

Tactical Piety: Heretical Piracy and Catholic Rhetoric in Colonial Quito, Panama, and Guatemala

by

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A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Auburn University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Hispanic Studies

Auburn, Alabama
May 10, 2025

Keywords: piracy, coloniality, Post-Tridentine Catholicism, identity formation

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Abstract

During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Francis Drake and other English corsairs attacked Spanish coastal cities and ports. In response to the attacks, Spanish functionaries devised a religious rhetoric as an offensive and defensive strategy. While recent studies have analyzed colonial poetry and the influence of religion on piracy, not many have paid attention to official administrative correspondence. This thesis focuses on three particular archival sources from three different locations that experienced pirate attacks: Quito, Panama, and Guatemala. I use Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory to examine the religious rhetoric of written correspondence and other documents by Spanish administrators who attempted to create a network of Catholic combatants. I argue that the Catholic rhetoric embedded in the three documents reveals an administrative use of religiosity with the purpose of persuasion both to build identity and show a united front against pirates.

Acknowledgments

A mis padres, por haber compartido conmigo la magia de leer. Mamá, gracias por apoyar siempre todas mis ideas. Papá, gracias por leer absolutamente todo lo que escribo, aunque esté en una lengua foránea.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	2
Acknowledgments.....	3
List of Figures.....	6
List of Abbreviations.....	7
Pirates in Catholic Waters: An Introduction	8
Analytical Precedents.....	10
Theoretical Frame	13
Drawing Lines: Contextual Considerations	16
Chapter One: Francis Drake and the Audiencia de Quito.....	22
Preventive Measures against Drake	25
Hispanic Catholicism and Pious Rhetoric.....	28
Representing Pirates.....	34
Conclusions.....	36
Chapter Two: Henry Morgan and the Fall of Panama	39
From Francis Drake to Henry Morgan.....	41
The Fear of Morgan	43
A Providential Purpose	45
The Burning of Old Panama: Final Remarks.....	49
Chapter Three: Santo Tomás de Castilla and the Toquegua	52
From Puerto de Caballos to Amatique	56
Evangelizing the Toquegua.....	58
Thieving Pirates	62

Conclusions.....	65
A Century of Piracy: Final Considerations	68
Works Cited	75
Appendix 1: Audiencia de Quito: disposiciones contra el corsario Drake	80
Appendix 2: Letter by pilot Benito Díaz.....	87
Appendix 3: Descubrimiento Puerto de Amatique; Defensa Puerto Caballos	89
Appendix 4: Breve del papa Inocencio XII	103

List of Figures

Figure 1: Treaty of Tordesillas	17
Figure 2: Ground plan of El Callao with the new fortification	23
Figure 3: Earliest map of the Strait of Magellan.....	25
Figure 4: Map of the district of the Audiencia de Quito	26
Figure 5: Map of Panama from Portobello to the Darién	41
Figure 6 Map of Portobello port and the fortifications planned for its defense.....	42
Figure 7: Ruins of the Cathedral Tower, Old Panama	46
Figure 8: A late colonial map of the Kingdom of Guatemala	53
Figure 9: Map of Puerto de Caballos	56
Figure 10: A view of Trujillo, a city belonging to the Spaniards in the Bay of Honduras.....	64

List of Abbreviations

AGI Archivo General de Indias

Pirates in Catholic Waters: An Introduction

Fui a la plasa, y en el cuerpo de guardia Principal dispuse un bando del tenor siguiente: que todos los que fuesen verdaderos catholicos españoles defensores de la fee y devotos de nuestra señora de la pura y'linpia concepcion saliesen conmigo a las quatro de la tarde para defender su pureza hasta perder las vidas; fue tanto lo que se conmovio el pueblo con este bando, que salieron todos (Bautista 175).¹

Many are the tales of legendary pirates that navigated the seas in search of treasures and gold, engaging in battles and adventures. Such is the case of Sir Francis Drake, a sixteenth century English corsair that circumnavigated the globe in 1577, earned knighthood, and became his nation's hero and a glorified epic figure (Fuchs 46; Zambrano 58). Some of his attacks included incursions into the Spanish ports of Nombre de Dios, Portobello and Santa Marta (58). Drake became such a torment for the Spanish that the Real Audiencia de Quito (1563-1822) issued several orders and proceedings against him in 1579. Drake's case typifies colonial legal documentation of Spanish struggles against pirates. Official reports, as well as eye-witness testimonies addressing piratical attacks, show the difficulties the Spanish faced and strategies they used to defend their territories.

Yet beyond maneuvers, these documents reveal the ideological threat these piratical enemies posed: as the opening quote explains, the Spanish considered pirates a threat to their faith, a Hispanicized Roman Catholicism. Enrique Dussel has proposed that a particular, militant mode of Christianity arose in early modern Spain that mixed two objectives: domination and evangelization of the inhabitants of the lands they had occupied (44). Consequently, the Spanish Empire used their religion beyond its spiritual dimensions, with political and tactical military purposes. Through that ideological lens, being a Christian and being a Spaniard were the same

¹ I am relying on the transcription by Juan Bautista Sosa included in *Panamá la vieja*, 2019.

(43). By extension, all means –even conquest– became their prerogative, as the chosen bearers of their faith to the world with no separation between Catholicism and Hispanic civilization. Any attack on their Hispanicized Catholic faith meant an attack on their very society. References abound to this religious concern in legal documents and written correspondence from Spanish colonial administrators notifying the Crown of incidents with pirates. Because these documents make explicit statements and assumptions about the growing religious preoccupation among the Spanish, in the present study I examine the role of Catholic rhetoric among Spanish colonizers in the territories of Quito, Panama and Guatemala in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century by analyzing three different documents. The first document, *Audiencia de Quito: Disposiciones contra el corsario Drake* [“Audiencia de Quito: Proceedings against Francis Drake,”] is a report by the Audiencia de Quito –written by the scribe Francisco de Zúñiga–, dated 1579, which narrates the incursion of English corsairs under Francis Drake’s command, on the coast of the viceroyalty of Peru in March of the same year. Addressing Philip II (r. 1556-98), the report focuses on how, when and where the Spanish learned of the corsairs, how the colonial administrators responded, and the preventive measures they took. The Spanish were quick to notify various Crown-appointed functionaries (*corregidores*) of the situation, as well as to describe the means they took to avoid the loss of valuable commodities to pillaging.

The second document, *Descubrimiento de Puerto Amatique; defensa Puerto Caballos* [“Discovery of Amatique Port; Defense of Puerto Caballos,”] dating to March 24, 1605, explains why corsair activity motivated the Spanish to move their shipping from Puerto de Caballos to Amatique.² Alonso Criado de Castilla, president of the Real Audiencia of Guatemala, wrote the document to Phillip III (r. 1598-1621). The document provides information on the Toquegua

² Although Puerto de Caballos was part of Guatemala, in the Viceroyalty of New Spain, nowadays it is part of Honduras, and its official name is Puerto Cortés.

people and their customs, and recounts how the Spanish converted them to Catholicism before establishing the new port in Amatique. Lastly, Juan Pérez de Guzmán y Gonzaga, governor of Panama, wrote to Mariana of Austria, Queen Regent of Spain, (r. 1665-75), in 1671. With references to the Catholic rhetoric he used to motivate combatants, Pérez de Guzmán recounts the attack of English corsair Henry Morgan on Panama, in the viceroyalty of New Granada. He explains Spanish defense strategies and reports the difficulties that they encountered, which resulted in the Spanish losing ground in Panama.

Regarding the foregoing documents, here I pose the following questions: what rhetorical devices did the Spanish employ in each document, and how did the religious rhetoric shape militaristic responses to English piracy? How do these documents reveal processes of identity construction? Looking at specific instances in which the Spanish expressed their religious concerns in the documents and the rhetorical resources they employed to do so, did the goal of the Spanish change over time? As we shall see, Spanish attitudes toward English piracy show similar tendencies over time. From their religious anxieties that shaped their tactical decisions, the documents, as forms of written persuasion, evince an ongoing identity construction among Spanish agents.

Analytical Precedents

Multiple scholars have contributed to the study of piracy and religious rivalry between European corsairs and Spaniards in colonial times. Kris Lane has offered a thorough description of pirate and corsair culture during the sixteenth century, demystifying common stereotypes associated with piracy. He proposes religion as a key characteristic of sixteenth century piracy: many pirates considered themselves warriors of their faith, protagonizing the recent rise of Protestantism against a retrograde Catholicism (*Blood and Silver* 112). In fact, corsairs made

priests and friars their “víctimas especiales de sus peores instintos asesinos” (Lane, *Blood and Silver* 112-113). Lane also suggests that defending the West Indies from foreign enemies gave all its inhabitants—including non-Spanish subjects—a sense of belonging (*Blood and Silver* 113). As Lane explains, the Spanish employed piety in the face of uncertainty from pirate attacks. In fact, apart from building defensive bastions, the main tactical resource of the Spanish was prayer (*Blood and Silver* 115). Similarly, according to Javier de Navascués, colonial epic poetry that historical events inspired reveals an image of a heroic community defending the Catholic faith that legitimized the empire (46). Navascués observes that the Spanish referred to all corsairs as Lutheran, emphasizing with broad strokes their bias against Christians who dared to oppose the Church of Rome and revealing their summary judgement of all Protestants as inauthentic Christians (50).³ Navascués further notes that one of Spain’s missions in the Americas was to spread Catholicism, by converting Indigenous Peoples, after having lost souls in Europe in the wake of the Reformation (51). To Spanish administrators, corsairs presented a satanic offensive that endangered the New World faithful (52). Likewise, Milton Zambrano draws attention to the geopolitical battle that took place in Spanish America.⁴ He stresses that the conflict of piracy flowed from dynastic and religious disputes (61). During the second half of the sixteenth century, Spain seemed to be losing the war against international Protestantism (50). Thus, suppressing piracy became one of Spain’s most urgent projects (53). As a corollary, some English privateers tried to convince their Spanish prisoners that their Catholic beliefs were false, and provided them with Protestant Bibles (56). All of these studies highlight the influence of religion on piracy. My

³ Navascués also argues that the possibility of the English buccaneers bringing their heretical books—that is, books what were not Catholic, triggered Spaniards’ panic due to a potential Protestant conquest of the minds of the newly formed Catholic empire in the Americas (51).

⁴ Zambrano points out that not only English, but also French, Dutch, as well as Portuguese and Danes, attempted to seize territories, riches and commerce from the Spanish, which reveals the fight for power among the states of the Old World (50).

own research, rather than historical synthesis or the analysis of poetry, examines the religious rhetoric in correspondence to the Crown from Spanish agents who experienced corsair attacks. These letters not only describe the events, but also disclose the Spanish administrators' concerns, their providentialist beliefs, and how they might convince others to act in response to piratical attacks. My study provides an analysis of official correspondence and stresses how these administrators tended to use piety as persuasion both to build identity and to present a united front against pirates whom they deemed outside of Hispanic Christendom.

In the chapters that follow, my close readings of letters and reports reveal the emergence of a shared Hispanic Roman Catholic identity among Spanish and creoles in the cities of Quito, Guayaquil, Old Panama, Puerto de Caballos, and Santo Tomás de Castilla. In order to consider how Catholicism influenced Spanish orations and written correspondence, it is important to consider the collective horizons they envisioned. Adrian Hastings' *The Construction of Nationhood* (1997) examines the impact of Christianity on the construction of nations and nationalisms. Hastings holds that "Christianity has of its nature been a shaper of nations, even of nationalisms" (187). While I do not claim the construction of a new nation or nationalism in the New World due to Christianity, I do contend that Christianity –specifically a Hispanic variant of Roman Catholicism– did shape the identities of the Spaniards, in the locales that the primary texts cover. This approach is in keeping with Hastings' statement that religion shapes the construction of ethnicities (185). Hastings defines ethnicity as a group of people with a common cultural identity and spoken language, which may survive within established nations (3). He also argues that some nations can even incorporate people and ethnicities that are very different from that out of which the nation initially developed (27). These considerations come to bear on my study since, as I will argue, the ways in which Spanish agents dealt with their religious others

varied according to their region, cultural identity, and spoken language. For instance, the primary sources reveal that the treatment European Protestant enemies received was not the same as the Indigenous Peoples, the latter being able to join the Spanish –in a tactical and political sense– by converting to Catholicism (see Chapter 3). This allowance for conversion, of course, does not mean that they had the same privileges. Eventually, by the seventeenth century, the Spanish had established a complex system of biological ranking, known as the *castas* (Masters 383), which served to reify differences as the Spanish perceived them. Indigenous Peoples, Afrodescendants, mestizos, and the Castilians themselves, while enjoying disparate privileges, all fell under the jurisdiction of the Crown, which envisioned its realms as Catholic.

Theoretical Frame

Before continuing, I here address complications arising in this examination of Spanish religious rhetoric in anti-pirate polemics. I have chosen rhetoric as the main arena for studying expressions of a Hispanic-Catholic normativity, which existed as a common thread between Spanish outposts in Quito, Panama and Guatemala. Rhetoric reveals future aims. In this case, the militaristic overtone of the correspondence I examine shows parallel cases of administrators who appropriate the Tordesillas-era precedent of evangelization as a rallying cry to expand Spain's imperial reach and protect newly-invaded lands from the counterfeit pieties of competing European states. Until this study, no previous intervention has focused on anti-piratical religious rhetoric as a tool for strengthening and defending Spanish ports. The archives have only begun to yield sources that bring to light this key yet understudied aspect of Spanish vulnerability in their frontier regions. While future research can uncover further examples of Spanish religious identities under piratical siege, my study connects consistent rhetorical strategies of colonial functionaries during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries across regions in Central and South

America. Due to the vast amounts of precious metals and other cargo that flowed through ports including Nombre de Dios, Portobello, and Puerto de Caballos, it comes as no surprise that Spanish authorities would employ providentialist interpretations of events. That is, they would explain the occurrences as part of a larger, divine purpose. Their decisions in writing had commercial, political, and ideological repercussions for these pivotal colonial cities, and, by association, the thousands of lives they touched.

Spanish colonial rhetoric in Quito, Panama, and Guatemala aimed to convince fellow Spaniards to act on behalf of what they viewed as a uniformly Catholic Empire. Yet the imperative to act in favor of that self image carried its own double –the imperative to act *against* religious difference. As Bruno Latour has observed, in discourses of identity, descriptions of “anti-groups” appear as simultaneous building blocks in constructions of collective identity (*Reassembling the Social* 32). When it came to pirates and piety, Spaniards at once defined their aims in terms of who they were and who they were not. Consequently, corsairs and Indigenous Peoples constituted the religious others of Spaniards, whose characteristics in turn shaped the Spanish as a collective, according to writers whose texts I analyze. With these considerations in mind, I will approach these texts via Latour’s (2005) Actor Network Theory to analyze the religious rhetoric of group identity. Latour holds that instead of imposing meta-social propositions or concepts on texts beforehand, researchers should look to the actors themselves in the primary sources examined as the definers and organizers of their social world (*Reassembling the Social* 23). Actors thus provide theoretical vocabulary as advocates of their group’s existence (Latour, *Reassembling the Social* 31). They are the historical agents who define who they are, what they have been, and what they should be; they delineate the group. In the current study, the actors that speak for the group are those who wrote the documents, since they speak on behalf of

their local colonial collectives, explaining and justifying their actions to the Crown. Francisco de Zúñiga, Juan Pérez de Guzmán, and Alonso Criado de Castilla were all Spanish administrators in these documents. Francisco de Zúñiga was a legal scribe (*escribano de cámara*) who wrote several documents on behalf of the Audiencia de Quito regarding piratical attacks in the 1570s. Juan Pérez de Guzmán was a knight from the Order of Santiago. He worked as governor of Antioquia, Cartagena and Puerto Rico, until reaching Panama in 1665. The viceroy of Peru, Pedro Antonio Fernández de Castro, dismissed him in 1667 and confined him in Lima for political reasons. However, after Henry Morgan's first attack in Panama, he reappointed Pérez de Guzmán to defend the territory. Pérez de Guzmán lived in Tierra Firme until 1671, when he went back to Spain. Finally, Alonso Criado de Castilla studied at the University of Salamanca, where he earned a doctorate degree. He was president of the Audiencia de Guatemala in 1598 and suggested establishing a new port in Amatique in 1605. Criado de Castilla earned a promotion in 1608 that appointed him as *ministro togado* at the Council of the Indies. He passed away in Guatemala in 1611 before he could work as such.

Clearly, the actions of one group are open to a panoply of interpretations on the part of actors in other groups. Actions and responses carry different meanings based on the perspectives and aims of the historical actors. Latour describes this polyvalence with the term "actants" – different configurations of the same actions (*Reassembling the Social* 54). In other words, while actors are specific individuals, various individuals manifest actants. For instance, the individuals mentioned above give themselves protagonist roles while portraying corsairs and Indigenous groups like the Chonos or Toquegua as opponents. Although corsairs, the Chonos and the Toquegua are not the same, they manifest the same actant: that of opposition. What is more, although they both share the same actant, the ways in which they interact with the actors varies,

which brings me to the next phase: with the actors and actants identified, one needs to observe their actions and trace connections between actors and the controversies in which they engage. Latour claims that actors “engage in criticizing other agencies accused of being fake, archaic, absurd, irrational, artificial, or illusory” (*Reassembling the Social* 56). In the primary texts under consideration, the actors accuse their others of being in the wrong and out of step with reality. Additionally, Latour stresses the importance of avoiding “meta-language” and instead uses a general analytical lexicon to avoid confusing the actors’ own preferred terms (*Reassembling the Social* 29-30). To put it another way, implicit assumptions and word choices disclose the writers’ perspectives on the subject matter. Actor-Network Theory ensures that the actors’ own expressions are apparent by avoiding the use of abstract or prescriptive vocabulary during analysis. When referring to Indigenous Peoples who have not converted to Catholicism, the Spanish call them “yndios ynfielos.” Likewise, when referring to corsairs, these writers use the blanket term “lutheranos” regardless of the corsairs’ actual faith, which reveals the Spanish perspective on their enemies. Corsairs could have been part of any denomination, but to the actors, they were homogeneous heretics. Further, the Spanish actors use expressions that have a Catholic overtone or implicit ideology that appears in all three texts as an ever-present rhetorical resource: “y assi encomendandolo a dios nuestro Señor procure este subçesso con muy ferboroso cuydado” (AGI, Guatemala, 129 f. 3v) or “y semejantemente fue dios servido” (f. 7r). These and other formulaic expressions provided justifications for their tactical decisions and military actions.

Drawing Lines: Contextual Considerations

The context of the primary sources sheds crucial light on the struggles that Spanish subjects faced due to piracy. In 1494, Spain signed the Treaty of Tordesillas with Portugal, a

document that distributed the Americas between Spain and Portugal (see fig. 1). Its infringement could end in conflict with Portugal, papal sanctions or, as Steven L. Danver explains, excommunication from the Catholic Church (1). The document, therefore, gave Spain the right to occupy the Western Hemisphere. Besides granting Spain the right to claim territories in the western side of the demarcation line, the treaty ensured a monopoly on the resources and wealth as well, facilitating Spain's expansion. The pope had long made use of documents called *potestas*, which gave them the license to act as referees in monarchical disputes (Bennassar 152). In terms of regional sovereignty, the pope had the right to grant control over a "pagan" or unfaithful territory to Christian monarchs under the condition that they evangelize all its inhabitants (152). Moreover, one of the bulls of the treaty established that any land or isles that had no Christian monarch would belong to Castile (155). With that purpose in mind, the Spanish understood that the Treaty of Tordesillas alone as evidence of their entitlement to those lands and to the guidance of their Catholic mission.




Figure 1. Treaty of Tordesillas, 1494.

However, papal authority, which formed a pillar of Spanish law, was a tangential consideration for the English (Navascués 47). The Protestant Reformation, starting with Martin Luther in 1517, entailed transformation in relations between European powers, and with Spain, which remained Roman Catholic. The Reformation also meant that the papal bulls were not useful anymore (Bennassar 157). Eventually, the Council of Trent (1545-1563) presented a reformation plan of its own, which defended what the Protestants rejected and also demanded improvements within the Catholic Church (Eire 432). Thus, political tensions intertwined with different religious positions (Solano 77). It is within this confessional turmoil that our actors' stories unfold.

Economic considerations also play a role. The Treaty of Tordesillas allowed Spain and Portugal to rely on an exclusivist commercial system, that is, mercantilism. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spanish Empire attempted to monopolize its markets in Spanish America (Haring 9; Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering* 160). By the seventeenth century, the Dutch, English, and French disregarded Iberian monopoly (Bennassar 157). To appropriate a share of the riches, northern maritime nations started quasi-piratical attacks. As a defensive strategy, the Spanish established voyages in convoy. They sailed in formation with military vessels by fixed routes twice a year. The *Flota de Nueva España* left in April, and the *Galeones de Tierra Firme* went to the northern coast of South America in August (Laviana 27; M.A. Rojas 52). These set routes became successful in terms of security, and few fleets suffered attack (Laviana 29). However, this relative safety was not necessarily the case for the ports, which became the targets of the attacks. By the seventeenth century, buccaneers of the West Indies became the terror of Spanish sailors (23). In fact, state-sponsored privateers –or corsairs– whom the English government authorized, intercepted, captured and attacked other vessels under the

license of their letters of marque (Hallwood and Miceli 237), Francis Drake exemplifies the state-sponsored privateer in this study. The threat of corsairs, therefore, was not only a matter of ideological dispute, but also economic and geopolitical.

Piratical attacks and Spanish military defense of their ports paralleled ideological and territorial wars in Europe during the same period. The Eighty Years War (1568-1648), the Anglo-Spanish War (1585-1604), the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659), and the Portuguese War of Restoration (1640-1668) are prominent examples of large-scale conflicts in which Spain participated.⁵As in the rest of Spain's empire, piratical skirmishes made concrete the ideological battles of the universities and courts of Europe.

The documents under examination form key moments during the emergence of a shared rhetoric and identity among colonial Spanish functionaries and typify their ideological response to the attacks of English pirates. The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter One, "Francis Drake and the Audiencia de Quito" deals with the document *Audiencia de Quito: disposiciones contra el corsario Drake* (1579). This text, as mentioned, narrates the events that took place when Francis Drake's corsairs entered the South Sea along the coast of Peru. This document is relevant to the study as it provides the perspective the Spanish agents in the Audiencia de Quito had regarding their English adversaries and how they dealt with them. From its first sentence, the letter identifies the corsairs as "*yngleses luteranos, enemigos de nuestra santa ffee catolica*" (AGI, Patronato, 266, R.7, f. 1r). Chapter Two, "Henry Morgan and the Fall of Panama" examines the letter by Juan Pérez de Guzmán in which he recounts the attack of Henry Morgan and his men on Panama. His letter is relevant to the religious quandary in that it

⁵ For readings on Spain's involvement in these conflicts, see *Elizabethan Privateering* (1964), by Kenneth Andrews; *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe* (1987), by Jeremy Black; *The Road to Rocroi* (2008), by Fernando González de León; and *The Eighty Years War. From Revolt to Regular War 1568-1648* (2019), by Olaf van Nimwegen, Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, and Louis Sicking.

specifically proposes a Catholic Spanish identity and faith worth defending and preserving from the corsairs: “me fui a la Yglesia mayor delante de nuestra señora de la Pura y linpia concepción devotísima y milagrosa ymagen e hice juramento de morir en su defensa, y unánimes todos, con gran fervor y devoción hicieron lo mismo” (Bautista 176). Chapter Three, “Santo Tomás de Castilla and the Toquegua,” provides an additional dimension of the emerging rhetoric. Rather than focusing on the corsairs that forced them to move from one port –Puerto de Caballos– to another –Santo Tomás de Castilla,– Alonso Criado de Castilla describes the newly established port and its people, the Toquegua. He specifically states how the Spaniards’ first mission before settling should be the Toquegua’s evangelization. I argue that conversion here served a strategic purpose as a means to expand the ranks of combatants against the pirates. Here descriptions of the “yndios ynfieles llamados toqueguas” (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 6v), compare favorably with piratical Protestants. They presented the Natives as a *tabula rasa*, ready to receive, and then defend, Hispanic Catholicism. Thus, Spanish colonial administrators could justify their actions by stating that the Toquegua’s conversion to Catholicism was actually “atendiendo principalmente al servicio de dios nuestro señor y de Vuestra magestad” (f. 6v). The presentation and examination follow an order of collective experience, not strictly chronological. Within that exposition, the documents shed light on the formation of an inter-regional Catholic rhetoric on how and why inter-European rivalries developed in the waters and ports of the Americas.

Among the three archival documents of this study, despite differences of location and local culture, Francis Drake forms one of their common threads. The transcriptions of the documents in the appendices are the first to be published. I have kept the original and distinct orthographies, particular to each document, in my transcriptions. The first chapter centers on an event in which he actively took part. Chapter Two responds to a chain of events Francis Drake

set in motion, when he attacked the port Nombre de Dios in 1596. In response to his attack, the Spanish relocated to Portobello, and later to Old Panama. The third chapter reveals similar procedures to the ones Drake set in motion in Chapter Two. In his report to the Crown, Alonso Criado de Castilla explicitly mentions the earlier relocation from Nombre de Dios to Portobello to justify why they also needed to move from Puerto de Caballos to Amatique: “por ser tambien el camino largo correrian las fragatas y varcos Riesgo de cossarios, como las que solian salir en tierra firme del puerto de nombre de dios para entrar en el rio de chagre” (f. 3r). Thus, even though years apart, the documents shared concerns of corsair attacks and tactical lessons learned from battles with Francis Drake. These shared experiences throughout the years and in different places lay groundwork for an identity based on a Hispanicized Catholicism.

The relationship between a Hispanicized Roman Catholicism and its impact on military decisions on how to deal with piratical attacks, particularly in official correspondence, remains an understudied area. This thesis, therefore, provides a fresh approach to processes of identity construction by looking at the rhetoric Spanish administrators used. The Spanish functionaries’ written expressions reflect their fears, concerns and vulnerabilities. Yet they also bring out their convictions and determination. To look at their rhetoric thus opens a window on their identity constructions. To do so, delving into the social world of the actors as they present it is the first step. In the pages that follow, episodes of pirates attacking and almost hanging Spanish pilots, images of the Virgin Mary, Catholic processions and prayers, as well as conversions abound. These narrativized events disclose the actors’ world and their perception of it. In turn, unveiling their underlying associations and relationships, reveals their understanding of piratical attacks and their resolve to defend Spanish ports, or even, on occasion, to fight back.

Chapter One: Francis Drake and the Audiencia de Quito

On a late Saturday morning of 1579, an English ship and two boats appeared next to a Spanish vessel en route from the port of Manta, in the city of Trujillo, to Panama. The captain of the ship and his men pillaged the Spanish vessel, taking all the silver. Yet the assault did not stop there. The English captain, who identified himself as Juan Dacles' brother, threatened to hang all the crew if they did not give him all the money that he believed the Spanish were hiding.⁶ Trying to escape their imminent death, the Spanish crew gave the thieves all their belongings. The English captain then tried to persuade the Spanish pilot to give him his ship, seeing that it was much faster than his vessel. He swore to the Christian God that he would return the ship and give him a piece of gold from Valdivia. He showed the pilot Benito Díaz his bronze globe and explained how he entered the South Sea: he held another Spanish pilot hostage from a previous successful attack in Paita, near the city of Piura. However, the next morning, the English captain changed his mind. Grabbing their swords, the corsairs once again threatened to hang the Spaniards, accusing them of holding back more silver. They tied the ropes around their necks and lifted them above the ground. Although they finally let the gasping captives down, the corsairs dropped the anchor to hinder Spanish escape. (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7 (5)). The episode reveals one of Francis Drake's navigational strategies. By capturing Spanish pilots, he could learn how to move through Spanish waters (Holmes 35). Instead of running away with the silver, the English performed the physical torture of hanging the Spanish crew in order to force out their knowledge.

⁶ John Hawkins appears as Juan Aquines Acles in Spanish chronicles and documents. William Hawkins was his brother, who also engaged in corsair activity. Both were relatives of Francis Drake.




Figure 2. Ground plan of El Callao with the new fortification, 1641. Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), MP-PERU_CHILE,8.
<https://pares.mcu.es/ParesBusquedas20/catalogo/show/22484?nm>

Until the 1570s, the Viceroyalty of Peru was relatively safe from pirates and corsairs (Flores 37), a fact that changed after an unexpected attack with Francis Drake at the helm. Between the 1560s and 1580s, Drake and other English corsairs sought fortune on religious grounds, since their Protestant polity had rejected the papal bull that protected Spain (Lane, “Pirate Networks” 345). In England, where the Treaty of Tordesillas had no validity, the monarchy sought open seas and trading freedom. Drake made one of his most notorious incursions into Peru in 1578, entering the South Sea via the Strait of Magellan (Walker 91; see fig. 3). This was not his first time in Peru, as he had successfully intercepted a Peruvian shipment of silver in 1573, taking that treasure from the port of Nombre de Dios. On the 1579 occasion, however, pillaging Peru formed part of his extended voyage of circumnavigation (Bradley 2). Drake destroyed the ports of Coquimbo, Valparaíso, and Arica, and finally arrived in Callao in

February of 1579 (Flores 37; see fig. 2). The Spanish, without flinching, quickly initiated correspondence between *corregidores* to notify all nearby provinces and ports to prepare for potential pirate attacks. Three letters alerted the Real Audiencia de Quito, two from Paita and another from the province of Guayaquil. The Audiencia de Quito convened on March 7, 1579, and discussed how to proceed. After the meeting, the scribe Francisco de Zúñiga wrote the resolutions of the Audiencia in a letter that they sent to Phillip II. In this chapter, I examine the religious rhetoric of that Audiencia report. I address two main points: on one hand, my close readings of their explicit religious rhetoric reveal information about Spanish military tactics and strategies. In particular, my readings shed light on the administrative use the Spanish made of religiosity. As we will see, religiosity itself served as a tactical tool to persuade men –particularly the Chonos– to fight against pirates. On the other hand, I consider accompanying rhetorical devices, not directly related to religion, that reinforce Spanish anti-piratical tactics.

The chapter is divided into three sections: after an overview of the defensive strategies the Audiencia prepared for the attacks, I consider how the Audiencia addressed religiosity as a tactic to motivate and persuade Indigenous Peoples to fight English pirates. Lastly, I examine evidence of the imaginary that Spanish administrators had of their English enemies. Throughout the chapter, I show how Spanish administrators at the Audiencia de Quito used a religious rhetoric to persuade the Natives in Guayaquil to fight the English. Via rhetoric, they created a shared imaginary space Spanish and Natives based on their rejection of the pirates' Protestantism. I also show ways in which Spanish functionaries represent their Northern European others as a triple threat: foreign, heretics, and thieves, ultimately distancing the Spanish-Native alliance from their constructed religious others.




Figure 3. Earliest map of the Strait of Magellan, 1520. Available in *Memoria Chilena*, Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, <https://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-98386.html>.

Preventive Measures against Drake

On March 6, 1579, at 2 a.m., the Audiencia de Quito received three letters. Later, after dawn, Pedro de Iñigosa, Diego Ortegón, Francisco de Auncibai, Gaspar de Peralta, and the president of the Audiencia, Diego de Narváez, gathered to read and deliberate over the letters. The scribe also reviewed the letters they received before including them in a large delivery correspondence to Phillip II (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7 (2-5)).⁷ The document follows a formal structure, maintaining an impersonal use of the subjunctive. Although a single scribe –Francisco

⁷ These three transcribed letters in the AGI have the titles “*Relacion de la primera carta del señor visorrey,*” “*Relacion de la segunda carta del señor bisorrey,*” “*Relacion de la carta de Payta,*” and “*Relacion de la carta de Benito Diaz.*”

de Zúñiga— wrote the document, he made sure not to use the first person, neither singular nor plural, and kept a formal, legal tone. Zúñiga provides a description of the events that took place prior to the meeting, narrating the moment they received the three alarming letters, as well as what the Audiencia concluded at their gathering. Although at first confusing them with “*franceses luteranos*,” the Spanish soon learned that the vessels they spotted were English. As Ramiro Flores points out, using this description emphasizes the enmity between Spaniards and their foreign religious threats (39). Referring to their credal others as French—even though they later realized they were English— and assuming they were Lutheran, reinforces a separation between the Spanish group and their competition: the anti-group was not only foreign, but also Protestant.



Figure 4. Map of the district of the Audiencia de Quito. Francisco Requena, 1779. Collection from Banco de la República.

<https://babel.banrepcultural.org/digital/collection/p17054coll13/id/246>

Besides alerting other provinces, the Audiencia took several preventive measures before the pirates arrived (see fig. 4). They set up a chain of couriers to deliver fast and efficient correspondence between Quito and Guayaquil. Then they wrote to the *corregidor* of Guayaquil, advising him to protect all goods and riches before the marauders arrived. According to the document, they believed English corsairs came to seize one of their galleys. Fearing they could lose the ship and its riches, the *Audiencia* gave explicit orders to cover it, sink it in a river, or flood it “de manera que de nynguna manera vinyese a mando de los dichos enemigos” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, f. 1v). Similar resolutions to destroy their own merchandise appear three times in the text. The Spanish would rather destroy their goods, wealth, or even official correspondence than lose them to their enemies. They also sent letters to Panama City, and the courier had orders to throw the dispatch of letters overboard should pirates intercept him *en route* (AGI, Patronato, 266, R.7, f. 2r). The Audiencia de Quito used this strategy to save their assets at any cost. Other preventive orders included taking “mugeres, nyños y gente ynutil” out of the city to a safe place (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, f. 1v). Any other individual that did not fit into those categories could not leave the city without an Audiencia license. Those who went against that order and tried to leave became prisoners. Furthermore, they stressed building fortifications as fast as possible, as well as gathering weapons, horses, and food.

Taken by surprise, they scrambled to carry out these responses. The South Sea had not been a popular objective among pirates until then, so the cities and ports had not prepared for attacks. The Crown considered the South Sea isolated and safe between the Strait of Magellan and the Isthmus of Panama (Walker 94). After Drake proved them wrong, the Spanish realized they had to build defenses both in terms of fortifications and tactical communication between provinces to keep up-to-date on the enemies’ latest move. Making sure that women, children, and

people they deemed as weaker or “useless” –that is, easy targets– left the cities would facilitate a better defensive operation. Meanwhile, fighting men had to stay to defend their territory and protect their land and riches. Pirates instilled great fear because of the slow and faulty communication between cities, which caused great uncertainty about the attacks (Lane, *Blood and Silver* 104). Given the fear surrounding pirates, it is worthwhile asking how Spanish administrators could possibly persuade men to fight instead of flee.

Hispanic Catholicism and Pious Rhetoric

The *oidores* at the Audiencia de Quito knew that besides fortifications and food supplies, they needed men to guard the port. They were well aware that their forces needed a reason urgent enough for them to give their lives. In the Spanish functionaries’ minds, no cause loomed larger than their Catholic faith. By taking their belief beyond religious matters, they made it into a rhetorical arsenal for a militaristic ends, particularly that of motivating Indigenous Peoples to fight as conscripts. Orders were clear: Spanish administrators had to convince the Indigenous population that the English corsairs represented more than an economic threat. The Audiencia gave the *corregidor* of Guayaquil, Hernando de Zúñiga, these instructions: “y que tubiese a punto de guerra a los yndios contra los yngleses y se les diese a entender que estos yngleses son enemygos de nuestra santa fee que bienen a rrobar y a llevar los yndios a su tierra y a les matar y hazer esclavos” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R.7, f. 4v). This passage shows that the Spanish assumed a common belief would support a common rhetoric. The Natives had to understand that the English were enemies of their holy faith. Using “*nuestra*” to refer to their faith would include all converts and followers of Catholicism. Thus, when the Audiencia targeted converts to help them understand how Drake and his men threatened their faith, Catholicism emerged as a common ground for Spanish and converts. That the Spanish had declared war on Drake and English

corsairs that same year allowed them to demand that Native converts follow them “a punto de guerra” (Mawson 93-94). More than an isolated skirmish, these instructions folded into a larger imperial project of forming a standing army ready for war.

Aside from the instrumental aim of mobilizing fighting forces, the Spanish relied on fear as a motivator, encouraging the Natives to believe that English corsairs came to enslave and kill them: “bienen a rrobar y a los matar y hazer esclavos.” This warning assumes that the threat of murder at the hands of English pirates came also with the possibility of enslavement. These perils would give them yet another reason to fight, to defend their freedom while avoiding slavery and death. Resorting to the threat of enslavement would become a recurring –and effective– rhetorical strategy among Spaniards even well into the eighteenth century (Blanchard 18). In areas with a high density of enslaved people, they often instructed priests to encourage those thus subjected to fight for the king and religion (25). These threats usually proved successful. Beyond filling the Natives with fear, the threat of Protestant enslavement reasserted the soft, cultural dominance of the Spanish. The Spaniards’ message implied these groups owed them gratitude and submissiveness for their protection (Schmidt-Nowara 47). Ironically, the *Requerimiento* (1512) established that if Natives did not comply with the Spanish and their Catholic policies, Spain had the right to declare war on them and enslave them (L. Rojas 133; Sánchez 5). Hence, the Audiencia was not really giving the Natives a choice: they had to understand that the English enemy was their enemy too, or face, if not enslavement, a tense relationship with colonial administrators. According to Spanish law, they would enjoy the protection of vassals, rather than face dire consequences if they joined the Audiencia’s opponent.⁸

⁸ The New Laws of the mid-sixteenth century abolished the use of the *Requerimiento*.

A closer look reveals that a pious rhetoric in the document formed a common space between Spanish and Natives, while stressing the hostility and differences with their English adversaries. The document explains, “y se les diese a entender que estos yngleses son enemygos de nuestra santa fee” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R.7, f. 4v). The Audiencia highlighted how the Indigenous Peoples had a place and purpose in their empire –a common religion, a common cause, – and warned them – “se les diese a entender”– how this would not be the case if the English captured them. Through this use of religious rhetoric aimed at Castilians and Natives, they deployed a military strategy that also served as identity construction. Appealing to the Hispanic understanding of Catholicism in the call to fight, the document presupposes public identification with the faithful as proof of Spanishness. As Adrian Hastings puts it, the existential understanding of Christianity became inseparable from Hispanic culture, as they equated being Spanish with being Christian (43). Since in practice Christianity and Spanishness joined as a single continuum, the Spanish would attempt to apply this identification to the Natives within the jurisdiction they claimed.

Indigenous groups varied from area to area. Although there are many allusions to Natives within the document, the Audiencia did not specify groups. Nonetheless, they explicitly mention the name Sancho Hacho de Velasco, who was a cacique from Latacunga, a *cacicazgo* that worked closely with the Quijos, with Hacho as the intermediary between the Quijos and the Spaniards (Garcés 60; Uribe et al. 59). Avila and Archidona, as part of the governorate of Quijos, payed tribute to the Spanish as well (Ruiz 86). Thus, Hacho played a part in pacifying the Quijos. These towns come to bear in this study as these areas ended up revolting against the Spaniards just as the English corsairs arrived. Coastal groups around Guayaquil, including the Quijos and the Chonos, were not accustomed to subjugation (Stohtert 80; López 66). In fact, the Inca Empire

had never managed to control the groups in Guayaquil. Even Túpac Inca Yupanqui (r. 1471-93), who sent an expedition in an attempt to add the Chonos and the Quijos –as well as other coastal groups– to his empire, did not succeed (Espinoza 136-38; Powers 225). The revolts of the Chonos appear in the Audiencia’s document.

Subsuming Indigenous Peoples under Hispanic Catholicism was not coincidental. Their insistence on this association reveals a consensus among colonial administrators that to identify as Spanish carried with it an official religious affiliation. The majority of Spaniards aligned the goals of the Spanish Empire with those of the Catholic Church (69). Converts were useful, not only because they could work or fight for them, but I would suggest that the religious rhetoric itself gave the administrators the cover of proselytization. The Audiencia concluded that the *oidores* had to cautiously alert the Indigenous population of the looming evil of the English corsairs: “Yten hordenaron que los señores oydores en particular avisen con disimulaçion a los yndios desta provinçia el mal que les verna destos cosarios como esta ttratado entre los dichos señores” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, 5v). What purpose could alerting the Indigenous population from Guayaquil that corsairs were a threat “con disimulaçion” serve? As in the previous example, it was a Spanish strategy to persuade the Natives to be on their side. The Spanish had an ulterior motive for their dissimulation: ensuring the Indigenous Peoples would not revolt against them to join the English. They were concerned that their piratical enemies could engage in negotiation with the Indigenous population and Afrodescendants, and started doubting the Indigenous People’s loyalty, fearing they could ally with the corsairs (Flores 40). Thus, it was convenient for the Spanish to make sure the Indigenous Peoples knew the “mal que les verna.” They gave an implicit warning regarding the English and “como esta ttratado entre los dichos señores,” alluding to the consequences should they not side with the Spanish. By spreading fear

and making the Natives believe the magnitude of the threat, Spanish administrators calculated that the Indigenous combatants would join the fight on their side.

Taking the further precaution to prevent Native defection to the British, Spanish administrators confined their leaders or exiled them to keep them under control. Their strategic religious discourse aimed to raise up a fighting force while also monitoring for potential betrayers. The Spanish had warrant to fear that the Indigenous Peoples would turn their backs on them. The Quijos had already destroyed the colonial settlements of Avila and Archidona, only reinforcing Spanish suspicions of defection. The groups that were supposed to be under control – previously pacified with the mediation of the cacique Sancho Hacha– rebelled in these two different cities (Garcés 67). This rebellion in Avila and Archidona could give corsairs an opportunity to recruit the Quijo to their side. The Audiencia thus faced a dilemma: as Quijos rose up, the corsairs’ influence lay uncomfortably nearby.

The Audiencia gave orders to start correspondence with the governor, Agustin de Ahumada, to address “lo tocante al allanamiento de la governaçion de los quixos y destruyçion de las dos çiudades de avila y archidona que los yndios della asolaron y muerte de todos los vezinos dellas y de la sospecha de alteraçion que avido delos” (AGI, Patronato, R. 7, f. 5r). The Audiencia was skeptical of the Natives, presuming there was “alteraçion y movimyento de los naturales de esta provinçia” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, f. 3r). When the news about English corsairs arrived, the Spanish decided to accuse and imprison Indigenous leaders to avoid a mutiny: “avia caçiques y prinçipales presos y fulmynado procesos contra ellos al tiempo que llego la dicha nueva de los cosarios” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, f. 3r). Later, when discussing another instance of the Indigenous revolt in Cuenca, the Audiencia ordered not to kill the caciques and chiefs, but rather to take them to captain Rodrigo de Salazar so that he could

“enbarcarlos y no bolviesen a esta provincia” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, f. 8r). Among these caciques was Sancho Hacho. In their foreclosing the possibility of Indigenous flight, administrators equated true faith with the willingness to fight for the empire. Any Native that proved a threat by siding with the English would receive imprisonment or exile for the sake of the integrity of the imagined religious community, as in the case of Sancho Hacho. The Audiencia de Quito pointed out these differences as part of an invective against what they considered an attack on their Hispanic Catholic identity.

Before proceeding, it is useful to summarize. So far, Spanish functionaries gave explicit orders to persuade and even to manipulate Indigenous Peoples with a dual intention. In Bruno Latour’s terminology, the Spanish actors –functionaries from the Audiencia, which included the scribe Francisco de Zúñiga– exerted their persuasion within a network (*Reassembling the Social* 107). In this particular context, the Audiencia targeted Indigenous converts in the province of Guayaquil. On the other hand, Native actants in turn inevitably influenced the Spanish behavior and decisions as their discursive opponents. Spanish actors responded with public condemnation of any Native behavior that gave quarter to the British. The dynamics of the two –Spanish functionaries and Indigenous converts– show how the Spanish saw utility in including the Natives, at least temporarily, in their rhetoric of a besieged Catholic community with a common enemy to overcome. Tracing these connections reveals that rather than excluding Natives, the Audiencia constructed an *entre nos* to establish control over the Indigenous population.⁹ Oratory of an abstract, unalloyed Hispanic Christianity aimed to create by *fiat* a community among

⁹ Constructions of an *entre nos* were not particular to the Audiencia de Quito. Mary Louise Pratt (1991) explains that Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, in his letter to Philip III, used a similar strategy. By denouncing the abuses of Spanish colonial administrators, Guaman Poma circumscribed an *entre nos* that included the sincerely pious – himself and the king. In the same letter, which he entitled “Nueva crónica y buen gobierno,” Guaman Poma posited the Andes, rather than Europe, as the true center of Christendom (34).

different groups and ethnicities (176). Defending the Indies from foreign adversaries gave all its inhabitants a sense of belonging (Lane, *Blood and Silver* 113). By drawing Indigenous Peoples into the fold and into the Spanish Empire, the Spanish exercised strategic control. Hastings explains that it is easier to persuade ordinary people to murder if they can advertise it as part of religious revival (147). Thus, the Audiencia worked to convince Native neophytes they had to fight for something larger than simply thwarting sea-going bandits. They should fight to uphold fidelity itself, or else face slavery or even death. Consequently, defending Hispanicized Catholicism created a space that Spanish functionaries, and even one of their others –Indigenous Peoples– could join.

Representing Pirates

The creation of a Spanish-Indigenous imaginary reinforced the separation between Hispanicized Catholics and their confessional others, the English corsairs, since otherness and contrast in part define one's group and identity (Felski 760). As Enrique Dussel observed, in Spain's self-conception Providence had chosen them to take Christianity to the world (38). In concrete terms, the Spanish believed that their destiny as a nation intertwined with the Catholic Church, with no space for English Protestants within that destiny. This thread is palpable throughout the document in allusions to Catholic faith or Christianity preceded by "*nuestra*," as in the expanded title of the document:

Relaçion de la entrada de los cosarios yngleses luteranos enemigos de nuestra santa ffee catolica en la mar del sur y de los daños que an ffecho en la costa del piru y de los proveymientos ffechos por los señores presidentes oydores desta rreal audiencia de san Francisco del Quito para la guardia y defensa de las çiudades y puertos de su distrito (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, f. 1r).

Summarizing the eight folios intended for Phillip II, the title offers a description of their enemies. The scribe, Francisco de Zúñiga, emphasized Spanish conceptions of English corsairs as

“*luteranos*,” which, as I noted earlier, highlights Spanish homogenizing views of their European opponents. They were corsairs, English, and Protestant, in other words, thieves, foreigners, and religious enemies. Zúñiga continued his description with the explicit statement that English buccaneers posed a threat to the Spaniards’ “*santa ffee catolica*.” The expanded title also makes clear the self-proclaimed mission of the Audiencia as the “*guardia y defensa*” of the cities and ports within its district. This protection covers physical fortifications, ships, and assets, and extends to a religious defense against those who posed an ideological threat. The English corsairs came, in fact, to intercept vehicles that conveyed wealth and the imperial power that went hand-in-hand with the Hispanized Christendom they imagined. In the estimation of the Audiencia, Drake came to “*apoderarse de una galera que por horden del señor visorey destos reynos estaba ffecha en el puerto de guayaquil*” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R.7, f. 1v). Drake’s actions undermined the Spanish empire’s hold on economic, political and religious fronts simultaneously.

The instance at the opening of this chapter, when William Hawkins decided to hang pilot Benito Díaz and other crew members, further reveals the entanglement of economic, political, and religious conflict in the letter the Audiencia received from the Spanish pilot, “*avisa como el dicho navio de yngleses le avia tomado un navio que llevaba a panama y robadole todo el oro y plata que llevaba y le avian querido ahorcar al dicho piloto y a otros pasajeros a los quales al fin solto y avisa que tenyan en el dicho navío hasta ochenta yngleses*” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R.7, f. 3v). Reporting the attempted hanging allowed Zúñiga to communicate an image of the English as both greedy for treasure and prone to violence merely for the sake of intimidation. Even after securing the Spanish gold, the corsairs’ rough treatment of those manning the cargo shipment and the lingering scars around their necks served as a reminder of the pirates’ animus against the empire. The episode reflects the tension between English corsairs and colonial administrators in

the Viceroyalty of Peru. In distinction to Indigenous converts, whom the Spanish tried to persuade and manipulate, the Audiencia presents the English corsairs as separate from the Spanish.

As a corollary to describing who they were not, this document, “Proceedings against Drake,” reveals processes of Spanish identity construction. Distancing themselves from European Protestants, functionaries in Guayaquil and Quito endeavored to convert Indigenous souls and rally them as a fighting force. Networks between the Audiencia and their actants reveal that the relationships the Spaniards had with each group differed according to their aim. The Spanish divided the surrounding groups emphasizing the potential of Indigenous allies and the threat of English corsair antagonists. Both of these actants in Hispanic Catholic rhetoric illustrate the identity formation of the colonizers. In fact, all group formation mobilizes observable features to make the group boundary hold in the face of pressures that work to dissolve it (753; Latour, “On Actor-Network Theory” 372). Despite the ostensible welcome of Indigenous converts into the fold, these neophytes still fell under the Audiencia’s suspicion.

Conclusions

The opening scene of this chapter when English corsairs attempted to hang pilot Benito Díaz reinforces the sum of the threats Francis Drake posed. Referring to the letter that the Audiencia received from the Spanish pilot, “avisa como el dicho navío de yngleses le avia tomado un navio que llevaba a panama y robadole todo el oro y plata que llevaba y le avian querido ahorcar al dicho piloto y a otros pasajeros a los quales al fin solto y avisa que tenyan en el dicho navío hasta ochenta yngleses” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R.7, f. 3v). Corsairs did not stop at taking gold. They used physical intimidation as a means to decenter Spanish imperial control. This representation of piratical violence aimed to gain favor from the Crown. At the same time,

as I have shown here, the document could justify the addition of military recruitment to the project of the religious conversion of the Natives in and around Guayaquil. To the Audiencia, negotiation with the English did not enter the equation. Instead, they used their conceptions of their English others to reify their self-image as the chosen bearers of a religious message that would transform former infidels into allies against marauding Protestants.

My readings here have also shown that the distinctions that emerge from this document shed light on Spanish mechanisms of othering. In a moment of crisis, the Audiencia divided outside groups into potential Indigenous allies on the one hand and the ideological antagonists of the English corsairs on the other. Both actants, in these piratical representations of Hispanic Catholic rhetoric, indicate a collective identity formation that the Audiencia articulated in terms of otherness, redefining and manipulating the Native groups “into positions with them” (Somerville 9). The antagonists exercised an ironic influence over the actions the Audiencia took, while remaining firmly outside of the group. The Quijo villages, on the contrary, could belong within the imagined Hispanic Catholic space as converts and comrades in arms. These group formations mobilize Hispanic Catholicism to involve all actors and actants with each other within a network (Lee and Brown 775). This document, “Proceedings against Drake,” reveals how the Spanish took defensive action on the ground and in the viceregal archive against those who would undermine their Hispanic Catholic identity.

Francis Drake’s attack on the Viceroyalty of Peru took Spanish administrators by surprise. Spaniards were overconfident regarding the advantages of geographic isolation. Despite the distance from the Strait of Magellan, that transoceanic access point became a vulnerability. As we will see in the next chapter, this was not the only time the Spanish trusted too much in distance and isolation to protect them. Upon hearing the news of Drake’s impending attack, the

Spanish gathered provisions and fortified Guayaquil. Yet the Audiencia understood that those measures would not suffice, and that they needed more men to fight, in case of a direct attack. Their strategy was to improvise a religious rhetoric that would convince Indigenous inhabitants in the region to risk their lives for the sake of a particular vision of Christendom under siege. The Audiencia created an imaginary space where both Indigenous Peoples and Spaniards could find common ground. The religious rhetoric of the Audiencia de Quito served the dual purpose of recruiting fighting Native men, while at the same time setting a precedent for the subsequent monitoring of their movements. Ultimately, their pious persuasion aimed to portray the corsairs as ruthless robbers, enslavers, and enemies of their holy Catholic faith. In Chapter Two, these representations of corsairs as savages and barbaric reappear. Although the Audiencia de Quito directed their religious rhetoric towards the surrounding Indigenous population, the principal actor in the next chapter, Juan Pérez de Guzmán, would employ a similar rhetoric, this time for an audience of Natives and Spanish settlers.

Chapter Two: Henry Morgan and the Fall of Panama

Mounted on his horse, Juan Pérez de Guzmán, the governor of Panama, stood in front of his men and he shouted “ea, hijos, a ellos, que ya no tiene otro remedio: o morir o vencer.” (Bautista 177). Over 1100 English and French pirates awaited in the frontlines, their harquebuses ready. As the governor moved forward through the gunshots, he found himself alone in the battle, as his men fled the scene. A bullet grazed the right side of his face but, as he recalled, “permitió Dios quedase vivo para pasar el tormento de dar cuenta a Vuestra majestad de tan gran factalidad” (177). This encounter was the last to take place before Old Panama burnt down. However, the incident had started a month before, on January 6, 1671, Three Kings Day. That day, at two in the afternoon, 600 English corsairs from Jamaica charged against the castle of San Lorenzo. The fight went on until dawn and the Spanish managed to expel their enemies out of the port a total of eight times. Yet, once the pirates shot firebombs, they destroyed all Spanish fortifications and weapons. After raining musket bullets on the Spaniards, the pirates easily took the citadel. These conflicts brought to the fore the driving force of the Spanish side. In the midst of the battle, Juan Pérez de Guzmán quickly formulated pious rhetoric that would motivate his frightened men to fight to defend the Virgin Mary.

Juan Pérez de Guzmán recounted this incident in a letter that he sent to Mariana of Austria, Queen Regent of Spain, on February 19, 1671, twenty-two days after their loss of their port. In this chapter, I examine Pérez de Guzmán’s religious rhetoric in the speech he made to rally his men. As in Chapter One, employing a Hispanicized Catholic discourse had the purpose of persuading them to fight. On this occasion, the main actor of the chapter, Pérez de Guzmán, positioned himself at the center of the action, as an essential instrument for the defense of Panama and as part of a large providential design for the region.

The chapter is divided into four sections. I first revisit the reasons for the relocation of Nombre de Dios to Portobello, and their importance, as well as the City of Panama's (see fig. 5). Understanding this strategic relocation also highlights the military advantages and vulnerabilities on the part of Spanish administrators as they faced pirates. As we will see, even though pirates attacked these ports frequently, the Spanish were slow to learn from experience and often relied on the same tactics that had failed them before. I then turn to the military tactics and strategies Pérez de Guzmán ordered to protect Old Panama from Henry Morgan's attack. Next, I will examine the passionate exhortations that Pérez de Guzmán gave before the battle, making his men swear that they would risk their lives and, if necessary, die for the defense of Catholicism and Panama. Along with the speeches, they also performed a series of ceremonies, such as processions and prayers, that enhanced their sense of religious purpose. My reading shows that his discourse aimed to establish a network of Catholic soldiers against heretical pirates. At the same time, Pérez de Guzmán positions himself as a key agent of Providence, guarding the city from falling into the hands of the enemy while his men ran away. In Pérez de Guzmán's eyes, all the multiethnic groups around him could answer his call. There is a specific mention of the collaboration of Afrodescendant captain Prado, and his involvement in the fight stands out in this document. According to Pérez de Guzmán, "andubo con mucho balor porque siempre vino picando al enemigo" (Bautista 175). The governor also commanded a hundred Natives from the Darién and another hundred Natives from Penonome to ambush the enemy. Lastly, I offer an evaluation of the effectiveness of Pérez de Guzmán's rhetoric in motivating residents and recruits from the hinterlands to fight, understanding that the governor's defense failed as a military operation. This chapter demonstrates that pious rhetoric aimed to create a network of Catholic combatants.

From Francis Drake to Henry Morgan



Figure 5. Map of Panama from Portobello to the Darién, 1600. Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), MP-PANAMA,23.
<https://pares.mcu.es:443/ParesBusquedas20/catalogo/description/22054>

By the end of the sixteenth century, Panama became the center of foreign attacks (Ward 343), causing the Spanish to relocate on multiple occasions. The first port the Spanish established was Nombre de Dios, in 1510, which became a crucial access point through which Spanish merchandise circulated (Garcia 77; Quiles 266). However, due to unfavorable conditions and constant corsair activity, the Spanish relocated to Portobello. Although the design of the new port began in 1595, construction did not start until 1597, when the Spanish were forced to move as Francis Drake attacked Nombre de Dios (Garcia 84; Quiles 267). In spite of the fortifications of Nombre de Dios to protect themselves from Drake's attack, the corsair managed to reach the port with a thousand men in January of 1596 and, although the episode ended with the English withdrawing and Drake dying of dysentery, the port city burnt down (Wright 59). Seeing the

need of better fortifications, Bautista Antonelli, the engineer in charge of the project of Portobello, planned the port surrounded by three castles: San Felipe de Sotomayor, Santiago de la Gloria, and San Jerónimo (see fig. 6). Notwithstanding the defensive preparations, in 1668, English buccaneer Henry Morgan successfully seized Portobello for fifteen days after defeating the battlements of San Jerónimo (Bautista 161). Yet this foray would only be the start for Henry Morgan. In 1670, he would return to the Isthmus, this time to attack Old Panama. That city, along with Nombre de Dios and Portobello, was one of the most important ports due to the annual fairs with fleets from Spain and Peru arriving there (Bautista 123; Ward 343). Moreover, the city was a key point in the trade route of Andean silver (Bautista 125). As the center of such operations, the port soon became attractive to foreign freebooters.




Figure 6. Map of Portobello port and the fortifications planned for its defense. Bautista Antonelli, 1597. Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), MP-PANAMA,12. <https://pares.mcu.es/ParesBusquedas20/catalogo/description/22043>

During the time of corsair activity in the 1660s, Juan Pérez de Guzmán held the jurisdiction over the territory. A knight of the Order of Santiago, he became governor of Panama in 1665. His first mission was to recover the island of Santa Catalina the same year he became governor. Although he succeeded, the Count of Lemos and Viceroy of Peru prosecuted him in 1667 and called him to Lima, where he became a prisoner (Bautista and Arce 216-217). However, with the appearance of Henry Morgan in Portobello in 1668, and the failure of the replacement governor of Panama at the time –Agustín de Bracamonte– to defeat him, they absolved Pérez de Guzmán and reappointed him as governor of Panama in 1670 (218). That same year, news that Henry Morgan and his men had set their eyes on Old Panama arrived.

The Fear of Morgan

After looting Portobello, Henry Morgan and his men returned to Jamaica to find that Spain and England were negotiating peace and as such should refrain from direct hostilities toward the Spanish (Hanselmann et al. 142; Lane, *Blood and Silver* 116). Nevertheless, Morgan disregarded the peace negotiations and set his plan to attack Panama in motion. Kris Lane mentions how habits of raiding were hard to stop when wartime ended, and figures like Morgan expanded the reach of buccaneering (“Pirate Networks” 349). To raid Panama, Morgan first took out the castle of San Lorenzo, a fortification on the Chagres River (Hanselmann et al. 145). He set it on fire, and the Spanish lost their weapons. Once Morgan took over the fort, he raised the English flag and cut the Spanish survivors’ throats (Suirra 88). A month before, Pérez de Guzmán had received a letter from the governor of Cartagena warning him of a potential offensive by the “enemigo Yngles de Jamaica con grueso de gente” (Bautista 173). The governor immediately prepared fortifications and defenses to keep the pirates away. He sent some men to the Castle of San Lorenzo, waiting for Morgan and his crew. He also ordered men to build trenches with

artillery pieces along the road they expected the enemy to take (162). Additionally, he gathered 1500 fighting men and grouped them under the command of Juan Portuondo Borgueño, governor of Veraguas, Juan Jiménez, sergeant major of the Plaza, and Alonso de Alcaudete, lieutenant general in Portobello.

Even though Pérez de Guzmán knew of Morgan's intentions to raid Panama, and although he came up with a defensive plan, once the fort of San Lorenzo fell, the governor lost all control of his men. He ordered 250 of them to recover the castle, but "ni pelearon con el ni hicieron mas que huir por el monte, sin yntentar siquiera ni lo uno ni lo otro, que abian prometido" (Bautista 174). Likewise abandoning the chain of command, captain Luis de Castillo, as well as Francisco González Salado and his company, chose to hold a meeting of their own instead of following the governor's orders:

Haziendo otra junta de Guerra sin mas facultad ni medios para ello que el miedo que les oprimia, se retiraron a Cruces, adonde teniendo entendida la resolucion tan fuera de hombres de valor y de la ynteligencia en que yo y todos los del reyno tenian, hallandome en el sitio de Guayaval, tres leguas de Cruces, adonde habia marchado para oponerme al enemigo, di horden para que aquella gente se retirase en considerasion de lo mal que avian obrado (175).

The governor soon found that his men were so afraid of the enemy that they not only stopped following orders, but also started deserting: "me hallé con dos tercios menos de la gente por el miedo que se le avia ynfundido" (175). In fact, when the people in Panama learned the number of pirates that came to attack them—2000 men—corporals urged the governor to withdraw from battle. How could Pérez de Guzmán win back his men's trust and motivation to fight? As he recalls, upon seeing his men flee and high ranking soldiers advising him to retreat, the governor came up with a new strategy. He made a series of Catholic speeches so convincing to the people that, with spirits regained, all joined with him—at least, on the level of his discourse.

A Providential Purpose

The fear the Spanish felt when they encountered Morgan's men ruined the governor's plans, leading to his loss of control of the situation. Amidst the chaos of the battle and his own men fleeing and disobeying, he went to the plaza, where the main force stood ready, and proclaimed the following:

Que todos los que fuesen verdaderos catholicos españoles defensores de la fee y devotos de nuestra señora de la pura y'linpia concepcion saliesen conmigo a las quatro de la tarde para defender su pureza hasta perder las vidas; fue tanto lo que se conmovio el pueblo con este bando, que salieron todos, concurriendo muchos sacerdotes y religiosos de todas las hordenes (175).

Adrian Hastings has proposed that a religion that is tied to identity, if threatened, will maintain its power to control the collective imagination (79). Like we saw in the previous chapter, being a Spaniard was intrinsic to being a Christian (Dussel 43). If Protestant corsairs threatened Catholics in Panama, then they were also threatening their Spanish identity. Hence Pérez de Guzmán devised a speech that would incite his people to fight precisely for the defense of Catholicism, their identity. Calling "all true Catholic Spaniards" reinforces the separation between them and their other, their moral enemy (191). What is interesting is that he assumed that all true Catholics were soldiers of faith *ipso facto*.¹⁰ Since their faith was at stake, all Catholics had the duty to guard it. Moreover, Pérez de Guzmán mentions how these men should also be devotees of "nuestra senora de la pura y'linpia concepcion," that is, Mary, and they should defend her "pureza hasta perder las vidas." Mary's figure serves as a synecdoche that connects all Catholics. By asking them to defend her, the governor was asking them to defend the Catholic faith.

¹⁰ It is no surprise that Pérez de Guzmán esteemed that all Catholics should fight to defend Catholicism, since he was a knight of the Order of Santiago. The order emerged in twelfth century Spain to fight Muslims and protect pilgrims going to Santiago de Compostela (Cabrerizo 31).



Figure 7. Ruins of the Cathedral Tower, Old Panama. Farnham Bishop. *Panama, Past and Present*. 1913. The Century Co., 1916.

As planned, at four in the evening all the men gathered in front of the Cathedral of Nuestra Señora de la Asunción, at the Plaza Mayor (see fig. 7). Once again, the governor used Mary in his rhetoric: “me fui a la Yglesia mayor delante de nuestra señora de la Pura y linpia concepción devotísima y milagrosa imagen e hice juramento de morir en su defensa, y unánimes todos, con gran fervor y devocion hicieron lo mismo” (Bautista 176). Setting himself as an example, he swore that he would die defending the Immaculate Conception. Just like appealing to Mary moved the soldiers, priests and Catholic followers on his first speech, evoking her presence this time had the same effect. The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception had great devotion in late seventeenth century Spain, although it was not recognized by the papacy until 1854 (Leddy 122-24). However, the Spanish monarchy undertook enterprise of the defense of the Immaculate Conception in the seventeenth century, becoming a sign of Spanish Catholic identity, different from the rest of Catholicism (P. González 486-87). This promotion of the Virgin Mary

was part of a policy that aimed to configure the Spanish monarchy as chosen by God in an attempt to use Catholicism to maintain loyalty and preserve a global empire (487). In a like manner, in Franciscan Gonzalo de Tenorio's view, a contemporary of Pérez de Guzmán, the Virgin was the prototype of Christ's universal reign, where the Spanish Indies were the Chosen People of the New Testament (122). In the governor's speeches, the use of the Immaculate Conception intended to lead the faithful to fulfill their duties as Catholic soldiers, as if chosen by Providence. Furthermore, many Spaniards were convinced that they were God's chosen people to spread Christianity to the world Providence (11). Both passages above share that providential character: as true Catholics and believers in the Immaculate Conception, it was their duty to defend her from Protestant intruders.

Throughout Pérez de Guzmán's speeches, as well as his whole written testimony, he positions himself as the chosen guardian of Panama: he was the last man standing, the one that pushed his men to fight for Mary, and by synecdoche, all Catholicism. In so doing, he described himself as nothing less than the instrument of Providence. After his speeches, when narrating the battle against the pirates, he reasserted the importance of his role in the city:

Hallandome solo no obstante me fui hasia el enemigo y llevando arbolado el baston me dieron en él un valaso teniendole junto al lado derecho de la cara; y permitió Dios que matasen a muchos que venian encubiertos detrás de mi cavallo, y aunque por él mi persona pasaron harto numero de balas, Dios nuestro señor permitió quedase vivo para pasar el tormento de dar quenta a Vuestra majestad de tan gran factalidad (Bautista 177).

This passage stands out for various reasons. On the one hand, through the use of hyperbole, the governor exalted his qualities to the queen, making sure to emphasize how he was alone in the battlefield, but still courageously rushed at the enemy with bullets flying by. His men fled, but he did not. Against all odds or, as he contends, because God allowed it, he survived, intact. He is underlining the fact that he, a single man, stood against more than a thousand Protestant corsairs

to defend the city of Panama in Mary's name –which, again, is a way of speaking for Catholicism.– Not only that, but he reasserts his condition as chosen over other individuals by stating “permitió Dios que matasen a muchos que venian encubiertos detrás de mi cavallo,” referring to the men that died in his place, and later “Dios nuestro señor permitió quedase vivo para pasar el tormento de dar cuenta a Vuestra majestad de tan gran factalidad.” He is implying that he had to survive at all costs, since he had a mission to complete, which was to report the battle's outcome to the Queen. Ironically, he tells the Queen that accounting his actions to her was a torment, perhaps hinting that she would not like what she would read, trying to give the impression that he himself was afflicted by the situation. This aspect of Pérez de Guzmán's writing is an example of *captatio benevolentiae*. The governor attempted to make the Queen well-disposed towards him. However, by the time the Queen would read the letter, she would already know what had happened.

In addition to pious rhetoric, ceremonies formed a key strategy. Joseph Gusfield and Jerzy Michalowicz explain that rituals in situations of uncertainty produce intense emotions in the individuals, ultimately creating a sense of collective membership (428). In the context of the besieged Old Panama, and after having listened to the governor's speeches, “ni faltaron diligencias humanas ni militares como constara de los Autos, que paran en poder de mi secretario, y en todo el reyno es publico y notorio, ni menos se omitieron las espirituales con generales procesiones, limosnas, penitencias, plegarias y oraciones” (Bautista 177). The governor tried to prepare his men spiritually for the battle with prayers and processions. These rites would also give all its participants a sense of belonging, all marching for the same cause in rituals that resembled their counterparts in Spain. In this sense, a metonymic link emerges

between the Old and the New World. They did not only transfer their practices symbolically, but they strategically positioned the rhetorical use of their creed for military purposes.

The rhetorical tools we have seen so far appeal to pathos, since the governor's goal was to achieve a reaction from both his men and the Queen. During a state of unrest, Pérez de Guzmán elicited in his men the reverence they felt for the Immaculate Conception to convince them to follow his orders and fight Morgan and his soldiers. Similarly, he was trying to lessen poor outcomes due to his management by making the Queen believe that his actions were heroic in the face of chaos. While his men abandoned him, he stood his ground, designed a series of military operations and tactics, and risked his life defending the territory.

The Burning of Old Panama: Final Remarks

As we have seen, the governor's words touched the soldiers, and they all swore they would fight and die defending the Virgin Mary and her purity. However, even after their oath, once the battle started, they ended up defecting once again. The governor recalled that after the ceremonies he, along with Joan Portuondo Borgueño and Alfonso de Alcaudete –who was shot twice– implored their men to face the enemy and not run away, but “no fue posible, porque largando las armas volavan” (177). Seeing he lost control of the situation yet again, the governor ordered his forces to burn the gunpowder warehouses, while he also retreated to a nearby town. “Y hallandome en el estado presente di horden para que se pegase fuego a las casas de la polvora como se executo, y yo me retire a Penonome, pueblo de naturales” (177). Although history has commonly attributed the fire to Morgan, the fact is that the governor himself ordered to burn the warehouses that stored gunpowder, with the fire rapidly spreading across the city (165). Still, Pérez de Guzmán declared that even from adistance, in Penonome, he attempted to organize

another operation to reclaim the land and citadel, but concluded that it was impossible due to the fear that gripped the Spanish,

Y siendo mi yntension ver si podia reducir numero de gente (...) para volver a probar mano con el enemigo, lo tengo por diligencia ynposible porque ha entrado de tal calidad el miedo en los corazones de los hombres, que largando las armas aseguran sus vidas, (con pretexto de que van a guardar a sus mujeres la tierra adentro) en lo mas yntrincado de los montes (177-78).

Certainly, although the people in Old Panama were able to connect with the governor's speeches, their fear of Morgan and his crew was so great that not even their veneration of the Virgin Mary or their desire to defend Catholicism was enough to motivate them to fight. They found other excuses, like protecting their women, instead of admitting that they were not willing to fight, all of which constitutes the breaking of their oath. In the end, Morgan and his men abandoned Panama after four weeks, before the Spanish could retaliate (168). The Count of Lemos and Viceroy of Peru dismissed Pérez de Guzmán and imprisoned him in Lima for his poor management, just like four years earlier (Alcedo 42). Our actor likely knew that he would be charged for his actions, and attempted to justify his decisions before the Queen, which explains his use of hyperbole and his providentialist approach to convince her that he played a key role in rescuing Panama. However, neither of his plans succeeded.

In this chapter I have shown that, in sixteenth century Panama, the Spanish administrator, Juan Pérez de Guzmán, also tried to employ a Hispanicized Catholic rhetoric as a tool for persuasion to convince his men to fight, just as Spanish administrators had done with Francis Drake in Quito, Guayaquil, and Nombre de Dios a century before. He used visible icons and ceremonies, for instance, appealing to the devotion of the Immaculate Conception as a synecdoche for all Catholics, and organized prayers and processions to prepare his soldiers before the battle with a sense of camaraderie. Although the Spanish soldiers seemed overcome

with emotions and thrill subsequent to hearing the words of their governor, and even swore to die defending the purity of the Virgin Mary, in truth the strategy was not successful, since men still fled and deserted the frontlines. Regardless of the outcome, this episode does reveal that functionaries and Spanish individuals in Panama considered rhetorical appeals to Catholicism a strategic tool worth using in desperate times. While the document from Panama makes no explicit mentions of the effect of Juan Pérez de Guzmán's speeches on the Afrodescendant and Indigenous Peoples, his rhetoric reveals an openness to incorporating these groups as combatants against pirates. The next chapter, will uncover how Alonso Criado de Castilla, the governor of Guatemala at the turn of the sixteenth century, did see the need to convert the Toquegua people to Catholicism. The chapter also delves into a shared imaginary among Spaniards and the Amatique Natives of tactical piety.

Chapter Three: Santo Tomás de Castilla and the Toquegua

Piratarum hæreticorum infestationes adeu creueriut, ut immanis illorum furor, non sine maximo Catholicæ fidei detriimento, vastissimas illas regiones cædibus, ruinis excidiis, direptionibus necnon Portuum, et locorum status et bona summum in discrimen adducutur (AGI, MP, BULAS Y BREVES, 314).¹¹

In 1693, Pope Innocent XII issued a brief lending a subsidy of a million ducats to the king of Spain, Charles II, allowing the king to use it to suppress piracy in the West Indies. As the Pope claimed, heretical piracy had increased so much in the West Indies that Spanish territories and the Catholic faith were in danger. Since piracy threatened the evangelizing mission of Spain and the Catholic Church (Bustamante and Jordán 56), the Vatican decided to intervene economically to facilitate better defenses and preparation against pirates. Given the actions of Francis Drake in Catholic waters, it is no surprise that Innocent XII came to Spain's aid. However, it is worth asking how the fight against piracy in Spanish ports in the Americas had fared since the days of Drake. What policy changes had occurred toward piracy? Did the former religious rhetoric from the sixteenth century remain? What changes did that rhetoric experience? This chapter focuses on these questions.

A century earlier, in 1585, Philip II sent a similar resolution to the Captaincy General of Guatemala, in the Viceroyalty of New Spain, allowing officials to use the money from the *Real Hacienda* to build fortifications against piracy (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 2r).¹² In addition to providing funds, the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition established itself in New Spain and the Viceroyalty of Peru in the second half of the sixteenth century (Ita 10). The Inquisition punished corsairs and any sympathizers, even if they were Spanish. Notwithstanding

¹¹ “The infestation of heretic pirates increased so much that their immense fury, not without detriment of the Catholic faith, laid waste to those regions with slaughter, ruin and destruction, and the ports and condition of their positions and assets brought to great danger.”

¹² The Real Hacienda was the institution that managed all fiscal activities in the Spanish Indies.

the monetary aid and the Inquisition's persecution, piratical incursions persisted. Poor management, as well as poorly developed defensive strategies and infrastructure, led to the loss of goods, riches, and territories (Reichert 121). In an attempt to change their fate—and seeing the impossibility of defending their wealth from pirates in Puerto de Caballos—Alonso Criado de Castilla, governor and president of the Real Audiencia de Guatemala (1598-1611), wrote a letter to Philip III proposing the relocation of the port from Puerto de Caballos to Santo Tomás de Castilla, which they had established in Amatique Bay.



Figure 8. A late colonial map of the Kingdom of Guatemala, circa 1783. Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE). https://www.bne.es/es/Micrositios/Guias/12Octubre/MapasAmerica/GaleriaMapas/DetalleImage_n20.html

The Captaincy General of Guatemala was a target for most pirates from its beginnings in 1524 (see fig. 8). For decades afterwards, the Spanish Crown focused on other territories, sending neither support nor money to the Kingdom of Guatemala (Reichert 119; M.A. Rojas 53). The Spanish paid more attention to defending their fleets or major ports, leaving the rest of the

region unattended and unprotected (Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering* 162). To make matters worse, Spanish colonizers chose to settle in unsanitary port cities where unhygienic conditions prevented large populations from living there (Musset 24). Consequently, the lack of fortifications and people, as well as the exposed locations, made the cities and ports in the territory of Guatemala an easy target for sea rivals. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the Spanish monarchy started to take action. In 1542, Charles V ordered the fortification of port cities in the Caribbean with funding from the Real Hacienda (Reichert 120). Similarly, his successor, Philip II, created a subsidy in 1570 with the same purpose (120). Fifteen years later, the king once again allowed administrators in the Kingdom of Guatemala to use money from the Real Hacienda for fortifications, ammunition, and supplies (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 2r). However, these attempts were not enough to suppress piracy, which continued to be an issue in the late seventeenth century (M.A. Rojas 58-59). During the Anglo-Spanish war (1585-1604), some English privateers –such as Richard Hawkins– opposed negotiating peace in order to open the Americas to English trade (Andrews, “Caribbean Rivalry” 8), and refused to stop their privateering activities. One of the places that suffered many of these attacks was Puerto de Caballos, a smaller, unprotected port (*Elizabethan Privateering* 172). In this chapter, I examine the rhetoric of a letter that the governor of Guatemala wrote to Philip III in 1605. In his correspondence, he addresses the measures he took to prevent piratical activity in Puerto de Caballos, following the battle of 1603. In the same letter, he justifies the discovery and establishment of Santo Tomás de Castilla, in Amatique Bay, and the conversion of the Toquegua as necessary steps to develop a defense against pirates.

The chapter is divided into three different sections. Firstly, I deal with the main strategies the governor took before moving to the new port and the reasons for its relocation. Criado de

Castilla's justifications give insight into plans for defense in the port. Similar to the two previous chapters, Criado de Castilla chose to rely on repairing and upgrading their fortifications as their main tactic. This time, however, unlike the case of Quito and Panama, Alonso Criado de Castilla saw the danger in trusting natural resources and location to protect the port from piracy, expressing how vulnerable they were and thus advocating for its relocation, a strategy which, as we will see, was not unusual among Spanish functionaries. I next turn to the evangelization and conversion process of the Toquegua as a crucial first step to establish the port of Santo Tomás de Castilla. I will argue that Criado de Castilla attempted to create a network of Catholic Toquegua in order to exert soft power over the Native group, and to have an army ready to fight should the need arise. Lastly, by looking closely at the context, I revisit the initial religious rhetoric associated with the attacks of Francis Drake in Peru and Henry Morgan in Panama. I maintain that anti-piratical, religious rhetoric remains, yet with an emphasis on defense, rather than offensive tactics as earlier.

From Puerto de Caballos to Amatique




Figure 9. Map of Puerto de Caballos. Don Luis Díez Navarro, 1744. Ministerio de Cultura, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), MP-GUATEMALA,33BIS.

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On the seventeenth of February 1603, a joint force of English pirates under Christopher Newport, who fought with French privateers under the command of Michael Geare and Anthony Hippon together attacked Puerto de Caballos (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 1r; Andrews, “Caribbean Rivalry” 2).¹³ The fight lasted over eight hours, and ended in English and French victory, who together occupied the port for eighteen days (“English Voyages” 252). In his letter from 1606, Criado de Castilla explains the measures he took to repair and secure the port, fearing that the success of Newport, Geare, and Hippon would inspire other corsairs to attack as well (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 1r). The governor’s instructions bear striking resemblance to those of the Audiencia de Quito and Juan Pérez de Guzmán in the two previous chapters, reflecting a similar *modus operandi* among Spanish administrators in different provinces and viceroalties.

¹³ Golfo Dulce refers to the current Lake Izabal, in Guatemala, not to the Golfo Dulce in Costa Rica.

Alonso Criado de Castilla ordered the rebuilding of the fort in Golfo Dulce, adding a bastion and sending thirty-two musketeers under the command of Pedro de Bustamante (ff. 1r-1v). Additionally, he gave instructions to build a trench and repair the artillery and weapons in Puerto de Caballos to ensure protection of the ships (f. 1v). In addition, Criado de Castilla laid out the disadvantages and vulnerabilities of Puerto de Caballos that concerned him. He was aware that its geography was not ideal, as an open bay with an exposed beach (f. 2v; see fig. 9), and he pointed out that, because the port was not a “sitio fixo donde se pueda hazer Fortaleza sino de arena que encabando un poco se conbierte en agua” (f. 2v), its defenses would not last long against a direct attack. Criado de Castilla was not the only Spanish administrator to warn the Crown. Jorge de Alvarado, governor of Honduras, sent a letter to the Crown from Trujillo in March 1603, warning the king of the financial and trading loss he would face if he did not provide some defensive measures, the attacks being an annual occurrence (AGI, Guatemala, 39, R.13, N.81, f. 2v). However, the Escorial did not respond (Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering* 182; Reichert 125). Another issue Puerto de Caballos faced was that the governor carried out his duties in Comayagua, forty leagues away (about 216 km). This distance, as Criado de Castilla warned, made it impossible to send aid since, by the time it arrived, the corsairs and plunder were long gone. Finally, the governor emphasized that the residents of Puerto de Caballos experienced poor living conditions, and inhabitants died on a regular basis (f. 2v). For those reasons, Criado de Castilla concluded that the best solution to put an end to piracy in Puerto de Caballos was finding a new or better port to replace it. Relocating ports and cities was a common solution among governors in colonial times (Musset 23; Andrews *Elizabethan Privateering* 174). As the administrators in the Viceroyalty of Peru chose to move Nombre de Dios to Portobello and later to Old Panama, Criado de Castilla followed suit. He initially sent an expedition to

Puerto de Sal and Triunfo de Cruz, but neither of these ports' conditions were ideal, as they had limited capacity that did not support bigger ships (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 3r). He then learned of a cove in Amatique bay. The place met all the requirements: it was located in between Golfo Dulce and Puerto de Caballos at only sixteen or seventeen leagues away (about 89 km) and could accommodate larger vessels. After much deliberation, Criado de Castilla, “encomendandolo a dios nuestro Señor” (f. 3v), finally made the decision to establish the new port in Amatique regardless of the difficulties they could encounter during the process, claiming that Amatique was their only hope. Even in that comment, there is a slight providentialist rhetoric: the governor entrusted God with the relocation. Many opposed Criado de Castilla's decision but, on March 7, 1604, debates ceased, and Criado de Castilla received approval to build the port, naming it Santo Tomás de Castilla.

Evangelizing the Toquegua

The new port had, at first glance, optimal conditions. The governor designed the space to accommodate artillery and fortifications. Its entrance required experienced pilots because the canal was narrow and harder for corsairs to enter (f. 5v). The surrounding rocks also served as a natural fortification (f. 6r). Criado de Castilla was convinced that “no se podra entrar por ninguna parte y de alli se defenderian con mucha facilidad las naos llegadas” (f. 6r). However, they faced an issue: another group of people already inhabited the land.

Estar la costa de la dicha ensenada poblada de indios yn fieles, silvestres de guerra que pareçia la guardaban a manera de encantamento fabuloso siendo todo cossa yntacta ni tratada de cristianos, de do se causaba horror a la gente de tierra y a las naves de proballa, y que avia de ser forçoso que primero se conquistasen aunque esto tube yo por mejor para la comodidad y mas qualidad que con ellos podia tener el puerto haziendolos de Vuestra magestad basallos (f. 3v).

The passage above was the main reason why the people from Puerto de Caballos objected to moving to Amatique bay. What frightened Spaniards more than encountering another group other than themselves living in Santo Tomás de Castilla was the fact that they were a group of “indios yn fieles.” Unlike the Audiencia de Quito, who engaged with the already converted Chonos, Criado de Castilla and the Castilians in Puerto de Caballos now had to confront a Native group that had not had any previous contact with Catholicism, the land being “cossa yntacta ni tratada de cristianos.” Interestingly, on the first mention of the group, the governor did not specify who they were, but still described them as “silvestres de guerra,” assuming they had a combative nature and using hyperbole to stress the fabulous enchantment of their religious outlook. The Castilians from Puerto de Caballos took these factors into consideration as they assessed the potential threats of the Toquegua. They deemed that, before even relocating, they should forcefully conquer them. Criado de Castilla saw this as an opportunity to create a network of newly converted individuals that could work for the Spanish Empire “haziendolos de Vuestra magestad basallos,” using them as assets for the port itself “para la comodidad y mas qualidad que con ellos podia tener el puerto.” The governor based his strategy on intimidation and persuasion disguised under the ostensible goal of their conversion and incorporation into Spain’s Christian kingdoms. Convincing Indigenous groups to convert through these means was a common practice known as *pacificación*. The end goal was not destroying the other, but rather achieving their obedience and incorporation into the Spanish imperial world without resistance (Pradenas 6). Indeed, once Criado de Castilla moved to Amatique, he stated that “era nezesaria la paçificacion y poblacion de los yndios yn fieles llamados toqueguas” (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 6v), since “eran grande estorbo e yn pedimento los dichos indios yn fieles” (f. 6v), as they had to go through their land. The governor sent his musketeers to the Indigenous group, to intimidate

them. At the same time, he wrote peace letters for interpreters to read (f. 6v). The governor also gave the caciques gifts including short swords or silk clothes and offered them “toda seguridad y contentamiento en lo que [le] quisieran pedir haziendose cristianos” (f. 7r). The Spanish administrators aimed to link in the minds of the Toquegua being Catholic with protection. Instead of getting rid of them –which was illegal due to the laws of Burgos of 1512 (Sánchez 31), and the New Laws of 1542 (Solórzano 2),– Criado de Castilla could use these individuals as a paid workforce as long as they belonged to the Spanish Empire, which could only happen through evangelization.

There is a clear administrative use of pious rhetoric when the governor explains why his first mission in Amatique was to convert the Native population: “atendiendo principalmente al servicio de dios nuestro señor y de vuestra magestad para que fuesen Reduçidos de mas de lo que podian ayudar al uso del dicho puerto trato y comercio sin otros buenos effetos, trate de conquistarlos” (f. 6v). This time, the particulars of evangelization follow a defensive rather than offensive strategy as in Guayaquil and Panama. As opposed to other instances in which administrators used a religious speech as a means to form a fighting group, this reduction comes as a bureaucratic procedure, which also justified their actions in the name of Catholicism and the Crown. Nonetheless, it still serves the same purpose of creating networks of opponents that become part of the Spanish group, this time by populating the area with Catholic allies. Criado de Castilla recounts that “fue dios servido” (f. 6v), since the Toquegua converted to Catholicism without resistance.

The Toquegua’s origins remain, to this day, unclear. Archeological evidence suggests that they were merchants of cacao and organized their group in different social ranks (Sheptak 154). Criado de Castilla describes their customs before conversion as “diferente del comun uso destas

barbaras naçiones oçidentales” (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 8v): they were monogamous, and chose their wives from an early age, raising them from their youth until they were ready to fulfill their duty as wives. It is interesting to note how the governor’s descriptions of the Toquegua changed before and after their conversion, first assuming they had a hostile nature – “sylvestres de guerra”–, then claiming that “ase conoçido en los dichos yndios buen animo e ynclinaçion para tener confiança” (f. 8v). In other words, once the Toquegua converted to Catholicism, they earned the trust of the Spanish, and their pagan traditions before their conversion did not seem so savage anymore.

When it came to the Toquegua’s education, Criado de Castilla was against teaching them in Latin or Spanish, considering it “cossa muy estraña y no entendida de los yndios” (f. 7r). Instead, he called the Dominicans from Santo Domingo, who oversaw the instruction of the indigenous groups in Cahabón and Xocolo, in Verapaz, and whose languages resembled that of the Toquegua (f. 7v). This approach was in keeping with evangelization language policies for clergy, where all missionaries had to know Native languages (Wasserman-Soler 690). The Toquegua spoke a Lencan language with words borrowed from Nahuatl, Chol, and Yucateco (Sheptak 154). Finally, Alonso Criado de Castilla also ordered that the Toquegua should not leave their town under any circumstances, declaring that otherwise “seria sino mober la planta Reçien puesta antes de arraygarse que nunca bendria aprender” (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 8v). Isolating the Indian community that had accepted Christianity was a common practice to develop a Christian mentality in just a generation (Dussel 67-68). Considering the governor wanted to make sure the Toquegua received proper instruction in a language they could understand, and the fact that he wanted them to stay in the same town until they fully completed their instruction, proves that Criado de Castilla wanted the Toquegua to learn but also understand the Catholic

doctrine and their duty as subjects of the Crown. Even so, Criado de Castilla used conversion according to imperial law to lay groundwork for his anti-piratical defense.

This group of Natives who in time would find Catholic rhetoric convincing and would be willing to defend the port from pirate attacks, became a defensive asset for colonial administrators. As in previous chapters, Criado de Castilla supported discourses that, should the need arise, would motivate the Toquegua to fight Protestant pirates. Conversion would thus facilitate control of the group (Reichert 118). If the Toquegua feared the heretical enemy, they would not engage and join the Spanish enemy, nor revolt against the Spanish. All in all, converting the Toquegua served the triple purpose of forming a workforce for the construction of the new port of Santo Tomás de Castilla, keeping them under control, and having a military reserve in case of pirate attack.

Thieving Pirates

By 1571, the Inquisition in New Spain prosecuted pirates, condemning them of Lutheran heresy. Authorities developed a direct relation between foreign piracy and heresy (Bustamante and Jordán 56), and employed the *Auto de fe* as a spectacle for all people to see (Ita 42). From early on, Spaniards elaborated an imaginary based on their European others as heretical enemies, which devised itself as a collective Catholic and anti-Protestant concern of the Spanish Crown (Bustamante and Jordán 56; Ita 51). It comes as no surprise, then, that the Spanish imbued their portrayal of their others –of pirates– with anti-Protestant descriptions. In the previous chapters the Spaniards’ depictions included “yngleses luteranos, enemigos de nuestra santa ffee catolica” (AGI, Patronato, 266, R. 7, f. 1r) and the need to defend their faith and the purity of Mary (Bautista 175). This time, however, there is a considerable change in the governor’s descriptions

of their dogmatic others. He describes them as cowardly thieves who are too afraid to engage in actual battle and whose only purpose is to steal.

La condición propia de cosarios que quando entienden esta la gente despierta y aperçivida viniendo como se ve ser su yntento a solo hurtar y no a predominar se Refrenan huyendo el Riesgo, como entonçes subçedio que aviendo corrido aquella costa con diversas naos y lanchas no se atrebieron a entrar en el dicho golfo (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 1v).

Here, Alonso Criado de Castilla refers to Golfo Dulce, where corsairs attempted to enter the land to steal rather than to besiege it. He considers all pirates as thieves that operate while residents sleep, so as to escape detection. Thus, in Criado de Castilla's view, the corsairs avoided a direct confrontation with the Spaniards. When they did attempt to enter Golfo Dulce, they saw thirty-two Spanish musketeers waiting for them and aborted the mission, "huyendo el Riesgo." Later, when describing piratical activity in the West Indies, the governor again identifies the corsairs' intentions as the simple looting of the ports rather than risk a battle.

Haziendo entonçes gran casso de que este genero de enemigos pusiesen el pie en tierra, temiendo no se quisiesen en ella apoderar, de que se a visto tan claro el desengaño, pues aviendo entrado con fuerza de navios y gente tomado Lugares e yslas principales de las yndias como fueron Cartagena sancto domingo Puerto Rico y otros no trataron de detenerse en ellos mas de quanto los Robaron, por ser solo su yntento a que vienen a las yndias no a otra cossa que a urtar (f. 15r).

The Spaniards had been afraid that pirates could be interested in seizing the Spanish port cities and reinforced their defenses in the area of Trujillo. However, they soon realized that, although pirates attacked various regions like Cartagena, Santo Domingo, or Puerto Rico, they cared only for treasure and not for occupying or controlling these ports. Even when referring to notorious corsairs like Richard Hawkins and Thomas Canvendish, Criado de Castilla still understood the only motive for their raiding was stealing the silver: "y en el piru el cosario Richarte gobernando el marques de canete don garçia de mendoça (...) y en tiempo del virrey conde del villar el cosario Thomas Candi, de los quales fue manifiesto por cossa çierta no benian sino a Robar y

buscar Plata” (ff. 15r-15v). What could have caused this change in the perception of piracy, and why did the governor of Guatemala not consider them a religious threat, like the Spaniards in the Audiencia de Quito and Old Panama did in 1575 and 1671? The answer lies in the specific geographic area and piratical operations changing over time from offensive to defensive measures.



Figure 10. A view of Trujillo, a city belonging to the Spaniards in the Bay of Honduras. Library of Congress (LIB), LC-DIG-pga-10304. <https://lccn.loc.gov/2003666724>

During Francis Drake’s era, there was still a palpable religious resentment. For instance, when Christopher Newport first raided Puerto de Caballos in 1592, he removed the church bells and destroyed its images (Andrews, *Elizabethan Privateering* 172). However, starting in 1603 and 1604, privateers switched their interest to illicit trading. They frequented the same ports in the West Indies to exchange merchandise and information (4). The fact that pirates now seemed more interested in foreign contraband explains why Spaniards like Alonso Criado de Castilla would perceive them as thieves as opposed to ideological enemies. Moreover, pirates did not

occupy the ports and cities in the Caribbean as they once had. The Crown sacrificed smaller, less critical ports, like Puerto de Caballos, Trujillo or Golfo Dulce, to fortify more lucrative areas of the empire like Peru (see fig. 10). At seeing diminished defenses, pirates benefited from raiding these lesser ports (Reichert 122). Criado de Castilla observed this piratical preference for plunder over their previous commitments to letters of marque: “siendo assi y que quando viniesen a Truxillo no Era de consideracion pues alli ay tan poco que Robar, que se puede decir que la pobreza de la Tierra es la mayor deffenssa que pueden tener los vezinos della” (AGI, Guatemala, 129, f. 15v). With this observation, Criado de Castilla makes the pirates’ loss of interest in Trujillo understandable in simple, economic terms –the residents of Trujillo were too poor to have anything worth stealing. These claims further prove that the governor saw pirates as an economic threat –they would cause more damage to the economy by stealing their riches– than an ideological one. In this context where pirates focused on treasures and unofficial trade, the people of Puerto de Caballos would do better to turn to their Hispanic-Catholic identity not to fight them off in a militant sense, but to strengthen a sense of community on the shifting sands where they built and quite often, rebuilt.

Conclusions

The letter Alonso Criado de Castilla sent to Philip III presents a fresh perspective on piracy in the context of the Caribbean. Spanish responses to piracy changed over time, shifting their tactical piety from an offensive to a defensive purpose. In the previous two chapters, both in 1575 and 1671, the administrators in Quito and Old Panama saw a religious motive for the continuous raidings. However, this was not the case in Guatemala. Rather than considering pirates enemies of the Catholic faith, Alonso Criado de Castilla saw them as robbers. His religious rhetoric aimed more at long-term protection of the area than inspiring immediate action

against a heretical enemy. While Crown paid more attention to other places like the Viceroyalty of Peru, it left the Kingdom of Guatemala, and particularly smaller ports like Puerto de Caballos, unattended and defenseless. Pirates took advantage of this vulnerability to raid the ports and loot the ships and galleons. Nonetheless, they were not interested in claiming those territories.

On the other hand, although the governor of Guatemala did not consider pirates a direct threat to their identity and religion, he still took similar measures as his fellow governors in Quito and Panama to prevent their attacks. In fact, the emergence of an identity based on a Hispanic understanding of Catholicism can be distinguished in the conversion of the Toquegua as an essential step to build the new port of Santo Tomás de Castilla in Amatique Bay. In Bruno Latour's terminology, actors –Criado de Castilla– and actants –the Toquegua– construct associations to produce alliances through attachments (Papilloud 186). In other words, to achieve their bond, Catholicism linked both entities. Additionally, Latour explains how alliances and associations do not always work (*Reassembling the Social* 187). To stabilize and secure these alliances, actors and actants must accumulate associations (*Reassembling the Social* 188). Similarly, Criado de Castilla understood that, in order to secure faithful Catholic Toqueguas, they had to stay in the same place, in contact with the same social adhesive of Catholicism until a stable alliance coalesced between the Spaniards and the Toquegua. Latour affirms that humans –actors, actants; Spaniards, Toquegua– forge their identities by forming solid bonds with non-humans (Whiteside 187). For Latour, those non-humans, which he also refers to as objects, can take any form, from an image to a rhetorical device. Within the context of this study, and particularly in Amatique, the object that influenced and shaped the Spanish and the Toquegua's identity was Catholicism.

Although Alonso Criado de Castilla did not use Catholic rhetoric to refer to his others, the opponents; that is, English and French corsairs, he did use a pious discourse to describe the Toquegua. He gave a detailed account for the conversion of the Native group, as a prerequisite to the port's relocation. The governor knew that he –and his group– would need a direct relationship with the land's inhabitants. However, in the Colonial Spanish Catholic understanding of the world, to establish a relationship, they would need to ensure that the Toquegua were part of their Empire. To prove their belonging, the Indigenous group had to be Catholic. That is, Catholicism acted as the entanglement or membership that allowed converts to assimilate into the invading group. At the same time, this process is an indicator of identity construction, since people –actors and actants– engaged with each other and shaped each other's identities through objects, in this case, a Hispanic Catholicism that tied both groups against the anti-group of pirates. Since this identity remained unthreatened because the enemy did not pose a direct threat in Guatemala, it did not require Catholic rhetoric to support an offensive operation. However, the Spanish did resort to a defensive use of pious rhetoric to approach pirates, as evident in the Toquegua's conversion process and purpose. In the face of a direct risk to their religious and political identity the Spanish would resort to a Catholic rhetoric that would enfold all followers, Old Christians and neophytes, into its defense.

A Century of Piracy: Final Considerations

This thesis covers over one hundred years of piracy in three crucial ports. I have shown that over that time in all three documents religious rhetoric served a tactical purpose to fight those who Spanish administrators deemed heretical corsairs. While beginning in short oblique references and epistolary formulae, over time, this rhetoric grew in its length and the ideological territory it covered. Over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, piratical attacks shaped the rhetoric of Spanish functionaries. By tracing networks between Spanish actors and their opponents, this study has shed light on an imaginary of religion and identity among Spanish administrators in Quito, Panama, and Guatemala based on a Hispanicized iteration of Catholicism. All three functionaries who produced the documents of this study –the scribe Francisco de Zúñiga, and governors Juan Pérez de Guzmán and Alonso Criado de Castilla– employ a similar religious rhetoric, where Hispanic Catholicism serves as a strategic defense and as a framework for a shared identity to confront political threats. Together, the three locations examined provide multiple presentations of tactical piety aimed at military action, proselytization, and defense. While they relate different events, a common mode of persuasion, an ideological lexicon, joins these texts. These articulations reveal a shared ideological program for the protection of Spanish ports and commodities as a sacred obligation.

Actor Network Theory has provided an approach to the complex dynamics between Spanish ports. Colonizer rhetoric, although ostensibly arbitrary, did not come about by accident. Word choices and phrases expose how the functionaries understood piratical attacks, and how they responded. Piratical representations and religious rhetoric draw boundaries within which the Spanish defined their collective identity. The Hispanized community forming in the cities of Quito, Panama, and Guatemala converged in a shared imagined space of catholicity. Piety

became a militaristic strategy to deal with their opponents –corsairs and, later on, unconverted Indigenous Peoples. These actors moved in a context where religious aims were a fundamental part of Spanish expansion (Díaz 33; Dussel 44; Martínez 95-96), which in turn lent further support to Hispanicized Catholicism. Adrian Hastings has proposed that a collective trajectory at a defining moment in public history affects identity and nation formation, rather than genetic descent –such a group orientation can include Catholicism as an element of social cohesion (188). As I have shown, piratical attacks provided a basis for the Spanish to promote imperatives and duty around Catholicism. I have also shown examples of differences in Spanish perspectives toward Natives in Guayaquil and later the region in Amatique. According to Spanish colonizers, Indigenous People could enter the Spanish Catholic imaginary, as opposed to the corsair antagonists, who exacerbated differences between Protestantism and Catholicism. This rhetorical turn intensified the expectation that Natives would enter the fold and defend Spanish Catholic ports.

In Chapter One, I explained how the Audiencia de Quito used piety as a tactical tool to persuade the Chonos population to fight for their Catholic faith. This strategy had a double purpose. The Spanish needed men to fight and defend Guayaquil and Quito. At the same time, Spanish administrators worried that the Indigenous population could betray the Empire and join the English corsairs. Through persuasion, the Spanish gained combatants while also ensuring that they would not run away with the enemy. The analysis of the document “Proceedings against Drake” reveals Spanish fears, concerns, and their vulnerabilities in the face of pirate attacks. More importantly, the text shows a shared, explicit Catholic imaginary where the Spanish used the mechanism of conversion to turn contraries into allies. Meanwhile, they present the English corsairs as foreign, heretical, and thieves. The harrowing account of Benito Díaz to the Audiencia

of his near hanging and that of his crew provided further evidence of English greed and ruthlessness. Representing English corsairs as a violent, thieving element on the American continent created a greater distance between the Spanish and their others.

Chapter Two focused on the letter that Juan Pérez de Guzmán wrote to Mariana of Austria Queen Regent of Spain in 1671. Similarly to the Audiencia de Quito, Pérez de Guzmán employed a Hispanized Catholic rhetoric to persuade his soldiers to fight and defend the city of Old Panama. Not only did he use a religious rhetoric, but he specifically addressed all “true” Catholic and Spanish men, devotees of the Virgin Mary, admonishing them to defend their faith and Mary’s purity even to death. Pérez de Guzmán’s letter highlights how nearly one hundred years after Francis Drake’s attack on Nombre de Dios, religiosity remained a consistent imaginary for Spaniards. As the most explicit of the documents in terms of its Catholic rhetoric, this letter reveals a coalescing identity among the colonial inhabitants of Panama. Ultimately, Juan Pérez de Guzmán created a network of Catholic soldiers by using the Immaculate Conception as an object to persuade his men. Appealing to her image influenced the soldiers’ reactions to the point of swearing they would die for her. While the governor’s rhetoric seemed to impress and inspire his target audience, this strategy ultimately failed when facing their enemies, whose men and weaponry outnumbered them. Regardless of their defeat, the use of this Hispanized Catholic rhetoric in military operations reveals that piety continued to undergird the identity of colonial residents. Their use of Catholic ceremonies and prayers before the battle provide further examples of a practical use of their faith, preparing soldiers spiritually in the face of war.

Chapter Three examined the letter by Alonso Criado de Castilla, president of the Audiencia de Guatemala, in 1605. In this document, Criado de Castilla emphasizes the need to

convert the Toquegua from Amatique Bay before building Santo Tomás de Castilla, replacing the previous hub of Puerto de Caballos. Due to ongoing corsair attacks, the Spanish were in the process of moving their regional center to Amatique. Criado de Castilla, as well as his fellow Spaniards, considered that the most important mission and a precondition to moving there should be to evangelize the Natives. Like the Audiencia of Quito, he recognized the value of staking an ideological claim in a territory as a necessary preliminary to its defense in a combat scenario. In addition to the practical concerns of his pious rhetoric, Criado de Castilla provided a description of this group and their customs, stressing that they in fact resembled the Spanish more than other groups they had encountered.

On the other hand, in keeping with the rest of the documents under examination here, Criado de Castilla gave consistent representations of pirates. However, instead of condemning pirates for heresy, the governor described them as simple cowardly thieves, who avoided direct attacks and instead focused on pillaging ports while the residents slept. His striking descriptions, however, do not contradict the claim that Spanish identity formed around a Catholic imaginary of their space. Although Criado de Castilla limits his use of pious rhetoric to the Toquegua and their evangelization process, I have shown that conversion served a tactical purpose in this case as well. Similar to the Audiencia de Quito, the president of the Audiencia de Guatemala used a Catholic discourse to convert and persuade the Native group. Criado de Castilla aimed to bring them into the Empire as Catholic vassals in a network of committed individuals ready to fight. I have also argued that, because piracy in the Kingdom of Guatemala was more focused on plundering than seizing land, it posed little ideological threat to Spanish colonizers, and therefore did not call for an offensive military use of Catholic rhetoric. In a project of preparation, Criado de Castilla proposed a defensive posture against European enemies. Piracy would continue to

pose a religious threat in the years to come. Pope Innocent XII's brief shows that in his view piracy loomed ominously toward the Catholic faith, in addition to fueling geopolitical and economic issues at the end of the seventeenth century.

Future research can cover other territories the Spanish claimed via anti-piratical, religious rhetoric and identity during the eighteenth century, another period rife with piratical activity. At that time, some of the most famous pirate attacks occurred in Cartagena de Indias, where Blas de Lezo led its defense against Edward Vernon in 1741 (Serrano 362). Other attacks include the siege of Havana by George Pocock and Augustus Keppel in 1762 (Schneider 6), and attacks to Spanish fleets in the Caribbean (Victoria 132). New studies can examine if the Spanish responses to piracy during this period maintained an offensive or defensive use of religious rhetoric, or else forged approaches suited to the later Bourbon era of Spanish colonialism.

Throughout the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, Spanish administrators used Catholic rhetoric in various ways. Compared to earlier responses to piracy of relocation as an evasive tactic, the approach of converting Indigenous groups shows a change in Spanish strategy over time. While imperial hands at first penned pious rhetoric was used as an offensive strategy, they later broadened possibilities to include defensive tactics as well. Spanish functionaries became aware that more was at stake than control of land and resources, which is why, in cases such as the Audiencia de Quito or governor Juan Pérez de Guzmán's testimony in Panama, the Spanish would rather destroy their own lands and riches before marauding, heretical enemies could take a hold of them. Through the prolonged conflict, the Spanish influenced the religious imaginary of the continent as a means to preserve their hegemony.

This study has also made evident differences in treatment under Spanish law based on geographical and religious origin. The Spanish in the Americas, isolated as they were, tended to

see a blank slate in the conversion of Amerindians in comparison to conversions in the Iberian Peninsula, where *pureza de sangre* dictated social outcomes. In the metropole, Protestants, Jews, and Muslims had their respective identities and cultures engraved into them because it was not possible to separate the religious from the cultural domain (Martínez 38). Discerning between genuine and false conversions was a complex process because there was no clear distinction between cultural and religious identities (39). Additionally, for many Spaniards, there was no such thing as a genuine conversion of a Jew or Muslim. Old Christians in the peninsula thus were wary of Jewish converts and *moriscos*, as well as their habits and practices. On the other hand, Native converts presented a possibility of loyalty to creed and crown, without the taint of the entrenched system of *pureza de sangre*.

In the three documents examined, Natives in the Americas show a tendency to present themselves as neophytes and ready fighters insofar as their minds were not “infected” with beliefs that were a threat to the Crown, like Judaism or Islam (96). Spain considered Natives as converts and conscripts, representing a cheaper option than asking the Crown to send soldiers from Spain or other regions in the American continent. Moreover, beginning in 1552, Spanish functionaries that petitioned for an assignment in the Americas had to prove their purity or *limpieza de sangre* as Old Christians in order to qualify for the position there (Jacobs 14-15). Through this filtering, the Crown attempted to create a system that would ensure that Catholicism held a near-exclusive influence over the minds of Natives. It is in this scenario that pirates presented a heretical risk. Thus, in the face of piratical threat, Spanish colonial administrators simultaneously sought the sincere conversion of Natives as well as their civic and religious loyalty to Spanish military causes.

The legacy of anti-piratical religious rhetoric is a specific manifestation of othering, enabling the Spanish to define who they were and who they were not, by distancing themselves from pirates. At the same time, it is an indicator of worlding on the part of the Spanish. While Spaniards were defining their identity, they also created a network of individuals who did not necessarily need to be Castilian to be part of their system. Spaniards organized a system of communities based on Catholicism and piety that encompassed Indigenous individuals as well as Castilians but left out their Protestant and European others. This selective inclusivity under early modern Spanish law would influence historical outcomes that exceed the scope of the present study. At the same time, this study has demonstrated the tactical importance of discourses of Catholic piety for expanding military, religious, and territorial influence.

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Appendix 1: Audiencia de Quito: disposiciones contra el corsario Drake. AGI, Patronato 266, R. 7.

Relaçion de la entrada de los cosarios yngleses luteranos, enemigos de nuestra santa ffee catolica, en la mar del sur, y de los daños que an ffecho en la costa del piru, y de los proveymientos ffechos por los señores presidentes, oydores desta rreal audiencia de san Francisco del quito para la guardia y defensa de las çiudades y puertos de su distrito. [...]Veçinos.

En seys dias del mes de março del ano de setenta y nueve, dos oras despues de anochecido, vinieron a la dicha rreal audiencia tres cartas mesibas: la una de hernando de cunyga, corregidor de la provinçia guayaquile, que distan desta çiudad çinquenta leguas. su fecha la primera carta de hernando de cunyga y la de payta a ultimo de febrero del dicho año, y la otra del cabildo y justiçia de la çiudad de Payta, su fecha a veynte e uno del dicho mes de febrero y la otra del pueblo de chimbo, fymada de santiago de abirid sin fecha, por las quales se da aviso a la dicha rreal audiencia en que en veynte e uno del dicho mes avian arribado al dicho puerto de payta un navio que pareçia de franceses luteranos y una lancha que traya avia entrado en el puerto de la dicha çiudad y tomado un barco cargado de umo que estava en el dicho puerto. como esto y otras cosas a ello tocantes mas largo se contiene en las dichas cartas cuyo traslado a la letra va con esta relaçion.

Visto pir los dichos señores doctor Pedro de Hinigosa y licenciados Diego Ortegon, Francisco de Aunçibay oydores y licenciado Gaspar de Peralta, fiscal de su magestad en ausençia y por enfermedad de su señoria del señor licenciado don Diego de Narvaez, presidente desta audiencia, que esta muy enfermo, se juntaron en acuerdo en siete dias del dicho mes [f. 1v] de março del dicho año a conferir y ttratar el dicho negoçio y lo que en el se devia proveher y salio del acuerdo proveydo lo siguiente:

Primeramente, hordenaron y mandaron poner chasques, que son las postas desta tierra, desde esta çiudad hasta la de guayaquile, que esta çinquenta leguas desta çiudad, para dar y tener aviso de lo que sucediese con la presteza y diligençia posible y luego yncontinente se encargo desto personas altas para ello.

Mandaron escribir, y escrivio al dicho corregidor de guayaquil, una carta por audiencia en que le mandaron que luego con toda la diligençia posible pusiese en mucho recaudo y custodia la caxa rreal y de bienes de difuntos de la dicha çiudad.

Yten porque se tenya entendido que los dichos cosarios yngleses trayan [...] de apoderarse de una galera que por horden del señor visorrey destos reynos estava ffecha en el puerto de guayaquil, y no armada la encubriesen y metiesen por algun rrio o la enpatanase y en efeto hiziese de manera que de nynguna manera vinyese a mando de los dichos enemygos.

Yten sacase de la çiudad y pusiese en parte segura las mugeres y nyños y gente ynutil con todas las joyas oro y plata y ropa de los veçinos.

Yten con toda diligençia y presteza hiziese alguna fortificaçion para la defensa del puerto la que para la necesidad presente con mas façilidad se pudiese hazer.

Yten enbiase luego aviso que gente, armas y caballos, munyçiones y bastimentos tenya la dicha çiudad y avisase de las cosas de que tubiese necesidad de socorro porque luego se le proveyesen.

Yten escrivieron a la real audiencia que residen en la çiudad de panama del reyno [f. 2r] de tierra firme con traslado de las dichas cartas mandaron al dicho corregidor despachase luego persona de rrecaudo con un barco a la dicha çiudad e puerto de panama para dar el dicho aviso y fuese con mucho cuydado y rrecaudo de suerte que no vinyese a manos de los enemygos, y si

acaso subcediese hechasen los despachos con una pesga a la mar antes que fuesen tumados, y que en este barco no consintiese llevar oro, ny plata, mercadurias ny otra cosa mas que bastimentos, y enbiase en el testimonyo a los dichos señores de lo que ubiese subcedido del ya es del primer aviso hasta la partida del dicho barco.

Y este mysmo despacho se enbio duplicado a la dicha real audiencia de panama por chasques e por el puerto de la buenaventura, que esta en la governacion de popayan, dirigido a las justicias y ofiçiales reales para que con la mysama diligencia se despachase otro barco con el mysmo aviso porque en uno o el otro llegase.

Ytense escrivio al dicho corregidor y al dicho puerto de la buenaventura no dexasen salir navio de los dichos puertos hasta que otra cosa se proveyese.

Ansimismo se despacho provision general para que las cartas que fuesen firmadas de francisco de Cunyga y Gaspar Suarez, secretarios desta rreal audiencia y selladas con el sello rreal del acuerdo, fuesen obedecidas, guardadas y cumplidas como provision rreal porque asi convenya al breve despacho deste negoçio.

Yten se despacho provision por la qual se mando entregar a los vezinos encomenderos de yndios de la dicha çuadad [f. 2v] de Guayaquil un tributo de sus encomyendas que les estaban enbargado por la visita de los naturales para que se pudiesen ayudar y socorrer. De ay se mando al dicho corregidor les compeliase a que del dicho dinero se proveyesen luego de armas ofensibas y defensibas las que no las tubiesen con que se obligasen los unos vezinos pir los otros de estar a derecho y pagar lo juzgado y sentenciado en la dicha visita, y en esta carta se enbio a regradecer al dicho corregidor el cuydado que avia tenydo conforme a sus cartas y encargandole la defensa de la dicha çuadad y puerto por ser negoçio de tanta calidad e ynportancia la guarda y defensa del como tenia entendido advirtiosele en esta carta que el rrastro que ubiese ffecho la galera si la sacasen en tierra la cegasen de manera que no se pudiese entender y las personas o yndios que la uviesen escondido diese horden como estubiesen donde nynguno pudiese venyr a poder de los enemygos y en este estado quedo el dicho negoçio este primer acuerdo aviendose despachado en el por chasques que se pusieron luego por toda la tierra a todo lo susodicho y salieron los dichos señores del dicho acuerdo a mas de la una ora despues del mediodia y del fueron a la sala donde se hizo audiencia breve y todos los dias siguientes hasta diez y seys del dicho mes de marzo se hizieron otros autos y proveymientos tocantes a la guerra que en sustancia mandaron hazer y juntar armas ofensibas y defensibas polvora bastimentos de trigo mayz y bizcocho y jamones y quesos y otras cosas y encargose de todo esto a personas de calidad de la dicha çuadad o paresçieron ser mas aptas y convinyentes para ponerlo en execucion y en cunplimyento [f. 3r] como luego se fue haziendo y juntando en las casas reales desta çuadad así para el proveymyento de la çuadad de Guayaquil como para el de esta ciudad rrespetto de la sospecha de alteracion y movimyento de los naturales de esta provinçia que se a tenydo sobre que avia caçiques y prinçipales presos y fulmynado procesos contra ellos al tiempo que llego la dicha nueva de los cosarios.

En diez y seys dias deste pasante mes y en diez y siete llegaron dos cartas del señor visorrey destos reynos que en sustancia avisa por ellas que en quinze de febrero proximo pasado avia llegado al puerto y callao de la çuadad de los reyes un navio de vela y remo de yngleses con dos lanchas y asi mesmo que avia tenydo por carta del corregidor de Arica de la costa del mar del sur sobre lima muchas leguas que el mysmo navio de yngleses avia llegado aquel puerto con otro navio que avia tomado en el puerto de santiago de chile que hera del licenciado torres testigo de lima y que en aquel puerto avia hallado otros dos navios uno cargado de azogues para potosi y otro de mercadurias y los avia robado y quemado el uno y llevado el otro y que

asimysmo tenya nueva que este navio con otros quatro partio de ynglaterra con disinyo de entrar por el estrecho de magallanes y que en el se avian perdido los dos y que este dicho navío se avia apartado de los otros dos y no se sabia a donde se avian ydo asimysmo avisa el dicho señor visorrey que avia despachado luego dos navíos de armada con quatroçientos hombres en busca de los dichos yngleses y en este mesmo dia se resçibio una carta de un piloto llamado [f. 3v] benyto diaz ffecha en el puerto de manta a siete de março en que avisa como el dicho navío de yngleses le avia tomado un navio que llevaba a panama y robadole todo el oro y plata que llevaba y le avian querido ahorcar al dicho piloto y a otros pasajeros a los quales al fin solto y avisa que tenyan en el dicho navío hasta ochenta yngleses y porque el traslado de las dichas cartas del dicho señor visorrey y las del dicho piloto en que dizen otras cosas particulares se enbia el traslado dellas con esta rrelaçión no se refiere aqui.

Visto por los dichos señores presidente e oydores y que por el señor visorrey y por el corregidor de guayaquil se les pide socorro para la guarda del dicho puerto acordaron de darle y nombraron luego por capitan del al capitan rodrigo de salazar hombre rico que tiene en esta çidad seys myll pon de plata de renta arriba y antigo y capitan del numero de su magestad al qual mandaron luego se partiese y le se ofreçio de gastar lo necesario para este socorro con la gente que con el fuese. y luego se hizo una lista de la gente que paresçio necesaria y convinyente para el dicho socorro asi de la que asistia en esta çidad como de la que estaba en los pueblos del camyno que ay della al puerto de guayaquile a los quales se mando aperçevir y fueron apercevidos los desta çidad con pena de caher en mal caso y otras penas partiesen luego en dentro de veynte y quatro oras en seguimyento del dicho capitan y se apregon publicamente que nynguna persona saliese desta çidad sola dichas penas y para que la parte de fuera se tuviese prevenyda [f. 4r] para el dicho socorro se despacho luego con mucha diligencia y les notificase que estubiesen y no saliesen de sus pueblos.

Y ten pirque el governador andres contero y el capitan juan marin su maese de campo estaban proveydos y tenyan juntas alguna gente para yr a hazer el descubrimyento del camyno desta çidad a la baya de san mateo que esta donde dizen las esmeraldas que se abre para mas breve camyno y navegacion desta çidad mandaron que por ahora cesase el dicho descubrimyento y el dicho governador y su gente fuesen con el dicho capitan salazar al dicho socorro y el dicho governador fuese por maese de campo con el dicho capitan salazar y llebase consigo al dicho capitan Juan marin y para este efeto se despacho luego un alguazil de esta corte y otro hombre que lo fuesen a nutificar al dicho capitan juan marin que estaba con la dicha gente junta en los yumbos ocho leguas desta çidad y luego vino a ella con los dichos soldados.

Yten se proveyo de guarda en la puente de pançaleo que esta cerca desta çidad por donde forcosamente an de pasar los camynantes que van desta çidad a la de los reyes el qual proybyese el paso a todos los que no llevaen licencia de esta rreal audiençia ya senbiase presos.

Yten se hordenó que el licenciado francisco de aunçibay escriviese una carta muy regalada a un negro que está alçado en la dicha baya de san mateo con los yndios de la llamada yllescas a el qual se le enbiase provision en que le nombrasen don francisco de yllescas y en ella se le ofreçiese mucha merced de parte de su magestad y lo demas que [f. 4v] estaba tratado y ordenado en el acuerdo yten se hordenó que juan de villalobos ffuese la tierra adentro a los pueblos de latacunga, rriobanba y otras partes y juntase y comprase cinquenta caballos de brio y hiziese dozientas picas muy buenas y las trajese luego a esta çidad yten se mando a usar luego a la governacion de popayan y mandar a la justicia y offiçiales reales pusiesen en guarda el puerto de la buenaventura y que por el se enbiase a panama el dicho aviso. Y un pliego de cartas desta rreal audiençia a la de panama con mucho cuydado y recato y otro pliego de aviso a la audiençia

de santa fe del nuevo reyno de granada y otro pliego de aviso al governador y provincia de cartagena y se despachase luego canoa propia por el rio grande de la madalena y otro pliego a don cristoval de heraso general de los galeones y armada de su mag para que todos ffuesen advertidos de lo que a pasado en esta mar del sur.

Yten se mando escribir al corregidor de Guayaquil agradeçiendole lo que avia ffecho hasta ahora y exortandole para lo de adelante y dandole aviso del socorro que le yba y que tubiese a punto de guerra los yndios contra los yngleses y se les diese a entender que estos yngleses son enemygos de nuestra santa fee que bienen a rrobar y a llevar los yndios a su tierra y a los matar y hazer esclabos y diese horden como don francisco toma la caçique de la puna con su gente se vinyese luego a la çiudad y diese horden como de alli ny de otra parte no pudiesen tomar [f. 5r] los enemygos nyngun bastimento hordenose que se les escribiese al señor visorrey avisandole de lo que esta audiençia proveya escriviose luego al corregidor de rriobamba que rrecoxiese a preçios moderados duzientos quintales de bizcocho myll quesos jamones çeçinas y ajos y lo enbiase con gran brevedad al puerto de guayaquil con yndios y harrias y el mesmo fuese con ellos hasta el enbarcadero y avisase desde alli al corregidor de la llegada y se lo entregase por quenta y rrazon y cobrase del el costo y costas y no mas y lo pagase de sus dueños ante el escrivano y testigos y el corregidor de guayaquil lo pagase de la caxa rreal de su magestad y que el dicho corregidor de guayaquile lo rrepartiese y pusiese por memoria el rrepartimyento que haze el dello a quien y quanto y en todo tubiese quenta y razon con apercevimyento y porque acerca de provision de mantenymyentos se avia dado otras comysiones antes desta a gonçalo de martos juez de comysion desta audiençia y alvaro de çaballos mandaron no derogase lo uno a lo otro antes todos por su parte lo cumpliesen y proveyesena guayaquil.

Yten hordenaron que el señor licenciado francisco de aunçibay oydor desta rreal audiençia y el señor licenciado gaspar de peralta fiscal de su magestad escrivan en cartas particulares al señor visorrey destos reynos el estado desta provincia asi en lo tocante al allanamyento de la governaçion de los quixos y destruyçion de las dos çiudades de avila y archidona que los yndios della asolaron y muerte de todos los vezinos dellas y de la sospecha de alteraçion que avido delos [f. 5v] Yten se mando escribir y se escrivio luego al señor providente desta rreal audiençia este aviso que esta çinco leguas desta çiudad muy enfermo.

Yten proveyeron y enbiaron luego a hernando alonso de cantos hermano del corregidor de otobalo y por su enfermedad del dicho corregidor a hazer polvora con gran diligençia y juntar otros mantenymyentos y ten mandaron hazer alarde general en esta çiudad de la gente de a caballo y de a pie y que los de a caballo anden a la gineta y que no traygan gualdrapas a la brida.

Yten hordenaron que los señores oydores en particular avisen con disimulaçion a los yndios desta provincia el mal que les verna destos cosarios como esta ttatado entre los dichos señores.

Yten mandaron que el capitan diego de sandoval con don diego de figueroa recoxa myll fanegas de trigo y myll de mayz de entre los yndios a quien se pague como vale y se meta en las casas reales y se entregue a geronimo de velasco contador de la rreal hazienda con memoria de todo ello.

Yten que dos personas rrecoxiesen en rriobamba todo el trigo y mayz que los yndios tubiesen por memoria e ynventario y se guarde.

Yten que el dicho capitan sandoval hiziese hazer diez myll pares de alpargates.

Yten que el capitan francisco rruiz hiziese hazer y repartiese entre los vezinos en [f. 6r] comenderos buena suma de morriones y escaupiles y rodela de cueros de vaca.

Yten que el dicho francisco ruyz diego arcos hiziesen hilar y hazer con presteza quatro quintales de cuerda de arcabuz.

Yten provision para que rrios rrecoxa myll quesos.

Yten que don geronimo guaraca caçique haga hazer a sus yndios quinyentas petacas y ttresmyll pares de alpargatas.

Yten se proveyeron que el capitan Joan de galarça alguazil mayor desta audiència vaxe al pueblo de hatunquixo a hazer alli alto con la gente que le fuese señalada asi para el reguardo de los yndios que estan entre esta çiudad y la governacion de los quixos como para su correxa la ciubdad de balca si fuese necesario y partio luego con doze hombres.

Yten mandaron al alcalde se cree bastidas que recoxa a todo el bizcocho que estaba repartido y mande a los vezinos desta çiudad antes de ahora tubiesen para qualquier necesidad.

Yten mandaron que una pisca de artilleria de hierro pequeña que estaba en esta çiudad se entregase al capitan rodrigo de salazar.

Yten se hordeno hiziesen algunas pieças de artilleria en esta çiudad y para ello el capitan juan mosquera recoxiese todo el metal que ubiere en esta çiudad con mucha brevedad.

Y mandaron que los secretarios no duerman hasta tanto que todos estos despachos [f. 6v] quedasen hechos y despachados y asi se hizo eceto el despacho de cartagena y del piru y del reyno que se hizieron adelante.

Despues de lo qual se proveyo en otro acuerdo lo siguiente

Que al hombre que biene de guayaquil por mantenymientos se den y entreguen luego a preçios justos y moderados como si no oviera guerra y el corregidor de rriobanba se los entregue luego y que compre dozientas o trezientas fanes al de mayz y las enbie luego a guayaquile.

Auto en que se comete al señor licençiado aunçibay haga rregistro de todas las mercadurias de castilla que ay en esta çiudad por ante escribano y se hizo.

Yten mandaron se escriba luego a quenca que de alli se enbien por bola a guayaquil plomo y que el governador Juan de salmos lo despache luego y lo pague de la hazienda de su magestad y si no la oviere lo tome a su credito y asi del costo que esta audiència lo pagara luego.

Yten mandaron escribir y se escrivio luego al corregidor de guayaquil y al cabildo de puerto viejo dicho que no despueblen el pueblo de puerto biejo atento a lo que a ultimamente a escripto el corregidor de guayaquile y otros avisos que se an tenydo no obstante que esta rreal audiència avia mandado recoxer los vezinos de puerto biejo a guayaquile antes los sustenten pudiendo y lo mysmo los pueblos de yndios de jaramyjo, jarapoto, manta y colonche yalunchillo.

Yten mandaron a martin sanchez persona que esta en la punta de santa elena [f. 7r] se rrecoxa a poblado y no consienta pescar los yndios y rrecoxan los mayzes y ganados y que el corregidor de guayaquil enbie persona de rrecaude a esto.

Yten mandaron que el corregidor de guayaquil apreste la galera y salga en ella y se junte con nuestra armada con boluntad y acuerdo de los capitanes del señor visorrey.

Yten se mando escribir y escrivio al governador Juan de salmas capitan general del partido de quenca y loxa y çamora guarde los puertos de bola y çaraguello y este a punto de guerra para acudir a donde esta audiència lo governara y mandare y que no acuda al puerto de payta por la ynposibilidad de socorrelle.

Yten por la necesidad en que esta su magestad promptamente de dineros mandaron hazer y fuesen copia de los mercaderes desta çibdad a quien particularmente tuca el asegurar la mar del sur y de sus haziendas y posibles entre los quales mandaron hazer çierto repartimyento en cantidad de para que aviendo necesidad forçosa acudan con este socorro para los gastos de la

guerra y dello se hizo auto en forma ynserto el repartimyento y lo mismo mandaron se hiziese en la provinçia de quenca.

Yten mandaron los dichos señores que algunos delinquentes que estaban presos en la carcel real desta corte vezinos desta çibdad fuesen dados en fiado de la hazer con que ffuesen a servir a guayaquile.

Yten mandaron poner horden para que de aqui adelante ayan caballos de casta y no se hechen galanones a las yeguas si no fuesen exsamynadas y para esto se hizieron algunas [f. 7v] prevenciones y se pregono publicamente y ten por quanto un diego de alcampo presento en el acuerdo un memorial que lo mas sustançial del hera hazer una muralla en çierta parte de la puna para la guarda y defensa del puerto de guayaquile mandose dar provision para que fuese luego a la çibdad de guayaquile y lo comunicase y tratase con el corregidor y se pusiese luego en execuçion si convinyese y para el proveymyento desto se mando luego hazer en esta çibdad cantidad de cal y ladrillo para que se llevase al dicho puerto e pon a otra qualquier fortificaçion en fuese necesario hazer en ella.

Yten se mando escreivir al corregidor de guayaquile avisandole como se enbian de socorro çien hombres con el capitan salazar y que asi podra tener gente para poder socorrer a puerto viejo lo qual haga con prudiençia advirtiendo al resguardo de la dicha çibdad de guayaquile principalmente.

Yten mandaron advertir al dicho corregidor que un maese luis ynginyero que esta en guayaquile lo rregales y trate muy bien y lo tenga en su casa y no le dexee salir de la çibdad y se le de a entender que sera gratificado de lo que alli sirviere.

Yten se mando escribir al corregidor y cabildo de la çibdad de guayaquil avisandoles que el dicho capitan salazar a ofresçido socorrer a los soldados de lo necesario que avise de lo que hiziere con secreto y que enbien por la polvora de que tubieren necesidad a hambato que alli se le entregaran y lo mysmo se escrivio a los oficiales rreales.

Yten se mando escribir al governador Juan de Salmas que no enbie jente de [f. 8r] quenca a guayaquile porque no es necesario pues e desta çibdad va suficienete socorro y que junte mantenymyentos y los tome por moderados preçios y los pague de la real hazienda y enbie a guayaquile y sentreguen al corregidor con quenta y razon de todo ello y socorra al puerto de bola por ser ynportante.

Yten se escriba a los ofiçiales reales de quenca paguen de la real hazienda mantenymyentos que se enbiaren a guayaquile tengan cuydado de cobrar lo del corregidor y ofiçiales de guayaquile y lo buelvan a la caixa porque cesen tantas quantas como avia si oviese mas que una caixa que gastase y por como va apuntado en esta rrelaçion avido algunos yndiçios contra los indios destas provinçias de novedad y alteraçion y dellos resultavan culpados don sancho hacho caçique principal de Latacunga y otros caçiques y prinçipales desta provinçia por ser los dichos yndiçios de tal calidad que por ellos no deven ser condenados a muerte hordenaron los dichos señores que los dichos Don sancho y don diego Sanabria a quien se avia dado tormento sobre el caso y negoçio y otros caçiques e yndios prinçipales se entregasen al capitan Rodrigo de salazar y diese horden como embarcarlos y no bolviesen a esta provinçia y en este estado queda la dicha provinçia de quito hasta oy dia de nuestra señora de la encarnaçion veinte e cinco de marco de myl e quinientos y setenta y nueve años fue sacada esta rrelaçion de los autos originales que en el dicho negoçio se an escripto.

Y lo que despues descrita esta rrelacion ay de que da aviso es aver escrito el señor visorrey que del puerto acarica se avia dado aviso avian pareado otros quatro navios [f. 8v] de corsarios yngleses y la rreal audiencia se prebenido de socorro de gente y mantenymientos en la

ciudad y puerto de guayaquil. Asi desta ciudad de quito como del partido de que no y con dos o tres que quedan en esta ciudad yngenieros se van haziendo artilleras y arcabuzes y en este estado queda lo tocante a los dichos yngleses y por lo del alcamyento de los yndios de que se a tenido sospecha se enbiaron a guayaquil algunos caçiques prinçipales de quien se tenia sospecha en el dicho alçamyento y en el alçamyento de los naturales desta provincia de los quixos se esta paçificando y se an preso algunos yndios principales culpados en el dicho alcamyento en especial uno que llaman pende fecha esta relacion en quito a diez y seis de mayo de myll y quinientos e setenta y nueve años.

Francisco de Zuñiga escrivano de camara de su magestad

Relaçion de la carta de Benito Díaz

Justicia señor bisto la desgracia que por nuestros pecados nos a benido a esta mar del sur savado por la mañana en postrero de febrero sobre los rrios de los que quiximies amanebçio una nao de luteranos junto a nosotros con una lancha grande y otra pequeña la qual vino a nuestro bordo el capitan y treinta hombres con el e lo primero que hizo fue coger todo el dinero que abia en nuestro nabio sin quescapase un real e despues llevo los pasajeros a su nao y les dixo que si alguna plata alçasen despues cuya fuese que luego los abia de ahorcar e ansi todos tubieron por bien de darles todo el dinero aprometiendonos la vida – acabado esto mando dar todas las belas para ber quel andaba mas esto fue despues que entro el biento porque quando nos tomaron fue con calma y bisto que mi nabio andaba mas quel suyo y que la lancha mando que todos los pasajeros e a los marineros que fuesen a tierra an la barca e llebasen su rropa e la comida que les paresçiese y despues que fueron me dixo el capitan que queria este nabio para de armada e yo acuitandome que hera probe e que no tenia otra hazienda mas sino este navio respondiome que no tubiese pena quel me daria mi nabio en panama e luego mando a la gente questava en la lancha que fuesen por dos tiros de bronçe e mando luego cafar el navio y echar Xarga a la mar e despues me tomo por la mano y me llevo a proa y me dixo que no tuviese pena que por el dios en que adorava que me daria mi nabio e un cable de su tierra e que si me tomase la nao para llebarla a su tierra quel me lo pagaria en un pedazo de oro de baldibia de que tomo a la gran capitana e rriendole yo las gracias por ello aunque mi corazon no siguro e acabado estas platicas le pregunte que a quien traya por piloto y quien le abia metido a esta mar y me rrespondio que el hera el piloto y con la palabra en la boca me tomo por la mano y menseño un tiro de bronçe en el qual tenia asentado todo el mundo la qual traia figurado como una bola e alli repartido el polo artico y antartico y el tropico canzer y del capricornio y la linia quinoçial e con el çirculo zudiaco y me dixo que se conozia que cosa hera aquello e yo haziendome de nuevas dize que no savia [f. 1v] y me respondio que quien esto save repartir no tespantes quentre y salga donde quiscere yo enseñandole buen rrostro y loandole su habilidad dixele que pues que ya me yba con el a panama que hizieseme de decir quien hera y quien le abia mobido a mober aca respondiome que pir el dios en quien adorava que si diria dixome hera hermano de Jun Dacles quel birrey de la nueva spaña no le cunplio bien la palabra que le prometio e quel salio quando en una nao y su gente en otra e que agora benia con çinco galeones en los cuales se apartaron en la costa de ginea e quel e nuestro por el estrecho por tierra de çinquenta e cinco grados donde hallo gente de un ojo e un pie e de una mano e dize que todos los navios desta mar del sur los tiene debajo de su mano e que abia tomado a la capitana en chile y tomo toda la gente e la hecho en tierra con el bates e que por ser el nabio viejo hecho altraves en la mar.

En el que se que pir tardar se undia no abia tomado todas las barras que alli abia e que bido hir por una loma adelante muchos carneros de la tierra cargados de barras e mucha gente de guardia a caballo con ellos desto se iba pelando las barbas entro en el callao y corto los cables a los nabios y los dexo a la rronca en paita tomo el barco del sordo e lleva consigo el piloto custodio Rodriguez e sobre pauna al gonzalo albarez que llevara esta nao ochenta hombres de presa al cabo de poa al rato me pregunto que si hera berdad que se abia muerto Don Juan de austria e los reies porque los pasajeros se lo abian dicho yo le dixele que si luego llamo a toda su gente y se lo dixo en la lengua e todos tomaron plazer y enpezaron a baylar sin hombres que en toda [...] llaman a [...] que el dia me dixo piloto as de saber que toda mi gente a de hazer gran

gira esta noche. Los jamones e mis gallinas lo obieron de pagar – otro dia domingo por la mañana me dixo piloto ya no te quiero llevar a panama sino que te baias a donde quisieres e tomo toda la carne y polbora que abia en my nabio e se lo llevaron que no nos dexaron que comer ya que se querian hir me llebaron al scrivano francisco Jacome y a todos yndios negros se los llevaron e me dexaron [f. 2r] solo al cavo de poco rato bi benir otra vez la lancha y llegaron a nuestro lado y echaron mano a las espadas e me dixeran piloto saca la mas plata que tienes escondida que tu lo saves y el esrivano e si no aqui te emos de aorcar con toda tu gente a uno luego lo pusieron por oras e todos estuvimos con la soga a la garganta e nos alçaron mas de dos baras de medir del suelo de la cubierta Francisco Jacome paso mal trabaxo que mas de una ora no bolbio en si y luego se fueron a proa y lateron la berga del trinquete e la bela de un ancla me lo hecharon a la mar e ansi como pudimos benimos a este puerto de manta que berdaderamente nuestro señor fue el que nos trajo a ella que otro no doy abiso a Vuestra Magestad para que si Vuestra Magestad no save esto que luego Vuestra magestad de abiso a su excelencia no se ofresze otra cosa de que hazer saber a Vuestra Magestad si no que nuestro señor guarde la justicia y señoria de vuestra magestad deste puerto de manta siete de marzode myll e quinientos y setenta e nueve años [...] señor [...] servidor benito diaz. Es traslado de la carta de benito diaz bravo. hernando de çuñiga.

Appendix 3: Descubrimiento Puerto de Amatique; Defensa Puerto Caballos. AGI, Guatemala, 129.

Señor

Visto el subçesso y Robos que el año pasado de seisçientos y tres hizo en el puerto de caballos y golfo dulce Neoporto yngles cossario, acompañado de otro ladron françes entrando una noche a los diez y siete de febrero tan de ynproviso que las naos de flota que alli estavan aun no tubieron lugar de disponerse a la deffenssa contra la fuerza por entonçes ynsuperable de mill hombres los mas mosqueteros que en quinze navios traxo de que a vuestra magestad informe en carta de treinta de marzo de aquel año, y pareçiendome era la neçesidad muy urgente de obrar al poder de enemigo tan pujante bolviendo de nuebo el o a su exemplo otros a causar los mismos daños contra las naos de flota que de esos Reynos se speraban Procure con todo estudio y cuydado ocurrir al Remedio assi en lo presente de la protection de aquellas naos que despues desto llegaron como tambien al que convenia para en lo de adelante proveerse de una vez, que fuese en todo tiempo bastante contra enemigos cosarios, y assi en lo primero ordene que en el dicho golfo dulce en la parte mas comoda que el agua estrecha la corriente, y a do en otro tiempo se avia hecho un pequeño fuerte que ya estaba desbaratado, este se Rehiçiese y juntamente un baluarte a do puse de Presidio [f. 1v] treinta y dos soldados mosqueteros con su capitan persona experta y de confiança llamado pedro de bustamante y con algunas pieças de artilleria y otras armas que aqui yo avia mandado hazer y prevenido de la havana (sufficiete deffeensa para aquel passo) y a la condiçion propia de cosarios que quando entienden esta la gente despierta y aperçivida viniendo como se ve ser su yntento a solo hurtar y no a predominar se Refrenan huyendo el Riesgo, como entonçes subçedio que aviendo corrido aquella costa con diversas naos y lanchas no se atrebieron a entrar en el dicho golfo lo que duro el presidio que fue en el mas sopechoso tiempo desde el mes de diçiembre asta mayo, en que las mercaderias se acabaron de traer a esta ciudad y las naos bolvieron a hazer para esos Reynos su Viaje.- y assimismo en el puerto de caballos para deffensa de las dichas naos di orden que en tierra se hiziese una trinchera y Reparó de artilleria aplicando çerca las naos para que la fuerza dellas y de tierra se juntase a hazer presidio con la gente que se pudo prebenir de ambas partes. y este orden con otras diligencias y prebençiones que bien ynformado de gente experta me pareçieron bastantes aprobaron y siguieron el governador de honduras y capitanes de las dichas naos y oficiales Reales y assimismo la gente militar de capitanes y soldados de flandes y de ytalia que en esta çiudad a la saçon se hallaron como consta por los autos – y para el gasto que en esto se a hecho de plata que hera en parte la dificultad mas contraria, no aviendo de tocar en la hazienda de Vuestra magestad ni ynponer en las mercaderias nengun derecho sin que Vuestra magestad lo mandase, y de otra parte obligar a los vecinos encomenderos desta çiudad a que fuesen a guardar el golfo o puerto de caballos estando tan lexos y apartados [f. 2r] y que sin aver saltado el enemigo en tierra hiçiesen alli presidio para esperalle, me pareçio Riguroso casso y de diferente obligacion de la que tienen los vecinos de la provinçia de honduras por estar mas llegados a los puertos de aquella costa y acostumbrados en ocurrir a semejantes neçesidades – Por lo qual aviendo en esta ocassion algunos Repartimientos de las provinçias deste gobierno Vacos, aplique lo que yvan rentando para estos forçossos gastos como fue los de comayagua y nicaragua para el puerto de caballos y los desta çiudad y alcaldias mayores de sant salvador y chiapa a la deffensa del golfo, y que dellos se pagasen las armas que se avian traydo conpradas de la havana, considerando que pues este genero de hazienda Vuestra magestad haze della merçed a los que le han servido y ayudado a ganar la tierra, era lo mismo darla por aquel tiempo a los soldados que fueron a

guardarla, pues no es de menos estimación antes mayor, conserbar lo adquirido que el averlo
aquistado, baliendome tambien para el dicho gasto de la liçençia que Vuestra magestad a dado
por su Real carta en Respuesta de otra de los offiçiales Reales de honduras su data en madrid
onçe de henero de mill y quinientos y ochenta y siete años, de poderse gastar en prevençiones
conta cosarios de la Real hazienda lo neçesario en bastimentos municiónes y algunas
fortificaçiones y Reparos con orden y tenplança como yo lo provey con Vuestra Real audiencia
en muy moderada parte – esto pues en suma se hizo proveyendo al presente daño que
amenazaba, y aunque esta prevençion no aviendo otro mejor medio pudiera en tanto usarse
mediante el camino de por tierra que yo avia hecho descubrir desde el puerto de caballos a esta
çiudad al fin hera costoso Remedio, y no el que bastava Por lo qual acudiendo a lo que dix
prevenia con mas fundamento para en lo de adelante, considerados los peligros de enemigos. E
[f. 2v] ynconvinientes del dicho golfo y puerto de caballos y sus yncomodades por ser este
puerto una vaya muy abierta donde con gran façilidad entran a surgir en ella los navios de
cosarios por no ser el sitio fixo donde se pueda hazer fortaleza sino de arena que encabando un
poco se conbierte en agua, y la Playa muy espaçiosa y grande y que por qualquiera parte puede
saltar el enemigo en tierra, y anssi los que an venido an Robado con façilidad las naos que en el
an allado y las haziendas prendiendo muchos vezinos que por esta causa han desamparado sus
cassas y dexadolos a negros y mulatos, y no poder reçivir socorro al tiempo que en el entran los
cosarios por estar el governador de aquella provinçia en la çiudad de comayagua quarenta leguas
distante y quando llega el socorro ya es ydo el enemigo con el Robo y no sirve sino de gastos y
molestias de la gente sin hazer nengun effecto que aprobechase: es la bivienda del dicho puerto
muy enferma y a do muere mucha gente de ordinario, porque por medio del pueblo pasa una
çienega de mal olor muy grande que todos los años creze de manera que anega las cassas y se an
perdido y llebado a la mar quantidad de hazienda y mercaderias y muchas vezes puestos los
vecinos en Riesgo de aogarse, y por tener el agua lexos la gente pobre beve de unos xagueyes o
poços de que se corronpen y mueren miserablemente, y por el exçesivo calor y molestias de
muchos mosquitos y otras sabandixas benenosas causados de la dicha çienega, de manera que
aun la gente de mar no pueden dormir de noche con estar dentro de sus naos, haze todo aquel
sitio ynabitable de naturaleza– y discurriendo por los otros puertos de aquella costa, el de
truxillo (demas de estar tan apartado aunque tiene mas deffensa que no el de caballos) esta en
distancia desta çiudad mas de çiento y sesenta leguas; [f. 3r] de camino muy fragoso y aspero y
que por la mar para traer las mercaderias de alli al golfo dulce por ser tambien el camino largo
corrierian las fragatas y varcos Riesgo de cossarios, como las que solian salir en tierra firme del
puerto de nombre de dios para entrar en el Rio de chagre, sin otras ynperfecciones y no ser
berdadero puerto sino vaya de mar avierta que en algunos tiempos del año haze abrigo a las naos,
y la mayor parte del en espeçial quando corren los vientos suestes es mas peligrosa y braba en
que se an perdido navios, y corriendo tiempo contrario estan alli a fuerza de amarras de la
manera que subçede en la vaya de cadiz. y assi aunque le llaman puerto no lo es propiamente
puesto que el pueblo esta mas fuerte por ser en montaña y la artilleria estar sobre una barranca o
promontorio a la mar a do se juega y dispara, aunque por tierra debaxo la dicha barranca an
venido algunas vezes cosarios a ynbadir el pueblo sin que de lartilleria pudiesen Reçivir offensa
ni daño: entre este dicho puerto de truxillo y de caballos hize diligencia en examinar y sondar
otro que llaman puerto de sal y allose ser de poco fondo y para solo fregatas y pequeñas naos, y
la misma esperiençia se hizo de otro menor puerto que a quatro leguas de aqueste esta que
llaman triunfo de Cruz, y no es capaz mas de para varcos y vaxeles moderados – a cuya causa
por no dexar nada por yntentar en toda aquella costa ynquiriendo alguno otro puerto vine a tener

notiçia aunque confussa de una ensenada que çerca del dicho golfo dulce esta cuyo sitio llamaban de Amatique junto a una punta que alli haze la mar nonbrada manabique, a la qual todas las fregatas y varcos que van y vienen de puerto de caballos al dicho golfo [f. 3v] la Reconoçen de Passo por no estar distante del golfo mas de asta diez leguas y del puerto de caballos diez y siete o diez y seis, y porque ya no quedaba en toda la costa otra parte ni esperançã de hallar mas puerto y ser ya este el ultimo Remedio de Reparar la cayda desta tierra y aumentarla, y que siendo de tanto serviçio de Vuestra magestad ninguno de mis antecesores lo avia yntentado, me aventure a todas las dificultades por ser tanta la ganancia y assi encomendandolo a dios nuestro Señor procure este subçesso con muy ferboroso cuydado puesto que por las ynformaciones que hize de muchos testigos personas antiguas desta tierra españoles y pilotos y otra gente de mar experta constaba no se allar berdadero puerto en aquella parte, porque aunque en lo ynterior del se entendia avia fondo enpero que al principio estaban muchos baxios de peñas y arena que llaman plaçeles, conque se ynpedia la entrada no sin grande peligro de las naos, y de otra parte oponian estar la costa de la dicha ensenada poblada de indios ynfieles silvestres de guerra que pareçia la guardaban a manera de encantamento fabulosso siendo todo cossa yntacta ni tratada de cristianos, de do se causaba horror a la gente de tierra y a las naves de proballa, y que avia de ser forçosso que primero se conquistasen aunque esto tube yo por mejor para la comodidad y mas qualidad que con ellos podia tener el puerto haziendolos de Vuestra magestad basallos – de clan tambien de contrario que quando hubiese puerto faltaria camino de por tierra por ser aquella paludosa llena de pantanos y montaña, por lo qual los pueblos de aquella costa Truxillo san pedro el de caballos y probinçia de honduras contradeçian este descubrimiento alegando que si el puerto de caballos se [f. 4r] cerraba y despoblaba como al presente esta no biniendo a el las naos de españa quedaria aquella provinçia desierta y desamparada, y la gente desta çiudad por la mayor parte en disfabor deste puerto y desconfiança deçian que ya en otro tiempo se avia yntentado este negoçio por un vezino della llamado juan de cuellar que fue a sonarlo y que por no ser puerto tal se avia demucho tiempo antes dexado y que un ingeniero juan baptista antoneli de naçion Romano a quen Vuestra magestad el año pasado de quinientos y noventa embio con un capitan quintanilla alcayde de la fuerza de la punta de la habana y con don francisco de balverdi a sondar el dicho puerto de caballos y el de fonseca abiendo estado tan çerca del dicho puerto nuevo no avian hecho quenta del, o por bentura (como yo e dicho) se les passo por alto; a questas contradiciones no me disuadieron para dexar de seguir mi yntento asta ver la esperiençia clara, ynformandome e yndagando por todas vias y partes asta que tube notiçia que deste nuevo puerto tenia buena opinion un buen viejo y antiguo piloto de aquella costa llamado françisco nabarro que por su muy larga edad se avia Recogido a bivar en la ysla de la habana, por el qual ymbie luego para que viniese a verse conmigo ofreçiendole premio a su trabaxo – el qual vino y en compaña de un yerno suyo llamado el capitan juan del oyo entraron en la dicha ensenada y nuevo puerto de amatique y sin nenguna mas gente que ellos con algunos yndios del golfo en una canoa que es baxel que los yndios usan hecho de un arbol concabo antigua forma de varcos que al principio del mundo se ynvnetaron, en esta pues andubieron por la dicha ensenada surcandola y con la sonda haziendo Pruebas [f. 4v] y experiençia Por espaçio, y aviendose satisfecho me dio aviso ser el puerto muy suficienete y sin los ynpedimentos y baxios que todos publicavan, por lo qual teniendo ya por mi parte y buen desseo, un testigo tan aprobado aunque todavia los contraditores no se aquietavan dubdando por la hedad de piloto tan ançiano, provey fuesen luego personas desta çiudad al dicho puerto a berlo de nuevo y sonarlo en compaña del dicho piloto françisco nabarro, y para ello nombre desta audiençia a un oydor el liçençiado abaunça y al cabildo desta çiudad encargue nombrasen a uno

de los alcaldes hordinarios y a un regidor con aprobaçion mia, y nombraron de los alcaldes al capitán don estevan de alvarado y Regidor don carlos bazquez de coronado que heran las personas de mas satisfaçion y de quien yo les avia en particular tratado por su qualidad y buenas partes porque el dicho capitán don estevan de alvarado es nieto del adelantado don pedro de alvarado primer governador y conquistador desta tierra, y el dicho don carlos hijo de don juan bazquez de coronado adelantado de costa Rica y al dicho cabildo pedi que pues este negoçio hera para tanto bien y aumento destas provinçias y mas en particular desta çiuad y provinçia de guatemala acudiesen con alguna parte de la Renta de sus propios aunque no tan abundantes, para con lo demas que yo procuraba juntar de lo caydo de tributos Vacos, los cuales dieron mill tostones con voluntad escusandose de no poder dar mas por la neçesidad con que la çiuad estava, y puniendo en execucion esta dicha xornada el dicho oydor liçençiado abaunça se escuso de hazerla representando causas y assimismo el Regidor don carlos [f. 5r] vazquez sobre que yo mande hazer deligençias, y provey que el dicho capitán don estevan de alvarado con plena comision mia, dandole titulo de lugarteniente fuese al dicho nuevo puerto llebando consigo al dicho piloto françisco nabarro y a los pilotos de las naos de flota que a la sazon estaban en puerto de caballos y otras personas de ynteligençia y experiençia en aquel arte quantas pudieron ser avidas con orden de que si no allasen que el dicho nuevo puerto de amatique era suficienete y qual convenia, fuesen al de caballos y muy particularmente lo reblesen con todo cuydado de manera que constase de la substançia ser y sitio que el dicho puerto de caballos tubiese para hazer fortaleza y deffenssa de las naos contra cossarios y assimismo andubiesen por nuevo camino de por tierra que desde aquel puerto yo avia hecho descubrir para esta çiuad, y bien ynformados de su vondad para el uso de traginar por el las mercaderias me traxesen por escrito Relaçion de todo con las particularidades y puntualidad que se Refiere en el auto desto, para que se pudiese probeer en ello convenientemente al serviçio de vuestra magestad, y bien publico destas probinçias; los cuales aviendo ydo a la dicha ensenada y nuevo puerto de amatique y sondandolo por todas partes y con gran cuydado visto rodo lo que pareçio que bastava para enterarse, hallaron ser verdad lo que el dicho piloto viejo françisco nabarro avia dicho en su aprobaçion y sonda, y ser el dicho puerto muy bueno sin los ynpedimentos que oponian las personas Referidas de contrario, aunque la canal por donde an de entrar las naos que es buena y ondable por algunas partes no es muy ancha que es menester entrar por ella con cuydado con pilotos praticos que la ayan [f. 5v] andado, y esta es muy grande qualidad y esta mejor para que a los enemigos y cosarios no les sea tan façil la entrada; tiene la vaya que es desde la punta de manabique donde las naos que vinieren de españa an de surgir a la misma punta, veinte braças de fondo y desde alli donde entrar por la canal dsminuyendo asta quatro braças que es a tiro de escopeta de tierra donde oy estan surtas las naos de flota, y este espaçio de mar que es mucho se puede tener todo por puerto por no aver vientos contrarios, y los que corren quando suelen venir las naos de españa que es el norte y norueste son muy faborables a popa y neçesarios para la entrada de las naos, y los demas vientos no son forçossos por venir por çima de tierra – y el fondo de todo el puerto tiene el suelo y bassa de lama por lo qual es mas segura la entrada por no poder Peligrar las naos aunque toquen en tierra; y con el muelle que se a hecho tiene desenbarcadero tan agradable que la gente de las naos y pasajeros saltan en tierra sin mojarse los çapatos, al contrario de lo que subçede en los demas puertos a do los marineros desenbarcan en hombros a la gente, el agua asta el cuello de do enferman y mueren por ser los taleas puertos calurosos y este nuevo puerto muy tenplado mas frio que calido, afirman los dichos pilotos ser este dicho puerto capaz para poder estar en el muchas naos de seisçientas toneladas y seguro de tiempos y muy guardado – esta la ensenada de manabique y este nuevo puerto de amatique yncluso en ella

de la banda del Poniente del puerto de caballos en la parte que la carta de marear pone cabo de tres puntas, que es la mesma de manabique, y desta punta a la boca del golfo dulce ay quatro leguas y corre la ensenada y puerto de norte sur, y tiene la ensenada de manabique desde cabo de tres puntas [f. 6r] asta la entrada del puerto de amatique cinco leguas y de ancho tres y quatro, y la entrada del puerto de amatique de punta a punta como esta dicho media legua, y desde la entrada asta donde se funda el pueblo que es de norte a sur (segun esta Referido) poco mas de una legua, y de ancho del este ueste legua y media, çercado todo el puerto de la banda del este de manglares, y del ueste de Rocas y sercania ynacesibles con peñas muy altas, con que por todas partes tiene fortificaçion como se vee por los nuebos mapas Reformados que con esta embio a Vuestra magestad y ay dispusiçion en el para aumentarla en los lugares de peñas o morros que tiene, y a la entrada de las dichas dos puntas en la ultima vaya que es donde an de estar las naos, ay una parte que llaman buey de arena y lama, donde abiendo persona que lo enteinda se podria hazer una fuerza do se pudiese tener presidio, y junto al pueblo en una punta que sale a la mar tiene commodidad muy oportuna para plantarse alli algunas pieças de artilleria, de manera que con esto y con tener los lados tan guardados como esta Referido, no se podra entrar por nenguna parte y de alli se defenderian con mucha façilidad las naos llegadas al morro que de çerca esta, en el qual dicho morro ay mucha cantidad de piedra de cal y en el pueblo barriales colorados y amarillos de que se puede hazer ladrillo con grande abundançia de maderas para la dicha fortificaçion, y aunque sobre esto e ynbiado al puerto a que se Reçiban pareçeres de personas que lo puedan entender para ymbiarlos a vuestra magestad tengo por muy nezesario que vuestra magestad mande que algun yngeniero venga de esos reynos a berlo, para mas satisfaçion como vuestra magestad lo mando proveer para puertovelo.— Y todos los dichos pilotos [f. 6v] se conformaron en aprobar el dicho puerto y ser muy suficienete para entrar en el las naos de flota que vinieren de esos Reynos de la manera que lo declararon en sus dichos y como pareze por los autos — y despues desta sonda y visita con las que se an hecho de nuebo afirman las personas praticas de la mar ser el mejor puerto de las yndias; fue este subçesso y aprobaçion del dicho nuebo puerte en siete de marzo del año pasado de seisçientos y quatro dia de sancyo tomas de aquino de quien tomo su nombre — y pareçiendome que despues deste descubrimiento era nezesaria la paçificacion y poblaçion de los yndios ynfieles llamados toqueguas, y que para mejor Proçeder en lo que restava a la perfietion del dicho nuebo puerto por la parte de tierra, y descubrir el camino que por ella se avia de abrir para venir a esta çiudad, eran grande estorbo e ynpedimento los dichos yndios ynfieles pues neçesariamente se avian de pasar por sus tierras para hazer las poblaçiones de españoles, y el dicho camino, atendiendo prinçipalmente al serviçio de dios nuestro señor y de vuestra magestad para que fuesen Reduçidos de mas de lo que podian ayudar al uso del dicho puerto trato y comerçio sin otros buenos effectos, trate de conquistarlos y a esta saçon aviendo yo probeydo que la compaña de soldados mosqueteros que estaban de presidio en el golfo de quien al prinçipio dixen se disolviese y alçase por çessar ya la ocassion del tiempo de cosarios y traydose a esta çiudad todas las mercaderias dava orden que la dicha compaña que no estava muy apartada del sitio de los yndios, se asercasen a ellos haçiendoles Reseña de las armas y de otra parte tratando con los dichos yndios de paz escribiendoles yo cartas por ynterpretes que con ellos comunicaban [f. 7r] que fue el modo que tube con los negros çimarrones de vallano quando los Reduxe al serviçio de vuestra magestad, Presidiendo en la real audiençia de tierra firme, y semejantemente fue dios servido subçediese lo mismo con estos dichos yndios que de paz se ofreçieron y convirtieron al serviçio de vuestra magestad, porque aviendo venido tres dellos a esta çiudad a presentarse ante mi en nombre de todos a quien yo reçivi en el de vuestra magestad y su amparo Real y los bestid de seda y di a cada

uno una espada corta o machete y otras cosas de poco valor con que los ymbie gratos, y todos los demas sus compañeros lo estubieron con este tratamiento, y los caçiques y prinçipales, a los quales en el mismo vuestro Real nombre yo les ofreçi toda seguridad y contentamiento en lo que me quisieran pedir haziendose cristianos, como lo berian por experiençia y assi dexandose comunicar particularmente de un vezino del dicho golfo llamado anton jorge y del dicho capitán don estevan de alvarado a quien di comission para ello y otras personas que ynterpuse para que effetuasen esta paçificaçion, embiandoles de bestir de Ropa de poco preçio eçepto a los caçiques y prinçipales que fueron mejorados y sus megeres en las cosas que pareçio conbenian a su modo, luego trate como fuesen doctrinados e ynstruidos en la doctrina cristiana para que fuesen baptiçados, y aunque el obispo de comayagua pretendiendo que aquella tierra fuese de su jurisdiction episcopal embio con deligençia un saçerdote, estando yo ynformado que no sabia la lengua, y que a los dichos yndios les enseñaba la doctrina y oraçiones cristianas [f. 7v] en Latin y otras vezes en Romançe (cossa muy estraña y no entendida de los yndios;) Probey que el dicho clerigo tomase a cargo el exerçiçio de doctrina y sacramentos para con los españoles y la demas gente de capaçidad y pobladores de aquel puerto de los que del de caballos yo avia mandado transferir alli como nueva colonia, aunque muchos dellos negros y mulatos libres, y la parte destos nuevos yndios Reduçidos encargue por entonçes y asta que vuestra magestad mandase otra cossa, a Religiosos de santo domingo que por tener a su cuydado las doctrinas de la provinçia de la verapaz y en espeçial de los pueblos de yndios que llaman de caabon y Xocolo comarcamos a los dichos yndios toqueguas cuyas lenguas se conforman y simbolizan en mucho, me pareçio muy conviniente encararles la dicha doctrina y no a otros Religiosos, porque estando tan çerca los de sacto domingo, poner otro de diferente orden no estubiera tambien a los yndios Reçien conbertidos, los quales van proçediendo bien en su reduction y poblaçion y se an baptiçado y tienen su yglesia y classas a do biben con demonstraçion de mucho contento y acuden a sus labores y grangerias y a venderlas a los vezinos del nuevo puerto en que ya se comiença a sentir parte de lo que se espera an de ser de provecho en aquel puerto – estos yndios Reduçidos toqueguas (cuyos nombres de sus caçiques y dellos estan en los autos que de todo embio a vuestra magestad) son en numero mas de duçientos, y eran los prinçipales que bibian çercanos al puerto, y ay mas otros esparçidos por aquellas montañas que a exemplo [f. 8r] destos y de las buenas obras y tratamiento que se les a hecho es muy çierto se yran Reduçiendo, sin algunos extrabagantes que de otras partes se yran aggregando, no lejos de alli en la misma costa yan començacdo a venirse que llaman Zoytes y los que se diçen del campin, de cuya Reduçion y de las que asta aqui tengo fechas de çerca de dosmill yndios en la probinçia de la verapaz llamados manches de quien luego que vine a esta tierra comenze a tratar su paçificaçion y di aviso a vuestra magestad, y assimismo de los que de taguzgalpa se redugeron en la nueva segovia, y de los que llaman borucas, en la costa de la mar del sur y nuevo camino que yo hize abrir por tierra de la probinçia de costa Rica a panama, tan en serviçio de vuestra magestad y bien general destas provinçias Tierra firme y nueva spaña, dare quenta a vuestra magestad con Relaçion particular en otra ocassion – y a los dichos nuebamente Reduçidos toqueguas puse en la Real corona de vuesta magestad como lo e hecho en los demas Referidos semejantes, y ellos tambien lo pusieron por condiçion que no los avia de encomendar en Persona particular y a esto añidi que fuesen Relebados del tributo asta tanto que vuesta magestad fuese servido de mandarlo y por conplaçerles y obligallos mas al serviçio de vuestra magestad y que viesen que por su Respecto avian de mereçer otros, probey que en un pequeño Repartimiento de asta veinte yndios que se llaman de amatique sus vezinos Paçificos y tributarios de tiempo atras que avian sido encomendados, y de presente yo avia hecho encomienda dellos en un capitán solorçano vezino

de truxillo, se hiçiese lo mismo entendiendo dellos quanto se agradavan desto [f. 8v] los unos y los otros, Pareçiendome tambien que por esta via se afirmaba mas su Reduçion, y que estando tan conjuntos unos de otros no hubiese diferente condiçion entre ellos, y que los nuebamente conbertidos en sus prinçipios no tubiesen al officio la carga de tributo de sus vezinos en que ellos en de venir a parar, ni que tanpoco los tributarios sintiesen con ynvidia, ver que los mas nuebos en el servizio de vuestra magestad mereçian mas porque no tienen capaçidad para discurrir sino lo que de presente veen, por lo qual aunque este Repartimiento fuera de mayor numero y consideraçion, pareze se devia hazer lo mismo, Resarziendo y enterando al encomendero en otro tanto ynteres de yndios como yo lo di y de nuebo le encomende mas çerca de su cassa en la proibnçia de honduras, y diles assimismo mandamientos con penas para que nengunas Personas aunque fuesen justiçias no los saquen de su pueblo para ningun ministerio ni trabaxo aunque fuese de su voluntad Porque lo contrario no seria sino mober la planta Reçien puesta antes de arraygarse que nunca bendria aprender; ase conoçido en los dichos yndios buen animo e ynclinaçion para tenerse dellos confiança, y de sus costumbres quando estavan en su ynfidilidad se save de çierto que no tenian mas de una muger cosa muy nueba y diferente del comun uso destas barbaras naçiones oçidentales que tienen Pluralidad de muchas, como tambien lo acostumbran las orientales, y esta muger que assi tenian en su gentilidad, la criaban desde niña de muy Tierna Edad de tres o quatro años y algunas desde su naçimiento [p. 9r] a titulo de venir a ser su muger como en efecto eran en llegando a la Edad y algunos de los dichos yndios ubo que tenian nombres de sanctos Juan y Pedro, y entiendese aver sido por aver entrado entre ellos algunos otros yndios de los ladinos, o fugitibos baptiçados a quien quisieron ymitar – esto es en quanto a los yndios del dicho puerto nuebo en que E hecho esta digression, Bolviendo pues a el, por lo que Resta digno que vuestra magestad lo sepa, vista la aprobaçion que los pilotos hizieron del como esta Referido, y que tan justamente se podia desamparar el de caballos para que alli no hubiese ynpedimento, di orden y nuebas comisiones al dicho capitán don estevan de alvarado para que lo fuese a despoblar tratandolo Primero con la justiçia y Regidores de alli; y generalmente con los vezinos dandoles mis cartas y con suaves terminos tratase con ellos que de su voluntad viniesen a poblar el nuebo puerto, y no se persuadiendo a ello les compeliесе, Por ser medio neçesario y forçosso que de otra manera no pudiera yr adelante la nueba poblaçion, y vistas las cartas que en particular yo les escrevi y de mi parte se les Trato, puesto que algunos Repararon por entonçes, al fin vinieron en ello de su voluntad y dieron en nombre de Todos petiçion ante mi que esta en los autos, consintiendo la translaçion del dicho puerto de caballos en el de santo tomas, pidiendo algunas condiçiones y comodidades que las que pareçieron justas de hazerles y ayudarles a hazer sus cassas y semejantes a esta se les conçedieron con otros faores, y assimismo que la justiçia ordinaria y Regidores usasen de sus offiçios y Proçediesen en el dicho nuebo Puerto segun y como lo haçian en el de caballos– [f. 9v] Acercabase ya a este Tiempo la venida de las naos de flota de honduras, y para que llegados al puerto de truxillo do hazen la primera escala tubieren notiçia de lo que se avia hecho y viniesen al nuebo puerto de santo tomas sin entrar en el de caballos, ymbie cartas y Provisiones y un trato autoriçado de las diligenias y hondas que se avian hecho en el dicho nuebo puerto con los pareçeres de los pilotos que lo sondaron, en que hubo muy grande contradiccion de Parte de los capitanes y naos faoresçidos de los mismos vezinos del dicho puerto de truxillo a do se atrebieron a hazer ynformaciones contra el dicho Puerto y su aprobaçion escribiendome cartas los capitanes de las dichas naos y alegando que ellos venian con las mercaderias consinados al puerto de caballos y otras causas, y aviendo venido del dicho Puerto de truxillo al de caballos, no abiendose acabado de despoblar del todo hizieron nueba Repugnancia y opposiçion el cabo y almirante Reuyendo de

yr al nuebo puerto por Reçelo del peligro que temian diçiendo Eran grandes sus naos y la mitad dellas agena y de mucho valor y el artilleria ser de la bexia açi los quales Respondiendoles yo por mis cartas les di a entender que mi yntento no era de que se fuesen al dicho nuebo puerto ni entrasen en el por solo el parezer y aprobaçion de las personas y pilotos aunque tan suficièntes que lo abian sondado y experimentado, sino que los dichos capitanes con sus pilotos y gente lo sondasen de nuebo y hiçiesen todas las diligençias neçesarias de manera que se enterasen a su satisfacion porque no hazer esto era difamar el puerto para que las demas naos que viniesen quisiesen escusarse semejantemente, [f. 10r] y que esto no se avia de Permitir ni tanpoco que sin satisfacion suya de ser el puerto tal entrasen con temeridad en el, aunque estava ya hecha la speriençia, con esto se determinaron a hazer nueba sonda y assi el almirante sancho de meras con los pilotos y gente suya entraron en el dicho nuebo Puerto y por todas partes lo sondaron y sulcaron con mucho cuydado y diligençia y con averle allado tan suficiènte y capaz como se les avia Representado, se detubieron algunos dias sin querer hazer la entrada, y aviendo de nuebo y a la ynstançia que yo les hazia Respondido que lo querian bolver a sondar otra vez, los Pilotos suyos con mayor claridad y como estimulados de su conçiençia se declararon mas confesando publicamente que no podian negar ser el puerto muy bueno, y con todo eso se detubieron en deliberar la entrada haziendoseles cossa de Horror y gran Riesgo entrar en puerto do nengunas naos se save hubiesen entrado desde que dios lo crio, y mas con las suyas siendo tan grandes, que aquestio estubo mejor que fuesen tales para mas aprobaçion del Puerto que no si fueran de las ordinarias menores que al Puerto de caballos solian venir, y al fin la fuerza de la Razon y diligençias e ynstançias que con ellos hize poniendoles delante el serviçio de vuestra magestad les conbençio, y aviendo esperado a que hiçiese buen tiempo hiçieron su nabegaçion para el dicho nuebo puerto de santo tomas y acompañados de otro navio y seis fragatas que Por todos fueron nuebe belas, fue nuestro señor servido que juntos a un tiempo entraron en el, domingo en la tarde que se contaron diez y seis dias de henero deste año sin Riesgo ni ynpedimento alguno antes con [f. 10v] mucha suabidad y Plaçido viaje; y surgieron çerca de tierra en lo mas ynterior del dicho puerto do dieron fondo y do al presente estan surtos Reçibiendo carga ya de camino para bolver a esos Reynos, con lo qual el dicho Puerto de caballos quedo del todo despoblado y sin nenguna vezindad porque los pocos vezinos que alli avian quedado se vinieron con las dichas naos al dicho puerto de santo tomas donde estan, y Reconoçen quan mejorada bivienda sea la deste nuebo puerto y tan diferente de la de caballos porque es en todo contraria de un extremo de bondad a otro de yncomodidades malas, ya Referidas que tiene el dicho puerto de caballos siendo como es el de santo tomas su tierra y comarca y a do estan las poblaciones de españoles y de yndios y se haze la carga y descargade las naos, muy apacible temple frio y tan saludable que quasi toda la gente de mar de las dichas naos que de puerto de caballos vinieron enfermos, en llegando al de santo tomas sanaron quanto en los demas puertos subçede de contrario a do enferman y mueren de manera que a vezes no se allan marineros que puedan bolver a españa con las naos y causa admiracion que entre dos partes y sitios calidisimos enfermos y tan ynabitables como son el golfo dulce y puerto de caballos estando vezinos al de santo tomas, sea este frio y sano y sin la ynportunidad de mosquitos que enesotros se allan, y deve ser la causa natural estar alli çerca unas altas sierras que llaman de sant gil de do el viento fresco que dellas naçe, baña a toda aquella comarca – entra en el mismo Puerto y junto a la poblaçion un claro Rio y otros arroyos de muy buen agua – las naos estan muy mas seguras de tenporales y de enemigos que no en el puerto de truxillo [f. 11r] ni en el de caballos espeçialmente con la fuerza que se ubiere de fundar en alguno de los morros aplicandose a el las naos – tiene capaçidad para armadas y es abundantisimo en pescado, y no lejos del estan algunas estançias de ganado para mantenimiento

y sera en mas abundancia abierto el camino por tierra a la provincia de honduras y gracias a dios, do assimismo ay mucho ganado de carneros y bacas y muchas legumbres, y Para ser el dicho puerto del todo bien bastecido de comidas y Regalo y de vizcocho y otros mantenimientos. para las armadas, se pueden probeer desta çuidad, y de la provincia de la verapaz por la mar doçe leguas de do se vaxan maiz y gallinas en cantidad, y tambien de yucatan y pueblo de bacalar, de do se traen las lonas para hazer las belas de las naos y otros proveymientos de cossas que alli acuden de las yslas y puertos comarcanos, y çerca del dicho puerto ay dispusiçion para sementeras de maiz do asimismo se da todo genero de ortaliças y quanto se siembra Produce con gran fertilidad, y abunda assimismo de caza en espeçial de perdiçes mayores quasi al doble de las de españa, que todo conbida a que mucha gnete apetezca yrse a bibir alli y se puede sperar con el tiempo se aran buenas poblaçiones y causarse otros muy mayores y notables effectos, como son averse toda esta tierra Restaurado de la perdida y disminuiçion en que viniera si este puerto le faltara, con que no solo se a Recobrado mas acreçentado y del piru abra mas comunicaçion y trato, y Prinçipalmente si vuestra magestad fuese servido que las flotas de tierra firme viniesen a este puerto por derecha descarga [f. 11v] Para el piru, con lo qual se enriqueçeria y aumentaria la tierra y en particular esta çuidad de manera que ninguna hubiese mejor en las yndias por las comodidades que tiene, de quien en otro lugar ynformare a vuestra magestad acabando la discripçion que de todo el distrito desta Real audiencia voy haciendo, pues segun que antes de aora l'escritto a vuestra magestad se podria constituir aqui un Reyno muy estendido y opulento juntando con estas probinçias la de yucatan cuya jurisdiction temporal Perteneçio en tienpos pasados a esta audiencia, y aora con mas Raçon no solo la tenporal sino la espiritual con la comodidad de camino breve que por tierra para aquella provincia, va cada dia mas ofreçiendose mediante la reduction y paçifiçacion de los yndios llamados manches çerca de la provincia de la verapaz de que E hecho apuntamiento en esta carta para escribirlo a vuestra magestad en otra mas despaçio, y con hazer la yglesia desta çuidad metropolitana le podria ser sufraganea la de yucatan y en la provincia de Costa Rica hazer obispado que seria a una metropoly muy señalada con los demas obispados del distrito desta audiencia y en que podria aver unibersidad de estudio general que para esto ay mucho aparejo y de las demas cossas que suele aver en otros Reynos de vuestra magestad y arçobispados; y en quitarle yucatan a mexico no era ynconbiniente por estar mas apartado y camino de mar de no mucha seguridad y mas çercano a guatemala, y Por no divertirme tanto dexo de deçir aqui mucho que se ofreçia a este proposito sino hubiera de Proseguir el yntento desta carta – y es asi que quando vuesta magestad [f. 12r] Mando venir al yngeniero Juan baptista antoneli el año pasado de quinientos y noventa con don francisco de balverdi como ya apunte, a sondar el puerto de Caballos, y en la mar del sur el que llaman de fonseca Puerto muy aprobado, se entendio por çierto que vuestra magestad lo mandava a fin de ordenar que las flotas de Tierra firme se mudasen a venir al puerto de caballos, enbarcando las mercaderias en el de fonseca Para el piru. y si esto pudo tener effecto es en el tienpo Presente, con la merçed que dios a hecho deste nuebo puerto correspondiendole en la mar del sur otro que se llama del salto, que yo Tengo descubierto dias a de que di a vuestra magestad aviso y mas çerca para hazer en el la enbarcaçion que no en el de fonseca porque desta çuidad esta poco mas de veinte leguas a la mar del sur y el camino Echo y usado por esta çuidad del uno al otro puerto que quasi todo es camino Real, lo qual falta en el de fonseca por estar mas apartado y el camino no descubierto y con caudalosos Rios que avian menester puentes y muy costosos gastos, segun que me he ynformado de persona desta çuidad que andubo con el dicho yngeniero y don francisco de balverdi en toda aquella xornada, de la qual aunque abra Papeles en ese real consejo por do vuestra magestad sera ynformado, me pareçio que la dicha persona de quien digo lo e sido

yo, que es un vezino desta çiuðad muy honrrado y de credito escrivano de vuestra magestad que se llama alonso duarte, hiziese una breve Relaçon de lo que vio y entendio deste subçeso, que va conesta, por lo que Puede ser a proposito de lo que voy Tratando, y para [f. 12v] que yo mexor lo pueda Hazer en cossa tan ynportante cuya platica pienso sera a vuestra magestad agradable y en ynformar que entre estos dos puertos que se corresponden de la mar del norte a la del sur, esta çiuðad este en medio tan acomodada Para sustentarlos y amparallos, E determinado que demas de las diligençias que hize en el descubrimiento del dicho puerto del salto, en la mar del sur que fue que lo viesen de ynbierno y de berano Pilotos de las yndias y de españa Practicos de que ay escrito autos y pareçeres por donde aquel Puerto aprobaron, se buelva de nuebo otra vez a sondar y esperimentar, y de todo lo a el tocante, sitio y comodidades (que se dias a. son muy buenas) ymbiare a vuestra magestad relaçon mas anplia – y no tan solamente para el piru es de tan grande effecto y utilidad segun esta Referido a queste nuebo puerto mas aun para la nueba españa pienso (si no me engaño) puede ser de Probecho a do Teniendo por puerto tan peligroso E ynçierto como es el de san juan de ulua, en el qual y en la navegaçon que para el se trae por tan tenpestuoso mar ay tantos naufragios y peligrosos subçesos de los nabios y gente como se a visto por esperiençia, los podria evitar con mas seguridad de su persona y Hazienda, quien al dicho puerto de santo tomas viniese, y no se si me atreba a afirmar a vuestra magestad que podran Tambien las flotas de nueba españa venir a el y Traginarse las mercaderias desde esta çiuðad por el camino Real que va de aqui a mexico que es de asta doçientas y quarenta leguas, de las quales descontando çerca de çiento que desde el puerto de santo Juan de [f. 13r] Ulua ay a la çiuðad de mexico, no era mucho Por tan gran cossa como es vida y Hazienda, Rodear çiento y quarenta leguas mas por camino de Tierra viniendo al dicho puerto de santo tomas y por esta çiuðad para mexico, que los que van al piru aunque pueden yr Por mar asta el puerto del callao de lima y quassi sin Riesgo por ser muy mansa aquella mar y la navegaçon de ordinario mas segura en todo tiempo, con todo eso por solo que a vezes el viaje se alarga tienen los pasajeros por mucho Regalo en llegando al puerto de payta caminar a lima por tierra otras çiento y quarenta leguas y aun con algunas mercaderias que lleban – quanto mas que esta distançia de doçientas y quarenta leguas que ay desta çiuðad por el camino Real como esta dicho a la de mexico, se podrian acortar y ser menos no viniendo del puerto de santo tomas a guatemala derechos sino atrabesando el camino desde este puerto– y siendo assi que no aviendo Podido allarse aunque se a procurado tantas vezes por los virreyes de nueba spaña otro mas seguro puerto en aquella costa para escusar el que es tan peligroso como el que tiene, mucho de considerar es y estimar si puede aver lugar aora o en otro tiempo a que se consiga una cossa tan grandiossa como seria que para las flotas de piru y nueba españa se hubiese allado en este de santo tomas seguro y acomodado puerto, y que las dichas flotas juntas y aconpañadas y mas fuertes pudiesen bolver a españa con su Riqueça desde este puerto, y a la venida las naos que son para estas provinçias y honduras [f. 13v] viniesen yncorporadas con las de mexico asta este puerto , y con la misma seguridad estuviesen en el – y tambien que quando hubiese dispuçiion y comodidad en esos Reynos como algunas vezes a subçedido, de salir del Puerto de san lucas las flotas del piru y nueba españa juntas y a un mismo tiempo se hiziese lo mismo viniendo Para este nuebo puerto, y Por esta via subçeda que como con la ynvençion deste dicho puerto se desampara el de caballos, se dexa tambien el que en su tanto no es menos malo como es el de san Juan de Ulua que tiene mexico, y aunque tomado esto assi a bulto por mayor se Reputara por paradoxa y estrañeza, si se mira enpero por mayor, discurriendo en ello, otra cossa Pareze, y por aora me basta deçir negoçio tan arduo en esta pequena adbertençia, que el çelo y amor del serviçio de vuestra magestad me a causado para la proponer tan justo atrevimiento – y con esto assimismo a cessado y acabado de todo punto no

solo el puerto de Caballos sino tambien el golfo dulce que ambas partes heran ladroneras el uno de los cosarios y el golfo de los mismos y de otra Ruin gente españoles que como por aquellos Rodeos y anfratos se llebaban las mercaderias en las fragatas y varcos al golfo que hera lugar despoblado y desprobeydo, como a Rio buelto entre barqueros marineros y arrieros se cometian urtos, y el almozarife o encomendero que cobraba los derechos de vuestra magestad tenia oportunidad Para dar la quenta que quisiese en esto y en las cossas que de fuera venian no solo de nabios de flota mas de varcos y fragatas que alli aportaban de las yslas y Probinçias, [f. 14r] y anssi an sentido mucho el nuebo Puerto por no poder ser en el aprobechados como solian aviendo de aver mas Razon y quenta, y tambien vienen a escusarse y se aorra con este puerto el flete de las fragatas y derechos de encomienda que llebaba el dicho almozarife, y se aumentan los derechos de vuestra magestad con el trato y comerçio que mediante el dicho puerto viene aver de los puertos de canpeche, bacalar y cuçumel de la Provinçia de yucatan, con cuya comunicaçion que assi la ay mayor, se podra mejor unir y juntar aquella provinçia a esta para lo que arriba E Referido tocante a la jurisdiction, y dexo de deçir otros muchos effectos que no solo al presente se ven sino otros mayores de los que con el divino favor se pueden adelante sperar – E hecho assimismo descubrir el nuebo camino de Por Tierra que a queste nuebo Puerto a abido menester que es de veinte leguas y luego entra en el camino Real antiguo que esta çiudad tenia para el golfo como se ve por el mapa, el qual es muy façil y apaçible de tierra tiessa de cascaxal sin pantanos ni Rios y con arroyos de muy buen agua en que ay pescado y suficienete pasto para las cabalgaduras, Por el qual con gran seguridad se pueden traxinar las mercaderias que van desta tierra a esos Reynos por no tocar en el golfo ni en otra parte donde lleguen enemigos y an pasado ya Requas por el y llebadosse bastimentos y se podran por alli meter ganados para el sustento del dicho puerto, y los montes deste camino no son altos sino laderas llanas y con palmares que tambien sirben de pasto Para el ganado – y en suma es tal y tan bueno como lo es el puerto, y tan contrario al por do se entraba en el golfo, que en tres leguas que tenia de tan grandes [f. 14v] Pantanos y lodos era menester dos dias y Tres para Pasallo y eran muy Pocas las mulas que Podian yr Por el sino fueran muy fuertes y escogidas de las muchas que en esta tierra ay –y aunque çerca deste nuebo Puerto se podria Hazer embarcaçion Por un caudaloso Rio que alli esta por do fuesen las mercaderias para traer y llebarlas desta çiudad, conque se aorraria mucha parte del camino de Por Tierra, no me a pareçido yntroduçir esta navegaçion Por no despertar al enemigo al enemigo Para entrar con sus lanchas por el –y Para que de la provinçia de Honduras se habra camino de Por Tierra para este puerto voy dando orden como se haga que esto y ynformado que sin dificultad se podra descubrir, y aprobechar del camino nuebo de la Xigua que antes deste nuebo puerto yo tenia descubierto segun que lo escribi a vuestra magestad y de su vondad y aprobaçion consta Por los autos e ynformaçiones que van con esta, con que çesara la ocassion que an tomado las personas de aquella Probinçia de quexarse y contradreçir un bien tan grande y general como es el dicho puerto, çiegos de su particular ynteres sin echar de ver que a ellos tambien les cabia Parte de los daños que en el de caballos hazian los cossarios, y anssi dandoles este camino de Por Tierra descubierto de mas del que Tienen por mar desde su puerto de caballos con quien tan cassados estan distando del de Santo tomas menos de veinte leguas que por la mar no es de consideraçion a do Podran yr con tanta façilidad o por tierra o Por mar, no tienen Razon de dezir quedo desanparada aquella Provinçia antes pues el dicho nuebo Puerto de santo tomas a de ser el prinçipal do se a de Reduçir la fuerza de aquella costa, sin hazer casso de los demas Puertos [f. 15r] y el todo desta tierra y mar, a quien nezesariamente vuestra magestad a de mandar fortificar, pareze se podria traer a el la artilleria que esta en truxillo que es muy buena y en cantidad, y el situado de mill pesos de minas de Renta que alli gastan en polbora y

muniçion artilleros y çintinelas, y transferirlo todo alli; Porque aunque la prevençion y deffensa desta artilleria quando se ordeno que la hubiese en aquel puerto, pudo convenir Para que los cossarios que se yvan yntroduçiendo no llegasen a aquella tierra, cossa que en los Primordios de las yndias tanto se Recato y procuro Evitar, Haziendo entonçes gran casso de que este genero de enemigos pusiesen el pie en tierra, temiendo no se quisiesen en ella apoderar, de que se a visto tan claro el desengaño, pues aviendo entrado con fuerza de navios y gente tomado Lugares e yslas prinçipales de las yndias como fueron Cartagena sancto domingo Puerto Rico y otros no trataron de detenerse en ellos mas de quanto los Robaron, por ser solo su yntento a que vienen a las yndias no a otra cossa que a urtar,e y en la mar del sur se entendio lo mesmo de los que a ella pasaron que fueron tres y todos en mi tiempo, en tierra firme el capitan Juan asne. que fue el primero a quien presidiendo yo en el audiençia Real y Haziendo offiçio de capitan general en aquella ocassion que administre la guerra fue preso con sus compañeros de quien Hize justizia – y en el piru el cosario Richarte governando el marques de canete don garçia de mendoça cuyo lugarteniente de capitan general yo era – que tambien [f. 15v] fue Preso por don beltran de castro– y en tiempo del virrey conde del villar el cosario Thomas Candi, de los quales fue manifiesto por cossa çierta no benian sino a Robar y buscar Plata, y siendo assi y que quando viniesen a Truxillo no Era de consideraçion pues alli ay tan poco que Robar, que se puede deçir que la pobreza de la Tierra es la mayor deffenssa que pueden tener los vezinos della, y ver que todavia estan en aquella antigualla de que tocar el cosario el pie en su costa pobre, es mucho negoçio de sentir, y que para que no subçeda ayan de tener fortaleza que los defienda, no pareze causa suficiẽte para que alli se dexen estar aquella artilleria pues con ella no ay que guardar sino assi mesma, y que es lo que podian Robar – y para que no lo Hagan ni se pierda el buen nombre y Reputaçion que asta aora a tenido de deffenssa aquel puerto, seria bien quitarla de alli, Porque quando los cosarios entren y quemèn el pueblo que quasi todas las cassas del son de paxa sera façil a los vezinos Hazer otras mejores y con acogerse al monte quando los cossarios bengan es la mayor fortaleza que pueden tener, y assi pareze es ynpertinente y de poco fructo en aquel puerto la dicha artilleria y lo E entendido assi de personas pratricas y Religiosos granes de aquella provinçia – de mas que el dicho pueblo de Truxillo por la mas seguridad de cosarios se podra Retirar la Tierra adentro quatro o çinco leguas sin que se alexen de sus estançias y Haziendas del Campo quedando en el puerto algunas cassas como ventas que acudan a los pasajeros que aportaren alli [f. 16r] y los vezinos podrian bolver a el con sus grangerias a los tiempos de venida de naos de españa a do se Proveen de lo nezessario y Reçiven sus mercaderias; que esto mismo Hizo el virrey del piru conde del villar con la poblaçion de vezinos que avia en el puerto de payta, que por la misma ocassion de cossarios los quito de alli y se fueron a poblar a una antigua Poblacion de un fertil y deleytoso balle diez o doze leguas de la mar que llaman Piura, do al presente Residen y estan dexando en el puerto de paita algunas caserias que sirven de ventas para probeymiento de los pasajeros que vienen y van; de que nos dio notiçia a los oydores que entonçes nos allamos con el, y con esto los moradores de Honduras escusarian el trabajo y molesta que los gobernadores les dan tan continuo que a qualquiera nueba que las mas son falsas los conpele a venir a los Puertos (aunque del de caballos ya estan libres,) y todo es un Ruido vano porque el cossario en un punto Haze el salto y quando llega la gente siempre es tarde y sin effecto porque ya es acabada la ocassion y el enemigo ydo, pues detener a los dichoz vezinos en los puertos desperar el cossario (como entiendo se a hecho algunas vezes) es bexaçion y carga yncoportable, de mas de lo que los yndios que se Hallan en esto Padeçen, y assi Pienso çierto que si esta ocassion de yr los vezinos de comayagua a defender a Truxillo se quitase, estaria aquella provinçia de Honduras mas Poblada, y de gustosa bibienda, y que el cossario Retirada aquella

Poblacion segun E dicho tambien se Retiraria como lo Haze de todas las costas despobladas – De otra parte en contrario pareze segun me E ynformado que mudar el pueblo de ally seria mucho [f. 16v] Daño para los vezinos que con bibir junto a el tienen sus grangerias de que biben, y que estas Perderian si se apartasen, y que aquella probinçia aviendo cessado el puerto de caballos si tras desto se mudase el Puerto de Truxillo quedaria muy diminuida y desmantelada como dizen y de manera que no Hera nezesario governador sino se juntase con otra provinçia la de san salvador u otra vezina y que el situado y artilleria pues ya esta constituyda en aquel puerto y su magestad ahorra poco en quitalla, no se mude siendo como es abrigo y autoridad de aquella Tierra en su Real serviçio – y la determinaçion de lo que es mejor se podria esperar que la diese el tiempo, conque se tomara asiento en todo y asta que el camino de por Tierra se acabe de la dicha provinçia de Honduras y graçias a dios podria suspenderse vuestra magestad sera servido de Proveer en todo lo que mas convenga a su serviçio–

Y en tanto que vuestra magestad lo manda me pareçio que el dicho puerto de santo tomas fuese alcaldia mayor de la jurisdiction desta çiudad como lo es el golfo, y no de la provinçia de Honduras por estar mas acomodado a esta dicha çiudad y al trato prinçipal que los mercaderes della an de tener en el, y no estaria tambien que derechamente gobierne aquello el governador de Honduras como el presidente desta Real audiènçia a quien puesto que vuestra magestad aya dado el gobierno general de todas estas Provinçias, todavia tenerle mas en particular y directamente en el dicho puerto, es de diferente y de mejor expediçion para los cassos y negoçios que alli se ayan de Probeer supuesto que el governador de Honduras [f. 17r] no Puede asistir alli sino en veçes, por estar de ordinario en la çiudad de comayagua, de do tambien podra ocurrir y ayudar en ocassiones de guerra como lo hazia quando se ofreçian en el de caballos —

Y tambien sera nezesario nombrar official Real que asista en el dicho puerto a cobrar los derechos y alcabalas de vuestra magestad porque yr desta çiudad alguno de los que tienen a su cargo la Real caxa tendria ynconbiniente su ausençia y assi aunque al prinçipio yo avia Probeydo que en el ynterin que se nombraba fuese uno de los dos offiçiales desta çiudad, me pareçio despues mas conviniente que en la ocassion Presente deste año para las abaliamos y cobranças y Registros de las naos, viniese asistir al dicho nuevo puerto uno de los offiçiales de Honduras que estava en el de caballos en aquella sazón–

No bastando para los gastos que se Han ffecho (de que ay quenta y Razon) lo que de tributos de yndios vacos se Pudo Recoger, y por falta de plata estando a riesgo de dexarse una obra tan grande deste dicho puerto, y siendo en el mas ynterados que otras personas, los mercaderes desta çiudad, les obligue a que cada uno conforme a su posibilidad prestasen asta tres mill y treçientos ducados (aunque no se cobraron todos) y para ello tube parezer del audiènçia que lo aprobo y confirmo aviendose apelado de mi, devese esta cantidad y quasi otra tanta de xornales de yndios que an trabaxado en abrir el camino y hazer las cassas del puerto y en otros trabazos forçosos tocantes a el; suplico a vuestra magestad sea servido de mandar probeer de donde se pagua aquesto y lo demas que Resta forçosso para que obra tan grande se acabe de perfiçionar, aunque en lo substançial esta a [f. 17v bis] el puerto del sal lo mas a proposito que el de fonseca y camino a proposito: [...] 12

Incomodidades del puerto de San Juan de Ulua [...] 12 quinta

camino nuevo para el puerto nuevo [...] 14

Vase dando orden para que de Honduras se haga camino al nuevo puerto [...] 14

A el Rey nuestro señor
En su Real Consejo de Indias

Guatemala – 24 de marzo 1605

Del presidente de la audiencia

Haze Raçon de las diligencias que se han hecho sobre el descubrimiento del nuebo puerto de amatique de la mar del norte y de otras cosas tocantes destas.

Appendix 4: Breve del papa Inocencio XII estableciendo un subsidio de un millón de ducados de plata a imponer sobre frutos, rentas proventos y beneficios eclesiásticos de Indias que se especifican, durante tres años, a razón de un tercio anual y concediendo al rey Carlos II la facultad de aplicarlos a la represión de la piratería en costas americanas. AGI, MP, BULAS Y BREVES, 314.

INNOCENTIVS PP.XII.

AD FVTVRAM REI MEMORIAM. Etsi Nobis pro cura Pastoralis Officiis divina disponente providentiâ Nobis meritis licet imparibus, commissi nihil magis cordi sit, quàm personas Ecclesiasticas ab extraordinariis oneribus immunes semper conservare, id quo, nisi summa necessitas cogat, reipsa præstare animo statuerimus; nihilominus, cùm, sicût nomino Charissimi in Christo filii nostri Caroli Hispaniarum Regis Catholi Nobis nuper exponi fecit dilectus filius Nobilis vir Modernus Dux de Medina Coeli eiusdem Caroli Regis apud nos, et sedem Apostolicam Orator in Indiarum Occidentalium ipsi Carolo Regi subiectarum Oris Piratarum hæreticorum infestationes adeu creueriut, ut immanis illorum furor, non sine maximo Catholicæ fidei detrimento, vastissimas illas regiones cædibus, ruinis excidiis, direptionibus nec non Portuum, et locorum illarum partium invasionibus un dequaque complere saura que et profana omnia miscere minime vereatur; adeo que dictus Carolus Rex non tam suun, quàm Dei, cuins templa, et [...], veraque Religio pervertitur, acussi [...] ecclesiarum quo, et locorum piorum, quorum æ què personæ, status et bona summum in discrimen adducuntur, causam acturus, pro eorumdem Piratarum conatibus reprimendis omni virium, animique contertione maiores quàm unquam antea Classes parare, et instruere; instructas que quam primum adversus illos emittere intendat; verùm ingenti in eam causam faciendorum sumptuum moli Laicorum ea nun dem Indiarum facultates pares minimè futuræ Sint; ipse que Carolus Rex non tam pro Regnorum, et Dominorum Suorum quàm pro einsdem Catholicæ fidei in Indiis præfatis, ac in aliis Provinciis defensione adeò gravia expensarum onera subire hactenus coactus fuerit, et in dies cogatur, ut non solum ordinarios, et extraordinarios Regnorum suorum redditus verùm etiam omnia illorum ceraria ferè exhausserit; et propter á dictus Dux eiusdem Caroli Regis nomino nobis humiliter supplicari fecit, ut super ecclesiarum in Indiis supradictis consistentium peculio, Christi que Domini patrimonio aliquod subsidium ipsi Carolo Regi præstandum, et abco in subventionem expensarum præmissonun occasione faciendarum e rogandum inponere de benigne Apostolica dignemur: Nos considerantes non minus clericonun, quàm lanonun interessem ut Catholici nominis hostium andacia retundatur, ac ingentium einsdem Caroli Regis, eindgue Maiorum in hanc sanctam sedem men'tonum contemplation, et intuit, illum specialis favore gratia prosequi volentes, humoi supplicationibus inclinati, ad limites, et in causan pranarrata necessitatis de attributa Nobis à Domino potestatis plenitudine, tenore prasentium, indicimus, et imponimus, inxta tameu modum inferiùs exprimendum, et non aliàs, umun semeltantùm intra tres annos proximos illonun nempé singulo protertia parte persoluendum subsidium quod in totum summam unius Milionis Ducatonun moneta argentea illannu partium non excedat, spuer omnibus, et singulis fructibus, redditibus, et proventibus omnium Ecclesianun Patriarchalium, Archiepiscopalium, Episcoàlium, Collegiatanun, Paroocialium, necnon Monasterionun, et Conventuum, ac etiam Mensanun Abbatialium, Capitularium tam Cathedralium, etiam Metropolitanarum, et Patriarchalium, quàn quarumcumgue Collegiataru, Ecclesiarum inec non Conuentualium, Prioratum quogne Prapositionarum, Praceptoriamun, Canuicatum, et Prabendarum, Dignitatum, Personatum, administratorum, etian Fabrica at officiorum cateronungue Beneficiorum Ecclesiasticorum cum cura, et svire cura sacularium, ac sancti

Benedicti, sancti Augustini, Cluniacen, [...], Pramonstrateru ac quommaungno alionun Ordinam utringuo sexus etiam Mendicantium exprivilegio, et aliàs bona immobilia, sencertos redditus quoquo modo ecclesiasticos habentium, tãmvitonun, quàm Mulierum, nec non Congregationum, et Institutorum Regularium, ac Societatum, etiam Jesu; et pratereá Hospitalium pauperum hospitalitatem non exercentium, sen bona, et redditus ultra usus infinuorum, et alias, pro quibus instituta sunt, pia official exercenia possidentium, cecnon, quanuncumgne Militiarum, hexceptis tamen S.R.E. Cardinalibus, ac fratribus Militibus Hospitalis Sancti Joannis Hierosolymitani, gui pro sui tutela contra Jurcas et alios Infideles alienis auxiliis quotidie indigent, et quoad Patriarchales, Mertropolitanas, et alias Cathedrales Ecclesias, iis, quonun trium millium Scutonun, quo verò ad Curata, iis, quonun Centum, et quo ad si, plicia beneficia Ecclesiastica, iis, quorum ammi redditus summam viginti quatuor Ducatommi de Canera non excedunt: In Indiis occidentalibus prafatis, et Insulis eis adiacentibus eidem Carolo Regi subiectis consistentium, ac similiter superonmibus, et singulis pensionibus super pramissis assignatis, et assignandis percipiendum, et exigendum á qui buscumgno Patriarchis, Archiepiscopis, Episcopi, Primatibus, Praposis, Decanis, Capitulis, Canonicis, Rectoribus, Beneficiatis, Abbatibus, Prioribus, Comunendatariis, Abbatissis, Priorissis, fratribus Militibus, et aliis quocumque nomine nunenoatis sæcularibus, et Regularibus, ceterisque cuinsenmgne Dignitatis, Status, et conditionis existentibus præfata quocumquo inre, modo, occasione, et titulo obtinentibus, seu detinentibus, et obtenturis, necnon oeconomis, et Administratoribus perpetuis, sen temporalibus, Usufructuariis, ac fructus, pensiones, res, et alia quacumgue humoi Jura, et bona exquacumgne causa quanis autoritate in toto, velin parte sibiresernata, antconcessa habentibus, sen habituris secularibus, et regularibus Ordinum, Congregationum Militianun, et Hospitalium ptonun, necnon abipsis Ecclesiis, Capitulis, Connectibus Ordinibus, Congregationibus, Collegiis, Hospitalibus, Militiis, Mensis, Massis, et locis quocumque privilegio, et exemption reali, personali, et mixta, antiquâ, et inun immemorabili, pacificâ, et continuatâ suffultis; quos omnes exceptis supradictis Collectoribus ut infra dsputandis volumus subsidium prafatum intrá tres annos proximos, illonun videlicet singulo protertia parte, sicut pramittitur, persolvuisse, inxta tamen taxam, sen partitionem á Venerabilifrate Friderico Archiepiscopo Mediolanen nostro, et Apostolica Sedis in Reguis Hispanianun Nuncio postquàn sibi de Veritate narratonun constiterit, ita faciendam, ut portio ratione subsidii huinsmodi á personis ecclesiasticis. Justitia, et aqutatis regulis intereas accurate, et discretè servatis persolvenda omnino minor sit portione á laicis dictanun partium dictistribus annis durantibus in evismodi causam verè, realiter, et cum [...] ectu contribuenda, et non aliàs, aliter, necaliomodo, superquo einsdem Triderici Archiepiscopi conscientiam strictissimè oneramus. Decernentes nullas omninò exemptiones, et immunitates exactionem huiusmodi impedire posse; sicque perquoscumgue Incices Ordinarios, et Commissarios, etiam Causarum Palatii Apostolici Auditores, ac S.R.P. Cardinales etiam de latere legatos, sublatà eis, et eorum cuilibet quâuis aliter indicandi et interpretandi facultate, et autoritate, indicari, et definiri debere, ac irritum, et inanem si secus superhis á quoquam quauis auctoritate scienter, velignoranter contigerit attentari Coeteruin, ut supradict diligenter, et fideliter executioni demandentur, eumdem Tridericum Archiepiscopum Modernum, et protempore existem nostrum, et sedis ptoe indictis Reguis Hispanianun Nuncium, cuius integritas, et prudentia Nobis i am pridem cognita est, nec non Venlés fratres Archiepiscopos, Sn episcopos earuindem partium abeo nominandos subsidij huiusmodi Collectores cum omnibus inris dictionibus, quæ aliis huius modi Collectoribus de Jure, velconsuetudino quomo dolibet competunt, autoritate, et tenore prafatis constituimus, et deputamus. Mandantes, ut pecunia quacumque se subsidii huius modi exactione quomodolibet proventura, et redigenda memorato Carolo Regisen eius Ministris adid deputandis

despecialieinsdem Nuncii Mandato per eum subscripto trada [...], et consignentur, ad hoc ut in causa expensarum, sicut pramittitur, faciendum, enon in aliam quamcumque omnirio connertatur, ipsanunque pecuniarum, qua sic tradita, et consignata fuerint, rationes seorsum habeatur, et earum erogatio in causam su pradictam coram Nuncio prafato suo tempore instificetur. Praterea ipsi Nuncio plenam, liberam, et amplam, ai absolutam potestatem tribuimus taxam, et repartimentum humoi secunduin Justitia, et aquitatis regulas, sicut pramittitur, conficiendiac omni, et quacumque appellatione, recursu, mullitatis diction, ac in integrum restitutione penitus remotis, faciendi, et prascibendi, pradictos omnes ad subsidium humoi pro ata quem libet inxta prafatam Jaxam tangente persohendum, etiam per edictum locis publicis affigeidum, etiam sub censuris, et poenisecclesiasticis monendi, et requirendi, non parentes, contumaces, et fraudantes in censuras, et ponas prafatas incidisse declarandi, proprietates, fructus, res, et bona ipsonun [...], et usquo ad satisfactionem retinendi, contradictores, perurbatores, molestatores, et rebelios quoscumgue, eisgue anxilium vel favorem publicè, vel ocultè quouis quasito colore prastantes cuinscumgue Dignitatis, gradus, et Ordinis fuerint prafatis, aliisque censuris, et poenis Ecclesiasticis, nscenon peuniariis, cceterisgue Innis, et facti resmediis opportunis compescendi, illasque etiamiteratis vicibus aggravandi, eos verò, qui debitès santiffecerit, abonmibus censuris, et poenis supradictis in forma ecclesiac consueta absoluendi; Deunin quascumque personas ecclesiasticas in collectors, et Subcollectores fide, et facultatibus idoneos in omnibus Cinitatibus, Dioecesibus, Provinciis, et Ditionibus e [...] Indiarum Occidentalium, et Insulamm, eisadiacentium quotquot expedierit econstituendi, ac eos et sonem quemlibet arbitrio suo revocandi, negligentes, et morosos remouindi, ac alium, sen alios subpgandi quotiescmngue ei videbitur; indelinqentes, et contumaces par se velalium, sen alios, etiam sunplicitè, et de plano, ac sine strepitu et figura Indixij inquirendi, ac eos meritis poevis puniendi, modos, et formas in prafatis servandas prascibendi, dubia quacumque in pramissis forte oritura dedarandi. [...]: Bonifacii Papa vii. Pradecessoris nostril de unà, et Concilii generalis de duabus Dictis, aliisque Apostolicis, ac in Uninesalibus, Provincialibusque, et Synodalibus Conciliis eclitis generalibus velspecialibus Constitutionibus, et Ordinationibus inecnon Ecclesiarum, Monasteriorum, Connentuum, Collegiorum, et locorum piomm, ac Ordinum, Congregationum, Societatum, etiam Jesu, Militiarum, et aliorum ptonun, et quibusuis a liis etiam juramento, confirmaons Aplica, vel quanis firmitate [...] roboratis Statutis, et consuetudinibusm stabilimentis, et usibus etiam immemorabilibus; [...]: quoque, Indultis, et literis A'plicis eisdem Ecclesiis, Monasteriis, Collegiis, Connentibus, et locis piis, ac ordinibus, Congregationibus, societatibus, etiam Jesu, Militiis, et aliis pradictis illonunguo Prasulibus, Capitulis, Abbatibus, aliisquo superioribus, et personis qui buslibet etiam in [...] foundationis, et ertionis sub qui buscum quo verbonun tenoribus, et formis, ac cum qui busuis etiam derogatoriis derogatoriis aliisque efficacioribus, efficacifsimis, et insolitis clausulis, irsitan tibusque etaliis Decretisin genere, usfinspecie, etiam consistorialiter, et alias quomo dolibet incontrarium pramissonum concessis, confinatis, approbatis, et innovatis. Quibus ommibus, et singulis, etiam si proillonum sufficienti derogatione de illis eonungne totistenoribus specialis, specifica, expressa, et individua, ac de verbo ad verbum, non autemper clausulas generales idem importantes mentio sen quanis alia expressio habenda, ant aliqua alia exquisita forma ad hoc serva [...] huimodi, ac si de verbo ad verbum nihil pemius omipo, et forma in illis tradità observatâ, exprimerentur, et inseverintur, prasantibus proplenè, et sufficienter expressis et insertis habentes, illis alias in suo rebore permansmis, ad præmissorum effectum hacvice dumtaxat specialiter [...] plenissimè, et amplissimè derogati, ese volumus, cæterisquo contrariis qui buscumque; Aut si præfatis, velaliis qui buslibet communiter, vel divísima abeadem sit sede

indultum, quod in interdici, suspendi, vel excommunicari non possint per literas Apostolicas non facientes plenam, et [...] Indulto humo mentionem. In percipiendo verò subsidio præfato rec: memoria clementis Papæ v. etiam Prædecessoris nostri in Concilio [...] Constitutionem ac præsertim quòd nec Calices, nec libri, ceteraque Ecclesiarum Ornamenta [...] divino Cultui dicata, a [...] causa pignoris capi, recipi, vel distrahi, aut aliàs quomodo dolibet occupari debeant ubique [...] illius occasione Ecclesiæ Monasteria, aliæque pia, et sacra loca quæcumque debitis propterea non fruantur obsequiis ac dim [...] in eis cultus et [...] literarum exenita, etiam impressa [...], et alius personæ in Dignitate Ecclesiastica constitutæ Sigillo obsignata eandem in Indicio, et extra illud ubique locorum fidei faciant, quam ipsæ Originales facerent, si essent exhibitæ, vel ostensæ. Datum Romæ apud S. Mariam Maiorem Sub Annulo Piscatoris [...] Pontificus [...] Anno Tertio.