The Changing Status of Women in Taiwan: 1945-2010

by

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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the economic, social, and political status of women in Taiwan from 1945 to 2010. This research was guided by a theoretical model of how the status of women worldwide is influenced by the extent of patriarchal culture, the level of economic development, and the degree of democratization.

Hypotheses drawn from the theoretical model were tested by using data collected from 174 developing and developed nations. Overall, the statistical analysis found that patriarchal culture, economic development, and democratization exert fairly strong influences over some dimensions of women's status but have little association with others. This implies that the nature of women's status is complex and complicated because each nation has its own circumstances that are shaped by its historical background, traditional culture, geographic location, and so on. Therefore case studies of individual countries should provide valuable insights into the dynamics of women's changing status in the contemporary world.

This dissertation presents such a case study that analyzes the status of Taiwanese women in terms of social conditions, human and social capital, economic activities, and political participation and power. Although women made major progress in all four areas, significant problems and barriers remain. In terms of social conditions, Taiwanese women made substantial gains and reached developed world status by the 21st century on

life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and fertility. However, Taiwan's sex birth ratios give strong evidence of selective female abortions after the second child, indicating the continued existence of patriarchal norms.

During the postwar era, there have been tremendous increases in women's educational levels and literacy; and the pre-existing gender gap on these dimensions has vanished among younger Taiwanese. In addition, women are now more active than men in voluntary organizations. However, substantial sex segregation in higher education majors still remains; and the less educated women from previous generations are at a substantial disadvantage in the country's modernized economy and society.

Over time women's participation in the labor force has increased greatly, but it still is not high by international standards. In addition, there was a major jump in occupational segregation between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, which probably hurt women's relative status. In contrast, women's average wages and salaries have risen to approximately 80 per cent of men, far from equal but approximately the level that exists in the United States.

Women and men now vote at equal rates, although women remain substantially underrepresented in terms of office-holding. Over the postwar period, women's representation in legislatures and councils increased gradually to 20 per cent to 30 per cent over the last two decades, although their share of the elective chief executives of local governments is much lower. There were few women in the national cabinet before 2000, but since then they have held 15 per cent to 20 per cent of the ministerial posts; and women's share of the civil service has increased markedly over the last two decades to

nearly 40 per cent. By international standards, this is fairly respectable.

The experience of women in Taiwan since the end of World War II, consequently, offers hope to women in other developing nations. Their living conditions have improved greatly; and they are approaching parity with men on many dimensions. While certain types of inequality certainly remain, more progress in the future appears highly likely.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

After the Second World War, countries all over the world were able to reconstruct their war destroyed economies or to start work on economic development. Within just a few decades, Taiwan has been transformed from an agricultural society to first an industrial and then a high-tech economy as well as from an authoritarian government to a liberal democracy. In fact, Taiwan, one of Asia's Four Little Dragons, is praised as an economic miracle in the world (Chow, 2002; Wong, 2003; Vogel, 1991).

Based on the “modernization model,” it is assumed that socioeconomic development, along with democratization, leads to equality for women who have long been suppressed in patriarchal societies. The logic is that economic development should bring wealth. As a result, mass education is possible and necessary and should, in turn, affect production relationships and lifestyles in different ways. Further, development should bring democratic politics. Therefore, women could push for legal and policy reforms through which “gender inequality” might be reduced. That is, a compound of social, economic, and political changes would create “modernization”, which could undermine traditional patriarchal norms and provide women with a great many resources through which they could pursue their own goals autonomously and improve their lives

(Black, 1966; Eisenstadt, 1973; Klein, 1984; Randall, 1987).

However, in the real world, economic development and its accompanying changes might not generate results which would benefit women and improve their situations as the modernization model has predicted. Ester Boserup (1970), in her book *Women's Role in Economic Development*, points out that many women in developing countries face marginalization rather than enhancement. Generally, they are confined to unstable, low-paying, unskilled manufacturing jobs. In addition, women's traditional roles and statuses and support from kinship networks are substantially eroded in the modernization process. Women in some social groups and classes might gain from industrialization, but the accompanying economic and social transformations have reproduced and reinforced patriarchy in many ways. With regard to political participation, it is expected that economic development brings forth democratization. Democratization thus offers opportunities for women to exert political influence resulting in policies and legal reforms that can be used to directly change or soften the patriarchal culture of a society (Clark and Lee, 2000, p. 1-3; Clark and Clark, 2002, p. 3-5). Regrettably, according to Darcy, Welch, and Clark's research (1994) and Rule's studies (1987, 1994a, and 1994b), women are underrepresented among political officials in all but a very few countries, even in the developed world.

In sum, the relationship between development and the status of women is not absolute and decisive. Thus, this study attempts to explore the changing status of women in Taiwan under the impact of economic development. Taiwan presents a good case study for this purpose for several important reasons. First, Taiwan has documented

economic achievement during the entire postwar period and has completed the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy and from industrialization to a primarily postindustrial society. This research examines how a successful economic transformation, in turn resulting in cultural, social, economic, and political changes, can affect women's status. Second, in the early 1970s the first wave of the Taiwan women's movement arose after Lu Hsiu-lien wrote her New Feminism. Since then, diverse women's organizations or associations have emerged after Martial Law was lifted in 1987. Most of Taiwan's feminists and members of women's groups once studied in western countries, especially in the United States. They introduced trends of western thought to men and women in Taiwan (Ku, 1988, p. 181; Wang, 1999; Chen 2004; Chang, 2009).

Moreover, Taiwan is becoming an open society. Taiwanese do business with countries all over the world; and people go abroad for traveling or studying very frequently. Furthermore, by 2005, 364,596 people from foreign countries and China (339,752 females and 24,844 males) had married Taiwanese (Foundation of Women Rights Promotion and Development, 2007, p. 44-45). How and in what ways would a patriarchal culture be challenged or eroded by these above existing conditions is an open question.

Third, Boserup (1970) points out "With fewer children and lighter domestic duties, the work pattern for married women in developing countries will probably be radically different from the one seen during earlier periods of industrialization when most married women stayed at home. It follows that in the future, when a large proportion of women may have jobs, it becomes an important task to devise new educational and training

programmes, which can help to reduce the productivity gap between male and female labor, thus fitting women to their new way of life" (Boserup, 1970, p. 225). What Boserup had predicated, proposed, and suggested will be examined in this research. In the early 1950s, access to education was extremely limited and showed clearly a very noticeable gender imbalance as the average man had attended school for four years and the average woman one and a half. In 1968, the government enacted nine-year (elementary and junior-high) compulsory education and paid for it by public expenditures. This policy started to expand educational opportunity in general and to narrow the different education level afforded to girls and boys. Moreover, the "spillover" of education policy and fewer children trends, accompanying greater affluence, have tremendously narrowed the educational gap between males and females (Hermalin, Seltzer, and Lin, 1982; Parish and Willis, 1993; Tsai, Gates, and Chiu, 1994; Hayhoe, 1995; Yi, 2002, p. 337-340).

Finally, women in Taiwan have gained very significant representation in many areas of the public sphere. Women's groups and parties' competition under the impact of democracy provide opportunities to improve the status of women. Diverse women's groups and organizations have emerged since Martial Law was lifted in 1987. Some of them focus on gender concerns from different perspectives and provide professional services and assistance to women. Others actively participate in political and social movements to urge the modification of laws and to supervise the government's execution of public policies to improve women's status in Taiwan's society (Lee, 1988; Ku, 1988 & 1989; Wang, 1999; Fan, 2000; Chen, 2004; Chang, 2009). Revising the Civil Code in

order to ensure women's property rights, quickening the legislative process of the Equal Employment Act, and lobbying the passage of the Gender Equity Education Act are major achievements during the process of democratization (Chen, 2004; Chang, 2009). Also, Taiwan has been democratizing in terms of high competition between parties. The competition has encouraged women to take part in politics. For example, there were 47 legislators of the Legislative Yuan, as women held 20.9% of the seats during 2005-2007 (elected in 2004). The 2008 legislative elections elected 34 female legislators from a total of 113 members, representing 30% of total seats in the Legislative Yuan. The 1946 constitution guaranteed women 10 % of the legislative seats at all levels of governments, and from the late 1960s women generally won more than the minimum quota (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990; Chou and Clark, 1994; Lee, 2000). In 2005, in some local elections they even reached above 30 percent (Foundation of Women Rights Promotion and Development, 2007, p. 114, Table 5-1-7). Taiwan's new democracy with its increasing number of female elected officials and legislators, is worthy of being the subject of research.

2. Progress and Problems for Women in Taiwan

This section presents an overview of the status of women in the economic, social and political realms.

At the end of 2006, Taiwan's population reached 22.9 million, of which 11.3 million were female. Life expectancy for women had increased from 71.45 in 1970 to 79.4 in 2004 and was nearly 6 years longer than that for males (73.6). Females had a

lower death rate than males; the female death rate was 458 per 100,000, while the male rate was 718 per 100,000, meaning that the male death rate was 1.57 times the female rate. The total fertility rate in Taiwan has experienced an uninterrupted decline since 1951. In 2004, the average number of children born to each woman aged 15 to 49 was 1.2, which was the lowest in historical records. At the same time, there were 109 boys born in Taiwan for every 100 baby girls, this ratio was much higher than the normal condition because the global ratio of males to females at birth is about 105:100 (ROC, 1998, p. 23; Women Web, 2006; ROC, 2007).

With regard to education, except at the highest level, there was no difference in the educational attainment of young men and women at the university level and below for the 2004 school year (Women Web, 2006). But substantial gender segregation by subject matter continues to exist at the level of colleges and vocational schools (Liu, 2002, p. 90-94).

In 2005, the female labor force participation rate was 48.1%, which reached the historically highest point (according to Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan). In contrast, men's participation rate has decreased since 1987 (75.2%). In 2005, it went down to 67.6%, which was the lowest point on record. That is, the gap between male and female labor force participation has narrowed year by year. However, women's labor force participation in Taiwan was lower than that of 2004's global average at a rate of 53.9%, while around 60 per cent of all workers were women in Western countries. Although the female labor force participation rate has been increasing steadily in Taiwan, there are still huge differences in earnings between men and women.

In 2004, females in non-agricultural sectors earned NT$37,104 monthly, on average about 78% of what males earned (NT$47, 836) (ROC, 1989a, p. 62; Women Web, 2006; ILO, 2004, p. 2; Lien, 2005, p. 294; ROC, 2007, p. 12).

In regard to social participation, volunteering and citizen involvement have been actively promoted by Taiwan's government in recent years. In 2004, there were 45,000 females registered as volunteers, making up 68.8% of all volunteers in Taiwan (Women Web, 2006). The gender ratio of elected officials and legislators in the latest elections for all categories of public office and political representation in Taiwan are as follows: 2 county magistrates (8.7%); 234 councilwomen (26%), 32 Legislators of the Legislative Yuan (18.2%); 17 councilwomen in Taipei (32.7%) and 10 councilwomen in Kaohsiung (22.7%) in the 2002 election. At the end of 2006, Chen Chu was elected mayor of Kaohsiung. Before Chen was elected, there weren't any female mayors in Taipei or Kaohsiung; Taipei and Kaohsiung are two special municipalities in Taiwan. In 2004, the number and sex ratio of administrators and government personnel in Taiwan was as follows: 7 chiefs of the Executive Yuan (18.9%); 2 commissioners of the Executive Yuan (28.6%); 3 justices (20%); 3 commissioners of the Examination Yuan (15.8%); 2 commissioners of the Control Yuan (9.1%); 47 Legislators of the Legislative Yuan (20.9%); and 29 chief administrators (9.5%) (Women Web, 2006).

In Taiwan, from the1970s until now, the status of women has dramatically changed in line with the nation's cultural, social, economic, and political change. It is necessary to investigate each influence that caused the changing of women's status; otherwise, we cannot see the whole picture of how the status of women arrived at current

conditions in this country.

As Clark and Clark mentioned in “Institutions and Gender Empowerment in Taiwan,” “a nation’s social and cultural institutions are a central determinant of the opportunities that women have for empowerment in a particular society.” (Clark and Clark, 2008, p. 140). In early times, under traditional beliefs such as: "treatment of females as inferior to males" and "a girl will get married sooner or later and is prone to take the side of her husband instead of her own family," most parents supported their sons to have further studies using their limited financial resources, but girls had to get jobs or stay at home helping with domestic work after they graduated from primary schools. This severe barrier to women’s empowerment was overcome in 1968, because the government made elementary and junior-high education compulsory and paid for it by public expenditures. Moreover, families now had ample financial resources to support both sons and daughters, due to Taiwan’s economic development and fewer children trends. Women’s greater educational opportunities since the end of 1960s are widely seen as one of the important contributions to the increased status of women in Taiwan (Hermalin, Seltzer, and Lin, 1982; Parish and Willis, 1993; Tsai, Gates, and Chiu, 1994; Hayhoe, 1995; Yi, 2002, p. 337-340).

During the 1960s, the government in Taiwan drew forth its economic development policies and started to head towards industrialization. Abundant cheaper workers and inexpensive manufacturing sites were the two major factors attracting many foreign companies to set up production branches in Taiwan. In 1966, the first manufacture and export center, Kaohsiung Chienchen Export Processing Zone (EPZ),

joined the industrial line. Two other export centers, Kaohsiung Nantzu EPZ and Taichung Tantzu EPZ, were established by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1971. These centers became the main gates to foreign investors, which benefited the most from the development of the world economy and usually imported cheap materials and exported manufactured goods, including textiles, garments, shoes, toys, leather and electronic products. They combined the advantages of imported materials, the cheap cost of the facility and the low wages of domestic female workers. It was the inexpensive young female laborers at great human cost that enabled the economic miracle of Taiwan to happen (Ho, 1978; Ranis, 1979; Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981; Gold, 1985).

While female workers were gradually becoming the main force in the labor market, industry in Taiwan was also being transformed. The labor disputes, wage increases, and appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar gradually decreased the competition of export products. On the other hand, a steep hike in land prices further aggravated the overall manufacturing environment, forcing many small and medium-sized firms as well as labor-intensive enterprises, to scale down, shut down, or move their businesses. Those firms that moved often relocated on the Chinese mainland or elsewhere in Southeast Asia, leading to a shrinkage in their relevant sectors.

Upgrading and deskilling resulted from economic restructuring in Taiwan. For further development, most industries eliminated their old machines and invested in new equipment for automation of production. Employers only hired a few skilled workers to operate machines in terms of capital-intensive investment; the government permitted various sectors to introduce foreign workers; and some industries hired cheaper foreign

female laborers to replace local female workers. Furthermore, one way that employers have deskilled jobs was through new technologies. Employers needed fewer white-collar workers in their offices than before because of computerization. Deskilling was also common at fast-food restaurants and super markets, where many modern cash registers now are programmed to take over part of the selling jobs. The trend of upgrading and deskilling resulted in some jobs disappearing and some jobs being created, but most new jobs were low-skilled and low-paying jobs. Moreover, new jobs seemed fewer than the jobs that had disappeared, and both men and women were victims, as the unemployment rates were 2.6% in 1996, the highest in that decade (Ho, 1997). This situation was not improved as the unemployment rates reached 5% and 4.4% in 2003 and 2004, respectively (ROC, 2009b).

On the other hand, in 1996, Taiwan's hardware information technology industry (domestic and overseas combined) yielded a total production value of US$18.2 billion, making it Taiwan's most important foreign exchange earner. Up 20% from the previous year, Taiwan has been the world's third-largest computer hardware supplier since 1995, trailing only behind the United States and Japan. Access to technical and professional fields has gradually opened up to women. The number of female employees working in Hsinchu's Science-based Industrial Park has been increasing year by year, where the percentage of female employees was 52% of total employees in 1994 (Taiwan Women Web, 1998). In 2003, the ratio of males to females working in Hsinchu's Science-based Industrial Park was still around half (Song & Huang, 2004).

Generally speaking, the young generation of female workers has the advantage of

higher education, and they might benefit from economic transformation. Those low-educated middle-aged female labors are sacrificed, and some of them are involuntarily unemployed.

Women in Taiwan have gained very significant representation in many areas in the public sphere, as the statistical data showed earlier. Women's groups and parties' competition provide evidence of the impact of democracy upon the status of women. First, it wasn't until the early 1970s when the first wave of the Taiwan women's movement brought the public's attention to the unequal treatment of women. The Awakening of Women Magazine Agency founded in 1982 by Lee Yuan-chen was the only women's organization to focus on gender issues during the enforcement of Martial Law. In turn, diverse women's organizations or associations have emerged since Martial Law was lifted in 1987. The distinguishing feature of these women's groups is that they began to focus on gender concerns from different perspectives. Some of them provide professional services and assistance to women. Others actively participate in political and social movements to urge the modification of laws and to supervise the government's execution of public policies to improve women's status in Taiwan's society. They directly challenge the thousand-year-old patriarchal culture and provide support for women's rights as well as gender equality (Lee, 1988; Ku, 1988 & 1989; Wang, 1999; Fan, 2000; Chen, 2004). Second, Taiwan has been democratizing in terms of high competition between parties. The competition has caught the attention of women. Therefore, women's policy always is one of their political views because each party only can win the election through the support of women's votes. Revising the Civil Code in order to

ensure women's property rights and quickening the legislative process of the Equal Employment Act are major legislative achievements during the process of democratization (Chen, 2004; Chang, 2009).

The status of women in Taiwan has been changed step by step along with social, economic, and political transformation. The improvement is associated with the transition from agricultural society to industrialization, from an industrial economy to high-tech development and from an authoritarian government to liberal democracy.

Industrialization has brought greater wealth. As a result, the level of education of both sexes has increased. Thus, highly educated people allowed Taiwan to develop a high-tech industry and compete with other countries, such as South Korea. In this global competition, Taiwan's women were not absent. Because of the similar education opportunities among men and women, they are able to participate in high-tech industry.

On the one hand, the society has urbanized along with the economic development. The kinship system is being diminished in some way. Social change and economic development have granted Taiwanese women more autonomy, resources, and a sense of self-efficacy. In these regards, Taiwanese females are empowered, and the status of women is improved. On the other hand, traditional cultures and patriarchal norms have been challenged. According to the Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taipei City Government, in 2004, there were five alien bridegrooms among 100 new weddings; and, 70% of alien bridegrooms come from European countries, North America, and Japan (Shi, 2005). Also, problems concerning the high divorce rates, single mothers, and alien brides all result from social changes, according to many studies (Hsia, 2000;

Liu, 2001; Pong, 2006; Copper, 2009, p. 101).

On the surface, it seems the status of women has been greatly improved based on the statistical data. But, serious disparities among women themselves might be revealed if some conditions are taken into account. For example, the young generation of female workers has the advantage of higher education, and they might benefit from high-tech development and earn decent pay. Those low-educated middle-aged female workers are sacrificed, and some of them are involuntarily unemployed owing to economic transformation (Ho, 1997). Also, the status of women might not be improved if we are aware of social conditions and violent attacks. For instance, Peng Wan-ru, a long-time activist in Taiwan's feminist movement and the director of the Women's Division of the Democratic Progressive Party, was murdered in 1996 (Yang, 2006). In 2001, among the 15,681 victims of criminal acts of violence, 69.27% were women (Liu, 2002, p. 100).

History shows that women's rights do not improve automatically. They need to be improved through the efforts of government, advocacy groups and women themselves. Due to Peng's sacrifice the Sexual Assault Prevention Act was passed at the end of the same year. The Gender Equity Education Act was announced on the 23rd of June, 2004. The General Provisions state the purposes of the act: "to promote substantive gender equality, eliminate gender discrimination, uphold human dignity, and improve and establish education resources and environment of gender equality." The act originated from a local feminist movement in the 1980s, began to be drawn up in 2000, and was announced in 2004 (Chang, 2009, p. 123-125). Since the middle of the1980s, Taiwan has been democratizing because of high competition between the major parties. If women

are diligent to use their votes, their voice will be heard. As the numbers of female legislators increase, women's political representation should enhance their political power and have policy consequences for women's daily lives.

The next section discusses the chapter outline, which presents the remainder of the five chapters for this research.

3. Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 reviews the literature and, accordingly, develops a path diagram as well as hypotheses. The first section discusses theories about patriarchal culture and how it inhibits the status of women. The second briefly summarizes the central dynamics and basic stages of economic development; and the third describes the conflicting theories of how development affects the status of women. The fourth discusses the presumed relationship between democratization and the status of women. Finally, the fifth section presents a theoretical model of how three factors (culture, economic development, and democratization) influence women's status in the contemporary world.

Chapter 3 tests the theoretical model, developed in Chapter 2, of the factors that shape the status of women and then uses these data to evaluate the relative status of women in Taiwan. There are three parts in the chapter. The first one talks about defining and measuring properties, as well as data collection. In the second part, the eight research hypotheses are tested for 174 countries. The third part focuses on comparing Taiwan to other nations in the world, both developing and developed, by various indicators of women's status and then uses a "residuals analysis" from regressions using

gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) to explain a nation's values on these items to determine whether Taiwan is an "underachiever" or "overachiever."

Chapter 4 gives an overview of Taiwan's socioeconomic and political transformation over six decades. There are five sections in this chapter. The first one briefly introduces Taiwan. The next four describe the major stages of Taiwan's transformation from a poor agricultural and authoritarian country to an exporter of high-tech products, post-industrial society, and young democratic nation, as a background for analyzing the status of women in Taiwan in chapter 5.

Chapter 5 presents statistics and analysis on the status of women in Taiwan, highlighting changes over time and the current situation as well as the differences between men and women in Taiwan and women in other countries. Analyses are based mainly on statistics and resources from Taiwan's government and international statistical agencies. The study covers four broad dimensions – social conditions, human and social capital, economic activities, and political participation and power. The end of this chapter summarizes the progress that women have and have not made.

Chapter 6 presents the finding of this study, illustrates the dynamics of women's status of Taiwan, and develops a model to explain both the progress and limitations in women's social, economic, and political status in Taiwan. The significance of this study illustrates at the end of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 2

INFLUENCES ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

The status of women varies tremendously among contemporary nations and societies (Giele and Smock, 1977; Gray, Kittilson and Sandholtz, 2006). While women may not have achieved full equality anywhere, women have far more ability to exercise their talents and pursue their own interests and agendas in some societies, such as the Scandinavian ones, than in others, such as many Middle Eastern ones (The Global Gender Gap Report 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). As summarized in Figure 2.1, three general factors have been suggested as explanations for why this is so. First, the culture of a society certainly shapes the opportunities available to women; and some cultures are extremely patriarchal, while others are less so. Second, industrialization tends to bring cultural change favorable to women and to allow women to find employment and escape ties to tradition; and post-industrial "information" economies are particularly favorable for women. Finally, women can use political processes in democracies to gain legal protections and adopt favorable policies. Thus, economic development and democratization are often seen as empowering women, although these conclusions have been strongly challenged as well.

This chapter develops the theoretical foundation for analyzing the status of women in Taiwan by examining previous research on the three factors that shape women's roles in a society. The first section discusses the nature of patriarchal cultures and how this concept has been applied to Confucian cultures. The second briefly summarizes the central dynamics and basic stages of economic development; and the third describes the conflicting theories of how development affects the status of women. The fourth discusses the presumed relationship between democratization and the status of women. Finally, the fifth section presents a summary model of how these three factors influence women's empowerment in the contemporary world.

Figure 2.1 Forces Promoting the Empowerment of Women



1. Theories about Patriarchal Culture and How It Inhibits the Status of Women

What is culture? There might not be a single answer to this question. *Redefining Culture: Perspectives Across the Disciplines,* by Baldwin et al., presents over 300

definitions of culture from across the disciplines (Baldwin, Faulkner, Hecht and Lindsley, 2006). In addition, Samuel P. Huntington points out that the term “culture” has had multiple meanings in different disciplines and different contexts. He suggests that if culture includes everything, it explains nothing (Harrison and Huntington, 2000, p. xv). On the one hand, this study focuses on how Chinese patriarchal culture influences women’s lives. Thus, “culture” refers to values, beliefs and attitudes in terms of gender relations. On the other hand, for some sociologists, culture is contrasted with structure. They argue that societies consist of a framework of social institutions—the social structure—and culture provides a kind of social cement keeping the structure intact. For example, Talcott Parsons distinguished social structure from culture which is responsible for integration and goal attainment (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2000, p. 83). Based on this argument and this model, this section investigates how the cultural factor influences women’s roles and gender relations and shapes women’s status.

In regards to gender equality, Barbara Crossette, in her article “Culture, Gender, and Human Rights”, argues that “despite great political and economic gains in many places, women around the world still have good reason to be sensitive to how cultures affect them” (Crossette, 2000, p. 181). In addition, some scholars suggest that a society’s cultural heritage is one of the factors that shape the status of women (Rives and Yousefi, 1997). Furthermore, Clark and Lee indicate that in almost all societies, women as a whole are forced into subordinate roles and statuses that are embedded in and reinforced by a wide array of patriarchal cultures (Lee and Clark, 2000, p. 1).

The Nature of Patriarchy

Sylvia Walby points out that the concept of patriarchy is an essential tool in the analysis of gender relations (Walby, 1989, p. 213). While the concept of "patriarchy" has been criticized for not being able to deal with historical and cross-cultural variation in the forms of women's subordination, Walby offers a new way of theorizing patriarchy to meet these objections. She defines patriarchy as a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women. In turn, the author suggests that patriarchy needs to be conceptualized at different levels of abstraction. At its most abstract, patriarchy comprises a system of social relations. At the next level, patriarchy is composed of six structures: the patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions, such as religion, the media and education. In each of these structures, it is possible to identify sets of patriarchy practices (Walby, 1989, p. 214).

According to Walby, the patriarchal mode of production is one of two patriarchal structures operating at the economic level. Women's labor is expropriated by their husbands within the marriage and household relations (Walby, 1989, p. 221). Walby asserts, by invoking Christine Delphy's argument (Delphy, 1984; cited in Walby, 1989, p. 221), that the defining feature is the relationship of production under which the work is performed rather than the tasks which constitute the work. The work performed by women may range from cooking and cleaning for the husband to caring for their children. Women's domestic work is not rewarded with money because it is part of the marriage

relationship between a husband and wife. That is, the wife works for her husband. The husband is able to expropriate the wife's labor because he has possession of the labor power which she had produced. He has effective possession of the fruits of her labor. Also, he is able to sell this labor power as if it were his own (Walby, 1986). After constructing the structure of housework, Walby presents three stages to her claim. First, the domestic division of labor is a major form of the differentiation of men and women. Second, the domestic division of labor has significant effects on other aspects of social relations. Third, the domestic division of labor is a form of gender inequality. Walby points out that time budget studies and the research on the domestic division of labor show the unequal amounts of housework and total labor time performed by the spouses (Cowan 1983; Gershuny 1983, 1987; Oakley 1974; Vanek 1980; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 221). Also, the results of investigation of the unequal division of household resources demonstrate that women have a lesser share in the consumption of household goods than do men, ranging from food to leisure time (Deem 1986; Delphy 1984; Pahl 1983; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 221).

Patriarchal relations in paid work shape the second of the patriarchal structures at the economic level, according to Walby. The key feature of patriarchal relations in paid work is that of closure of access by men against women. This involves the exclusion of women from paid work or the segregation of women within it (Walby, 1989, p. 222). As an outcome, women's work is devalued, and they earn lower wages. In addition, this causes a social fact with determinate effects, not only on women's paid work, but also in other areas including the domestic sphere and gender relations. At the household level,

women depend on their husbands economically. The gender relations are between the excluder and devaluer and the excluded and devalued: men and women stand on unequal platforms.

Occupational segregation is the key to understanding patriarchal relations in paid work, according to Walby. The practice of paying women less by occupational segregation in an open way is out of date because of the passing of equal pay legislation in most of the western countries, but an indirect process still works. Job segregation takes place in many ways, vertical and horizontal (Hakim, 1979; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 223), and between full-timers and part-timers (Robinson and Wallace, 1984, cited from Walby, 1989, p. 223). Women's occupations and men's occupations are segregated at different steps by vertical hierarchy; in turn, women's jobs and men's jobs are divided in the form of horizontal segregation. Jobs or occupations decide wages; therefore, segregation provides the possibility for differential wage rates being paid. Most often, women's jobs are regarded as less skilled or less important, which results in women's pay being less than men's. The differentiation between full- and part-time makes significant differences to the amount of legal protection given to employees (Hakim, 1987, cited from Walby, 1989, p. 223). And, most part-time jobs are at the bottom of the jobs hierarchy (Dex 1987; Martin and Roberts, 1984; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 223). Women are paid less, because part-time jobs are usually taken by women.

The state is another patriarchal structure. Walby argues that women are excluded from access to state resources and power because of the patriarchal nature of the state (Walby, 1989, p. 224). Women were almost totally invisible in the public sector when

women's suffrage was denied. Women exercise the "right to vote" in most countries today, while more indirect forms of exclusion result in women's political underrepresentation. The limited representation in the public sphere produces an effect that women do not have the power to influence public policies which pertain to the resolution of issues in their favor.

Walby argues that the fact that the state is a patriarchal structure does not imply that the state is a monolith. In fact, there are frequently conflicts between the various branches of the state over different patriarchal strategies and between the representation of patriarchal and capitalist interests (Walby, 1989, p. 224). For example, there have been conflicts over the regulation of women's paid work (Witz 1986, cited from Walby, 1989, p. 224) and over whether women should be called into the workforce to make munitions in the second World War or left at home in a traditional patriarchal setting (Summerfield, 1984; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 224).

Walby indicates that the patriarchal relations in the state have a series of significant effects on gender relations (Walby, 1989, p. 224). For example, the state enacts laws or rules on divorce and marriage, fertility (by legalizing or criminalizing abortion), contraception, new reproductive technologies, wage discrimination, sexuality (by court rulings on the custody of the children of lesbian mothers), male homosexuality, prostitution, pornography, male violence (by court practices in cases of rape and battering), housing priorities for battered women, and belief systems (by setting parameters within which religions may operate) (Walby, 1989, p. 224).

Walby points out that male violence has a social structural nature. She argues its patterning cannot be understood in terms of individual psychologies. For Walby, men use violence as a form of power over women. "It (male violence) has a regular social form and, as a result of women's well-founded expectations of its routine nature, has consequences for women's action" (Walby, 1989, p. 224). In practice, male violence takes varied forms, including rape, wife beating, father/daughter incest, flashing, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. Because of fear of male violence, most women alter their conduct and patterns of movement. In other words, women's daily lives and actions might be influenced by the threat of male violence.

Walby suggests that male violence interacts with other patriarchal structures. For instance, she argues that unless the violence is "extreme" and in "inappropriate" circumstances, it is tolerated and condoned by the patriarchal state (Walby, 1989, p. 225). Also, Brownmiller's research demonstrates a link between an increase in the militarization of society and an increase in the rate of rape (Brownmiller, 1976; cited from Walby, 1989, p. 225). That is, the rate of rape in a given country is historically variable, being higher in times of militarization and specially warfare (Walby, 1989, p. 218).

Walby mentions that scholars on gender relations have tended either to see sexuality as the basis of women's subordination or have ignored it completely. She suggests that certain forms of sexuality are crucial for patriarchal relations. In particular, the institutionalization of heterosexuality is necessary for patriarchy because without it the patriarchal mode of production could not exist (Walby, 1989). From Walby's view,

patriarchal relations in sexuality form a structure both in the sense of the primacy given to the heterosexual form of sexual practice as distinct from lesbianism and homosexuality, and in the sense of the unequal relations within this sexual practice. This orientates women towards marriage as a desirable goal and stigmatizes close female friendships (Walby, 1989).

Patriarchal relations in cultural institutions, such as the media, religions, and education, generate a relatively diverse set of patriarchal practices. With regard to the media, Coward's study on different women's magazines shows those magazines have in common the differentiation of masculinity from femininity (Coward, 1978; cited from Walby 1989). Historically speaking, religions have been very important patriarchal institutions which provide correct forms of conduct for men and for women, respectively. These defined behaviors have been variable, from burning women who assumed too much power as "witches" to committing adultery. Education is a site of both differentiating men and women and offering men more credentials. The principle that women should be feminine and men ought to be masculine is enhanced through cultural institutions. Under such conditions, certain forms of jobs will be given to men because of the reinforcement of their masculinity. As well, some work is assigned to women due to gender roles emphasized by the media, education, and religions.

Walby argues patriarchy is not an historical constant. The component structures within this system are not only relative over time but also alter in terms of their interrelationship with each other. In addition, Walby suggests that there are two major forms of patriarchy: private and public. Private patriarchy is where women are relatively

excluded from arenas of social life apart from the household. They provide services individually and directly in the home. Public patriarchy does not exclude women from certain sites, but women are subordinated and exploited in this inclusion collectively rather than individually. Walby takes Britain as an example. She indicates that patriarchy had moved towards the private form, and then it shifted to the public form over the last two centuries. Domestic ideology intensified during the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century. Women, especially married women and middle class women, rarely worked in the public sector, only in their own households. Women were excluded from the public realm of the state. They did not have the right to vote. And, if married, they lacked the ability to own property. Violence against wives was condoned. Cultural institutions, such as the church, supported the concept that a woman's best place was in her home. In regard to non-marital sexuality, there were strong sanctions against women (Walby, 1989, p 228).

Today, public patriarchy is widespread in Britain. Although women have participated in the public sector, they are subordinated there. Most women have paid jobs, but wage gaps and occupational segregation are prevalent. Women now have the same citizenship rights as men, but they only share a small proportion of the elected offices and only a tiny part of public policies pertain to women's issues. There are less severe sanctions against non-marital sexuality for women, but these still show a greater degree for women than men. The products of pornographic images, which objectified women, have increased. Marriage may end by divorce, and divorce rates have gone up. Women usually take more responsibilities of childcare after divorce. As an outcome, female's

poverty has increased. Husband's violence is not quite as legitimate as it once was, but few legal penalties have been enacted to protect women. Women are increasingly allowed to participate in cultural institutions, but still in a subordinated way (Walby, 1989, p 228 - 229).

Further, Walby suggests that it is necessary to divide the public form of patriarchy into two types, based on whether the market or the state brings women into the public sphere, in order to present the major differences in the forms of patriarchy between different countries of the industrialized world. On both ends of the continuum are the countries of Eastern Europe and the United States, respectively. In Eastern Europe, once the formerly Communist European countries outside the Soviet Union, the state had played a major role of dealing with caring for children, the sick, and the old. Previously, those tasks were individually performed by women in their households. When the state stepped in, women were organized and assigned to take part in the workforce. By and large, care jobs were performed by women. In contrast, the market plays an equivalent role in America. Those states of Western Europe, located in the middle of the continuum, are welfare countries. On the one hand, welfare countries usually make some public policies dealing with women's needs. On the other hand, women search for jobs depending on the market mechanism.

Confucian Patriarchal Cultures

Catherine S. P. Farris argues that the position of women should be evaluated within specific societies and cultural contexts. She indicates that the Chinese cultural

value of nan zhu wai, nu zhu nei (man rules the outside, woman, the inside) highlights a worldview of gender complementary, rather than equivalence, and is one that defines a fundamental differences in feminist movements in the United States and in Chinese societies. Farris points out that women's liberation in Western societies focuses on liberation from family, while women's liberation in Chinese societies is perceived as deriving power from social networks and by ending male abuses. Thus, Farris argues, women's liberation in different societies can be understood only in the cultural context (Farris, 2000, p. 144-145).

Historically speaking, Confucianism has endured as the basic social and political value system in Chinese society for over twenty centuries. The major reason that Confucianism has had such a profound impact is that it was adopted as the governmental ideology of many dynasties in China; even alien regimes never ignored Confucian philosophy and teachings. Moreover, Confucianism was institutionalized and propagated both through the formal curricula of the educational system and through the selection process of government officials. In general, any male adult in imperial China, regardless of his wealth or social status, could become a government official by passing the civil examination (Dubs, 1938). Scholars point out that "the openness of civil exams assured the spread and homogenization of Confucian ideology ratifying Chinese family values through all levels of society" (Fricke, Chang, and Yang, 1994, p. 25). Thus, Confucianization has had a tremendous influence on values, beliefs, attitude, and the way of life of the Chinese people. Imperial China ended in 1911. After the loss of hegemony as a state orthodoxy, Confucianism did not completely disappear; remnants remain at the

micro-level of family and community, the mid-level of the education system and business activities, and the macro-level of the state and its guiding thought (Rozman, 2002, p. 13).

In general, Sylvia Walby defines patriarchy as a system of social structures, and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women. However, when Walby's patriarchy theory is applied to explore women's oppression and gender inequality in Chinese society, it is necessary to take account of the features of Confucian culture in order to present patriarchy in practice in the institutions suggested by Walby. That is, with added culture factors to an examination of general patriarchy, the causes and effects of gender inequality in Chinese society could be clearly seen.

Lu Hsiu-lien (also known as Annette Lu, 呂秀蓮), a Taiwanese feminist and politician, is a former Vice President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 2000 through 2008. In the early 1970s, the first wave of the Taiwan women's movement arose after Lu wrote her "New Feminism." Based on a survey of the history of women in Chinese society, Lu indicates that four views from Confucian teachings are the root of contemporary women's low position and lack of self-confidence. These four views are "Continue the Family Line," "Three Obediences and Four Virtues," "Men Outside/Women Inside," and "One-sided Chastity" (Lu, 1994, p. 291; Reed, 1994, p. 228).

The most powerful, and from Lu's viewpoint, most destructive, traditional Chinese value is the importance of continuing the male family line (Reed, 1994, p. 228). In Chinese society, which is based on a patrilineal system and patrilocal marriage, it is believed that male heirs are necessary to carry on the family name and the ancestral sacrifices. Male descendants perform the funeral rites, and worship their ancestors to

provide them with a comfortable and peaceful afterlife. For Chinese, without male heirs and ritual offerings, the ancestors' spirits would exist as hungry ghosts. According to Confucian teachings, "There are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them" (*Mencius*, 4A:26; cited from Reed, 1994, p. 228). Lu argues that the significance of this aspect of filial piety results in parents and society in general considering boys important and girls unimportant. Moreover, Lu argues that the concept of family line continuity causes families to treat their own daughters as commodities and women's marital homes to view them as "tools' for bearing male heirs. "Married daughters are spilled water" is a common expression in Chinese society. This phrase tells that no matter what happens, a married woman belongs to her husband's family and can never return to her natal family after marriage. Also, families see little point in providing resources for educating their daughters who would benefit their future families. Families might force their daughters to work at a young age or to work as bar girls or prostitutes in order to increase family income. Daughters are expected to pay back their natal families for the expense of raising them before they go to their marital families. Bearing male heirs, at least one, is regarded as women's responsibility for their marital families; undoubtedly, women very often face this pressure (Reed, 1994, p. 228-229).

According to Lu, the second traditional view of women's destiny sums up women's moral life: the "three obediences and four virtues" (Reed, 1994, p. 230). Addressed in the Confucian classic text, the *Book of Rites* (*Li Chi*, 禮記), three obediences admonish a woman to obey the father before marriage, obey the husband when married, and answer to the son if widowed (Lu, 1994, p. 291). In the *New*

Feminism, Lu describes the "three obediences" as a magical spell being compared to the demon-subduing incantation of the legendary Monkey King in the *Journey to the West*. It makes women take obedience as their guideline for living from birth until death (Reed, 1994, p. 230).

Pan Chao, a Han Dynasty poetess and China's first female historian (White, 2003, p. 85), brought the "three obediences" and the "four virtues" of womanhood together in her Confucian text *Instructions for Women* (*Nu-chieh*, 女誡). Four virtues are four criteria that women have to meet in order to be "virtuous": morality, skill in handcrafts, appearance, and language for women. According to Lu, the essential meanings of the four virtues effectively ties up women's hands and feet, limiting women's innate talents to merely adorning themselves and limiting their temperament to gentle submission, cowardice, and ignorance (Reed, 1994, p. 230). In addition, Lu indicates that by the end of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) the phrase "the lack of talent is a virtue in a woman" (女子無才便是德) was applied to express feminine "virtue" (Reed, 1994, p. 230). Confucius advocated educating everyone without discrimination (有教無類, *Analects* 15:39; cited from Chan, 2000, p. 120), and Mencius mentioned that one of the three delights of chun-tzu (gentlemen or superior man, 君子) is to educate the most talented people in the empire (得天下英才而教育之, 三樂也. Mencius 7A:20; cited from Chan, 2000, p. 120). However, contemporary scholar Sin Yee Chan points out that among the thousands of students of Confucius and Mencius, none was a female. In addition, we realize how Confucius educated his son from the *Analects* (*Analects* 16:13), but there is no hint that he also educated his daughter. Chan argues these facts point to an acceptance of the

prevailing practice of excluding women from receiving a Confucian education. This does not mean that women received no education at all. They did learn about subject matters like domestic duties, appearance refinement and female crafts. In particular, they were educated in the "four virtues" of womanhood (Chan, 2000, p. 120-121 & 131). As the civil service examinations were based on the Confucians classics and only men could be candidates, women were totally excluded from political participation in traditional society.

Lu suggests the third traditional view of women's lot is the division of men's and women's realms of activity and influence (Reed, 1994, p. 230). The chapter "the pattern of family" (*Nei-Ze*, 內則) in the *Book of Rites* (*Li Chi*, 禮記) describes the ideal for the separation of men's and women's lives as inside and outside the home: "The men should not speak of what belongs to the inside (of the house), nor the women of what belongs to the outside … Things spoken inside should not go out, words spoken outside should not come in." Thus, this concept of men outside/women inside instructs that an ideal woman should not speak of outside matters or participate in outside activities, while her husband is not necessary to help with household chores because doing housework is considered to be the woman's responsibility. In her article "The Domestication of Women," Barbara Rogers argues "the domestication of women in terms of housework and child care is closely linked with various forms of discrimination against them in the non-domestic sphere." For example, the restriction of education opportunity is rationalized in terms of the future domestic career as wives and mothers that await all girls. In hiring, promotion and wage structures, the arguments are all similar, with the additional remark that women do not need to work because they are deemed to have husbands supporting them and their

children (Rogers, 1980, p. 24-25).

Chastity, the primary moral virtue for women in some Confucian texts, is the fourth traditional view of women's destiny addressed by Lu. According to Lu's study, chastity became an ideal not only for wives but for widows. Since the old days, widowhood had been promoted by the state and endorsed by the Confucianism. During the Sui Dynasty, emperor Wen-ti (隋文帝, 581-604) prohibited the widows of upper-class families from remarrying. By the Song Dynasty (960-1127), widows who did not remarry were praised as the highest ideal for women. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the government glorified chaste widows with memorial arches. Widowhood was highlighted under public recognition and social and familial pressure. As a result, even engaged girls whose fiancés died were pushed to remain chaste and not ever marry (Reed, 1994, p. 231). In reality, upper-class families could afford to support widows living in widowhood, while poor ones might not.

Margery Wolf did a field study in one Taiwanese village. She reports in her book *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan* that a respected widow was one who stayed with her deceased husband's family, but the desire for male descendants allowed the family to take no notice of the ideal of chastity if their daughter-in-law became pregnant. Wolf argues "virtuous widows among poor farm families were filial widows who stayed with their parents-in-law. Their sex life was not relevant" (Wolf, 1972, p. 201). In contrast, men were allowed to have concubines in Chinese society. Laws governing marriage favored men. For seven reasons, including barrenness, lasciviousness, jealousy, talkativeness, thieving, disobedience towards her parents-in-law, and leprosy, wives could

be divorced or resold. For the sake of keeping a barren wife, the difficulty might be obviated by the taking of a secondary wife (White, 2003, p. 177). In imperial China, the fact that men owned concubines did not show as special cases (Mann, 1997). However, the ideology of one-sided chastity might still exist today. According to a research by Kung et al, economic boom and changes in China resulted in most manufacturing industries in Hong Kong moving their factories to China where the cost of production is much lower. Thus, large numbers of employers and employees from Hong Kong are stationed in China for extended periods of time. An increased number of Hong Kong men had extra-marital affairs in China which led to increased divorce rates in recent years. Kung et al argue the trend of a more permissive attitude towards divorce is noted, while greater social stigma is attached to divorced women (Kung, Hung, and Chan, 2004).

2. Major Stages and Dynamics of Economic Development

Modernization theory is one of several perspectives of development. At what historical moment did modernization theory appear and subsequently revive? Modernization theories originated in the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim. It came back and was popularized during the late 1950s and early 1960s by Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Lerner, Walt Rostow, and Karl Deutsch (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). According to Alvin Y. So's study, the modernization school was a historical product of three crucial events in the post-World War II era. First, there was the rise of the United States as a superpower. While other Western nations, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, were weakened by World War II, the United States

emerged as a world leader due to its robust economy. As a result, the United States instituted the Marshall Plan to help war-torn Western Europe. Second, there was the spread of a united world communist movement. Following the Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War in 1945, the Soviet Army occupied nations in both Eastern Europe and East Asia. As a result, communism as a movement spread through many new countries. Third, there was the disintegration of the European colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, giving birth to many new nation-states in the Third World. These newly established nation-states were seeking a model of development to promote their economy and to reinforce their political independence. Under such circumstances, American political elites urged scholars to study the Third World, to promote economic development, and to help political stability in the Third World nation-states, for the sake of avoiding losing those nascent states to the Soviet communist bloc. Consequently, a great number of studies and discourses relating to modernization and development, supported by the U. S. government and private foundations, have been produced since the 1950s (So, 1990; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978, p. 535).

From the beginning, the modernization school was in search of a theory. It applied an evolutionary theory and a functionalist theory to explain, predict, and observe the process of modernization in the Third World countries. Evolutionary theory was born after the industrial revolution and French revolution. The industrial revolution applied science and technology resulting in establishing the factory production system, rising productivity, and selling products to markets in the world. The French revolution created, in terms of equality, liberty, and freedom, a whole new political order and parliamentary

democracy. By observing this changing social, economic, and political order, evolutionary theory asserted that the process of modernization not only shattered the old social order but also built the foundation for a new one. By invoking Auguste Comte's writing (Comte, 1964), So indicates that the classical evolutionary theory has three features. First, it assumes that social change is unidirectional— the fate of human evolution is predetermined. Second, it imposed a value judgment on the evolutionary process: the movement toward the final phase is good because it represents progress, humanity, and civilization. Third, it assumes that the rate of social change is slow, gradual, and piecemeal: the process of modernization is evolutionary, not revolutionary. Therefore, to make progress from a simple primitive society to a complex modern one will take centuries to complete (So, 1990, p.18-19).

Another part of the modernization school stemmed from the functionalist theory of Talcott Parsons. Parsons was originally trained as a biologist. For that reason, the organism metaphor is key to understanding Parsons's theory. First, just as the parts that make up a biological organism are interrelated and interdependent, so the institutions in a society are closely related to one another and coordinate harmoniously in a "system". Second, each institution performs a specific function for the sake of society's stability and growth. Parsons addressed the concept of "functional imperatives" to support this standpoint, and presented four crucial functions that every society must perform. These four functions are adaptation to the environment, goal attainment, integration, and latency (pattern maintenance of values from generation to generation), which are performed by the economy, the government, the legal institutions and religion, and the family and

education, respectively. Third, borrowing from the concept of homeostasis of biological organisms, Parsons formulated the notion of "homeostatic equilibrium" for constant interaction among institutions. When one institution is impacted by social change, it produces a chain reaction of changes, or adjustments, in other institution so as to restore equilibrium. That is, the institutions in the system are always changing and adjusting; therefore, the social system is not a static entity. Finally, Parsons developed the concept of "pattern variables" to tell the differences between traditional societies and modern societies. For Parsons, there are five sets of pattern variables: affective versus affective-neutral relationships, particularistic versus universalistic relationships, collective orientation versus self-orientation, ascription versus achievement, and functionally diffused versus functionally specific relationship (as cited in So, 1990, p. 20-23). Traditional societies display more of the former variables while modern, more of the latter.

The modernization school does not lend itself easily to simple characterization under either the influence of evolutionary or functionalist theories because scholars and researchers formulate the theories of modernization based on sociological, economic, and political approaches. Different disciplines raise different research questions, and different area specialists stress different aspects of the process of modernization (Etzioni and Etzioni, 1964; So, 1990). However, the modernizationists argue that the task before the underdeveloped countries is to transform themselves from tradition to modernity following the footsteps of the now developed countries (Isbister, 1998, p. 40). The process of modernization, or development, is often seen in terms of stages through which

all countries could pass on their journey to a high standard of living. Some of these stages are simple: agriculture to industry to services, or rural to urban to suburban. One of the more complex stages of development theories was presented in W.W. Rostow's book *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960).

According to Rostow, in the process of economic development societies pass through five distinctive basic stages: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. A traditional society operates within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology. Thus, the great majority of people live in a traditional way at a bare subsistence level. The second stage involves the formation of the preconditions for accelerated economic growth, largely as a result of the traditional society's reaction to the external intrusions, actual or threatened, of economically more advanced nations. This reaction weakens the traditional relations of domination and subordination, promotes education and introduces new attitudes and ideas regarding economic activities, and makes the technological advances available for raising productivity. Although this period of transition between the traditional society and the take-off is regarded as changes in both the economy and social values, Rostow indicates that the building of an effective centralized national state is a decisive feature of the preconditions period, and it is a necessary condition for take-off. These related conditions are required for take-off to occur: when political power regards economic growth as its main business; when the rate of productive investment, as a proportion of national income (or net national product), doubles or is over 10%; and when technological innovation is applied to a few leading

sectors, both agricultural and industrial. In turn, the take-off is followed by the drive to maturity. According to Rostow's study, about sixty years was required to move a society from the beginning of take-off to maturity. During this period, economic growth spreads from the initial few leading sectors to a wide range of activities. The country becomes an active participant in international markets, exporting new products and producing for domestic use goods that were formerly imported. As the country reaches maturity, it is able to use modern technologies and entrepreneurial skills to make, not everything, but any goods it chooses to produce. Finally, the society goes into the age of high mass-consumption, and the leading sectors shift towards durable consumers' goods and services. The fruits of growth are transferred to the mass of the population. Thus their standard of living rises steadily and predictably. Also, an increased number of white-collar population and skilled factory jobs result in urbanization. In addition to these economic changes, the society has sufficient wealth, through the political process, to allocate resources to social welfare and security (Rostow, 1960).

Rostow's key contribution to the analysis of economic development is the concept of "take-off." The term is borrowed from the field of aeronautics: an airplane must gain a certain amount of speed before it has enough momentum to take off and continue to go to higher altitudes and greater speeds on its own. Similarly, in the process of economic development, an economy is absorbed by the population growth and by increased consumption. Only after the increase of production rises above that of consumption can a flow of investment allow the economy to grow continuously on its own. That is, the decisive transformation of national economic development is the take-off point (Rostow,

1956). Stage theory accentuates the dynamics of national development, international competitiveness in the global market, and the role of government for promoting economic upgrading.

In his book, which is usually referred to simply as *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Adam Smith illustrates the relationships of the division of labor, productivity, and national wealth. As the book's title indicates, Smith is primarily concerned with wealth creation, which would advance the standard of living in a country. He argues that enlarging national wealth depends on its total production increases, and the division of labor is the decisive method of raising productivity. Smith gives three reasons why a division of labor can bring a great increase in the quantity of work. First, individuals become more proficient at their specialized tasks. Second, the advantage is gained by saving time. Workers no longer need to move from one sort of task to another and change to different tools. Third, under the division of labor, the whole attention of workers' minds is directed towards a single object. People are much more likely to discover easier methods concerning this object; therefore, the invention of the great number of machines facilitate and abridge labor and enable one man to do the work of many (Jardine, 2004). However, in Smith's day of the late 18th century, the industrial revolution just got started, and the extensive use of machinery was still in its infancy. As we look around the world today, industries have used the idea of specialization, both of skillful laborers and of machinery, to increase production to the point where the market is overflowing with goods.

A second fundamental principle addressed by Adam Smith, in his analysis of the

proper path for a nation to pursue economic prosperity, was the necessity of economic liberty (Crobaugh, 1937). In a free-market economic system, anyone can buy or sell whatever goods and service they please at whatever price they bargain. Therefore, an "invisible hand" will promote economic development through market competition. When the supply of a particular commodity is less than its demand, consumers will bid up the price, and this provides incentives for suppliers to produce more. Conversely, prices would be driven down under the circumstance of oversupply. The competition push for gaining greater profit stimulates technological and organizational innovations that will increase productivity and total production (Clark and Montjoy, 1998). In addition, Smith (1776) argues that capitalism posits a mutual interdependence among firms, societies, and nations. The productivity gains of one can be transferred to others in the form of either cheaper goods or technologies that can help others to be more productive (Clark and Montjoy, 1998).

Can competition, as Smith's "mutual benefit" model indicates, really bring benefits to all nations involved in international economic activity? It is easily realized that productivity gains are much greater in the industrial sector than in agricultural production or service occupations (Clark and Montjoy, 1998). For example, based on the principle of "comparative advantage," British cloth should be traded for Portuguese wine. The result shows Britain becoming rich while Portugal is still staying poor in the twenty-first century. This is not a single or an exceptional case. According to Benjamin J. Cohen's research, the developed countries were about twice as rich as other countries at the beginning of the 19th century, while this gap had widened four-fold to eight-to-one in

1950 (Cohen, 1973). Moreover, at the present time, industrialized countries are rich and have higher living standards; whereas, those countries without going through industrialization are still suffering from poverty (Clark and Montjoy, 1998). Obviously, industrialization, using energy and machine technology for making goods, performs a vital role in the process of economic development, especially when countries face growing international economic competition.

Industrialization seemingly created what Lester Thurow terms a virtuous cycle, according to Clark and Montjoy. In his book *Head to Head*, Thurow argues that nations became rich and industrial during the 19th and 20th centuries by possessing and utilizing some combination of four sources of competitive advantage: (1) natural resources, which could be sold or used as industrial inputs, (2) new technologies, (3) investment capital to put the raw materials and new technologies to work, and (4) human capital in the form of skilled labor and entrepreneurs. Thurow indicates that this process became self-reinforcing because the productivity growth associated with industrialization produced more physical and human capital, as well as bringing new technologies and new institutions. Development meant jumping on the escalator of industrialization (Thurow, 1992; Clark and Montjoy, 1998).

The nature of industrialization has evolved dramatically since the 19th century in the industrialized countries. The whole process of development demonstrates structural changes in the economy, from agriculture to light industry to heavy and high technology industry to services. Also, the leading sector has shifted—first textiles, next iron and steel, then automobiles, and most recently high tech and advanced electronics. Clark and

Montjoy indicate that, unlike Thurow's "virtuous cycle," this "industry sequencing" model suggests that the advantages of the most advanced industrial nations will at last be undercut as they move from high tech industry to the "postindustrial society" whose economy is dominated by the service sector where productivity gains come much more slowly than in manufacturing production (Clark and Montjoy, 1998).

Moreover, according to Clark and Montjoy, the "product life-cycle" theory explains why and how each of these industries one after the other spread like a wave across the world. The product life cycle was described in the 1970s by Raymond Vernon. Based on the manufacturing experience of US-based multinational corporations (MNCs), Vernon argued that some products the most industrial countries once produced and even exported were eventually produced abroad and became imported. In general, an innovative product is devised and produced in a highly industrialized country which possesses the latest and most expensive technologies. At the beginning, the new product is produced by very capital-intensive processes and highly skilled workers. After a period of time, the production of the item becomes more standardized and labor-intensive. As a consequence, production will be moved abroad. New producers may be process innovative firms in Japan or low-cost factories in newly industrialized countries (NICs) and less developed countries (LDCs). In the final stage of the cycle, the country that invents a new product very often finds its domestic demand is met by imports from countries that have lower labor costs (Vernon 1966; Clark and Montjoy, 1998; Singleton, 2005, p. 220-221).

While firms and producers in the most advanced nations find themselves on an

innovation treadmill because of the effect of the product life cycle, governments in developing countries and less developed countries confront two dilemmas in the process of economic development. On the one hand, development has an attractive face that appeals to leaders and citizens in developing countries with the promise of less poverty, longer life, and greater status. On the other hand, development has a disgusting face of exploitation, manipulation, and continued subjugation. Particularly, most developing nations became politically independent after World War II. It seemed colonial wounds were in many ways still fresh and deep in the early post-war period. However, one central question facing developing countries concerned the choice of economic strategies—what was the best way successfully to develop and achieve economic growth? The two major alternatives that have been promoted for economic development, and that form the core of debate among development scholars, are: (1) import-substituting industrialization (ISI) frequently employed by Latin America countries; and (2) export-oriented industrialization (EOI) commonly practiced in Asian countries and suggested by international financial organizations. Each of these strategies stands for a particular approach to the two faces of development (Gibson and Ward, 1992; Kukreja, 2005).

During the 1950s, Latin American scholars were increasingly skeptical of the "comparative advantage" path to development that might leave developing countries specialized in primary commodity production. Their new industries could not possibly compete with developed countries; thus, the dependency critique became an influential framework for development in this region. As a result, the strategy of ISI was adopted to break out of dependency on primary commodity exports. Also, this strategy fostered

opposition to depending on foreign capital and international trade to promote development, which resulted in setting stringent regulations to control foreign investment and making restrictive trade policies. In addition, instead of importing all manufactured goods, through the ISI path, Latin American countries started to purse the replacement of imports by promoting "home-grown" industries (Krueger, 1997; Kukreja, 2005; So, 1990). However, the result of Martin Landsberg's research suggests that there were some reasons preventing the strategy of ISI from success. First, they were short of consumer-goods markets because the majority of the population in Third World countries remained poor. Domestic production thus was geared toward tiny urban markets of luxurious and consumer-durables goods. Second, the domestic bourgeoisie did not have enough capital or technology to start domestic industrialization. Third, instead of importing foreign manufactured products, ISI speeded up the import of foreign capital and technology. This was followed by massive profits flowing out to the home countries of the multinational corporations (MNCs). Consequently, the trade deficit in Third World nations continued to grow. In sum, Landsberg argues that the results of the ISI approach were definitely not positive: growing income inequalities, limited industrialization, foreign domination, and large fiscal deficits and foreign debts (Landsberg, 1979; So, 1990). Since the late 1980s nearly all Latin American countries have adopted market-oriented, neoliberal reforms. Economic hardship, caused in part by the previous implementation of ISI policies, convinced these governments to reduce the role and size of the state in the economy (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2004).

In contrast, the performance of economic development in Asian countries

demonstrates the benefits of export-oriented growth (Gereffi and Fonda, 1992; Gibson and Ward, 1992; Gilpin, 1987; Krueger, 1997). The EOI approach tends to maximize the benefits of modernization and industrialization by taking advantage of opportunities offered by international markets, but governments formulated and implemented policies to settle the fears of dependency and exploitation. It is clear that export-oriented growth takes a combination of liberal and mercantilist prescriptions for economic development. Instead of relying on non-interventionism and the free market mechanism, the East Asian NICs, which are often thought of as glowing examples of practicing EOI method, vigorously pursued specific policies for development and increased economic growth (Kukreja, 2005). Although developing policies adopted by these countries are various, some specific features, more or less, can be identified among them.

First, the EOI polices of East Asian NICs continued to promote their industries through changing the structure of their productions. During the 1950s and 1960s, like other developing countries, South Korea and Taiwan focused on manufacturing labor-intensive consumer products. In order to achieve this goal, both governments set up mercantilist-style restrictions to protect “infant” industries from foreign competition. Further, governments provided financial resources and tax incentives to promote manufacturing. As a consequence, this strategy increased the level of employment, which practically helped stabilize their political situations (Kukreja, 2005). By the late 1960s, South Korea and Taiwan altered their economic development strategies to enter the international market for light industry goods. This outward-looking development was followed by industrial deepening in the 1970s, and industrial upgrading and

diversification from the 1980s. Advanced EOI allowed the East Asian NICs to compete more effectively with the low wage neighboring Asian countries, which were engaging aggressively in labor-intensive manufactures for global markets (Cheng, 2001, p. 28; Gereffi and Fonda, 1992, p. 434; Gilpin, 1987, p. 48-49). Second, these countries have made substantial and continuing investments in education (including job training) and human capital, which foster a cohort of knowledgeable and skillful workforce, increase productivity, help industrial deepening, and thus enhance international competitiveness (Brautigam, 1994, p. 119; Gilpin, 1987, p. 302; Liou, 2002, p. 131-132; Shive and Lee, 1999, p. 103). Third, Joseph E. Stiglitz indicates that capital accumulation is often given credit for being the engine of growth. A high level of savings and investment (including research and development) in the East Asian countries acts as a motor driving the performance of the economy (Brautigam, 1994, p. 123; Dodgson, 2002, p. 244-247; Gilpin, 1987, p. 268; James, Naya, and Meier, 1989, p. 63-82; Stiglitz, 1996, p. 153 & 158). Fourth, the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) and U. S. aid was another major source of the capital formulation in East Asian countries. Both the Korean War and Cold War tensions had a strong influence on the flow of American aid into South Korea and Taiwan. Between 1953 and 1961, U.S. aid financed nearly 75 percent of South Korea's capital formation (Haggard, Kim and Moon, 1991, p. 852). Also in Taiwan, aid in kind was crucial to the extension of the food and textile industries, and aid funds were key resources for the emergence of the plastics, synthetic fiber, glass and cement industries (Cheng, 2001, p. 27-28). Taiwan's domestic capital formation also depended heavily on foreign capital inflow during the same period, about 40 percent of

domestic investment was externally financed (Kukreja, 2005). With FDI and American aid flowing in during the 1950s and 1960s, South Korea and Taiwan spurred their initial development and established the groundwork for economic growth in the long run. Last but most important, East Asian industrial policies are typically built around a “pilot agency” that shapes development initiatives. Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is a classic and pioneering example. Others are the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in Korea, the Council on Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) in Taiwan, and the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in Singapore. The pilot agency performs as a think tank, charts the route for economic development, and decides which industries ought to exist or be created and which industries are no longer needed in order to adjust the industrial structure and uplift the nation’s international competitiveness (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990).

In summary, modernization theorists suggested that the experiences of the industrialized countries offered a useful model for the late developing countries. The factors of a successful Western model include free market economics, social mobility, political stability, liberal democracy, and the “modern” values of the Anglo-Saxon cultures (Chan and Clark, 1991, p. 563). Modernization supporters tend to offer a neoliberal view of economic development. In general, they advocated free markets at home and on the international front, and minimal state interference at the marketplace except providing a stable business climate, public goods, and infrastructure. Through the motion and force of the “invisible hand,” the free market stimulates industrialization, encourages innovation, and thus creates a “general benefit” by raising production. From

the viewpoint of dependency theorists, trade is a tool used by the rich to penetrate and make poor countries dependent. Latin American countries employed ISI strategy because of fears of dependence on capitalist core countries. Although this strategy had led to rapid industrialization once in Brazil, its results by and large were disappointing. Political economist Robert Gilpin indicated there were some specific reasons for the failure of ISI path: the small size of national markets led to uneconomic plants; extreme protectionalism weakened incentives to improve quality of production; and the necessaries of importing industrial technology and capital goods caused massive trade deficits and foreign debts (Gilpin, 1987, 292). Since the late 1980s, most Latin American countries have adopted a market-oriented strategy, neoliberal reforms, and reducing the role and size of states. East Asian NICs' success is due to many factors, but an outward-looking industrialization strategy and a strong role for the state have been seen as two essential components. On the one hand, those NICs have been fully integrated into world economy by pursuing an export-led approach along with the expansion of American and Japanese multinationals. On the other hand, governments conscientiously initiate, formulate, and implement policies to promote economic growth, industrial upgrading, and diversification in the process of development. Some scholars, based upon the developmental state model, suggest that a strong state is politically autonomous from partisan domestic interests; thus, it can provide economic leadership and facilitate administrative guidance for the private sector with respect to market decisions and can create opportunities for globally economic development (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). However, Chow and Lyter argue that the statist perspective is used to defend

protectionism and interventionism. They indicate this view is politically driven to support authoritative regimes and ignore the negative effects of industrialization and economic development, such as labor unions' repression, human rights violations, and environmental degradation (Chow and Lyter, 2002).

3. Contending Theories of How Development Affects the Status of Women

The effect of socioeconomic development on women is a hotly debated issue (Jaquette, 1982; Tiano, 1987). While much of the relevant literature and research involves empirical studies that do not always make a systematic theoretical framework (Forsythe et al, 2000), Susan Tiano recommends that competing perspectives in this field can be subsumed within three explanations: integration, marginalization, and exploitation (Tiano, 1987). According to Tiano, the integration thesis claims that modernization leads to female liberation and gender equality by involving women more centrally in economic and political activities. The marginalization thesis holds that capitalist development makes women peripheral to productive roles and resources. The exploitation thesis asserts that development creates a female proletariat supplying low-wage labor for capital accumulation (Tiano, 1987). This study selects four approaches in line with Tiano's three explanatory schemata for analyzing the impact of development on women: the modernization theory perspective, the liberal feminist perspective, the dependency theory perspective, and socialist feminist perspective. These four perspectives are examined in turn.

The "modernization theory" perspective assumes that socioeconomic

development, along with democratization, leads to equality for women who have long been suppressed in patriarchal societies. The logic is that economic development should bring wealth. As a result, mass education is possible and necessary, and should in turn affect production relationships and lifestyles in different ways. Further, development should bring democratic politics. Therefore, women could push for legal and policy reforms through which "gender inequality" might be reduced. That is, a compound of social, economic, and political changes would create "modernization," which could undermine traditional patriarchal norms and provide women with a great many resources through which they could pursue their own goals autonomously and improve their lives (Black, 1966; Eisenstadt, 1973; Goode, 1963; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Patai, 1967; Rosen and Laraia, 1972, p. 353-354).

For modernization theory, a society transforming from tradition into modernity is associated with improving technology, increases in divisions of labor and literacy, growth of commercial activities, urbanization, and the decline in traditional authority. This approach dominated mainstream thinking on the international development during the 1950s and 1960s (Misra, 2000; Rathgeber, 1990). During these two decades, it was assumed that "modernization," which usually equated with industrialization and development, would improve the standards of living of the entire population through a "trickle down" effect (Rathgeber, 1990, p. 490). Thus, scholars who paid attention to the impact of development on women first found only positive effects (Jaquette, 1982). Industrialization and improved technology were said to reduce the impact of biological asymmetry between men's and women's physical strength. Birth control was seen to give

women freedom from the endless involuntary reproduction. Modern values were expected to enhance women's competence and self-respect and increase their autonomy. The opportunities for schooling and employment outside the home were anticipated to enrich women intellectually as well as financially (Jaquette, 1982, p. 269; Rosen and LaRaia, 1972, p. 354-356). Second, it was believed that any differences between male and female absorption into the process of modernization were seen as a failure of diffusion, not as a failure of the model. Women's relative "backwardness" was explained as the residue of traditional attitudes. At least in the long run, modern societies would be democratic and egalitarian (Jaquette, 1982, p. 269).   Third, on the basic assumption of modernization theory, the administration of development policies and programs are perceived as sex-neutral or as particularly advantageous to women, who have been more fettered and constrained than men by traditional values confining their roles (Jaquette, 1982, p. 269). From these views, women were seen as a homogeneous group, and it was predicted that gender roles would change as women gained an equal role to men in the development of education, employment, and other spheres of society. Also, the modernization theory perspective tends to take for granted that males' experience will be generalized to females and that men and women can benefit equally as societies increasingly become modernized. As a result, women were rarely treated as a separate unit of analysis in the modernization literature during the 1950s and 1960s (Jaquette, 1982, p. 268; Rathgeber, 1990, p. 491).

By the 1970s, many studies in terms of the liberal feminist perspective challenged the assumptions of the modernization model, contending that economic development had

not improved women's status but rather women were marginalized in capitalist societies. This view argued that development isolates women from production and political control, reinforcing patriarchal culture or the eroding the power and authority they had in traditional societies, limiting women's autonomy and access to cash, property, and other resources. Thus despite the ideology of egalitarianism, development had in general increased women's economic and social marginality, resulting in economic dependence on men (Boserup, 1970; Jaquette, 1982; Park, 1993; Tiano, 1987; Tinker, 1976).

Ester Boserup's *Women's Role in Economic Development*, published in 1970, launched the first thorough feminist attack on conventional liberal assumptions (Jaquette, 1982) and pioneered systematically using gender as a variable in examining the impact of economic change on women by analyzing how a gendered hierarchy modifies changes in women's role in different types of societies (Rathgeber, 1990, p. 490). Most significantly, Boserup's study pointed out that many women in developing countries faced marginalization rather than enhancement. Boserup argued that women's status in agrarian societies was relatively correlated with their role in carrying out subsistence tasks. As technologies advanced that resulted in a shift from subsistence production to machine-based agriculture, men monopolized the more advanced technologies while women were increasingly marginalized from agriculture. This in turn reduced women's status, and women were often confined to their homes and under the strict surveillance of male kin. The conversion to the cash economy was introduced by postcolonial administrations and development planners which provided men with the training, land, inputs, credit, and markets, while women continued to work the least productive land

with the poorest inputs (Boserup, 1970; Jaquette, 1982, 1990). Boserup contended that other aspects of modernization were also detrimental to women. In cities, women were often excluded from formal sector jobs because of their low level of education and sex stereotyping. As a result, they worked as domestic helpers, owners of open-air restaurants, petty traders, and often prostitutes (Boserup, 1970, p. 99-103). Development, in line with industrialization, required specialization in a division-of-labor for efficiency and increasing productivity. However, women lacked opportunities for acquisition of education, training, and new skills necessary for functional specialization. Thus they were confined to unstable, low-paying, unskilled jobs (Park, 1993). Urbanization, mobility, and conversion to the cash economy as processes cut women off from their traditional economic and social roles and pushed them into the modern sector where they were discriminated against and exploited. Consequently, this condition increased female dependency (Jaquette, 1982).

Since the 1970s, inspired by Boserup's work, a plethora of studies based on the liberal feminist perspective have documented empirically how the processes of development marginalized women economically and socially and increased their dependence on men (Jaquette, 1982; Park, 1993). Further, regarding the solutions to female marginalization and dependency, liberal feminist scholars advocated legal and administrative changes to ensure that women would be better integrated into economic systems so that women could have equal access to work and its economic rewards (Jaquette, 1982; Rathgeber, 1990). In short, the liberal feminist perspective differed from the modernization model which argued that women's integration into the process of

development automatically improved their status. Rather, this perspective directed attention toward policies based on equal rights that could enhance women's chances and mend their marginalized situation (Jaquette, 1990).

Just as the modernization theory can be said to examine development from the viewpoint of the United States and other Western countries, the dependency theory can be said to view development from the Third World perspective (So, 1990). Theorists in the dependency theory tradition argue that economic relationships between the core nations and nations at the periphery of the world system are structurally detrimental to the less developed countries (LDCs) because of the inherent dynamics of international capitalism (Amin, 1976; Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson, 1978; Dos Santos, 1971; Frank, 1967, 1970). Most developed countries exploit natural resources, cheap labor, and often lax environmental regulations in developing countries. As a result, developing countries have become locations for manufacturing labor-intensive products for export, shifting residents in the Third World from agriculture to jobs in factories and the tertiary employment sector, where they serve as cheap labor (Chang, 2004; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Tiano, 1987). Some typical features of dependency include the growth of export-based manufacturing, multinational corporate penetration, investment dependence, and export-processing zones (Chang, 2004). Particularly, multinational corporations (MNCs) have played a critical role in recent decades in the Third World (Shen and Williamson, 1997; Isbister, 1998). Through direct investment and subcontracting arrangements, the spread of MNCs created the international division of labor, where female employment in developing countries was based on wage gaps between developed

and developing countries as well as between men and women (Lim, 1983; Nash, 1983).

Regarding the impact of economic development on women, the dependency perspective assumes that women in the Third World are not integrated into the essentially beneficial development process. Rather, women are involved in an exploitative global capitalism which deepens female subordination (Jaquette, 1982, p. 273; Park, 1993, p. 129-130; Tiano, 1987, p. 217-218). During the colonial period, the underdeveloped countries were integrated into the world economic system. Agriculture turned from subsistence production to a cash-crop economy which was dominated by men because Europeans held western belief that farming was a man's job. In addition, urbanization cut women off from their kinship support networks where they were the main participants in the so-called "informal sector" (Jaquette, 1982, p. 273).

In spite of technological changes and liberal values that favor women's participation in development, women's exploitation continues to exist in today's global economy because it serves the needs of capitalism (Jaquette, 1982, p. 274). That is, capital accumulation is made possible by the extreme exploitation of the most vulnerable sector of the working population who provides the cheapest labor (Nash, 1983, p. 7). Many studies have found that development often makes women in the Third World more central to industrial production, but this has resulted in the exploitation of women (Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Tinker, 1990). Women provide cheap and easily expendable labor because of discriminatory hiring practices, occupational segregation, and inadequate preparation (lack of education and training) which weakens their position within the labor markets (Beechey, 1978; McIntosh, 1978; cited from Tiano, 1987, p.

218). Also, the considerable competition for the jobs available to women maintains low wages and docility (Lim, 1981, p. 187). In addition, the nature of women's intermittent employment in the paid labor force creates a "reserve army of labor" (Jaquette, 1982, p. 1982) which can be utilized by the capitalist economy in times of growth when their labor is required, and then sent home during lean times (Code, 2000, p. 426). Especially, part-time married female workers can be exploited in this way during economic recessions (Code, 2000, p. 426). Moreover, female workers are often powerless to change their working conditions because they rarely organize effective unions (Enloe, 1983, p. 421; Kung, 1983, p. 174). In a few words, capitalist industrialization in developing countries may provide jobs for women, but while the global capitalist system is operated under the extraction of surplus value to accumulate capital, it jeopardizes women's well-being (Fuentes and Ehrenreich, 1983).

Following the idea of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, classical Marxist feminism uses "class" analysis rather than "gender" analysis to explain women's oppression (Tong, 2009, p. 106). In contrast, contemporary socialist feminism, also known as dual systems theory, synthesizes the Marxist analysis of capitalism and radical feminist theorization of patriarchy to present the importance of both social systems in structuring gender relations (Code, 2000, p. 146; Eisenstein, 1979, p. 22; Tong, 2009, p. 4). Accordingly, socialist feminists argue that the way to end women's oppression is to kill the two-headed beast of capitalist patriarchy or patriarchal capitalism (Tong, 2009). For the sake of this goal, socialist feminist scholars seek to develop theories powerful enough to explain the complexity in which capitalism and patriarchy allied to oppress

women (Tong, 2009, p. 111). Some argue that there has been a fusion of capitalism and patriarchy into a single capitalist patriarchy or patriarchal capitalism, while others conceptualize these structures as mutually independent, yet interactive, systems of gender oppression (Code, 2000, p. 146; Eisenstein, 1979; Sargent, 1981; Tong, 2009, p. 4). Among them, Heidi Hartmann, and Sylvia Walby especially stress issues related to women and work (Tong, 2009, p. 5).

In regard to the impact of development on women, the socialist feminist perspective develops an explanation of Third World women's marginalization and exploitation. That is, capitalism employs preexisting patriarchal relations (systems of male domination) to accelerate capital accumulation (Tiano, 1987, p. 239). This analysis contends that women's oppression originates in the household, the primary locus of patriarchy that assigns women largely to reproductive roles. The gender division of labor benefits capitalism because women's unpaid domestic labor and child-rearing activities reproduce the labor force at minimal cost. In turn, women's reproductive roles condition the terms of their participation in paid production. Women are regarded as subsidiary wage earners whose major responsibility is to take care of husbands, children, and domestic work. They are relegated to insecure and low paid positions seen as extensions of their reproductive roles. Also, women's child-rearing duties and the ambivalent attitude towards their roles as wage workers cause them to function as a "reserve army of labor," to be pulled into or expelled from the work force according to the capital system's needs. In sum, contrary to classical economic models, which analyze women's productive roles based on labor demand, human capital, and other characters of the labor

market, the socialist feminist perspective attributes women's vulnerability in production to their reproductive roles and the patriarchal dynamics that emanate from the domestic sphere (Tiano, 1987, p. 239).

In her article "Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex," Heidi Hartmann characterized patriarchy as an independent system of domination anteceding capitalism and rooted in the sexual division of labor that is hierarchical, with men on top and women on the bottom. Accordingly, Hartmann reviewed the historical literature on the division of labor by sex during the emergence of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution in England and the United States and argued that women's confinement in the home was consummated through a historical coalition between working-class and capitalist men. Men's appropriation of women's labor, partly achieved through the enactment of protective legislation and the family wage, removed women from the sphere of paid work, and as a result, from effective access to political power and economic resources. Hartmann suggested that the improvement of women's social and economic condition would depend on eliminating the sexual division of labor and integrating women into paid employment (Hartmann, 1976).

Hartmann's argument might be supported by Sylvia Walby's study. Researching on the workplace in the United Kingdom, Walby noted that the British government made full employment for both men and women one of its public policies. As a result, more women than before participated in workforce, where they gained not only economic clout but also political voices. According to Walby, conceptualizations of the United Kingdom as having a strong male breadwinner logic no longer made much sense. British

government policy in 2002 has been oriented toward full employment for all. The British government became convinced that in order to compete successfully in the European Union and global economic system, the nation needed to provide women workers with working hours that were more flexible, ample childcare (The National Childcare Strategy), and decent minimum wages. Walby optimistically claimed that modernization of the gender regime is creating a new political constituency of working women who are vocalizing their perceived interests in policies to assist combining home and work (Walby, 2003; Tong, 2009).

Since the mid-1970, regarding the economic development in the Third World, one of the popular studies has been research on the impact of women factory workers in export industries in the developing countries, especially those women employed by MNCs (Lim, 1983, p. 70; Lim, 1990, 101). The reason for the widespread interest in this topic is the historical coincidence of the women's increasingly changing roles worldwide with the increasing integration of production on a world scale and the expansion of export manufacturing in developing countries (Benería, 2003, p. 77; Lim, 1990, p. 101; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983). In addition, the newly popular dependency theory seemed to explain the scattered data available, providing a widely accepted stereotyped of poverty-stricken Third World women suffering low wages, poor working and living conditions, and ruthless exploitation by MNCs located in export-processing free trade zones in Asia and Latin America (Lim, 1990). This trend displayed an evidence of female exploitation under capitalist development (Benería, 2003, p. 78; Jaquette, 1982; p. 274). However, this analysis gradually was seen as simplistic and unable to deal with the

complexity of women's involvement (Benería, 2003, p. 78; Elson and Pearson, 1989; Lim 1983, 1990). Thus, many scholars began to point out that women were not passive victims of exploitative conditions and demonstrated the multiplicity of factors that affected women's incorporation in paid work and their active involvement in it (Ong, 1987). Yet, Linda Y. C. Lim suggested that women's employment in MNCs might actually result in improving certain aspects of women's status because they benefited from formal, well-paid employment. Particularly, she indicated that MNCs paid higher wages than the domestic firms. Further, she explored the reasons why this issue, which in fact involved only a tiny proportion of working women in developing countries, became such a sensational case. She argued that the vision of greedy multinationals and exploited young female laborers served ideological stances of Marxists, feminists, and trade unionists. Consequently, facts were overwhelmed by symbolism as these various protagonists utilized and interpreted reality to suit their purpose (Lim, 1990).

4. How Does Democratization Affect Status of Women?

In his book *The Third Wave*, Samuel Huntington analyzes the transition of some thirty countries, mainly in Europe, Asia (including Taiwan), and Latin America, from authoritarian regimes to democratic political systems between 1974 and 1990 (Huntington, 1991). It is assumed that democratization might offer prospects for better citizen participation and that those previously or traditionally marginalized groups in these countries could exert newly acquired political influence to improve their situations (Clark and Clark, 2002). From a gendered perspective, how does democratization affect

the status of women?

Figure 2.2 How Democratization Can Promote the Status of Women



Source: Clark, Cal and Janet Clark. 2002. "The Social and Political Bases for Women's Growing Political Power in Taiwan." *Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, Number 3 - 2002 (170): p. 4.

Theoretically, Clark and Clark suggest that democratization should open new channels for women to pursue their autonomous objectives. They argue that democratization helps women use political influence through two distinct mechanisms, which are shown in Figure 2.2. First, women could become public officials with the political power to enact laws that can benefit their sex. Second, greater political liberalization and civil freedom could furnish a conducive context for the emergence of independent women's groups pushing the government to enact desirable reforms. The end result in either case is that public policies can be used to lessen or remove the restrictions on women constructed by the patriarchal cultures that exist in most societies.

Moreover, sketched in Figure 2.2, Clark and Clark contend that the influence of the existing patriarchal ideology will almost inevitably affect both the extent of women's autonomous participation in the public domain and the efficiency of government policy (Clark and Clark, 2002).

Women's Movements and Women's Autonomous Interest Groups

"Social movement" is defined as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1217; cited in Rosenfeld and Ward, 1991, p. 475). Stated simply, a social movement is a group of people with a common interest, who work together to change a policy of government and/or to change

Figure 2.3 Social Movements, Women's Movements, Feminist Movements, and Women's in Movements



how society perceives something (Henderson and Jeydel, 2007). Women's participation in movement activities is often viewed as a subtype of social movement (Beckwith, 2000; Diamond, 1994; Freeman, 1975; Freeman and Johnson, 1999; Gelb and Palley, 1996; Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald, 2000; Hsiao, 1990; McBride and Mazur, 2008) and falls into three broad categories—"women's movements," "feminist movements," and "women in social movements" (Beckwith, 2000; Krook and Childs, 2010), which are shown in Figure 2.3.

Karen Beckwith suggests a definition of women's movements as a subset of sociopolitical movements that are "characterized by the primacy of women's gendered experiences, women's issues, and women's leadership and decision making. The relationship of women to these movements is direct and immediate. Movement definition, issues articulation, and issues resolution are specific to women, developed and organized by them with reference to their gender identity" (Beckwith, 2000, p. 437). However, the content of women's issues and women's gendered experiences vary across national and state structures, cultural contexts, and women's classes, races, and identities. "Women's movements" can include rightwing or antifeminist women's movements and progressive, leftwing or feminist women's movements, but exclude women's activism in other social movements, for example, women in nationalist movements that lack gender content and where men predominate in leaderships and decision making. From this viewpoint, Beckwith argues "women's movements" are distinguished from "women in movements" (Beckwith 2000, p. 437).

Feminist movements are often seen as a subset of women's movements (Beckwith,

2000; Martin, 1990), but many scholars have used the terms “women’s movement” and “feminist movement” interchangeably (Goertz and Mazur, 2008, p. 234-235). Feminist movements are distinct because they may include men and share a gender power analysis of women’s subordination (Beckwith, 2000; Krook and Childs, 2010). Moreover, feminist movements and organizations may be inspired by different types of feminism (Martin, 1990). Liberal feminism stresses equality between men and women and believes that change can be achieved through legal and social reform. Radical feminism emphasizes differences between men and women and regards gender inequality as a basic system of power that arranges gender relationships. Socialist feminism merges capitalism from Marxism and patriarchal ideology from radical feminism together to form patriarchal capitalism (or capitalist patriarchy) that is the cause of women’s oppression. Postmodern feminism combines ideas about “sex” and “gender” with postmodern or poststructuralist theory to highlight the multiple and contradictory aspects of individual and collective identity, which weaken the possibility of a unitary category of “women” or “men” (Code 2000, p. 397-399; Donovan, 2000; Krook and Childs, 2010; Lorber, 2010; Tong, 2009).

In general, social movements are loosely organized people and groups who act over time, outside established institutions, to promote or resist social change (Greenberg and Page, 2007). For what interests, in specific, do women strive by mobilizing collective action? According to Maxine Molyneux’s analysis, the concept of women’s interests is highly contentious one. Because women are positioned within their societies through a variety of different means (class, ethnicity, and gender), the interests which

they have as a group are similarly shaped in complex and sometimes conflicting ways. Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about the interests of women. While "women's interests" do not exist in any general sense, Molyneux argues about a notion of "gender interests," which can be either practical or strategic, each being derived in a different way and each embracing implications for women's subjectivity (Molyneux, 1985).

According to Molyneux, practical gender interests arise inductively from the concrete conditions of women's positioning within the gender division of labor, and are formulated by the women who are themselves within these positions rather than through external interventions. Practical interests tend to emerge in response to immediate needs in women's daily lives, and they do not entail strategic goals such as women's emancipation or gender equality. Studies of women's collective action usually use this notion to explain the dynamic and goals of women's participation in social movements. When governments fail to provide basic needs, or the livelihood of their families, especially their children, is threatened, women often play a leading role in food riots, demonstrations, and petitions. In addition, Molyneux indicates, based on these examples, gender and class are closely intertwined; poor women are often mobilized by economic necessary. Obviously, practical interests cannot be assumed to be innocent of class effects (Molyneux, 1985).

In contrast, strategic gender interests are deductively derived from an analysis of women's subordination and lead to the formulation of an alternative set of arrangements to those which exist. These ethical and theoretical criteria help to formulate strategic

objectives to overcome women's subordination, such as the abolition of the sexual division of labor, the alleviation of the burden of domestic work and childcare, the removal of institutionalized forms of discrimination, the attainment of political equality, the establishment of reproductive rights, and the adoption of adequate measures against male violence and control over women. Strategic gender interests are often called "feminist" or "women's real" interests, and, according to Molyneux, require a feminist level of consciousness to struggle for them (Molyneux, 1985).

Molyneux makes an important distinction between practical and strategic gender interests. This distinction is helpful in understanding why women mobilize as women and when and where they do. Practical needs are derived from women's daily lives and experiences, while strategic needs arise from an analysis of women's subordination to men. Practical gender interests are more immediate and reflect women's daily responsibilities; strategic gender interests are longer term and concern the transformation of the relationships between men and women (Jaquette and Staudt, 2006, p. 31; Miraftab, 2006, p. 182).

Why do women's movements occur? Women's movements often appear for similar reasons or factors as the causes of other social movements (Greenberg and Page, 2007; Henderson and Jeydel, 2007; Freeman and Johnson, 1999). The approaches to understanding the emergence of social movements could be classified into three general theories, which are also broadly applied to interpret women's movements (Henderson and Jeydel, 2007; Costain, 1992; Buechler, 1990). First, the theory of relative deprivation argues that movements form when individuals begin to notice a great gap between what

they believe that they should be able to achieve and what they actually can achieve in society. They then become frustrated and angry. When this discontent is politicized and the power of opposition nearly equals the government, social movements may occur (Gurr, 1970, cited from Costain, 1992, p. 3). In her book *The Politics of Women's Liberation,* Jo Freeman showed evidence to support her viewpoint that relative deprivation among female college graduates in the 1960s contributed to the rise of the second women's movement in America. She argued that when women compared their jobs and social prospects with men of the same age and educational attainment, they felt they were unjustly treated. Males were assigned to management-trainee positions, while females with college degrees in the 1960s were put in secretarial or clerical jobs or expected to be full-time wives and mothers. While men advanced quickly in their careers and income, women lagged behind their husbands and former male classmates, which increased a sense of gender inequality and flaming frustration (Freeman, 1975). This also reveals that women's and feminist movements were often led by middle-class, college-educated women because they were subject to the greatest strain (Freeman, 1975; Klein, 1984). In general, studies based on relative deprivation theory focused on the psychology of movement participation. They looked for the sources of discontent, analyzed the motives of participants, explored their ideologies, and critiqued their leaderships (Freeman and Johnson, 1999).

Second, the resource mobilization theory contends that the development of social movements depends mainly on the availability of resources, such as money, facilities, communication networks, and committed volunteers (skilled and unskilled) willing to

participate the movement including some elite allies who are interested in associating with the movement, such as governments officials, religious leaders, and corporations (McCarthy and Zald, 1987; Henderson and Jeydel, 2007; Banszak, 1996). Policy-oriented studies found that social movements sometimes led to concessions from government (Button, 1978; Piven and Cloward 1977; cited from Meyer, 2004). From this viewpoint, movement strategies could be seen as rational efforts by people poorly positioned to make claims on government using conventional means (Meyer, 2004). For those left outside of the pluralist arena, protest was a "political resource" to be used to influence policy (Lipsky, 1970; Zald, 1977; cited from Meyer, 2004). Resource mobilization theory stressed movement participation as a rational decision calculated to obtain specific goals. This made the role of ideology and grievances appear less important. That is, studies based on the theory of resource mobilization ask “who did what” rather than “why” (Freeman and Jonson, 1999, p. 4; Meyer, 2004, p. 127). In addition to relative deprivation, Freeman’s book *The Politics of Women’s Liberation* (1975) also introduced resource mobilization theory by indicating that communication networks among college women were already in place through the student and new left movements. These networks were used to organize and disseminate information, helping the second wave of women’s movement in the United States to grow fast (Freeman, 1975). Moreover, Jo Freeman edited a collection of articles on *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies* (1983). Articles in this book were largely based on the theory of resource mobilization. Furthermore, all of Freeman’s later works emphasized the ability of the women’s movement to attract resources and create new organizations. In contrast,

women's grievances and isolation at home were seen as less significant (Freeman, 1983; Freeman and Johnson, 1999; Costain, 1992).

Third, political opportunity theory, also known as political process theory or political structure theory, argues that social movements are greatly affected by political opportunities. While this perspective acknowledges, in agreement with the resource mobilization theory, the critical role of resources, leaders, and elite assistance for explaining movement emergence, it places more emphasis on the mobilization of resources external to the movement, including political opportunities, political structure and political process (Tarrow, 1998; Meyer, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). In her book *Inviting Women's Rebellion*, Costain analyzed the women's movements in the United States by employing political opportunity theory. She argued that the increased presence of women in higher education and workforce participation provided additional resources to female constituencies seeking to mobilize in the 1970s. Given congressional attention to discrimination against women, government openness legitimated and encouraged collective action as the success of the civil right movement did. According to Costain's study, opportunities for women's movements also brought opportunities for policy reforms, which inspired each other in a synergistic spiral. In addition, Costain argued that demobilization followed political defeats and government neglect (Costain, 1992).

Studies have showed that social movements, or civil society groups, played significant roles during the third wave of global democratization (Diamond, 1994; Hsiao, 1990). These social mobilizations encompassed a vast number of groups which

collectively challenged authoritarian regimes and strove for democratic changes, including students movements, churches, professional associations, women's groups, trade unions, human right organizations, producer groups, the press, civic associations, and the like (Diamond, 1994). Women took the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the subsequent transitions as political opportunities. They became involved in the transformation processes by mobilizing collective actions in the hope that democratization could create a "jump start" for improving their status (Clark and Clark, 2002). Although the results might vary (Viterna and Fallon, 2008), most studies conclude that women apparently made few gains from the democratic transformations in the former Soviet bloc and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s (Waylen, 1994, Jaquette, 1994).

Women's Political Representation

Democracy is about "people's rule." In a democratic polity, citizens are presumed to have equal rights, opportunities, and a voice in the governance of the public sphere. In modern nation states, citizens *per se* cannot directly make decisions. Instead, they need to go through representatives, a process that requires interest aggregation through political parties and pressure groups. Therefore, the institution of regular, free, and fair elections to determine people's representatives in governments is the first requirement of democracy in its modern form (Razavi, 2000).

Globally, while in 1997 women accounted for 11.7 percent of members of parliament, this figure has increased to 16.2 percent in 2005 (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2).

The election and integration of women into national legislatures leads us to wonder: do women legislators pay more attention to women's issues? Are female legislators more likely to enact laws that can eliminate or lessen discrimination against women? Answers to these questions might depend on how we choose to define representation in general and representation of women in particular.

Table 2.1 Women in Parliament in 1997, by Region of the World

Region	Single House or Lower House	Upper House Or Senate	Both Houses Combined
Nordic countries	36.4%	-	36.4%
Americas	12.9%	11.5%	12.7%
Europe – OSCE member countries including Nordic countries	13.8%	8.5%	12.6%
Europe – OSCE member countries excluding Nordic countries	12.3%	8.8%	11.5%
Asia	13.4%	9.9%	13.1%
Sub-Saharan Africa	10.1%	13.6%	10.4%
Pacific	9.8%	21.8%	11.6%
Arab states	3.3%	2.1%	3.3%
Global average	12.0%	10.1%	11.7%

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), "Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of 1 January 1997, <http://www.ipu.org>.

Table 2.2 Women in Parliament in 2005, by Region of the World

Region	Single House or Lower House	Upper House Or Senate	Both Houses Combined
Nordic countries	40.0%	-	40.0%
Americas	19.7%	19.9%	19.7%
Europe – OSCE member countries including Nordic countries	19.0%	16.3%	18.4%
Europe – OSCE member countries excluding Nordic countries	16.9%	16.3%	16.8%
Asia	16.1%	14.4%	15.9%
Sub-Saharan Africa	16.4%	17.6%	16.5%
Pacific	12.0%	26.5%	13.9%
Arab states	7.0%	5.9%	6.8%
Global average	16.4%	15.0%	16.2%

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), "Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of 31 December 2005," <http://www.ipu.org>.

In her book *The Concept of Representation*, Hanna Pitkin defines a "descriptively" representative body as one that mirrors the characteristics of the represented community and a "substantively" representative body as one that reflects the interests of the represented community. Accordingly, descriptive representation means "standing for," while substantive representation refers to “acting for" (Pitkin, 1967). That is, “standing for” is concerned with who the representatives are (male or female, black or white, rich or poor, etc.), and “acting for” is concerned with what the representatives do. A female legislator can represent women by her mere presence in or occupation of that office. In this sense, only women can descriptively represent women. However, to represent women substantively, a female elected official must act for women and their interests (Reingold, 1992). In addition, Pitkin argues that descriptive representation is of interest primarily because we "tend to assume that people's characteristics are a guide to the actions they will take" (Pitkin, 1967, p. 89). Put together these concepts address the question: Do women in elected positions of power engage in enhancing women’s interests and enacting women-friendly policies in order to improve women’s status?

Scholars have documented that female legislators are more likely to work on issues which are important to women. For example, Saint-Germain’s study found that women sponsor more legislation dealing with women's concerns than do their male colleagues (Saint-Germain, 1989). Lijphart found that democracies with higher proportions of women in the legislature passed more laws which benefit children (Lijphart, 1991). Thomas’ research indicated that legislatures with higher numbers of female representatives introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of

women, children, and families (Thomas, 1991). In her longitudinal study of the Arizona state legislature, Saint-Germain found the same pattern evidence as Thomas' findings (Saint-Germain, 1989). Swers stated that women's representatives express strong support for issues of women's right (Swers, 1998). While much empirical research indicated that female legislators are concerned with women's issues and social issues, the study (data from six Latin American legislatures) by Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Tayor-Robinson discovered that women tended to be isolated on committees dedicated to women's and social issues and kept off more powerful economics and foreign affairs committees as the percentage of legislators who are women increased, when party leaders or chamber presidents controlled committee assignments and when the structure of the committee system provided a specific committee to deal with women's issues (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Tayor-Robinson, 2005). That is, the traditionally dominant male group controlled committee assignments. As a result, female newcomers were marginalized and kept on the sidelines to deal with women's issues and social issues.

Greater progress in women's parliamentary representation has been made in some parts of the world, remarkably the Nordic countries, where women's representation averages 40 percent. Yet, real gains in women's accessing legislatures have not occurred in many regions. For example, women are still least represented in the Arab states, where the regional average in lower houses is 6.7 percent in 2005 (see Table 2.2). Also, women remain regrettably underrepresented in the parliaments of the Pacific Island states, with an average of 3.2 percent, excluding Australia and New Zealand, where women's representation stands at 24.7 percent and 28.3 percent, respectively (Ballington, 2005).

Although more female legislators have entered parliaments, women have remained underrepresented in national legislatures throughout the world. It even took approximately sixty years for Denmark, Norway and Sweden to cross the 20 per cent threshold, and seventy years to reach 30 per cent (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005).

What are the factors that affect women's parliamentary nomination, and therefore recruitment? In particular, what is the relative significance of political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors that boost or hinder women's representation in national politics? With regard to political factors, empirical analyses have found that electoral systems, party differences, and gender quota systems are crucial variables influencing women's political representation.

Cross-national studies in terms of women's share of parliamentary seats have focused on the influence of political factors, particularly the structure of the electoral system (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). Proportional representation (PR) has been identified to have strong and significant effects on women's parliamentary representation in comparison to the single-member district system (SMD) (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1998; Norris, 1985; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1994a, 1994b). That is, women can make greater progress in elected parliaments in nations which use PR systems. In a SMD system where only one person is elected, political parties have a disincentive to risk backing a women candidate because of voter prejudice against women's ability to assume legislative duties (Norris 1996, p. 201; Rule 1994b, p. 690). In a PR system, however, political parties have an incentive to balance tickets by including more women to appeal to different

constituencies (Norris, 1987, p. 129; Matland 1998, p. 112-113; Matland and Studlar 1996; Rule 1994b). Also, a PR system can help women because of a contagion effect. Under a PR system, once a party starts to nominate women in prominent positions in candidates lists, others will be quicker to adopt this policy (Matland and Studlar, 1996; Matland, 2005, p. 101-102). Moreover, parties only nominate a single candidate in SMD systems. Because of the zero-sum feature of nominating decisions, women candidates must compete with existing interests within the party which tend to be dominated by men (Matland, 1998, p. 112).

Another factor affecting women's representation in national politics is party differences in terms of political ideology. Left-oriented parties are more likely to reduce gender inequality and tend to nominate women as candidates (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). In contrast, right-wing parties are apt to support traditional values that discourage women's participation in politics (Rule, 1987). Therefore, the larger the proportion of parliamentary seats held by leftist parties, the larger women's share of those seats tends to be. The presence of leftist parties has been found to increase women's representation by some studies (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Matland, 1998; Rule, 1987). However, partisan differences may have become less important in recent years, as right-wing parties have moved to nominate more women in order to dismiss this as a characteristic distinguishing parties of the left (Matland and Studlar, 1996; Rule, 1994a). Also, Darcy et al indicate that in Scandinavia and some other European countries, conservative parties have become nearly as likely as leftist parties to nominate women (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994, p. 152).

Palema Paxton argues that countries with one-party dominance under "Marxist-Leninist" doctrine tend to have more female legislators (Paxton, 1997). Although the legislature in such countries may be elected by popular vote, ruling parties usually manipulate election outcomes in many ways. In this case, because of the equalitarian ideology, Marxist-Leninist political regimes select more women in national legislatures to present gender equality. Paxton finds a very strong effect for a "Marxist-Leninist" dummy variable including in her analyses for 1975 and 1988 (Paxton, 1997). However, owing to the dissolution of the Soviet bloc during the third wave of democratization, few countries with Marxist-Leninist backgrounds remain (Huntington, 1991).

Gender quotas have been used as a highly effective way of increasing the number of women in public office (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Krook, 2009; Matland, 2008). Starting with the adoption of quotas by leftist and Green parties in some European countries in the 1970's, quotas for women in parliaments have quickly spread all over the world (Matland, 2008). Gender quotas vary in type and institutional location (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Krook, 2009; Randall, 2006). The two most common types of electoral gender quotas are candidate quotas and reserved seats (Dahlerup, 2005, p. 142). Candidate quotas set a minimum percentage of candidates for election that must be women. Legal candidate quotas are stipulated in the constitution or in electoral laws or in political party law. Voluntary party quotas are adopted voluntarily by political parties. Reserved seats require a certain number of seats for women among representatives in a parliament, laid down either in the constitution or by legislature (Dahlerup, 2005; Krook 2009). Voluntary gender quotas are adopted by political parties, for example, in

Mozambique and South African. While political parties are required to adopt gender quotas for national legislative candidates in many of Latin America, no country in sub-Saharan Africa mandates political parties to adopt a gender quota for national legislative election. The reserved-seats system is more common in Asia, but the proportion of reserved seats is usually very low. Alternatively, it can be found in Tanzania and most recently Rwanda, where three-eighths of national assembly seats are reserved for women (Randall, 2006; Yoon, 2004).

While quotas for women may help increase women's political representation in a quick way, Chou, Clark, and Clark suggest that there are two problems in this system. First, if the quota is fairly low, the implementation of the quota system has the effect of turning the floor into a ceiling. Second, women's political activists do not favor a quota system because it underlines the stereotype of women as a secondary class in politics who need protection. Women are seen as weaker and less competitive in the political arena, thus reinforcing gender inequality. Moreover, women politicians, who are elected by quotas system, may have to strive for equal recognition within legislatures (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990).

About forty countries had adopted gender quotas for parliamentary recruitment in 2005, either by constitutional amendment or electoral law. Also, quotas for women candidates have been laid down in major political parties' statutes in more than fifty countries (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). Dahlerup and Freidenvall suggest that the general trends in quota adoption can be identified as the incremental track (Scandinavian countries) and the fast track (Latin American and other Third World countries). From a

liberal viewpoint, quotas for a specific group conflict with the principle of equal opportunity for all. Gender quotas for women, explicitly favoring certain groups of citizens, mean that not all citizens (men) are given an equal chance to attain a political career. Therefore, the incremental-track discourse prefers equal opportunity to equal results. In contrast, the fast track discourse rejects the idea of gradual improvement in women's representation. It argues that an increase in resources might not automatically lead to equal representation. Women's exclusion and gender discrimination in the public sphere only can be solved by engaging in affirmative action. However, Dahlerup and Freidenvall argue that without specifications of quota provisions which match the electoral system and rules about the rank order of candidates as well as sanctions for non-compliance, gender quota provisions may be merely symbolic (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005).

Referring to gender quotas in terms of women's political representation, Nordic countries are usually seen as fine examples. In fact, Nordic countries were generally world leaders in this area even before introducing any quotas (Matland, 2005). Moreover, Dahlerup and Freidenvall point out that electoral quotas have always been voluntarily adopted in Scandinavia, never a legal requirement, and only used by some political parties (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). Matland contends that causality may run from being a world leader to adopting rules, rather than the rules causing one to become a world leader (Matland, 2005).

Women's progress in attaining political power surely depends, in part, on the extent of progress they have made outside political activities (Kenworthy and Malami,

1999; Randall, 1987). Regarding socioeconomic factors, scholars have identified levels of women's education, levels of women's labor force participation, and women's share in professional occupations as important variables that affect women's access to the legislature. Political participation increases with the level of education. Also, educational status has been identified as a key feature distinguishing political elites from ordinary citizens (Putnam, 1976). For these reasons, increasing levels of college graduates among women should enlarge the eligible pool of possible women candidates (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994). Rule and Norris find that the proportion of women's college graduates has positive effects on women's political representation, but only Rule's research shows the effect to be statistically significant (Rule, 1987; Norris, 1985).

Women who work in the formal economy develop stronger feelings of confidence and independence through their jobs and, therefore, develop a greater sense of political efficacy. Also, work or careers provide the organizational basis for political activities by leading women to join trade unions and business groups. Therefore, more females in the labor force might lead to increasing women's political participation and a larger number of motivated and well-connected women candidates who are willing to stand for office (Norris, 1987, p. 122). Studies by Rule and Norris have shown that female labor force participation rates have a positive effect on women's parliamentary representation, but only Rule finds this effect to be statistically significant (Norris, 1985; Rule, 1987).

Scholars argue elected officials at the national level frequently are recruited from professional occupations (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, p. 108). Lawyers, educators, journalists, and business professionals tend to be heavily represented in legislatures in

comparison with the general population (Norris, 1996, p. 188-190). That is, a greater the share of women in professional occupations might lead to a larger share of women's legislative representation. Empirical research by Kenworthy and Malami finds that women's share in the professions is consistently associated with the proportion of parliamentary seats they hold (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 257).

Paxton and Kunovich conclude that ideas about women's role and position in a society can enhance or constrain women's ability to seek political power (Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). Studies show women may win greater political representation in countries where people in general have more liberal attitudes or egalitarian values toward the role of women in politics (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). That is, if politics is considered an appropriate vocation for women and they are seen as capable of serving in the public sphere efficiently, they will be more likely to win office. Therefore, women are more likely to be nominated by party leaders, chosen by voters (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999), and successfully elected to office (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 144-145). Norris created a "political egalitarianism" index from responses to several survey questions in terms of attitudes toward women in politics. She found that countries with more equalitarian scores tended to have larger proportions of parliamentary seats held by women (Norris, 1985, 1987). In addition, holding political and socioeconomic factors constant, the research by Kenworthy and Malami found countries in which religions emphasize women's traditional roles tend to have fewer women in legislatures (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, p. 257).

A report by Frederick Nzwili reveals why Kenya's legislature has one of the worst

record in Africa regarding female representation. Although violent attacks against candidates in Kenya are not limited to women, they are certainly a tactic used to try to prevent women in particular from seeking political office. In the 2002 elections, 130 women expressed an interest in running for office, but finally only 44 did because some of female candidates and their relatives were threatened or assaulted by supporters of their male rivals (Nzwili, 2002; cited from Henderson and Jeydel, 2007, p. 5). According to Henderson and Jeydel, in the last Assembly only 9 out of 220 members were women and at no point in Kenya's history has the number of female legislators ever exceeded 10 (Henderson and Jeydel, 2007, p. 5). Although women's political participation in Kenya might be an extreme case, it vividly depicts that patriarchal culture stands in the way of women's decision to run for and ultimately win office.

Studies of the impact of democracy on the status of women demonstrate the interrelationship of several factors. First, women need the psychological will, resources and opportunities to engage in movements to improve the status of women. Second, the cultural values and political structures of the society affect how many women representatives are elected. Finally, once elected, women must rise in the legislative power structure to be in positions where they can influence the passage of policies beneficial to the interest of women.

5. Theoretical Model

This section presents a theoretical model of how patriarchal culture, economic development, and democratization influence women's status. The dissertation uses the

theories regarding these relationships that were discussed in this chapter to examine the conditions of women in Taiwan. A general scholarly consensus exists about some of these relationships, but others are quite controversial with different schools of thought making opposing presumptions. The following path diagram in Figure 2.4 models more specific hypotheses about these relationships.

Figure 2.4 Model of How Patriarchal Culture, Economic Development, and Democratization Affect the Status of Women



Patriarchy refers to the prevalence of male dominance in a society. Women, in general, are treated as a secondary and subordinate sex. It is hypothesized by all the major theoretical traditions that a higher degree of patriarchy in traditional cultures should produce a debased status for women.

H1: The degree of patriarchy in traditional culture will have a negative relationship with the status of women.

The relationship between development and the status of women is controversial. There are two quite different viewpoints. One, based on the conventional modernization model assumes that the impact of development on the status of women is positive. The other associated with the liberal feminist, dependency, and socialist feminist paradigms argues that development has a negative impact upon women's status in traditional societies and the developing countries for several reasons. First, agricultural development strategies, such as the introduction of more advanced technology and the transformation from subsistence crops to cash-crop production, weaken women's production role by decreasing their participation in agricultural work. Also, at the onset of industrialization, women are marginalized in the "modern" sectors, where they are widely confined to informal, unstable, low-paying, and unskilled manufacturing jobs. Meanwhile, women's traditional roles and support from kinship networks are actually eroded. Since the impact of development upon the status of women is not clear, two competing hypotheses will be tested. The first hypothesizes that higher levels of economic development should produce an increasing status for women. The second hypothesizes that higher levels of economic development during agricultural modernization and at the earlier stages of industrialization will lead to deterioration in women's status.

H2: The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon the status of women.

versus

H3: The level of economic development will have a negative impact upon the

status of women.

In a democratic country, public officials are selected by the people; and fundamental political rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble, and the right to petition, are guaranteed for all citizens. Therefore, there are at least three channels through which women can exert political influence to improve their status. First, women themselves could become elected officials to enact laws that can eliminate or lessen discrimination against women. Second, women can form advocacy groups to press government to make policies and enact legal reforms that help women to gain better situations or ensure a more equal status of women. Finally, under democratic systems, it is inevitable that parties must compete for votes, which makes them more responsive to important constituencies, such as women. Thus, it is hypothesized by modernization theorists and probably most liberal feminists that democratization should improve the status of women. In contrast, dependency theorists and socialist feminists would probably argue that democracy would not help women in most situations because of the powerful reinforcing effects of capitalism and patriarchy.

H4: *The degree of democratization will have a positive impact upon the status of women.*

versus

H5: *The degree of democratization will not be associated with the status of women.*

Likewise, there is strong disagreement over the impact of economic development on the degree of patriarchy. Modernization theorists conclude that greater development

should produce cultural change undercutting patriarchal norms, while dependency theorists and socialist feminists are quite skeptical about this line of argument.

H6: *The level of development will have a negative association with patriarchal culture.*

versus

H7: *The level of development will have no association with patriarchal culture.*

A higher GDP per capita correlates with democracy. Moreover, democracy was very rare before the industrial revolution. Thus, empirical research leads many to believe that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy (modernization theory), or helps newly established democracies stabilize (Przeworski et al, 2000). Some campaigners for democracy also suggest that democratization will become inevitable if economic development progresses. Thus, it is hypothesized that economic development should promote democratization.

H8: *The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon democratization.*

Chapter 3 provides an overall test of these hypotheses and evaluates the status of women in Taiwan. First, correlation and regression analysis of aggregate data for nation-states are used to show the direction and strength of each of these five relationships, with analyses being conducted for both developing and developed countries. The data for Taiwan will then be examined in some detail. Finally, the indictors of the status of women in Taiwan will be used to benchmark the nation's performance after statistically controlling for its economic development level.

CHAPTER 3

THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

This chapter tests the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 of the factors that shape the status of women and then uses these data to evaluate the relative status of women in Taiwan. There are three parts in the chapter. The first one talks about defining and measuring properties, as well as data collection. In the second part, the eight research hypotheses will be tested for the 174 countries listed in Appendix A. The third part focuses on comparing Taiwan to other nations in the world, both developing and developed, by various indicators of women's status and then uses a "residuals analysis" from regressions using gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) to explain a nation's values on these items to determine whether Taiwan is an "underachiever" or "overachiever."

1. Defining and Measuring Properties and Data Collection

The main independent variables included in this study are the level of economic development, the degree of patriarchal culture (as measured by the degree of gender equality), and the extent of democracy. The level of economic development was measured by a nation's GDP (gross domestic product) per capita for 2000, adjusting for

differing national costs-of-living with the purchasing power parity (PPP) index. GDP per capita (PPP US$) for each country was collected from the United Nation's *Human Development Report 2002* (2002) except for Taiwan.

Bernstein and Dyer indicated that beliefs and attitude cannot be directly observed, they must be measured indirectly through observation of some behavior—usually the response to a questionnaire (Bernstein and Dyer, 1992, p. 64). Accordingly, a nation's gender equality scale (GES) was applied to measure the degree of patriarchal culture in a society. For each country, the value of GES was calculated by averaging the total score of a set of five items (based on 100 points in each one) from the pooled 1995-2001 World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS). Inglehart and Norris pointed out that these five items for WVS and EVS are similar to those contained in the more comprehensive psychological scales of gender equality, including attitudes toward politics, the workforce, education, and the family (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 31-32). Survey questions for these five items were: D059 MEN MAKE BETTER POLITICAL LEADERS: "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do." (Agree coded low); C001 MEN HAVE MORE RIGHT TO A JOB: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." (Agree coded low); D060 UNIVERSITY IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A BOY: "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." (Agree coded low); D019 WOMEN NEED CHILDREN: "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" (Agree coded low); D023 WOMAN AS A SINGLE PARENT: "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do

you approve or disapprove?" (Disapprove coded low). Data on the five items by country were collected from Wave 2000 in the book *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook based on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys* (Inglehart et al, 2004).

Since 1972, Freedom House, a non-profit organization founded in New York in 1941 to promote democracy and expand political and economic freedom around the world, has annually rated the extent of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) in different countries. According to Freedom House, PR and CL scores, ranking from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) respectively, are based on "a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars." Combining these two scores produces an index that varies between 2 (most free) to 14 (least free). Thus, to create a scale which goes from the least free to the most free, the original scale is subtracted from 15 to produce the "FH score" for each country as the indicator of the extent of democratization. In other words, each country was assigned a score from 1 point to 13 points, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of democratization.

With regard to the dependent variables, this research included women's labor force participation rate, total fertility rate (per woman), and the percentage of seats in parliament held by women to indicate the economic, social, and political dimensions of the status of women, respectively. Conventionally, participating in the paid workforce should give women more resources; therefore, they would become economically independent and could autonomously pursue their goals; lower fertility rates would allow women to engage in broader economic and political activities; and women's involvement in the political sphere, as measured by seats in the legislature, should make governments

more responsive to women's rights, concerns, and needs. Data for each of the three indicators of women's status were collected from the United Nation's *Human Development Report 2002* (2002) except for Taiwan.

Table 3.1 Economic, Social, and Political Indicators Used in the Analysis, and Taiwan's Data Sources

Variable	Indicator
I. Level of economic development	GDP per capita (PPP, US$), 2000
II. Degree of patriarchal culture	Gender equality scale (GES), 2000
III. Extent of democratization	Freedom House score (FH score), 2000
IV. The status of women	Women's labor force participation rate (%), 2000
	Fertility rate (per woman), late 1990s
	Seats in parliament held by women (as % of total), 2002

Indicator	Taiwan's data	
	Year	Source
GDP per capita (PPP, US$)	2000	*Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2009,* published by Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan) (ROC, 2009b)
Gender equality scale (GES)	2000	Included in the world dataset
Freedom House score (FH score)	2000	Included in the world dataset
Women's labor force participation rate (%)	2000	*Taiwan Women's Almanac* (1st ed.), published by Foundation of Women Rights Promotion and Development, ROC (Taiwan)
Fertility rate (per woman)	2000	*Social Indicators 2009,* published by Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan) (ROC, 2009a)
Seats in parliament held by women (as % of total)	2002	*Taiwan Women's Almanac*(1st ed.), published by Foundation of Women Rights Promotion and Development, ROC (Taiwan)

Taiwan's data on GDP per capita (PPP US$) and the three indicators for women's status were taken from different government departments of Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC), because it is not a member of the United Nations. However, both the pooled 1995-2001 World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Values Surveys (EVS) and Freedom House's survey of Freedom in the World in 2000 included Taiwan. Original data were thus available for calculating Taiwan's GES and FH score. The data sources for all indicators used in analysis are listed in Table 3.1.

2. Testing the Hypotheses

The model is tested with data from 174 developing and developed nations (Appendix B reports their values on the six variables included in the analysis). The data for this study are analyzed by using SPSS software. The binary regressions are performed showing the association between 1) the three indicators (GDP per capita, GES, and FH score) of the independent variables (economic development, patriarchal culture, and democratization) and 2) the three indicators (women in labor force, fertility, and seats in the legislature held by women) of the economic, social, and political status of women. Only variables measured on either an interval or ratio scales are appropriate for use in the calculation of Pearson correlation coefficients; and all the variables examined in this research are interval ones. In addition, SPSS calculates the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients.

This section tests the eight hypotheses in my theoretical model that were developed in Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2. First, we will discuss the simple bivariate

correlations between the three explanatory variables and the three indicators of women's status. Second, multiple regression analysis will be applied to develop more complex models of the simultaneous effects of the independent variables.

Bivariate Correlations for Testing the Theoretical Model

The first hypothesis (H_1) is that the status of women will be lower in countries with more patriarchal cultures or, using the indicator in this analysis, that the status of women will be better in countries that have higher gender equality values. As the correlations in the first column of Table 3.2 show, the nature of this relationship differs dramatically among the three dimensions of women's status. The hypothesis is strongly supported in politics, as gender equality has a high positive correlation of .59 with the percentage of women in the national legislature that is statistically significant at the .001 level. In other words, women receive much better political representation when norms of gender equality are fairly widespread. In contrast, H_1 is only weakly supported in the area of social outcomes, as gender equality has a negative correlation of -.20 with the fertility rate that is not statistically significant. The first hypothesis, moreover, is disconfirmed in the economic dimension of women's status because there is no association at all between gender equality and the percentage of women in the labor force.

The second and third hypotheses reflect competing theoretical perspectives on how economic development should affect the status of women. H_2 predicts that this will be a positive relationship, while H_3 posits a negative association. The middle column in Table 3.2 strongly supports the second hypothesis for the political and social outcome

Table 3.2 Correlations of GDP per Capita, Gender Equality, and Democratization with Three Indicators of the Status of Women

	Gender Equality	GDP per capita	Democratization
Economic			
Women in Labor Force	.07	-.25**	-.08
Social			
Fertility	-.20	-.59**	-.52**
Political			
Women % Legislature	.59**	.47**	.38**

*Statistically significant at .05 level.
**Statistically significant at .001 level

indicators. GDP per capita has a fairly strong positive correlation of .47 with the percentage of women in parliament and a quite strong negative one of -.59 with the fertility rate respectively. Both these correlations, moreover, are highly statistically significant at the .001 level. However, the second hypothesis is disconfirmed for the economy as GDP per capita has a weak-to-moderate correlation of -.25 with women's labor force participation which is statistically significant at the .001 level. That is, higher levels of development bring decreased, not increased, formal economic activities by women, lending some support to H_3.

The forth and the fifth hypotheses, similarly, represent different perspectives on how democratization should influence that status of women. In H_4, the degree of democratization exerts a positive influence on women's status, while H_5 predicts that there will be no association between these two variables. The results here in the last column in Table 3.2 parallel those for the impact of economic development almost

exactly. H_4 is strongly supported for social outcomes, moderately supported for politics, and disconfirmed for the economy. Democratization has a fairly strong negative correlation of -.52 with fertility and a moderate positive correlation of .38 with the percentage of women in the legislature; and both of these correlations are statistically significant at the .001 level. In contrast, the fifth hypothesis (H_5) that the degree of democratization will be unrelated to the status of women is supported by the lack of correlation (r = -.08) between democratization and the proportion of women in the labor force.

Table 3.3 Correlations of GDP per Capita with Gender Equality and Democratization

	GDP per capita	Democratization
Gender Equality	.63**	.48**
Democracy	.52**	

*Statistically significant at .05 level.
**Statistically significant at .001 level

The last three hypotheses are tested by the correlations in Table 3.3. The sixth hypothesis (H_6) that the level of economic development will have a negative impact on the level of patriarchal culture is strongly supported, as GDP per capita has very strong correlation .63 with gender equality that is statistically significant at the .001 level. Consequently, the seventh hypothesis (H_7) that the level of economic development will have no association with the level of patriarchal culture is strongly disconfirmed. Finally, the eighth hypothesis (H_8) that the level of economic development will have a positive impact on the degree of democratization is strongly supported because GDP per capita

has a fairly strong positive correlation of .52 with democratization, which is statistically significant at the .001 level.

Multiple Regressions for Comparing the Impacts of the Three Explanatory Factors

The three factors that are used here to explain the status of women are all strongly associated with each other. Table 3.3 showed that GDP per capita has correlations of .52 with democratization and .63 with gender equality; and the correlation between gender equality and democratization is .48. All these correlations are highly statistically significant at the .001 level. This section, hence, applies multiple regression analysis to provide a more sophisticated model of how GDP per capita, gender equality, and democratization influence the three indicators of the status of women.

Tables 3.4 presents the multiple regression results for how the three explanatory variables affect the fertility rate. In combination, the independent variables exert a strong effect as indicated by the Multiple R of .56. The R^2 shows that the three explanatory items explain 31% of the variance in fertility rates among these countries. In terms of the independent effects of the explanatory variables, GDP per capita and democratization have moderate-to-strong independent effects in the predicted direction. However, once the effects of these other two items are statistically controlled in the multiple regression, countries with greater gender equality actually have slightly worse, not better, outcomes for women. In multiple regression, the Beta (or standardized regression) coefficients can be used to compare the relative impact of the independent variables. In Table 3.4 for the fertility rate, GDP per capita, has a Beta of -.39 that is statistically significant at the .05

Table 3.4 Multiple Regression Explaining Fertility Rate

Overall Equation			
Multiple R .56			
Multiple R^2 .31			
Significance .000			
Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	Beta	Sig.
Gender Equality	.021	.20	.12
GDP per capita	-.00005	-.39	.013
Democratization	-.12	-.33	.017

level, thereby giving moderate support to H_2; and democratization has a Beta of -.33 which is statistically significant at the .05 level, moderately supporting the fourth hypothesis. Gender equality, in sharp contrast, has a weak positive effect on the fertility rate, with a Beta .20 that is not statistically significant (sig. = .12), which is inconsistent with H_1.

The multiple regression explaining the percentage of women in the national legislature in Table 3.5 displays a much different causal pattern. Overall, the Multiple R of .63 and R^2 of .39 denote a fairly strong combined impact of the three independent variables. Their relative influences, though, are exactly the opposite of the ones that they have on the fertility rate. Gender equality exercises the dominant influence, with a Beta of .45 that is statistically significant at the level of .001. In contrast, the independent effects of GDP per capita (Beta = .09, not statistically significant) and of democratization (Beta = .18, not statistically significant) are fairly marginal at best, which does not lend

Table 3.5 Multiple Regression Explaining Percent of Women in Legislature

Overall Equation			
Multiple R .63			
Multiple R^2 .39			
Significance .000			
Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	Beta	Sig.
Gender Equality	.38	.45	.000
GDP per capita	-.00009	.09	.52
Democratization	.54	.18	.16

much support to H_2 or H_4. Thus, once culture is controlled, the influence of the other two independent variables vanishes. In sum, the results of this multiple regression analysis strongly support the first hypothesis (H_1), which predicted that the degree of patriarchy in traditional culture will have a negative relationship with the status of women. Thus, cultural factors appear to be very important in promoting the increased political representation of women.

Finally, the top row in Table 3.2 above showed that women's participation in the labor force has little association with the three independent variables used here. Consequently, it should not be surprising that the Multiple R for this multivariate relationship in Table 3.6 is fairly weak at .22 (not statistically significant). Unlike the bivariate correlations, though, gender equality does have a weak association with women's increased economic activity as indicated by a Beta of .23 (compared to its r of .07 in Table 3.2) once the effects of the other independent variables are controlled. We

probably should not make too much of this relationship since it is not statistically significant. Still, culture does appear to have a marginal effect upon women's entry into labor markets.

Table 3.6 Multiple Regression
Explaining Women's Labor Force Participation Rate

Overall Equation			
Multiple R .22			
Multiple R^2 .05			
Significance .33			
Separate Effects of Independent Variables	b	Beta	Sig.
Gender Equality	.23	.23	.12
GDP per capita	-.000	-.17	.33
Democratization	-.37	-.11	.50

3. Comparing Taiwan to Other Nations by a Residuals Analysis

Table 3.7 shows that Taiwan was well above the average for all the 174 nations in the analysis in terms of economic development level, as it had a US$15,000 GDP per capita in 2000 compared to an international average of US$5,041 (median), or $8,543.30 (mean). Taiwan also was an overachiever on two of the three dimensions of women's status but an underachiever on the other one. Taiwan had a fertility rate of 1.7, which was about half of the median (3.000) and mean (3.480) for all countries, suggesting a very good performance. Taiwan also rated highly on the indicator of female political

Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics of GDP per capita and the Three Indicators of Women's Status

	GDP per capita, 2000	Women's Participation in Labor Force, 2000	Fertility Rate per Woman, late 1990s	Women's Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats, 2002
N Valid	173	163	167	162
Missing	1	11	7	12
Mean	$8,543.30	52.876	3.480	13.242
Median	$5,041.00	52.800	3.000	10.950
Std. Deviation	$8,956.857	14.4837	1.8466	8.7934
Minimum	$490	19.2	1.1	.0
Maximum	$50,061	82.8	8.0	42.7
Taiwan	**$15,000**	**46.0**	**1.7**	**20.9**

Source: 174 countries' statistics of GDP per capita, women's labor force participation rate, fertility rate, and women's per cent of parliament seats are shown in Appendix B.

participation since women held 20.9% of seats in parliament compared to an international average of 10.95% (median), or 13.24% (mean). In contrast, Taiwan was clearly below average on women's participation in the labor force. Here, Taiwan's rate of 46.0% was significantly below the international average of 52.8% (median), or 52.876% (mean).

These comparisons use the average for all countries as the standard for benchmarking. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that richer nations will have an advantage in many areas. Thus, a more sophisticated approach to benchmarking is to control a nation's level of affluence in the benchmarking process. This can be done by using GDP per capita to explain national variations in a regression analysis and then measuring how

far a country falls above or below the regression line to indicate how much of an underachiever or overachiever it is. This is called "residuals analysis" because the emphasis is on the difference or residual between a country's actual score and what the regression equation predicts its score should be based on its GDP per capita. By using residual analysis, this section establishes benchmarks for evaluating an individual country's performance on the indicators of women's status relative to its economic resource base.

Technically speaking, a residual is the difference between the observed value of the dependent variable and the value predicted by the regression line. That is, the predicated value is seen as a "benchmark" of "normal achievement" when the independent or explanatory variable is a measure of resources or wealth, such as GDP per capita in this research. The distance of a country above or below the regression line, therefore, indicates how well or poorly it is doing relative to its economic resources. Once the statistics pertaining to the linear regression of the two variables are calculated by SPSS, the regression equation, in turn, can yield the predicated value and the residual of each country. Therefore, by comparing residuals, countries that have observed values better than the predicted ones can be considered "overachievers." Conversely, when the actual values are worse than the predicated ones, a nation would be regarded as an "underachiever" (Chan and Clark, 1992).

Residuals Analysis for Women's Participation in Labor Force by GDP Per Capita

Table 3.8 presents the statistics for the regression of "Women's Participation in

Labor Force" on "GDP Per Capita." The correlation (Pearson's r) is only a weak-to-moderate -.25, but it is highly significant statistically. Thus, women's labor participation is slightly lower in richer nations. The regression equation is:

$$Y \text{ (women's labor Force participation rate)} = 56.361 - 0.0003992 \times \text{(GDP per capita)}$$

Consequently, because the GDP per capita for Taiwan in 2000 was $15,000, this regression equation predicts that Taiwan should have had a women's labor force participation rate of 50.373:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= 56.361 - (0.0003992 \times 15{,}000) \\ &= 50.373 \end{aligned}$$

In reality, Taiwan was an underachiever because its actual rate was 46.0 or lower than the predicated value. That is, the predicated women's labor force participation rate of 50.373 produces a benchmark of what would normally be expected for a country with the same level of economic development in terms of GDP per capita as Taiwan's.

Table 3.8 Statistics for the Regression of Women's Labor Force Participation on GDP per capita

a	56.36
b	-0.0004
r	-.25
Sig	.001

Table 3.9 presents the 15 countries with the highest and lowest residuals (i.e., the differences between their actual and predicted values for women's labor force participation) computed from the regression equation (see Appendix C for a list of the residuals for all 174 countries). In other words, these are the greatest overachievers and underachievers. Ten out of the 15 greatest overachievers in terms of women's labor force participation are countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, Guinea, Kenya, and Eritrea), consistent with Ester Boserup's argument that when agriculture is the dominant form of economic activity at low levels of economic development, women participate in the labor force in large numbers often as unpaid family workers on the family farm as well as carrying out subsistence tasks (Boserup, 1970). Eleven out of the 15 greatest underachievers are countries in which Islam is the majority religion of the people (Oman, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iran, Algeria, Sudan, and Pakistan). Women living in these highly patriarchal societies tend to be excluded from economic activities and confined in the private sphere. The other greatest underachievers, Belize, Malta, Ecuador, and Peru, have the majority of their populations practicing the Roman Catholic religion. These societies with more traditional attitudes toward gender roles exhibit lower female labor force participation rates.

Table 3.9 Greatest "Overachievers" and "Underachievers" on Women's Participation in Labor Force Rate Given Their GDP's Per Capita

Country	Women's Participation in Labor Force Rate (%)	Predicated value	Residual
Overachievers			
Mozambique	82.8	56.020	26.7801
Rwanda	82.6	55.984	26.6156
Burundi	82.0	56.125	25.8751
Tanzania	81.8	56.152	25.6480
Solomon Islands	81.2	55.703	25.4971
Cambodia	80.4	55.784	24.6164
Ghana	80.1	55.577	24.5232
Uganda	79.5	55.879	23.6214
Iceland	66.6	44.552	22.0479
Malawi	77.9	56.115	21.7847
Guinea	77.3	55.570	21.7304
Thailand	73.3	53.805	19.4948
Burkina Faso	75.0	55.971	19.0288
Kenya	74.7	55.953	18.7472
Eritrea	74.7	56.027	18.6733
Underachievers			
Oman	19.2	51.029	-31.8291
Saudi Arabia	21.2	51.823	-30.6231
Libya	25.0	53.339	-28.3389
Jordan	26.6	54.778	-28.1776
Belize	27.1	54.123	-27.0229
Syria	28.6	54.941	-26.3413
Yemen	30.5	56.004	-25.5043
Lebanon	29.6	54.641	-25.0411
Iran	29.0	54.012	-25.0119
Algeria	29.5	54.242	-24.7419
Malta	25.8	49.465	-23.6655
Ecuador	32.7	55.082	-22.3822
Sudan	34.8	55.643	-20.8435
Pakistan	35.3	55.591	-20.2912
Peru	34.5	54.445	-19.9451

Residuals Analysis for Fertility Rate by GDP Per Capita

Table 3.10 presents the statistics for the regression of the "Fertility Rate" on "GDP Per Capita." For this relationship, the correlation is a quite strong -.59. That is, fertility is lower in more developed countries. The regression equation is

$$Y = 4.522 - 0.0001203X$$

$$Y \text{ (predicated fertility rate)} = 4.522 - 0.0001203 \times \text{(GDP per capita)}$$

Thus, this regression equation predicts that Taiwan should have had a fertility rate of 2.716 based on its GDP per capita of $15,000:

$$Y = 4.522 - (0.0001203 \times 15{,}000)$$
$$= 2.716$$

In comparison to this benchmark, Taiwan's actual fertility rate 1.7 was much lower than the predicated value. This negative residual demonstrates that Taiwan was a significant overachiever on the total fertility rate given by its GDP per capita.

Table 3.10 Statistics for the Regression of Fertility Rate on GDP per capita

a	4.52
b	-0.00012
r	-.59
Sig	.0004

Table 3.11 lists the 15 countries with the highest positive residuals and the 15 nations with the lowest negative residuals (see Appendix D for a list of the residuals for all 174 countries). In general, countries with high negative residuals have created a more favorable situation for women than would have been predicated from just their GDP per capita, while women apparently would have a low quality of life in those with large positive residuals. In addition to Sri Lanka, the other fourteen greatest overachievers in terms of fertility rate are communist and former communist countries, suggesting a legacy from these command economies that promoted a very high level of economic activity among women. Although Sri Lanka had a low GDP per capita of $3,530, it rated as one of overachievers with a high negative residual due to an actual fertility rate of 2.1 that equals the conventional replacement rate (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2007). Traditionally, Sri Lanka has attached great importance to education. For example, it has higher literacy rates and high school enrollment ratios than other South Asian countries (Clark and Roy, 1997). According to *The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics*, at higher levels of education, all countries show a clear inverse relationship between educational attainment and fertility (United Nations, 2000).

Among the underachievers with much higher than predicted fertility rates, Luxembourg ranked the second with a residual of 3.2. However, this resulted from its having the highest GDP per capita (US$50,061) in the world, which led to a negative predicated fertility rate of -1.503. This is obviously nonsensical. In contrast, most of the other underachievers were fairly poor African nations. Taken together, these findings

Table 3.11 Greatest "Overachievers" and "Underachievers" on Fertility Rate Given Their GDP's Per Capita

Country	Fertility Rate per Woman, late 1990s	Predicated value	Residual
Overachievers			
Armenia	1.4	4.214	-2.8136
Ukraine	1.3	4.062	-2.7623
Bulgaria	1.1	3.834	-2.7343
Moldova	1.6	4.268	-2.6677
Georgia	1.6	4.201	-2.6009
Latvia	1.1	3.674	-2.5737
Romania	1.3	3.749	-2.4485
Belarus	1.3	3.614	-2.3136
Russia	1.2	3.513	-2.3134
Azerbaijan	1.9	4.168	-2.2682
China	1.8	4.043	-2.2430
Estonia	1.2	3.310	-2.1101
Macedonia	1.9	3.909	-2.0094
Sri Lanka	2.1	4.097	-1.9967
Poland	1.5	3.432	-1.9322
Underachievers			
Niger	8.0	4.432	3.5682
Luxembourg	1.7	-1.503	3.2034
Equatorial Guinea	5.9	2.707	3.1925
Yemen	7.6	4.414	3.1859
Saudi Arabia	6.2	3.153	3.0465
Angola	7.2	4.258	2.9417
Oman	5.8	2.914	2.8859
Uganda	7.1	4.376	2.7238
Mali	7.0	4.426	2.5744
Burkina Faso	6.9	4.404	2.4959
Ethiopia	6.8	4.441	2.3588
Malawi	6.8	4.448	2.3525
Burundi	6.8	4.450	2.3496
Congo Republic	6.7	4.429	2.2705
Chad	6.6	4.417	2.1833

imply that the relationship between fertility rate and GDP is significantly curvilinear; so that a linear equation somewhat distorts the predicted fertility rates for nations with extreme values on GDP per capita.

Residuals Analysis for Women's Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats by GDP Per Capita

Table 3.12 Statistics for the Regression of Percentage of Women in the Legislature on GDP per capita

a	9.33
b	0.00045
r	.47
Sig	.0004

Table 3.12 presents the results for the regression of "Women's Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats" on "GDP Per Capita." For the overall equation, there is a fairly strong positive correlation of .47. That is, women's parliamentary representation is better in more developed countries. The regression equation is

$$Y \text{ (women's per cent of parliamentary seats)} = 9.329 + 0.00045267 \times \text{(GDP per capita)}$$

This regression equation predicts that women in Taiwan should hold 16.12% of the legislative seats:

$$Y = 9.329 + (0.0028511 \times 15{,}000)$$
$$= 16.12$$

However, Taiwan’s actual value 20.9% was higher than the predicated value 16.12%. The positive residual of 4.78 shows that Taiwan was an overachiever on the percentage of women in the legislature based on its GDP per capita.

Table 3.13 reports the greatest overachievers and underachievers for women’s parliamentary representation (see Appendix E for a list of the residuals for all 174 countries). The 15 overachievers include a perhaps surprising variety of nations: 1) five Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Iceland) plus New Zealand in the developed world; 2) several communist and former communist countries (Viet Nam, Turkmenistan, and Bulgaria); and 3) five African nations (Mozambique, South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania) plus Argentina in Latin America.

As Chapter 2 describes in detail, institutional factors have been found to play an important role in improving women’s legislative representation. For example, women candidates do considerably better in large multi-member electoral districts; and they especially benefit from electoral systems that provide minimum representation or quotas for women (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994). Taiwan, for example, had both these conditions which were given credit for women’s strong improvement in winning legislative office over the postwar era (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990).

Table 3.13 Greatest "Overachievers" and "Underachievers" on Women's Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats Given Their GDP's Per Capita

Country	Women's Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats, 2002	Predicated value	Residual
Overachievers			
Sweden	42.7	20.319	22.3809
Mozambique	30.0	9.716	20.2844
Argentina	31.3	14.932	16.3680
South Africa	29.8	13.585	16.2152
Denmark	38.0	21.836	16.1643
Rwanda	25.7	9.756	15.9441
Finland	36.5	20.645	15.8554
Viet Nam	26.0	10.233	15.7674
Turkmenistan	26.0	11.120	14.8801
Uganda	24.7	9.876	14.8241
Bulgaria	26.2	11.914	14.2861
Norway	36.4	22.873	13.5272
Tanzania	22.3	9.566	12.7342
New Zealand	30.8	18.415	12.3854
Iceland	34.9	22.720	12.1798
Underachievers			
United Arab Emirates	0	17.448	-17.4481
Kuwait	0	16.481	-16.4812
Luxembourg	16.7	31.991	-15.2914
Japan	10.0	21.441	-11.4409
South Korea	5.9	17.197	-11.2969
Equatorial Guinea	5.0	16.153	-11.1525
United States	13.8	24.785	-10.9850
Italy	9.1	20.024	-10.9244
Vanuatu	0	10.597	-10.5975
Morocco	0.5	10.934	-10.4343
Djibouti	0	10.405	-10.4051
Solomon Islands	0	10.075	-10.0751
France	10.9	20.295	-9.3947
Ireland	13.7	22.849	-9.1492
Yemen	0.7	9.733	-9.0333

This institutional explanation appears to be quite applicable to the overachievers in Table 3.13. As shown in Table 3.14, two-thirds of them (10 out of 15) use the party-list proportional representation system (PR), while only 4 out of the 15 greatest underachievers have PR systems. The comparatively high percentage of women in these parliaments (24.7% to 42.7%) supports the argument that an electoral system based on the PR has a positive effect on women's political representation. Furthermore, the application of candidate quotas or reserved seats in Argentina, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, and Tanzania strongly indicates that this "fast track" is a powerful tool for increasing women's political representation at the national level. For example, women's representation was as high as 30 percent in Mozambique, up from 16 percent in 1991, and almost 30 percent in South Africa, up from 3 percent in 1991 (Tripp, 2001). In addition, women's share of legislative seats in Argentina jumped from 5.9 percent in 1992 to 31.3 percent after the National Quota Law came into force in 1993 (Carrio, 2005, p. 167).

On the other hand, what factors can explain women's parliamentary underrepresentation in states with the greatest underachievement? Here, a combination of general and specific forces appears to be at work. First, an ingrained patriarchal culture can inhibit women's participation in politics to a considerable extent. In particular, five Arab states (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Morocco, Djibouti, and Yemen) were among the 15 greatest underachievers with zero or a very small percentage of women's seats in parliaments. Although the Arab world is not a homogeneous region and there is no single archetype for Arab women, traditionally the status of women is low

Table 3.14 The Electoral Systems of 15 Greatest Overachievers and 15 Underachievers Countries Based on Female Parliamentary Representation Given by GDP Per Capita

Country	Electoral System for National Legislature[1]	Electoral family
Overachievers		
Sweden	List PR	PR
Mozambique	List PR	PR
Argentina	List PR	PR
South Africa	List PR	PR
Denmark	List PR	PR
Rwanda	List PR	PR
Finland	List PR	PR
Viet Nam	TRS	Plurality/Majority
Turkmenistan	TRS	Plurality/Majority
Uganda	FPTP	Plurality/Majority
Bulgaria	List PR	PR
Norway	List PR	PR
Tanzania	FPTP	Plurality/Majority
New Zealand	MMP (FPTP&List PR)	Mixed
Iceland	List PR	PR
Underachievers		
United Arab Emirates	N[2]	
Kuwait	BV	Plurality/Majority
Luxembourg	List PR	PR
Japan	Parallel (FPTP&List PR)	Mixed
South Korea	Parallel (FPTP&List PR)	Mixed
Equatorial Guinea	List PR	PR
United States	FPTP	Plurality/Majority
Italy	MMP (FPTP&List PR)	Mixed
Vanuatu	SNTV	Other
Morocco	List PR	PR
Djibouti	PBV	Plurality/Majority
Solomon Islands	FPTP	Plurality/Majority
France	TRS	Plurality/Majority
Ireland	STV	PR
Yemen	FPTP	Plurality/Majority

[1] For countries with bicameral legislatures, system for the lower house.
[2] No provisions for direct elections.
Key: **FPTP**-First Past the Post; **TRS**-Two Round System; **BV**-Block Vote; **PBV**-Party Block Vote; **Parallel**-Parallel System; **MMP**-Mixed Member Proportional; **List PR**-List Proportional Representation; **STV**-Single Transferable Vote; **SNTV**-Single Non-Transferable Vote.
Source: Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. 2005. *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA).

in Arab countries because of the combination of patriarchy, conservative religion, tribalism, and the public-private divide. Female labor force participation in this region is generally low; and women's political office-holding is even lower (Sabbagh, 2005). For example, the Kuwaiti cabinet granted women the right to vote and run for public officeonly in 2005 (Palmieri and Jabre, 2005, p. 218). Not surprisingly, there are no women serving in the Kuwait parliament (see Table 3.13). Similarly, the influence of patriarchal culture can be applied to explain women's gross underrepresentation in Equatorial Guinea. According to the country report by Freedom House, "Constitutional and legal guarantees of equality for women are largely ignored, and violence against women is reportedly widespread. Traditional practices including primogeniture and polygamy discriminate against women. Abortion is permitted to preserve the health of the mother, but only with spousal or parental authorization" (Freedom House, 2010).

Second, according to a worldwide comparative analysis by Kenworthy and Malami, "the timing of women's suffrage" is persistently related to women's political representation, with earlier suffrage associated with larger women's shares in parliament (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). This finding can be utilized for interpreting why there is no parliamentary seat held by a woman in Vanuatu or the Solomon Islands. These are new nations that were established between 1977 and 1993; so that women have only recently been granted the right to vote (Palmieri and Jabre, 2005, p. 218).

Third, the atypically low representation of women in Japan and South Korea appears to reflect institutional features in addition to their widely cited traditional patriarchal cultures. For example, Ray Christensen argues that campaign activities in

Japan have been severely restricted by laws and regulations, so that candidates rely heavily on personal political support groups called *koenkai*. However, Japanese women have been at a tremendous disadvantage in creating and leading such political machines due to social and political reasons. As a result, in spite of being one of the advanced industrial democracies, Japan is notorious for women's underrepresentation in the lower house (Christensen, 2000). Likewise, Rose J. Lee shows the importance of institutional factors by comparing South Korea and Taiwan in terms of women's political representation. She indicates that these two countries share many characteristics, such as patriarchal Confucian cultures, a long postwar period of authoritarianism, rapid economic growth and industrialization starting in the 1960s, and the transition and consolidation of democracy since the late 1980s. However, their records of women's representation in politics are sharply different. Throughout the postwar era, women's political representation in South Korea has been very low, falling in the 1 to 3 percent range at both the national and local levels. By contrast, over the same period, owing to the application of a reserved seats system, women's representation in Taiwan at both the national and local levels reached the 15-to-20 percent range. Accordingly, Lee suggested that, in a highly patriarchal society, a legislated minimum level of representation for women will encourage women's political participation and, in turn, promote women's office-holding (Lee, 2000).

Finally, women's underrepresentation in Japan is not a unique case among advanced countries. In the residuals analysis, the western societies of Luxembourg, the United States, Italy, France, and Ireland are ranked among the greatest underachievers.

Cultural factors appear to provide at least a partial explanation for women's low levels of political representation in the four European countries (the heavily Catholic France, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg). In a comparative study, Margaret Inglehart found that women's political activism was lower in the Catholic than in the Protestant countries of Western Europe and suggested that this was because the Catholic Church was more hierarchical and authoritarian in nature than the Protestant churches (Margaret Inglehart, 1979; cited from Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 134). In particular, the Catholic Church remains quite traditional on women's roles.

A more detailed case study of France, furthermore, indicates that the underrepresentation of women there results from a combination of cultural and institutional factors. In Europe, French women were among the last to be granted the right to vote and to stand for election when they gained these rights under the ordinance of 21 April 1944 (Sineau, 2005, p. 122). According to a case study by French political scientist Mariette Sineau, a number of historical factors explain why women in France have never held more than a marginal position in national legislature. The 1789 French Revolution legitimized the notion that women were not competent to conduct public affairs which hindered their ability to participate in politics for over 150 years. In addition, women are marginalized in the Fifth Republic (1958) because of its single-member district system for the parliamentary elections. Sineau argues that this system gives a political premium to the notables (usually men) in French society and, thus, indirectly discriminates against women. That is, in selecting their candidates, the parties tend to choose the most well-known personality, who already holds a local office in the

district. Unfortunately, women have been largely excluded from local politics and have not been able to make the first step in a standard French political career. Moreover, most of the appointed high-level civil servants are trained in distinguished educational institutions, such as the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, all of which are male institutions par excellence. Further, Sineau suggests that the feminist movement of the 1970s must also bear a share of the responsibility for these institutional constraints. French feminists expected change to come from social movements, not political parties. As a result, for a long time women in France have been underrepresented in the leadership of the parties as well as in government office-holding. Additionally, Sineau contends that a final barrier to the political representation of women in France is judicial. In 1982, the country's highest judicial organ (the Constitutional Council) struck down a provision which was meant to institutionalize a maximum of 75 percent representation for either sex on the list of candidates contesting municipal elections in cities with a population over 3,500. Sineau argues that by setting this precedent the judicial decision clouded the outlook for reforms promoting women's candidacies (Sineau, 2005, p. 122-124; Lovenduski, 2010, p. 85).

The data on the underachievers in Table 13.3 also support the importance of institutional factors, such as the nature of the electoral system. For example, the disproportionately low number of women in the U.S. House of Representatives is caused, not just by the negative effects of male incumbency and slow turnover, but also by America's single-member district system which is widely regarded as the major factor retarding women's chances to gain office at the national level (Norris, 1993; Darcy,

Welch, and Clark, 1994). In addition, Richard E. Matland argues that some PR systems are preferable to others. PR systems that guarantee high party magnitudes through a combination of high district magnitudes and electoral thresholds are expected to be superior for women. That is to say, just having a PR system is not sufficient. Ireland, for example, which uses the Single Transferable Vote (STV) form of PR, has very small district magnitudes (between three and five members) and, therefore, has lower levels of female representation than even such plurality/majority systems as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom (Matland, 2005, p. 106-107).

4. Conclusions

This chapter tested the theoretical model that was developed in Chapter 2 to explain why the status of women is better in some societies than in others. This statistical analysis found that patriarchal culture, economic development level, and the degree of democratization exert fairly strong influences over some dimensions of women's status but have little association with others. In addition, the residuals analysis of the 15 greatest overachievers and underachievers on women's labor force participation, fertility rate, and legislative representation confirmed the complex effects that cultural, economic, and political factors exert on the status of women in national societies. This implies that the nature of women's status is complicated because each nation has its own circumstances that are shaped by its historical background, level of economic development, degree of democratization (including regime types), religious affiliation, traditional culture, geographical location, and so on. It could be argued that these factors

influence women's lives in each country, negatively or positively, in fairly unique combinations. Therefore, case studies of individual countries should provide valuable insights into the dynamics of women's changing status in the contemporary world. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will focus on exploring the social, economic, and political statuses of women in Taiwan. This nation should provide an interesting case study since it is an overachiever with respect to fertility rate and legislative representation, but an underachiever on women's participation in labor force.

CHAPTER 4

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF TAIWAN

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Taiwan was a poor, primarily agricultural society that was ruled by an oppressive authoritarian regime. Over the course of the postwar era, the country has experienced very substantial development and transformation in both the economic and political realms. The pattern of economic and political change was quite different, though. Economic development was fairly continuous and cumulative; and by the 1980s Taiwan was widely recognized as having experienced an "economic miracle." In contrast, there was little political reform until the 1980s, but Taiwan then experienced a very successful democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There are five sections in this chapter. The first one briefly introduces Taiwan. The next four describe the major stages of Taiwan's transformation from a poor agricultural and authoritarian country to an exporter of high-tech products, post-industrial society, and young democratic nation, as a background for analyzing the status of women in Taiwan in chapter 5.

1. An Introduction to Taiwan

Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China (ROC), is situated in the

western Pacific between temperate Japan to the north, subtropical Southern China to the west, and the tropical Philippines to the south. It lies on major sea and air transportation routes in this region. This ocean nation comprises the main island of Taiwan, the archipelagoes of Penghu (the Pescadores), Quemoy, and Matsue, and a number of small islands. It has a combined area of approximately 36,000 sq. km (13,900 sq. miles). Only about one-fourth of the land is cultivatable because nearly two-thirds of the main island, Taiwan, is mountainous. Thus, the population is concentrated on the west coast where the largest wide flatland lies. Although the land's natural fertility has been depleted due to intensive farming for several centuries, Taiwan's tropical-to-temperate spectrum of climatic zones and generally abundant rainfall provides an excellent agricultural environment for producing multiple cropping by using chemical fertilizer (Chiao-min Hsieh, 1964, cited from Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 34; ROC, 2005; ROC, 2008a).

The population of Taiwan was 22.958 million in 2007, which was one of the most densely populated nations in the world (638 persons per sq. km). Han Chinese make up the vast majority of people (about 98 percent); and the remaining minority are composed of Austronesia indigenous groups. The so-called Taiwanese of today are descended from successive waves of immigrants belonging to different subgroups that started arriving in Taiwan in the 17th century. The majority of these early immigrants were Holo from southern Fujian province and Hakka from eastern Guangdong province. In addition, after 50 years of Japanese colonialism ended in 1945, the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist government moved to Taiwan and brought about 1.3 million immigrants from all parts of the Mainland to the island after its defeat in the civil war in Mainland China in 1949.

They are known as Mainlanders (ROC, 2005; ROC, 2008a).

Although the official language of Taiwan is Mandarin Chinese, which has been the language of instruction in the education system after 1949, most Taiwanese also speak Holo Taiwanese (also known as Taiwanese or Minnanese), except for two counties, Hsinchu and Miaoli, where the Hakka dialect is spoken. The Austronesia languages are spoken by the indigenous peoples, but are slowly disappearing due to cultural assimilation (ROC, 2005).

In 2007, Taiwan was the world's 24th-largest economy among 181 economies ranked by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook Data base, April 2008. In the same year, the World Trade Organization (WTO) statistics indicated that Taiwan was the world's 16th-largest merchandise exporter and 17th-largest merchandise importer, with a trade surplus of US$27.43 billion. At the end of 2007, Taiwan had the world's fifth-largest foreign exchange reserves, amounting to US$270.31 billion. Moreover, Taiwan had a nominal GDP per capita of nearly US$16,800, the 38th-highest among the 181 ranked economies in the aforementioned IMF database. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), this was equivalent to more than US$30,000. With regard to contributions to the GDP (US$383.3 billion) by sector in 2007, services, industry, and agriculture were 71.05 per cent, 27.50 per cent, and 1.45 per cent, respectively. In 2007, 10.29 million people participated in the labor force, 57.9 per cent of them were employed in the service sector, 36.8 per cent in industry, and 5.3 per cent in agriculture (ROC, 2008a, p. 98-100).

Before the 17th century, Taiwan was an isolated, neglected, and underdeveloped

island. However, during the age of mercantilism and maritime conquest by Europeans, Taiwan attracted world attention because of its geographical location and natural resources. In 1590, Portuguese navigators arrived off the coast of Taiwan. They were impressed by its majestic green mountains rising steeply out of the deep blue waters of the Pacific and exclaimed "Ilha Formosa," meaning "beautiful island." Thus, the island has been known as Formosa in the West for centuries. Unlike the Portuguese six-week stay, the Dutch and the Spanish colonized parts of northern and southern Taiwan. During the thirty-eight-year Dutch rule of Taiwan (1624-1662), the Dutch East India Company used the island as a base for its Asian trade, linking this trade with its worldwide commercial networks. Moreover, Dutch Protestant missionaries introduced both Christianity and the Latin writing system to the island's aborigines. Beginning in 1626, the Spanish established small settlements in northern Taiwan to challenge the Dutch dominance of the Asian trade. In September 1642, the Spanish garrison was defeated by a Dutch force and expelled from Formosa. In 1662, Jheng Cheng-gong, a leading Ming loyalist, defeated the Dutch and set up a government on Taiwan to defy the Manchurians who had established the Qing dynasty on the Chinese mainland. The Qing dynasty conquered Taiwan in 1683 and ruled it until 1895 when Taiwan and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Taiwan was colonized by Japan for 50 years. Following Japan's defeat and surrender in August, 1945, at the end of the World War II, the Republic of China assumed authority over Taiwan on October 25 (Eto, 1964; Davison, 2003; Tsai, 2009).

During the postwar era, Taiwan's economy and politics went through a series of

transformations that resulted in a superior economical performance, and the creation of a fledgling democracy, in turn, created opportunities for many women, in general, to have better lives. Chronologically, four periods of major historical, social, economic, and political transformations can be discerned: (1) from 1945 to the 1950s when both an authoritarian regime and the transformation away from an agricultural economy were consolidated; (2) the early 1960s to the early 1970s when the "export boom" advanced the economy and set off significant social changes as well; (3) the mid 1970s to the late 1980s when substantial industrial upgrading occurred that was accompanied by the emergence of a middle class society and the launching of political liberalization; (4) the late 1980s to present when full democracy was finally achieved but the country was also challenged by an ongoing transformation from an industrial to an “information age” economy.

2. From 1945 to the 1950s

According to the research by Chen Shao-hsing, a leading sociologist at Taiwan National University, statistical data show that Taiwan had economically and socially advanced during Japanese colonial rule. The years from 1926 to 1940 presented a tremendous increase in the output of agricultural products which reached its peak on the eve of the World War II. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s social and intellectual development was also promoted by economic development. By 1943, about 70 per cent of children of legal school age were officially enrolled in schools. The literacy rate (about 80 per cent) was second only to Japan in Asia. Medical education, one of the few advanced fields open to

Taiwanese, presented a good example of modernization. By 1935, 90 per cent of the death certificates required by law were issued by doctors of western medicine. Labor and peasant unions, political parties, and literacy movements mushroomed in Taiwan during the 1920s under the influence of Japanese liberalism, Wilsonian ideals, and the May Fourth Movement on the China mainland, although these civil societies were put down after the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s (Chen Shao-hsing, 1955; cited from Mancall, 1964, p. 2-4).

However, despite the fact that economic and social advancement had occurred, the Taiwanese resented the political, social, and economic restrictions due to Japanese colonial control. Therefore, initially, Taiwanese welcomed the island's return to China and looked forward to participating as full citizens of the ROC with great enthusiasm (Gold, 1985, p. 90; Tien, 1989, p. 36; Metraux, 1991, p 28). Regretfully, contrary to expectations, after eighteen months, Taiwanese openly revolted against the Nationalist administration.

At the end of World War II, mainland China's economy was in a very bad condition because of intermittent warfare for decades. Worse, the Chinese Nationalist army, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was fighting the growing communist revolution which revived in 1946. At this juncture in Taiwan, in addition to approximately US$2 billion worth of civilian properties, Japan handed over enormous stockpiles of foodstuffs, medicine, and arms and ammunition to the Chinese Nationalists. Moreover, Governor-General Chen Yi, who was appointed by Chiang, took over and expanded the Japanese system of state monopolies in tobacco, sugar, camphor, tea, paper, chemicals, petroleum

refining, and cement (Tsai, 2009, p. 175-176). Before long, Taiwan's resources, raw materials and dismantled factories were shipped off to mainland China by opportunists, carpetbaggers, and government agencies charged with confiscating assets. Besides, occupying Mainlanders tended to treat the local Taiwanese as collaborators who had prospered under Japanese colonial era while the Chinese had a hard time resisting Japanese invaders during the eight-year Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). In the public realm, Taiwanese were relegated to the lowest positions, while Chen Yi moved into the Sōtokufu building (Today's presidential building of the ROC) and staffed his administration with Mainlanders and token Taiwanese, or so called "half-mountains," who had spent the war years in China (Kerr, 1965; Gold, 1985; Tien, 1989; Tsai, 2009).

Economic mismanagement and political retrogression, the mix of corruption, lawlessness, plundering, high inflation, shortages of daily necessities, high unemployment, and disease created a chaotic environment in Taiwan; and the suffering and helpless Taiwanese were on the verge of insurrection. The tension finally exploded on the evening of February 27, 1947, following an incident in Taipei where a widow was beaten while resisting arrest for selling untaxed cigarettes at the black market, and one bystander was killed in the commotion. Crowds rioted throughout the island, seizing police stations, radio stations, arms, and killing a number of post-1945 immigrants from the mainland China. The following week, while reformist protests flared throughout Taiwan, some Taiwanese leaders organized the February 28 Incident Settlement Committee and tried to negotiate with Chen Yi's administration in order to end the riot. Ostensibly, a compromise between Chen Yi and the ad hoc committee settled the crisis.

In reality, upon arrival on March 8, the KMT troops launched a massacre. Some of the killings were random, while others were systematic. Particularly, Taiwanese elites and professionals were targeted. Many of the Taiwanese who had formed home rule groups during the Japanese colonial period were also victims of the 228 Incident. The total number of Taiwanese killed in 1947 ranged from 10,000 to 20,000, if those who disappeared and prisoners presumed dead are included (Kerr, 1965; Gold, 1985; Tien, 1989; Tsai, 2009).

Chen Yi was quickly replaced by Wei Tao-ming, a former Chinese ambassador to the United States. In 1950, Chen was executed in Taipei for treason because he attempted to join the communists. While the Taiwanese activists searched for international support, the KMT was defeated by Mao Zedong's liberation army in China. In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT regime, together with more than a million Nationalist soldiers, officials, supporters, and refugees fled to Taiwan. In addition to the declaration of Martial law, which expanded the scope of power of the Taiwan Garrison Command and suspended the protection of individual rights guaranteed in the 1946 Constitution, all aspects of the public were completely controlled under the party-military organ directed by Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, the KMT secret police, under the leadership of Chiang Ching-Kuo (Chiang Kai-shek's son) interrogated and terrorized tens of thousands of "Taiwanese independents" and Communist elements and those who criticized the KMT and the Chiang family. In this so-called "white terror," victims included both Taiwanese and Mainlanders (Gold, 1985; Taylor, 2000).

The United States publicly abandoned Chiang's regime in Taiwan on January 5,

1950, while it was not yet clear what kind of relationship would be developed with Communist China. On June 25, North Korea's Kim Il-sung invaded South Korea. President Harry Truman was forced to reverse the American hands-off policy toward the KMT and sent the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to protect the ROC. Due to the anti-Communist containment policy, the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Security Act in the fall of 1951. Under this policy, economic aid and military support were to be resumed (Tsai, 2009, p. 179-186).

In the political arena, the first phrase of Taiwan's postwar transformation was strongly shaped by the imposition of authoritarian rule over the island with repression and terror. In addition, political power was concentrated in the hands of Mainlanders, who were about 15 per cent of the population, whereas Taiwanese were treated as "second class citizens" in their own land. While the one-party dictatorship was strongly authoritarian, it imperceptibly did include several situations that helped to promote democratization several decades later because of a "bottom-up" effect. The ruling KMT party incorporated existing social and political groups and factions into the low levels of the regime. It also allowed local elections which the central party-state, acting as a mediator, skillfully manipulated to control local political factions or play one off against another. However, contested elections among competing KMT factions were quite intense in many localities; consequently, many opponents of the Kuomintang, officially classified as independents, ran and were elected. Gradually, "Taiwanization" of all level of elections occurred in the process of democratization (Chou, Clark and Clark, 1990, p. 49; Copper, 1997; Clark and Clark, 2002).

In this stage, Taiwan's economic situation, in contrast, showed a number of positive reforms and transformation. In the early 1950s, the government implemented three major policies that helped stimulate the initial steps in development: taming inflation, introducing a radical land reform program, and carrying out an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy.

Almost certainly, the most damaging economic indicator in the immediate post-war period was inflation. The Taipei wholesale price index increased 260 per cent in 1946, 360 per cent in 1947, 520 per cent in 1948, and 3,500 per cent in 1949 (Ho, 1978). The KMT regime realized that the runaway inflation of the late 1940s had been a major reason for its defeat in the civil war and moved quickly to stop inflation in Taiwan. Monetary and fiscal stabilization measures were imposed to slow the spiraling inflation, including a thorough monetary reform, preferential interest rates on deposits, tight control on the money supply, and strict government budgets. These policies successfully tamed inflation— consumer price increases dropped to 30 per cent in 1951-1952 and 10 per cent or less a year by the mid-1950s, bringing about a stable environment for development (Kuo, 1983; Li, 1988).

During this stage, probably the most important changes came from the radical land reform that was implemented in three steps between 1949 and 1953. Step one, "rent reduction", was initiated in 1949 and limited farm rents to a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the total annual yield of the major crop. Traditionally, the tenure arrangement was sharecropping. Taiwan's tenants, about half the farming population, paid 40-60 per cent of their output to landlords as rent according to the quality of land. The "sales of public

lands to actual tillers" program was implemented as the second step. Public farmer land, which had formerly belonged to the Japanese government and individuals and had been transferred to the Nationalist government, was sold to tenant farmers. The price was set at 2.5 times the annual yield of principal crops and the payment was to be paid in twenty installments over a period of ten years. Totally, more than 71,000 hectares were sold between 1948 and 1958. The third step of the land reform process occurred in 1953, the land to the tiller program. It took from landlords all land in excess of three chias (2.91 hectares, one chia = .97 hectare), and in turn the government resold these lands at the same price described above to the present cultivators. Landlords were compensated 70 per cent with land bonds in kind (rice for paddy land, sweet potatoes for dry land) and 30 per cent with shares of four state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including Taiwan Cement, Taiwan Paper and Pulp, Taiwan Agriculture and Forestry, and Taiwan Industry and Mining (Ho, 1978; Gold, 1985).

In 1950, the vast majority of Taiwanese were farmers. The radical land reform, coupled with sizable investments in agriculture supported by US aid and a large-scale agricultural extension program conducted by the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), created a productive agricultural sector. The average growth was 5 per cent a year in the 1950s and 4.5 per cent a year in the 1960s. Agricultural development created resources to finance the initial industrialization through tax payment in kind, the fertilizer-rice barter system (the forced barter of rice for fertilizer at state-dictated prices), and the monopoly of sugar refining. In addition, during the 1950s, agricultural exports increased rapidly enough to keep the trade deficit acceptable.

Although a part of farmers' yield was squeezed to foster the industrial sector and to support the rest of the economy, increased production, products diversity, and innovation in farming helped increase farmers' income, which thus improved their living standard, greatly reduced the country's economic and social inequality, and provided resources for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Lee, 1971; Ho, 1978; Thorbecke, 1979).

In the industrial sector, the KMT government adopted an import substitution industrialization (ISI) path to spur its infant industry, focusing on manufacturing light industrial products. That is, imported manufactures were replaced by domestic production. While high tariffs and quotas were used to discourage imports, ISI industries received targeted loans, and the government tightly controlled new entrants. Initially, three industries were earmarked for expansion: chemical fertilizer, plastics, and textiles. Later, the synthetic fibers, glass, and food processing industries were added to the list. The ISI policy brought about real industrial growth which averaged over 10 per cent a year during the 1950s. The ratio of imports to total production in manufactured goods fell sharply; and total energy consumption (a leading indicator of industrial development) more than doubled between 1952 and 1958 (Ho, 1978; Galenson, 1979; Cheng, 2001, p. 26; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 38).

In addition to the three major policies mentioned above, a program of six-year compulsory primary education for school-age children 6-12 years old continued and universalized the policy existing in the Japanese era and proved to be extremely successful in developing the ROC's human capital (Ho, 1978, p. 99-100; Cheng 2001, p. 24). Also, at this stage, the Nationalist government substantially increased its economic

leadership capability by recruiting technocrats, most of them had been educated at leading U.S. universities, into the top level of government. These technocrats played a critical role in making public policies that laid the foundation for Taiwan's continued economic development (Gold, 1985; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 49).

3. From the early 1960s to the early 1970s

Although the initial effects of the inward-oriented path appeared quite positive, this developmental strategy showed its limitations very soon. As ISI output in non-durable consumer good sectors exhausted the domestic market demand, economic growth slowed down and in turn created an unemployment problem. In addition, by the late 1950s, it was clear that the United States would terminate aid to Taiwan in 1965 (in reality, the U.S. aid continued until 1968). To overcome these problems, under the persuasion of Chinese-American economists and the aid agency as well as the suggestion from technocrats, the ROC government made a major change in development policy, shifting from a domestic raw materials or land-based to an imported raw materials and labor-intensive pattern of production and exports. That is, the ISI trajectory was gradually replaced by export-oriented industrialization (EOI) track (Ranis, 1979, p. 221; Ho, 1978, p. 195-196; Gold, 1985, p.76-78).

To start this strategy, the Nineteen-Point Program of Economic and Financial Reform was promulgated in 1960. The program included a number of measures designed to encourage saving and private investment, to remove subsides, to increase public utility rates, to liberalize trade regulation, to unify the multiple exchange rate system, and to

curb military expenditures (Ho, 1978; Gold, 1985, Li, 1988). Further, the 1961 Statute for Encouragement of Investment facilitated the acquisition of plant sites and provided production incentives by tax exemptions and deductions. However, the response of industry to export expansion in the early 1960s was slow. The breakthrough came in 1964 when General Instruments from the U.S. established a bonded electronics factory near Taipei. Its rapid success demonstrated the potential of offshore assembly in Taiwan to other multinational corporations (MNCs). As a result, seven more were set up in 1964 and seventeen in 1965. In 1965, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment was revised and its scope extended. The next year, the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone (EPZ), which is located beside a modern harbor, was formally opened, although exporting from this zone had begun before. Subsequently, since applications from investors flooded in, the government set up two other EPZs in 1969, Nantze in Kaohsiung and Taichung in central Taiwan. Within EPZs, no duties were imposed on imports and the administrative procedures were simplified (Ranis, 1979; Gold, 1985; Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981).

The export promotion strategy proved to be very successful. Real GNP growth accelerated to a very high average of 11 per cent annually during 1963-1973. Moreover, this rapid growth produced a fundamental shift in the production structure. Between 1958 and 1973, the share of the manufacturing sector in net domestic product (NDP) more than doubled from 16 per cent to 36 per cent, while that of the agricultural sector declined from 31 per cent to 14 per cent. Likewise, the share of the total labor force participating in agriculture and related industries declined from 49 per cent to 31 per cent,

and that engaged in the industrial sector, including transportation and communication, rose from 15 per cent to 35 per cent. In other words, these shifts meant the extensive movement of labor, capital, and enterprises from the more slowly growing sectors to the more rapidly growing sectors. Furthermore, the export-oriented development brought a dramatic change in the ROC's balance of trade. The large deficits of the late 1950s and early 1960 were transformed into surpluses by the early 1970s (Kuznets, 1979; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 36).

During this period, some changes and transformations had occurred under the influence of export expansion and industrialization. First, the high growth rates generated higher incomes, which helped increase domestic saving and in turn accelerated investment. Saving as a proportion of GNP hovered around 9 per cent from 1952 to 1956, and skyrocketed from 12 per cent in 1962 to 22 per cent in 1968 to 33 per cent in 1973. This huge jump increased the investment rate from 18 per cent of GNP in the early 1960s to 25 per cent over the rest of the decade. According to W. W. Rostow (Rostow, 1961), a country's development will enter the "take off" stage when its net investment comprises more than 10 per cent of the national income. Taiwan's economy began to meet this required condition by 1963. Although multinational corporations (MNCs) were an engine to start Taiwan's export-oriented economic development, foreign direct investment (FDI) only accounted for less than 1 per cent of total investment during 1950s, about 4 per cent between 1960 and 1967, and 9 per cent at the beginning of the 1970s. However, foreign investors, mainly coming from the United States and Japan, were significant conduits for technology transfer that helped upgrade Taiwan's industries.

MNCs also had the effect of fostering small local firms as component suppliers that led to supporting the private sector without nurturing big capital as well as proliferating small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Little, 1979, p. 476; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 40; Kuo, Ranis, and Fei, 1981, p. 27; Gold, 1985, p. 79-87).

Second, at first, food processing was the most important leading export. In the 1960s, it was overtaken by textiles. At the same time, the electronics production emerged and consequently grew rapidly in the 1970s. That is, from the 1950s to the early 1970s, Taiwan's export products diversified, and the dominant industries shifted due to the influence of a dynamic global market and international product cycle (Gold, 1985). Third, economic development in Taiwan resulted from a pattern of decentralized, labor-intensive small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which were flexible and could quickly respond to and adjust to rapid changes in the international market conditions. Scholars invented the term "guerrilla capitalism" to describe SMEs' aggressive and audacious entrepreneurship (Lam and Lee, 1992). Fourth, both local and foreign firms were involved in labor-intensive manufacturing during this phrase. Manufacturing employment could expand rapidly in a short period of time because women entered the industrial labor force in large numbers. According to data from the industrial and commercial censuses, the ratio of male to female workers in manufacturing in 1954 was 2.49 to 1. From 1954 to 1961, 38 per cent of the increase in manufacturing employment was female; from 1961 to 1966, 54 per cent; and from 1966 to 1971, 57 per cent. As a result, the ratio of male to female working in manufacturing declined to 2.18 to 1 in 1961, 1.69 to 1 in 1966, and 1.13 to 1 in 1971. From 1954 to 1966, 82 per cent of increase in female labor force participation in

manufacturing was absorbed by four industries: food processing (26.2 per cent), chemicals and chemical products (11.3 per cent), textiles (31.6 per cent), and electrical equipment (12.5 per cent). Textiles had always employed a higher percentage of women, while other industries gradually reduced the ratio of male to female workers. From 1966 to 1971, 60 per cent of the increase in women's employment in manufacturing was absorbed by two industries: textile and apparel (43 per cent) and electrical equipment (17 per cent) (Ho, 1978, p. 211).

Finally, until the lifting of Martial law in 1987, workers in Taiwan could not strike. This orderly, disciplined, and docile work force was a major element for the industrialization push. Human capital also qualitatively improved during the EOI period. Beginning in 1968, the Executive Yuan extended the numbers of years of compulsory schooling from six to nine. As a result, the enrollment ratio of the twelve to seventeen-year-old age group dramatically increased: from 49 per cent to 71.5 per cent for males and 32 per cent to 60 per cent for females (Shih, 1972; cited from Galenson, 1979, p. 397). Moreover, in 1972, the government established the National Vocational Training Fund, which was financed by a payroll tax of 1.5 per cent. Accordingly, a number of firms and factories set up on-the-job training or apprenticeship training programs, often in cooperation with vocational schools (Galenson, 1979, p. 399-401).

While the "export boom" dramatically improved Taiwan's economy and set off significant social changes as well, there was no comparably simultaneous political relaxation. In 1960, Lei Chen (a mainlander) and others were jailed on the eve of the formation of the opposition China Democratic Party. The next year, the authoritarian

regime sentenced Taiwanese assemblyman Su Tung-chi to life in prison for allegedly plotting an armed rebellion. In 1964, Pen Ming-min, a Taiwan University professor, and two of his students were arrested for attempting to distribute anti-KMT materials. Thus, political opposition activists were badly shaken by these events and stopped trying to organize or lead political liberalization. The only challenge to the authoritarian regime came from individuals who ran against KMT candidates in provincial and local elections. However, these local-level elections still could be manipulated by other means. For example, non-KMT Taiwanese Kao Yu-shu (Henry Kao) was twice elected mayor of Taipei (1960 and 1964). In 1967, for the sake of maintaining party control of Taiwan's most populous city and the site of the largest concentration of mainlanders, the regime declared Taipei a "Special Municipality," which was under direct control of the Executive Yuan with an appointed mayor (Gold, 1985; Tien, 1989).

By the early 1970s, although the successful implementation of the EOI method brought Taiwan an economically prosperous country, the ROC also encountered a series of political shocks with respect to international relations. The setback began with Canada's recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1970. The next year, facing a certain vote by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to seat the PRC (China), the ROC (Taiwan) withdrew from the UN. In 1972, at the end of the landmark visit to China, President Richard Nixon and the PRC's Premier Chou En-lai signed the Shanghai Communiqué, in which the United States acknowledged that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The same year, Japan switched the diplomatic recognition from the ROC to Peking. In addition, twenty-five other countries followed

the same formula between 1971 and 1972 (Chai, 1981, p. 386-387). To face these dramatic changes and international politics reality, the ROC government immediately adopted a number of foreign policies which stressed economic, cultural, technical, and educational ties with selected countries. For example, after the severance of formal diplomatic relations with Japan, two nongovernmental agencies, the Association of East Asian Relations of the Republic of China and the Interchange Association of Japan, were established to continue their relationship (Chai, 1981). This was just the beginning not the end of Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, however.

4. From the mid 1970s to the late 1980s

At the beginning of this stage, in addition to political frustrations in the international sphere, the success of Taiwan's economy was confronted by several serious problems. Its exports began to face clamorous protectionist threatens, especially in the United States; wages were rising faster than competitors; other newly industrializing countries (NICs) were moving into the same markets; and the physical infrastructure began to fall behind demand. Also, world prices of nonoil goods were going up due to bad weather in 1971 and 1972 and the communist bloc import of grain from the U.S.; and the Taiwan currency was pegged to the U.S. dollar which was devalued in 1971 and 1973. In 1973 and 1974, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of oil. Because imports then were a third of Taiwan's GDP, these import price increases instantly caused negative impacts on the domestic economy. For 1974, the real GNP growth dropped to 1 per cent, from 10 per cent per annum during the

1960s and early 1970s; inflation reached 40 per cent, having been less than 2 per cent per year between 1961 and 1971; and the trade deficit exceeded US$1 billion. As a consequence, emigration and capital flight to the United States increased, investment and foreign trade slowed down, and university students began to voice their dissatisfaction (Kuo, 1983; Li, 1988; Wade, 1990, p. 96).

For solving these problems as well as the oil crisis, the ROC government quickly responded with an innovative policy package, including deflationary programs to tame inflation and public investment (Ten Major Construction Projects) to pull up the economy. As a result, economic conditions improved very soon. By 1975, inflation was curbed and dropped to a negative 5.1 per cent, and the economic growth reached 4.2 per cent. Moreover, for the three post-oil crisis years (1976-1978), the average growth rate was 12.4 per cent, and the inflation was 3 per cent (Kuo, 1983, p. 199-232; Li, 1988, p. 267-279).

Again, the second oil price increases in 1979-1980 sunk energy and trade dependent Taiwan into inflation and recession. The impact of this crisis was smaller than the first one; and the government implemented the same policies as before but mildly and gradually (Kuo, 1983, p. 218). While inflation was brought down fairly easily, rapid growth did not resume until the economic recovery in the United States in 1983 which provided an opportunity for another export expansion. The share of the U.S. market in terms of Taiwan's exports jumped from 34 per cent in 1980 to 48 per cent during the period 1984-1986. Taiwan's export growths went up to 14.2 per cent in 1983 and 18.9 per cent in 1984, fell to a 1.3 per cent in 1985 due to a mini recession, and then leaped

again by 15 per cent per year in 1986-1987. Corresponding to the up-and-down exports, GNP growth was 9 per cent per year in 1983-1984, 5 per cent in 1985; near 12 per cent a year in 1986-1987 (Kuo, 1983, p. 200; Gold, 1985, p. 98; Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 42).

During the time when the ROC government dealt with problems caused by the oil shocks, it also engaged in promoting industrial upgrading by two very different paths. One was based on massive public investment for infrastructure projects together with the expansion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in establishing heavy and chemical industries, such as steel and petrochemicals. The other focused on urging and assisting the private sector to shift from labor-intensive light industries to high technology production, particularly in the electronics and information processing fields (Kuo, 1983; Li, 1988; Clark, 1994, p. 18). It is worth of noting that the industrial structure transformation during this stage was accomplished by several significant policies. First, the Ten Major Construction Projects were proposed by Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, beginning in 1974 and being completed by 1979. These projects, pouring US$8 billion into the economy, especially included an integrated steel mill (China Steel Corporation) and a new Naptha cracking plant for the state-run Chinese Petroleum Company. China Steel Corporation not only provided domestic needs but also exported products abroad; it later became one of the world's most profitable steel companies. The petrochemical industry vertically integrated synthetic textiles and plastics, two of Taiwan's major industries at that time; on the other hand, the production of domestic substitutes for imported intermediate materials helped Taiwan to effectively reduce its reliance on

foreign suppliers and to upgrade its industrial structure successfully(Gold, 1985, p. 100-101). In turn, even before all of these projects were completed, the ROC government upped expenditures another US$23 billion and invested in 14 additional projects (Davison, 2003, p.98). These public investments significantly improved infrastructure and enlarged Taiwan's economic base.

Second, in 1973, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was established to deepen research and development (R&D) capacity for the new growth sectors because the government considered that the large number of Taiwan's SMEs could not afford to undertake enough technology investment by themselves. ITRI established laboratories for testing products and brokered the application of R&D. It also identified market opportunities and incubated engineer-turned-entrepreneurs. By 1987, ITRI had a budget of US$215 million and staffed more than 4,500 highly skilled employees. It's researches targeted six fields, including electronics, machinery, chemical engineering, energy and mining, industrial materials, and standards and measurement. Furthermore, ITRI's played a critical role when Taiwan's local firms entered strategic alliances with leading Western firms during the 1980s, especially in the semi-conductor and computer industries (Wade, 1990, p. 98; Cheng, 2001, p. 32-33). Finally, based on the concept of export-processing zones, the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park was set up in 1980. The ITRI, next to the Park, provides contract research in many technical areas. The National Tsing Hua University and the National Chiao Tung University, two of Taiwan's leading institutions in science and engineering, are located nearby; they offer the science park high-tech engineers and R&D assistances. The Park creates an

environment conducive to high-tech R&D; and its production, work, life, and entertainment attract high-tech professionals and technologies. The excellent location and the rapid growth of its companies and products have made it the "Silicon Valley of Asia" and a base for developing technology-intensive industries (Li, 1988; Cheng, 2003; ROC, 2005).

Along with industrial upgrading, Taiwan's domestic politics had significant transition and changes during this phrase. Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975, Vice President Yen Chia-kan became president according to constitutional provisions. In fact, Chiang's eldest son Chiang Ching-kuo inherited the mantle of supreme power in the country from his position as premier and via his role as the chairman of the KMT (Nationalist Party). That is, the ROC went through a smooth political succession after Chiang Kai-shek's death without problems (Tien, 1989; Copper, 2000).

In 1978, Chiang Ching-kuo was officially elected President of the ROC by the National Assembly after the term of Yen Chia-kan. President Yen had earlier declared that he would not be a candidate. As premier (1972-1978) and later as president (1978-1988), Chiang Ching-kuo presented a "man of the people" image by going out among the people and talking with farmers, workers, and the general public. He dressed casually and often wore a peaked cap to show his affinity and accessibility. Also, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed a large number of Taiwanese to government and party positions during his administration (Tien, 1989; Copper, 2000).

Conventionally, Taiwan's politics had always involved the publication of political

journals to express opposition views because the forming of new political parties was forbidden under the "Temporary Provisions." However, until the 1970s, the editors and writers of magazines were usually mainlander elites, such as Lei Chen, Po Yang, and Li Ao (all had been jailed). They lacked a potential voter base, so they in general didn't seek elected office or take part in political activities. In addition, they obsessed about issues concerning all of China, not just about Taiwan. The trend changed in the mid-1970s. Taiwanese elites became the primary source of political activists; and they engaged in both the literary activities and the electoral politics of the opposition movements. Meanwhile, some second-generation mainlanders also joined the opposition's camps (Tien, 1989, p. 94-95).

In 1975, Taiwanese politician K'ang Ning-hsiang and his partners published the *Taiwan Political Review* (*Tai-wan Cheng-lun*). But after only five issues were distributed, government censorship closed down the journal. K'ang and some of his associates, thus, published another journal, *The Eighties* (*Pa-shih nien-tai*), which delivered more moderate opposition viewpoints toward the ruling regime for the sake of avoiding trouble. Very differently, the radical activists began a separate journal, *Formosa* (*Mei-li-tao*), to criticize KMT authorities and to press for democratic reform and political liberalization. That is, while the former went on cautiously in challenging KMT regime, the later was more assertive and progressive. Although the leading members of the *Formosa* group were brought up and educated under ROC rule, they embraced a strong sense of their Taiwanese heritage and resisted identification with the Chinese mainland and a government that was structured to rule both the mainland and Taiwan. Despite their

different approaches for the processes of political reform and democratization, a muted opposition group of candidates for political offices began to coalesce in Taiwan. In the mid-1970s, opposition politicians, mostly Taiwanese, worked together and formed an informal political group "*dangwai*" (literally, outside the party, or outside the KMT party) (Tien, 1989; Copper 2000; Rigger, 2001).

In the 1977 elections, under the umbrella of "*dangwai*," opposition candidates won 21 of 77 seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and 4 of the 20 magistrate and mayoral elections (Jacobs, 1981, p. 27; cited from Tien, 1989, p. 96). On the polling day, unfortunately, there was a riot in Chungli, a city in Taoyuan County of Taiwan. A mass protest against alleged irregularities in vote counting caused a serious clash between angry voters and the police. Consequently, a police station was burned, and a number of causalities were reported (Lin and Chang, 1978, p. 240-79; cited from Tien, 1989, p. 96). At last, Hsu Hsin-liang, who left the KMT party and ran as a *dangwai* candidate for the Taoyuan county magistrate's position, won the election. However, the government-controlled media used the riot to label the *dangwai* as a violent and unreasonable group (Rigger, 2001, p. 19). The riot became known as the "Chungli incident." It was the first political protest on the streets since the 1940s. The incident clearly showed that a growing population disenchantment with the KMT's domination and manipulation in electoral politics. Thus, the opposition movement had revived, led by the *dangwai* activists (Tien, 1989).

Immediately following the Chungli incident, Taiwan experienced two turbulent political events in 1978 and 1979. In December 1978, people in Taiwan were shocked by

the Carter administration's decision to establish formal ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Only a few days before this announcement, the *dangwai* leaders, encouraged by the results of the 1977 election, got together in Taipei for a well publicized political meeting. They looked forward to making considerable gains in the 1978 election for seats at the national level. But the election was cancelled after the US decision to terminate diplomatic relations with the ROC government. On January 1, 1979, indeed, the US granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC and broke formal ties with the ROC. However, on April 10, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relation Act, which in essence gave Taiwan security and trade guarantees and treated Taiwan as a sovereign nation-state, though it did not use the term "Republic of China" (Tien, 1989; Copper, 2000).

Meanwhile, *Formosa* was more than a magazine. It established local branches throughout the island, promoting prodemocracy activities that challenged to the KMT regime. In December 1979, *Formosa* supporters organized a rally and parade in Kaohsiung to commemorate International Human Rights Day, but also to protest government policies which resulted in Taiwan's diplomatic isolation. During the march, violence erupted between the participants and the police that quickly developed into an unexpected riot know as the Kaohsiung Incident. As a result, on March 18, 1980, eight key leaders of the protest, including Lu Hsiu-lien who then was a feminist and later became the Vice President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2000-2008), were indicted for subversion and sentenced from twelve years to life by the military courts. Another thirty-seven defendants were tried in civil courts. By and large, the Kaohsiung rally

became a well-remembered event in the history of confrontations between the KMT and the *dangwai* (Tien, 1989; Rigger, 2001).

In December 1980, the legislative election originally scheduled in 1978 finally took place. *Dangwai* candidates included several of the *Formosa* defendants' attorneys and family members (Rigger, 2001). At the same time, one important role played by women in the opposition movement was as *Shounan Chiashu*, or relatives of political prisoners. Motivated by the painful experience of KMT's repression and the imprisonment of their husbands, *Chiashu,* the wives of the arrested *dangwai* leaders, took part in political activities by becoming candidates; they viewed elections as symbolic and used campaign platforms as channels to express anger against the authoritarian regime. Voters were solicited as an expression of sympathy for the jailed *dangwai* leaders and of solidarity against injustice. The 1980 election was a turning-point in the history of the opposition movement when two wives of Kaohsiung defendants, Chou Ch'ing-yu and Hsu Rung-shu, achieved surprisingly successful campaigns. Particularly, Chou won the highest number of votes in her multi-member district for the National Assembly. Encouraged by these pioneers, other wives of political prisoners began to run *Chiashu* campaigns, in many cases winning public offices (Clark and Clark, 2002).

In addition to political opposition activities pushed by the *dangwai* camp, the emergence of social movements was another force driving Taiwan to the path of democratization from bottom. In the past, residents of Taiwan were not permitted to organize, assemble or march publicly in support of social causes, since the island was under martial law. Freedoms of speech and expression were severely curtailed, and those

who intended to publicize such causes and urge government policies always suffered serious reprisals. To some extent, political opposition activities might facilitate the development of social movements. The authoritarian government had already experienced fiercer and progressive political movements; it thus was not too shocked when social movements began to come up. By the end of 1988, there were 17 major social movements, including women's movements, emerged to make claims on the state, calling for the revision of its policies and its relaxation of controls on the society (Hsiao, 1990).

At this juncture, President Chiang Ching-kuo realized that substantial changes would have to be made because of the sociopolitical climate on Taiwan. The legitimacy of his government was at stake. Further, he believed that if a democratic country could be built in Taiwan, it could eventually be transferred to the mainland. Therefore, Chiang Ching-kuo had conceived a plan for democratization. First of all, Chiang picked Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese scholar and technocrat, as his vice-president when he was elected to another six-year term in 1984. In addition, other Taiwanese became the governor of Taiwan province and mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. But he had to wait two more years before he could launch his political reform because various external and internal crises intervened (for example, the murder of Henry Liu and the financial scandal of Tenth Credit Cooperation). In the spring of 1986, he announced that martial law would be lifted and replaced by a national security law in the fall. However, on September 28, 135 members of the *dangwai* courageously but illegally established a new political party: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Now, Chiang became tolerant and wise, for he

took no action toward the formation of the DPP. In December, the nation held its first legal two-party election (for supplementary seats in the Legislative Yuan), with the KMT competing with the DPP. The KMT won, while the DPP nominated 44 candidates for 73 available seats and 12 were elected. The election outcome indicated that the people still supported the KMT for the sake of stability, while the DPP demonstrated an impressive electoral debut. More importantly, the electoral competition between the two parties had sent Taiwan to the first step of the democratization (Tien, 1989; Clark, 1994; Copper, 1997 and 2000).

The next year, in mid-1987, the Emergency Decree, generally called martial law, was terminated. At the same time, the National Security Law went into effect, reducing the role of the military in Taiwan's politics. In turn, new regulations also enhanced press freedom, allowing new newspapers to publish and all papers to increase the number of pages printed. All radical political reform efforts during 1980s, especially ending martial law, had significantly pushed Taiwan toward political liberalization and democratization (Copper, 2000 and 2009).

In sum, economic development was fairly continuous and cumulative. By the 1980s, Taiwan was widely praised as an economic miracle by the international community. In contrast, there was little political reform until the early 1980s. However, Taiwan finally started a very successful democratic transition at the end of this stage.

5. From the late 1980s to present

With political liberalization in process, at this stage, three major changes moved

Taiwan from the transition stage toward the consolidation of democracy. First, the senior representatives of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, who were elected in China and had been frozen in office since 1947, were asked to step down in 1991. Second, the first direct presidential election for the ROC was held in 1996. Third, party alternations occurred in 2000 and then in 2008, making Taiwan a full-fledged liberal democracy.

When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui succeeded him as president according to the ROC Constitution. Soon, Lee also became the party's leader of the KMT, though he was briefly challenged by some top officials in the party, including Madam Chiang Kai-shek. Lee's leadership symbolized an end of the Mainland Chinese minority's hold on political domination in Taiwan. In March 1990, Lee was reelected president for a six-year term by the National Assembly in an uncontested vote. At the same time, the Wild Lily student movement took place in Taipei. Over 10,000 pro-democracy students occupied Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square for a week and pledged democratic reforms, especially urging direct elections of Taiwan's president and vice president and new elections for all representatives. Lee met student representatives and promised, among other things, a National Affairs Conference to discuss issues such as the composition of elected bodies of government. In July, the National Affairs Conference ended after suggesting the popular election of the president and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, as well as other reforms. Delegates to the Conference included members of the KMT ruling party, the opposition DPP, and academics. However, it was a complex process of forcing senior parliamentarians to

retire. After months of KMT efforts on the inside and DPP efforts on the outside, the senior parliamentarians began to relent. Finally, following an interpretation of the Constitution by the Council of Grand Justices, they retired en mass. As a result, election for all seats in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were first held in 1991 and 1992 (Copper, 1994 and 2000; ROC, 2005).

In 1992, the newly elected National Assembly evaluated many proposals for Constitution amendments in order to further Taiwan's political reform. Among the most hotly debated was the proposal to directly elect the president. In April 1994, the fourth meeting of the new National Assembly revised the Constitution of the ROC, and decided that the president shall be elected by direct popular vote to a four-year instead of six-year term. The first direct popular election of the president would be held on March 23, 1996 (Copper, 2005, p. 18).

During the months preceding the election, Taiwan became the target both of Beijing's acid tongue and its armed intimidation. Beijing conducted a series of large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Missiles were fired just 10 miles away from Kaohsiung and Keelung, which are Taiwan's two largest seaports. The PRC repeatedly claimed that they would not renounce its military threat to deter Taiwan from independence. As a result, at the time of the presidential election, Taiwan was the center of world attention, with more than seven hundred journalists from around the world on the island covering the election, and two U.S. aircraft carriers and their battle groups standing in the open seas to protect Taiwan from the PRC's heightened military threat. Finally, Lee Teng-hui gained a convincing victory over three other teams, winning 54 per

cent of the votes in the election, for which over 76 per cent of eligible voters turned out (Shaw, 1996; Copper, 2000 and 2009).

On March 18, 2000, the second direct presidential election was held. There were five pairs of candidates contending for the positions of president and vice president. In a tight, three-way race, former Taipei City Mayor Chen Shui-bian, representing the DPP, narrowly defeated his rivals with 39 per cent of the vote, closely followed by former Taiwan provincial Governor James Soong, who ran independently after failing to get on the KMT ticket, with 37 percent of the vote. Then Vice President Lien Chan, representing the KMT, received 23 per cent of the vote. This election not only brought a record high of 82 per cent voter turnout, but also ended the KMT's five-decade holding on the presidency . Moreover, Lu Hsiu-lien, Chen's running mate, became Taiwan's first female vice president. In 2004, Chen Shui-bian and Lu Hsiu-lien were reelected. In 2008, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou was elected to the presidency, completing the ROC's second party alternation between two major parties (ROC, 2005, p. 51; ROC, 2008a, p. 45).

After the late 1980s, economic growth declined quite noticeably, as shown in Figure 4.1. However, despite the impact of the Asian financial storm and the 921 earthquake (it happened in 1999 in Jiji, Nantou county; 2,415 people were killed, 11,305 injured, and over US$10 billion worth of damage was reported), Taiwan achieved an average economic growth rate of 6.5 per cent during the 1990s. Although Taiwan had to contend successively with the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the SARS epidemic, and the late-2000s global financial crisis, it had an average economic growth rate of 3.8 per

cent from 2000 through 2008. In reality, however, two very different types of structure changes brought by globalization impacted Taiwan's latest economic dynamics.

Figure 4.1 Taiwan's Economic Growth: 1952-2008



Source: *Economic Development, R.O.C. (Taiwan), 2008* (ROC, 2008b, p. 17).

First, the very successful promotion of high tech industries, such as computers and semiconductors, enabled Taiwan to move into a knowledge-based economy at the beginning of information age. By the early 1990s, Taiwan became the third-largest producer and exporter of IT and computer-related products in the world market (Chow, 2002). In its May 2005 cover story entitled "Why Taiwan Matters," *BusinessWeek* magazine highlighted Taiwan's vital role in the global technological supply chain, with the headline pronouncement that "The global economy couldn't function without it" (*BusinessWeek*, May 16, 2005). Further, in 2007, Taiwan remained a key player in the global information and communication technology (ICT) industries. About 60 per cent of manufacturing production value was yielded by high- and mid-high-technology

manufacturers. The lion's share of high-tech revenues was generated by companies located in the Hsinchu Science Park, the Southern Taiwan Science Park, and the Central Taiwan Science Park; the three parks' combined revenues came to nearly US$60 billion, representing a growth of more than 12.5 per cent over the previous year (ROC, 2008a, p. 101-102). Moreover, as shown in Table 4.1, Taiwan's manufacturers continued to rank number one and number two globally in terms of production value in several ICT industries (ROC, 2008a, p.102).

Table 4.1 Production Value and Global Share of Taiwan-made IT Products and Services in 2007

Category	*Production Value (US$ million)*	*Global Share (%)*
No. 1 in the World		
IC foundry	13,774	68.1
Mask ROM	353	92.9
IC packaging	7,450	47.6
IC testing	3,350	67.7
Large-size TFT-LCD panels	34,450	48.7
TN/STN LCD panels	4,850	41.2
No. 2 in the World		
IC chip design	12,186	26.5
DRAM chips	7,015	22.4
OLED flat panels	392	39.0
Small and medium-size TFT-LCD panels	3,670	20.8

Source: Industrial Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) (cited from ROC, 2008a, p. 102).

Second, while Taiwan's ICT industries are continuing to develop and evolve, its factories manufacturing labor-intensive, relatively low-skilled products have gradually

moved to areas providing cheaper labor and land, typically to China. By the middle and late 1980s, Taiwan's labor-intensive manufacturing confronted increasing international competition from other NICs and other developing countries. Meanwhile, the New Taiwanese Dollar (Taiwan currency) appreciated sharply due to Taiwan's huge trade surplus and foreign exchange reserves. Coupled with the increasing wages, Taiwan quickly lost its competitive advantage in its traditional fields of production. Taiwanese businesses thus were forced to move their production offshore in order to survive in the world market. The first flows of this investment were concentrated in Southeast Asia. However, a considerable number of firms moving to Southeast Asia encountered various difficulties caused by cultural differences, the language barrier, labor-management disputes, and complex legal problems. In the meantime, China aimed to attract greatly needed capital investment and entrepreneurial know-how through an open door policy; and, in late 1987, the ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the 37-year-ban barring Taiwan's residents from visiting their relatives on the mainland for humanitarian concerns. Consequently, these policies provided Taiwan businesspeople opportunities to survey China's markets and establish direct business negotiations with their Chinese counterparts. Obviously, Taiwan's abundant capital and advanced technology matched well with China's unlimited supply of cheap labor. Moreover, China's pragmatic provincial leaders vigorously offered substantial incentives to attract investments for export industries. These advantages, taken together with the similarities in culture, tradition, and language as well as geographical proximity, are the key factors pushing Taiwan's trade with and investment in China. Gradually, the Chinese mainland became a prime location for new

factory sites for many Taiwanese firms (Ranis, 1992; Chai, 1994; Soled, 1995; Rapkin and Avery, 1995; Wu, 1995; Clark, 1999; Lee 2007).

Figure 4.2 Gross Domestic Production by Sector



Source: Data come from Taiwan Statistic Data Book 2009 (ROC, 2009b).

Along with the expansion of offshore manufacturing in China, both Taiwan's production and employment structures had dramatically changed, shifting from the industry sector to the services sector. As presented in Figure 4.2, during the 1960s and 1970s, with the rapid growth of manufacturing, Taiwan's industry sector almost caught up with its services sector in terms of GDP percentage. Taiwan's industrial production reached a highest point in 1987 (47.4 per cent of GDP). However, the service sector expanded rapidly after that. By 2007, the services sector accounted for 70.7 per cent of Taiwan's GDP, a percentage very similar to that of many advanced countries.

Correspondingly, as shown in Figure 4.3, in the late of 1980s (the early stage of moving labor-intensive production “off shore”), the services sector surpassed the industry sector in terms of the share of employment. By 2007, about 58 per cent of employed persons were working in the service sector. At this stage, most of new jobs were generated from the services sector, particularly in the financial and stock market areas (ROC, 2005, p. 148; Copper, 2009, p. 169).

Figure 4.3 Employment Structure in Taiwan: 1952-2007



Source: Data come from Taiwan Statistic Data Book 2009 (ROC, 2009b).

In addition to the major political and economic transformations over the last two decades, two public policies implemented during this stage are also worth noting. First, after the liberalization of the university establishment policy starting in 1996, the number of colleges and universities in Taiwan increased from 67 to 149 in 2007. During the

same period of time, the population aged 15 or older with a college or university degree rose from 19.3 per cent to 33.9 per cent (ROC, 2008b). However, the rapid expansion of higher education institutions resulted in more slots in colleges and universities than applications (Copper, 2009, p. 95). Second, the National Health Insurance (NHI), a universal health care system in Taiwan, was formally instituted in 1995 to provide the whole population with medical care. The NHI incorporated thirteen existing public health insurance plans. At the same time, it extended coverage to the eight million citizens who were formerly uninsured, mainly the elderly, children, students, housewives, and the disabled. Participation was mandatory under the Health Insurance Law. By the end of 2007, 99 per cent of Taiwan's population was enrolled in the NHI program (ROC, 2005; ROC 2009a; Copper, 2009).

In addition, starting in the late 1990s, there was a notable increase in marriages between Taiwan's citizens and foreign nationals. The majority of the foreign spouses (about 93 per cent) are the "Chinese brides" and "foreign brides" of Taiwanese men. Cumulatively, by the end of 2007, 66 per cent of 399,038 foreign spouses came from China (including Hong Kong and Macau), while 20 per cent and 7 per cent were from Vietnam and Indonesia, respectively. Consequently, in 2007, marriages of ROC citizens to immigrants accounted for one in every six marriages, and children from this type of marriage made up 10 per cent of all new births (Foundation of Women Rights Promotion and Development, 2007, p. 21 and 44; ROC, 2008a, p. 28).

6. Implications

Over the past six decades, these four transformations have thoroughly reshaped Taiwan from a poor agricultural authoritarian regime to a prosperous industrial democratic country. Such essential and far-reaching change certainly offers many resources and opportunities that women might potentially use for greater empowerment. However, as noted in the literature review chapter, development in many Third World nations has not necessarily benefited women because of various barriers that prevent them from availing themselves of such theoretically potential resources and opportunities. The next chapter, therefore, examines what socioeconomic and political development has meant for women in Taiwan by presenting the transformations of women's status in terms of social, economic, and political dimensions.

CHAPTER 5

THE CHANGING STATUS OF WOMEN IN TAIWAN

This chapter presents statistics and analysis on the status of women in Taiwan, highlighting changes over time and the current situation as well as the differences between men and women in Taiwan and women in other countries. Analyses are based mainly on statistics and resources from Taiwan's government and international statistical

Table 5.1 Dimensions of the Status of Women in Taiwan

Dimension	Indicators
I. Social Conditions	• Life expectancy • Infant and maternal mortality • Fertility rate • Sex ratio at birth • Urbanization
II. Human and Social Capital	• Educational level • Literacy • Participation in voluntary organizations
III. Economic Activities	• Labor force participation • Distribution of occupations and occupational segregation by sex • Entrance into administrative, managerial, professional, and technical related occupations • Gender pay gap
IV. Political Participation and Power	• Voting rate • Political representation • Participation in women's interest groups

agencies. The study covers four broad dimensions – social conditions, human and social capital, economic activities, and political participation and power. The main indicators of each dimension are showed on Table 5.1.

1. Social Conditions

Life Expectancy

Figure 5.1 Women's Life Expectancy in Taiwan: 1965-2008



Source: 1965's data from *Statistical Yearbook 1971* (p. 78), United Nations; others from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Figure 5.1 clearly indicates a steadily increase in life expectancy for women in Taiwan from 1965 to 2008. On the whole, the life expectancy of the women in Taiwan increased by 11.5 years over that time period. While life expectancy increased for both men and women in Taiwan between 1965 and 2008, as shown in Figure 5.2, women had consistently higher life expectancy than men with the difference starting at 4.6 years in

1965 and culminating in a difference of 6.3 years in 2008. When compared with the life expectancies in other selected countries in Figure 5.3, Japan had somewhat higher life expectancies than Taiwan whereas China ranked lower than Taiwan. Taiwan and South Korea, two of the Four Asian Little Dragons, performed exactly similarly with respect to life expectancy in 2008. Singapore (one of the Four Asian Little Dragons) and the United States had life expectancies similar to Taiwan, but Singapore showed one year more of life expectancy in women than Taiwan, and the United States demonstrated one year less in women's life expectancies.

Figure 5.2 Life expectancy in Taiwan, by Sex: 1965-2008



Source: 1965's data is from *Statistical Yearbook 1971* (p. 78), United Nations; 1981-2008 are from Directorate- General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Figure 5.3 Life Expectancy in Taiwan and Selected Countries: 2008



Source: 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau (www.prb.org).

Infant and Maternal Mortality

Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths in a given year of children less than one year old, divided by the total proportion of live births in same year, multiplied by 1,000. It is an approximation of the proportion of children, per 1,000, who are born alive but die within one year of birth (United Nations, 2000, p. 53). Over the span of time displayed in Table 5.2, Taiwan's infant mortality rates have significantly decreased between 1948 and 2009. However, the decline is most pronounced in earlier years with the difference in infant mortality rate leveling off as the data approaches the present. As infant mortality rates decrease over time, women are freed from the necessity of being

perpetually pregnant. Consequently, the currently low infant mortality rate in Taiwan indicates that women have a relatively higher quality of life than they did in the past.

Table 5.2 Infant and Maternal Mortality Rates in Taiwan: 1948-2009

year	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births)
1948	56.6	-
1953	33.7	-
1960	30.5	-
1965	22.2	-
1969	19.1	-
1984	6.9	14.1
1990	5.3	11.9
1995	6.4	7.6
2000	5.9	7.9
2001	6.0	6.9
2002	5.4	7.7
2003	4.9	6.6
2004	5.3	5.5
2005	5.0	7.3
2006	4.6	7.3
2007	4.7	6.8
2008	4.5	6.5
2009	4.1	8.4

Source: 1. Infant mortality rate: 1948-1969 come from Statistical Yearbook 1957 (p. 42), 1961 (p. 51), and 1970 (p. 99), United Nations. 1984-2009 are from Bureau of Health Promotion, Department of Health, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2. Maternal mortality rate come from Bureau of Health Promotion, Department of Health, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).
Note: - data are not available.

Figure 5.4 shows the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births in 2008 of the world (46), of more developed countries (6), and of Asia (43); accordingly, Taiwan (4.5) has a low infant mortality rate. However, compared to other selected countries, Taiwan in 2008 had a lower infant mortality rate than both China (21) and the United States (6.4),

while contrasted with Singapore (2.2), Japan (2.6), and South Korea (3.4) Taiwan had a higher infant mortality rate.

Figure 5.4 World Infant Mortality Rates in Selected Countries: 2008



Source: 2010 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau (www.prb.org).

Data shown in Table 5.2 indicate a marked improvement of gynecological healthcare standards in Taiwan. In 1984, for every 100,000 live births, there were 14.1 birth-related maternal deaths. By 1990, the maternal mortality rate dropped to 11.9 per 100,000 live births. In the 2000s, the maternal mortality rates were between 5.5 and 8.4 in Taiwan, while the average rate for more developed countries was 9 per 100,000 live births (United Nations, 2010, p. 35). Thus, just as for the infant mortality rate, Taiwan is better than the average for the developed world.

Fertility Rate

Table 5.3 Fertility Rates in Taiwan: 1949-2009

Year	Fertility rate (per woman)	Year	Fertility rate (per woman)
1949	5.900	1980	2.515
1950	6.030	1981	2.455
1951	7.040	1982	2.320
1952	6.615	**1983**	**2.170**
1953	6.470	1984	2.055
1954	6.425	1985	1.880
1955	6.530	1986	1.680
1956	6.505	1987	1.700
1957	6.000	1988	1.855
1958	6.055	1989	1.680
1959	5.990	1990	1.810
1960	5.750	1991	1.720
1961	5.585	1992	1.730
1962	5.465	1993	1.760
1963	5.350	1994	1.755
1964	5.100	1995	1.775
1965	4.825	1996	1.760
1966	4.815	1997	1.770
1967	4.220	1998	1.460
1968	4.325	1999	1.555
1969	4.120	2000	1.680
1970	4.000	2001	1.400
1971	3.705	2002	1.340
1972	3.365	2003	1.235
1973	3.210	2004	1.118
1974	2.940	2005	1.115
1975	2.765	2006	1.115
1976	3.085	2007	1.100
1977	2.700	2008	1.050
1978	2.715	2009	1.030
1979	2.670		

Source: Department of Household Registration Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Total fertility, or the fertility rate, is the number of children that will be born to each woman if all women survive to the end of their reproductive years and bear children

at each age at the same rates as the ones observed in a given period. Generally, it is calculated as the sum of age-specific fertility rates for women aged between 15 and 49 years (childbearing-age women). The total fertility rate is said to be below replacement level when it is less than 2.1 births per woman (UN, 2000, p. 31).

As shown in Table 5.3, Taiwan's fertility levels have decreased sharply in the past six decades. During the years between 1949 and 1959, the total fertility rate for each year was around or over 6 births per women; but the fertility rate dropped to around 5 in 1964, to around 4 in 1970, to around 3 in 1976. By 1983 Taiwan' fertility rate was at replacement level and fertility continued to decline over the next 25 years. As of 2009, the fertility rate was 1.03 per women.

Table 5.4 Countries (or Areas) with Fertility Rate Below 1.2 per Women: 2009

Countries (or Areas)	Total Fertility Rate (per women)
Hong Kong	1.0
Macao	1.0
Taiwan	1.0
Singapore	1.2
Andorra	1.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1.2
San Marino	1.2
South Korea	1.2

Source: Data collected from *2010 World Population Data Sheet*, published by Population Reference Bureau (www.prb.org).

While Taiwan's Family Planning program of the 1960's was praised as a success story around the world, the government did not notice there was a need to follow up with a plan to maintain the fertility rate. As a result, in the 21th century Taiwan has become

one of the lowest of low fertility countries (or areas) as shown in Table 5.4. The ROC government has begun to worry that the extremely low fertility level will result in rapid population aging and bring about other negative socio-economic effects. Therefore, in its Mega Warmth Social Welfare Program (MWSWP) of 2006, the government focused on increasing Taiwan's birthrate. The relevant policies in dealing with low fertility include maternity leave benefits, parental leave benefits, childcare subsidy system, and early children education and care (ECEC) (Lin and Yang, 2009). The result of implementing these female-friendly labor policies and childcare policies is worth being observed in the future. Late is better than never, however.

Sex Ratio at Birth

Sex ratio at birth (SRB) is usually expressed as the number of male newborns per 100 female newborns. In addition, SRB is a measure for estimating the number of selective abortions, calculated on the basis of the assumed "normal" SRB of 105 males for 100 females. In general, the accepted "norm" for SRBs is between 104 and 107 males per 100 females. This range is based on worldwide data from the 1950s and 1960s, before sex-selective abortion was available. Data indicating SRBs above the upper limit of 107 are interpreted as not "natural" but achieved primarily through female-selective abortion (FSA) (Visaria, 1967; Miller, 2001, p. 1084). The most recent estimates for 2005-2010 show that the global ratio of males to females at birth is about 107:100. However, regional differences are evident. In Africa the sex ratio is 103 whereas in Asia it increases to 109 (and in Eastern Asia to 117). In Europe the sex ratio is 106 male

newborns per 100 female newborns, while it is 105 in Latin America, the Caribbean, Northern America, and Oceania (United Nations, 2010, p. 6).

Table 5.5 Sex Ratio at Birth in Taiwan: 1980-2009

(Female =100)

Year	Sex Ratio at Birth	**Year**	Sex Ratio at Birth	**Year**	Sex Ratio at Birth
1980	106.5	**1990**	110.3	**2000**	109.4
1981	107.1	**1991**	110.4	**2001**	109.4
1982	106.9	**1992**	109.9	**2002**	108.7
1983	107.1	**1993**	108.1	**2003**	110.3
1984	107.4	**1994**	108.9	**2004**	110.8
1985	106.7	**1995**	107.9	**2005**	109.1
1986	107.3	**1996**	108.8	**2006**	109.6
1987	108.4	**1997**	108.9	**2007**	109.8
1988	108.2	**1998**	108.7	**2008**	109.6
1989	108.6	**1999**	109.5	**2009**	108.5

Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Table 5.6 Sex Ratio at Birth in Taiwan, by Birth Order: 2001-2006

(Female = 100)

Year	Sex Ratio at Birth	Birth Order and Sex Ratio at Birth				
		1st Birth	2nd Birth	3rd Birth	4th Birth	5th Birth+
2001	109.4	106.9	105.8	120.8	135.0	121.2
2002	108.7	106.9	109.1	121.5	138.7	123.0
2003	110.3	107.7	108.9	123.6	139.7	122.2
2004	110.8	108.7	109.4	122.6	134.1	122.8
2005	109.1	107.7	107.1	122.0	124.3	121.9
2006	109.6	107.2	108.2	126.7	136.6	113.3

Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Before 1986, the sex ratio at birth in Taiwan was between 105 and 107, but the SRBs never dropped below 108 since 1987 (See Table 5.5). According to *Taiwan's Social Indicators 2009*, during the last twenty years, 53.7% of newborn babies were the first birth in terms of birth order, 36.5% were the second birth, 7.9% were the third birth,

and 1.9% were the remaining births (ROC, 2009a). As shown in Table 5.6, in the 2001-2006 period, there was not a huge difference between the first birth and the second one in terms of SRB; the ratios stayed between approximately 105 and 109, which were a little higher than the generally accepted "norm" (104 -107). However, the SRBs of the higher parity births reached up to 120 or more, even near 140. These imbalanced gender ratios in Taiwan imply that sex-selective methods are applied by people with son preference. Moreover, the higher SRBs among the higher parity births suggest that both the concept of "having a son to carry on the family name" and the ideology of traditional male-domination are still valued in Taiwan's society.

Urbanization

While urbanization goes hand in hand with industrialization, the physical and social amenities of cities facilitate gender-equitable change. That is, the concentration of population in urban areas opens many possibilities for women to get educational opportunities, reach job markets, access health services, form social support networks, exchange information, and organize around the things of greatest importance to them. More importantly, cities tend to favor greater cultural diversity and, as a consequence, more flexibility in the application of social norms that traditionally impinge on women's freedom of choice (UNFPA, 2007). According to a study by Inglehart and Norris, the levels of urbanization, one of common indicators of social well-being, systematically vary across classifications of different types of society. Based on data from the *Human Development Report 2000*, Inglehart and Norris find that the average percentage of urban

population in postindustrial societies is 79.1, as compared to 67.2 percent and 40.9 percent in industrial and agricultural societies, respectively (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 22).

Taiwan has experienced a rapid urbanization in recent decades as a result of industrialization and modernization. In 1940, about 12 percent of the people in Taiwan lived in cities with the population of more than 100,000. The proportion jumped to 20.7 percent in 1950 because of the influx of Chinese from the Mainland. Most of them settled down in cities, especially becoming dwellers in Taipei. By the middle and late 1950s, as a consequence of land reform and the rising productivity in the agricultural sector, a great number of people began moving to cities for nonagricultural activities. Meanwhile, the rate of natural increase was the highest in Taiwan's history. The process of urbanization accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s as factories proliferated in or near Taiwan's large and medium-sized cities. As a consequence, Taiwan's proportion of urban population rose dramatically from 25.9 percent (2.795 million) in 1960, to 36 percent (5.282 million) in 1970, to 47.2 percent (8.396 million) in 1980, to 53.3 (10.61 million) in 1988 (Ho, 1978; Tien, 1989; Speare, 1992; Copper, 2009). According to the *2010 World Population Data Sheet*, in 2008, Taiwan had 78 percent of its total population living in urban areas, while more developed nations were about 74 percent urban; and 44 percent of residents of less developed countries dwelled in urbanized cities (Haub, 2010).

2. Human and Social Capital

Educational Level

Education has often been seen as one of the keys to women's empowerment (Roy, Blomqvist, and Clark, 2008). Over the past six decades, Taiwan has significantly improved women's access to education due to two major educational expansions. At the beginning of industrialization, educational opportunities were extremely limited. In addition, very substantial gender inequality exsited in the education system. In 1951, the average man had attended school for four years, while the average woman had only a year and a half of education (Chiang and Ku, 1985, p. 5). From 1953 to 1967, when the ROC government made primary schooling compulsory, school attendance of children in the six- to twelve-year age group (primary school) increased from 88% to 98% (gender disaggregated data are not available). Further, the ROC extended the number of years of compulsory schooling from six to nine in 1968. The result was a dramatic increase in the enrollment rate of the twelve- to seventeen-year age group or junior high from 49% to 71.5% for males and 32% to 60% for females (Shin, 1972; cited from Galenson, 1979, p. 397).

As shown in Table 5.7, by the year 1976, there was nearly universal schooling for both boys and girls of age six to eleven. However, gender inequality still existed for other age groups. For example, 72.82% of girls aged 12-14 were in school compared to 81.6% of the boys; 40.11% of female students aged 14-16 were in school compared to 46.08% of the male students; 8.73% of female students aged 17-21 were in school compared to 11.15% of the male students. Obviously, many girls and women still had

limited educational opportunities in 1970s.

Table 5.7 Percentages of Attending School in Taiwan, by Age Group and Sex: 1976-2009

Year	Age 6-11 (Elementary school)		Age 12-14 (Junior high school)		Age 15-17 (Senior high school)		Age 18-21 (College)	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
1976	97.59	97.49	72.82	81.60	40.11	46.08	8.73	11.15
1980	97.70	97.43	82.03	84.73	49.06	50.25	10.25	11.86
1985	96.31	96.29	86.86	87.18	62.86	61.80	13.49	14.24
1990	97.87	98.21	90.59	90.05	76.85	69.36	20.44	18.33
1995	99.10	99.01	94.47	93.83	82.65	75.84	29.78	25.88
2000	98.79	98.77	94.11	93.83	89.39	84.90	42.11	35.47
2005	98.44	98.49	96.51	96.50	89.85	87.32	61.06	54.00
2009	97.91	98.09	97.43	97.54	93.15	91.61	68.93	61.34

Source: Ministry of Education, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).
Note: Data based on the net enrollment rate; the net enrollment (NER) represents the number of children in the official age group enrolled at a given level of education, divided by the total number of children of that age in a given school year, and multiplied by 100 (UN, 2000, p. 88).

By the late 1980s, Taiwan emerged as an industrialized society and instituted a new policy for the expansion of higher education. As a result, gender inequality in the education system was overcome. As shown in Table 5.7, between 1990 and 2009, all levels of school enrollment for both sexes had increased. Moreover, women had become more likely than men to continue their education above 15 years old. For example, during this period of time, more women aged 18 to 21 attended college and university than their male counterparts.

Although these data (in Table 5.7) show aggregate equality of educational opportunities for men and women at all levels, substantial gender segregation by subject studied exists at the higher levels of education in Taiwan. For example, as shown in

Table 5.8, college women are concentrated in the fields of health professions, education, business and administration, and social science, while they are underrepresented in the more technical fields such as computer science, physical sciences, and engineering. Those fields dominated by women might not be associated with "good jobs" in the labor market because Taiwan has entered the era of high-tech development beginning in the early 1990's.

Table 5.8 Higher Education Enrollment in Taiwan: 2009/2010

Subjects	Women (%)	Men (%)
Health Professions	73	27
Education	64	36
Business and Administration	61	39
Social Science	56	44
Law	50	50
Agriculture	50	50
Computer Science	36	64
Physical Sciences	25	75
Engineering	12	88

Source: Ministry of Education, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Literacy

Table 5.9 demonstrates that Taiwan's literacy rate has steadily increased during the last few decades; the rate of literacy among people aged 15 and over was 85.04% in 1976 and it reached 97.91% in 2009. As shown in Table 5.10, by 2009, almost all Taiwanese aged 15-24 were able to read and write, while 13.89% of the population aged 65 years old and above remained illiterate, accounting for most of the illiterate population in this country. In 2009, the overall literacy rate of Taiwanese women was 3 percent

lower than their male counterparts (see Table 5.9), the gap existed primarily because 23.60% of Taiwanese women over 65 years old are illiterate compared with only 3.42 percent of elderly men (see Table 5.10).

Table 5.9 Literacy Rates in Taiwan (% of Aged 15 and Over): 1976-2009

year	Literacy rate (%)		
	All	Male	Female
1976	85.04	-	-
1992	93.16	96.92	89.15
2000	95.55	98.51	92.49
2005	97.33	99.29	95.34
2009	97.91	99.50	96.33

Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Table 5.10 Literacy in Taiwan, by Age Group and Sex: 2009

age	All		Female		Male	
	Literacy rate	Illiteracy rate	Literacy rate	Illiteracy rate	Literacy rate	Illiteracy rate
15-19	99.99	0.01	99.99	0.01	100.00	0.00
20-24	99.99	0.01	99.99	0.01	99.99	0.01
25-29	99.98	0.02	99.97	0.03	99.98	0.02
30-34	99.95	0.05	99.94	0.06	99.96	0.04
35-39	99.93	0.07	99.91	0.09	99.94	0.06
40-44	99.91	0.09	99.89	0.11	99.93	0.07
45-49	99.83	0.17	99.76	0.24	99.83	0.17
50-54	99.45	0.55	99.07	0.93	99.83	0.17
55-59	98.75	1.25	97.76	2.24	99.76	0.24
60-64	97.16	2.84	94.94	5.06	99.49	0.51
65+	86.11	13.89	76.40	23.60	96.58	3.42

Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Participation in Voluntary Organizations

Figure 5.5 The Number of Volunteers in Taiwan by sex: 1996-2009



Source: Data colected from Ministry of Interior, Republic of China (Taiwan).

A substantial proportion of nonprofit groups rely on volunteers in pursuing their objectives. There are many reasons for participation in voluntary organizations. In addition to altruistic motives (helping people, benefiting children, working for a cause, serving the community, and so on), numerous studies have indicated that people get involved in volunteer work in order to build or improve their human and social capital, such as acquiring new skills and knowledge, gaining career enhancement and employment opportunities, increasing self-worth, and expanding social interaction and networks (Mueller, 1975; Wiehe and Isenhour, 1977; Gora and Nemerowicz, 1985 & 1991; Unger, 1991; Riecken, Babakus, and Yavas, 1995; Johnson-Coffey, 1997; Day and

Devlin, 1998; Putnam, 2000; OECD, 2001; Bussell and Forbes, 2002).

In 2009, there were 154,000 persons in Taiwan registered as volunteers, in which 106,000 were females (68.8%) and 48 thousand were males (31.2%), increasing by 360% and 270% from 1996, respectively. In Taiwan, women are more likely to volunteer than men. As shown in Figure 5.5, the number of females participating in voluntary organizations has been more than two times of that of males for past years except 1996.

3. Economic Activities

Labor Force Participation

Table 5.11 Labor Force Participation in Taiwan: 1961-2009

	Labor Force (1,000 Persons)			Labor Force Participation Rate (%)		
Year	Total	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
1961	3,655	-	-	61.75	35.81	86.37
1970	4,654	-	-	57.35	35.45	78.87
1980	6,629	2,223 **(33.53%)**	4,406 **(66.47%)**	58.26	39.25	77.11
1990	8,423	3,160 **(37.52%)**	5,263 **(62.48%)**	59.24	44.50	73.96
1995	9,210	3,551	5,659	58.71	45.34	72.03
2000	9,784	3,917 **(40.03%)**	5,867 **(59.97%)**	57.68	46.02	69.42
2001	9,832	3,978	5,855	57.23	46.10	68.47
2002	9,969	4,074	5,896	57.34	46.59	68.22
2003	10,076	4,172	5,904	57.34	47.14	67.69
2004	10,240	4,272	5,968	57.66	47.71	67.78
2005	10,371	4,359 **(42.03%)**	6,012 **(57.97%)**	57.78	48.12	67.62
2006	10,522	4,467	6,056	57.92	48.68	67.35
2007	10,713	4,597	6,116	58.25	49.44	67.24
2008	10,853	4,680	6,173	58.28	49.67	67.09
2009	10,917	4,737 **(43.39%)**	6,180 **(56.61%)**	57.90	49.62	66.40

Source: *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a); Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).

As shown in Table 5.11, women in Taiwan comprised 33.53% of the total labor force in 1980 and accounted for 43.40% of it by 2009. On the one hand, the population of women in the labor force in Taiwan was 2.223 million in 1980 but had jumped up to 4.737 million by 2009. That is, between 1980 and 2009, the number of females in the labor force increased by 113%. On the other hand, in 1980 the population of men in the labor force was 4.406 million but by 2009 there were 6.180 million: over the course of thirty years the number of men in the labor force increased by 40%. In short, during this period of time, the number of females participating in the labor force increased much more than the number of males, resulting in the gap of women's access to the labor market relative to men's being substantially narrowed. However, in terms of gender parity, women's share of total labor force is still far behind that of men's.

Figure 5.6 Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) in Taiwan: 1961-2009



Source: Data collected from *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a) and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan).

While Figure 5.6 displays an overall decrease in the labor force participation rate of men in Taiwan by about 20%, from 86% in 1961 to 66% in 2009, it also demonstrates a general increase in the labor force participation rate for women by around 14%, from 36% to 50%. The gap between participation rates of women and men has narrowed significantly but remains at a considerable 16 percentage points in 2009.

Along with more education opportunities for women and women's eagerly striving for equal rights, the female labor force participation rate (FLFPR) among the countries displayed in Figure 5.7 generally increased between 1988 and 2008 with the exception of Japan which showed a decrease in FLFPR by 0.5%. Of all the countries listed, the Netherlands experienced the greatest increase by about 10%. While Taiwan had an overall increase in FLFPR by 4.1% from 45.6% in 1988 to 49.7% in 2008, South Korea exhibited a 5% of increase at the same period time, from 45% to 50%. Globally, however, women's participation in the labor market remained steady in the two decades from 1990 to 2010, hovering around 52 per cent (UN, 2010). Thus, Taiwan is slightly below average.

Figure 5.7 Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Selected Countries: 1988 and 2008



Source: Original data collected from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan) and International Labor Organization (ILO), cited from *Taiwan's Social Indicators 2009,* p.76 (ROC, 2009a).

Note: With respect to 1988's data, Germany and Netherlands refer to 1991 and 1995, respectively; Norway's 2008 data refers to 2007; Labor force participation rates for USA and Norway are based on the civilian population over 16 years of age who are in the labor force.

Distribution of Occupations and Occupational Segregation by Sex

Table 5.12 Occupational distribution by gender: 1978-2010

(%)

Year	Legislators, government administrators, business executives and managers	Professionals	Technicians and associate professionals	Clerks	Combined service, shop, market, sales workers	Agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing workers	Production, machine operators and related workers
Female							
1978	1.12	4.68	6.54	9.86	15.61	22.34	39.85
1980	1.05	4.79	7.44	11.00	16.70	17.98	41.03
1990	1.90	6.56	12.96	14.08	19.65	10.10	34.76
2000	1.54	7.98	16.82	20.64	24.20	5.28	23.54
2010	1.95	9.67	22.25	20.56	23.89	3.38	18.30
Male							
1978	4.06	3.25	6.69	4.04	13.20	25.65	43.10
1980	5.07	3.40	7.69	4.00	13.80	19.79	46.25
1990	6.41	4.31	10.82	4.33	14.91	14.32	44.90
2000	6.23	5.38	16.74	4.20	13.88	9.26	44.32
2010	5.94	8.08	19.78	4.46	14.86	6.43	40.46

Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Men's and women's occupations in Taiwan have significantly changed along with the transformation of the production structure during the process of industrialization and modernization. Government statistics show that by the late 2000s, industry's share of employment had fallen to less than 37%, while service's share reached 58% of total employment. In contrast, employment in agriculture had decreased to about 5% (ROC, 2009b). As shown in Table 5.12, in 1978, women were concentrated in three occupational groups: about 40% were production, machine operators and related workers;

22.34% were agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing workers; and 15.61% were combine service, shop, market and sales workers. By 2010, the majority of women were involved in three major occupational categories: 23.89% were engaged as combined service, shop, market, and sales workers; 22.25% were technicians and associate professionals; 20.56% worked in clerical positions. With regard to men's employment, as presented in Table 5.12, in 1978, over 80% of male labor force were concentrated in three occupational groups: 43.1% were production and related workers; 25.65% involved in agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing jobs; and 13.2% employed in the field of service and sales . By 2010, about 75% of men's labor force concentrated in three occupations: 40.46% had production and related jobs; 19.78% were technicians and associate professionals; 14.86% devoted themselves to combined service, shop, market, and sales jobs.

By translating the statistics displayed in Table 5.12 into graphs, Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 illustrate changes over time for each occupational category for women and men, respectively. During the past decades, Taiwan has been transformed from an agricultural society to an export-led labor-intensive manufacturing country, and then to a post-industrial nation. Particularly, since the late 1980s, Taiwan's economic activities have gradually shifted toward high-skill and knowledge-based production as well as the service sector, while low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing moved abroad, typically taking place in China. Figure 5.8 shows that women being engaged in the agricultural and related jobs fell about 19 percentage points, from 22.34% in 1978 to only 3.38% in 2010. In contrast, women employed in the field of technicians and associate

professionals gradually increased by nearly 16 percentage points, from 6.54% to 22.25%. In addition, female production, machine operators and related workers, so-called blue collar jobs, in general dropped by 21.55 percentage points from 39.85% to 18.30%. Albeit female blue collar jobs once reached the highest point in 1979, sharing 41.67% of total female labor force. The percentages of female clerks, service and sales workers, and professionals increased 10, 8, and 5 percentage points, respectively. In particular, both clerks and professionals for women doubled from 9.86% to 20.56% and from 4.68% to 9.67%, respectively. Yet, the percentage of women who worked as legislators, government administrators, and business executives and managers increased only negligibly to 1.95% in 2010 from 1.12% in 1978.

Figure 5.8 The Transformation of Women's Occupations in Taiwan: 1978-2010



Figure 5.9 The Transformation of Men's Occupations in Taiwan: 1978-2010



Likewise, men's labor force distribution across occupations has changed in the process of economic structural transformation resulting from industrialization. As shown in Figure 5.9, the number of men who worked at agricultural and related jobs fell about 19 percentage points, from 25.65% in 1978 to 6.43% in 2010, while between 40% and 46% of male employees were hired as production, machine operators and related workers. Over the same time period, men's employment in the field of technicians and associate professionals increased 13 percentage points in a gradual way, from 6.69% to 19.78%; and, the percentage of men who were engaged in professional careers increased 4.83 percentage points, from 3.25% to 8.08%. Meanwhile, men's share of administrative and managerial positions, service and sales employment, and clerical jobs increased 1.88,

1.66, and 0.42 percentage points, respectively.

Figure 5.10 Segregation Index by Occupation (SIO)



Source: Annual employment figures for seven broadly defined occupational groups are reported by Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan. The index of segregation is calculated according to the formula: $SIO_t = \Sigma_i \mid w_{it} - m_{it} \mid / 2$, where w_{it} (m_{it}) is the percentage of women (men) working in occupation i.

To gauge the extent of the occupational segregation by gender in Taiwan, this study uses the well-known segregation measure developed by Duncan and Duncan (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; cited from Fuess and Hou, 2009). For year t, segregation index by occupation (SIO) is given by $0 \leq SIO_t = \Sigma_i \mid w_{it} - m_{it} \mid / 2 \leq 100$, where w_{it} (m_{it}) is the percentage of women (men) working in occupation i. The index represents the percentage of women (or men) that would have to reassign to achieve gender balance across occupations. There is absolute segregation (every occupation employed either

only men or only women) if the SIO is 100; the index would equal 0 if men and women were perfectly integrated across all occupations (Reskin and Padavic, 1994; Fuess and Hou, 2009). As shown in Figure 5.10, the degree of sex segregation of occupations has dramatically increased, especially since 1986. However, the years after 1996, the segregation indexes have hovered between 28 and 30.

For 1978, the index of occupational segregation is only 9.66 (see Figure 5.10); that is, less than 10% of the female (or male) labor force required relocation to accomplish gender balance across occupational groups. There was nearly equal representation in professional and technical jobs with 11.22% of women and 9.94% of men working in these fields. There also was little disparity with respect to service and sales occupations, the share for women and men were 15.61% and 13.2%, respectively. Among production, machine operators and related workers, male representation somewhat exceeded that of females, as comparing 43.1% with 39.85%. In contrast, men were almost four times more likely than women to work in executive or managerial jobs, showing 4.06% versus 1.12%. In addition, women were more than twice as likely to work in clerical jobs as men, presenting 9.86% versus 4.04%. (See Table 5.12). However, the average SIO was 12.28 between 1978 and 1986, but by 1986 it had climbed to 13.7. This trend is mild, compared to remarkable increase after 1986 (see Figure 5.10). Between 1978 and 1991 the SIO measure more than doubled, jumping from 9.66 to 22.38. By 2010, 29.2% of working women (or men) would have to have been in different occupations to achieve gender balance. In other words, over the past three decades, sex segregation of occupations nearly tripled.

By and large, the segregation index increased so dramatically because of growing disparities in three occupational groups. First, between 1978 and 2010, the gap in clerical employment continued to widen, with the female share of this occupation rising from 9.86% to 20.56% while remaining around 4% for men. Second, in 1978, services and sales jobs were fairly gender-balanced; by 2010 female labor force working in this occupation category far exceeded that of male, employing 23.89% of women but only 14.86% of men. Third, in 1978 the male share of production and related jobs was slightly greater than that of female by 3.25%, 43.1% for men compared to 39.85% for women; by 2010 male domination in this occupation had grown to 22.16 percentage points, showing 40.46% for men versus 18.3% for women.

In addition, along with Taiwan's industrialization, agricultural employment fell from 36.7% of total employment in 1970 to 5.3% in 2007 (ROC, 2009b), by 2010 respective shares for men's and women's labor force in this occupation were 6.43% and 3.38%. From the income-earning ability viewpoint, women's underrepresentation in agriculture may be a positive sign for them. As show in Table 5.15, agricultural and related workers make the lowest average monthly earnings among all occupations.

Entrance into Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technical Related Occupations

Over the past three decades, women have reached educational levels comparable to men, increased their participation in the labor force, and expanded their economic opportunities by limiting childbearing. As a result, as shown in Table 5.13, women's

Table 5.13 Distribution of Ratio of Female and Male Workers to Total Employed in Administrative and Managerial, Professional, and Technical Occupations

	Share of administrative and managerial workers (%)		Share of professional and technical related workers (%)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
1980	90.6	9.4	64.3	35.7
1990	84.9	15.1	56.3	43.7
2000	85.7	14.3	56.9	43.1
2010	79.5	20.5	52.7	47.3

Source: Data calculated by suing statistics from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan).

share of administrative and managerial workers doubled between 1980 and 2010, increasing from 9.4% to 20.5%. However, women are still pretty much underrepresented in this top occupation that entails decision-making authority and responsibility as well as higher pay. During the same period of time, women's share of professional and technical related employees also increased 11.6%, from 35.7% in 1980 to 47.3% in 2010. Qualified professionals and technicians are required to manage the expansion of a country's science, technology and innovation capacity. However, in an age where science and technology based-knowledge is becoming a determinant of economic competitiveness in Taiwan, women are slightly underrepresented among professionals and technicians, although the gap has been narrowed in recent years.

Gender Pay Gap

Table 5.14 shows the average monthly earnings for men and women who were employed in the industrial and service sectors (non-agricultural sectors), average women's wage as a percentage of men's, and the gender pay gap for each year from 1981

to 2009. In 1981, women in Taiwan earned only 64 per cent of what men earned, presenting a gap of 36 per cent. However, along with the increase of women's educational attainment and the transformation of the production structure, over the course of the thirty years the wage gap had narrowed significantly. By 2009, women's average salary was 80 per cent of men's. However, pay differentials between women and men vary across occupational groups. For example, as illustrated in Table 5.15, in 2009, the gender pay gap in the field of administrators and managers was smaller, while those of services and sales related, agriculture, and machine operators were larger.

Table 5.14 Gender Pay Gap in Taiwan: 1981-2009

	Average Monthly Earnings of Employees in Industry and Service Sector (NT$)			F = % of M*	Pay gap (%)
	All	Male	Female		
1981	10,677	12,550	8,051	64	36
1985	13,980	16,580	10,526	63	37
1990	24,317	28,376	18,923	67	33
1995	35,389	40,571	28,395	70	30
2000	41,861	47,253	35,007	74	26
2005	43,163	47,836	37,480	78	22
2006	43,493	48,021	38,035	79	21
2007	44,414	48,903	39,032	80	20
2008	44,424	49,065	38,870	79	21
2009	42,176	46,459	37,144	80	20

Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan).
Note: * an expression of female earnings as a percent of male earnings.

Table 5.15 Gender Pay Gap by Occupation: 2009

Occupation	Average Monthly Earnings (NT$)			Gender Pay Gap (%)
	All	Male	Female	
Legislators, government administrators, business executives and managers	67,076	68,525	61,750	10
Professionals	48,785	54,990	42,544	23
Technicians and associate professionals	38,485	41,961	34,712	17
Clerks	28,683	34,250	27,109	21
Combine service, shop, market, sales workers	25,762	31,033	22,194	28
Agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry and fishing workers	20,825	23,070	16,957	26
Production, machine operators and related workers	27,254	29,776	21,004	29

Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan).

While countries engage in the promotion of gender equality and even enact laws to ensure equal pay, nevertheless the gender pay gap still exists. As shown in Figure 5.11, in 2008, Taiwan's gender pay gap was 20.8% which was similar to the United States at 20.1%, while it was much lower than both Japan at 34.1% and South Korea at 33.5%. However, by comparing 1990 to 2008, the pay gap narrowed in each selected country with Taiwan demonstrating the most significant narrowing of the gap by about 12.5 percentage points (ROC, 2009a, p. 77).

Figure 5.11 The Gender Pay Gap in Taiwan and Selected Countries: 1990 and 2008



Source: Social Indicators 2009 (ROC, 2009a, p. 77).

4. Political Participation and Power

Women can use two distinct ways to improve their status: government and the political processes. First, female officials are usually assumed to be especially responsive to women's concerns and issues. Thus, having more women officials should result in more governmental policies supportive of women (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990; Thomas, 1994). Second, women's interest groups and individual women can lobby public officials to gain favorable policies. Indeed, the activities of grassroots women's organizations have been quite effective in upgrading the status of women in a wide range of contexts in both the developed and developing countries (Costain, 1992; Lee and Clark,

2000). This section, hence, examines women's political status on Taiwan by presenting women's voting rate, political representation, and women's movements.

Voting Rate

Table 5.16 Taiwan's Voting Rates in Elections between 2008 and 2010

	Voting rates (%)		
	All	Men	Women
2008 Legislative Elections	58.3	58.5	58.1
2008 Presidential Election	76.3	75.0	77.7
2009 County/City Mayors Elections	63.3	62.9	63.7
2010 Metropolitan Elections	71.7	71.1	72.4

Source: Data collected from Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw).

Taiwan has a long history of elections. Even during the martial law period, elections had been held regularly. Voting eligibility is defined broadly: the minimum voting age is 20, and there are no gender, property, or educational requirements (ROC, 2005, p.74). Generally speaking, there is almost no difference in voting rates between men and women (Chou and Clark, 1994, p. 163). However, as demonstrated in Table 5.16, women's turnout rates were slightly higher than men's in three out of the four recent elections (except 2008 Legislative elections). Particularly, in the 2008 presidential election, 77.7% of female voters went to the polls, compared to 75 % of male voters.

Political Representation

This section presents the changing status of women's political representation in Taiwan since 1950s. Three groups of indicators are selected: women's representation in

the legislative bodies, in the leadership positions, and in the public administration (civil service).

Since the KMT-led government set up on Taiwan in 1949, albeit with some changes, legislative institutions are divided into four categories: national level (the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan), provincial level (the Taiwan Provincial Assembly), Municipal level (five Municipal City Councils –Taipei, Kaohsiung, New Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan), and local level (County/City and Township/Village Councils).

Previously, the Legislative Yuan served as the parliament or congress of the Western democracies while the National Assembly had to approve constitutional amendments and, before 1996, served as the Electoral College in presidential elections. In elections for these two legislative bodies held between 1969 and 1989, only additional seats were directly elected, as the majority was held by senior representatives elected from constituencies on the Chinese Mainland in 1948. By the end of 1991, all veteran members retired. Taiwan held its non-supplementary elections for the National Assembly in 1991 and the Legislative Yuan in 1992. However, constitutional amendments gradually transferring almost all of the National Assembly's powers to the Legislative Yuan in the late 1990s made the National Assembly a dormant body in 2000 and fully defunct in 2005. Thus, currently, the Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative or lawmaking body of the state, consisting of popularly elected representatives who serve four years and are eligible for reelection (ROC, 1989b; ROC, 2005; Copper, 2000 and 2009).

The Taiwan provincial government was established in May, 1947, and representatives for the Provincial Assembly had been elected by popular vote at four-year intervals since 1951. However, due to government reform, the Provincial Assembly was eliminated in December 1998, along with the elected governorship and most other organs of the provincial government (ROC, 1989b; Copper, 2000 and 2009). Taiwan now has five special municipalities; they comprise 60 per cent of total population. Taipei gained this status in 1967; and Kaohsiung in 1979 (ROC, 2005; Copper, 2000). At the end of 2010, Taipei County (renamed New Taipei City) was upgraded to municipal status along with the merged Taichung City (encompassing Taichung City and Taichung County) and the merged Tainan City (encompassing Tainan City and Tainan County); also Kaohsiung County was merged with the already upgraded Kaohsiung City. Each municipal city has a council, whose main function is to check and balance of its corresponding city government. Taiwan's local or grassroots legislative bodies are County/City and Township/Village Councils. Elections for these councilors started from the early 1950s (Copper and Chen, 1984, p. 44).

In Taiwan, elections for legislative bodies are based on a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system for multimember districts (MMD), except the Legislative Yuan which applied SNTV for both MMD and proportion representation (PR) between 1992 and 2004 and a mixed parallel electoral system (voters cast separate single member districts and PR ballots) since the 2008 election. Under the SNTV system, voters can vote for only one candidate; MMD allows candidates to win with a fairly small number of total votes. While women in Taiwan have had the right to vote and to stand for

election since the 1950s, they also are guaranteed a minimum level of representation in legislative bodies according to the 1946 Constitution. The reserved-seats system was included in the ROC's Constitution during the early stage of the republic, seeing that women as a group were severely disadvantaged in their social and economic status under the traditional Confucian patriarchal culture and could not compete with men in the political arena. In practice, one or more seats are reserved for women in Taiwan's multimember electoral districts, depending on the size of the district. When a sufficient number of female candidates gain enough votes to be elected, they are considered to have met this quota. When no or not enough women candidates get enough votes to be elected, those with the most votes are awarded the seat or seats reserved for them. On the whole, about 10 percent of legislative seats are reserved for women by this system (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990).

Table 5.17, Table 5.18, Table 5.19, and Table 5.20 present the situation of women's representation in four levels of Taiwan's legislative bodies. The general impression from all four tables is that women's share of representation in legislative bodies has steadily and incrementally increased throughout the postwar era. In latest elections, while women appeared to have 30 per cent or more of the total seats in the Legislative Yuan and four of five special municipal city councils (except Taichung City Council where women gained 27 per cent of total seats), women's representation in County/City and Township/Village Councils also reached 27.4 per cent and 22.7 per cent of total seats, respectively. In addition, the percentage of women being elected into the last elections of the National Assembly (1996) and the Provincial Assembly (1994) were

18.3 per cent and 20.3 per cent, respectively (these two assemblies were abolished after their 1996 and 1994 terms).

Table 5.17 Women's Representation in National Legislative Bodies in Taiwan

Year	Candidates			Seats				
	Total	Women	% Women	Total	Reserved for Women	% Reserved for Women	Women	% Women
Legislative Yuan								
1969	25	4	16.0	11	0	0	1	9.1
1972	55	6	10.9	36	3	8.3	4	11.1
1975	61	4	6.6	37	3	10.8	4	10.8
1980	218	17	7.8	70	5	7.1	8	11.4
1983	171	22	12.9	71	5	7.0	8	11.3
1986	137	12	8.8	73	6	6.0	7	9.6
1989	302	26	8.6	101	7	6.9	13	12.9
1992	403	46	11.4	161	10	6.2	17	10.6
1995	397	50	12.6	164	NA	NA	23	14.0
1998	498	86	17.3	225	NA	NA	43	19.1
2001	584	110	18.8	225	NA	NA	50	22.2
2004	492	95	19.3	225	NA	NA	47	20.9
2008	423	121	28.6	113	0	0	34	30.1
National Assembly								
1969	29	2	6.9	15	2	13.3	2	13.3
1972	78	10	12.8	53	5	9.4	8	15.1
1980	185	17	9.2	76	7	9.2	12	15.8
1986	169	25	14.8	84	8	9.5	16	19.0
1991	627	76	12.1	325	28	8.6	42	12.9
1996	591	103	17.4	334	29	8.7	61	18.3

Source: Data collected from various sources: *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a); Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p 90; Lee, 2000, p 53; Sun, 2004, p 174; Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) (www.ly.gov.tw); Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw).

Table 5.18 Women's Representation in Taiwan Provincial Assembly

Year	Candidates			Seats				
	Total	Women	% Women	Total	Reserved for Women	% Reserved for Women	Women	% Women
1951	140	10	7.1	55	5	9.1	5	9.1
1954	110	18	16.4	57	6	10.5	6	10.5
1957	118	22	18.6	66	9	13.6	9	13.6
1960	126	18	14.3	73	9	12.3	10	13.7
1963	137	14	10.2	74	9	12.2	10	13.5
1968	129	19	14.7	71	10	14.1	11	15.5
1972	121	21	17.4	73	10	13.6	12	16.4
1977	125	23	18.4	77	10	13.0	13	16.9
1981	199	34	17.1	77	9	11.7	10	13.0
1985	158	28	17.7	77	9	11.7	13	16.9
1989	157	30	19.1	77	9	11.7	14	18.2
1994	178	32	18.0	79	9	11.4	16	20.3

Source: Data collected from *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a); Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p 91; Lee, 2000, p 54; Sun, 2004, p 175; Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw).
Note: The Provincial Assembly was eliminated in December 1998 due to political reforms.

Table 5.19 Women's Representation in Municipal City Councils in Taiwan

Year	Candidates			Seats				
	Total	Women	% Women	Total	Reserved for Women	% Reserved for Women	Women	% Women
Taipei City Council								
1969	77	8	10.4	48	4	8.3	7	14.6
1973	63	8	12.7	49	4	8.2	7	14.3
1977	61	8	13.1	51	5	9.8	8	15.7
1981	83	11	13.3	51	5	9.8	7	13.7
1985	74	10	13.5	51	5	9.8	9	17.6
1989	100	24	24.0	51	5	9.8	10	19.6
1994	145	29	20.0	52	5	9.6	12	23.1
1998	110	28	25.5	52	5	9.6	17	32.7
2002	115	30	26.1	52	5	9.6	17	32.7
2006	103	31	30.1	52	5	9.6	19	36.5
2010	103	36	35.0	62	NA	NA	21	33.9
Kaohsiung City Council								
1981	81	15	18.5	42	5	11.9	6	14.3
1985	71	13	18.3	42	5	11.9	6	14.3
1989	94	14	14.9	43	5	11.6	6	14.0
1994	129	16	12.4	44	5	11.4	6	13.6
1998	105	15	14.3	44	5	11.4	5	11.4
2002	114	19	16.7	44	5	11.4	9	20.5
2006	77	26	33.8	44	5	11.4	16	36.4
2010	134	38	28.4	66	NA	NA	23	34.8
New Taipei City Council								
2010	142	42	30.0	66	NA	NA	23	34.8
Taichung City Council								
2010	137	35	25.5	63	NA	NA	17	27.0
Tainan City Council								
2010	130	37	28.5	57	NA	NA	23	40.4

Source: *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a); Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p. 91; Lee, 2000, p 54; Sun, 2004, p. 175-176; Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan).
Note: The end of 2010, Taipei County (renamed New Taipei City) was upgraded to municipal status along with the merged Taichung City (encompassing Taichung City and Taichung County) and the merged Tainan City (encompassing Tainan City and Tainan County); also, Kaohsiung County was merged with the already upgraded Kaohsiung City.

Table 5.20 Women's Representation in County and Township Councils in Taiwan

Year	Candidates			Seats				
	Total	Women	% Women	Total	Reserved for Women	% Reserved for Women	Women	% Women
County/City Councils								
1950	1827	116	6.3	814	70	8.6	69	8.5
1952	1844	224	12.1	860	74	8.6	74	8.6
1954	1579	142	9.0	928	94	10.1	94	10.1
1958	1621	168	10.4	1025	102	10.0	101	9.9
1961	1629	162	9.9	929	91	9.8	95	10.2
1964	1563	230	14.7	907	108	11.9	123	13.6
1968	1262	208	16.5	847	100	11.8	123	14.5
1973	1480	206	13.9	850	99	11.6	119	14.0
1977	1271	190	14.9	857	93	10.9	121	14.1
1982	1683	226	13.4	799	89	11.1	115	14.4
1986	1472	209	14.2	837	97	11.6	127	15.2
1990	1743	265	15.2	842	NA	NA	128	15.2
1994	1868	275	14.7	883	NA	NA	133	15.1
1998	1952	316	16.2	891	NA	NA	151	16.9
2002	2057	455	22.1	895	NA	NA	197	22.0
2005	1689	404	23.9	901	NA	NA	234	26.0
2009	935	241	25.8	592	NA	NA	162	27.4
Township/Village Councils								
1952	NA	NA	NA	5695	0	0	11	0.2
1954	NA	NA	NA	6397	NA	NA	550	8.6
1958	NA	NA	NA	6834	NA	NA	629	9.2
1961	8833	1068	12.0	5260	NA	NA	660	12.5
1964	8510	668	7.8	4776	NA	NA	411	8.6
1968	7769	736	9.5	4709	NA	NA	497	10.6
1973	5575	516	9.3	3757	NA	NA	378	10.1
1977	6460	872	13.5	3793	NA	NA	488	12.9
1982	6717	878	13.1	3700	NA	NA	490	13.2
1986	6066	901	14.9	3754	NA	NA	560	14.9
1994	NA	NA	NA	6317	NA	NA	937	14.8
1998	NA	1104	NA	3663	NA	NA	322	8.8
2002	NA	NA	NA	3717	NA	NA	NA	NA
2006	6079	1206	19.8	3717	NA	NA	759	20.4
2009	3818	806	21.1	2322	NA	NA	527	22.7

Source: *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a); Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p 92; Lee, 2000, p 55; Sun, 2004, p 176-177; Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) (www.ly.gov.tw); Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw).

Three stages of development display the evolution and advancement of women's representation in legislative bodies. First, initially, women appeared to win many of their seats because of their quota. For example, as shown in Table 5.20, the 1952 elections for Township/Village Councils held without implementing the reserved-seats system, women won only 11 of 5,685 council seats or 0.2 per cent of the total seats. Two years later, the reserved-seats system was brought into the 1954 elections, women gained 8.6 per cent of the Township/Village Councils seats, indicating that the quota for women gave an impetus to promote women's representation. Thus, throughout the 1950s, women won approximately 10 percent of the seats in the elective bodies (Provincial Assembly, County/City and Township/Village Councils; see Table 5.18 and Table 5.20). Similarly, this trend emerged when elections began for the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly in the late 1960s. Second, Taiwan's elections were highly competitive among party factions and individual politicians because the authoritarian regime wanted to maintain control by playing local factions off against each other (Copper, 1997; Clark and Clark, 2002). In such conditions, some women needed to be recruited to run; otherwise, reserved seats would go by fault to women from opposing factions. That is, women might not totally depend on the reserved-seats system to win elections; rather, they had to compete with other female candidates. Owing to real competition, therefore, women gradually built their own political skills and became independent political actors in their own right. By the 1970s or 1980s, depending on the office, women were exceeding their reserved quotas by significant margins in all of Taiwan's legislative elections. This shows that women in Taiwan have been able to win their seats by their own efforts rather

than relying on the “privileges” prescribed for them by the reserved-seats system.

Finally, the founding of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 and the lifting of martial law in 1987 led to Taiwan’s political liberalization; and then the growing electoral competition made parties more sensitive to appealing to female voters by slating more women candidates than before. At the same period of time, due to social and economic advancement, the rapid growth in the number of women with higher education attainment and professional employment greatly expanded the “eligibility pool” for women candidates. More women were nominated and then elected. As a result, women’s representation has markedly increased since the mid-1980s: the Legislative Yuan, from 12.9 per cent in 1989 to 30.1 per cent in 2008; the Provincial Assembly, from 16.9 per cent in 1985 to 20.3 per cent in 1996; Taipei City Council, from 17.6 per cent in 1985 to 33.9 per cent in 2010; Kaohsiung City Council, from 14.3 percent in 1985 to 34.8 per cent in 2010; the County/City Councils, from 15.2 per cent in 1986 to 27.4 per cent in 2009; and, the Township/Village Councils, from 14.9 per cent in 1986 to 22.7 per cent in 2009. In sum, although women’s representatives at all levels of legislatures still falls far short of providing equal representation for their gender, it cannot be denied that they have made more than modest progress.

There were relatively few women in the top leadership positions of government during the authoritarian era. It was not until 1988 (the beginning of democratization) that a woman, Dr. Shirley W. Y. Kuo, gained a cabinet position in the government as minister of finance. Since then, women continue to be appointed cabinet members, and the share of cabinet ministerial positions held by women has gradually increased. Particularly, as

shown in Table 5.21, women held at least 15 per cent of cabinet-level positions between 2000 and 2010 in both the Chen Shui-bian (DPP) and Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) administrations. Although Taiwan's first popular election for president and vice president was not held until 1996, Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lien) ran on the same ticket with President Chen Shui-bian and became Vice President in 2000; together with President Chen, she was re-elected in 2004.

Table 5.21 The Appointment of Women Cabinet Ministers in Taiwan, 1950-2010

Period	Premier	Cabinet Ministers		
		Total	Women	% Women
1950.03.10-1954.05.26	Chen Cheng	19	0	0
1954.05.26-1958.07.04	Yu Hung-Chun	20	0	0
1958.07.04-1963.12.10	Chen Cheng	18	0	0
1963.12.10-1972.05.26	Yen Chia-kan	20	0	0
1972.05.26-1978.05.09	Chiang Ching-kuo	19	0	0
1978.05.26-1984.05.25	Sun Yun-suan	23	0	0
1984.05.25-1898.05.30	Yu Kuo-hwa	20	1	5.0
1989.05.30-1990.06.01	Lee Huan	20	1	5.0
1990.06.01-1993.02.27	Hau Pei-tsun	23	2	8.7
1993.02.27-1997.08.31	Lien Chan	37	5	13.5
1997.09.01-2000.05.20	Siew Wan-chang	40	4	10.0
2000.05.20-2000.10.06	Tang Fei	42	9	21.4
2000.10.06-2002.02.01	Chang Chun-hsiung	41	9	22.0
2002.02.01-2004.05.20	Yu Shyi-kun	44	8	18.2
2004.05.20-2005.02.01	Yu Shyi-kun	41	7	17.0
2005.02.01-2006.01.24	Hsieh Chang-ting	45	7	15.6
2006.01.25-2007.05.21	Su Tseng-chang	44	7	15.9
2007.05.14-2008.05.19	Chang Chun-hsiung	46	7	15.2
2008.05.20-2009.09.10	Liu Chao-shiuan	46	11	24.4
2009.09.11- present	Wu Den-yih	46	9	19.6

Sources: Data collected from *Taiwan Women's Almanac* (Foundation of Women Rights Promotion and Development, 2007, p119), Awakening e-news (Awakening Foundation http://enews.url.com.tw/enews/46083), and Executive Yuan (www. ey.gov.tw).

Table 5.22 Local Government Chief Executive Officers by Women

Year	Total	Women	% Women
Municipal City Mayors			
2006	2*	1	50
2010	5**	1	20
County Magistrates/City Mayors* **			
1985	21	2	9.5
1989	21	3	14.3
1993	23	1	4.3
1997	23	3	13.0
2001	23	2	8.7
2005	23	2	8.7
2009	17	3	17.6
Township Heads/Village Supervisors			
1994	319	6	1.9
1998	319	18	5.6
2002	319	20	6.3
2005	319	25	7.8
2009	211	25	11.8

Source: *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a, p276); Sun, 2004, p. 177-178, and Central Election Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (www.cec.gov.tw).
Notes: * Taipei and Kaohsiung. ** Taipei, New Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung. *** There were no women candidates between 1950 and 1981, according to data from *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1988* (ROC, 1989a, p 276).

As shown in Table 5.22, the situation of women's representation in the local government chief executive positions is less successful than that in the local legislative bodies (see Table 5.19 and 5.20). In fact, women had not won any election as a county magistrate or city mayor before 1985; and, there were only three women among the 312 township heads/village supervisors in the mid 1980s (Chou, Clark, and Clark, 1990, p 90). However, in the latest elections in 2009, with significant increases, women accounted for 17.6 per cent and 11.8 per cent of total county magistrates/city mayors and township

heads/village supervisors, respectively. Significantly, in 2006, Chen Chu, an ex-political prisoner from the DPP camp (the political opposition in the past), won the Kaohsiung mayoral election and became the first elected female municipal city mayor. She was re-elected in 2010 with 52 per cent of the vote in a three-way intense race. In previous years, Chen Chu held senior appointed posts in Taipei City and Kaohsiung City governments between 1995 and 2000. Also, she served as minister of the Council of Labor Affairs between 2000 and 2005.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that Tsai Ing-wen became the first female presidential candidate in the history of the ROC (Taiwan) after defeating two competitors in the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) presidential primary held in April 2011. She will run against President Ma Ying-jeou of the ruling KMT in the 5th direct presidential election, which is scheduled on January 14, 2012. Tsai has been the chairwoman of the DPP after her party's heavy loss in the 2008 parliamentary (Legislative Yuan) and presidential elections. Prior to that, she was the chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council (2000-2004), legislator (2005-2006; elected by PR system from DPP list), and Vice Premier (2006-2007). Tsai, born in 1956, is a decade younger than the generation of DPP leaders who struggled for democratization in the 1980s. And, she is quite new to the party, becoming a DPP member in 2004. However, as the DPP's first chairwoman, Tsai's leadership was solidified because of electoral victories in December 2009 and in by-elections in early 2010. Consequently, she was reelected chair in May 2010, gaining 90.3% of votes cast by party members (Tien and Tung, 2011; Fell, 2010 & 2011).

Figure 5.12 Number of Public Employees in Taiwan, by Sex: 1991-2010



Source: Data collected from Ministry of Civil Service (www.mocs.gov.tw).

Two indicators, women's share of total government employees and high-ranking positions in the public sector, show that women's representation in public administration has quite significantly advanced. As shown in Figure 5.12, the number of government employees steadily increased between 1991 and 1996, and then sharply decreased between 1997 and 2007 due to public sector downsizing and privatization of state owned enterprises. However, the size of government slightly increased between 2008 and 2010. On the whole, the number of government employees was actually reduced 17 per cent, dropping from 410,822 in 1991 to 340,106 in 2010. At the same period of time, while male employees decreased 29 per cent, falling from 295,307 to 208,260, female

employees increased 14 per cent, increasing from 115,515 to 131,846. Moreover, as Table 5.23 shows, in terms of gender ratio, women comprised 39 per cent of total government employees in 2010, compared to 28 per cent in 1991.

Table 5.23 Gender Ratio of Public Employees in Taiwan, 1991-2010

Year	Men (%)	Women (%)
1991	72	28
1995	69	31
2000	67	33
2005	63	37
2010	61	39

Source: Figures calculated by the author based on data collected from Ministry of Civil Service, Examination Yuan (www.mocs.gov.tw).

Table 5.24 Government Employees by Grade and Sex, 1991-2010

Year	Grades 10-14	Grades 6-9	Grades 1-5
Women			
1991	0.41	27.58	72.01
1995	0.73	35.75	63.52
2000	1.28	48.92	49.80
2005	1.97	53.53	44.50
2010	2.58	59.65	37.77
Men			
1991	3.66	36.34	60.00
1995	3.63	36.91	59.46
2000	7.17	56.10	36.73
2005	8.26	57.55	34.19
2010	8.20	60.27	31.53

Source: Figures calculated by the author based on data collected from Ministry of Civil Service, Examination Yuan (www.mocs.gov.tw).

Table 5.25 Percentage of Men or Women at High-ranking level of Public Administration

Year	Men (%)	Women (%)
1991	95.79	4.21
1995	91.70	8.30
2000	85.18	14.82
2005	80.98	19.02
2010	74.13	25.87

Source: Figures calculated by the author based on data collected from Ministry of Civil Service, Examination Yuan (www.mocs.gov.tw).
Note: High-ranking level refers to grades 10-14, see Table 5.23.

Likewise, women's share of high-ranking positions in the public sector has improved in a gradual way. This improvement can be seen from two aspects. First, as presented in Table 5.24, women high-ranking officials (grades 10-14) increased over five times, from only 0.41 per cent in 1991 to 2.58 per cent in 2010. Second, as shown in Table 5.25, in terms of the gender ratio, women shared 25.87 per cent of high-ranking public administrators in 2010, compared to 4.21 per cent in 1991.

Participation in Women's Interest Groups

Since the 1970s, along with Taiwan's political liberalization and democratization came, a wide variety of feminist and women's groups which strive for gender equality in order to better their lives and status. During the period of "hard authoritarianism" from the late 1940s through the middle of 1970s (Winckler, 1984), two kinds of women's organizations existed in Taiwan. The first type of women's organization was supported by the government and stressed traditional women's roles, duties to their families, and dedication to the country. Madame Chiang (Song Mei-ling), the first lady of President

Chiang Kai-shek, established the Women's Department within the Central Committee of the KMT in 1953 and also led two other large women's organizations, the Taiwan Provincial Women's Association (set up in 1946) and the Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League (instituted in 1950). Politically, some members of these government-affiliated women's groups occupied the guaranteed quota of women representatives in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Provincial Councils. While leaders of those organizations were seldom replaced, their primary works were supporting charitable causes or the armed forces. The second type of women's groups included fairly conservative social and professional organizations that were closely tied to government-affiliated women's organizations, such as the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), Jaycees Women's Club, Lions Women's Club, Zonta Club, International Career Women's League, Women Doctors' Association, and Women Secretaries' Association. In general, during this period of time, women's organizations and groups were controlled or monitored by the KMT regime. They highly supported the status quo and kept themselves from challenging Taiwan's patriarchal culture (Chiang and Ku, 1985; Lee, 1988; Clark and Clark, 2002; Chen, 2004, p. 278).

By the early 1970s, along with economic growth, Taiwan was undergoing the transformation from an agricultural society to an industrial one. Simultaneously, great social changes took place due to the emergence of the middle class, nurturing an emergent civil society under the KMT regime's limited tolerance of sociopolitical dissent. However, none of these changes brought much influence to the women's organizations mentioned above. On the contrary, a few well-educated women began to review women's

issues in transformation. Lu Hsiu-lien was a very typical example of that. In 1971, Lu was working at the Executive Yuan after she acquired a master's degree in comparative law from the University of Illinois. While Lu was studying in the United States, she was in fact impressed by the heated debate over the emerging women's movement in that country. There was a noisy patriarchal outcry in Taiwan about guaranteed quotas for male students and how to prevent too many female students in the joint college entrance examination. Lu published an article entitled "The Traditional Roles of Men and Women" in the *United Daily*, criticizing the traditional beliefs of continuing the family line by producing a male heir, three obediences and four virtues of women, female (one-sided) chastity or virginity, and the dependent female, male-supported household. This article received wide acceptance and became sensational in Taiwan. In 1974, her famous book *New Feminism* came out. This was a pioneer voice of the women's movement in Taiwan. *New Feminism* brought the public's attention to the unequal treatment of women. In addition, Lu initiated the concepts that women should first be people and then women. They should walk out of the kitchen. Sex discrimination against women should be removed; and the potential of women should be developed (Chiang and Ku, 1985; Lee, 1988; Lu, 1994).

Lu attempted to set up a real organization dealing with women's rights but it was not accepted by the government because the Martial Law was still practiced. Instead, in 1975, she established the Pioneer Press in Taipei. Fifteen books and two pamphlets were published in one year (1975-1976). Those books focused on the issues of housewives, female workers, farm women, and prostitutes. On March 8, 1976, Women's Day, with the

help of the Jaycees Club, Pioneer Press held two activities. One was a men's cooking competition; the other was a tea party outside the kitchen. The former aroused great interest in men, while the latter brought many females getting together to exchange their view points. On the one hand, Lu tried to eliminate the traditional bias that a perfect or true gentleman never cooks or helps in the kitchen. On the other hand, she encouraged women to walk out of the kitchen, since the world of women should not be restricted to the kitchen (Chiang and Ku, 1985; Lee, 1988; Lu, 1994).

During the 1970s, export processing industries were flourishing and female labor problems were very serious, especially in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs). In view of this situation, Lu set up a special telephone line called "Protect you" in Kaohsiung to provide consulting and related services to the female laborers. Later, "Protect you" was also established in Taipei, but it was cancelled very soon for political reasons. Moreover, Lu called for meetings of "The proposal for revising the Book of Family under the Civil Code" and "The Eugenic Protection Act" to speed up the legislative process of these two laws. She also offered a course in oral skills training for females working with Pioneer Press. At the same time, she tried to popularize the new concept of gender equality by organizing a club called Concentric Circles (Lee, 1988). In 1977, owing to repression from the KMT and financial difficulties, Lu closed business in Taiwan. The next year, she returned to the United States to obtain a second Master’s degree from Harvard Law School. Since then, she became increasingly interested in Taiwan’s political status. Unfortunately, Lu was jailed for her involvement in the "Kaohsiung Incident" in 1979 (Ku, 1988; Lu, 1994).

In 1982, while Lu was in prison, a number of her associates during the pioneering women's movement (1972-77), led by Lee Yuan-chen, established the Awakening Publishing House in order to raise female consciousness, encourage self-development, and voice feminist opinions. In addition to the publication of a monthly magazine, *Awakening*, and feminist books, the Awakening activists also contributed joint newspaper columns and served as advisors on television programs, concerning women's issues and promoting gender equality. Moreover, the Awakening activists organized annual seminars on International Women's Day (March 8), addressing particular topics regarding women's issues and concerns (Ku, 1988; Ku, 1989).

Meanwhile, some women's organizations were formed and devoted themselves to improving women's lives. For example, the Taipei Women Development Center, focusing on the topic of the re-employment of minority women and the elderly, was founded in January, 1984. The Warm Life Association for Women branched off from the Awakening Magazine in September, 1984 in order to assist divorced women and women on the verge of divorce. The Women's Research Program in the Population Center, National Taiwan University was established in September, 1985 to work on gender and women's studies. The Rainbow Project, supported by the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan, was set up in June, 1986 to help aboriginal teen girls. Subsequently, an intricate network was created. Within this network, if any group seized a particularly compelling issue, the others immediately stepped up to help win the attention of the public. Therefore, some significant accomplishments for women's rights were fulfilled (Wang, 1999; Chang, 2009).

Drafted by the KMT government's Public Health Department in 1971, the Eugenic Protection Act was approved by the Executive Yuan in 1982 and sent to the Legislative Yuan for further deliberation and legitimization. In June, 1984, the Awakening Magazine convened six other women's groups; therefore, 154 women signed a petition for legalizing abortion and sat in the Legislative Yuan to see the legal passage of the Eugenic Protection Act. Under pressure from women's groups, the Legislative Yuan finally passed the bill and legalized abortion in Taiwan on July 9, 1984 (Yu, 1994; Wang, 1999, p. 79; Chang, 2009, p. 115). Now under the protective umbrella of the Law, both doctors and pregnant women undergoing abortion operations no longer have to worry about the punishment from the Criminal Code. Before the Eugenic Protection Act was implemented, abortion had long existed in the society as a means to avoiding an unwanted child; yet, abortion was deemed a violation of the Law. As a result, many pregnant women had to ask quacks to do the crucial operation for them. Many women suffered from the ordeal given by poorly-equipped, poorly-trained, and unlicensed doctors to avoid having the offspring they could not afford (Ku, 1988; Yu, 1994).

As another example, under pressure from women's groups and organizations, revisions of the Book of Family in the Civil Code were enacted into law on June 5, 1985 and took effect two days thereafter. Major revisions concerned matrimonial property control, grounds for divorce by judicial decree, children's family name, bigamy, and how husbands and wives should take their domicile. Under the old law, all properties of husband and wife, whether acquired at the time of marriage or during the continuance of the marriage, other than the separate and contributed properties owned by wife, were

owned and managed by the husband (Yu, 1994).

The Awakening Magazine advanced with startling decisiveness to lay a firm foundation for the women's movement after Martial Law was lifted in 1987 and was renamed the Awakening Foundation. With its earlier experiences, the Awakening Foundation still undertook awareness-promotion campaigns on a new issue every year on Women's Day, thus attracting the media and strengthening their appeals. In the meanwhile, diverse women's organizations or associations also emerged in the post-martial law era (a list of women's organization founded between 1987 and 2004 is shown in Appendix F). One characteristic of these women's associations is that they began to focus on gender concerns from different perspectives. While some of them provided women practical services and professional assistance, others actively took part in the political and social movements to urge the modification or enactment of laws and to supervise the government's execution of public policies to improve women's status in Taiwan's society. Most significantly, in contrast to feminists' prior need to compromise with conservatives, activists threw off their self-censorship after the revocation of martial law. For example, women's groups based on social feminism and radical feminism began to be establish in the1990s and afterward (Ku, 1988; Wang, 1999; Chang, 2009, p. 118-155; Chen, 2004, p. 55-57).

In conclusion, it wasn't until the early 1970s that the first wave of the Taiwan women's movement arose after Lu Hsiu-lien wrote *New Feminism*, which brought the public's attention to the unequal treatment of women. The Awakening Publishing House founded in 1982 by Lee Yuan-chen was the only women's organization to focus on

gender issues during the enforcement of Martial Law. In turn, diverse women's organizations or associations have emerged since Martial Law was lifted in 1987. Moreover, in 2001, the National Alliance of Taiwan Women’s Associations (NATWA), an umbrella organization, was established to coordinate the country’s more than 70 gender-related NGOs (Gao, 2011). Directly challenging traditional beliefs and patriarchal culture, autonomous women’s groups in Taiwan have been working hard to improve women’s situations in various fields, including women’s right to reproductive choice, the prevention of domestic violence and sexual assault, environmental protection, gender equality in employment opportunities, the civil rights of same-sex couples, and the advancement of women into leadership roles in the political arena (Chang, 2009, p. 11). In particular, the women’s movement had a significant impact on women’s daily lives through its success in obtaining legal reforms for gender equality. The achievements in legislative reforms between 1984 and 2011, as presented in Table 5.26, include legalizing abortion, revising the Civil Code to protect women’s rights, preventing children and teenagers from becoming prostitutes, prohibiting different forms of violence against women, eliminating gender biases in the education system, and securing women’s equal access to employment opportunities.

Table 5.26 Women's Movement's Achievements in Legislation, 1980s-2011

Name of Bill	Issue and Content	Process and Outcome
Eugenic Protection Act	The act legalized abortion.	Women's groups petitioned for "Legalized Abortion" in 1984. The act passed in 1984 after 13 years of conceiving and contraction at the Legislative Yuan.
Child and Youth Sexual Transaction Prevention Act	Prevents children and teenagers from becoming prostitutes.	First seminar held in 1985. First reading in 1993. The act passed in 1995
Revision of Family Provision in the Civil Code	Divorce and gender equality within marriage and the family: expands the definition of "acceptable grounds for judicial divorce," making it easier to get a divorce; allows wife to keep the property registered in her name prior to 1985 without proving that she previously owned it; pays housework or professional help to outside party.	First seminar held in 1991. Grand Justice determined the Article 1089 in the Civil Code was unconstitutional in 1994. The act sent to Legislative Yuan in 1995; final revisions passed in 1996.
Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act	The act criminalizes all sexual violence against women.	First public hearing held in 1993; the act submitted in 1994 and passed in 1996.
Domestic Violence Prevention Act	The act gives the government and police authority to act in household affairs, an area that formerly had been viewed as an exclusively private sphere.	The act submitted in 1996 and passed in 1998.
Gender Equality in Employment Act	Gender equality in the work place; equal employment opportunity for women; offers maternity and paternity leave; prevents sexual harassment.	Formation of a drafting committee in 1987. First reading in 1990. The act passed in December 2001.
Gender Equity Education Act	The law stipulated that a gender-balanced curriculum should be integrated into students' learning experiences from kindergarten through twelfth grade, and every university should offer courses in gender studies.	The act originated from local feminism movement in 1980s, it passed in 2004. In 2011, a revision to the act designed to prevent and penalize sexual harassment and gender-based bullying.
Sexual Harassment Prevention Act	The importance of this act is that sexual harassment is defined as a crime.	The process of legislation lasted six years; the act passed in 2005.

CEDAW* Implementation Act	The act directs government agencies to revise all relevant laws and administrative measures to fall in line with CEDAW's provisions by the end of 2014, as well as requires the submission of a national report on progress toward CEDAW's implementation every four years.	Although Taiwan's unique political situation has prevented the country from rejoining the UN, CEDAW was drafted and passed in January 2007 under the pressure from women's groups. The act passed in May 2011, and will take effect on January 1, 2012.

Source: Fan (2000), p. 141, Table 5.7; Chen, (2004), p. 263, Appendix B; Mo (2005); Gao (2011), p. 30-35.
Note: * The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

5. Conclusion

Although women made major progress in all four areas, significant problems and barriers remain. In life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and fertility women made substantial gains and reached developed world status by the 21st century; and rapid urbanization occurred as well. However, sex birth ratios give strong evidence of selective female abortion after the second child, indicating the continued existence of patriarchal norms.

During the postwar era, there have been tremendous increases in women's education levels and literacy; and the pre-existing gender gap on these dimensions has vanished among younger Taiwanese. In addition, women are now much more active than men in voluntary organizations. However, substantial sex segregation in higher education majors still remains; and the less educated women from earlier generations are at a substantial disadvantage in Taiwan's modernized economy and society.

Over time women's participation rate in the labor force has increased greatly, while men's has dropped, but it still is not high by international standards (see Chapter 3).

In addition, there was a major jump in occupational segregation by gender between the mid-1980s and mid 1990s with women becoming more concentrated in clerical, service, and sales jobs and men in production, which probably hurts women's relative status. Finally and more positively, women's average wages and salaries as a proportion of men's have risen to 80 per cent, far from equal but approximately the level that exists in the United States.

Women and men now vote at equal rates. Over the postwar period, women's representation in legislatures and councils has increased gradually to 20% - 30% over the last two decades, although women's share of the elected chief executives of local governments is much lower. Despite women's continued gross under representation, this is fairly respectable by international standards. Women's electoral representation has been promoted by 1) the "reserved-seats system" which guaranteed about a tenth of the seats for women; 2) the growing number of women with higher education and professional jobs which increases the "eligibility pool" for women candidates; and 3) democratization. There were few women in the cabinet of the national government before 2000, but they have held 15% - 20% of the ministerial posts since then; and women's share of the civil service has increased markedly over the last two decades to nearly 40%. In addition, a woman was Vice President of Taiwan from 2000 to 2008; and a woman is now in a close race in the 2012 presidential election. Finally, democratization unleashed a huge expansion of women's interest groups.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

This dissertation analyzes the economic, social, and political status of women in Taiwan from 1945 to 2010. Taiwan has experienced tremendous changes over the postwar era. First, administration was transferred from the defeated Japanese to Mainland China, which established an authoritarian regime; and over time the one-party rule was replaced by competitive democracy. Second, the economy shifted through several stages from a poor, primarily agricultural society to a post-industrial, information-based one. Martial law controlled citizens' activities during early stages repressing the emergence of a civil society. It was lifted in 1987 giving rise to the establishment of interest groups and competing political parties. All of these changes potentially impacted women's lives.

This research was guided by a theoretical model (Chapter 2) of how the status of women worldwide is influenced by culture, the level economic development, and the degree of democratization. Hypotheses drawn from the theoretical model were tested by using data collected from 174 developing and developed nations. Whether Taiwan was an underachiever or an overachiever on selected indicators was also discussed (Chapter 3). Taiwan's economic and political development were traced from the end of World War

II through the present (Chapter 4). Finally, the changing status of women in Taiwan in terms of social conditions, human and social capital, economic activities, and political participation and power were analyzed (Chapter 5).

2. Theoretical Model

Below is the theoretical model of how patriarchal culture, economic development, and democratization influence women's status, used in this dissertation to examine the conditions of women in Taiwan. A general scholarly consensus exists about some of these relationships, but others are quite controversial with different schools of thought making opposing presumptions. The following path diagram in Figure 6.1 models more specific hypotheses about these relationships.

Figure 6.1 Model of How Patriarchal Culture, Economic Development, and Democratization Affect the Status of Women



Patriarchy refers to the prevalence of male dominance in a society. Women, in general, are treated as a secondary and subordinate sex. It is hypothesized by all the major theoretical traditions that a higher degree of patriarchy in traditional cultures should produce a debased status for women.

H1: The degree of patriarchy in traditional culture will have a negative relationship with the status of women.

The relationship between development and the status of women is controversial. There are two quite different viewpoints. One, based on the conventional modernization model assumes that the impact of development on the status of women is positive. The other associated with the liberal feminist, dependency, and socialist feminist paradigms argues that development has a negative impact upon women's status in traditional societies and the developing countries for several reasons. First, agricultural development strategies, such as the introduction of more advanced technology and the transformation from subsistence crops to cash-crop production, weaken women's production role by decreasing their participation in agricultural work. Also, at the onset of industrialization, women are marginalized in the "modern" sectors, where they are widely confined to informal, unstable, low-paying, and unskilled manufacturing jobs. Meanwhile, women's traditional roles and support from kinship networks are actually eroded. Since the impact of development upon the status of women is not clear, two competing hypotheses will be tested. The first hypothesizes that higher levels of economic development should produce an increasing status for women. The second hypothesizes that higher levels of economic development during agricultural

modernization and at the earlier stages of industrialization will lead to deterioration in women's status.

H2: The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon the status of women.

H3: The level of economic development will have a negative impact upon the status of women.

In a democratic country, public officials are selected by the people; and fundamental political rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble, and the right to petition, are guaranteed for all citizens. Therefore, there are at least three channels through which women can exert political influence to improve their status. First, women themselves could become elected officials to enact laws that can eliminate or lessen discrimination against women. Second, women can form advocacy groups to press government to make policies and enact legal reforms that help women to gain better situations or ensure a more equal status of women. Finally, under democratic systems, it is inevitable that parties must compete for votes, which makes them more responsive to important constituencies, such as women. Thus, it is hypothesized by modernization theorists and probably most liberal feminists that democratization should improve the status of women. In contrast, dependency theorists and socialist feminists would probably argue that democracy would not help women in most situations because of the powerful reinforcing effects of capitalism and patriarchy.

H4: *The degree of democratization will have a positive impact upon the status of women.*

H5: *The degree of democratization will not be associated with the status of women.*

Likewise, there is strong disagreement over the impact of economic development on the degree of patriarchy. Modernization theorists conclude that greater development should produce cultural change undercutting patriarchal norms, while dependency theorists and socialist feminists are quite skeptical about this line of argument

H6: *The level of development will have a negative association with patriarchal culture.*

H7: *The level of development will have no association with patriarchal culture.*

A higher GDP per capita correlates with democracy. Moreover, democracy was very rare before the industrial revolution. Thus, empirical research leads many to believe that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy (modernization theory), or helps newly established democracies stabilize . Some campaigners for democracy also suggest that democratization will become inevitable if economic development progresses. Thus, it is hypothesized that economic development should promote democratization.

H8: *The level of economic development will have a positive impact upon democratization.*

3. Results

This model is tested with data from 174 developing and developed nations. As summarized in Table 6.1, indicators of patriarchal culture, economic development and

democratization were used to explain three separate dimensions of women's status: 1) economic as indicated by women's labor participation rate, 2) social as indicated by the fertility rate, and political as indicated by the percentage of parliamentary seats held by women. Table 6.2 summarizes the results. One surprising finding is that women's labor force participation is only marginally related to the three independent variables. This strongly implies that this factor does not promote women's empowerment in the manner that is very widely assumed in the literature. In contrast, fertility rate and women's parliamentary representation have consistent correlations with the three independent variables.

Table 6.1 Variables Used in the Statistical Analysis

DEPENDENT VARIABLES: INDICATORS OF WOMEN'S STATUS
Economic: Women's Labor Force Participation Rate Social: Fertility Rate Political: Percentage of Parliamentary Seats Held by Women
INDEPENDENT OR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Patriarchal Culture: Low Scores on Gender Equality Index Economic Development: High GDP per capita Democratization: Freedom House's Indices of Political and Economic Freedom

The first hypothesis (H_1) is that the status of women will be lower in countries with more patriarchal cultures or using the indicator, in this analysis, that the status of women will be better in countries that have higher gender equality values. The hypothesis is strongly supported in politics (as indicated by parliamentary representation). In contrast, it is only weakly supported in the area of social outcomes (as indicated by the

Table 6.2 Summary of Statistical Results

Women's labor force participation is only marginally related to the three independent variables, suggesting that this factor does not promote women's empowerment in the manner that is normally assumed.
H_1 that patriarchy undermines the status of women is strongly confirmed for political representation but only weakly supported for fertility rate.
H_2 that higher GDP per capita promotes the status of women (as opposed to H_3) is strongly confirmed for both political representation and fertility rate.
H_4 that greater democratization promotes the status of women (as opposed to H_5) is supported moderately for political representation and strongly for fertility rate.
H_6 that higher GDP per capita should reduce patriarchy (as opposed to H_7) is strongly supported.
H_8 that higher GDP per capita should promote democratization is strongly supported.

fertility rate). The second and third hypotheses reflect competing theoretical perspectives on how economic development should affect the status of women. H_2 predicts that this will be a positive relationship, while H_3 posits a negative association. The statistical analysis in Chapter 3 strongly supports the second hypothesis for both the political and social realms. The fourth and the fifth hypotheses, similarly, represent different perspectives on how democratization should influence that status of women. In H_4, the degree of democratization exerts a positive influence on women's status, while H_5 predicts that there will be no association between these two variables. The results here parallel those for the impact of economic development almost exactly. H_4 is strongly supported for social outcomes and moderately supported for politics. The last three hypotheses concern the impact of economic development level upon patriarchal culture and democratization. The sixth hypothesis (H_6) that the level of economic development will have a negative impact on the level of patriarchal culture is strongly supported. Consequently, the seventh hypothesis (H_7) that the level of economic development will

have no association with the level of patriarchal culture is strongly disconfirmed. Finally, the eighth hypothesis (H_8) that the level of economic development will have a positive impact on the degree of democratization is strongly supported.

In addition to testing the hypotheses in the theoretical model with aggregate data on a large number of nations, Chapter 3 also evaluates Taiwan's performance on the three central indicators of women's status (parliamentary representation, fertility rate, and labor force participation). To do this, regression analysis was applied to see whether a country's value or score on each of these indicators was significantly above or below what would be predicted given its GDP per capita. Table 6.3 summarizes these results. Applying this residuals analysis showed that Taiwan was an overachiever on the political and social indicators. That is, it has a significantly higher representation of women in the national legislature and lower fertility rate than would be predicted by its level of economic development. In contrast it was an underachiever in the economic area with a lower than predicted rate of women's participation in the labor force.

Table 6.3 Taiwan's Performance Compared to What Would be Predicted for a Nation With Its GDP per capita

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: Underachiever because it is less than would be predicted.
FERTILITY RATE: Overachiever because it is less than would be predicted.
PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION: Overachiever because it is more than would be predicted.

Overall, the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 found that patriarchal culture, economic development level, and the degree of democratization exert fairly strong influences over some dimensions of women's status but have little association with others.

This implies that the nature of women's status is complex and complicated because each nation has its own circumstances that are shaped by its historical background, level of economic development, degree of democratization (including regime types), religious affiliation, traditional culture, geographical location, and so on. It could be argued that these factors influence women's lives in each country, negatively or positively, in fairly unique combinations. Therefore, case studies of individual countries should provide valuable insights into the dynamics of women's changing status in the contemporary world. This dissertation analyzed the social, economic, and political statuses of women in Taiwan.

Chapter 4 provided an overview of Taiwan's development during the postwar era. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Taiwan was a poor, primarily agricultural society that was ruled by an oppressive authoritarian regime. Over the course of the next half century, the country experienced very substantial development and transformation in both the economic and political realms. The pattern of economic and political change was quite different, though. Economic development was fairly continuous and cumulative; and by the 1980s Taiwan was widely recognized as having experienced an "economic miracle." In contrast, there was little political reform until the 1980s, but Taiwan then experienced a very successful democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Chapter 5 analyzed the status of women in Taiwan in terms of social conditions, human and social capital, economic activities, and political participation and power, as indicated in Table 6.4. Although women made major progress in all four areas, significant problems and barriers remain. In terms of social conditions, women made

Table 6.4 Summary of Status of Taiwanese Women

SOCIAL CONDITIONS Women made substantial gains and reached developed nation status on life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and fertility. In contrast, the ratio of male to female babies indicates selective female abortion after the second child, implying the continued existence of patriarchal norms.
HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL Tremendous increases occurred in women's educational levels and literacy; and the gender gap on these has vanished among younger Taiwanese. Yet, substantial gender segregation exists in higher education majors. Furthermore, older and less educated women are substantially disadvantaged.
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES Women's labor force participation has increased greatly but is not high by international standards. A major jump occurred in occupational segregation by gender between the 1980s and 1990s that probably disadvantaged women. Women's wages and salaries are now 80% of men's, the same as in the U.S.
POLITICAL AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION Women and men have similar voting rates. Women participate more than men in voluntary organizations. Democratization was followed by a huge expansion of women's interest groups.
ELECTIVE OFFICE-HOLDING There was a gradual increase over the postwar era; and women now hold 20% to 30% of the seats in Taiwan's legislatures and councils. Women remain seriously underrepresented, but this is a good record by international standards
EXECUTIVE SERVICE There were few women in the Cabinet before 2000 (none before 1988), but women now hold 15% to 20% of the ministerial posts. Women's share of the civil service has increased markedly over the last two decades to nearly 40%. Women have much lower representation among the elective chief executives of local governments.

substantial gains and reached developed world status by the 21st century on life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and fertility; and rapid urbanization occurred as well. However, Taiwan's sex birth ratios give strong evidence of selective female abortion after the second child, indicating the continued existence of patriarchal norms.

During the postwar era, there have been tremendous increases in women's education levels and literacy; and the pre-existing gender gap on these dimensions has vanished among younger Taiwanese. In addition, women are now much more active than men in voluntary organizations. However, substantial sex segregation in higher education majors still remains; and the less educated women from earlier generations are at a substantial disadvantage in Taiwan's modernized economy and society.

Over time women's participation rate in the labor force has increased greatly, while men's has dropped, but it still is not high by international standards. In addition, there was a major jump in occupational segregation by gender between the mid-1980s and mid 1990s with women becoming more concentrated in clerical, service, and sales jobs and men in production, which probably hurts women's relative status. Finally and more positively, women's average wages and salaries as a proportion of men's have risen to 80 per cent, far from equal but approximately the level that exists in the United States.

Women and men now vote at equal rates. Women's representation in legislatures and councils has increased gradually to 20%-30% over the last two decades, although women's share of the elected chief executives of local governments is much lower. Despite women's continued gross under representation, this is fairly respectable by international standards. Women's electoral representation has been promoted by 1) the "reserved-seats system" which guaranteed about a tenth of the seats for women; 2) the growing number of women with higher education and professional jobs which increases the "eligibility pool" for women candidates; and 3) democratization. There were few women in the cabinet of the national government before 2000, but they have held 15%-20%

of the ministerial posts since then; and women's share of the civil service has increased markedly over the last two decades to nearly 40%. In addition, a woman was Vice President of Taiwan from 2000 to 2008; and a woman is now in a close race in the 2012 presidential election. Finally, democratization unleashed a huge expansion of women's interest groups.

Because this analysis of Taiwan is a case study, it is hard to evaluate the eight hypotheses in the theoretical model on a strictly statistical basis. Still, as summarized in Table 6.5, the results are quite suggestive and parallel those in the aggregate data analysis in Chapter 3. The barriers that patriarchal cultures are posited to raise for the status of women (H_1), for example, are clearly evident in the gender-specific abortions and would almost certainly emerge in a qualitative analysis of declining patriarchy over the postwar era.

Table 6.5 Summary of the Implications of the Taiwan Case for the Research Hypotheses

H_1 that patriarchy undermines the status of women would almost certainly be strongly confirmed by qualitative analysis.
H_2 that higher GDP per capita promotes the status of women is supported by the major progress that women made in many areas. Yet, there is significant support for the contradictory H_3 as well. Women's labor force participation has lagged; women with low education are increasingly marginalized; and the big jump in occupational segregation by gender in the late 1980s and early 1990s probably hurt women.
H_4 (as opposed to H_5) that greater democratization promotes the status of women is supported in one area by the explosion of women's groups that occurred after democratization. Yet, democratization seemingly had little effect on the other indicators of women's status.
H_6 that higher GDP per capita should reduce patriarchy (as opposed to H_7) is, at least impressionistically, supported.
H_8 that higher GDP per capita should promote democratization is supported, although democratization in Taiwan considerably lagged its rapid industrialization.

H_2 and H_3 provide contrasting predictions about the impact of economic development on the status of women with the first hypothesizing that development should promote women's status and the second that development should undercut it. As just noted, rapid development on Taiwan over the past 60 years has been associated with considerable progress for women on many indicators of social conditions and human capital, consistent with the second hypothesis. Yet, there is significant support for the third hypothesis as well. Women's labor force participation has lagged; many women with low education were marginalized from the benefits of industrialization; and the jump in occupational segregation by gender between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s suggests the potential for similar problems as Taiwan enters the post-industrial age.

The fourth and fifth hypotheses predicted, respectively, that democratization should augment or have no effect upon the status of women. Unlike the aggregate data analysis which generally supported H_4 (except for labor force participation), the only clearly discernible impact of democratization in Taiwan was to stimulate an explosion of independent feminist and women's groups. Otherwise, long-term trends in women's social and economic conditions and political office-holding appeared to continue from the authoritarian to the democratic eras, consistent with H_5.

H_6 and H_7 predicted that increasing development levels would either reduce patriarchal norms or have no impact on them. Because time series data on the gender equality index are not available, it is not possible to test these competing theoretical perspectives formally. Impressionistically, though, Taiwan's huge economic transformations during the second half of the 20th century were accompanied by a

significant decrease in the prevalence of many patriarchal norms. Finally, Taiwan's democratization after four decades of rapid development is consistent with H_8 that economic development should promote democratization. However, it could also well be argued that democratization in Taiwan was delayed considerably beyond what might have been expected given its level of development.

4. Significance of this Study

The reason that I decided to embark on this research derives from my experience as a tour manager for a travel agency in Taiwan. This career took me to visit different countries throughout the world. Although Taiwan was still considered to be a developing country, I observed that the conditions of women in my country were relatively high as compared to those in most of countries I visited whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa. I noticed wide variances between these countries ranging from Scandinavia where women enjoy relatively high gender equality to India where they have a distinctly inferior position. Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations; therefore, the progress made by women there has been virtually ignored in the international community. Consequently, I believe it is beneficial to women everywhere to have a case study of the progress made by women in Taiwan to demonstrate what conditions promote greater gender equity.

The descriptive analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 show how important economic development and institutional frameworks have been in providing opportunities for at least some women in Taiwan to improve their status. First, although the Confucian culture always valued education and knowledge for men, the need for human capital and

trained workers for the developing economy has led to the expansion of public education to include both men and women. Their rising level of education has given women greater self-confidence and also caused a massive reduction in the birth rate. Thus, women now have greater controlled over their lives. Second, the expansion of the job markets provided more employment opportunities and economic independence for women. In many cases, a substantial number of women moved to the cities where the urban environment offered them more freedom than living in the country side. Third, although democracy came late in the period of this study, women were well placed to organize feminist interest groups and to enter elective offices. The institution of "reserved seats" gave them a start to enter politics. This jump start was later augmented by their increased levels of education and by legitimate party competition.

However, this case study provides additional evidence of the impact of cultural lag. As indicated by the findings in Chapter 3, the dynamics of patriarchal environment have retarded women's entrance into the paid labor market. Moreover, it has influenced the types of the education and jobs that women hold. Furthermore, the cultural imperative that each family have at least one son to carry on the family line has not completely disappeared despite extremely low birth rates.

The experiences of women in Taiwan since the end of World War II offer hope to women in other developing societies. The living conditions of women in Taiwan have greatly improved since 1945. In many ways, they enjoy parity with men. For example, they vote equally in most elections; they have a high level of education; and they have longer life expectancy. While certain types of inequality still exist, it is likely that with

continuing economic and democratic advancement, women's lower status in terms of occupational level, job segregation, and salaries will gradually disappear.

Appendices

Appendix A

Nations Included in Study

Albania
Algeria
Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Congo Rep
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Lebanon
Lesotho
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Vincent & Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Yemen

Cyprus
Czech Rep
Denmark
Djibouti
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Rwanda
Saint Lucia
Samoa
Sao Tome & Principe
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Appendix B

Statistics of GDP Per Capita, Women's Labor Force Participation Rate, Fertility Rate, Women's Per Cent of Parliament Seats, FHscore, and GEscale by country order

Country	gdppc	work	fertilty	womenleg	FHscore	GES
Albania	$3,506	59.7	2.6	5.7	6	56
Algeria	$5,308	29.5	3.2	4.0	4	49
Angola	$2,187	72.8	7.2	15.5	3	
Antigua & Barbuda	$10,541			8.3	9	
Argentina	$12,377	35.6	2.6	31.3	12	62
Armenia	$2,559	62.4	1.4	3.1	7	39
Australia	$25,693	55.8	1.8	26.5	13	77
Austria	$26,765	43.9	1.4	25.1	13	67
Azerbaijan	$2,936	54.6	1.9	10.5	4	48
Bahamas	$17,012	66.6	2.4	19.6	13	
Bahrain	$15,084	33.5	2.6		2	
Bangladesh	$1,602	66.3	3.8	2.0	8	40
Barbados	$15,494	61.7	1.5	20.4	13	
Belarus	$7,544	59.3	1.3	18.4	3	46
Belgium	$27,178	39.7	1.5	24.9	12	63
Belize	$5,606	27.1	3.4	13.5	13	
Benin	$990	73.6	6.1	6.0	11	
Bhutan	$1,412	57.1	5.5	9.3	2	
Bolivia	$2,424	48.0	4.4	10.2	11	
Botswana	$7,184	63.0	4.4	17.0	11	
Brazil	$7,625	43.8	2.3	6.7	9	58
Brunei	$16,779	50.0	2.8		3	
Bulgaria	$5,710	56.8	1.1	26.2	10	46
Burkina Faso	$976	75.0	6.9	11.0	7	
Burundi	$591	82.0	6.8	14.4	3	
Cambodia	$1,446	80.4	5.2	9.3	3	
Cameroon	$1,703	49.3	5.1	5.6	2	
Canada	$27,840	60.1	1.6	23.6	13	79
Cape Verde	$4,863	46.1	3.6	11.1	12	
Central African Rep	$1,172	67.6	5.3	7.3	8	
Chad	$871	67.2	6.6	2.4	4	
Chile	$9,417	37.6	2.4	10.1	11	54
China	$3,976	72.7	1.8	21.8	2	71
Colombia	$6,248	48.1	2.8	12.2	7	59
Comoros	$1,588	62.5	5.4		5	
Congo	$825	58.4	6.3	12.0	5	

Congo Rep	$765	60.6	6.7		2	
Costa Rica	$8,650	37.1	2.8	19.3	12	
Croatia	$8,091	48.7	1.7	16.2	10	49
Cuba		49.5	1.6	27.6	1	
Cyprus	$20,824	49.0	2.0	10.7	13	
Czech Rep	$13,991	61.2	1.2	14.2	12	66
Denmark	$27,627	61.7	1.7	38.0	13	54
Djibouti	$2,377		6.1	0.0	6	
Dominica	$5,880			18.8	13	
Dominican Republic	$6,033	40.0	2.9	14.5	11	62
Ecuador	$3,203	32.7	3.1	14.6	9	
Egypt	$3,635	35.0	3.4	2.4	4	40
El Salvador	$4,497	45.8	3.2	9.5	10	65
Equatorial Guinea	$15,073	45.7	5.9	5.0	1	
Eritrea	$837	74.7	5.7	14.7	3	
Estonia	$10,066	61.0	1.2	17.8	12	61
Ethiopia	$668	57.3	6.8	7.8	5	
Fiji	$4,668	37.0	3.2		6	
Finland	$24,996	57.0	1.7	36.5	13	75
France	$24,223	48.5	1.7	10.9	12	54
Gabon	$6,237	63.2	5.4	11.0	6	
Gambia	$1,649	69.7	5.2	2.0	3	
Georgia	$2,664	55.7	1.6	7.2	7	40
Germany	$25,103	47.9	1.3	31.0	12	63
Ghana	$1,964	80.1	4.6	9.0	10	
Greece	$16,501	38.0	1.3	8.7	11	58
Grenada	$7,580			17.9	12	
Guatemala	$3,821	36.0	4.9	8.8	8	
Guinea	$1,982	77.3	6.3	8.8	4	
Guinea-Bissau	$755	57.0	6.0	7.8	6	
Guyana	$3,963	40.7	2.4	20.0	11	
Haiti	$1,467	56.0	4.4	9.1	4	
Honduras	$2,453	40.3	4.3	5.5	9	
Hong Kong	$25,153	50.7	1.2			
Hungary	$12,416	48.5	1.4	8.3	12	48
Iceland	$29,581	66.6	2.0	34.9	13	60
India	$2,358	42.1	3.3	8.9	10	50
Indonesia	$3,043	55.2	2.6	8.0	8	55
Iran	$5,884	29.0	3.2	3.4	3	54
Ireland	$29,866	37.1	1.9	13.7	13	79
Israel	$20,131	48.4	2.9	13.3	11	
Italy	$23,626	38.3	1.2	9.1	12	63
Ivory Coast	$1,630	43.9	5.1	8.5		
Jamaica	$3,639	67.1	2.5	16.0	11	

Japan	$26,755	50.8	1.4	10.0	12	63
Jordan	$3,966	26.6	4.7	3.3	7	40
Kazakhstan	$5,871	61.1	2.1	11.2	4	
Kenya	$1,022	74.7	4.6	3.6	4	
Kuwait	$15,799	36.6	2.9	0.0	6	
Kyrgyzstan	$2,711	60.8	2.9	6.7	4	
Laos	$1,575	74.4	5.3	21.2	2	
Latvia	$7,045	60.0	1.1	17.0	12	45
Lebanon	$4,308	29.6	2.3	2.3	4	
Lesotho	$2,031	47.4	4.8	10.7	7	
Libya	$7,570	25.0	3.8		1	
Lithuania	$7,106	57.8	1.4	10.6	12	49
Luxembourg	$50,061	37.9	1.7	16.7	13	63
Macedonia	$5,086	49.7	1.9	6.7	8	56
Madagascar	$840	69.1	6.1	8.0	9	
Malawi	$615	77.9	6.8	9.3	9	
Malaysia	$9,068	48.4	3.3	14.5	5	
Maldives	$4,485	65.4	5.8	6.0	4	
Mali	$797	70.1	7.0	12.2	10	
Malta	$17,273	25.8	1.9	9.2	13	64
Mauritania	$1,677	63.4	6.0	3.0	4	
Mauritius	$10,017	37.9	2.0	5.7	12	
Mexico	$9,023	39.4	2.8	15.9	10	60
Moldova	$2,109	60.4	1.6	12.9	9	51
Mongolia	$1,783	73.5	2.7	10.5	10	
Morocco	$3,546	41.4	3.4	0.5	6	42
Mozambique	$854	82.8	6.3	30.0	8	
Myanmar	$1,027	65.8	3.3			
Namibia	$6,431	53.7	5.3	20.4	10	
Nepal	$1,327	56.7	4.8	7.9	8	
Netherlands	$25,657	45.4	1.5	32.9	13	77
New Zealand	$20,070	57.2	2.0	30.8	13	86
Nicaragua	$2,366	47.2	4.3	20.7	9	
Niger	$746	69.4	8.0	1.2	7	
Nigeria	$896	47.6	5.9	3.3	7	41
Norway	$29,918	59.1	1.8	36.4	13	83
Oman	$13,356	19.2	5.8		4	
Pakistan	$1,928	35.3	5.5		4	53
Panama	$6,000	43.3	2.6	9.9	12	
Papua New Guinea	$2,280	67.6	4.6	1.8	10	
Paraguay	$4,426	36.8	4.2	8.0	8	
Peru	$4,799	34.5	3.0	18.3	9	70
Philippines	$3,971	49.5	3.6	17.2	10	46
Poland	$9,051	57.1	1.5	20.7	12	51

Portugal	$17,290	51.2	1.5	18.7	13	45
Qatar	$18,789	41.0	3.7		3	
Romania	$6,423	50.7	1.3	9.3	11	43
Russia	$8,377	59.3	1.2	6.4	5	42
Rwanda	$943	82.6	6.2	25.7	2	
Saint Lucia	$5,703		2.7	13.8	12	
Samoa	$5,041		4.5	6.1	11	
Sao Tome & Principe	$1,792			9.1	12	
Saudi Arabia	$11,367	21.2	6.2		1	
Senegal	$1,510	61.6	5.6	19.2	8	
Seychelles	$12,508			23.5	9	
Sierra Leone	$490	44.6	6.5	8.8	6	
Singapore	$23,356	50.1	1.6	11.8	5	66
Slovakia	$11,243	62.7	1.4	14.0	12	69
Slovenia	$17,367	54.6	1.2	12.2	12	63
Solomon Islands	$1,648	81.2	5.6	0.0	7	
South Africa	$9,401	47.2	3.1	29.8	12	65
South Korea	$17,380	53.2	1.5	5.9	11	55
Spain	$19,472	37.5	1.2	26.6	12	66
Sri Lanka	$3,530	42.9	2.1	4.4	8	
St. Kitts & Nevis	$12,510			13.3	12	
St. Vincent & Grenadines	$5,555			22.7	12	
Sudan	$1,797	34.8	4.9	9.7	1	
Suriname	$3,799	36.0	2.2	17.6	12	
Swaziland	$4,492	41.5	4.8	6.3	4	
Sweden	$24,277	62.5	1.5	42.7	13	83
Switzerland	$28,769	50.7	1.5	22.4	13	67
Syria	$3,556	28.6	4.0	10.4	1	
Taiwan	$15,000	46.0	1.7	20.9	12	61
Tajikistan	$1,152	57.6	3.7	12.4	3	
Tanzania	$523	81.8	5.5	22.3	7	63
Thailand	$6,402	73.3	2.1	9.6	10	
Togo	$1,442	53.4	5.8	4.9	5	
Trinidad & Tobago	$8,964	44.1	1.6	20.9	11	
Tunisia	$6,363	36.9	2.3	11.5	4	
Turkey	$6,974	49.9	2.7	4.2	6	54
Turkmenistan	$3,956	62.1	3.6	26.0	1	
Uganda	$1,208	79.5	7.1	24.7	4	57
Ukraine	$3,816	55.6	1.3	7.8	7	48
United Arab Emirates	$17,935	31.7	3.2	0.0	4	
United Kingdom	$23,509	52.8	1.7	17.1	12	75
United States	$34,142	58.8	2.0	13.8	13	81
Uruguay	$9,035	48.0	2.4	11.5	13	59
Uzbekistan	$2,441	62.3	2.8	7.2	2	

Vanuatu	$2,802		4.6	0.0	11	
Venezuela	$5,794	43.1	3.0	9.7	7	59
Viet Nam	$1,996	73.8	2.5	26.0	2	54
Yemen	$893	30.5	7.6	0.7	4	
Zambia	$780	64.2	6.0	12.0	6	
Zimbabwe	$2,635	65.3	5.0	10.0	4	61

Appendix C

Residuals for Women's Participation in Labor Force Given by GDP Per Capita

Country	Female Labor Force Participation Rate	Predicated value	Residual
Albania	59.7	54.961	4.7388
Algeria	29.5	54.242	-24.7419
Angola	72.8	55.488	17.3122
Antigua & Barbuda	.	52.153	.
Argentina	35.6	51.420	-15.8199
Armenia	62.4	55.339	7.0607
Australia	55.8	46.104	9.6958
Austria	43.9	45.676	-1.7763
Azerbaijan	54.6	55.189	-0.5888
Bahamas	66.6	49.570	17.0303
Bahrain	33.5	50.339	-16.8393
Bangladesh	66.3	55.721	10.5787
Barbados	61.7	50.176	11.5244
Belarus	59.3	53.349	5.9507
Belgium	39.7	45.511	-5.8114
Belize	27.1	54.123	-27.0229
Benin	73.6	55.966	17.6344
Bhutan	57.1	55.797	1.3028
Bolivia	48.0	55.393	-7.3932
Botswana	63.0	53.493	9.5070
Brazil	43.8	53.317	-9.5169
Brunei	50.0	49.663	0.3373
Bulgaria	56.8	54.081	2.7186
Burkina Faso	75.0	55.971	19.0288
Burundi	82.0	56.125	25.8751
Cambodia	80.4	55.784	24.6164
Cameroon	49.3	55.681	-6.3810
Canada	60.1	45.247	14.8528
Cape Verde	46.1	54.420	-8.3195
Central African Rep	67.6	55.893	11.7070
Chad	67.2	56.013	11.1869
Chile	37.6	52.602	-15.0016
China	72.7	54.774	17.9264
Colombia	48.1	53.867	-5.7666
Comoros	62.5	55.727	6.7731
Congo	58.4	56.031	2.3685

Congo Rep	60.6	56.055	4.5446
Costa Rica	37.1	52.908	-15.8078
Croatia	48.7	53.131	-4.4309
Cuba	49.5	.	.
Cyprus	49.0	48.048	0.9521
Czech Rep	61.2	50.776	10.4244
Denmark	61.7	45.332	16.3678
Djibouti	.	55.412	.
Dominica	.	54.014	.
Dominican Republic	40.0	53.952	-13.9525
Ecuador	32.7	55.082	-22.3822
Egypt	35.0	54.910	-19.9097
El Salvador	45.8	54.566	-8.7656
Equatorial Guinea	45.7	50.344	-4.6437
Eritrea	74.7	56.027	18.6733
Estonia	61.0	52.342	8.6575
Ethiopia	57.3	56.094	1.2058
Fiji	37.0	54.497	-17.4974
Finland	57.0	46.382	10.6175
France	48.5	46.691	1.8090
Gabon	63.2	53.871	9.3290
Gambia	69.7	55.703	13.9975
Georgia	55.7	55.297	0.4026
Germany	47.9	46.340	1.5602
Ghana	80.1	55.577	24.5232
Greece	38.0	49.774	-11.7737
Grenada	.	53.335	.
Guatemala	36.0	54.835	-18.8355
Guinea	77.3	55.570	21.7304
Guinea-Bissau	57.0	56.059	0.9406
Guyana	40.7	54.779	-14.0788
Haiti	56.0	55.775	0.2248
Honduras	40.3	55.382	-15.0816
Hong Kong	50.7	46.320	4.3802
Hungary	48.5	51.404	-2.9044
Iceland	66.6	44.552	22.0479
India	42.1	55.420	-13.3195
Indonesia	55.2	55.146	0.0539
Iran	29.0	54.012	-25.0119
Ireland	37.1	44.438	-7.3384
Israel	48.4	48.325	0.0754
Italy	38.3	46.929	-8.6294
Ivory Coast	43.9	55.710	-11.8101
Jamaica	67.1	54.908	12.1919

Japan	50.8	45.680	5.1197
Jordan	26.6	54.778	-28.1776
Kazakhstan	61.1	54.017	7.0829
Kenya	74.7	55.953	18.7472
Kuwait	36.6	50.054	-13.4539
Kyrgyzstan	60.8	55.279	5.5214
Laos	74.4	55.732	18.6679
Latvia	60.0	53.548	6.4515
Lebanon	29.6	54.641	-25.0411
Lesotho	47.4	55.550	-8.1501
Libya	25.0	53.339	-28.3389
Lithuania	57.8	53.524	4.2759
Luxembourg	37.9	36.377	1.5234
Macedonia	49.7	54.331	-4.6305
Madagascar	69.1	56.025	13.0745
Malawi	77.9	56.115	21.7847
Malaysia	48.4	52.741	-4.3409
Maldives	65.4	54.570	10.8296
Mali	70.1	56.043	14.0573
Malta	25.8	49.465	-23.6655
Mauritania	63.4	55.691	7.7086
Mauritius	37.9	52.362	-14.4621
Mexico	39.4	52.759	-13.3589
Moldova	60.4	55.519	4.8811
Mongolia	73.5	55.649	17.8509
Morocco	41.4	54.945	-13.5453
Mozambique	82.8	56.020	26.7801
Myanmar	65.8	55.951	9.8492
Namibia	53.7	53.794	-0.0936
Nepal	56.7	55.831	0.8689
Netherlands	45.4	46.119	-0.7186
New Zealand	57.2	48.349	8.8511
Nicaragua	47.2	55.416	-8.2163
Niger	69.4	56.063	13.3370
Nigeria	47.6	56.003	-8.4031
Norway	59.1	44.418	14.6824
Oman	19.2	51.029	-31.8291
Pakistan	35.3	55.591	-20.2912
Panama	43.3	53.966	-10.6656
Papua New Guinea	67.6	55.451	12.1493
Paraguay	36.8	54.594	-17.7940
Peru	34.5	54.445	-19.9451
Philippines	49.5	54.776	-5.2756
Poland	57.1	52.748	4.3523

Portugal	51.2	49.459	1.7413
Qatar	41.0	48.860	-7.8603
Romania	50.7	53.797	-3.0968
Russia	59.3	53.017	6.2833
Rwanda	82.6	55.984	26.6156
Saint Lucia	.	54.084	.
Samoa	.	54.348	.
Sao Tome & Principe	.	55.645	.
Saudi Arabia	21.2	51.823	-30.6231
Senegal	61.6	55.758	5.8420
Seychelles	.	51.368	.
Sierra Leone	44.6	56.165	-11.5652
Singapore	50.1	47.037	3.0628
Slovakia	62.7	51.873	10.8274
Slovenia	54.6	49.428	5.1720
Solomon Islands	81.2	55.703	25.4971
South Africa	47.2	52.608	-5.4080
South Korea	53.2	49.423	3.7772
Spain	37.5	48.588	-11.0876
Sri Lanka	42.9	54.952	-12.0517
St. Kitts & Nevis	.	51.367	.
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	.	54.143	.
Sudan	34.8	55.643	-20.8435
Suriname	36.0	54.844	-18.8443
Swaziland	41.5	54.568	-13.0676
Sweden	62.5	46.669	15.8305
Switzerland	50.7	44.876	5.8237
Syria	28.6	54.941	-26.3413
Taiwan	46.0	50.373	-4.3729
Tajikistan	57.6	55.901	1.6991
Tanzania	81.8	56.152	25.6480
Thailand	73.3	53.805	19.4948
Togo	53.4	55.785	-2.3852
Trinidad & Tobago	44.1	52.782	-8.6824
Tunisia	36.9	53.821	-16.9207
Turkey	49.9	53.577	-3.6768
Turkmenistan	62.1	54.782	7.3184
Uganda	79.5	55.879	23.6214
Ukraine	55.6	54.837	0.7625
United Arab Emirates	31.7	49.201	-17.5012
United Kingdom	52.8	46.976	5.8239
United States	58.8	42.731	16.0686
Uruguay	48.0	52.754	-4.7541

Uzbekistan	62.3	55.386	6.9136
Vanuatu	.	55.242	.
Venezuela	43.1	54.048	-10.9479
Viet Nam	73.8	55.564	18.2360
Yemen	30.5	56.004	-25.5043
Zambia	64.2	56.049	8.1506
Zimbabwe	65.3	55.309	9.9911

Appendix D

Residuals for Fertility Rate Given by GDP Per Capita

Country	Fertility rate	Predicated value	Residual
Albania	2.6	4.100	-1.4996
Algeria	3.2	3.883	-0.6827
Angola	7.2	4.258	2.9417
Antigua & Barbuda	.	3.253	.
Argentina	2.6	3.032	-0.4319
Armenia	1.4	4.214	-2.8136
Australia	1.8	1.429	0.3707
Austria	1.4	1.300	0.0997
Azerbaijan	1.9	4.168	-2.2682
Bahamas	2.4	2.474	-0.0741
Bahrain	2.6	2.706	-0.1061
Bangladesh	3.8	4.329	-0.5287
Barbados	1.5	2.657	-1.1568
Belarus	1.3	3.614	-2.3136
Belgium	1.5	1.251	0.2494
Belize	3.4	3.847	-0.4468
Benin	6.1	4.402	1.6976
Bhutan	5.5	4.352	1.1484
Bolivia	4.4	4.230	0.1702
Botswana	4.4	3.657	0.7431
Brazil	2.3	3.604	-1.3039
Brunei	2.8	2.502	0.2979
Bulgaria	1.1	3.834	-2.7343
Burkina Faso	6.9	4.404	2.4959
Burundi	6.8	4.450	2.3496
Cambodia	5.2	4.348	0.8525
Cameroon	5.1	4.317	0.7834
Canada	1.6	1.171	0.4291
Cape Verde	3.6	3.936	-0.3363
Central African Rep	5.3	4.380	0.9195
Chad	6.6	4.417	2.1833
Chile	2.4	3.388	-0.9882
China	1.8	4.043	-2.2430
Colombia	2.8	3.770	-0.9696
Comoros	5.4	4.330	1.0696
Congo	6.3	4.422	1.8777
Congo Rep	6.7	4.429	2.2705

Costa Rica	2.8	3.480	-0.6805
Croatia	1.7	3.548	-1.8478
Cuba	1.6	.	.
Cyprus	2.0	2.015	-0.0153
Czech Rep	1.2	2.838	-1.6377
Denmark	1.7	1.197	0.5034
Djibouti	6.1	4.235	1.8645
Dominica	.	3.814	.
Dominican Republic	2.9	3.795	-0.8955
Ecuador	3.1	4.136	-1.0361
Egypt	3.4	4.084	-0.6841
El Salvador	3.2	3.980	-0.7803
Equatorial Guinea	5.9	2.707	3.1925
Eritrea	5.7	4.421	1.2792
Estonia	1.2	3.310	-2.1101
Ethiopia	6.8	4.441	2.3588
Fiji	3.2	3.960	-0.7597
Finland	1.7	1.513	0.1868
France	1.7	1.606	0.0938
Gabon	5.4	3.771	1.6291
Gambia	5.2	4.323	0.8769
Georgia	1.6	4.201	-2.6009
Germany	1.3	1.500	-0.2003
Ghana	4.6	4.285	0.3148
Greece	1.3	2.536	-1.2356
Grenada	.	3.609	.
Guatemala	4.9	4.062	0.8383
Guinea	6.3	4.283	2.0170
Guinea-Bissau	6.0	4.431	1.5693
Guyana	2.4	4.045	-1.6446
Haiti	4.4	4.345	0.0550
Honduras	4.3	4.226	0.0737
Hong Kong	1.2	1.494	-0.2943
Hungary	1.4	3.027	-1.6272
Iceland	2.0	0.961	1.0386
India	3.3	4.238	-0.9378
Indonesia	2.6	4.155	-1.5553
Iran	3.2	3.813	-0.6134
Ireland	1.9	0.927	0.9729
Israel	2.9	2.099	0.8013
Italy	1.2	1.678	-0.4781
Ivory Coast	5.1	4.325	0.7746
Jamaica	2.5	4.084	-1.5836
Japan	1.4	1.302	0.0985

Jordan	4.7	4.044	0.6558
Kazakhstan	2.1	3.815	-1.7150
Kenya	4.6	4.399	0.2015
Kuwait	2.9	2.620	0.2799
Kyrgyzstan	2.9	4.195	-1.2953
Laos	5.3	4.332	0.9680
Latvia	1.1	3.674	-2.5737
Lebanon	2.3	4.003	-1.7031
Lesotho	4.8	4.277	0.5229
Libya	3.8	3.610	0.1895
Lithuania	1.4	3.666	-2.2663
Luxembourg	1.7	-1.503	3.2034
Macedonia	1.9	3.909	-2.0094
Madagascar	6.1	4.420	1.6795
Malawi	6.8	4.448	2.3525
Malaysia	3.3	3.430	-0.1302
Maldives	5.8	3.982	1.8182
Mali	7.0	4.426	2.5744
Malta	1.9	2.443	-0.5427
Mauritania	6.0	4.320	1.6803
Mauritius	2.0	3.316	-1.3160
Mexico	2.8	3.436	-0.6356
Moldova	1.6	4.268	-2.6677
Mongolia	2.7	4.307	-1.6070
Morocco	3.4	4.095	-0.6948
Mozambique	6.3	4.419	1.8812
Myanmar	3.3	4.398	-1.0979
Namibia	5.3	3.748	1.5524
Nepal	4.8	4.362	0.4382
Netherlands	1.5	1.434	0.0664
New Zealand	2.0	2.106	-0.1061
Nicaragua	4.3	4.237	0.0632
Niger	8.0	4.432	3.5682
Nigeria	5.9	4.414	1.4863
Norway	1.8	0.921	0.8792
Oman	5.8	2.914	2.8859
Pakistan	5.5	4.290	1.2105
Panama	2.6	3.799	-1.1994
Papua New Guinea	4.6	4.247	0.3529
Paraguay	4.2	3.989	0.2111
Peru	3.0	3.944	-0.9440
Philippines	3.6	4.044	-0.4436
Poland	1.5	3.432	-1.9322
Portugal	1.5	2.441	-0.9406

Qatar	3.7	2.260	1.4398
Romania	1.3	3.749	-2.4485
Russia	1.2	3.513	-2.3134
Rwanda	6.2	4.408	1.7919
Saint Lucia	2.7	3.835	-1.1352
Samoa	4.5	3.915	0.5852
Sao Tome & Principe	.	4.306	.
Saudi Arabia	6.2	3.153	3.0465
Senegal	5.6	4.340	1.2602
Seychelles	.	3.016	.
Sierra Leone	6.5	4.463	2.0374
Singapore	1.6	1.711	-0.1106
Slovakia	1.4	3.168	-1.7684
Slovenia	1.2	2.431	-1.2314
Solomon Islands	5.6	4.323	1.2768
South Africa	3.1	3.390	-0.2901
South Korea	1.5	2.430	-0.9298
Spain	1.2	2.178	-0.9780
Sri Lanka	2.1	4.097	-1.9967
St. Kitts & Nevis	.	3.016	.
St. Vincent & Grenadines	.	3.853	.
Sudan	4.9	4.305	0.5947
Suriname	2.2	4.064	-1.8643
Swaziland	4.8	3.981	0.8191
Sweden	1.5	1.600	-0.0997
Switzerland	1.5	1.059	0.4409
Syria	4.0	4.094	-0.0936
Taiwan	1.7	2.716	-1.0363
Tajikistan	3.7	4.383	-0.6829
Tanzania	5.5	4.459	1.0414
Thailand	2.1	3.751	-1.6510
Togo	5.8	4.348	1.4520
Trinidad & Tobago	1.6	3.443	-1.8427
Tunisia	2.3	3.756	-1.4557
Turkey	2.7	3.682	-0.9822
Turkmenistan	3.6	4.045	-0.4454
Uganda	7.1	4.376	2.7238
Ukraine	1.3	4.062	-2.7623
United Arab Emirates	3.2	2.363	0.8370
United Kingdom	1.7	1.692	0.0078
United States	2.0	0.412	1.5875
Uruguay	2.4	3.434	-1.0342
Uzbekistan	2.8	4.228	-1.4278
Vanuatu	4.6	4.184	0.4157

Venezuela	3.0	3.824	-0.8242
Viet Nam	2.5	4.281	-1.7813
Yemen	7.6	4.414	3.1859
Zambia	6.0	4.428	1.5723
Zimbabwe	5.0	4.204	0.7956

Appendix E

Residuals for Women's Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats Given by GDP Per Capita

Country	Women's Per Cent of Parliamentary Seats	Predicated value	Residual
Albania	5.7	10.916	-5.2162
Algeria	4.0	11.732	-7.7319
Angola	15.5	10.319	5.1809
Antigua & Barbuda	8.3	14.101	-5.8009
Argentina	31.3	14.932	16.3680
Armenia	3.1	10.487	-7.3875
Australia	26.5	20.960	5.5399
Austria	25.1	21.445	3.6546
Azerbaijan	10.5	10.658	-0.1581
Bahamas	19.6	17.030	2.5697
Bahrain	.	16.157	.
Bangladesh	2.0	10.054	-8.0542
Barbados	20.4	16.343	4.0569
Belarus	18.4	12.744	5.6558
Belgium	24.9	21.632	3.2676
Belize	13.5	11.867	1.6332
Benin	6.0	9.777	-3.7772
Bhutan	9.3	9.968	-0.6682
Bolivia	10.2	10.426	-0.2263
Botswana	17.0	12.581	4.4188
Brazil	6.7	12.781	-6.0808
Brunei	.	16.925	.
Bulgaria	26.2	11.914	14.2861
Burkina Faso	11.0	9.771	1.2292
Burundi	14.4	9.597	4.8034
Cambodia	9.3	9.984	-0.6836
Cameroon	5.6	10.100	-4.5000
Canada	23.6	21.932	1.6679
Cape Verde	11.1	11.530	-0.4305
Central African Rep	7.3	9.860	-2.5596
Chad	2.4	9.723	-7.3233
Chile	10.1	13.592	-3.4921
China	21.8	11.129	10.6711
Colombia	12.2	12.157	0.0425
Comoros	.	10.048	.
Congo	12.0	9.702	2.2975

Congo Rep	.	9.675	.
Costa Rica	19.3	13.245	6.0552
Croatia	16.2	12.992	3.2082
Cuba	27.6	.	.
Cyprus	10.7	18.756	-8.0560
Czech Rep	14.2	15.663	-1.4627
Denmark	38.0	21.836	16.1643
Djibouti	0.0	10.405	-10.4051
Dominica	18.8	11.991	6.8091
Dominican Republic	14.5	12.060	2.4399
Ecuador	14.6	10.779	3.8210
Egypt	2.4	10.975	-8.5746
El Salvador	9.5	11.365	-1.8648
Equatorial Guinea	5.0	16.153	-11.1525
Eritrea	14.7	9.708	4.9921
Estonia	17.8	13.886	3.9141
Ethiopia	7.8	9.631	-1.8314
Fiji	.	11.442	.
Finland	36.5	20.645	15.8554
France	10.9	20.295	-9.3947
Gabon	11.0	12.152	-1.1525
Gambia	2.0	10.076	-8.0755
Georgia	7.2	10.535	-3.3350
Germany	31.0	20.693	10.3070
Ghana	9.0	10.218	-1.2181
Greece	8.7	16.799	-8.0990
Grenada	17.9	12.760	5.1396
Guatemala	8.8	11.059	-2.2588
Guinea	8.8	10.226	-1.4263
Guinea-Bissau	7.8	9.671	-1.8708
Guyana	20.0	11.123	8.8770
Haiti	9.1	9.993	-0.8931
Honduras	5.5	10.439	-4.9395
Hong Kong	.	20.716	.
Hungary	8.3	14.950	-6.6497
Iceland	34.9	22.720	12.1798
India	8.9	10.396	-1.4965
Indonesia	8.0	10.707	-2.7066
Iran	3.4	11.993	-8.5927
Ireland	13.7	22.849	-9.1492
Israel	13.3	18.442	-5.1422
Italy	9.1	20.024	-10.9244
Ivory Coast	8.5	10.067	-1.5669
Jamaica	16.0	10.976	5.0236

Japan	10.0	21.441	-11.4409
Jordan	3.3	11.124	-7.8244
Kazakhstan	11.2	11.987	-0.7868
Kenya	3.6	9.792	-6.1917
Kuwait	0.0	16.481	-16.4812
Kyrgyzstan	6.7	10.556	-3.8563
Laos	21.2	10.042	11.1580
Latvia	17.0	12.518	4.4817
Lebanon	2.3	11.279	-8.9792
Lesotho	10.7	10.248	0.4516
Libya	.	12.756	.
Lithuania	10.6	12.546	-1.9459
Luxembourg	16.7	31.991	-15.2914
Macedonia	6.7	11.631	-4.9314
Madagascar	8.0	9.709	-1.7093
Malawi	9.3	9.607	-0.3074
Malaysia	14.5	13.434	1.0659
Maldives	6.0	11.359	-5.3594
Mali	12.2	9.690	2.5102
Malta	9.2	17.148	-7.9484
Mauritania	3.0	10.088	-7.0882
Mauritius	5.7	13.864	-8.1637
Mexico	15.9	13.414	2.4863
Moldova	12.9	10.284	2.6163
Mongolia	10.5	10.136	0.3638
Morocco	0.5	10.934	-10.4343
Mozambique	30.0	9.716	20.2844
Myanmar	.	9.794	.
Namibia	20.4	12.240	8.1597
Nepal	7.9	9.930	-2.0297
Netherlands	32.9	20.944	11.9562
New Zealand	30.8	18.415	12.3854
Nicaragua	20.7	10.400	10.2999
Niger	1.2	9.667	-8.4667
Nigeria	3.3	9.735	-6.4346
Norway	36.4	22.873	13.5272
Oman	.	15.375	.
Pakistan	.	10.202	.
Panama	9.9	12.045	-2.1452
Papua New Guinea	1.8	10.361	-8.5612
Paraguay	8.0	11.333	-3.3326
Peru	18.3	11.501	6.7985
Philippines	17.2	11.127	6.0733
Poland	20.7	13.426	7.2736

Portugal	18.7	17.156	1.5439
Qatar	.	17.835	.
Romania	9.3	12.237	-2.9367
Russia	6.4	13.121	-6.7212
Rwanda	25.7	9.756	15.9441
Saint Lucia	13.8	11.911	1.8893
Samoa	6.1	11.611	-5.5111
Sao Tome & Principe	9.1	10.140	-1.0402
Saudi Arabia	.	14.475	.
Senegal	19.2	10.013	9.1874
Seychelles	23.5	14.991	8.5087
Sierra Leone	8.8	9.551	-0.7508
Singapore	11.8	19.902	-8.1022
Slovakia	14.0	14.419	-0.4187
Slovenia	12.2	17.191	-4.9910
Solomon Islands	0.0	10.075	-10.0751
South Africa	29.8	13.585	16.2152
South Korea	5.9	17.197	-11.2969
Spain	26.6	18.144	8.4561
Sri Lanka	4.4	10.927	-6.5270
St. Kitts & Nevis	13.3	14.992	-1.6922
St. Vincent & Grenadines	22.7	11.844	10.8563
Sudan	9.7	10.143	-0.4425
Suriname	17.6	11.049	6.5512
Swaziland	6.3	11.363	-5.0625
Sweden	42.7	20.319	22.3809
Switzerland	22.4	22.353	0.0474
Syria	10.4	10.939	-0.5388
Taiwan	20.9	16.119	4.7805
Tajikistan	12.4	9.851	2.5495
Tanzania	22.3	9.566	12.7342
Thailand	9.6	12.227	-2.6272
Togo	4.9	9.982	-5.0818
Trinidad & Tobago	20.9	13.387	7.5130
Tunisia	11.5	12.210	-0.7095
Turkey	4.2	12.486	-8.2861
Turkmenistan	26.0	11.120	14.8801
Uganda	24.7	9.876	14.8241
Ukraine	7.8	11.056	-3.2565
United Arab Emirates	0.0	17.448	-17.4481
United Kingdom	17.1	19.971	-2.8714
United States	13.8	24.785	-10.9850
Uruguay	11.5	13.419	-1.9191

Uzbekistan	7.2	10.434	-3.2340
Vanuatu	0.0	10.597	-10.5975
Venezuela	9.7	11.952	-2.2519
Viet Nam	26.0	10.233	15.7674
Yemen	0.7	9.733	-9.0333
Zambia	12.0	9.682	2.3179
Zimbabwe	10.0	10.522	-0.5219

Appendix F

A list of women's organizations founded between 1987 and 2004 in Taiwan

- *Homemaker's Union and Foundation*

Focus: Environmental preservation, green consumption.
Publication: The Correspondence of Homemaker's Union and Foundation.
Founded in: March 1987

- *Union of Progressive Women*

Focus: Political reform movement.
Publication: Progressive Women
Founded in: May 1987

- *Taipei Women Rescue Foundation*

Focus: The rights of abused teen girls.
Publication: The Correspondence of Women Rescue Foundation
Founded in: August 1987

- *The Garden of Hope Foundation*

Focus: Child prostitution and sexual abuse.
Publication: Magazine of the Garden of Hope
Founded in: May 1987

- *Modern Women's Foundation*

Focus: The rights of sexually abused women.
Founded in: 1987

- *Taiwan Grassroots Women Worker's Center*

Focus: Female workers' working rights and health problem.
Publication: Asia Women Workers, Female Workers in Taiwan
Founded in: July 1988

- *Christian Foundation of Women's Welfare*

Focus: Women's mental development and employment.
Founded in: 1989

- *End Child Prostitution Association, Taiwan (ECPAT)*

Focus: International trafficking and prostitution of teen girls.
Founded in: 1989

- *Research Program on Gender and Society, National Tsing Hua University*

Focus: Gender studies and education.
Founded in: 1989

- *The Warm Life Association for Women (Taichung)*

Focus: To assist divorced women and women on the verge of divorce.
Publication: Wan-Qin
Founded in: 1990

- *National Organization for Women*

Focus: Women's rights.
Founded in: 1991

- *Solidarity Front of Women Workers*

Focus: Assist the establishment of women workers' organizations, the movement of the opposite, and the education of women workers.
Founded in: June 1991

- *The Warm Life Association for Women (Kaohsiung)*

Focus: To assist divorced women and women on the verge of divorce.
Publication: Wan-Qin
Founded in: August 3, 1991

- *Kaohsiung Awakening Association*

Focus: Women's mental development; promoting and supervising the practice of public policy concerns with women's rights.
Founded in: July 1992

- *Center of Research on Gender, Kaohsiung Medical College*

Focus: Research and consultancy on gender issues.
Founded in: 1992

- *Taipei Women's Development Association*

Focus: The employment of women, and women in disturbed families.
Founded in: May 1993

- *Department of Women's Development, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)*

Focus: Women's mental development and grassroots movement.
Founded in: 1993

- *Taipei Community Women Association*

Focus: Women's rights, and women's organization in community.
Founded in: 1993

- *Taiwanese Feminist Scholars Association (TFSA)*

Focus: Anti-sexism, women's security, women's rights in education, workplace, family and health care, and women's representation in politics.
Founded in: September 1993

- *Taipei Association for Promotion of Women's Rights (TAPWR)*

Focus: Women's rights, and sexual education.
Publication: The Purple Sisters
Founded in: February, 1994

- *Fembooks*

Focus: A bookstore focuses on female related books and female writers.
Founded in: April 1994

- *Taipei Awakening Association*

Focus: Developing women's awareness of their status in the society, and promoting women's status.
Founded in: 1994

- *The Taiwanese Developmental Resource Center for Women*

Focus: Legal advice.
Founded in: 1994

- *Pink Collar Solidarity*

Focus: Women's status in service industry, and the elimination of obstacle against women's employment.
Founded in: 1994

- *Taipei One Leaf Orchid Growth Association for Widowed Family*

Focus: Mutual help between widowers or widows and their families.
Founded in: 1995

- *Kaohsiung Monocotylydonous Orchid Association*

Focus: Mutual help between widowers or widows and their families.
Founded in: 1995

- *Women Association of Taiwan*

Focus: The development of women's mentality, and the promotion of local culture.
Founded in: September 1995

- *Center for the Study of Sexualities, National Central University*

Focus: Sexualities research, and sexual education training provider.
Founded in: 1995

- *Research Center for Gender and Space, Institute of Building and Planning, National Taiwan University*

Focus: Gender and space.
Founded in: 1995

- *Kaohsiung Women's Action Association*

Focus: Women and gender issues.
Founded in: 1996

- *Peng Wan-Ru Foundation*

Focus: Personal safety of women, and the promotion of women's studies and practical services.
Founded in: 1997

- *Collective of Sex Workers and Supporters (COSWAS)*

Focus: Sex workers' rights
Founded in: 1999

- *Gender/Sexuality Rights Association, Taiwan (GSRAT)*

Focus: Concerning with and working for gender issues and sexual rights.
Founded in: 1999

- *Taiwan Women's Link*

Focus: Women's rights, especially in the area of women's health and politics.
Founded in: 2000

- *National Alliance of Taiwan Women's Associations*

Focus: Flourishing developments within women's groups and participating international women's meets and forums.
Founded in: 2001

- *Taiwan Gender Equity Education Association (TGEEA)*

Focus: Promoting gender equity education.
Founded in: 2002

- *TransAsia Sisters Association, Taiwan (TASAT)*

Focus: Supporting the foreign spouses from Southeast Asia countries married in Taiwan.
Founded in: 2003

- *LesHand Association*

Focus: Concerning and promoting lesbians' rights.
Founded in: 2004

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