09	-0.05	-0.05
CA	0.48	0.19	0.50	**0.12**	**-0.12**	0.00	**-0.13***	**0.13***	**0.17***	0.08	-0.10	0.03	**1.00**	0.02	0.01	-0.01	**0.12**	**-0.26***	**-0.21***	**-0.24***
MI	5.21	0.86	5.20	0.00	**0.16***	-0.01	**0.20***	**0.15***	**0.31***	**0.25***	0.09	0.10	0.02	**1.00**	**0.44***	**0.20***	**0.42***	**-0.28***	**-0.22***	**-0.20***
W	4.82	0.64	4.78	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.07	**0.17***	**0.49***	**0.28***	0.10	**0.32***	0.01	**0.44***	**1.00**	**0.38***	**0.59***	**-0.35***	**-0.28***	**-0.26***
PSP	4.55	1.25	4.63	0.06	-0.07	0.04	0.03	0.04	**0.31***	**0.27***	**0.18***	**0.33***	-0.01	**0.20***	**0.38***	**1.00**	**0.32***	**-0.14***	**-0.23***	-0.12
MIM	4.91	0.63	4.90	0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	**0.24***	**0.47***	**0.28***	**0.11**	**0.26***	**0.12**	**0.42***	**0.59***	**0.32***	**1.00**	**-0.39***	**-0.26***	**-0.24***
MD	2.18	1.10	1.88	**0.19***	-0.06	-0.05	**0.15***	**-0.49***	**-0.48***	**-0.26***	-0.10	-0.09	**-0.26***	**-0.28***	**-0.35***	**-0.14***	**-0.39***	**1.00**	**0.56***	**0.64***
CWB	1.59	0.61	1.40	**-0.15***	0.02	-0.03	0.01	**-0.44***	**-0.43***	**-0.37***	**-0.31***	-0.05	**-0.21***	**-0.22***	**-0.28***	**-0.23***	**-0.26***	**0.56***	**1.00**	**0.71***
UPB	1.29	0.62	1.00	**-0.15***	0.00	-0.04	0.09	**-0.37***	**-0.42***	**-0.16***	-0.07	-0.05	**-0.24***	**-0.20***	**-0.26***	-0.12	**-0.24***	**0.64***	**0.71***	**1.00**

Notes. N = 413-417. [a]Male = 0, Female = 1. [b]Organizational Tenure is in years. FO = Formalist Orientation. HH = Honesty-Humility. C = Conscientiousness. A = Agreeableness. SD = Social Desirability. DC = Dispositional Creativity. CA = Cognitive Ability. MI = Moral Identity. W = Wisdom. PSP = Power. MIMT2 = Moral Imagination at Time 2. MDT2 = Moral Disengagement at Time 2. CWBT3 = Counterproductive Work Behavior at Time 3. UPBT3 = Unethical Pro-organizational Behavior at Time 3. *p < 0.05*. **p < 0.01**.

Table 9

CFAs Examining Discriminant Validity of Morally Relevant Constructs

Model	χ^2	df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA [90% CI]	SRMR
5-factor model (combining UPB and CWB)	719.56	125	0.88	0.85	0.11 [0.10, 0.11]	0.09
5-factor model (combining MD and CWB)	911.83	125	0.84	0.80	0.12 [0.12, 0.13]	0.10
5-factor model (combining MD and UPB)	853.31	125	0.85	0.81	0.12 [0.11, 0.13]	0.10
5-factor model (combining MIM and UPB)	891.56	125	0.84	0.80	0.12 [0.11, 0.13]	0.12
5-factor model (combining MIM and CWB)	911.66	125	0.84	0.80	0.12 [0.12, 0.13]	0.12
5-factor model (combining MIM and MD)	731.36	125	0.87	0.84	0.11 [0.10, 0.12]	0.10
5-factor model (combining MI and UPB)	1063.04	125	0.80	0.76	0.13 [0.13, 0.14]	0.13
5-factor model (combining MI and CWB)	1052.64	125	0.81	0.76	0.13 [0.13, 0.14]	0.13
5-factor model (combining MI and MD)	1006.03	125	0.82	0.77	0.13 [0.12, 0.14]	0.12
5-factor model (combining MI and MIM)	830.95	125	0.85	0.82	0.12 [0.11, 0.12]	0.12
5-factor model (combining FO and UPB)*						
5-factor model (combining FO and CWB)	1512.45	125	0.71	0.64	0.16 [0.16, 0.17]	0.23
5-factor model (combining FO and MD)	751.58	125	0.87	0.84	0.11 [0.10, 0.12]	0.11
5-factor model (combining FO and MIM)	1031.49	125	0.81	0.77	0.13 [0.12, 0.14]	0.17
5-factor model (combining FO and MI)	730.53	125	0.87	0.85	0.11 [0.10, 0.12]	0.11
6-factor model	448.52	120	0.93	0.91	0.08 [0.07, 0.09]	0.09

Notes. N = 417. MD = Moral Disengagement. MIM = Moral Imagination. FO = Formalist Orientation.

*This model failed to converge.

Hypothesis Test Results

Table 10 displays the path analysis results, while Table 8 displays the correlations among study variables. As displayed in Table 8, moral disengagement had a significant positive correlation with counterproductive work behavior (CWB) ($r = 0.56, p < 0.001$) and unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) ($r = 0.64, p < 0.001$). Additionally, the path analysis indicated that moral disengagement significantly predicted CWB ($b = 0.29, p < 0.001$, 95% BCa CI [0.22, 0.35]) and UPB ($b = 0.36, p < 0.001$, 95% BCa CI [0.28, 0.44]). (See Table 10.) Therefore, Hypothesis 1a received full support. Moral imagination had a significant negative correlation with CWB ($r = -0.26$, $p < 0.001$) and UPB ($r = -0.24, p < 0.001$). However, contrary to Hypothesis 1b, moral imagination failed to predict CWB and UPB in the path analysis. The regression coefficients for the paths from moral imagination to CWB and UPB were nonsignificant and positive, contrary to the correlation coefficients.

Wisdom had a significant negative correlation with moral disengagement ($r = -0.35, p < 0.001$) and a significant positive correlation with moral imagination ($r = 0.59, p < 0.001$). The path analysis results also indicated that wisdom significantly predicted moral disengagement ($b = -0.46, p < 0.001$, 95% BCa CI [-0.61, -0.30]) and moral imagination ($b = 0.47, p < 0.001$, 95% BCa CI [0.38, 0.56]). Therefore, Hypotheses 2a and 2b received full support.

The path analysis results showed that moral disengagement mediated the negative relation between wisdom and CWB ($b = -0.13, p < 0.001$, 95% BCa CI [-0.19, -0.08]) and the negative relation between wisdom and UPB ($b = -0.17, p < 0.001$, 95% BCa CI [-0.25, -0.10]). Therefore, Hypothesis 3a received full support. However, the indirect effects of wisdom on CWB and UPB through moral imagination were not statistically significant, failing to support Hypothesis 3b.

The path analysis results regarding the moderating effect of moral identity on the relations between wisdom and moral disengagement and between wisdom and moral imagination were

nonsignificant. Therefore, Hypotheses 4a and 4b did not receive support. Moral identity also failed to moderate the indirect effects of wisdom on CWB and UPB through moral disengagement and moral imagination. Therefore, Hypotheses 5a and 5b did not receive support.

Hypothesis 6 proposed a negative relation between formalist orientation and moral imagination. The correlation matrix indicated a nonsignificant relation between the two variables (See Table 8.) However, the path analysis indicated a significant negative relation (b = -0.10, p = 0.01, 95% BCa CI [-0.18, -0.02]). An additional analysis indicated that the significant regression coefficient in the path model should be approached with caution, failing to offer support for Hypothesis 6. (See the Supplemental Analyses Re-examining Hypotheses 1b, 3b, and 6 section below.) Regarding the moderating effect of formalist orientation on the relation between wisdom and moral imagination (i.e., Hypothesis 7), the path analysis results were nonsignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 did not receive support. Additionally, formalist orientation failed to significantly moderate the indirect effects of wisdom on CWB and UPB through moral imagination (i.e., Hypothesis 8). Therefore, Hypothesis 8 did not receive support.

Hypothesis 9 proposed a negative relation between power and moral imagination. However, the correlation between power and moral imagination was positive and statistically significant (r = 0.32, p < 0.001). Also, the path analysis result for the path from power to moral imagination was nonsignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 9 did not receive support. The moderating effects of power on the relation between wisdom and moral imagination and on the indirect effects of wisdom on UPB and CWB through moral imagination were also nonsignificant. Therefore, Hypotheses 10 and 11 did not receive support.

Table 10

Path Analysis Results

	Parameter Estimates															
Dependent Variable	MIM				MD				CWB				UPB			
Time 1 Predictors	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)
Age	-0.01	0.00	0.49	(-0.01, 0.00)	-0.01	0.00	**0.001***	**(-0.02, -0.01)**	0.00	0.00	**<0.001***	(-0.01, 0.00)	0.00	0.00	0.44	(-0.01, 0.00)
Gender	-0.12	0.05	**0.02**	(0.21, -0.02)	-0.12	0.10	0.21	(-0.31, 0.07)	0.08	0.05	0.10	(-0.01, 0.18)	0.06	0.05	0.18	(-0.03, 0.16)
Social Desirability	0.13	0.09	0.16	(-0.05, 0.31)	-0.34	0.15	**0.02**	**(-0.63, -0.05)**	-0.57	0.08	**<0.001***	(-0.16, 0.14)	-0.01	0.08	0.88	(-0.16, 0.14)
Cognitive Ability	0.30	0.13	**0.02**	**(0.05, 0.54)**	-1.46	0.27	**<0.001***	**(-1.99, -0.94)**								
Wisdom	0.47	0.05	**<0.001***	**(0.38, 0.56)**	-0.46	0.08	**<0.001***	**(-0.61, -0.30)**	-0.08	0.05	0.11	(-0.18, 0.02)	-0.06	0.04	0.16	(-0.15, 0.02)
Formalist Orientation	-0.10	0.04	**0.01**	**(-0.18, -0.02)**												
Moral Identity	0.16	0.04	**<0.001***	**(0.09, 0.24)**	-0.18	0.06	**0.01**	**(-0.30, -0.06)**								
Power	0.03	0.02	0.11	(-0.01, 0.08)												
WisdomXMoral Identity	0.07	0.05	0.19	(-0.03, 0.17)	0.01	0.09	0.94	(-0.15, 0.19)								
WisdomXPower	0.06	0.04	0.12	(-0.02, 0.12)												
WisdomXFormalist Orientation	0.09	0.06	0.16	(-0.04, 0.22)												
Time 2 Predictors																
Moral Imagination									0.03	0.05	0.63	(-0.08, 0.12)	0.05	0.04	0.31	(-0.04, 0.13)
Moral Disengagement									0.29	0.03	**<0.001***	**(0.22, 0.35)**	0.36	0.04	**<0.001***	**(0.28, 0.44)**
Indirect Effects																
W-->MIM-->CWB									0.01	0.02	0.63	(-0.04, 0.06)				
W-->MD-->CWB									-0.13	0.03	**<0.001***	**(-0.19, -0.08)**				
W-->MIM-->UPB									0.02	0.02	0.32	(-0.02, 0.06)	0.02	0.02	0.32	
W-->MD-->UPB									-0.17	0.04	**<0.001***	**(-0.25, -0.10)**	-0.17	0.04	**<0.001***	
Conditional Indirect Effects																
WxMI-->MIM-->CWB									0.00	0.00	0.70	(-0.00, 0.01)				
WxPower-->MIM-->CWB									0.00	0.00	0.70	(-0.00, 0.01)				

	Estimate	SE	p	95% CI	Estimate	SE	p	95% CI
WxFO-->MIM-->CWB	0.00	0.01	0.70	(-0.01, 0.02)				
WxMI-->MIM-->UPB					0.00	0.00	0.47	(-0.06, 0.07)
WxPower-->MIM-->UPB					0.00	0.00	0.43	(-0.00, 0.01)
WxFO-->MIM-->UPB					0.00	0.01	0.48	(-0.00, 0.02)
WxMI-->MD-->CWB	0.00	0.03	0.94	(-0.05, 0.05)				
WxMI-->MD-->UPB					0.00	0.03	0.94	(-0.06, 0.07)
Total Effect (CWB)	-0.20	0.05	**<0.001***	**(-0.29, -0.10)**				
Total Effect (UPB)					-0.19	0.05	**<0.001***	**(-0.30, -0.10)**

Note. $N = 413$. All Time 1 predictors were mean-centered. 95% confidence intervals adjusted for bias (BCa) that fail to contain 0 are in bold. MIM = Moral imagination. MD = Moral disengagement. CWB = Counterproductive Work Behavior. UPB = Unethical Pro-organizational Behavior. T2 = Time 2. T3 = Time 3. W = Wisdom. MI = Moral identity. FO = Formalist orientation. **p < 0.05**. ***p < 0.01**.

Research Question 1 Results

Table 11 below presents the results of the RWAs testing Research Question 1. The RWA results with moral disengagement as the dependent variable indicated that wisdom explained variance above and beyond the other personality variables in the model, with a 95% BCa CI that failed to contain zero ([0.03, 0.09]). Wisdom explained the third most variance in the model behind Honesty-humility and Conscientiousness, accounting for 14.93% of the variance in the model ($R^2 = 0.37$). Therefore, Research Question 1a was answered in the affirmative. Wisdom explained incremental variance in moral disengagement above and beyond Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Honesty-humility, and dispositional creativity.

The RWA results with moral imagination as the dependent variable indicated that wisdom explained incremental variance above and beyond the other personality traits, with a 95% BCa CI that failed to contain zero ([0.17, 0.27]). Additionally, the results showed that wisdom accounted for the most variance in moral imagination, accounting for 53.28% of the variance explained in the model ($R^2 = 0.41$). Therefore, Research Question 1b was answered in the affirmative. Wisdom explained incremental variance in moral imagination above and beyond Honesty-humility, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and dispositional creativity.

Supplemental Analyses Re-examining Hypotheses 1b, 3b, and 6

Due to the correlation coefficients between moral imagination and the unethical organizational behavior outcomes being in the opposite direction of the regression coefficients in the path model, potential suppression effects were examined. Suppression was examined by running initial regressions with only moral imagination as a predictor and then running subsequent regressions, adding one predictor at a time to the equation. (See Appendix B for the results of these regressions.) The initial regressions with only moral imagination as a predictor

were significant, with moral imagination being a significant negative predictor of CWB (β = -0.26, b = -0.25, $p < 0.001$) and UPB (β = -0.24, b = -0.24, $p < 0.001$). The multiple regressions indicated a significant negative relation between moral imagination and these outcomes when the control variables and wisdom were added to the model. However, adding moral disengagement to the model led moral imagination's effects on these outcomes to become nonsignificant and positive (β = 0.03, b = 0.02, p = 0.61 and β = 0.05, b = 0.04, p = 0.36 for CWB and UPB, respectively). Therefore, moral disengagement was identified as a potential suppressor.

Due to collinearity among predictors enabling suppression effects to emerge, relative weights analyses (RWAs) were run to examine moral imagination's effects on CWB and UPB. (See Appendix B.) RWA has an advantage over traditional multiple regression in that the predictors are uncorrelated (Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2011). One RWA was run for each of the two outcome variables (i.e., CWB and UPB) using the same procedures outlined above regarding Research Question 1. The RWA results with CWB as the outcome indicated that moral imagination explained variance in CWB above and beyond the other predictors (95% BCa CI [0.01, 0.04]), accounting for 5.54% of the variance in the model (R^2 = 0.39). Therefore, these results supported Hypothesis 1b. However, the RWA results with UPB as the outcome did not indicate that moral imagination explained variance in UPB above and beyond the other predictors, with a 95% BCa CI containing 0 ([-0.00, 0.03]). Therefore, Hypothesis 1b only received partial support.

An additional path analysis was also run to examine the indirect effect of moral imagination on CWB through wisdom (Hypothesis 3b) after omitting moral disengagement from the path to CWB. (See Appendix B.) This decision was made after the RWA found that moral

imagination explained incremental variance in CWB after controlling for the other variables in the model. In support of Hypothesis 3b, the indirect effect of wisdom on CWB through moral imagination was significant ($b = -0.06$, $p = 0.03$, 95% BCa CI [-0.12, -0.01]). Therefore, overall, Hypothesis 3b received partial support.

The correlation coefficient between formalist orientation and moral imagination was negative but nonsignificant. However, the regression coefficient in the path analysis was statistically significant. These results suggest that suppression effects could have inflated the regression coefficient in the path analysis. Therefore, another regression that only included formalist orientation as a predictor was run. (See Appendix B.) Results showed that formalist orientation failed to significantly predict moral imagination ($\beta = -0.01$, $b = -0.01$, $p = 0.86$). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 did not receive support.

Table 11

Relative Weights Analyses Results for Incremental Validity of Wisdom

Dependent Variable	MIMT2				MDT2			
Predictors	R^2	Raw Relative Weight	Rescaled Relative Weight	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)	R^2	Raw Relative Weight	Rescaled Relative Weight	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)
	0.41				0.37			
Conscientiousness		0.11	26.05	**(0.07, 0.15)**		0.13	34.34	**(0.08, 0.19)**
Agreeableness		0.03	7.16	**(0.01, 0.06)**		0.02	5.94	**(0.01, 0.04)**
Honesty-Humility		0.02	5.38	**(0.00, 0.05)**		0.16	43.66	**(0.12, 0.21)**
Dispositional Creativity		0.03	8.14	**(0.01, 0.07)**		0.00	1.13	(-0.01, 0.02)
Wisdom		0.22	53.28	**(0.17, 0.27)**		0.06	14.93	**(0.03, 0.09)**

Note. N = 417. MIMT2 = Moral Imagination measured at Time 2. MDT2 = Moral Disengagement measured at Time 2. 95% confidence intervals adjusted for bias (BCa) not containing 0 are in bold.

Discussion

General Discussion

Results across two studies supported a robust relation between wisdom and moral reasoning (i.e., moral imagination and moral disengagement). Wisdom significantly predicted moral imagination and moral disengagement using different samples and operationalizations of wisdom and moral imagination. Additionally, wisdom predicted moral imagination and moral disengagement above and beyond other relevant personality variables in both samples, and other individual differences and contextual perceptions failed to impact wisdom's effect on moral reasoning. Lastly, results from the worker sample (i.e., Study 2) showed that wisdom influenced CWB and UPB through reduced moral disengagement. Supplemental analyses also showed that wisdom influenced CWB though increased moral imagination, after accounting for potential suppression effects. These findings underscore wisdom's importance in moral cognition and behavior. The Theoretical and Practical Implications section further explicates the ramifications of these findings.

The failure to find moderating effects of other individual differences (i.e., formalist orientation and moral identity) and contextual perceptions (i.e., power) on wisdom's relation to moral reasoning could indicate that wisdom's effect on these processes is resistant to other variables' influence. This proposition is consistent with a social cognitive theory perspective. If wisdom reflects a well-developed, well-functioning self-regulatory system, individuals who possess this trait may be able to help others and achieve their social goals (e.g., being a moral person) despite potential obstacles residing within themselves and in the environment. However, more research should examine this proposition.

Moral disengagement positively predicted unethical behavior across samples and

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operationalizations of unethical behavior. These findings are consistent with research on moral disengagement's role in unethical behavior in various contexts (Fida et al., 2014; Fida et al., 2018; Hadlington et al., 2021; Treviño et al., 2006). Moral imagination, however, only significantly predicted unethical behavior in the form of CWB in the RWA. Moral imagination may have significantly predicted unethical behavior in the worker sample but not the student sample, in part, because of the measures used. As mentioned, Study 1 used a measure of moral imagination that placed participants in a hypothetical scenario, whereas Study 2 used a measure that asked about participants' actual experiences of moral imagination. The Study 1 scenario's irrelevance to participants may have failed to adequately engage moral imagination processes that they use in their daily lives, resulting in reduced predictive validity. The moral imagination and unethical behavior measures used in the worker sample also differed from those used in the student sample in that they both asked participants about their experiences at work. Scale contextualization has been found to strengthen relations among psychological variables (Shaffer & Postlethwaite, 2014; Swift & Peterson, 2019). However, more research is warranted to understand how and when moral imagination influences moral behavior.

Formalist orientation, though in the expected negative direction, failed to significantly predict moral imagination in either sample. These findings suggest that adherence to moral rules may only pose a minor threat to engaging in moral imagination. Future research should further examine the relation between possessing deontological moral tendencies and moral imagination.

Power, contrary to expectations, had a significant positive correlation with moral imagination ($r = 0.32$) in Study 2. This finding may be explicable via Keltner et al.'s (2003) approach-motivation theory of power. According to this theory, power activates individuals'

behavioral activation system (BAS), which promotes positive affect and approach behavior (Matthews & Gilliland, 1999). Moral imagination is conceptualized as a proactive cognitive process (Keem et al., 2018) and could be viewed as a form of approach cognition stimulated by positive emotion. This contention is consistent with research on positive affect's role in creativity (Amabile et al., 2005; Isen et al., 1987). Future research should further explore this proposition.

Limitations and Future Directions

Limitations

The current studies have several notable limitations. First, neither study utilized behavioral measures of unethical behavior and relied on self-report and hypothetical scenario- based measures. Using self-report measures for personality, moral reasoning, and unethical behavior could have inflated the relations among these variables (Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992). However, several factors present in the current studies could have mitigated these potential inflationary effects. First, these variables were separated by a time lag of one month in Study 2, reducing the risk of inflationary effects from common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003) (e.g., transient mood states). Second, participants in both studies were told that their responses were anonymous, reducing the incentive for them to distort their responses in a socially desirable way. Third, social desirability functioned as a control variable in the analyses to remove its effects on the relations among these variables, though some meta- analytic evidence suggests its impact would be minimal (Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992).

Lastly, because workers often commit unethical behaviors surreptitiously, self-report measures may be more useful than other-report measures (Berry et al., 2012). Future research, however, should examine the influence of wisdom and moral imagination on objective measures of behavior and other-report measures to determine if the findings converge.

A second limitation of the current studies, particularly Study 1, involves sample characteristics. Study 1 used a student sample. While over 75% of participants had work experience and, on average, had nearly two years of paid work experience in an organizational setting, the scenarios used may not have applied to these individuals. The scenarios placed the participant in a managerial role. Many of the students who participated likely did not possess managerial experience. Therefore, the participants may have had trouble anticipating how they would respond in these scenarios. Future research may benefit from relying on samples with managerial experience when using such measures and correlating responses on the scenarios with objective behaviors, if feasible.

A final limitation pertains to the analyses used in the current studies. Neither study used a full cross-lagged panel design. Only through a true longitudinal design measuring the variables at three or more time points may a researcher assert causal precedence in a non- experimental study (Ployhart & MacKenzie, 2015). However, as many of the predictor variables in this study are conceptualized as stable individual differences, it made theoretical sense to only measure them at the initial time point. Cross-lagged designs have also shown that moral disengagement has a reciprocal relation with unethical behavior, with moral disengagement influencing and being influenced by unethical behavior (i.e., post-moral disengagement) (Fida et al., 2018). Therefore, research supports the plausibility of this study's claim that moral reasoning influenced unethical behavior. Consideration of participant cognitive fatigue also made the decision to measure some variables at a single time point more reasonable. Including all the measures at every time point increases the time needed for participants to complete the survey, enhancing the likelihood of fatigue and poorer response quality (Galesic & Bosnjak, 2009).

Future Directions

This study adopted Webster's (2003) conceptualization of wisdom as using personal experiences to benefit the self and others because of its relevance for social behavior, specifically unethical organizational behavior. Future research should examine wisdom's influence on other social behaviors at work. For example, wisdom may positively predict organizational citizenship behavior and pro-social behavior at work due to the trait's emotional regulation and perspective-taking components. Wise individuals may be more apt to notice the difficulties their coworkers face and may have a greater capacity to direct their positive emotions toward helping coworkers in need. Future research could also investigate wisdom's benefits for leaders. For example, wisdom could enhance leaders' ability to develop high leader-member exchange (LMX) with their subordinates. The other-related components of wisdom could help leaders to form relationships with subordinates characterized by trust and mutual respect.

This study examined several moderators of the relation between wisdom and moral reasoning and failed to find significant interactive effects. These results suggest that wisdom's influence on moral cognition and subsequent behavior is resistant to the influence of other individual differences and context. Future research should examine other moderators to test this proposition further.

Results indicated that wisdom significantly predicted moral imagination. It was noted that several of wisdom's facets could impact moral imagination at various stages of Werhane's (1999) model. However, this study did not examine wisdom's effects at the facet level. The use of the BSAWS in Study 2 made testing the effects of wisdom's facets on the individual moral imagination stages infeasible, as the measure only assesses the global construct (Fung et al., 2020). Future research is required to determine which of

wisdom's facets plays the strongest role at each stage of moral imagination.

This study examined the incremental validity of wisdom in predicting moral imagination and moral disengagement above and beyond the personality traits of Conscientiousness, Honesty-humility, Agreeableness, and dispositional creativity. These traits were selected because of their relations to moral reasoning, unethical behavior, and moral character in the literature (e.g., Cohen et al., 2014; Keem et al., 2018; Ogunforwora & Bourdage, 2014). However, future research could investigate the incremental validity of wisdom in predicting moral reasoning and behavior above and beyond personality traits not included in this study, such as those included in the Dark Tetrad, Light Triad, and other virtue traits. Future researchers could also examine if wisdom differentiates those of high moral character from those of low moral character utilizing latent profile analysis, like Cohen et al. (2014).

Future research could also benefit from studying other conceptualizations of wisdom. For example, organizational researchers could investigate the role of cognitive-based wisdom measures on task performance and adaptive job performance. Researchers could also examine the incremental validity of cognitive-based wisdom above and beyond other established predictors of task and adaptive performance (e.g., cognitive ability and conscientiousness; Bell & Kozlowski, 2002; Blickle et al., 2011; Pulakos et al., 2002; Shoss et al., 2012).

This study proposed that practitioners could benefit from using wisdom in selection contexts. However, this study did not measure wisdom in a high-stakes environment. Due to the socially desirable aspects and self-reported nature of the SAWS and BSAWS, job applicants might have an incentive and a capacity to distort their responses to these

measures. Future research should examine the predictive validity of wisdom in high-stakes environments, such as job application settings, to add credence to its utility for personnel selection.

This study focused primarily on the role of individual differences in moral imagination, apart from power in one's organization. Future research should explore the role of organizational characteristics, such as ethical climate and organizational moral identity centrality, on moral imagination. This research could also examine moral imagination at the group level (e.g., team-level moral imagination, work unit-level moral imagination, etc.), as many decisions within organizations occur in groups.

Lastly, this study relied on multiple stage models. Though evidence supports some of the CIM's temporal propositions (e.g., Bateman et al., 2002; Cameron et al., 2017; Greene et al., 2001), future research should test this model in its entirety. Researchers have also yet to investigate the temporal sequence of the stages in Werhane's (1999) model of moral imagination. Therefore, researchers need to conduct longitudinal research to examine the stages of moral imagination and how the process unfolds over time.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Theoretical Implications

This study relied on Dedeke's (2015) CIM to examine the roles of individual difference variables and context on moral reasoning rather than Rest's (1986) model of moral judgment. As mentioned, the CIM expands on Rest's (1986) model by including the roles of automatic cognition and emotion in moral decision-making and an initial issue-framing stage. The CIM also acknowledges the influences of individual differences (e.g., emotional regulation) and context (e.g., perceived ethical climate) on moral reasoning. Incorporating these elements into the moral decision-making process makes the CIM useful

for future moral imagination research, as it provides several directions regarding influences on moral reflection (e.g., perceived moral intensity, emotional regulation).

Practical Implications

This study's results indicate that wisdom has significant relations with moral cognition and unethical behavior in organizations, even when controlling for other personality traits prominent in the literature on unethical organizational behavior. Due to the costliness of unethical decisions and behaviors in the workplace (Statistic Brain Research Institute, 2018), organizations could consider incorporating wisdom into their selection decisions, particularly for leadership roles. Research has shown that strong norms for unethical behavior and unethical behavior performed by leaders encourage costly unethical behaviors throughout the organization (Fein et al., 2023; Lian et al., 2022; Nguyen et al., 2021; Pagliaro et al., 2018). Therefore, selecting wise employees and leaders who engage in fewer unethical behaviors could help organizations save money and ensure their long-term success. Wisdom in this study also had very small correlations with demographic variables, such as gender ($r = 0.02$ in Study 2) and age ($r = 0.07$ in Study 2). Therefore, selecting employees based on wisdom may not introduce or enhance adverse impact. Additionally, the lack of evidence supporting the moderating hypotheses suggests that organizations may not have to consider other variables mitigating wisdom's predictive validity. However, more research needs to examine these propositions.

Organizations may also benefit from conducting interventions to enhance employees' wisdom. Though conceptualized as a stable trait, interventions, if conducted properly, could increase employees' wisdom levels or, at least, certain facets of the trait. For example, mindfulness training has been found to increase employees' emotional regulation (Farb et al., 2014; Hülsheger et al., 2013), one of wisdom's five facets (Webster, 2003). However, future

research should study wisdom and its facets' malleability to support the feasibility of wisdom interventions in the workplace.

Conclusion

This study provides evidence that wisdom predicts moral imagination and moral disengagement and predicts reduced unethical organizational behavior through these processes. This research suggests that organizational researchers can benefit from studying wisdom's impact on other social behaviors in the workplace. This research also implies that practitioners may benefit from considering wisdom in their selection and development systems, as having wiser employees in the organization could reduce financial losses stemming from unethical behavior within the workplace.

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Appendix A

Study 1 Measures:

Time 1
measures:

Demographic questions:

1. What is your age in years?

2. What is your gender identification? (select one)
   o Male
   o Female
   o Non-binary/third gender
   o Prefer not to say

3. What is your ethnicity? (select one)
   o Native American
   o Asian or Asian American/Pacific Islander
   o Black/African American
   o Middle Eastern
   o White
   o Other (please specify) _____

4. Are you a native English speaker?
   o No
   o Yes

5. How many years of paid work experience in an organizational setting do you have?
   o [drop-down list from 0-50]

Cognitive Ability items (Sandia Matrices short form developed by Harris et al. (2020)):

1. Select the object below that completes the pattern.

2. Select the object below that completes the pattern.

3. Select the object below that completes the pattern.

4. Select the object below that completes the pattern.

5. Select the object below that completes the pattern.

6. Select the object below that completes the pattern.

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
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
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
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
Social Desirability items (Reynolds' (1982) Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale—Short Form):

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide how it pertains to you.
Please respond TRUE (T) or FALSE (F) to each item.

1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not engaged.

    o T
    o F

2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.

    o T
    o F

3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability.

    o T
    o F

4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right.

    o T
    o F

5. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
   - o T
   - o F

6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
   - o T
   - o F

7. I'm always willing to admit to it when I make a mistake.
   - o T
   - o F

8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
   - o T
   - o F

9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
   - o T
   - o F

10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from own.
    - o T
    - o F

11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
    - o T
    - o F

12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
    - o T
    - o F

13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.
    - o T
    - o F

Wisdom items (Webster's (2003) Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS)):

You are asked to rate all of the following statements. Remember, there are no "right" or "wrong" answers, and your responses will remain anonymous. Do not rush, but work steadily as we are interested in your first impressions. Please record your responses by selecting only one option on the rating scale below each statement.

1. I have overcome many painful events in my life.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree

- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

2. It is easy for me to adjust my emotions to the situation at hand.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

3. I often think about connections between my past and present.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

4. I can chuckle at personal embarrassments.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

5. I like to read books which challenge me to think differently about issues.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

6. I have had to make many important life decisions.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

7. Emotions do not overwhelm me when I make personal decisions.
   - o Strongly Disagree

- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

8. I often think about my personal past.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

9. There can be amusing elements even in very difficult life situations.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

10. I enjoy listening to a variety of musical styles besides my favorite kind.
    - o Strongly Disagree
    - o Moderately Disagree
    - o Slightly Disagree
    - o Slightly Agree
    - o Moderately Agree
    - o Strongly Agree

11. I have dealt with a great many different kinds of people during my lifetime.
    - o Strongly Disagree
    - o Moderately Disagree
    - o Slightly Disagree
    - o Slightly Agree
    - o Moderately Agree
    - o Strongly Agree

12. I am "tuned in to my own emotions.
    - o Strongly Disagree
    - o Moderately Disagree
    - o Slightly Disagree
    - o Moderately Agree
    - o Strongly Agree

13. I reminisce quite frequently.

- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

14. I try and find a humorous side when coping with a major life transition.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

15. I enjoy sampling a wide variety of different ethnic foods.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

16. I have experienced many moral dilemmas.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

17. I am very good at reading my emotional states.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

18. Reviewing my past helps me gain perspective on current concerns.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

19. I am easily aroused to laughter.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

20. I often look for new things to try.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

21. I have seen much of the negative side of life (e.g., dishonesty, hypocrisy).
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

22. I can freely express my emotions without feeling like I might lose control.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

23. I often recall earlier times in my life to see how I've changed since then.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree
   - o Strongly Agree

24. At this point in my life, I find it easy to laugh at my mistakes.
   - o Strongly Disagree
   - o Moderately Disagree
   - o Slightly Disagree
   - o Slightly Agree
   - o Moderately Agree

o Strongly Agree

25. Controversial works of art play an important and valuable role in society.
   o Strongly Disagree
   o Moderately Disagree
   o Slightly Disagree
   o Slightly Agree
   o Moderately Agree
   o Strongly Agree

26. I have lived through many difficult life transitions.
   o Strongly Disagree
   o Moderately Disagree
   o Slightly Disagree
   o Slightly Agree
   o Moderately Agree
   o Strongly Agree

27. I am good at identifying subtle emotions within myself.
   o Strongly Disagree
   o Moderately Disagree
   o Slightly Disagree
   o Slightly Agree
   o Moderately Agree
   o Strongly Agree

28. Recalling my earlier days helps me gain insight into important life matters.
   o Strongly Disagree
   o Moderately Disagree
   o Slightly Disagree
   o Moderately Agree
   o Strongly Agree

29. I often use humor to put others at ease.
   o Strongly Disagree
   o Moderately Disagree
   o Slightly Disagree
   o Moderately Agree
   o Strongly Agree

30. I like being around persons whose views are strongly different from mine.
   o Strongly Disagree
   o Moderately Disagree
   o Slightly Disagree
   o Slightly Agree
   o Moderately Agree

o Strongly Agree

31. I've personally discovered that "you can't always tell a book from its cover".
    o Strongly Disagree
    o Moderately Disagree
    o Slightly Disagree
    o Slightly Agree
    o Moderately Agree
    o Strongly Agree

32. I can regulate my emotions when the situation calls for it.
    o Strongly Disagree
    o Moderately Disagree
    o Slightly Disagree
    o Slightly Agree
    o Moderately Agree
    o Strongly Agree

33. I often find memories of my past can be important coping resources.
    o Strongly Disagree
    o Moderately Disagree
    o Slightly Disagree
    o Slightly Agree
    o Moderately Agree
    o Strongly Agree

34. Now I find that I can really appreciate life's little ironies.
    o Strongly Disagree
    o Moderately Disagree
    o Slightly Disagree
    o Slightly Agree
    o Moderately Agree
    o Strongly Agree

35. I'm very curious about other religious and/or philosophical belief systems.
    o Strongly Disagree
    o Moderately Disagree
    o Slightly Disagree
    o Slightly Agree
    o Moderately Agree
    o Strongly Agree

36. I've learned valuable life lessons from others.
    o Strongly Disagree
    o Moderately Disagree
    o Slightly Disagree

- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

37. It seems I have a talent for reading other people's emotions.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

38. Reliving past accomplishments in memory increases my confidence for today.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

39. I can make fun of myself to comfort others.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

40. I've often wondered about life and what lies beyond.
- o Strongly Disagree
- o Moderately Disagree
- o Slightly Disagree
- o Slightly Agree
- o Moderately Agree
- o Strongly Agree

Dispositional Creativity items (Gough's (1979) scale):

Please indicate which of the following adjectives best describe yourself.

Check all that apply.

- o Capable
- o Artificial
- o Clever

- Cautious
- Confident
- Egotistical
- Commonplace
- Humorous
- Conservative
- Individualistic
- Conventional
- Informal
- Dissatisfied
- Insightful
- Suspicious
- Honest
- Intelligent
- Well-mannered
- Wide interests
- Inventive
- Original
- Narrow interests
- Reflective
- Sincere
- Resourceful
- Self-confident
- Sexy
- Submissive
- Snobbish
- Unconventional

Moral Identity items (Aquino & Reed's (2002) scale):

Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person:
caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind.
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions.

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
    - Strongly disagree
    - Disagree
    - Somewhat disagree
    - Neither agree nor disagree
    - Somewhat agree
    - Agree
    - Strongly agree

2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree

- Agree
- Strongly agree

7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.
   - Strongly disagree
   - Disagree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Neither agree nor disagree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Agree
   - Strongly agree

8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations.
   - Strongly disagree
   - Disagree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Neither agree nor disagree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Agree
   - Strongly agree

9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics.
   - Strongly disagree
   - Disagree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Neither agree nor disagree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Agree
   - Strongly agree

10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
   - Strongly disagree
   - Disagree
   - Somewhat disagree
   - Neither agree nor disagree
   - Somewhat agree
   - Agree
   - Strongly agree

Formalist Orientation items (formalism subscale of Love et al.'s (2020) Ethical Standards of Judgment Questionnaire):

Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1. Solutions to ethical problems are usually black and white.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

2. A person's actions should be described in terms of being right or wrong.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

3. A nation should pay the most attention to its heritage, its roots.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

4. Societies should follow stable traditions and maintain a distinctive identity.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

5. Uttering a falsehood is wrong because it wouldn't be right for anyone to lie.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

6. Unethical behavior is best described as a violation of some principle of the law.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

Honesty-humility items (Honesty-humility subscale from Ashton & Lee's (2009) HEXACO- 60):

Please read each statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then indicate your response using the following scale:

5 = strongly agree
4 = agree
3 = neutral (neither agree nor
disagree) 2 = disagree
1 = strongly disagree

1. I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed.
   o 5
   o 4
   o 3
   o 2
   o 1

2. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
   o 5
   o 4
   o 3
   o 2
   o 1

3. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
   o 5
   o 4
   o 3
   o 2
   o 1

4. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
   o 5
   o 4
   o 3
   o 2
   o 1

5. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes.
   o 5
   o 4
   o 3
   o 2
   o 1

6. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.

- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1

7. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
   - 5
   - 4
   - 3
   - 2
   - 1

8. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
   - 5
   - 4
   - 3
   - 2
   - 1

9. I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
   - 5
   - 4
   - 3
   - 2
   - 1

10. I'd be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
    - 5
    - 4
    - 3
    - 2
    - 1

Conscientiousness items (Conscientiousness subscale from Ashton & Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60):

Please read each statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then indicate your response using the following scale: 5 = strongly agree 4 = agree 3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 2 = disagree 1 = strongly disagree

1. I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute.
   - 5
   - 4
   - 3
   - 2

- o 1

2. I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal.
    - o 5
    - o 4
    - o 3
    - o 2
    - o 1

3. When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details.
    - o 5
    - o 4
    - o 3
    - o 2
    - o 1

4. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.
    - o 5
    - o 4
    - o 3
    - o 2
    - o 1

5. When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized.
    - o 5
    - o 4
    - o 3
    - o 2
    - o 1
6. I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.
    - o 5
    - o 4
    - o 3
    - o 2
    - o 1

7. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time
    - o 5
    - o 4
    - o 3
    - o 2
    - o 1

8. I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.
    - o 5
    - o 4

- o 3
- o 2
- o 1

9. People often call me a perfectionist.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

10. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

Agreeableness items (Agreeableness subscale from Ashton & Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60):

Please read each statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then indicate your response using the following scale: 5 = strongly agree 4 = agree 3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 2 = disagree 1 = strongly disagree

1. I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

2. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

3. People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

4. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

5. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget."
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

6. I tend to be lenient in judging other people.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

7. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

8. Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

9. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3
   - o 2
   - o 1

10. When people tell me that I'm wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them.
   - o 5
   - o 4
   - o 3

o 2

o 1

Moral Imagination items (short version of Yurtsever's (2006) scale adapted by Keeem et al. (2018) to fit the vignette developed by Whitaker and Godwin (2013)):

The scenario below describes an ethical situation in the workplace. Read the scenario carefully and then think about how you would handle it.

One of your coworkers recently ran into some hard times. His wife has lost her job and his family (which includes five children) has been having considerable financial problems. In order to make some extra money, he has recently started painting houses for additional income. In order to make people aware of his new business, he has been using the company's e-mail account and telephone to schedule jobs and communicate with customers regarding job deadlines, payment, and other related details. In addition, he has placed the company's email address and telephone number on his personal business cards that he has been distributing. A few times over the last month, he has called in sick. Because he has been calling in frequently, some of his work has not been getting done and, as a result, other employees (including you) have had to step into fulfill his job duties. However, because he never appears to be under the weather, you suspect that he has been using sick days to get painting work done.

To what extent do the following statements describe your thought processes when reading the vignette? (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

1. I anticipated any moral problems that may threaten my career.
    - o 1 (not at all)
    - o 2
    - o 3
    - o 4
    - o 5
    - o 6
    - o 7 (very much)

2. I imagined similarities and differences between the situation at hand and other situations where a certain rule proved to be applicable.
    - o 1 (not at all)
    - o 2
    - o 3
    - o 4
    - o 5
    - o 6
    - o 7 (very much)

3. Since the current situation is morally ambiguous, I reconceptualized my

basic understanding.
- o 1 (not at all)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7 (very much)

4. I tried to recognize which ideas were morally worth pursuing and which were not.
- o 1 (not at all)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7 (very much)

5. I felt I had a moral responsibility for what I answered in terms of affecting others.
- o 1 (not at all)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7 (very much)

6. I felt the range and diversity of my social knowledge was sufficient to answer this question.
- o 1 (not at all)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7 (very much)

7. My imagination enabled me to look at myself from the point of view of another person.
- o 1 (not at all)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7 (very much)

8. I was able to conceive of the moral relationship that should be in place within this system.
    - o 1 (not at all)
    - o 2
    - o 3
    - o 4
    - o 5
    - o 6
    - o 7 (very much)

Moral Disengagement items (Moore et al.'s (2012) scale):

Indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

1. It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

2. Taking something without the owner's permission is okay as long as you're just borrowing it.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

3. Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it's hardly a sin to inflate your own accomplishments a bit.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

4. People shouldn't be held accountable for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too.

- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Somewhat disagree
- o Neither agree nor disagree
- o Somewhat agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

5. People can't be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

6. Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

7. Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

8. People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

Insufficient Effort Responding Items:

1. For this item, select the option labeled "F".
    - o A
    - o B
    - o C
    - o D
    - o E
    - o F
    - o G

2. For this item, select the option that refers to an animal.
    - o Rock
    - o Tree
    - o Cat
    - o Mountain
    - o Chair

3. For this item, select the option labeled "2".
    - o 1
    - o 2
    - o 3
    - o 4
    - o 5
    - o 6

Time 2 measures:

In-basket items:

In-basket description (adapted from Bailey and Alexander (1993)):

INSTRUCTIONS--Read carefully

For the purpose of this exercise, you are to assume the role of Pat Gibson. Pat Gibson is a General Manager for the Midwest Region of AmeriGrand Corporation. The AmeriGrand Corporation is a large conglomerate comprised of many strategic business units (SBUs). Most of the decisions for each strategic business unit are made by the directors of that unit and the General Manager for that region. AmeriGrand Corporation believes that at all levels within the organization, managers should remain "in-touch" with the basic operations. As a result, even General Managers engage in a spattering of tasks from the various business units. As a general manager, you are responsible for all operations within the Midwest Region. This region includes Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan,

Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Within these states, AmeriGrand Corporation owns twenty-seven business units (companies). These including such businesses as manufacturing firms, retail store chains, real estate investment firms, service firms, and a wide variety of other businesses. From the segment of the organizational chart provided on the following page, you will see that your boss is the Vice President of operations for U.S./Canada. Above him is Konrad J. Robinson, the chief executive officer (CEO). You have an executive secretary who does the usual secretarial tasks including taking phone messages, ordering office supplies, filing, and typing, including typing your dictation--which is often nothing more than notes you have made to yourself. In your six years as General Manager, you have found this typing of dictated notes helpful since it provides a written account of your thoughts and considerations regarding particular situations. These typed dictation notes are very useful for organizing your own thoughts and feelings when making decisions. On the following page, you are given an organizational chart. Following that, you will be asked to make some managerial decisions. You may refer back to the information. (As a check on how carefully these instructions are being read, please select the option labeled "2" below.) After viewing the organizational chart, you will have seven decisions to make based on memos, phone calls, and personal notes you have dictated to yourself. Your task is to assume you are Pat Gibson and make the decisions based on how you would actually respond in the given situations. You will be asked to choose between two responses. You are free to look back over any of the information provided to you at any time you wish. Figure 1 is part of the Organizational Chart for AmeriGrand Corporation. The entire chart is too large to reproduce for the purpose of this exercise. The relevant information regarding where Pat Gibson's position fits into the corporation is provided by this part of the chart.

Select from the following:
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

In-basket diagram (from Bailey & Alexander (1993)):

Organizational Chart for AmeriGrand Corporation (Partial)

Ethical In-basket items (adapted from Bailey & Alexander's (1993) ethical in-basket):

1. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Konrad J. Robinson, CEO

TO: J. Noonan, Pat Gibson, all Midwest Directors
RE: Location of new plant

I am writing to get your opinion. As you know, we are going to build a plant to keep up with some of our orders in one of our manufacturing businesses. We can build it in Indiana or Iowa. The land costs less in Indiana, but the taxes will be higher for the first five years of business. After five years, taxes will be the same in either state. In Iowa, the land costs more, but we get a five-year tax break. The money really equals out overall if we figure an average level of business over the next five years. I would like your opinion on what we should do.

Konrad J.
Robinson cjt

I MUST NOW CHOOSE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS:
   o   I will suggest we build in Iowa. If we build in Iowa, we get the tax break, and if we do more than average business, then we gain by the reduced taxes. I will suggest we build in Iowa.
   o   I will suggest we build in Indiana. If we build in Indiana, we get the land at a better price, and if we do less than average business, then we at least gain by purchasing the

less expensive land. I will suggest we build in Indiana.

How confident are you in your decision? (1 = I am NOT very confident I would choose this option, 7 = I am very confident I would choose this option)
- o 1
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7

[*This item is not scored because it is not an ethical scenario.]

2. AmeriGrand Corporation
Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: (dictation notes to
self) RE: Property Sale

One of the business operations I work in as a manager is the sale of some of our company properties in this region. One such property is a set of six buildings. They have been on the market for quite a while with only one potential buyer, a company that wishes to purchase the group and then sell each building individually. Last year, this same company made a similar purchase from me. They made a small profit when reselling the individual units. They made me aware of a planned riverside development and golf course, and this resulted in a higher selling price and a better bonus for me. I feel they were totally honest with me. I also feel my company and I got a fair share of the profits from last year's deal. Now, I am negotiating a deal with them on these new buildings. I will get a good commission from the sale. Today, I heard from a credible source that the vacant lot across the street is pretty sure to be designated for a troubled- youth city project. I talked on the phone with the potential buyers yesterday, and they asked me if I knew the city plans for the vacant lot across the street. I did not know. I need to let them know today; the deal will close or be lost today. Below I have mentioned what I feel I have to gain from two courses of action.

PG/kts

I MUST NOW CHOOSE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS:
- o I call right back. If I tell them I am pretty sure of the troubled-youth city house I may gain a good reputation, and my corporation may gain a good reputation. I will tell them that there may quite likely be a troubled-youth city house put up across the street.
- o I call right back. If I tell them I don't "know" what is planned for across the street, I will gain a good commission from the sale, and my corporation will gain the sale of those buildings. I will tell them I don't "know" what is planned across the street.

How confident are you in your decision? (1 = I am NOT very confident I would choose this option, 7 = I am very confident I would choose this option)
- o 1
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7

3. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: L. Brown, Midwest Division General Marketing Manager
RE: Found Marketing Report

I am sending you this memo with an enclosed manilla envelope package. At the national conference for our industry, which took place two days ago, I found a package. It was a large sealed envelope with words typed on the outside that said:

MARKETING REPORT AND PROJECTION FOR COMPETITOR COMPANY
        CONFIDENTIAL: TO BE READ ONLY BY
UPPER-LEVEL MANAGEMENT IN COMPETITOR COMPANY.

As I understand it, Competitor Company had decided to have a general company meeting to coincide with the industry conference since so many of their executives would be there for the conference. Part of their meeting included distributing these marketing reports and projections to upper management. Somehow, one of them must have been dropped, and I found it. I was not sure what to do with it, read it or send it back to them unopened. I have decided to pass it up to you, and let you handle it.

LB/pjs

   AmeriGrand Corporation
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: (dictation notes to self)
RE: L. Brown's memo about found marketing plan

Competitor Company's marketing report and projection would be very valuable to our company, in terms of strategic positioning as well as gaining information about the markets we serve. There is no doubt that the report inside this sealed package would prove valuable and result in increased profit-sharing checks for me. Below I

have mentioned what I have to gain from two alternative choices.

PG/kts

I MUST NOW CHOOSE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS:
- o If I keep and read the confidential report, I will gain some very valuable information about our competitor. I may get a big profit-sharing bonus since the information would help us to compete better and get more sales. The company may show higher profits as a result of this information. I will keep it and read it without letting anyone know about it.
- o If I send the confidential report back without opening it, I will feel good for doing the right thing. The company may be regarded by the competitor as honest and just. I will send the confidential report to Competitor Company without opening it.

How confident are you in your decision? (1 = I am NOT very confident I would choose this option, 7 = I am very confident I would choose this option)
- o 1
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7

4. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: (dictation notes to self)
RE: Possibly obtaining competitive information

One of the divisions I supervise is a high-technology enterprise in a very competitive industry. I have recently learned that a major competitor has a new development which could
give them a greater advantage in the market. One of the product development engineers who is employed by that competitor plays tennis with a manager from our company, and I supervise this manager. I recently spoke with our manager, and he told me that this engineer is working on the project of interest. Also, it seems he is not at all satisfied with a raise he has just received. I now must make a decision regarding attempting to recruit this engineer to our company in order to get him to give us some information. In this industry, many companies have vigorously recruited from the ranks of their competitors. We have not been "raided" in our engineering department; that is, we have not lost anyone too valuable to other competitors. Still, this other company has developed some valuable inventions. Below I have mentioned what I may gain from two courses of action.

PG/kts

I MUST NOW CHOOSE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS:
- o If I tell our manager to try to recruit the engineer by offering a large salary, our company may get a good engineer who is knowledgeable about recent developments. The increased ability to compete would make me look good, which could even lead to a promotion. I will tell our manager to try very hard to recruit the engineer, offering him a substantial increase in compensation from his current pay.
- o If I tell our manager not to pursue the engineer, our company may maintain a good reputation in the industry. I may get recognition for not playing dirty politics. I will tell our manager not to pursue the engineer.

How confident are you in your decision? (1 = I am NOT very confident I would choose this option, 7 = I am very confident I would choose this option)
- o 1
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7

5. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: (dictation notes to self)
RE: Sale of one of AmeriGrand's Businesses

One of our businesses is up for sale. There are two bids which have been offered for the business: Bid "A" comes from an investor banking group, Bid "B" comes from a large firm in the same line of business as the one up for sale. The investor banking group (bid A) is known for purchasing companies and then liquidating their assets. In other words, I expect that if the investor banking group purchases the business, all employees will be out of their jobs and the company will be sold off in bits. The other bid, bid B, is from a large firm in the same industry. If the business is sold to them, most of the employees will likely retain their jobs. It is my responsibility to decide who to sell the business to. The investment bankers have made an offer that is 2 percent higher than the similar firm's bid. Bid A is for $918,000, while Bid B is for
$900,000. Because of the larger commission for me for any amount over $900,000, with bid A I get $10,500 for commission and with bid B I get $4,500. Many of these employees have always felt they were secure in their jobs since the corporation has never mentioned any plans to sell.
Many of the managers and workers in this business for sale have treated me fairly in our transactions. Below I have mentioned what I have to gain from two courses of action.

PG/kts

I MUST NOW CHOOSE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS:

- o If I sell to the investment bankers (Bid A), I will gain the extra $6,000 in commission, and I will gain for the company the extra $12,000. I will sell to the investment bankers.
- o If I sell to the large similar industry firm (Bid B), I will gain the admiration of the many employees and gain a good reputation for our corporation. I will sell to the similar firm.

How confident are you in your decision? (1 = I am NOT very confident I would choose this option, 7 = I am very confident I would choose this option)

- o 1
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7

6. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: (dictation notes to self)
RE: (1) Thoughts on pay changes (2) Market research

One of our divisional firms is in the process of completely changing their models and specifications of their product. It is very important that they have accurate information from consumers so as to plan the changes in the most beneficial way possible. We are under a time crunch; we need the information very quickly. They do have a market research department. The type of information we want requires that the consumer being questioned is not made aware of our company because when they know which company is doing the research, the results are not very accurate. People tend to say they like the product and would use it. Usually, we have an independent market research firm get the information we need without identifying the company. But it takes months to get it all organized and longer to get back the results. The old equipment in the productions facility is already in the process of being removed and the new must be ordered in the next few days. In order to know what to order, we need to know exactly the desired product, and to know that we need good information about what the consumers are interested in. Our own marketing research could get the information if it does the research without telling the consumers which company it represents. Below I have mentioned what I have to gain from two alternative choices.

PG/kts

I MUST NOW CHOOSE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS:
- If I have our marketing researchers test consumer preferences and not tell them our company name (use a fake name), I stand to get the extra commissions resulting from increased profits to the company. I will have our marketing research test consumer preferences under an assumed market research firm.

- If I have an independent firm test consumer preferences, I may gain some employee good will since I will not have to ask any employees to misrepresent themselves to the consumers. The company may benefit from this choice by promoting straight-forward relations with consumers. I will have an independent firm test consumer preferences.

How confident are you in your decision? (1 = I am NOT very confident I would choose this option, 7 = I am very confident I would choose this option)
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7

7. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: (dictation notes to self)
RE: Customer using more of our product than is needed

Last week I was visiting a large manufacturing plant of a customer of ours. I was there to discuss some discrepancies between our records and theirs, and I feel that everything was worked out equitably. I feel they treated us fairly, and the results of our meeting were fair. They purchase a solution of some industrial chemicals from us as well as a few other products. While I was there, they showed me some of their operations. I immediately recognized that they were using way too much of our product for what they were doing. Our meeting did not have anything to do with this product. Using too much did not cause any damage or harm. They mentioned that they were quite happy with the product. However, I know they could get the same results using far less.
They spend a lot of money buying the solution from us, as it is very expensive. Below I have noted what I stand to gain from two possible choices of action.

PG/kts

I MUST NOW CHOOSE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS:
- If I tell the customer that they are using far too much of the solution, I will likely gain their trust and they will remain a loyal customer. Our company may gain a

reputation of being a decent organization to do business with. I will tell the customer that they are using much more of the solution than is really required for their purposes.

- o If I do not tell the customer that they are using far too much of the solution, I will continue to get more commission from the larger amounts they will buy. Our company will get extra profit from selling more of the solution. I will not tell the customer that they are using much more of the solution than is really required for their purposes.

How confident are you in your decision? (1 = I am NOT very confident I would choose this option, 7 = I am very confident I would choose this option)
- o 1
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7

Risk In-basket items (adapted from MacCrimmon & Wehrung's (1984) Risk In-Basket):

1. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: Ronald Moore, Director of AmeriSteel, Strategic Business Unit of AmeriGrand Corporation
RE: PMG lawsuit

This is with reference to the PMG case I mentioned previously. As I indicated, PMG has threatened to sue AmeriGrand Corporation for patent violation. The case has not yet been filed in court, since PMG are waiting to hear our response to their offer to settle out of court. They have proposed that we pay them $2 million in cash and agree to drop our Duraplast line, which our finance people estimate would involve an additional loss, in present value terms, of about $3 million (10% of AmeriSteel's 2020 profit). If we do not agree to this proposal, PMG will file their suit, which would, if we lose the case, probably involve a loss of $7 million in damage plus the loss of dropping the Duraplast line. On the other hand, if we win in court, we will incur only a small sum for legal expenses. Our corporate lawyer, Mr. Bell, and our outside law firm agree that the chance of our losing the case in court is 50%. We have been given one week from today to respond to PMG's settlement offer; I've tried to postpone this deadline, unsuccessfully. What do you recommend?

RM/pmg

If the chances of winning the court case were 99 out of 100, you would probably recommend taking the case to court. On the other hand, if the chances of winning the court case were 1 out of 100, you would probably recommend accepting the settlement. As

the chances were increased, there would be a point at which you decide to refuse the settlement. What is this switch-over point; this is, what is the lowest chance of winning (out of 100) that would prompt you to take the case to court?

- o would not take the case to court no matter what the chances
- o would take the case to court no matter what the chances
- o 1-10%
- o 11-20%
- o 21-30%
- o 31-40%
- o 41-50%
- o 51-60%
- o 61-70%
- o 71-80%
- o 81-90%
- o 91-100%

Indicate your inclination using the scale below (1 = Inclined to settle the case out of court, 9 = Inclined to take the case to court)

- o 1 (Inclined to settle the case out of court)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7
- o 8
- o 9 (Inclined to take the case to court)

2. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
    Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
 FROM: (dictation notes to self)

Last week the president of Tak On's Midwest Division called me to see whether AmeriGrand Corporation might be interested in a joint venture with them in the Midwest. I am not surprised at this suggestion because they must still be hurting from the major losses they incurred in their failed venture in the Southwest. Tak On is one of AmeriGrand Corporation's closest competitors and we haven't had a joint venture with them in quite some time.

However, Tak On helped us out in our Southeast venture in the late 2000s and we have had good relations with their management for many years. So far, they have always competed with us fairly. The proposed joint venture sounds quite promising. We and Tak On would jointly produce our standard water pumping equipment in our respective North Carolina

factories and market this equipment under a single new brand name in the Midwest. All costs, revenues and profits would be shared equally and both firms would put up half of the estimated initial investment of
$1 million. Tak On said they needed our participation in the joint venture to obtain the needed investment capital and to share the risks of a new market entry. They also had heard that we have been considering an independent entry into the Midwest's water pump equipment market and believe a cooperative joint venture would make both companies better off than a competitive battle for this new market.

Our analysis shows that a joint venture would yield a 20 percent return on investment for both firms. Tak On has already acquired strong support from political leaders across many states in the Midwest and this market should continue to expand. We have the necessary production capacity and we would be helping Tak On to get back on its feet after the difficult period it has been facing.

Alternatively, we can enter this market alone as we have been planning. In a competitive venture against Tak On, however, there is uncertainty about how much of the market we could capture. If Tak On doesn't have the resources to make a strong independent entry, we should gain a large market share. In this case we would earn a 25 percent return on our somewhat higher investment. On the other hand, Tak On might focus its energy on this new market because we had rejected their offer of a joint venture. Under this scenario, we could get only a small share of the market and perhaps only a 10 percent return on investment. Because of Tak On's situation, we believe the chances are two out of three that we could get a larger market share in a competitive venture and there is a one-third chance of getting a small market share.

Tak On has asked us to decide on their offer of a joint venture by June

PG/kts

If the chances of gaining a larger market share by entering the market alone were 99 out of 100, you would probably enter the market alone. On the other hand, if the chances of gaining a larger market share by entering the market alone were 1 out of 100, you would probably enter the joint venture. As the chances were increased, there would be a point at which you decide to enter the market alone. What is this switch-over point; this is, what is the lowest chance of gaining a larger market share (out of 100) that would prompt you to enter the market alone?

- o Would not enter the market alone no matter what the chances
- o Would enter the market alone no matter what the chances
- o 1-10%
- o 11-20%
- o 21-30%
- o 31-40%
- o 41-50%
- o 51-60%
- o 61-70%
- o 71-80%

- 81-90%
- 91-100%

Indicate your inclination using the scale below. (1 = Inclined to enter the market as a joint venture, 9 = Inclined to enter the market alone)
- 1 (Inclined to enter the market as a joint venture)
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9 (Inclined to enter the market alone)

3. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: (dictation notes to self)
RE: Merry-Winston Incorporated ceasing to conduct business with AmeriGrand Corporation

Merry-Winston Incorporated has been a customer of AmeriGrand Corporation for several years, purchasing products from AmeriGrand Corporation's strategic business unit, AmeriSteel.
However, upon discovering that AmeriSteel also supplies one of their main competitors, O'Connors Incorporated, Merry-Winston Incorporated has threatened to cease buying from AmeriSteel.

If AmeriSteel stops supplying Merry-Winston's competitor, O'Connors Incorporated, AmeriGrand Corporation will lose an estimated $4 million in annual sales. However, if AmeriSteel continues to supply O'Connors Incorporated, AmeriGrand Corporation will lose an estimated $3 million in annual sales due to losing Merry-Winston Incorporated's business. Additionally, O'Connors Incorporated is currently facing financial hardship. It is estimated that there is a 25 percent chance that O'Connors Incorporated will file for bankruptcy. If we continue to do business with O'Connors Incorporated and they file for bankruptcy, we will lose $4 million in annual sales from O'Connors Incorporated in addition to the $3 million in annual sales from lost business with Merry-Winston Incorporated.

PG/kts

If the chances of only losing $3 million in annual sales by continuing to supply O'Connors Incorporated were 99 out of 100, you would probably continue to supply O'Connors. On the other hand, if the chances of only losing $3 million in annual sales by continuing to supply O'Connors Incorporated were 1 out of 100, you would probably stop supplying O'Connors

Incorporated. As the chances were increased, there would be a point at which you decide to continue to supply O'Connors Incorporated. What is this switch-over point; this is, what is the lowest chance of only losing $3 million in annual sales (out of 100) that would prompt you to continue to supply O'Connors Incorporated?

- o Would not continue to supply O'Connors Incorporated no matter what the chances
- o Would continue to supply O'Connors Incorporated no matter what the chances
- o 1-10%
- o 11-20%
- o 21-30%
- o 31-40%
- o 41-50%
- o 51-60%
- o 61-70%
- o 71-80%
- o 81-90%
- o 91-100%

Indicate your inclination using the scale below. (1 = Inclined to stop supplying O'Connors Incorporated, 9 = Inclined to continue supplying O'Connors Incorporated)

- o 1 (Inclined to stop supplying O'Connors Incorporated)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5
- o 6
- o 7
- o 8
- o 9 (Inclined to continue supplying O'Connors Incorporated)

4. **AmeriGrand Corporation**
   Interoffice Correspondence

TO: Pat Gibson
FROM: Ronald Moore, Director of AmeriSteel, Strategic Business Unit of AmeriGrand Corporation
RE: Union request to discontinue time-and-motion study

As you know, AmeriSteel has been conducting a time-and-motion study to improve the efficiency of operations in our facilities. There has been a union request, however, to discontinue the study. If we comply with the request and discontinue the study, it is estimated that we will obtain a 6.5% return on equity. On the other hand, if we continue the study, it is estimated that we will obtain a 10% return on equity. However, we also run the risk of prompting a union strike if we continue the study, which would cost us roughly $200,000. The chances that continuing the study will prompt a union strike are about 60%.

If the chances of there not being a union strike were 99 out of 100, you would probably continue the time-and-motion study. On the other hand, if the chances of there not being a union strike were 1 out of 100, you would probably discontinue the time-and-motion study. As the chances were increased, there would be a point at which you decide to continue the time-and-motion study. What is this switch-over point; this is, what is the lowest chance of there being a union strike (out of 100) that would prompt you to continue the time-and-motion study?
- o   Would not continue the time-and-motion study no matter what the chances
- o   Would continue the time-and-motion study no matter what the chances
- o   1-10%
- o   11-20%
- o   21-30%
- o   41-50%
- o   51-60%
- o   61-70%
- o   71-80%
- o   81-90%
- o   91-100%

Indicate your inclination using the scale below. (1 = Inclined to discontinue the time-and-motion study, 9 = Inclined to continue the time-and-motion study)
- o   1 (Inclined to discontinue the time-and-motion study)
- o   2
- o   3
- o   4
- o   5
- o   6
- o   7
- o   8
- o   9 (Inclined to continue the time-and-motion study)

Moral Imagination items (A second vignette developed by Whitaker and Godwin (2013); items are the same as Time 1):

The scenario below describes an ethical situation in the workplace. Read the scenario carefully and then think about how you would handle it.

Four months ago, a coworker left and your office has been working long overtime hours without overtime pay to meet work demands. The hiring freeze has been lifted and your boss has been interviewing applicants to fill the position. You accidentally overhear an applicant talking on her cell phone and telling someone that she is pregnant. The boss tells you that he has chosen an applicant but wants your input before he hires her. You discover that the applicant he selected is the woman you overheard talking about her pregnancy. You are

fairly confident that your boss does not know she is expecting. You know she is not required to tell a potential employer that she is pregnant. You are concerned that you will spend the next six months training her. She will then go on maternity leave, or worse, she will quit. Then you will again be pressed in trying to take up the slack. Your boss asks for your opinion on the candidate.

To what extent do the following statements describe your thought processes when reading the vignette? (1 = not at all, 7 = very much)

1. I anticipated any moral problems that may threaten my career.
   - o 1 (not at all)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5
   - o 6
   - o 7 (very much)

2. I imagined similarities and differences between the situation at hand and other situations where a certain rule proved to be applicable.
   - o 1 (not at all)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5
   - o 6
   - o 7 (very much)

3. Since the current situation is morally ambiguous, I reconceptualized my basic understanding.
   - o 1 (not at all)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5
   - o 6
   - o 7 (very much)

4. I tried to recognize which ideas were morally worth pursuing and which were not.
   - o 1 (not at all)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5
   - o 6

o 7 (very much)

5. I felt I had a moral responsibility for what I answered in terms of affecting others.
    o 1 (not at all)
    o 2
    o 3
    o 4
    o 5
    o 6
    o 7 (very much)

6. I felt the range and diversity of my social knowledge was sufficient to answer this question.
    o 1 (not at all)
    o 2
    o 3
    o 4
    o 5
    o 6
    o 7 (very much)

7. My imagination enabled me to look at myself from the point of view of another person.
    o 1 (not at all)
    o 2
    o 3
    o 4
    o 5
    o 6
    o 7 (very much)

8. I was able to conceive of the moral relationship that should be in place within this system.
    o 1 (not at all)
    o 2
    o 3
    o 4
    o 5
    o 6
    o 7 (very much)

Unethical Behavior items (Detert et al.'s (2008) lie-cheat scale):

Indicate how frequently engage in each of the following behaviors (1 = never, 5 = many times).

1. Lying to my parents about my school performance.

- o 1 (never)
- o 2
- o 3
- o 4
- o 5 (many times)

2. Exaggerating my accomplishments on my college application.
   - o 1 (never)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5 (many times)

3. Lying about my age.
   - o 1 (never)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5 (many times)

4. Using a false excuse to delay taking an exam or turning in an assignment.
   - o 1 (never)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5 (many times)

5. Claiming to have turned in an assignment when I have not.
   - o 1 (never)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5 (many times)

6. Taking low-cost items from a retail store.
   - o 1 (never)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4
   - o 5 (many times)

7. Taking small amounts of money from my parents' wallet without their permission.
   - o 1 (never)
   - o 2
   - o 3
   - o 4

o 5 (many times)
8. Copying from another student on a test.
   o 1 (never)
   o 2
   o 3
   o 4
   o 5 (many times)

9. Collaborating or receiving substantial help on an assignment when the instructor asked for individual work.
   o 1 (never)
   o 2
   o 3
   o 4
   o 5 (many times)

10. Helping someone else to cheat on a test.
   o 1 (never)
   o 2
   o 3
   o 4
   o 5 (many times)

11. Copying material and turning it in as your own work.
   o 1 (never)
   o 2
   o 3
   o 4
   o 5 (many times)

12. Asking another student who has previously taken a quiz or exam for the questions or the answers prior to taking the test.
   o 1 (never)
   o 2
   o 3
   o 4
   o 5 (many times)

13. Changing a response after a paper or exam is returned and then reporting a grade error to the instructor.
   o 1 (never)
   o 2
   o 3
   o 4
   o 5 (many times)

Moral Disengagement items (Moore et al.'s (2012) scale [same as Time 1]):

Insufficient Effort Responding items (The first insufficient effort responding item is included after the initial in-basket prompt.)

1. For this item, select the option labeled "D".
   - ○ A
   - ○ B
   - ○ C
   - ○ D
   - ○ E
   - ○ F
   - ○ G

Study 2 measures (Time point; Time points 2 and 3 exclude the cognitive ability, conscientiousness, agreeableness, honesty-humility, social desirability, and dispositional creativity measures):

Demographic items (same as Study 1 but excludes the question about experience in an organizational setting):

Cognitive ability items (same as Study 1— Sandia Matrices short form developed by Harris et al. (2020)):

Social Desirability items (same as Study 1--Reynolds' (1982) Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale—Short Form):

Wisdom items (items 6, 18, 22, 23, 27, 29, 34, 36, and 40 from Webster's (2003) Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS) used in Study 1):

Moral Identity items (same as Study 1-- Aquino & Reed's (2002) scale):

Formalist orientation items (same as Study 1--formalism subscale of Love et al.'s (2020) Ethical Standards of Judgment Questionnaire):

Honesty-humility items (same as Study 1--Honesty-humility subscale from Ashton & Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60):

Conscientiousness items (same as Study 1--Agreeableness subscale from Ashton & Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60):

Agreeableness items (same as Study 1--Agreeableness subscale from Ashton & Lee's (2009) HEXACO-60):

Moral Imagination items (Yurtsever's (2006) scale):

Answer the following questions as they apply to you and how you are at work.

1. I like to imagine the consequences of my behavior that affect others.
   - o   Strongly disagree
   - o   Disagree
   - o   Somewhat disagree
   - o   Neither agree nor disagree
   - o   Somewhat agree
   - o   Agree
   - o   Strongly agree

2. I anticipate any moral problems that threaten our organization.
   - o   Strongly disagree
   - o   Disagree
   - o   Somewhat disagree
   - o   Neither agree nor disagree
   - o   Somewhat agree
   - o   Agree
   - o   Strongly agree

3. I am not able to imagine similarities and differences between the situation at hand and other situations where a certain rule proved to be applicable.
   - o   Strongly disagree
   - o   Disagree
   - o   Somewhat disagree
   - o   Neither agree nor disagree
   - o   Somewhat agree
   - o   Agree
   - o   Strongly agree

4. I have the ability to recognize which ideas are morally worth pursuing and which are not.
   - o   Strongly disagree
   - o   Disagree
   - o   Somewhat disagree
   - o   Neither agree nor disagree
   - o   Somewhat agree
   - o   Agree
   - o   Strongly agree

5. I imagine how our organizational decisions are informed as we negotiate morally complex situations.
   - o   Strongly disagree
   - o   Disagree

- o Somewhat disagree
- o Neither agree nor disagree
- o Somewhat agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

6. When I find myself uncertain about how to act in a morally ambiguous situation, I reconceptualize my basic understanding of moral concept.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

7. I do not have moral responsibility for what I imagine in terms of affecting others.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

8. I resist any regulations detrimental to the environment, even if I have to risk my current positions in the organization.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

9. My moral imagination helps me to anticipate invisible organization forces on information.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

10. I have systematically investigated for various kinds of factors that may affect the moral decisions of the organization.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

11. I am careful about condemning past decisions of the organization in retrospective judgments made under entirely different circumstances.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

12. I accept new regulations of the organization without any justification.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

13. It is impossible to pursue our particular interest as free of interference with others as possible.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree
   - o Somewhat disagree
   - o Neither agree nor disagree
   - o Somewhat agree
   - o Agree
   - o Strongly agree

14. The range and diversity of my social knowledge is not sufficient to make moral decisions.
   - o Strongly disagree
   - o Disagree

- o Somewhat disagree
- o Neither agree nor disagree
- o Somewhat agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

15. In general, when there is a discussion about moral issues, everyone tends to listen to me.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

16. I do not like to imagine the consequences of moral issues that call for unusual facts.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

17. My moral imagination heightens my ability to perceive morally relevant situations.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

18. I have the ability to revise my existing moral beliefs so as to adapt to changing conditions.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

19. My imagination enables me to look at myself from the point of view of another person.
    - o Strongly disagree

- Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

20. It would be a waste of time for me to ask the opinion of the disagreeing group when I make a decision.
    - Strongly disagree
    - Disagree
    - Somewhat disagree
    - Neither agree nor disagree
    - Somewhat agree
    - Agree
    - Strongly agree

21. It is difficult for me to bridge the gap between sensory data and intelligent thought.
    - Strongly disagree
    - Disagree
    - Somewhat disagree
    - Neither agree nor disagree
    - Somewhat agree
    - Agree
    - Strongly agree

22. I can put myself in the place of others.
    - Strongly disagree
    - Disagree
    - Somewhat disagree
    - Neither agree nor disagree
    - Somewhat agree
    - Agree
    - Strongly agree

23. I do not have enough ability to compare and contrast our own culture with that of others.
    - Strongly disagree
    - Disagree
    - Somewhat disagree
    - Neither agree nor disagree
    - Somewhat agree
    - Agree
    - Strongly agree

24. I can create alternative solutions to new moral situations.

- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Somewhat disagree
- o Neither agree nor disagree
- o Somewhat agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

25. I am not able to conceive of the moral relationship that should be in place within the system.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

26. I discipline all my capacities and inclinations in order to achieve self-control.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Somewhat disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

27. The reason for my willingness to envision novel and possible alternatives toward moral issues is not personal reward, but rather a profound sense of personal commitment.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

28. Once I have generated reasons supporting my belief, I find it difficult to generate contradictory reasons.
    - o Strongly disagree
    - o Disagree
    - o Neither agree nor disagree
    - o Somewhat agree
    - o Agree
    - o Strongly agree

29. I have trouble understanding others' culture and values.
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Neither agree nor disagree
- o Somewhat agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

Moral Disengagement items (same as Study 1--Moore et al.'s (2012) scale):

Unethical Behavior:

Counterproductive Work Behavior items (Spector et al.'s (2010) short version of the Counterproductive Work Behavior Checklist (CWB-C):

How often have you done each of the following things on your present job?

1. Purposely wasted your employer's materials/supplies.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

2. Complained about insignificant things at work.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

3. Told people outside the job what a lousy place you work for.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

4. Came to work late without permission.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

5. Stayed at home from work and said you were sick when you weren't.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

6. Insulted someone about their job performance.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

7. Made fun of someone's personal life.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

8. Ignored someone at work.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

9. Started an argument with someone at work.
   - o Never
   - o Once or twice
   - o Once or twice/month
   - o Once or twice/week
   - o Every day

10. Insulted or made fun of someone at work.
    - o Never
    - o Once or twice
    - o Once or twice/month
    - o Once or twice/week
    - o Every day

Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior items (Matherne and Litchfield's (2012) scale):

Indicate how often you engage in the following behaviors at work.

1. Falsify documents to protect your organization.
   o Never
   o Sometimes
   o About half the time
   o Most of the time
   o Always

2. Provide false or misleading information about your organization to protect it or enhance its standings.
   o Never
   o Sometimes
   o About half the time
   o Most of the time
   o Always

3. Fail to cooperate in an investigation to protect your organization.
   o Never
   o Sometimes
   o About half the time
   o Most of the time
   o Always

4. Fail to report unethical or illegal behaviors to protect your organization.
   o Never
   o Sometimes
   o About half the time
   o Most of the time
   o Always

5. Overlook the interests of another party in favor of the interests of your organization.
   o Never
   o Sometimes
   o About half the time
   o Most of the time
   o Always

Insufficient Effort Responding items (same as Study 1, Time 1):

Appendix B

Table 1

Internal Consistency Reliability Estimates for Duplicated Measures (Study 2)

	Alpha	Omega	KR-20*
Formalist Orientation	0.73	0.86	
Honesty-Humility	0.79	0.85	
Conscientiousness	0.84	0.88	
Agreeableness	0.83	0.88	
Dispositional Creativity			0.56
Social Desirability			0.81
Cognitive Ability			0.58
Moral Identity	0.83	0.91	
Wisdom	0.77	0.82	
Moral Disengagement	0.90	0.94	

Note. *KR-20 was calculated for scales with dichotomous scales.

Table 2

Supplemental Regression Results with only Moral Imagination as Predictor

DV = CWB					DV = UPB			
Independent Variables	β	b	SE	p	β	b	SE	p
Moral imagination	-0.26	-0.25	0.05	**<0.001***	-0.24	-0.24	0.23	**<0.001***
R^2	0.07							
F (df)	29.84 (1, 415)							

Notes. N = 417. ***p* < 0.05**. ***p* < 0.01**.

Table 3

Supplemental Multiple Regression Results with Moral Imagination, Wisdom, and Control Variables as

Predictors

DV = CWB					DV = UPB			
Independent Variables	β	b	SE	p	β	b	SE	p
Wisdom	-0.17	-0.16	0.05	**0.003***	-0.16	-0.16	0.06	**0.007***
Age	-0.14	-0.01	0.00	**0.002***	-0.13	-0.01	0.00	**0.005***
Gender	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.48	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.87
Social Desirability	-0.28	-0.63	0.10	**<0.001***	-0.03	-0.08	0.11	0.46
Moral imagination	-0.13	-0.12	0.05	**0.02**	-0.14	-0.14	0.06	**0.02**
R^2	0.19				0.10			
F (df)	18.57 (5, 407)				8.86 (5, 407)			

Notes. N = 413. ***p* < 0.05**. ***p* < 0.01**.

Table 4

Supplemental Multiple Regression Results with All Predictors

	DV = CWB				DV = UPB			
Independent Variables	β	*b*	*SE*	*p*	β	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Wisdom	-0.09	-0.08	0.05	0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0.05	0.20
Age	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.19	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.51
Gender	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.18
Social Desirability	-0.25	-0.57	0.09	**<0.001***	-0.01	-0.01	0.09	0.90
Moral imagination	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.36
Moral Disengagement	0.51	0.28	0.02	**<0.001***	0.64	0.36	0.02	**<0.001***
R^2	0.39				0.42			
F (df)	44.04 (6, 406)				49.39 (6, 406)			

Notes. $N = 413$. **$p < 0.05$**. *$p < 0.01$.

Table 5

Supplemental Relative Weights Analysis

Dependent Variable	CWB				UPB			
Predictors	R^2	Raw Relative Weight	Rescaled Relative Weight	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)	R^2	Raw Relative Weight	Rescaled Relative Weight	95% BCa CI (LL, UL)
	0.39				0.42			
Age		0.01	3.28	**(0.00, 0.03)**		0.01	2.66	(-0.01, 0.01)
Gender		0.00	0.51	(-0.00, 0.02)		0.00	0.28	(-0.03, 0.00)
Social Desirability		0.08	19.47	**(0.04, 0.12)**		0.00	0.42	(-0.03, 0.00)
Wisdom		0.03	7.72	**(0.01, 0.06)**		0.03	6.39	(-0.00, 0.04)
Moral imagination		0.02	5.54	**(0.01, 0.04)**		0.02	5.26	(-0.00, 0.03)
Moral disengagement		0.25	63.49	**(0.17, 0.34)**		0.36	84.99	**(0.26, 0.44)**

Notes. $N = 413$. 95% confidence intervals adjusted for bias (BCa) not containing 0 are in bold.

Table 6

Supplemental Path Analysis Results Omitting Moral Disengagement as Predictor of CWB

	Parameter Estimates															
Dependent Variable	MIMT2				MDT2				CWBT3				UPBT3			
Time 1 Predictors	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI(LL, UL)	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI(LL, UL)	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI(LL, UL)	b	SE	p	95% BCa CI(LL, UL)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.49	(-0.01, 0.00)	-0.01	0.00	**0.001***	**(-0.02, -0.01)**	-0.01	0.00	**0.001***	(-0.01, -0.00)	0.00	0.00	**0.03**	(-0.01, 0.00)
Gender	-0.12	0.05	**0.02**	**(-0.21, -0.02)**	-0.12	0.10	0.21	(-0.31, 0.07)	0.04	0.06	0.48	(-0.07, 0.15)	0.04	0.05	0.42	(-0.05, 0.14)
Social Desirability	0.13	0.09	0.16	(-0.05, 0.31)	-0.34	0.15	**0.02**	**(-0.63, -0.05)**	-0.63	0.08	**<0.001***	**(-0.79, -0.47)**	-0.04	0.08	0.58	(-0.19, 0.11)
Cognitive Ability	0.30	0.13	**0.02**	**(0.05, 0.54)**	-1.46	0.27	**<0.001***	**(-1.99, -0.94)**								
Wisdom	0.47	0.05	**<0.001***	**(0.38, 0.56)**	-0.46	0.08	**<0.001***	**(-0.61, -0.30)**	-0.16	0.06	**0.008***	**(-0.27, -0.04)**	-0.10	0.05	**0.02**	**(-0.19, -0.02)**
Formalist Orientation	-0.10	0.04	**0.01**	**(-0.18, -0.02)**												
Moral Identity	0.16	0.04	**<0.001***	**(0.09, 0.24)**	-0.18	0.06	**0.005***	**(-0.30, -0.06)**								
Power	0.03	0.02	0.11	(-0.01, 0.08)												
WisdomXMoral Identity	0.07	0.05	0.19	(-0.03, 0.17)	0.01	0.09	0.94	(-0.15, 0.19)								
WisdomXPower	0.06	0.04	0.12	(-0.02, 0.12)												
WisdomXFormalist Orientation	0.09	0.06	0.16	(-0.04, 0.22)												
Time 2 Predictors																
Moral Imagination									-0.12	0.06	**0.04**	**(-0.24, -0.01)**	-0.04	0.05	0.41	(-0.13, 0.05)
Moral Disengagement													0.20	0.03	**<0.001***	**(0.15, 0.27)**
Indirect Effects																
W-->MIM-->CWB									-0.06	0.03	**0.03**	**(-0.12, -0.01)**				
W-->MIM-->UPB													-0.02	0.02	0.41	(-0.06, 0.02)
W-->MD-->UPB													-0.09	0.02	**<0.001***	**(-0.14, -0.06)**
Conditional Indirect Effects																
WxMI-->MIM-->CWB									-0.01	0.01	0.32	(-0.03, 0.00)				
WxPower-->MIM-->CWB									-0.01	0.01	0.22	(-0.02, 0.00)				

WxFO-->MIM-->CWB	-0.01	0.01	0.25	(-0.04, 0.00)				
WXMI-->MIM-->UPB					0.00	0.00	0.55	(-0.02, 0.00)
WxPower-->MIM-->UPB					0.00	0.00	0.52	(-0.01, 0.00)
WxFO-->MIM-->UPB					0.00	0.01	0.53	(-0.02, 0.00)
WxMI-->MD-->UPB					0.00	0.02	0.94	(-0.03, 0.04)
Total Effect (CWB)	-0.24	0.05	**<0.001***	**(-0.34, -0.15)**				
Total Effect (UPB)					-0.22	0.05	**<0.001***	**(-0.32, -0.13)**

Notes. N = 413. All Time 1 predictors were mean-centered. 95% confidence intervals adjusted for bias (BCa) that fail to contain 0 are in bold. MIM = Moral imagination. MD = Moral disengagement. CWB = Counterproductive Work Behavior. UPB = Unethical Pro-organizational Behavior. T2 = Time 2. T3 = Time 3. W = Wisdom. MI = Moral identity. FO = Formalist orientation. **p < 0.05**. ***p < 0.01**.

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Table 7

Supplemental Regression with only Formalist Orientation as Predictor

DV = Moral imagination				
Independent Variables	β	*b*	*SE*	*p*
Formalist Orientation	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.86
R^2	0.00			
F (df)	0.03 (1, 415)			

Notes. $N = 417$. **$p < 0.05$**. *$p < 0.01$**.