Three Essays on Economics of the Parliaments

Abstract

I focus on the economics of the Turkish Parliament. In Chapter One, I estimate the impact of one additional Member of Parliament (MP) representing a province on that province’s economic growth: an extra MP increases the light of her province by 1% in a given year, which corresponds to an annual increase of 0.095% in real GDP. This increase likely is driven by MPs who are members of the government party. Meanwhile additional provincial representation increases the number of discussions of that particular province in public parliamentary meetings, as well as the funds allocated to that province. Taken together, some of Turkey’s regional economic growth is associated with legislative representation. In Chapter Two, the value of MP’s immunity in legislation is explored. Using a Difference-in-Differences design, we show that opposition MPs reduce their scrutiny of the government after they lose protection against prosecution. In addition, MPs’ other legislative activities, such as the number of laws they draft, decrease when they lose their immunity. The back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the value of an MP’s legal immunity is at least $100,000. In Chapter Three, I look into the relation between political election intensity and female nomination. I find that a more competitive electoral race positively impacts the party leadership’s nomination of female candidates in the next election. Specifically, in more competitive districts, compared to their counterpart districts with less competition, women are nominated such that their ex-ante probability of re-election is greater. In addition, in highly competitive districts, the number of female candidates on a party’s ticket is greater.