Electric Power Generation Expansion in Deregulated Markets

Abstract

The generation expansion problem involves increasing electric power generation capacity in an existing power network. In competitive environment, power producers, distributors, and consumers all make their own decisions with the aim of maximizing their own utilities from power transactions. Therefore, models that incorporate a behavioral structure in decision making of power producers are needed to analyze market operation and to make better decisions. In this dissertation, the main purpose is to develop generation expansion models for deregulated power markets using game theoretic approaches in order to make accurate analysis of generation capacity under transmission constraints in the power network and uncertainties in the power markets. Three new generation expansion models are introduced. The first model is a generation expansion model that incorporates the features of the transmission grid to the investment model to study the interaction between competition and network transfer capabilities in capacity expansion. The other two models are generation capacity expansion models under competition that incorporate the uncertainty on electricity demand and fuel costs. Numerical examples and analysis on the use of the models are given using a 5-bus and a 24-bus power network.